The Civil Code of the Philippines

Title XII. - CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

Art. 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.
Art. 357. Every child shall:
(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.
Art. 358. Every parent and every person HOLDING SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY shall see to it
that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and SHALL PARTICULARLY, by
precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country, veneration for the national
heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the
government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught
as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
Art. 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the
municipality. It shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their
cooperation.
Art. 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large
municipality.
Art. 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper
case be judicially admonished.
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. NO MOTHER SHALL BE SEPARATED FROM HER CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF
AGE, UNLESS THE COURT FINDS COMPELLING REASONS FOR SUCH MEASURE .

Family Code
TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY SHALL INCLUDE THE
CARING FOR AND REARING THEM FOR CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICIENCY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR MORAL, MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTER AND WELL-BEING.
(n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases
authorized by law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, UNLESS THERE IS A
JUDICIAL ORDER TO THE CONTRARY.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children,
UNLESS the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the CHOICE OF THE
CHILD OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, UNLESS THE PARENT CHOSEN IS UNFIT. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE SURVIVING GRANDPARENT. In case several
survive, THE ONE DESIGNATED BY THE COURT, taking into account the same consideration mentioned
in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such TESTIMONY IS INDISPENSABLE IN A CRIME against the descendant or
by one parent against the other. (315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed.(349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes,
orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The SCHOOL, ITS ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS, OR THE INDIVIDUAL, ENTITY
OR INSTITUTION ENGAGED IN CHILD are shall have SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility SHALL APPLY TO ALL AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES WHETHER INSIDE
OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR INSTITUTION. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph sHALL NOT APPLY IF IT IS
PROVED THAT THEY EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated
children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
 (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under
their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best
interests of the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental
authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for
disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice
or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall
be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the
petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not
more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by
the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed
but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon
the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than
ten per centum(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any
part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental
authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous
or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's
support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated
child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable
monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a
stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole
or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority;
or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.
(327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a
crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon
service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if
the parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of
the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the
guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose
or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to
sexual abuse, such person shall be PERMANENTLY DEPRIVED BY THE COURT OF SUCH
AUTHORITY. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of
the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC March 4, 2003
 RE: PROPOSED RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS
RESOLUTION

Section 4. Child Custody. - In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of the child of the
parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and shall
give paramount consideration to the material and moral welfare of the child.
The court may likewise consider the following factors:
(a) the agreement of the parties;
(b) the desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the child and
the other parent;
(c) the child's health, safety, and welfare;
(d) any history of child or spousal abase by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial
relationship with the child, including anyone courting the parent;
(e) the nature and frequency of contact with both parents;
(f) habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances;
(g) marital misconduct;
(h) the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment; and
(i) the preference of the child, if over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
The court may award provisional custody in the following order of preference:
(1) to both parents jointly;
(2) to either parent taking into account all relevant considerations under the foregoing paragraph,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(3} to the surviving grandparent, or if there are several of them, to the grandparent chosen by the child
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent is unfit or disqualified;
(4) to the eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(5) to the child's actual custodian over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or
(6) to any other person deemed by the court suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the child.
The custodian temporarily designated by the" court shall give the court and the parents five days notice
of any plan to change the residence of the child or take him out of his residence for more than three days
provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the parents.
Section 5. Visitation Rights. - Appropriate visitation rights shall be provided to the parent who is not awarded
provisional custody unless found unfit or disqualified by the court.

Section 7. Order of Protection. - The court may issue an Order of Protection requiring any person:
(a) to stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the child, other parent or any other
party, and to stay away from any other specific place designated by the court;
(b) to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such child or the other parent or any person to whom
custody of the child is awarded;
(c) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety, or
welfare of the child;
(d) to permit a parent, or a person entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation agreement, to visit the
child at stated periods;
(e) to permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in order to take persona!
belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court;
(f) to comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the child.

SAGALA-ESLAO V. CA
G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997
Facts:
- Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with
Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple HAD TWO CHILDREN NAMELY LESLIE AND
ANGELICA.

Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her parents
at Teresita's house.

- Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie.

- Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US
with him. A year after the marriage, MARIA RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES TO BE REUNITED
WITH HER CHILDREN AND BRING THEM TO US. The petitioner then informed the respondent about
her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his
willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education.

Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old
and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.

- THE TRIAL COURT rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.

Issue:
Does the Teresita have the right to the custody of the child?

Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of ADOPTION, GUARDIANSHIP AND SURRENDER TO A
CHILDREN'S HOME OR AN ORPHAN INSTITUTION. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company.

