TITLE III

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend
to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for
relief.(116a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity WITHOUT
the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who
has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-

appellee.

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

That the defendant, ONE MONTH AFTER he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her
that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode
and take refuge in the home of her PARENTS.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by
General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. Upon the
termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract.
 Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may
make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines
from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the
new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.

Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of
the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or
residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife
may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.
May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the
pension?

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,
November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right
would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause
morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood
as being thereby restricted.

RULING OF COURT: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the
act of marriage.  The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.  However,
this option given by law is not absolute.  The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. 
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she CAN THEREFORE CLAIM SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.   

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-

appellee.

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to
leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated
an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and
thus she filed:

 A cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation,

 a liquidation of conjugal partnership,
  and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital
relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant.

Plaintiff appealed.

Issues:
(1)     Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification
NO. IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE TALES OF CRUELTY ON THE PART OF THE HUSBAND
WERE NOT PROVEN;

(2)     Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the
marital society of his wife.

The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and
is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney’s fees, necessarily
incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large
require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses—a state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision
should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of
the case show that THE PLAINTIFF HAS DONE NOTHING TO FORFEIT HIS RIGHT TO THE
MARITAL SOCIETY OF HIS WIFE AND SHE IS UNDER A MORAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
RETURN TO THE COMMON HOME AND COHABIT WITH HIM.

(3)     Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to
return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife

Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the PURELY PERSONAL RIGHT OF
CONSORTIUM.

Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is NOT ENTITLED TO THE UNCONDITIONAL AND ABSOLUTE
ORDER for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint.

HELD: Judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that
Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is
her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996]

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin’s secretary, FORCIBLY
OPENED THE DRAWERS AND CABINET IN HER HUSBAND’S CLINIC AND TOOK 157
DOCUMENTS consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
FOR USE IN EVIDENCE IN A CASE FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE WHICH ZULUETA had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AND FOR
DAMAGES against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the TRIAL
COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT FOR MARTIN, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to
Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees;
and to pay the costs of the suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply
even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

HELD:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The INTIMACIES BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE DO NOT JUSTIFY ANY ONE OF THEM IN
BREAKING THE DRAWERS AND CABINETS OF THE OTHER AND IN RANSACKING THEM
FOR ANY TELLTALE EVIDENCE OF MARITAL INFIDELITY. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN
DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
 Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11, 1942.They had six children.
  Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was also the
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
 After 30 years of living together, the spouses separated on the year 1972; they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons.
 Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium – Manila and when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club while Erlinda lived in Antipolo city.
 On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at Antipolo after his arrival from the US.
 Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead of
the 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by the latter’s doctor in New York.
 Because of the overdose, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
 On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petititon for the guardianship over the person and property
of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced aged, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
 On May 1998, Potenciano DID NOT RETURN to Antipolo city after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio city. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati.
 On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondents prevented her from visiting her husband and
preventing the latter from going home to Antipolo.
 Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writ of habeas corpus. However, the CA granted
visitation rights.
 The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
 On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda
and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.

RULING OF COURT: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.  To justify the grant for
such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.  The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL AND EFFECTIVE DETENTION OR

DEPRIVATION OF POTENCIANO’S LIBERTY THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT.  The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated.  He still has the capacity to discern his actions.  With his full mental capacity having the
right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.  OTHERWISE, HE
WILL BE DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband.  In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.  Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by
any other process. 

NO COURT IS EMPOWERED AS A JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A HUSBAND TO LIVE

WITH HIS WIFE. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free
choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)

Romualdez-Marcos V. COMELEC

Separate Opinions PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has
clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 WE CANNOT
DISQUALIFY HER AND TREAT HER UNALIKE, FOR THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled
in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to
school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin
and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor;
and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied) In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained
why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the
theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from
the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with
this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her MARRIAGE BY ITSELF
ALONE DID NOT CAUSE HER TO LOSE HER TACLOBAN DOMICILE. Article 110 of the Civil Code
merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may
explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The
husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la
Viña, 6 . . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence
of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent
domicile. . . . It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by
the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary
decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the
wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot
change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife
lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy. In
the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile
and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time
and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was NOT AFFECTED in 1959 when her husband was elected
as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in
1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could
change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large
degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends." 7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2)
schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide,
Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife
retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. I do not subscribe to this
submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the
domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own
separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The
first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the
family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased
husband is an extension of this common law concept. Xxx As the result of statutes and court decisions, a
wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister." 20 IN THE CASE AT
BENCH, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away
from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women.

