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    Culpable Homicide and Murder

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    Deepa Patil

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    ours A oo oo Homicide (indian Penal Code 1860, Sections 299 to 311) Part A CULPABLE HoMICcIDE Section 299. Culpable Homicide.— Whoever causes death by doi acatwith the intention of causing-death, or with the intention of causing such bodilyinjury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge, the heis likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. Illustrations (@) Alayssticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or arabe knovsledge that death is likely tobe thereby caused, Z believing he ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in andiskilled. Ahas committed the offence ofculpable homicide. > . nt (b) Aknows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know its intending '© oe knowing it to be likely to cause 25 death, induces Bo fire at an 5 Se kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offences « culpable homicide. we jebehind a (© Avby shooting at a fow! with intent 6° ill and steal 1 B, vo ns val bush; A not knowing that he was there- Here, althou' “ tend 10 {all B, or © act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as at - cause cause death by doing an act that he knew ws likely £0 Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law canees bodily injury t0 noth: Explanation 1.—A person W : baal Ine co Nr wh ‘ ease dine labouring under a divorder, dis mn re teh, ; nther, shall be deemed to haye "hy accelerates the death of that ¢ 0 cange hindeath + _Avheredenh cca by bly ining. the pray nom. hd "hall he deemed to have caused tn Caunes ach bovtily injury shall be deer athe de i i r h alshough by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the deat h E Bun might have been prevented. * Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of a child in the mother, womb is not homicide. Bur it may amount to culpable homicig, tn cause the death ofa lving child ifany part ofthat child has been bref” torch, though the child may not have breathed or been completely Section 301. Culpable homi by causing death of Person othe, chan person whose death wasintended —Ifa person by doinganyaine which he inrends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neithe intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is ofthe description of which it would hang been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause. Sections 299 and 300, IPC, define culpable homicide, which is of two types: (1) Culpable homicide amounting to murder; (2) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The provisions relating to murder and culpable homicide are probably the most complicated in the IPC, and are so technical that very often they lead ‘0 confusion. A murder is merely a particular form of culpable homicide. Every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not ‘murder. Culpable homicide is the genus, and murder, its species. Section 299 defines culpable homicide simpliiter. Section 300 define mmurdet, which is also a culpable homicide with some special characteristics, which are set out in cll 1-4 of ¢ 300, subject to the exceptions given in § 300. If any culpable homicide falls within any of the four clauses iM f 300, then it will amount to murder. All other instances of culpable homicide including the ones, which may fall within: the! exceptions 0 § 300, will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 782 Scanned with CamScanner y Hani 4 | 299 defin alpable homicide’ piles siti wwhil emembet NOL ane to remember tha N exhaust «portant hat s 300 also de a I i hich amounts 10 murder, Before going put ons ecween § 299 and s 300, IPC, it fin i definition culpable ho, nici Mitty further detain + Wis important to und, in: inde ie nga ee ee gets of cui : Mle homicide: fy) Te ast eh of peso ice 1 Fe death shoul have been cause bythe at of 2 homes ¢ act of Ope at ain death sould hake en dn Mf another person, 3 . . . Ic} | {wth the intention of causing death; a (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is f cause death; or Yury as i likely to fo) with knowledge that such acts key to cause death me inion isl provides for thee crcmtanes, when the pr A . : ices, resence Thecenee of cern factors in causing death is nevertheless tested a caine culpable homicide. These circumstances ae dealt within explanations 1-3. Felton 1 provides Fora station where che injured pason i sullen Pome disorder, disease or bodily infirm, which quickened his de fey hat is death was quckened or hastened by the disorder or diese he ms already suffering from, will not reduce che guile or culpability of the peion causing the injury. In other words, the person who caused the isjry cannot escape criminal liability of culpable homicide by stating thar if the person injured did nor suffer from che sad disease or disorder, he would not have died. Explanation 2 provides for a situation wherein a person who has been injured dould have recovered and escaped death, if, he had been given p»DMP: and proper medical treatment. In such situations 100, the fact chat the iajured person died because he could nor avail of good medical treatment, cunnot bea ground for negating guilt or culpability of the person who inflicted the injury in the firse place. Prplanation 3 is i johtly different sitwation. Te takes into ion 3 is in respect of a slig i i ee contideation death eaused to 2 child a ia the death of Se child is caused when sill thers Ho isnot culpable homicide, However if any porion of te child a of the mother’s womb, even if it is not fully bor™ and if death ° ‘Uh child, then ie would amount to culpable homicide Scanned with CamScanner :RMINING ror D! hy may be si areat iMpe homicide oF not. The yp simple enough t0 unde yg DEAT . " srt in deciding, sgh “caus ether ry ‘omission would be covey ft i . ‘ sther the a articular shether a Peg to verily whe ‘ et done jy, * eather person The “her the death is caused as a direc , es VANE Considerag. i tft he accused: er y the evades! the deceased Gayacharan , abdomen, which were dangerony “! ), The injury was received on 9 Febtuge Tife (ie. wh iden nether he had fully recovered op m " H + 1960, Ther W728 PO OY om the hospitals He, however died on 1 vin when he was dise ee emated without any postmortem being done, Ty 1960. His body that che mere fact that the two gunshot injuries were Supezms Cour oor sufficient for holding that Gayacharan dex, ks after the incident, was on account of dangerons ace abou three wee ich took ou ‘ which rook eae a by him) The court observed that in order to prove the aca "5 murder, it was necessary to establish that he had f Gayacharan’ essary Sra account of the injuries received by him. Since there was no evidence death, the accused could not be said to have caused scablsh the cause of 8 eet of G al aspect highlighted by the court inthis the death of Gayacharan. A cruci } case was that the connection between the primary cause and the death should not be too remote. In Joginder Singh v State of Punjab,’ the deceased Rupinder Singh had teased the sister of the accused. In retaliation, the two accused went to Rupinder’s house and shouted that they had come to take away the sister of Rupinder Singh. In the meantime, the cousins of Rupinder Singh intervened. One of them was given a blow on the neck by the accused. Meanwhile, Rupinder Singh started running towards the field. The accused stared chasing ies and Rupinder Singh jumped into a well. As a result