In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was
merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
 DAISIE T. DAVID V. COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMON R. VILLAR
G.R. No. 111180 (November 16, 1995)

This case reflects Philippine society’s regard for mothers as the PRIMARY CAREGIVERS, especially to
very young children. While one might regard this provision as a form of gender bias against the fathers, it is
important to consider that an advocacy for the “neutralization” of this preference must entail other changes
that must necessarily be affected. Support structures must also be in place. For instance, joint parenting which
is already encouraged under the legal framework of the Family Code must find support in other laws and
policies such as extended paternal leave, programs on gender orientation, child rearing, as both a mother and a
father role, as contrasted to child-bearing which is a sex role assigned to women only. Until and unless other
supportive measures are in place, a change in Art. 213 to favor a father might not be effective. Conversely,
unless some measures are done, this provision can also be argued as perpetuating a gender bias that women
should be considered the primary caregivers, just because they are the ones capable of bearing children.

Facts: Petitioner David had an illicit affair with her married employer, private respondent Villar. Together
they had three children who were all accepted into the respondent’s legal family.

The refusal of the respondent—to return their eldest son, after obtaining the consent of petitioner to take the
child to Boracay with his family—gave rise to the problem regarding the custody of the child. Villar said
he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.

The decision was reversed by the respondent court, deeming the habeas corpus case to be improper.

Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This
is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their
legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of
their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar xxx

Held: Rule 102, §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband
and is entitled to the custody of her child, and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested
with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” The fact that the private respondent is
well-off is not sufficient reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering
that she has been able to independently raise and support all three children since birth.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action.

DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.

On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth[2] to GARDIN FAITH BELARDE TONOG,
her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student
while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private
respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house inQuezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a
welcome addition to the family.

A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work
as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal
grandparents.

On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor,
Gardin Faith.

Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only
on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution
dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her
opposition to private respondent’s petition. The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related
incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.

Trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration and granting
petitioner’s motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said
resolution.

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35971, questioning the actuations of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the APPELLATE COURT
DISMISSED the petition on the ground of lack of merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, the APPELLATE COURT ISSUED A RESOLUTION[3] DATED AUGUST 29, 1995
MODIFYING ITS DECISION

We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, continue
under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.

While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her legal
and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional and psychological effects upon the
latter of a change in custody should be considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from
petitioner to private respondent will be painful for the child who, all her life, has been in the company of
petitioner and her paternal grandparents.

Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as
the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of
seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that GARDIN FAITH IS NOW TWELVE YEARS
OLD.

RULING: In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith,
since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether A MOTHER IS A FIT PARENT FOR HER CHILD IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE
PROPERLY ENTERTAINED IN THE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[13] It
should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the
best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of
seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should
have the custody over her person.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with
hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long
as the children are under parental authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless
the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into
account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
SANTOS V CA (G.R. 113054)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
MARRIED IN ILOILO CITY IN 1986. Their union beget only one child, LEOUEL SANTOS, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.

The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private
respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her
son.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
 On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.  After an ex-
parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the
child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.  In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his
minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

ISSUE:
            Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

RULING:
THE MINOR SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE LEGITIMATE FATHER. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor.

Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father
is still preferred over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present
time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it
cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his EFFORTS
TO KEEP HIS ONLY CHILD IN HIS CUSTODY MAY BE REGARDED AS SERIOUS EFFORTS TO
RECTIFY HIS PAST MISDEEDS. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and
son.

The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the
natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
 ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant, vs. DRA.
VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.

Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, JOSEPH CASERO, was sought to be enforced by habeas
corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in its Special Proceeding No. 1947. After
hearing, the writ was denied by the Court, and the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively
on points of law.

On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the
Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali,
single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.

The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her
own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he
recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the REAL MOTHER NEVER
VISITED HER CHILD, AND NEVER PAID FOR HIS EXPENSES.

The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children
apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the
offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a
mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.

The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness. He
never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court informed him that
his real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the respondent. The boy
pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him, "Why do you choose to stay with your
"Mammy?" He answered, "She is the one rearing me." This confrontation was made in the presence of the two
women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in open court.

After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he
reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother
and denied the writ prayed for.

RULING: WE SEE NO REASON TO DISTURB THE ORDER APPEALED FROM. While our law
recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that
"in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of CHILDREN, THE LATTER'S WELFARE
SHALL BE PARAMOUNT" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that FOR COMPELLING
REASONS, EVEN A CHILD UNDER SEVEN MAY BE ORDERED SEPARATED FROM THE MOTHER.