XXX

With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property
owned in common by the married couple EVEN IF the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner.
XXX OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO THE CASE AT BENCH is ARTICLE 69 OF THE FAMILY
CODE which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it
JOINTLY to the husband and the wife, thus: Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live
together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife
may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:

28 (2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:

(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and
they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated
his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and
at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned.The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. THEY ARE NOW JOINT ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE FAMILY PROPERTIES AND EXERCISE JOINT AUTHORITY OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF THEIR CHILDREN. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied) In
light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated
by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of
her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to
resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by
the domiciliary determination of her dead husband. Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to
consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of law. 30 It can
HARDLY BE DOUBTED THAT THE COMMON LAW IMPOSITION ON A MARRIED WOMAN OF
HER DEAD HUSBAND'S DOMICILE EVEN BEYOND HIS GRAVE IS PATENTLY
DISCRIMINATORY TO WOMEN. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with
our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and
shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and
essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment. Prescinding
from these premises, I RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE BETTER STANCE IS TO RULE THAT
PETITIONER REACQUIRED HER TACLOBAN DOMICILE UPON THE DEATH OF HER
HUSBAND IN 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile
DID NOT CONTINUE after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate
the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the
right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now
recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the
common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her
Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased
husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. HER HUSBAND IS DEAD AND HE CANNOT RULE
HER BEYOND THE GRAVE.

XXX she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also
cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall
be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her. xxx xxx xxx 43. I WAS
NOT PERMITTED, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San
Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there. It is then clear that in 1992 PETITIONER REESTABLISHED HER DOMICILE IN THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in
San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence ". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections. The evidence presented by the private respondent to
negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed
with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that
her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-
prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. IN THE CASE AT BENCH, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she
has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the
First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in
her favor. It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested
alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and
her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify
petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the
case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner
to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. XXX Petitioner's
(Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban
City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District. All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal
processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal
access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the
meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner
who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for
all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the
Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness. Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that
the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833)
votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is
not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical
considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political
judgment. A final point. THE CASE AT BENCH provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and
Constitution. TO RULE THAT A MARRIED WOMAN IS ETERNALLY TETHERED TO THE
DOMICILE DICTATED BY HER DEAD HUSBAND IS TO PRESERVE THE ANACHRONISTIC
AND ANOMALOUS BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE OF A HUSBAND OVER HIS WIFE. We should not
allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The
Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what
has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it. I vote to grant the petition. Bellosillo and
Melo, JJ., concur.

Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured,
the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said
obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a)

CASES:

BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

                Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of
his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo.  The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the
couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name. 

                In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived
with the father-in-law CIPRIANO LAGUA who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots.   At first,
Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the
said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. 
                On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his YOUNGER SON,
herein respondent Gervacio.  Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to
petitioner her share to the harvest.  A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name
by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. 

                The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner.  In 1957, Gervacio and
Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots.  While the case was pending,
CIPRIANO DIED IN 1958.  It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. 

When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area
of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could
have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime  of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio. 
The DONATION WAS THUS DECLARED INOFFICIOUS AND HEREIN PETITIONERS WERE
ORDERED TO RECONVEY TO GERVACIO A PORTION OF 494.75 SQ. M. FROM ANY
CONVENIENT PART OF THE LOTS. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious. 

HELD:   

                Decision of CA based on UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS set aside; trial court’s order of
dismissal sustained. 

                Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached

Article 908.  To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. 

...then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.  With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.  CERTAINLY, IN ORDER THAT A DONATION MAY BE
REDUCED FOR BEING INOFFICIOUS,  THERE MUST BE PROOF THAT THE VALUE OF THE
DONATED PROPERTY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE DISPOSABLE FREE PORTION PLUS THE
DONEE’S SHARE AS LEGITIME IN THE PROPERTIES OF THE DONOR.  In the present case, it can
hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness
of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents. 

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be VOID, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) 

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse,
herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or SIX YEARS AFTER
THE DEED of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, FELIX DIED.

Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.

The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation WAS VALID inasmuch as it was made at the time
when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.

HELD:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a DONATION BETWEEN THE SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality REQUIRES
THAT THE SAME PROHIBITION SHOULD APPLY TO A COMMON-LAW RELATIONSHIP.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having
exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code:

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of
First instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married in 1962, with 5 children, and
were living on a house situated on a land inherited by the latter.

In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines.

In 1980, Fernando sold the house and lot to Daguines, who initiated a complaint for quieting of title.

