INTRODUCTION

Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question
of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the
interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such
unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation
and principles of interpretation.

According to Gray, the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or
layman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from
words of a statute book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature,
or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called ‘interpretation’.

The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers,  and
apply that to the facts of the case at hand.[v] An interpretation of the statutory provision
which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be
avoided. Justice Chakravarti made two observations on his behalf in Badsha Mia v.
Rajjab Ali:

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the
legislature and in England, the rules of interpretation, developed there, can be relied on
to aid the discovery because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature
into language, fashion their language with those very rules in view.

Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in accordance with the same rules as
the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the analysis of a statute
naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful whether,
in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times, especially of the provincial
legislature, the same assumption can always be made.

Interpretation is of two kinds – grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is

arrived at by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other
words, it regards only the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation
gives effect to the intention of the legislature by taking into account other
circumstances permissible according to the rules settled in this behalf. ‘Proper
construction’ is not satisfied by taking the words as if they were self-contained phrases.
So considered, the words do not yield the meaning of a statute.
According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws
of speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other
statutes and with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and
circumstances in which the statute was passed. It is the duty of the judicature to
ascertain the true legal meaning of the words used by the legislature.

A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to
which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to be expounded, according to the
intent of them that made it. The object of interpretation is to find out the intention of the
legislature.

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the
intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be
construed so as to ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and
grammatical meaning of the words which it has used. ‘The essence of the Law’,
according to Salmond:

Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless, in all ordinary cases, the
courts must be content to accept the litera legis  as the exclusive and conclusive
evidence of the sententia legis. They must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that
the legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has said.

Ita scriptumest  is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to add to
or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe
that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly expressed by it. It is to say, in
all ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable.

Parke B in  Becke v. Smith[xi] formulated the following well-known rule for the
interpretation of statutes:

If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to
construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case,
to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their
import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the function of legislators when we depart
from, the ordinary meaning of the precise words used merely because we see, or fancy
we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from adherence to their literal meaning.

Burton J in  Warburton v. Lovela observed:

I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the
grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or
inconsistent with any expressed intention, or declared purpose of the statute, or if it
would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must
then be modified, extended, or abridged so far as to avoid such inconvenience, but no
further.

The Literal Rule

Meaning
To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include “definitions” sections within a statute, which
explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a
definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The plain
meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a
term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.

If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may
have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law
says instead of what the law means.
A literal construction would not be denied only because the consequences to comply with
the same may lead to a penalty. The courts should not be overzealous in searching for
ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain. (Tata Consultancy Services v. State of
A.P.
The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions – 
 Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in the
interpretation section.
 Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any other.
 Words will not be inserted by implication.
 Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
 It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.
When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular
sense, it is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning
which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in
which they have been used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural,
“ordinary”, “literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost interchangeably to
convey the same idea.

For determination of the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question is
what is the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute
but when that natural or ordinary meaning indicates such result which cannot be opposed to
having been the intention of the legislature, then to look for other meaning of the word or
phrase which may then convey the true intention of the legislature.

Another important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact meaning is
preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament. In the case of Pritipal Singh v. Union of
India, it was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of Parliament
correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.

This rule is the basis of all court decisions in relation to statues. Here judges rely on the
exact wording of the statute for the case.

Lord Diplock in the Duport Steel v Sirs case (1980) defined the rule:

“Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not then for
the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to it’s
plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would be
inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.”

This definition says that a judge should not deviate from the literal meaning of the
words even if the outcome is unjust. If they do they are creating their own version of
how the case should turn out and the will of parliament is contradicted.

One Example of The Literal Rule was the Fisher v Bell case (1960). Under the offensive
weapons act of 1959, it is an offence to offer certain offensive weapons for sale. Bristol
shopkeeper, James Bell displayed a flick knife in his shop window. When brought to trial
it was concluded that Bell could not be convicted given the literal meaning of the
statute. The law of contract states that having an item in a window is not an intention of
sale but is an invitation to treat. Given the literal meaning of this statute, Bell could not
be convicted.