As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not
only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could
derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and
witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.l
No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we
hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.

ESPIRITU VS. CA
GR 115640, MARCH 15, 1995

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while
in US.  Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh for a TEMPORARY POST.  They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. 

After a year, they WENT BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES FOR A BRIEF VACATION WHEN THEY ALSO
GOT MARRIED.  Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald. 

In 1990, they decided to SEPARATE. 

Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California.  Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.  

She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.

Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for
bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was
actually rendered only on September 29, 1994.

When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, she filed a PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST REYNALDO AND HIS SISTER TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN. 

The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind
and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THEM BUT WITH
RIGHTS OF VISITATION TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES AND TO BE APPROVED BY
THE COURT.

On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera
concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to
Reynaldo.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount
concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for
compelling reasons.  The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age
is strong but not conclusive. 

At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age.  The CHOICE OF THE
CHILD TO WHOM SHE PREFERRED TO STAY MUST BE CONSIDERED.  It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt.  She was found of suffering from emotional shock
caused by her mother’s infidelity. 

Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. 

On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already
caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.    

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-
14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is
reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996)

Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse.  After
six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to RAY PEREZ II
IN NEW YORK ON JULY 20, 1992.
Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant.  Unlike his wife,
however, HE HAD ONLY A TOURIST VISA AND WAS NOT EMPLOYED.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.  After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S.  She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had
round-trip tickets.  However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to
follow her with the baby.  
 According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued working.  She was supposed to come back immediately
after winding up her affairs there.
When NERISSA CAME HOME A FEW DAYS BEFORE RAY II’S FIRST BIRTHDAY, THE
COUPLE WAS NO LONGER ON GOOD TERMS.  They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near
her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his
profession.  He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a
car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
NERISSA FILED A PETITION TO SURRENDER THE CUSTODY OF THEIR SON TO HER.
(Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son)
The trial court  issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting
custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Who should have rightful custody of a child?
Held:
Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
“SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.
Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other,
and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage
is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care,
custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to
choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its
mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” (Italics supplied)

The provisions of law quoted above cLEARLY MANDATE THAT A CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF
AGE SHALL NOT BE SEPARATED FROM HIS MOTHER UNLESS THE COURT FINDS
COMPELLING REASONS TO ORDER OTHERWISE.   The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in
the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. ONLY THE MOST COMPELLING OF REASONS
SHALL JUSTIFY THE COURT’S AWARDING THE CUSTODY OF SUCH A CHILD TO SOMEONE
OTHER THAN HIS MOTHER, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest
of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated
that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of
quality time with her son.  Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of
time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating
child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother,
as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids
under the eagle eyes of the mother. 
Although Ray is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies
on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his
child.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is
awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.

CANG VS COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children . During
the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
N o t   l o n g   t h e r e a f t e r ,   h o w e v e r ,   A n n a   M a r i e   l e a r n e d   o f   h e r   husband's alleged extramarital
affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WHICH WAS
GRANTED .

They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into
agreements without the written consent of  Herbert.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he SOUGHT A DIVORCE FROM ANA MARIE. He was
issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation
at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.
M e a n w h i l e ,   t h e   B R O T H E R   A N D   S I S T E R - I N - L A W   O F   A N N A MARIE FILED FOR THE
ADOPTION OF THE 3 MINOR  CANG  CHILDREN.

Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it.
Before the COURT OF APPEALS, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would
be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of
parental authority because:
(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption;
(b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and
 (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption

Issue:
C a n   m i n o r   c h i l d r e n   b e   l e g a l l y   a d o p t e d   w i t h o u t   t h e written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?

Held:
A r t i c l e   2 5 6   o f   t h e   F a m i l y   C o d e   p r o v i d e s   f o r   i t s retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d   r i g h t s   i n   a c c o r d a n c e   w i t h   t h e C i v i l
C o d e   o r   o t h e r   laws."

As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision o n   c o n s e n t   f o r   a d o p t i o n   n o w   r e a d s :

A r t . 1 8 8 .   T h e   w r i t t e n consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(2) the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper  government
instrumentality.

B a s e d   o n   t h e   f o r e g o i n g ,   i t   i s   t h u s   E V I D E N T   T H A T NOTWITHSTANDING  TH
E   A M E N D M E N T S   T O   T H E   L A W ,   T H E   W R I T T E N CONSENT OF THE NATURAL
PARENT TO THE ADOPTION HAS REMAINED A REQUISITE FOR ITS  VALIDITY. As clearly
inferred from the foregoing provisions of  law, the WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE NATURAL
PARENT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE DECREE OF ADOPTIO n.

Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "INSANE OR HOPELESSLY INTEMPERATE."In the instant
case, records disclose
that petitioner'sc o n d u c t   d i d   n o t   m a n i f e s t   a   s e t t l e d   p u r p o s e   t o   f o r e g o   a l l p a r e n t a
l   d u t i e s   a n d   r e l i n q u i s h   a l l   p a r e n t a l   c l a i m s   o v e r   h i s children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamountto abandonment. 

While  admittedly,  petitioner  was  physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained
regular communication with hiswife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

BONDAGJY VS. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001

Facts: Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February
3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites.

On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion.
However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,and Amouaje,
born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 

At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent  was  still  married  to  a  Saudi  Arabian

woman whom he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's
family in  Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived
for more than two years.

Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street,
Ayala Alabang. FOUZI ALLEGED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HIS CHILDREN UNTIL HE GOT AN
ORDER FROM THE COURT. EVEN WITH A COURT ORDER, HE COULD ONLY SEE HIS
CHILDREN IN SCHOOL AT DE LA SALLE-ZOBEL,  ALABANG, MUNTINLUPA CITY .

On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz  Bondagjy  to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje  Bondagjy  to  Amouage Selina Artadi.

Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila,and
that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under
Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee
of P40.00after the children come home from school.

Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in
his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.

On March 11, 1996, RESPONDENT FOUZY ALI  BONDAGJY  FILED WITH THE SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURT,MARAWI CITY, AN ACTION TO OBTAIN CUSTODY OF HIS TWO MINOR CHILDREN,
ABDULAZIZ, AND AMOUAJE.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of marriage,
custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court.

On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims,
Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
 
 
 The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and  Guardianship does  not apply to this case
because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her
children.

However, the Shari’a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus -

“A married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the community in which
she lives considers morally upright, and in a manner that her growing minor children will not be socially
and morally affected and prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has failed to observe that which is
expected of a married woman and a mother by the society in which she lives. xxx “

The evidence of this case shows the extent of the moral depravity of the respondent, and the kind of concern for
the welfare of her minor children which on the basis thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with the custody
of her minor children.
Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally disentitled to the custody of her
minor children by reason of ‘wickedness’ when such wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, such as
when she engages in ‘zina’ (illicit sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is
not worthy to be trusted with the custody of the child who is continually going out and leaving the child
hungry.

Issue:
 Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back
to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness
to be the custodian of her children?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the
issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent are:

[1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
[2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking  into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. 

The standard  in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is NOT RESTRICTED TO MUSLIM

LAWS. The FAMILY CODE SHALL BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION in deciding whether a non-
Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents. 
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father  and mother shall  jointly  exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not
divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority
and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje
Bondagjy, until the children reach majority age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of
rearing the children.
The father, FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may take the children
out only with the written consent of the mother.

LAXAMANA V.LAXAMANA
Sept. 31, 2002, Ynares-Santiago,

Facts: Reymond married Ma. Lourdes and had three children.

Reymond became a DRUG DEPENDENT, was confined, and eventually released as “drug-free”.
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully  rehabilitated. His drug dependence
WORSENED AND IT BECAME DIFFICULT FOR RESPONDENT AND HER CHILDREN TO   LIVE
WITH HIM. 
Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted  respondent. 

Thus, on June17, 1999, respondent and her 3children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house
of her relatives.

Reymond filed a case to have custody over his children.

A month later, his wife filed a  petition to annul the marriage. Parties reached an agreement with Reymond
being granted visitation rights and both spouses to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination.

On Jan. 14, 2000, trial court awarded custody to the wife.

Reymond filed an instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
 WON the lower court’s decision erred when it resolved the issue of custody without trial.

Held/Ratio:
  Yes. The paramount interests of the children were not given due consideration. Instead, the court a quo
relied on the basis of the psychological report of the  spouses’ conditions to render its decision. This is held
to being sufficient to justify awarding custody to the mother.

The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet "completely cured" may render him unfit to
take custody of the children, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT IS UNFIT
TO PROVIDE THE CHILDREN WITH ADEQUATE SUPPORT, EDUCATION, AS WELL AS MORAL
AND INTELLECTUAL TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT. 

Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision,
yet the COURT DID NOT ASCERTAIN THEIR CHOICE AS TO  WHICH PARENT THEY WANT TO
LIVE WITH. It is clear that - every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on
the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents'
say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts
must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law.