Mercedes resisted, claiming that the house and lot were CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, and the sale was null
and void for she had not consented thereto.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso
facto gave the land the character of conjugal property

(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the
circumstances surrounding the transaction

Held:

(1) The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph
of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx

Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.

Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership BUT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP IS INDEBTED TO THE HUSBAND FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND. The spouse
owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be
reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and
lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

(2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was
made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home
where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because:

a.) If transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law.
b.) It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as
to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law.
c.) The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise,
"the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union."

Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties.

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C.

TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA,
RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.  ZOSIMA DIED
in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the LATTER WAIVED HER SHARE CONSISTING OF ¼ OF THE PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF FRANCISCO. 

Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked:
 Leticia, his niece,
 Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and
 CIRILA ARCABA, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well
as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. 

On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila
was his mistress. 

However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.  She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco.  When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower.  The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was
provided with food and lodging.  Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden.  Tabancura testified
that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. 

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he
ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. 
THE LARGER PORTION OF 268 SQ M. WAS LEFT UNDER HIS NAME.  This was made in
consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.  Atty. Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550.  THE DECEDENT’S NEPHEWS AND NIECES AND HIS HEIRS BY
INTESTATE SUCCESSION ALLEGED THAT CIRILA WAS THE COMMON-LAW WIFE OF
FRANCISCO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a SUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP wherein
donation is not valid.   

The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of
“Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco.  Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding
themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, THE DEED OF DONATION BY FRANCISCO IN FAVOR OF CIRILA IS VOID UNDER ART.
87 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which
shall be divided EQUALLY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNLESS a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

SOICHI V. GOZON ET. AL.

Procedural History
There are of two separate petitions for review assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision and the 30 September 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447. The property involved in this case is a 30,000
sq. meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 5357 located in Malabon, Metro Manila. It is REGISTERED
UNDER THE NAME OF ALFREDO GOZON, who is MARRIED TO ELVIRA GOZON.

Statement of Facts
 On August 31, 1993, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell the property. At
that time, Elvira’s filed petition for legal separation as well as a notice of lis pendens, annotated with TCT
No. 535, were still pending at the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC).

Mario demanded an affidavit to be executed by Elvira, which in effect would ESTABLISH THAT THE
PROPERTY IS AN EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION of Alberto and that it should be excluded from their
conjugal property. Nonetheless, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations and Mario proceeded with
paying P5 Million earnest money as partial payment. After the payment, HE TOOK POSSESSION OF
THE LAND in September 1993. 

Consequently, the CAVITE RTC UPON THE JUDGMENT RENDERED DECREEING THEIR LEGAL
SEPARATION also held that the property is DEEMED CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

On August 22, 1994 Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter
Winifred Gozon.
On October 26, 1994, Alfredo by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred,
SOLD THE PROPERTY TO INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. (IDRI) FOR P18 MILLION. The
company paid in full thereafter.

Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages,
Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibition Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. The rendered judgment of Malabon RTC integrated that enjoining defendants
should respect plaintiff’s possession of the property, that the DEED OF DONATION entered into by and
between Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is NULL AND VOID along with actual and compensatory
damages for the plaintiff (Mario) and for Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision but with modification as follows; that
sale of the subject land by defendant Alfred Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is NULL AND VOID
because the conveyance was done WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ELVIRA GOZON, that Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided share is forfeited in favor of his daughter
Winifred Gozon by virtue of legal separation and that defendants Alfredo and Winifred must pay the pro-rated
moral and exemplary damages. 

Issue
1. Whether or not Mario’s Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Plaintiff prays for the court to direct Alfredo and
Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale.

2. On the side of IDRI, whether or not the court should uphold the validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976 over
the property since it is a buyer in good faith.

Answer
1. NO, Mario’s Agreement should not be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse.
2. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith.

Reasoning
Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is
the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code elaborates:

The essence that in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance WHICH MUST HAVE THE
AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OR THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER Spouse.   In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The court ruled that the ABSENCE OF THE CONSENT OF ONE OF THE SPOUSE RENDERS THE
ENTIRE SALE VOID, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted
the sale. With regards to Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

As found by the RTC of Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
FACTS and circumstances which should impel a cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors
title to the property. Thus IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property as
conjugal.

Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the NET PROFITS earned by the
conjugal partnership. IT IS ONLY ALFREDO’S SHARE IN THE NET PROFITS WHICH IS
FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF WINIFRED.

Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that

“[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.”

Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but
MERELY IN THE NET PROFITS of the conjugal partnership property.

