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A.C. No.

4549               December 2, 2013

NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION FELIPE-DOMINGO,


MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal,
docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we required respondent to comment.
Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of Tme To File Comment. 4 He requested for additional period
of 30 days within which to file his comment citing numerous professional commitments. We granted said
request in our October 2, 1996 Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment.
Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative Case For
Resolution Without Comment Of Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his
right to file comment.

On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.7

The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-Palma who set the
hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8

The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next hearing was set on
November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel.11

Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing, complainants
moved to calendar the case.12

The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on January 12,
1999.13

During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their Position
Paper.1âwphi1 Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14

Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16

It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating Commissioner
Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation.17

In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the Petition; he then
narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no discussion was made regarding the
merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants
alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the counsel for the defendants therein; that
respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants are half-
brothers and half-sisters of complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch
36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent
introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and
that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants
averred that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with the
rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that
they filed a Vigorous Opposition  to the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing
actuations, respondent violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay
complainants the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine, complainants
charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of
Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally
baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to determine whether respondent is guilty
of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue of whether the complainants are indeed related to the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being half-brothers and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to
make an assessment on the authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed was indeed
baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites
cannot be accomplished in this administrative case. The resolution of whether the parties are related to
each other appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint
for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Damages. The complainants
claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the
defendants therein, as represented by the respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants.
Clearly, the issue of filiation must be settled in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case. The
same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage Certificate which was submitted in
evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed against the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before
Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement that they are strangers to each
other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly
submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous
Opposition  to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by
the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action.
We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -

x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court
or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations
of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's disciplinary authority. However, if
the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liablity, and which do not directly require an inquiry
into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19

Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a
member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance,
however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer
concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that
are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the
conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss
the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending on the final outcome of the civil
case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition filed by complainants must be
dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion here. It has not escaped our notice
that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not file his comment. Neither did he file his Position
Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.

Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only irresponsible,
but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of
a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. As an officer of
the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an
order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as
the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers.22

Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the infraction committed
by the respondent.23

ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to give due
respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that commission of a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar,
and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
Re: Almacen Feb 8, 1970

FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by
Supreme Court”.  He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual “peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.”  His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb.”  He then vows to argue the cause of his
client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’
and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.”  He
ends his petition with a prayer that:

“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant.  The trial court rencered judgment agains his client.  On June 15,
1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision.  Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration
but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion.  Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966,
the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment.  For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both
motions.  To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier,
that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal.  Motion for reconsideration was denied by
Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right.  No law may abridge this right.  Nor is he “professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen.  Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
Non suspension from practice of law for using intemperate languages in pleadings
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal vs. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
[A.C. No. 8954. November 13, 2013.]
DEL CASTILLO, J  p:

Facts:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal.
Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. He filed his Pre-Trial Brief
without proof of MCLE compliance hence; it was expunged from the records without prejudice to
the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. The preliminary
conference was reset several times for failure of respondent to appear and submit his Pre-Trial
Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo gave respondent last chance to
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on
his part. Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference, respondent manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the
following day. The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language
in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. 

Issue:

Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for using intemperate language in
his pleadings

Held:

NO. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also employed intemperate
language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his
language. 

However, the court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, the
court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century.  Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, the court deem it proper to
fine respondent and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court
processes.
Garcia vs. Francisco,

AC No. 3923, March 30, 1993

FACTS

This is a disbarment case by Concordia B. Garcia against Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco. the complainant
claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to
thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The
proceedings stemmed from th lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the
proscription against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as
were authorized by law.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be punished for misuse of judicial process

HELD

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an
officer of the Court.

POBRE vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO


(A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)

PETITIONER

Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,


debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x.

According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be
disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.

RESPONDENT

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge
of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those comments to
expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the next Chief
Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 which states that:

"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof."

ISSUE

WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO.

The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good
conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is
not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances
of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her.

Petition is DISMISSED

Bansig v. Celera AC No. 5581, Jan. 14, 2014

FACTS:

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal
wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage
on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been
annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera committed gross immorality that would warrant their
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

YES, respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession.
He was ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.1âwphi1

Ratio:

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25

This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment
on the complaint against him. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to
comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of
them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had
not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is
pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition
of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s
deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance. Clearly, respondent's
acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We
have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the
Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of
the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders
of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He
is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

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