The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the
records reveals that no  such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This  latter court relied merely on
the  mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not  sufficient basis to determine the
fitness of each parent tobe the custodian of  the children.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and
respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall
remain with respondent but subject to petitioner’s visitation rights in accordance with the December 7,
1999 order of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005
 The case below upholds the right of the mother to exercise custody over her child under Article 16(1)(d) of
CEDAW. Parents should not be denied of their parental and custodial rights—in this case, a mother, just
because she has a non-heterosexual gender identity.

Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
RAFAELLO, whom his wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice.
A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out
that the wife is having LESBIAN RELATIONS.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the
child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art
213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided:

“Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des
granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”

No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise,”

This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c
reads:

“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

The “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors is always the paramount consideration.
Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that bear upon the children’s well-
being and development. Aside from material resources and moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may be considered, among which are: the previous care and devotion shown by each parent; religious
background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; and the children’s emotional and
educational needs.

But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of
her minor child.[51] To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses
have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
proper parental care.

It is, therefore, NOT ENOUGH FOR THE FATHER TO SHOW MERELY THAT THE MOTHER WAS A
LESBIAN.  HE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT SHE CARRIED ON HER PURPORTED
RELATIONSHIP WITH A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR SON OR
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONDUCIVE TO THE CHILD’S PROPER MORAL
DEVELOPMENT. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or
that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner , v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,Respondent

.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010
CARPIO,J.:
Facts:
•Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one
DAUGHTER, STEPHANIE, born on September 21, 1995.

•In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the ILLINOIS COURT DISSOLVED THE MARRIAGE
OF  PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT, AWARDED TO RESPONDENT SOLE CUSTODY
OF  STEPHANIE and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

•On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie.

•In 2004, HERALD FILED A CASE AGAINST SHARON ALLEGING THAT SHARON HAD EXERCISED SOLE
CUSTODY OVER STEPHANIE contrary to their agreement.

o The trial court held that:

(1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent;
(2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction; and
(3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS ON JURISDICTION AND DISMISSED THE CASE.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the
joint custody of the parties child

Held/ Rationale: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

 The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the  Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. 

What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.”

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law
on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x.”[16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody[17] to the mother is mandatory,[18] grounded on
sound policy consideration,[19] subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20]) Clearly then
the Agreement’s object to ESTABLISH A POST-DIVORCE JOINT CUSTODY REGIME BETWEEN
RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER OVER THEIR CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OLD
CONTRAVENES PHILIPPINE LAW.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody by the father.

Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-
divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, THE  ACTION LIES BEYOND THE ZONE  OF
THE  ILLINOIS COURT’S SO-CALLED “RETAINED JURISDICTION.”

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the
other. (315a)

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION

AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH

EMMA K. LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN
K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by
RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,

Facts: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as
immigrants from China. They had 11 children
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another
property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the
Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh
children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee
(who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already
38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother,
when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other
children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other
children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City[2]in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the
same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion
but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.

The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being
oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that
Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying.

Issue: Whether or not the stepmother can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

Ruling:
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in
criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds
of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie
connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus
provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 218. The SCHOOL, ITS ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS, OR THE INDIVIDUAL, ENTITY
OR INSTITUTION ENGAGED IN CHILD are shall have SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility SHALL APPLY TO ALL AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES WHETHER INSIDE
OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR INSTITUTION. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE
UNEMANCIPATED MINOR. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph sHALL NOT APPLY IF IT IS
PROVED THAT THEY EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

ROBERTO AMADORA VS. CA

GR NO. L47745, APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was MORTALLY HIT BY A GUN BY
PABLITO DAFFON (classmate) RESULTING TO THE FORMER’S DEATH. 

Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. 

The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with
Daffon and 2 other students. 

Complaints against the students were dropped. 

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .

Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following
reasons:

1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades
2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended
3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and
4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations
in maintaining discipline. 

Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The TIME ALFREDO WAS FATALLY SHOT, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened.  It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics requirement.  What was important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. 

On the other hand, the RECTOR, HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND THE DEAN OF BOYS CANNOT
BE HELD LIABLE because none of them was the TEACHER-IN-CHARGE as defined in the provision. 
Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. 

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, DEAN OF BOYS SHOULD PROBABLY BE HELD LIABLE
CONSIDERING THAT HE HAD EARLIER CONFISCATED AN UNLICENSED GUN FROM A
STUDENT AND LATER RETURNED TO HIM WITHOUT TAKING DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR
REPORTING THE MATTER TO THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES.  Though it was clear negligence on his
part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because ONLY THE
TEACHER OR THE HEAD OF SCHOOL OF ARTS AND TRADE is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student.  Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora
that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under
the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

AMADORA V. CA [1988]
CRUZ, J.
Facts:
•April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATING STUDENT
OF   C O L E G I O   D E   S A N   J O S E R E C O L E T O S   w e n t   t o   s c h o o l   t o   f i n i s h   a   P h y s i c s
experiment.