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256. (n)

Art. 116. All property acquired DURING THE MARRIAGE, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to
be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)

CASES:

CONCEPCION FRANCISCO V. FELIZARDO FRANCISCO

FACTS • On 1963 parties herein got married, their marriage was attended by constant arguments due to
respondent’s inadequate financial contribution despite being an executive at Caltex and due to such petitioner
exhausted all of her inheritance. In addition, petitioner’s mother-in-law’s constant interference and that when
they stayed in the petitioners ancestral home the RENTS FROM THEIR CONJUGAL HOME WENT TO
MOTHER OF RESPONDENTS.
 • That it was she who spent for the children’s education and that respondent insisted that his massage
parlor does not make any money.

• Also it was alleged that the respondent had a paramour who was the daughter of the manager of massage
parlor and that said paramour studied in the same school as her children in assumption.

• What prompted her to leave the conjugal home was due to a quarrel between the RESPONDENT’S
MOTHER AND THEIR MAID. In 1995 Concepcion filed for separation of property against Felizardo
because there is no longer any hope of reconciliation.

• Petitioner also alleged that when she demanded her share from the Conjugal properties the respondent made
an unfair offer and that respondent did not share his retirement pay.

• The RTC granted the decree for separation of properties. However both of them appealed on different
grounds

I. Petitioner appealed the declaration that Lot 19 was respondent’s exclusive property

II. Respondent appealed the declaration that the following were considered as conjugal property:

(3)1. Lot 20
2. Fishpond in Bulacan
3. Retirement pay

ISSUES:
1. Is Lot 19 conjugal?
2. Is Lot20, Fishpond and retirement pay conjugal?

HELD: (NEITHER APPEAL IS MERITOUS)

Family Code governs the property relations even if marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code. Since the
presumption is that they are conjugal, the burden of proof rest upon the party claiming they are not
conjugal.

It was error to assume that the properties were acquired during marriage due to the indication in the TCT that
they are married. This is because the SC already ruled that acquisition is different from registration.

1. NO. Lot 19 was NOT CONJUGAL PROPERTY because it was RECEIVED IN GRATUITY and
although they gave money to the respondent’s mother as payment for aforesaid lot SUCH WAS NOT
ACKNOWLEDGED.

Furthermore respondent presented a notarized deed indicating that Lot 19 was indeed given by gratuity
and as such it is indeed an exclusive property. On the contention that respondent is in estoppels, Estoppel
does not apply in the determination of the nature of the property because estoppel is limited in supplying the
deficiency in statutory law.

2. YES. Even though he bought the rights to purchase Lot 20 before his marriage, the TITLE BECAME
VESTED AFTER MARRIAGE. And although it is true that that petitioner did not contribute to the
installment payment thereto it is also equally true that respondent showed no evidence that the payment
was made through his own exclusive funds.
 As for the FISHPOND it is CONJUGAL BECAUSE IT WAS ACQUIRED THROUGH PURCHASE
AND NOT BY DONATION.

The RETIREMENT PAY was likewise conjugal because it was RECEIVED DURING THE
MARRIAGE notwithstanding Art 115, because Art 115 needs to be correlated with Art 116.Therefore the
burden of showing that it is not conjugal rest with the respondent and that such burden was not overcome.

Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of

the Conjugal Partnership

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The SUPPORT of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage SHALL NOT BE CHARGED TO THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at
the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned. (163a)

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents
FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). 

RESPONDENT ALFREDO CHING, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. 

PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching.  The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. 

Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.  Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. 

Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan DID NOT
REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE SAID CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. 

CA issued a TRO enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties. 

A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband ALONE is considered “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

HELD:

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and NOT FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF CHING. 

Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.  Clearly, the DEBT WAS A CORPORATE DEBT and
right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a SURETY or GUARANTOR, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”.  The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family.  CHING ONLY SIGNED AS A SURETY FOR THE LOAN CONTRACTED WITH
AIDC IN BEHALF OF PBM.  Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it
is NOT embarking in a business.  Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when
the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan.  It must not be a MERE BY PRODUCT OR A SPIN-OFF of the loan itself.  

Foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:

1. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he DIRECTLY RECEIVED THE
MONEY and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
2. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a SURETY OR GUARANTOR, that CONTRACT CANNOT, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family.

VICENTE G. VILLARANDA, petitioner, vs. Spouses HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA
Y. VILLARANDA; and COLORHOUSE LABORATORIES, INC., respondents.

DOCTRINE:

Under the Civil Code 166 and 173, the husband can’t alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without thewife’s consent. THIS IS VOIDABLE, NOT VOID. An action to annul such alienation
may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction.