The R V Harris case (1836), where the defendant bit the nose off the victim. The statute
stated the offence was ‘to stab or wound’. Under The Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing,
cutting or wounding (implying the use of an instrument). The defendant was proven not
guilty.

Main advantages of The Literal Rule:

1. No scope for the judges own opinions or prejudices to interfere.

2. Respects parliamentary supremacy and upholds separation of power.
3. Encourages drafting precision, promotes certainty and reduces litigation.

Rationale for this Rule

Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in
legislative or political issues. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not
have extensive access to secondary sources. In probate law the rule is also favored
because the testator is typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a will is
appropriate. Therefore, it is argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the
words used by the testator or their meaning. It can help to provide for consistency in
interpretation.

Criticism of this rule

Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous assumption
that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading justices to impose
their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little else is
offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives.

This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because
judges may not legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may
be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law’s literal wording.

There are disadvantages to The Literal Rule. For example, in the R v Maginnis case
(1987), the defendant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent to
supply under the misuse of drugs act 1971 (s.5). The defendant claimed that the drugs
belonged to a friend who was picking them up later. The judge stated that handing the
drugs back was supply. The case was upheld on appeal. In his speech at the appeal, Lord
Keith proposed that: “The word ‘supply’ in its ordinary natural meaning, conveys the
idea of furnishing or providing to another something which is wanted or required in
order to meet the wants or requirements of that other.”

Lord Goff dissented saying:

“I do not feel able to say that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee,
or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described as an
act of supplying goods to another.”

This case shows the main problem with The Literal Rule – that there can be
disagreement over the literal meaning of statutes.

The Literal Rule can create loopholes in law, as shown in the Fisher v Bell (1960) case and
the R v Harris (1960). Similarly, the Partridge v Crittenden (1968) case used a legal
loophole.
The defendant placed an advertisement offering two bramble finches for sale (s.6 of
protection of birds act (1954) makes it and offence to sell these birds). The advert was
treated as an invitation to treat, not an offer for sale and the defendant was acquitted.

The Literal Rule can also lead to injustice. One example of this is the. In the London and
North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) case a rail worker was killed whilst oiling a
track; no ‘stopping man’ had been provided. Under statute, compensation is provided
on death of workers ‘replacing or relaying’ track. The statute did not cover oiling and so
compensation wasn’t given. This can undermine public confidence in the law.

In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand
was changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30
days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor
vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute
must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The Supreme Court held that
literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

LORD WENSLEYDALE’S GOLDEN RULE

Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in  Grey v Pearson  and
thereafter it is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another
version of the golden rule. His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe
universally adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing
wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or
some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning
of the words used, and to the  grammatical construction, unless that  is at variance with
the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the ‘golden rule’ in  Matteson v. Hart.
We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of
construction, as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the
Legislature their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope
and intention of the statute, injustice, and absurdity would result from so construing
them.

Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the legislature to
be collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or repugnance, then the
language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, absurdity or
repugnance and no further. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful
construction, which is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act.

In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in literal interpretation leads

modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. When in construing a word
literally, there exist variance with the intention of the legislature to be gathered from the
subject or context of the statute, the language may be varied or modified in such a case,
but no further. Ambiguity here means double meaning, a word’s expression capable of
more than one meaning. A word is inconsistent when it is incompatible with other
words or gives separate meaning when read with other parts of the statute.

The word ‘absurdity’ also means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there is a
direct conflict or inconsistencies like one provision says, “do” and other says, “don’t.” A
situation may be reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the
other. In all such cases, the statute becomes equivocal i.e., double meaning or
questionable, suspicious or uncertain in nature. Whenever the meaning of the word,
phrase, expression or sentence is uncertain, it may be a case of departing from the plain
grammatical meaning, and there may be a need for application of the golden rule.

It is however reiterated in every concerned case[xvii], that the province of the judge is a
very different one of construing the language in which the legislature has finally
expressed. If they undertake the other province, which belongs to the legislature who,
have to endeavor to interpret the desire of the country, the courts are in danger of going
astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide.