However, while he was in the auditorium, HIS CLASSMATE PABLITO DAFFON FIRED A GUN
THAT HIT HIM . He died at 17.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

•Amadora’s parents filed a  civil action  for damages  under  CC  Art. 2180
 against the: school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher, plus Daffon
&  2  other  students thru  their  parents. Complaint against students was later dropped.

•CFI Cebu: DEFENDANTS   WERE LIABLE   IN   THE SUM   OF   P294,984.00   (death

compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages &
attorney’s fees)

•CA: REVERSED, ALL DEFENDANTS ABSOLVED COMPLETELY.

1 . A s p e r R u l e s o f C o u r t ( R O C ) R u l e 4 5 , C C   A r t . 2 1 8 0 i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e since
the school was an ACADEMIC INSTITUTION OF LEARNING & NOT A SCHOOL OF ARTS &
TRADES.
2. Students were NOT IN CUSTODY OF THE SCHOOL AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT since the semester had already ended
3. No clear identification of the fatal gun.
4. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury.

•Petitioners claim their son was still UNDER SCHOOL’S CUSTODY because he went to school to  comply
w/a requirement for graduation.

•Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer in their custody since the
semester was over.

•A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, DEAN OF BOYS, from Jose Gumbanon April 7, 1972.

It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban  w/o reporting  such to  the principal
or  taking further  action. Gumban was one Daffon’s companions when the incident happened.

Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondents rebutted by saying THERE
WAS NO PROOF THAT THEY WERE ONE AND THE SAME.

ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. – NO.

•Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School & a

b o y   s c o u t   a t t e n d e d   a   R i z a l   D a y   p a r a d e   o n   c i t y   s c h o o l   s u p e r v i s o r ’ s instructions.
Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep & drove it recklessly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers. SC
exculpated school in obiter dictum (it was not party to the case) since it was not a school of arts & trades.
Some justices dissented claiming  that liability under CC Art. 2180 applied to teachers in general &
heads of schools of arts & trades in particular.

•Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate w/a razor blade at the Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling
reiterated. Custody requirement was defined as a situation where student lives & boards w/teacher
such that control, direction & influences on pupil supersede those of parents.

•Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate w/ fist blows in the lab of Manila
Technical Institute. Court ruled that even  if offender was already of age & not boarding in the
school, the head & teacher-in-charge were solidarily liable w/him. Custody was defined as the protective &
supervisory custody that school, its heads & teachers exercise

Lastly, TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF  ARTS & TRADES SHALL BE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR PUPILS & STUDENTSOR APPRENTICES SO LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR
CUSTODY.

(CC Art. 2180) over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the school including recess
time. No such requirement as actual living & boarding in the school before such liability is attached. It set aside
Mercado ruling. Even students of age were still covered by provision since they’re equally in
custody of school & subj to its discipline.

•CC Art. 2180 APPLIES TO ALL SCHOOLS WHETHER ACADEMIC OR NON-ACADEMIC.

In the former, teacher-in-charge of student is the person responsible (general rule). Whereas in the latter (arts &
trades), it is the head (exception). SC agrees w/dissent in Exconde, saying that while the child is in school,
parentis not supposed to interfere w/discipline of school nor w/authority & supervision of teacher.
W/o authority, there can be no responsibility. No reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from teachers
from academic institutions and non-academic ones.

History of disparity:

a . h e a d o f   s c h o o l o f a r t s &   t r a d e s   e x e r c i s e d c l o s e r t u t e l a g e o v e r h i s students
who apprenticed to their master, the school head. He was personally involved in teaching
his students who usually boarded w/him& thus he exercised constant control, supervision & influence.

b.Head of academic school: exercised only administrative duties over teachers who were directly
dealing w/students. Thus, teacher is liable.

•CC Art. 2180’s custody requirement is  not limited to  boarding w/school authorities. It’s not co-
terminous w/sem. It includes periods of registration or before graduation during w/c,
student is still subj to the disciplinary authority of the school. There is custody for as long as he’s under
control & influence of school & w/in its premises regardless of time and for as long as student can show that he
is in school in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise
& enjoyment of a legitimate student rt/privilege. It includes relaxing in the campus.