of th cteafier he di ‘ee injuries, which made him loose consciousness and sced wet abou 15 co 30 fe ge ne epee Court held tat ino the well There wy oy 0m Rupinder Singh, when he jum Rupinder Singh into the sae evidence to show that the accused drove into the well Under these ct te lft him no option burr st T ARDS tances, it was held, that the accus 2 All 1 (1964) Cr Ly 72" { R 1979 SC 1876, (1979) Cr a ef So ~— Scanned with CamScanner 1 t Oy avo guns m eee sere fife eestor me ce as to W y __ Homicide Pinder Singh, and hence they were 000 acquitted of the charge of mder ol go be acu Madhya Pradesh." ied am v State of Madhys Pradech" yh Wt hal ease mpl ant . oe a knife to his wile, Gyanyai + She was admit ies with 7 operation was performed on her ce. high temperature, ted ina the Uheveafien, she develope which she died, ‘Thig Me an weal, debilitated the doctar whe performed ure and a in tand 3 tat pot! i AS A teste 4 exias nie ea) was 4 result of atmospheric teniperan 1 ho already had some temperanite, "vada wi n opined that the death was not 184 result of multiple er qosemorten se of hyperpyrexia, The Madhya Pradesh High Court yas but case OF Nye 299, IPC. Ie observed thar fae supervening So etre the injuries causcd, then the person inflicting the Se a ang dex ea if death was not the direct rene of i aan case there was medical evidence to show tho vues. 1 me the running of high temperature) was 4 result of her rer dition. Gyanvatiba fell ints Achiltated condition because iti con ieee hich she had sustained, due to which she had to «ule injures, wih post-operative starvation, which was necessary A aed fr her deat Thus, her desth was 2 diet fr her TeeOveTy, injuries inflicted on her. Intervening or supencting consequence ahh was a direct result of the mip i nd . er i € serious injt a eden we petee i ne eros injures sutaoed by it was " soon for murder was upheld ts conviction Istevion On KNOWLEDGE id 300, ? appear in ss 299 an on’ ‘knowledge’ app: Jedge are used tention’ and ion and knowledge are w a wing differen consequences. Intention a cullpable homicide. lees ft , : weids ae Revng dients to constitute the offer ent things. Intention is % aernate ingredie d knowledge are two di ferent difficult to legally jens mention an certain purpose, Tnrention rion of a person’ : ee i uP th desire 7 pchien 8 oe as it essentially is a onto a person's mind ° is evide! > . i int the el ete which requires ging ine gathered Fom _ 7 had. the ac a : i erson i from mine what oe ihe pe fe, and more particularly Stendant circumstances o: ”: oF the accused, ab AIR 1958 SC 465: Xilore ; se of Punyal TORTS eo vin She Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1977 Scanned with CamScanner came to be considered by ihe ¢ nwo 5 ween the IP Tease, the accuse Su pasdev’ 1 in a marti a AYINE Bot dia te Court fn Bi aid boy ina di . run reat 0 runt that he aid not ave the Knog 16-¥ Je was 50 " “lings ieee RHO Wede that bi P what was a trifling incigene, “py key fc y fol kil the boy FOr’ a cde: ec intention (© kill mative, intention and knowledges) un . ed berween " differential - fe . cahing which prompts man 10 Form aN instensg ive is something ; equence: Sie n Motive is s¢ eeewarenest of the consequences of the act, In man Knowledge ts 4 {knowledge merge into ¢ ch other and Mean : RK an cases. inrention and 2 more or | and intention can be presumed f, same thin, Om rage emareaing fine between knowledge and ingen rowed Spur iti nor difficult co peresive that they conn is no do ~ ec different things. or the mental element in committing the crime is an ssential ingredient of culpable homicide. While intention’ is a very importan aacae all cimes, it becomes crucial in the offence of culpable horn Secu itis the degre of intention of the accused, which determines degre of crime. In other words, itis the mental clement of the accys4 lone, which is material to decide whether a particular act is culpable homicide amounting to murder, or culpable homicide not amounting tp Intention murder. As far as the offence of culpable homicide is concerned, there are three species or degrees of mens rea present: (1) An intention to cause death; (2) an anil to cause dangerous bodily: injury: as is likely to cause leath; (3) Knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.® ios mc, one ion of culpable homicide, does not The expectation thatthe a ca ition or preplanning to kill a person. (0 consticute intention. A ma person is likely to result in death is sulficient and therefore, in law, he j in expects the natural consequences of his act acts. So, if a person i, . f Presumed to intend the consequences of his the consequence there forming some act either: (1) expects death to be Consequence of his acts or. or (2) expects a dangerous injury to be the ct; or (3) knows thar death is a likely consequence of 4 AIR 19 56 SC 488, For ; 5 Jigar» State of Tamil Naan sled discuss ; mil Nadu AIR | ion on the facts, see ch 12. it » State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 Sc 148 See ite, H fe. asec Scanned with CamScanner Homicide ease death ensue and in he \ uh ensues, his intention in the fi vdge in) the ie and uted i the third venders the seta inst two cases, ge is vont act a homicide ge is thus essential to the affenc I 7 JA guilty wlence under this section." ection his rion OF knowled| nt ¢ MEns Rea sys eaten the thitd degree of tention capable homicide is knowledge Teele fei eee le. tid part of 6 299 act. ith a vet to cause death, commits t opi ee a au use death, commits the offen fis PY She shee ofthe seston, the a i ape treontemplated (0 make nium age of we pls 9 make a at fami cupbe c oe ge tha the EB Tikely to cause death, . ed cans conscious Tis awareness of the consequences of ; o se tye fener sont reasonably expect that the consequence of his act pel ese in che dah ofa pon if he did not intend likely’ as used in s 299 is 0 denote a lower se the death. The word ne jkelihood, whereas the same vor likely’ ins 300 woold denote ahigher degree of likelihood of death. _finitio” ed he whoever ca at ch ty by such foie val lemes ‘Act OF Kaine A Person Nor Inrenvep To Be Kittep wen if the act of a person is not would still amount to culpable ives examples of a person f them. He is said to be Jes where the offender The first illustration to s 299 explains that e intended or aimed at any particular person, it fomicide Illustration (A) t0 cl (4) of s 300 also gi randomly shooting into 4 crowd and killing one of ity of murder. Both these illustrations are examp! Ft not have intention against any particular person. Bue the same analogy would apply even in cases where 7 Ne inrention co kill may be in respet* of “F but the act of the person results in the death of B. Even in such an ietance the required mens rea of intention ists and the homicide would aaarer co rounder. Ic is called transferred vnalice or transferred mens £62 But then, again intention is always 2 question of fact and the fact that the accused did not intend co cause the injury he did, may be @ mitigating factor. In Gurmail Singh v State of | ‘Punjab,’ there accused on the Band G on the one hand and the some indecent jokes by the accused before Bs wife. TI other, 0 he deceased interven Lith eda, Law Publishers, ‘Allahabad, ingh Gour, Penal Law of India, vol 3s 7 1288.09 2377-78 AIR 1982 SC 1466. 