And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in
what seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and grammatical
sense of the words must be adhered to in the first instance, it means that most words
have primary meaning in which they are generally used, and such a meaning should be
applied first. Words have a secondary meaning

The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to
depart from a word’s normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.
It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However,
when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the
judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have
more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; if the word only has
one meaning, but applying this would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a
completely different meaning.

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense
where there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.
For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not use lifts in case of fire.” Under the
literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire.
However, this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign
is obviously to prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.

The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to
principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The facts of
a case are; a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to
rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother’s family, or the son’s descendants. There
was never a question of the son profiting from his crime, but as the outcome would have
been binding on lower courts in the future, the court found in favour of the mother’s family.

APPLICATION OF GOLDEN RULE

If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v.
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. “We should avoid a construction which would
reduce the legislation to futility or the narrower one which would fail to achieve the
manifest purpose of the legislation. We should rather accept the bolder construction
based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about
an effective result. Thus, if the language is capable of more than one interpretation, one
ought to discard the literal or natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and
adopt that interpretation which leads to reasonably practical results.”

In this case Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929, was in question. This provision
provided machinery for the transfer of the undertaking (an old company) to a new
company. Under the section, “transfer” includes all property, rights, liabilities and duties
of the former company vest with the latter. An issue therefore was whether a contract
of service previously existing between an individual and transferor company
automatically becomes a contract between the individual and the latter company.
Hence, an action was taken against him; however, no notice was given to him about the
proposed amalgamation either by the transferor or the transferee company. It was
contended that the contract of service could fall under the term “property”. Rejecting the
contention, the House of Lords held that the benefits of a contract entered into between
the former company and the employee cannot be transferred (by X company to Y
company) without the consent of the employee.

Notice of amalgamation by transferor or Transferee Company to the individual servant

was essential. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given
their ordinary- meaning. If the legislature really desired that workmen should be
transferred to a new company without their consent being obtained, plain words could
be derived to express this intention.

As in the present case, neither the provision of law provides such a primary meaning as
applicable to the transfer of personal service, and nor there is any overt act on the part
of the transferor or the transferee company informing the worker as regards the
amalgamation The contract did not exist between the appellant and the respondent and
therefore the latter company cannot take any action against the employee regarding
service.

In R. v. Sweden Lord Parker construed Section 1(1) of the poor Prisoners’ Defense Act,
1930: “Any person committed for trial for an indictable offence shall be entitled to free
legal aid in the preparation and conduct of his defense at the trial and to have solicitor
and counsel assigned to him for that purpose.” The Court of Criminal appeal held that
this section gave the right to an accused person once the certificate is granted to have a
solicitor assigned for the purposes mentioned, but not a right that that solicitor or
another should defend him at the trial.

The court observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person a right
to have a solicitor at the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly refuse to have the
solicitor assigned when he got advice which he did not like and go to others, and there
would be no means whatever to prevent that, with the result that there might be added
expense to the country, delays and abuse of the whole procedure.” Such an
unreasonable intention of Parliament cannot be imputed.

In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India, a restricted construction was given to rule 11 (VI) of
the Central Services (Classification, Appeal and Control) Rules, 1965. This Rule
empowers imposition of “penalty of reduction to a lower time-scale pay, grade post or
service.” The Supreme Court held that a person initially appointed to a higher post and
grade of pay scale cannot be reduced to a lower grade or post. A wider construction if
given to the provision, it may affect the recruitment policy itself for a person directly
recruited to a higher post may not have the requisite qualification for the lower post.

Maxwell says that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be
seen in the area devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and
construction to avoid inconvenience and injustice, and to prevent evasion He illustrated
the application of the rule in various cases relating to criminal, civil, labour, revenue
taxation and administration branches of law.

In  Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe (1964) AC 541 a Statute made it felony
‘to break from prison”. Held it would not apply to a prisoner who escaped while the
prison was on fire. Since his act was, not to recover liberty, but to save his life. Similarly,
a statute which made ‘an act’ criminal in unqualified terms was understood as not
applying where the act done was excusable or justifiable on grounds generally
recognized by law.