•Under similar circumstances, teacher-in-charge  should be liable for his students’ torts. He need

not be physically present or in a position to prevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child
& the discipline instilled. Applicable as well to head of school of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of
student’s age. Teacher should be liable & not school itself unless he can prove that he exercised the diligence of
a good father such as by employing sufficient no. of security guards, etc. This defense is made available to the
teacher considering that his responsibility/influence over the child cannot be equated to that of the parents.
Parents can expect more obedience from the child since kid depends more on parents. Parent can instill more
lasting discipline on child than teacher & thus, should be held to a greater accountability for tort committed by
kid. WRT liability for kids of the age of majority, leniency should be  observed in assessing
teacher’s responsibility considering that parents are no longer liable for the acts of their emancipated children.

HOLDING: Petition denied.

1. Rector, principal & dean – not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge. They only had general authority over
students.
2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just   because Amadora went to school in
connection w/a  physics report doesn’t necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-in-charge.
Besides, there’s no showing that the teacher was negligent in any manner. He was not even required to
report to school on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence. On the contrary, they
have proven that they exercised due diligence.
3. Dean of boys – no proof that the gun he released was the same gun that killed Amadora.

PSBA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year student, while on the
SECOND-FLOOR PREMISES OF THE PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF  BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
(PSBA).

The parents of the deceased filed a suit for damages against the PSBA AND ITS CORPORATE
OFFICERS FOR THEIR ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND LACK OF SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

The assailants were not members of the schools academic community but were elements from outside the
school. The suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief
of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano(Assistant Chief of Security).

Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article
2180 of the Civil Code,  the complaint state sno cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject
is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of  the rule in the afore-
stated article.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss;

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The CA primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. According to the CA, the law holds the teachers and
heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article2180 by 'proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.'

ISSUE: Could PSBA and its officers be held liable for Arts. 2176 and 2180?

HELD: No. But they could be held liable for breach of contractual obligation and  for tort, in conjunction
with Art. 21 of the Civil Code, even if there is a contractual obligation.

Ratio:
1.Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals.

In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.

However, this MATERIAL SITUATION DOESNOT EXIST IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR, AS
EARLIER INDICATED, THE ASSAILANTS OF CARLITOS WERE NOT STUDENTS OF THE
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. However, does the appellate court's failure to consider
such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.

2. Because the circumstances of the prese nt case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the RULES ON QUASI-DELICT DO NOT REALLY GOVERN. A perusal of Article
2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or  implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

3. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to MAINTAIN PEACE AND
ORDER WITHIN THE CAMPUS PREMISES AND TO PREVENT THE   BREAKDOWN THEREOF.

4. It has already been determined by this Court that although there is a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,obligations from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, may arise. Remember Air France v. Carrascoso? In that case, the Court referred to the petitioner-
airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.

5. It can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. A contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently on the contract, unless then negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the
Civil Code.

6. In this case, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the
trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold. The complaint should be tried on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila,
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS ET. AL

Facts: For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrolment drive
through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among the
students of SMA who took part in the campaign was SHERWIN AND JAMES. Sherwin and other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by James, then 15 years
old. On their way to Dapitan City, the JEEP TURNED TURTLE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF
SHERWIN. 

The parents of Sherwin thus SUED JAMES AND HIS PARENTS, VICENTE AND SMA. At the trial, the
traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the steering
wheel guide of  the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator was not disputed
by any of the parties. 

After trial, THE LOWER COURT HELD THAT  THE SCHOOL  IS PRIMARY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
AS IT HAD SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. The parents of
Dino were found to be only subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the
school. Dino was absolved for being only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio,
the vehicle owner was not held liable at all. 

Issue:

Was the lower court correct? 

Held:

No. 

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
(1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
(2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.

This SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES TO ALL AUTHORIZED

ACTIVITIES, WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE   THE PREMISES  OF  THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR
INSTITUTION. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
PARENTAL AUTHORITY ARE PRINCIPALLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED
BY  THE ACTS  OR OMISSIONS OF THE UNEMANCIPATED MINOR WHILE UNDER THEIR
SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION, OR CUSTODY.

However, for  the school  to be liable, there must be a finding that   the act  or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done.  Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 

In this case, the PARENTS OF SHERWIN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES. They admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the
DETACHMENT OF THE STEERING WHEEL GUIDE OF THE JEEP. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of
the Family Code is unfounded. 

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner  Vivencio who allowed the minor James to drive  the
jeep at the time of the accident. The SCHOOL DID NOT ALLOW JAMES TO DRIVE  THE JEEP. So
whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had no control. If the
school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the NEGLIGENCE OF THE MINOR’S PARENTS OR THE
DETACHMENT OF TH ESTEERING WHEEL  GUIDE OF  THE JEEP. 