787 Scanned with CamScanner Dy 7 The accused raised a bay, om fighting, ~ hela 4, ive cessed. The Supteme Cann deceased, even if yy les fi ca fell on the ¢ nawity against te - pod can be inferred iM view a rhe fig ‘ hat the accused intended (0 cane hang Nj pert frown 9 302 10 5 304,19 i " to stop the two id ow to A, which accused had ne ant " vam G tw the dee 9 show Msinisg malice fr is no evidence © hic conviction was ¢ inflicted, bi Proor Or INTENTION noni alvays ery cle oan, ng which an be gathered and infeed fom, e " Phe rounding CHCUMSONES, Sch yg Sg of the person of the attack, the time and place of attack, the h the aa a ray the nate of injures caused to the decesed and gt Thee and other factors may be taken into consideration 19 4 These and other fa be take into whether a person had the requisite a When injuries ar infted on vel parts ofthe body like ¢ by a lech or sharp edged weapon, the iressible inferen accused intended to kill the deceased. Direct proof of in intention is somethi on, CletMing he abdom ¢ is thar the Part B Murber Section 300. Murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— Secondly—If icis done with the intention of, causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— Thirdly—If vis done with the i Person, and the bodily injury i ordinary course of nature to Fourthly—If the petsin com ingerous that it must, intention of. causing bodily injury to any intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the cause death, or— >mmitting the act knows that itis so imminent in all probability, cause death or such bodly “ Chabat Khan y Saar oF of Haryena AIR 1972 SC 2574, (1973) Cx LJ 36 6C Se KamatatavVedenaapen (1999) SCC auc.) 788 Scanned with CamScanner 5 likely to cause death Se sary asi : injuy ? . + and comm curring the risk of caus nmits incase OF INCUTHIN sk of causing de ‘ tl Pact without any ‘ath or such j TY a8 afores; T such injury as afi resaid t Mustrations @ Ashoots Z with the intention of killin h Whim, Zi murder. Zaliesin consequence. A con commits Acknowing that Zis labouring under such li senses im wh he 2H Howie cae consequence ofthe blo. i pily at mundane line Zen pave been scent in the onlinaty coun of at te low might person ina sound stateofhealth. Buti dsnotknmind as he eth ofa any disease, giveshim such ablowas would novinthe cg enue killaperon in asound stateof heath here 4, although bee eeeroanme bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, ifhe did notintend. oak oe bodily injury asin the ordinary course ofnatue wuld cane da nt (@._Aintentionally gives Za sword-cut orlub-wound sfieneo cae th sfamanin te ordinary courte ofratue Zlesn conoque Hee aca | of murder, although he may not haveintendedtocause Zideath, (@)_Avithout any excuse fresa loaded cannon ntoa crowd of persons and lone of them. Ais guilty of murder, although he may not have hada premeditated design to kill any particular individual b) homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the provocation or causes the death of any other person Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder—Culpable person who gave the by mistake or accident. lowing provisos:— hit or voluntarily provoked by erson. The above exception is subject to the fol First—That the provocation is not soug! the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any P nything done in na is not given by a : fal exercise of the Secondly—That the provocatio lic servant in the law! obedience to the law, or by a publ powers of such public servant. Thirdly—That the provocation is not give” by an lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation,—Whether the provocation to prevent the offence from amounting ©° mt | dliliisactaimcii..3508? ything done in the as grave and sudden enough urder is a question © cts ~~ Scanned with CamScanner Mlustrations (a) Av under the influence of passion excited by a provocation riven jy incnionally ils 7chil. Thisisrmunter insemuch the proger i ion nos given bythe cil al he death f the child was nace bye i Mt ip mistornune in doing an act caused by the provocation, hes graveand sudden provocation to 4. , an this provocation, f 0) Ygivesgrave ' 1g a1 Yenather intending nor knowing himll be likely oil Z why Neat hi but our of sight. 4 kills Z, Here A has not commitied murder, ™ but mer culpable homicide. ly (©) Aislawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff is excited to sudden and vi the arrest, and kills Z, This is murder, inasmuch as the provocat a. thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers, (d) A appearsas a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe word of Ai deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is passion by these words, and kills Z, This is murder, (© Aattemprs to pull Z’snose.Z, in the exercise ofthe right of private defence ys hold of Ato prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and Violen passion in consequence, and kills Z. Ths is murder, inasmuch asthe Provociton ‘was given bya thing done in the exercise ofthe tigh« of private defence, () Zsuikes B. Bis by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending co take advantage of Brag, and ro cause him tokillZ, pus aa into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but Ais guilty of murder, Exception 2—Culpable homicide is not murder ifthe offender, inthe excise in good faith ofthe right of private defence of person or propery, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death ofthe person against whom heis exercising such right of defence without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary forthe purpose of such defence. olent pasion ion Wat gien by moved to sudden Mlustration Zattemptstohorsewhip A, notin sucha manner as to cause grievous hurt to.d.A draws outa pistol. Z persists in the assault, A believing in good faith that he can by no othe ‘means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead, A has not commited ‘murder, but only culpable homicide Exception 3—Culpable homicide is not murder ifthe offender, being? Public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement © Public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes 790 Scanned with CamScanner Homicide ful and necessary and necessary su without ill- ich public servant and with f yeued 1 ty t i Me he person whose death is caused. ware Fl h icici dle homicide is not murder fit i ler ifitis committed without Culpa "fine po qian in a $e i a and without the ;sual manner, Me Fgh : the heat of passion upon a sudden offenders having taken undue advantage oracted nl ee qjorunt in iy iN ., It is immater ial in such cases whi ag aation + cases which party offers the BP or commits the first assault, én Fao" P .—-Culpable homicide is noc murder when the person whose tion : i a caused being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or oe he risk of death without his consent. 8 Illustration uses Z, a person under eighteen years of age, ro commit s.byinsigntion» voluntarily ca of giving consent to his own ccd Heres 0" aecount of Zs youth, he was incapable Spas therfore bere murder. score OF SECTION 300 es murder with refere requirements provi nce to culpable homicide defined ded in cll 1-4 of s 300 are fulfilled, capable homicide will chen amount 1 murder,” provided, of course, the seoes not fll within any of the Exceptions provided in s 300. If an act, ee halls within cll 1-4 of s 300, also falls within one of the Exceptions, dan it will be culpable homicide not amounting murder. ir would probably have been simpler and less complicated if the Code ld fnedefned homicide and then defined separately culpable homicide aaaaererntace rome clauses in ss 299 and 300 over i has led 10 a Itofdscusions debates and differences in judicial pronounceme © about ie scape of each section and the distinctions and differences berween them, & following are the essential inj lpable homicide is murder, if it is secon 300 defin “n299.F the special gredients of s 300: done with: (1) Intention to cause deaths nico uner ny efor 999 SC75. 