In Luke v. R.R.C, Lord Reid said: “An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not
to be imputed a statute if there is some other construction available. Where to apply
words literally would defeat the “obvious intention of the legislation and produce a
wholly unreasonable result” we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that
obvious intention and produce a rational construction. Though our standard of drafting
is such that it rarely emerges, but a problem may arise where more than one meaning
arc available through the words of the statute, that meaning should be chosen which is
reasonable and rational.”

In R. v. London Justices, Section 105 of the Highways Act, 1835, gave an appeal to ‘any
person’ who though himself aggrieved by any order, conviction, judgment or
determination of a justice under the Act. This was held not to apply to ‘an informant who
complained of an acquittal’ on a charge of obstructing of the highway, for if it did, the
person acquitted would be liable to be twice vexed for the same offence.

In  Day v. Simpson, it was held that the Theatres Act, 1843, which prohibited under a
penalty the performance of plays without license, would extend to a performance where
the players did not come on the stage, but acted m a chamber below it, their fingers
being reflected by mirrors so as to appear to the spectators to be on the stage. To
carryout effectually the object of a statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all
attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has
prohibited or enjoined.

This manner of construction has two aspects; one is that the courts, mindful of the
Mischief Rule will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow
persons within its purview to escape its net. The other is that the statute may be applied
to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions, thus defeating any shifts
and contrivances, which parties may have devised in the hope of thereby falling outside
the Act. When the courts find an attempt at concealment, they will, “brush away the
cobweb varnish, and shrew the transactions in their true light.

Thus, in the name of justice or beneficial construction, the language of a statute cannot
be narrowed down so as to permit one to escape from the purview of law. However,
where the language itself is evasive and ambiguous, modification of it is permissible.

In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd., (1961) 1 WLR 92
held; “Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth
working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing
or prolonging artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results.
Where two possible constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen.

In Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid: ‘Beneficial
laws are addressed to practical people, and ought to be construed in the light of
practical consideration, rather than a meticulous comparison of the language of their
various provisions. If the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought
to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that
interpretation which leads to a reasonably practical result.” 

INDIAN CASES
In India, there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have
applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it
appears that even for the literal rule, this rule is named. As golden rule initially starts
with the search of the literal meaning of the provision, and if there is unequivocal
meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy, an uncertainty of absurdity appears,
apply the meaning.

But when there is a possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further to avoid
the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or substitution
of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the legislature.
[xxxviii]

In Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore, the Supreme Court held that the
expression “landless person” used in Section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act,
1953, which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to
“landless laborers”. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no
agricultural land.

The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless
businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan
movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in
agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp, Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided that “a driver
causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the word “stop” was
in question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after
causing an accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the court held that the
driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a
reasonable period so as to enable interested persons to make necessary inquiries from
him about the accident at the spot of the accident.

In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar in construing Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders

Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of the
offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the
sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was
below 21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was
above 21 years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute.

This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute
is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by their association
with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of the prison. An accused
below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending him under the supervision
of the probation officer instead of jail.

In Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil, Section 23 of the Representation of People

Act, 1951, which permitted inclusion of the name in the electoral roll “till the last date
for nomination” for an election in the concerned constituency, has been
construed. Section 33(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 specifies that the nomination papers
shall be presented between the hours of 11’O clock in the fore noon and 3’0 clock in the
after noon. Reading these provisions together in the light of the object behind them, the
Supreme Court construed the words “last date” in section 23 as “last hour of the last
date” of nomination under Section 33(1) of the Act.

In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P., Sales Tax

was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of “cooked food” under Section 3A
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit
manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can
be construed as “cooked food” and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued
under the said provision.

Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether the wider
or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute. Here
biscuit was not covered within the words ‘cooked food’. However, where the precise
words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their
ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of
policy which has to decided not by the court but by Parliament itself.

In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh the appellant argued that it was obligatory

under Section 99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal
to record names of all persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including
parties and non-parties to the petition and that under the proviso, notice should be given
to all persons named under Section 99(1)(a)(ii). He being a party to the petition was,
therefore, entitled to a fresh notice. Supreme Court said that such an interpretation will
lead to an absurdity and held that the proviso along with clause (b) thereto and the
setting of the section pointed out that notice is contemplated only against non- parties
to the petition.