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, IT IS NOT THE SCHOOL BUT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE VEHICLE WHO
SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE DEATH OF SHERWIN. Registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. (St. Mary’s
Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al G.R.143363, February 
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying.  SHERWIN CARPITANOS JOINED THE CAMPAIGN.  Along
with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same
school.  It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. 
Sherwin died due to this accident. 

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

ISSUE: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.
HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was
pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep.  However, for them to be held liable, the ACT OR OMISSION TO BE CONSIDERED
NEGLIGENT MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY CAUSED thus, negligence needs
to have a causal connection to the accident.  It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. 

The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner.  The spouses
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.  Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner
allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva.  The mechanical defect was an event over which the school
has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to 3rd  persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road.  It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. 
Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
petitioner.
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE ET AL V. MIRANDA

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s [SJC’s] premises, the class
to which [respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one
of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass.
The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson].
At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye
and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] EYES WERE
CHEMICALLY BURNED, PARTICULARLY HIS LEFT EYE, FOR WHICH HE HAD TO UNDERGO
SURGERY AND HAD TO SPEND FOR HIS MEDICATION. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
[Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s Medical
Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his
teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not
been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge,
Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing
[Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the
request.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it
should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel
for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because “the accident occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply with the written procedure for the
experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into,
the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against
[petitioners]
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to
reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to
pay [Jayson’s] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said amount of P26,176.36 from
the P77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees;
 4. To pay the costs of suit.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the
ruling of the RTC

RULING: We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were
“NEGLIGENT SINCE THEY ALL FAILED TO EXERCISE THE REQUIRED REASONABLE CARE,
PRUDENCE, CAUTION AND FORESIGHT TO PREVENT OR AVOID INJURIES TO THE
STUDENTS.”

Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in disregarding the
instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our
ruling in St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St. Mary’s Academy from liability for the
untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that “the negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.”

We are not convinced.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’ conclusions are borne out by the records of this case. Both
courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause.

ALL OF THE [PETITIONERS] ARE EQUALLY AT FAULT AND ARE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
BECAUSE ALL OF THEM ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXERCISING THE REQUIRED REASONABLE
CARE, PRUDENCE, CAUTION AND FORESIGHT TO PREVENT OR AVOID INJURIES TO THE
STUDENTS. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being.

Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including
Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off.
Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student,
herein respondent Jayson.

We disagree.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners
to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners
were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority
on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

TITLE X
EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY

Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:
(1) By the marriage of the minor; or
(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent
exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be
irrevocable.(397a, 398a, 400a, 401a)

Art. 235. The provisions governing emancipation by recorded agreement shall also apply to an orphan minor
and the person exercising parental authority but the agreement must be approved by the court before it is
recorded. (n)

Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)

Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement
mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority over the minor but shall
not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil
Register. (n) 

Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings

TITLE XI

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW

Chapter 1. Prefatory Provisions

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as
regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents
involving parental authority. (n) 
 
Chapter 2. Separation in Fact

Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks
judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent
is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in
detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any
case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)
Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a
separate action. (n)
Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the
proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting
in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n)
Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the
transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be
granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by
a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n)
Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being
assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by
counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n)
Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the
reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)
Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may
proceed EX PARTE AND RENDER JUDGMENT AS THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MAY
WARRANT. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)
Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary
hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the
court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their
testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses.(n)
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.(n)
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the
abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed
by these rules. (n)
 
Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority

Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be
verified. (n)

Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place WHERE THE CHILD
RESIDES. (n)
Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity,
the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child. (n)
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as
they are applicable. (n) 
 
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings

Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n) 
 
 ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.

On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein RESPONDENT MARIETTA CALISTERIO.

Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds
on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.

Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.

On 09 October 1992, herein PETITIONER ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, a surviving sister of

Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT MARIETTA
ESPINOSA CALISTERIO BEING ALLEGEDLY BIGAMOUS and thereby NULL AND VOID. She
prayed that HER SON SINFRONIANO C. ARMAS, JR., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would
have been settled.

Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico.

On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.

On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now
assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

XXX

On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal.

It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico
and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.

RULING OF COURT: Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
 "(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
UNTIL DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY A COMPETENT COURT."

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second
marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, SHOULD THUS BE DEEMED VALID NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ABSENCE OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF JAMES BOUNDS.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, PERTAINS TO THEM IN COMMON. Upon its dissolution with the
death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED
except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner
are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of
her own children. No costs.