1% nse ion the prosecution has to br x Jagtar Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1 Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law (a) mention 0. til injury, ath ™ tee fe sing body injury sufficient in the Ordin, (3) Intention e : : ¢ act is so imminently danger, 6 of nacure (0 cause é ey dagen ie will cause death or bodily injury ig, in g 0 & - nowt ea probability death; and (b) such act shoul will noe be murder, if is: nd sudden provocation; Id be without justification, Calpable homici Exception 1: On grave al Explanation. (a) The provocation should not be voluntarily sought or g caused by the accused; elie (h) Should no be a esl of at done by public servant ory to kw; Obey (c) Not be in self-defence. whether a particular act is grave and sudden is a question of fg ception 2: In exercise of right of private defence of person or Prepay (a) And withoue premeditation and without intention, Exception 3: (2) An act done by public servant or in aidi act d aidin i (b) Acting in advancement of public justice; + pb pg (©). Such act of the public servant is i we im, but exercised in good fh, ofthe Pesce such act is necessary to dischar (@) Andis withou il will, papery Exception 4: (a) A sudden fight wi ight wiche ar (8) The ofendr should nor eke ts unusual manner, Explanation.—who started th Exception 5: take undue advantage or act in a crud ot fight or quarrel is not material. Death caused (0 a person above 18 years of age with his consent 792 Scanned with CamScanner jereNTIONALY Causinc Dearii —Ciause (1) OF Secrion 300 ¢ first clause of 5 300 stipulates that wh ausing death, the hen an act is done with the plest and it is culpable en it is elpable homicide amounting to fer al at he sae tine, the mow gravest of the | is clause is clirect a i ae about it Weis the action of a person with tt ; in Tenn | he ac with the cle: , JH Antentio at intenti walling * person. bs 1 ‘ Mion ‘ what intention does.’ So, the intention of e Ba i : 0 ine person ct gathered from the action of the person. If a perso person ct eg no mn ers gers a deadly poison to an, then it is very clear that he has an an vee of murder. intention of admin ill th jqxentio 0 kill that man, because the cause and effect of the act ar fe very intention evident thar the cause of death is i act. If the identity of the person who has administered the poison cna ine se ase isa neatly wrapped, Howeve seldom ae ets n tal life so simple ro come BY. i ince intention is always a state of mind, it can be proved only by its exremnal manifestations. When injuries are inflicted on vital parts ob the body with sharp edged instruments then the intention to kill can be pibused co the offender.” ‘When a person sets fire to the deceased, after another had poured kerosene ao his body, there cannor be any doubt that the intention of the accused was to kill the deceased. Shen an accused hit the deceased on a vital par ofthe bodys the chest, with the blade of a sword, two fect in Length with such force as to impair theliver and the aorta, it was held che offence was plainly one of murder." ‘When the accused, on secing the deceased Dasan said that he was searching for him everywhere and stabbed him with a knife, and especially sven the knife was drawn downwards as if co cut the body into two, it was Wild that the intention to kill the deceased Dasan was Very clear from the facts."* When the accused pierced a sharp edged weapon in the heart of the deceased and uttered words of ‘doing away with the deceased’ before the 10 See Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, vyol 3, Lith eda, Law Publishers, Allahabad, 1998, p 2421. 1 hid, fy Cathet Khon v State of Harare ‘AIR 1972 8C.2574. a aendapal Venfeaterwarla v State of Andra Prades? (19799380082 so Ras Bhawani Hangud St of Maharashtra IR 1979 SC 1224 (979) CH] 0). 15 Scan Sae of Tamil Nadu (1998) 9 SCC 308 (1999) sc 1009 (CH: 793 Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law ——_——— TS se c crime, it was held by the Supreme commissioning of the crime, it was held by P Court thar intention to kill can be infer : / Un Vasant Shute of Maharaona” there was previons enmyy : ved, The accused and the decease ye 4 ore pre ee grappling with each ener, Some persons who were present sepa, ‘ favo, The accused! then went running to his jeep, drove it on the aon te 1 ACCUSC " ey and covsanls the deceased in high speed, knocked him down and. im, Killing him, The road on which the incident took place wae him, killing him necessity forthe accused yy ¢ i: the accused and the dee ove 4 Wide and deserted one, There was no reason 0 driven the jeep in the wrong direction. The Supreme Court held dee th accused had deliberately dashed his jeep against the accused and ye on him with the intention to cause his death, Iris pertinent to pone ou tht the fist clause oF ¢ 300, which yg done with intention of causing death’, is identical to the fi § 299, which is also ‘doing an act with the intention of ca Therefore, an act coming under cl (1) of s 300 will also fall § 299, and in both instances, it will be culpable homicide murder. st clause of sing death inder cl (1) of amounting to INTENTIONAL CausING OF BODILY Injury with KNowLepce ‘THAT IT Witt Cause DeatH—C1ause (2) oF SECTION 300 The second clause of s 300 stipulates that if a person intentionally causes bodily injury, with the knowledge that such bodily injury will cause dest of the person injured, then it will be culpable homicide amounting to murder. Thus, the mens rea or the mental attitude contemplated under cl 2 of s 300 is twofold. First, there must be an intention to cave bodily harm. Secondly, there must be ‘knowledge’ that death is the ‘Tkely’ result OF consequence of such intended bodily injury. The second clause of s 300 will apply if there is irs, the intention 1 cause bodily harm and next, there is the ‘subjective knowledge’ that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury." It is said to be ‘subjective knowledge’, because it is the a of the consequences of his act. The knowl to the objective requirement in cl 3 of s 300, Clause 3 of s 300 stipulates thar the bodily injury intended is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature ‘0 cause death. Therefore, the requirement of cl (3) of s 300 is thar ie must = 1, Kata Ramudle v Sate of Andra Pradesh Atk 1997 SC 2428, | 17 AIR 1998 SC 698, (1998) Cr} 844 ($0, Pradch 18. Rais Singh vStateof Kerala AIR.19G6 SC 1874, p 1878; see also Stare of Ucar 1» Virendra Prasad AIR 2004 SC.1517, iccused’s own personal perception ledge here is subjective, as oppo 794 Scanned with CamScanner Homicide th; iectively ¢ r ‘i pe ob jeath. By objective, i NY Fs sulfcien tin the ordinary course cal! 0 e ° accused that matte al perception of ie ay intentional cased ale fin real terms : cats . f The see ause. In th use, In the cquses he eT (2), the intent ion to cause death wea t Je, Bur in ¢ (2), the imtention is only to « Wise such ‘anton al ch in . a ae Mende subjectively knows is likely to cane des ili injury, as a tence beeen (1) and el 2) the degre af intention, tr the only a way, the craft (2) isthe knowledge of the case det aus of 529 clause of s 299, whi ‘wich the | ne decor which states ‘with the intention of causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death’, is simi so 29 Knowledge thatthe injury i Tikal ee 2 of = 300. peced as contemplated incl (2) of s 30, _ The word ‘likely’ in cl (2) of s 300, coupled with the word ‘knowledge’ sadnes a definiteness or certainty of death and not a mere probably, This clause contemplates a situation, where the offender has a ceran special knowledge regarding the peculiar situation or health condition of the ‘cular victim that the intentional bodily injury is likely to be fatal In William Slaney v State of Madhya Pradesh,” the accused was in love with the deceased's sister, which the deceased did not like. There was a erween them and the deceased asked the accused to leave the accused went and came back with his brother. He called out for he deceased came out, There was a heated d snatched a hockey stick, which was with on his head. As a result, there was a this case, the Supreme Court accused that the act is likely to quarrel b house. Th the deceased’s sister. Instead, ¢ exchange of words. The accuse his brother, and hit the deceased fracture of the skull and the deceased died. In held that the act of the accused is only one which was likely to cause death and the accused did not have any special knowledge to bring in under d (2) of s 300. The accused was convicted under s 304, Pr Il, and not under s 300. injuri In BN Srikantiah v Mysore State, there were as many 35 24 injuris oo the decened and of them 21 were incised. They were cither on his head, the neck, or the shoulders and on the forearms. Since, most ofthe ii Wete on vital parts and che weapons used were sharp, ic was hel vider the intention of causing bodily injuries was established; bringing "© cover of s 300. et : AIR 1956 SC 116, (1956) Cr LJ 291 (SC). AIR 1958 SC 672, (1958) Cr LJ 1251 (SC). sea ae a iS Scanned with CamScanner Intentional, CAUS Crause (3) Or See ¢ stared earlier, views the mate from an Obj The thin clans alan intention 0 cise ny inte, yf standpoint, I re course of nature (0 cause death, Th, eS8ene0 i sufficient in the i vieney of the injury in the ordinary course OF nate the clause is the sul i re word ‘sulliciency’ is used, Hemcans Where theres” cause death, When he injury resulting in death, in very high probability In Virwa Singh w 5 ate of Punjab’! the Supreme Court laid down 4 Jer to bring a case within cl (3) of s 300, the prosecution muse Proy onder to bring a cas a in the following: 7 (1) First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury i present; (2) Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these an purely objective investigation; ptoceatal (3) Thirdly, it must be proved that there was, an intention 0 inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was no accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended; Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further; and Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, This Part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender? (4 Intention as to Sufficiency of Injury Not Required Ithas been seen that the earlier cl (2) first, intention to caus that such bodily inj concerned, it is suffi that was ai contemplates two levels of intention— « bodily injury and thereafter secondly, the knowledge ty is likely to cause death, But, as far as @is icient that there is intention to cause the bodily injury tually caused, The subjective facan ends with that. There need ARDSESCAGSee . 2 Thaeebe . Ke 380. Kiker Singh v Srate of Rajasthan AIR 1993 SC 2426. ome par ofa ate become docus ‘lasicus, are ingrained in our legal system, and ba 12S) A te See Calo Kunjue & Ors v Stare of Kerala (2009 2004 5C 1966, 704 SC 2688; Shan ‘Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharshi AR "Perec Sa of Timi ‘Neds (2005) 9 ScGi6500 Scanned with CamScanner Homicide TO y whe further enqu er the offender hac 0 | the intention of the pe gge that such bodily injury should he sulficient in the ordi now fnatte £0 CAUSE Cea, Thy Vipgy Singh's cave, the Supreme cae, va Fn oF KOI 1 CS ny. tha ee the ordinary iment cause death is Gllcions. The emir hekt sn the two patty a pe alsumetive: The Mist parti sthjcton ty the offender: “If i is " HY person’, Once this is puutely an objective fact Ie ig proven fiets about the nature intention, Whether a particular of nature to cause death of not, is 41.0) ae itetion of casing bai uy Jone We the sulliciency of the injury ig a ference or deduction from dy mater and has nothing to do with th of he irr cient in the ordinary course ‘A cient ination of fact. discussion, wh . fron the above discussion, whae emerges is that the accused, who santonaly cused the injury, may not be aware chat injury was sufcens intent death or was likely to cause death, But, if his intention to cause city is established and the injury caused is sufcent w couse dev the ininay course of nature, then the accused is guilty ofelpabe i eile amounting © murder. tnrention to Cause Particular Injury Required ingh case, while postulating the ingredients of cl (3) of s 300, Ine i ee ed incr alist proved hat there was an o a o inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was inne oral or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was 1 et This aspect of the matter came up for consideration befor the ia Henjinder Singh v» Delhi Adminstasion3® In this ease, Si aoe ying co assault one Dalip Singh and the decal ee he accused finding himself one aginst «vo, took ox the Wierd gabbed the deceased. Ac that stage, the deceased tape ina couching position presumably 10 nen an pe The fe pieced the upper portion ofthe le shih The sa wo ra cblque and ecu the femora artery and vein unde hs met hich are important main vessels of the body. The BAIR 1958 SC 465. 1956) Cr LJ 278 (SO)- 1956 SC 99, ( 2 Narayam Nair v Sate of Tavancore AIR ‘ ara Pr 15 Ve Muh» eae “rads 971) 38CCART Ste of tai Nadya Doth Pa 7 SC 455 (1977) Cr LJ 1 (SC): Kishore STC 450 (SCh Se AMRIBPYSC2007 aaa Sete fad Pode f Usar Pradesh v Virendra Prasad AIR 2004 SC 1517. 26 AIR 1968 SC 867, 797 Scanned with CamScanner ts abo a would Fendt immedi ret Is og The Supreme Coure eld thag eth seit it vas the intention of the ayy th rar particular place. I view of pe ty apply. The accused w would result in g " death after a short che evidence, it was not Pt yont i articular injury © nike ra) of s 300 would not held thar ¢ " ‘ ry rae . ed i Nikalje » State of Maharashiray there " ae ce and the deceased and the accused whi between the accused a poe tad the accused on the chest near the shoulder, Knife and stabbed a ta ‘ofthe chest, but since the knife cut ge ipreme Court held y this 7 ag Ht yay 8 cong ‘ aS a ‘Wate ue iy mon a vl fe, it resulted in death. Supr " inside, itr no proof that the injury caused was the inry Intended, a5 bu , * : ering f the artery, death might not have oi It was held the th Une fil er ch) of 8300. Accordingly, he acre eee under «304, IPC. Similarly, in Addba'v State of convicted under s 304, IPC." § * Pradesh” wherein the accused in a sudden fight peeween ihe C0 gi atacked the deceased with Jc that resulted in his death, the Spee? Cour in the absence of evidence indicating his intention to cause dent convicted the accused under s 304 and not for murder. en in this case, the Knowzepce Tuar Act Is So IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS So As To Cause DeatH— Cause (4) Or SecTION 300 Clause (4) of s 300 contemplates generally, commission of acts which ae 50 imminently dangerous that itis likely co cause death. Under this dause the act need not be directed at any particular individual nor need there be am intention to cause the death of any particular individual. Ie has merely be a reckless act, which is imminently dangerous. Illusteation (d) cleatly Sets our the scope ofthe clause. ‘A without any excuses fires a loaded canaon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a pre-meditated design to kill any particular individual’ The essential ingredients of this clause are as follows: (1) The act must be imminently dangerous; (2) The person committing the act must have knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous, 27 AIR 1968 SC 1390, 28 See lio, Jagrup Singh v State of Biba AIR L SC) Had : AIR 1972 SC 952, (1972) Cr LJ 587 (SC) Het ‘Singh vStateof Punjab AIRA975 SC. 195, I jan 1966 SC 148, (1966) Cr Yin (sc), *75)3 SETA Any See 29 (2001) Cr Lj 4675, (sc), 798 Scanned with CamScanner a —__ Homicide —— 6) Thar in all prob Y it will cause likely ro cause deat ‘ause (a) death (b) bodily inj 4) such imminently dany HOUS act gh ly injury as is or justification for manning the hoe he done without any reas sees FEIHENECNTENBT yey ja a death or sch injury arses inosine cangewons tha it ele Ome ha boil” injury that is likely to cause death, The \ kely toy cause death or such feds that the danger should be ec itminenly danger eh lates the tention to Kl aya sid cose at han, Hence, Tonssirtre the offence of murder The wekleate required in order to aehst be by the faets andl circumstances + avd inexeusahilty ofan set pel dangstOUs 3s casing deh wll mount beet sh wrder only if it inne doe wow any reasonable exese fra peste af Madiya Pradesh » Ram Prasad this da such a risk, sp upreme Cour ina totally differen ee es ali by ihe Spa and is wife Rai hada qual, Vilage his ewe the some fam Joo avail AC tha time, the accused poured Teowneol one Re 3me S njures. The Supreme Court observed tha in total 13 of 5 300, the question would arise as what was the intention of the accu F injuries he intended to cause ete which would a be matters te Piultin, The Supreme Court opined that ie would be simgler to 3 elance on cl () because i contemplates ony owl a 0 Da en The court held cha though generally the cause i invoked where aoe intention to cause the death of any paricuar person, the clause aarp terms be used in those cases where thee i ch cllousnest rye the result, and the sk taken is such that it may be sae char the person knows thac the act is likely ro cause death, In the present case, ‘4 set fire to his wife, he must have when the accused poured kerosene ani fnown that the act would resulr in her death. As he had no reason for incurring such risk, the offence was held to fall within cl (4) of s 300 and would be culpable homicide amounting to murder. In Thangaiya v State of Tamil Nadu, 1 the Suprem ruled that cl (4) of s 300 would be applicable where dl affender as to the probability of deach of a person appro: certainty, Such knowledge on the part of the offender m degree of probability. In Sehaj Ram v State of Haryana,” a constable, 2303 rifle, fired several shots at another constable. One 5! the nacure o! Court categorically he knowledge of the ximates fo a practic ust be of the highest who was armed with thot hit the vietim 30 AIR 1968 SC 881. 31 (2005) 9 SCC 650. 32 AIR 1983 SC 614. 799 Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law he fell down. Even he knee of | he leg and i ter thay beneath the her shot at him, though the shot did not hie i’ the ccused fired another a ce, it was Sin aoa tle hit the deceased below the knee, it was contendeg that ge the be ioe eet ws any 0 Frghten the deceased or eng! von of the accused! Wi si intention of the accused was On) Sst raleaed che Fret and nor to kil him. The Supreme Court rejected the con hurt 3 Fee aee wo! fall within the amie of el 4 oF § 300 an at the ac sed of murder, tion Md cony; held tha . the acet Wren Currants Homicte Is Nor Murper 1-4 of s 300 provide the essential ingredients wherein cy} Clauses dlet, The section also provides five exec homicide amounts to murder. The : ove Br exept situations, the existence of which will remove 2 se Fom the puny 5 300, In other words, even if a case falls within any of the four clases op + 300, if i also fils within any of the five exceptions, then it wil cee be murder. It will merely be culpable homicide not amounting to muri, Te may be nored tha l (4) of s 300 has an in-buil exception clas stipulates that the imminently dangerous act should be done ‘Without an; excuse for incurting the rsk of causing death or such injury’. Te thus indicang that an immediately dangerous at is not murder if ic is done to preven: grenter evil. Iti evident thae the exceptions provided in the section a applicable uniformly to all the four clauses of s 300. In which cas, iti only logical to conclude that the words ‘without excuse’ used in cl 4 contemplates situations other than those which fall within the ive exceptions Provided. It will also apply to situations, which fall short of the exceptions or which are other than the exceptions.*® The following are the exceptions provided for under s 300: Pable U1) Grave and sudden provocation; (2). Private defence; (3) Acts of public servants; 4) Sudden fight; \(5) Consent, Exception 1—Grave and Sudden Provocation Culpable homicide will not be murder, and sudden provocation, is deprived of his power of self control and 2 the death of a person. The person, whose death is caused, may be Berson who give the provecaion or any other person by mistake or acide 98 See Hari Singh Gout, Penal Law of India; vol 3 1998, p 2471. g if, the offender, on account of grave 11th eda, Law Publishers, last 800 Scanned with CamScanner am tant 1 is it ‘The exceP Ubject to three ox ) First, the provocation should 1 I not have been « ( by the offender, as an excuse fiyp kiln been sought for voluntarily ing, i . person, 8 oF doing any harm to any Sect y, the provocati (2) Secondly. the provocation is wot as reanle of an act done in sdience of law or by the acy op obedience of low oF by the act of public aac he | ant in the lavful of his powe exercis : (3) Thirdly, the provocation is not ag exercise of the right of pr esult of anything done i sa thing done in the Jn onder that this exception should apply, the Ineand sudden. Ifthe provocation i sudden semsudden, then the offender c Provocation should be both idden but not grave, or grave but cae er canoe aval of the benefit of this cretion, Further, it sh hat the provocation was of such a nature that the offender was deprived of the power of self-control In KM Nanavati v State of Mabarashera,™ the accused was a naval officer He was married with three children, One day, his wife confessed to kim that she had developed intimacy with the deceased, Enraged at this, the accused went to his ship, took a semi-automatic revolver and six cartridges from the store of the ship, went to the flat of the deceased, entered his bedroom and shot him dead. Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the act of the accused could be said to fall within Exception 1 of s 300. The Supreme Court laid down the following postulates relating to grave and sudden provocation: (1) The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused: was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. ; vain 2) In India, words and gestures may also, under cetttl circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accuse so as to bring his act within the first excep IPc. ; (3) The mental background created by the previous 3 may be taken into consideration in ascertail in subsequent act caused grave and sudden p' committing the offence. tion to section 300, ct of the victim whether the in for . 778, (1998) CF ARTE RC eae aca Sate of Ur Prac vate (1999) sw Ya 60. Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law _ “| w The ial lw shnlkl be clearly tae to heen pS (4) ‘The fa One OF bag ion and tot afer the pas " arising, from that provacation an Passion hag mn oe on cor atherwise givinys room ang Dl pee af Hime, OF 6 5 and down by lapre 0 i ef ‘Or siemedttation and ealenation, I the Supreme Court, which aid down the ¢ Thea tetd hat the accused alice is wife confessed te i ; vienhis vith the deceased, may have monetary a gay had thereafter dropped his wile and chi ren at nem collected the revolver, did some ati al busin va office of the deveased an! later to his house, ‘Three bn then and therefore, there was sufficient time for him (0 regain he control. In view of this, the court held that the Provisions of Ex. s 300 were nov attacted. The accused was convicted for mt ‘ sentenced to life imprisonment, and he by oS Self. ©eption | tb The Explanation to Exception 1 states that whether the Provocatio, was grave and sudden is a question of fact mn In Hansa Singh v State of Punjabs® the accuse Committing an act of sodomy on his son, which enrag the deceased. It was held that it amounted to 2 Provocation, The conviction under s 302 was set asid under 5 304, IPC. In Dattu Gen Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra,” the accused for killing the deceased was the fact th: d saw the dece, \ 'aseq ed him and he killed Brave and suddeg lc. He was Convicted the reason Biven by at he attempted to ew of the long time i he accused, accompanied “a the deceased fined a one the deceased, Apprehending danger to his f the companions of che accused and theeb? 3 ARDC 5; 1411 GC Seto Ur Prada» Laan 36 AIR 1977 SC 1g9) 37 AIR 1974 SC 397.122) CHL 1448 (60), 387, (1 38 AIR 1980 5¢ 44g, 7) CFL 446 50), 39 (2003) 9 sec 205, (1998) scw 778, (1998) Nite cise tina Scanned with CamScanner Homicide caused ae killed him en attacked the deceased wi. Fi ee sed grave and snk te Pls aha fit a axe on on re wo accept the Wenn Provocation te hin the ov his ° a8 the The se el shen acme aie th any pees! sun and prave’ provocation, the hackyromel fe eh wm en which ay EASE RAVE provacation bun att oF cali inser By CONS 8 FTO Tha eng the wn sulden, may al Pena” State of Kerala," the deceased had on Tee In Francis aa ae assed’ brother and brother nd as occasions sen far of menace fom che dceised tothe ves and wera ie oar ofthe accused So, eventhough the ener ncdenc ofan artack on bers did not constitute 's dde ave’ i and grave’ provocation, his family Me™ rs reduced to life imprisonment cenrence WAS Bxeption 2—Exceeding the Right of Private Defence As een in the chapter on ‘General Exceptions’, a person has a tight of srivate defence of property and person. This right, under certain roumstances, even extends to the causing of death. This clause is in respect segues where a person has exceeded his right of private defence. Ie may be pointed out that the fact that a person has exceeded his right of private Mfnce does not rorally exonerate a person under this exception. fe merely jsconsidered as a mitigating factor to reduce the offence from that of murder 0 culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Of course, before this tion can be availed of, it has to be proved that the accused had the right of private defence as stipulated in ss 96-106, IPC. It is only after the ght is established chat the question whether che accused will arise, If, in the first instance, the tight of private defence, then existence of the ri had exceeded his right to private defence it appears that the accused does not have obviously this clause will nor come into play. As already noted in the chapter on General Exceptions, if a person genuinely exercises his right of private defence wichin the limits prescribed by la, then he commits no offence. However, if he exceeds the right, it will amount to a lesser offence than murder. The most important circumstance in determining this factor is the intention of the haa The second exception stipulates that the exceeding of the eight of pri defence should be without pre-meditation, and without any inter the doing mone Lan tan i recossry for the purpose of Overs 7 ception, In other words, the exceeding © ye £ private defence b a 40 AR 1974 SC 2281, (1974) Cr LJ 1310 (SC). Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law ca a hould be done unintentionally, Only then can the accused , sl ! ided under this clause, The question whether theul Ft or ie ciahs of private defence was dane intentionally or yy ot me re re which has to be decided on the In Nan 1 State of Madras," the accused and bi wile were jn Posse {some lands which they fad been cultivating for several yen “retin ane en ape ofthe Fase amount cet the landldy The triad te cvict shee accused forcefully and tried to harvest the crop, in 4, in the exercise of his right to private defence of pro} erty, rt be elnocbie epted the contention thar th. filled the deceased. The Supreme Court accepte ‘sleet d at the took place when the accused had exercised his lf right ofp against the property. However, since the deceased party wa with any deadly weapons and here could not have been any or grievous hurt on the pare of the accused and his party, ¢he tithes private defence of property was limited to the extent of causing any haw other than death under s 104, IPC. It was therefore held rh the accused exceeded his right of private defence and the case would fl under Exception 2 to 5 300, IPC, and the offence committed by the aceuch ne held tobe culpable homicide not amounting to murder, ast was committed in good futh and without any intention of causing death, The seen death imposed upon the accused was reduced to one of life imprisons In Onkarnath Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,” the deceased party had initially atempred to attack the accused party. These was an inciden of grappling between the parties. When the deceased party was fleeing, the accused party made a murderous assault. It was held in this case tha ine the murder was committed when the deceased were fleeing, the right of Private defence ended with that, since the right is co-terminus with the eg, eed a lninteniggg NCS and ie in Ke SOE atme fear of 4 circumstances, it was held that the accused were neither entitled to a sight Of private defence, not to the benefir of Exception 2 to s 309, IPC. In Mobinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab,” the deceased and his colleagus were workers in the factory of the accused. There was a dispute beoweet = 1 AIR 1973 SC 665, (1975) Ce Ly 608 (sq. 980 2 aR 1974S 1550, (1974) CL} 1015 SC); Md MS Hameed vSae of eae AR! 108. 43 AIR 1979 SC 577, (1979) Ce 1) 584 (sq), 804 Scanned with CamScanner _ Homicide a cpa 19 payment of wages, On the | e day ef gembled outside the of occu chert pad the factory and raised trrence, the ole brie has ‘k tne Hector, Some property trike ative slogans amet ms ada ch a same out at his affice toni rods ine ip et his sevolver which billed the dene ot gon Ve Saree Ct el dh he ase Tsoi of ne such as t0 erst i is ovina the d eee 1c death or grievor ee Aen His Hight of private defence Eee hurt would be wee eased had exceeded hi re awed had exceeded his rig aba the ae ‘ 1 his right of private defence, Excepti 8 gs ek 98 cable to the facts of the ce, was not exercised, It was saspion FA of Public Servant gimilar to Exception 2, inthe sense cha it deals with situa Bas ble servane exceeds his laf ower inule doctor of wich cases death. The essential ingredients of hi exception ge 3s follows: {) Thence must be commited by a publi sewant or by pson siding a public servants (2) The act alleged must have committed by the public servant in the djzcharge of his official duties (5) He should have exceeded the powers given co him by law (4) The act should be done in good faiths (3 The public servant should have belived chat is act was lawful and ecenary for the due discharge of his duties (6) He should noc have borne any ill-will towards the person whos death was caused, A supected thief was arrested by a police constable and was being taken in ain, The thief escaped from the running train, The constable pursued seiko he was nov in a position to apprehend him, be fired ac him. Bat in that process he hie ehe fireman and killed him. Tr was held that the case was covered by this exception. ‘ Where an order to shoot was given by the public servant and his subordinate carried his orders, when there was no occasion to do so, it was held that the order of the public servane was illegal and neither the public servant nor the person acting under the order can be said to have acted in good futh-* Obedience of a superiors lawful order provects 2 subordinate “Wai SmI {5 ebb Singh v State IR 1955 A11379. (1959) x1 905 (All) (D8)- AIR 1950 EP 32 (DB). 205 Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law _ ri Causing death by the subo ine | order, therefore, cannot he exe n Sudden Fight it ne of MY & facie yy ng q cal 1 Foception 698 100 covers acts done without Premeding: The Fo arr this als leas with 3 €386 of prove aya in a en yuan This exception apes 09 stances, wih i al Scan However under Facepton I the provocation an not only be sudden and graves but it should also ie total eptivatign | self-control, Only under such circumstances, can the offender seek sf if However, under Exception 4 offender loses jy, under Exception 1. er, un : 7 of reasoning dct heat of passion aroused stddeny. Fart, yy fist Exception, the offender should nor have sought or Voluntatily Provoke the provocation. However, under this exception, the term ‘sudden fight implies mutual provocation and aggravation. It implies the abseng of previous deliberation or determination to fight. In such situations cn not be possible to trace from which party the initial provocation emanates The only requisites of this Exception are that: (1) The murder should have been committed without premeditation (2) It should have been committed in a sudden fight; (3) It should have been committed in the heat of passion; (4) It should have been commitced upon a sudden quarrel, and (5) It should have been committed without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. All these conditions are required to be proved for bringing the case within the ambit of Exception 4 to s 300.” ‘There has to have a fight. Where there is no fight at all, the Exceptionis not attracted.” The word ‘ight’, which not defined under the IPC, conveys Something more than a verbal quarrel. It implies mutual attack in which = 4G State of Wet Bengal v Sew Mangal Singh AIR 198\ $C.1917. 47 hint Gorka Nayak» Stare of Caja Q003) 9 SCC322; seal, Sate Sih AIC gLA03)7 SCC 441; Sache Lal Tisai v State of Uar Pade (2008) 11 SCC 48 kik pa SC 5039; Sridhar Whuyan v State af Ora (2004) 6 J 299. o. Ghar Singh v State of Rajasthan ALR | 993 SC 2426; Rajendra Singh v State of Bib HS N77 Sibldeu Singh v Sate (2003) 7 SCC 441, Prd Chand» gy Ringel Pradch 2004) 11 SC 38, ‘ ait Sint of ea ‘fdminiaraion) AIR 1999 SC 1406; Subhash Shane Pat a SCALE 24. 7" 2000) 1 SCC 3845 Pappu v State of Madiya Pradesh 2 50 Juan: Singh vit of User Pada 1998) $C 134 Ca, Scanned with CamScanner Homicide he parties participate. It implies « path the P by anodes change of bl py one PM ¥ » Another de me An Xs FF cannot be a Fight. Nev no actual a erthele: " Mack Neless, at t constitute figl Mute fight.” One-sided ey by aos conti a fight, Howes he tacep chain to into play only when eu pable homicide ig committed inant il ome ae cd in an unpremeditned ‘The words ‘sudden fight OF upon sudden quarrel pate mare of fre ight Free fight isi oe pa ane, meting ne fight from the start, go out to fight and the vise ere is a pitched battle tion of who a ks and who defe The quest nds in . ends . 7 " uncer and depends on the tactics adopted by we i i rival mre can be no question of a free Fight in om that one of the parties was the vast the cl ‘yhhere an accused inflicted chree fatal blows with sas unarmed, i was held tha it could not be sido by se fghs a8 a fight postulates a bilateral transaction in ‘hich blows ae exchanged by both the parties. When the aggression is only on o va are cannot be said to be a fight.°> ne sie, Ie Merely sudden quarrel and the absence of premeditation do not warrant the Exception. It is also required to show that the accused has not taken undue advantage’ or acted in cruel or unusual manner. In Dharman v State of Punjab,” there was a dispute between the accused and the deceased concerning a vacant piece of land. The accused claimed that he was in possession of the land. On the other hand, the deceased puny chimed that they had set up a Time-crshing machine on the land Proveedings were pending under s 145, CxPC, berween the paris. In the meantime, the accused party destroyed the lime-crushing machine, The ight is wholly commanders, lear finding of 31 Mohammad Myron Shabul Haid v State of Kerala AIR 1980 SC 108: Ashok Kumar Barik 1 State of Orisa (1992) Cr L} 1849 (Ori) Prakash Chand v State of Himachal Pradesh (2004) 11 SCC 381. 52. Chonadan Karunan v State of Kerala (1994) SCC 501 (Cri); Krishna Tiwary vy State of Bibar i He (2002) 3 SCC 3275 Sachchey Lal (0 Cr 3277 (SC); Subir Singh Sate re Shan Tiwari v State of Utar Pradesh AIR 2004 SC 5039, (200 ‘ Pachunde v State of Maharashtra (2006) 1 SCC 384. 33. Pran Das v State (1954) Cr LJ 331 (SC). SA. Gajanand v State of Utar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 69>. (1954) Cr LJ ne et 4660. 35. Bhagwan Munjaji Pavade v State af Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 133. 370 ae Se 56 The expression ‘undue advantage’ as used in the Exception a i a and Sia Dhirajbhai Gorakbbhai Nayak v State of Gigarat (2003) 9 SCC 322s of Himachal Pradesh (2004) 11 SCC 381. i» Soate of Maia 57-AIR 1957 SC 324, (1957) Cx Lj 420 (SC see also Mais eer Pade (2000) LCC 319s Japa» Stat of Haran 2000) Scanned with CamScanner Criminal Law ' pat cine Immediately, a Aiphe enn with 7 reewed Jecened received fatal injutiog Ieyaey, tM eh tone withowe pre meg Mel deceased poarey Ht the corer off thie fi be decenced were ee! U the injuries in the beg ting Ma the eases weed cance the tage woof Bi n, anders Faghr ond th " The accused had alo not taken inde nn ing an seen quate Te ve therefore held thay a Et Fat prion 410 ¢ X00, TPC “a cea te wn TD agheven Nair » State of Thmamore hy, Tene ean one Velayuthan Nain. te tested gn fight herwren the acute’ cen c e Ming he two The deceased came up to them ancl tried te herwren the nwo souffle herwe admonbed Velayuthan, who was the “Dit, 4 hed Velayuthan, who was the son-in-law, ne 7 nevniehy them and ad Rey The dacoued ited swan off the blow soy was hit sia dears THe deed erick again and this time chef ow the che and cased the injury. which eventually ie the covended on behalf the accused that ths war coe Sudden ih x sh whi he fou Exception 3001 ge Cows rssh comnton and aid hat he aise bed ee man who made no sen aginst i, ut merely asked the sl Troe op feng, The ihe of the acute was oor a Seco but with the sonindaw of the decease The son simpy ‘mh end alta and sbbed the deceted, The cour bed hg 4 to s 300 would not apply. In Subbbir Singh » State of Haryana, of mud by pok a pet arn ¢ is Waist 4

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