"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the HUSBAND CANNOT ALIENATE OR ENCUMBER
ANY REAL PROPERTY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP WITHOUT THE WIFE’S
CONSENT. x x x

"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, AND WITHIN TEN YEARS FROM THE
TRANSACTION QUESTIONED, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
the property fraudulently alienated by the husband."

Petitioner VICENTE and respondent Honorio Villaranda are brothers who INHERITED LAND from
their parents. In 1976, they executed a DEED OF EXCHANGE, wherein Vicente agreed to convey his
portion to Honorio in exchange for property in Macasandig (Honorio).

H o n o r i o   a n d   h i s   w i f e ,   A n a ,   b r o u g h t   a n   A C T I O N   F O R   S P E C I F I C PERFOR
MANCE TO COMPEL VICENTE TO FULFIL HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DEED.

VICENTE NEVER IDENTIFIED OR DELINEATED HIS UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE

PROPERTY. Vicente claims the Deed was revoked by both parties.

RTC ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.

On appeal, the CA held that the Civil Code was applicable since t h e D e e d w a s e n t e r e d i n t o
i n 1 9 7 6 . T H E A B S E N C E O F T H E W I F E ’ S SIGNATURE MADE   IT VOIDABLE, NOT
VOID .

Also, Ana was aware of the Deed but never brought action for its annulment within 10years from
its execution. The prescriptive period for the cause of action r a n n o t f r o m t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e D e e d
b u t f r o m w h e n V i c e n t e refused to transfer his title to Honorio, some 2 months before the filing of the
case. CA again ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.

ISSUE:

WON the Deed is valid without the signature of Ana

RULING OF COURT:

YES

The Deed was entered into on 1976, before the Family Code. The Civil Code applies. The Macasandig lot was
part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal property. Under the Civil Code 166 and 173, the husband can’t alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. This is voidable,not void.
An action to annul such alienation may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from
the transaction. The Deed is valid until annulled. There is no evidence that any action to annul the transfer
was brought by Ana within 10 years from the transaction. Her right to bring an action has prescribed.
The Deed is still valid and enforceable.

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
JOINTLY. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court OR the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed ONLY IN FAVOR
OF THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. AS VENDEE thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the
latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be SECURED by the spouses
Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor
of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of RESPONDENT.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In the meantime, MARCELINO DAILO, JR. DIED. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela
learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford
sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.

Claiming that SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORTGAGE constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.

In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the TRIAL COURT rendered a Decision declaring the SAID DOCUMENTS NULL
AND VOID and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint
to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the
attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
 

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.

2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED
BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE FAMILY.

HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .

Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
SETTLEMENT, the SYSTEM OF RELATIVE COMMUNITY or CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
GAINS governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income
from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT
OF HIS WIFE, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHICH
FORMED PART OF THEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the ABSENCE OF (COURT) AUTHORITY or WRITTEN CONSENT of the other spouse,
any DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY SHALL BE VOID.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.

ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
 to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .

(1)       Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited; . . . .”

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity
and well-being of the family as a unit.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such.  Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his
family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

NOTE:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that
the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. NOWHERE in the answer filed
with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan.

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

FACTS:

DR. ERNESTO JARDELAZA suffered stroke that rendered him COMATOSE.  GILDA, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as SOLE ADMINISTRATOR OF THEIR CONJUGAL
PROPERTY and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions.  She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to
SELL THEIR PROPERTY IN LOT 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. 

RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF GILDA contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that
the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, TEODORO, filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND
PROPERTIES of his father.  As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should FOLLOW THE RULES GOVERNING SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS in the
Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits.  He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between
Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.  Hence, he argued
that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her DAUGHTER AND SON IN LAW. 
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA REVERSED THE DECISION of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal
property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC RULED IN FAVOR OF TEODORO. 

The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated
or incompetent to give consent.  In this case, trial court found that subject spouse WAS INCOMPETENT
who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract.  Hence, the PROPER REMEDY
IS A JUDICIAL GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING UNDER THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.  The
law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian.  Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary
judicial proceedings under FC. 

SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and
void on the GROUND OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS.

G.R. No. 118784 September 2, 1999

HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIENA MALABONGA,
respondents.

FACTS:

 Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961.

 The couple resided in Manila but they OPERATED A MACHINE SHOP in Lucena City. This
business was managed by Rafael Ayuste.
 The couple purchased on AUGUST 1982 a PARCEL OF LAND WITH AN AREA OF 180
SQUARE METERS on which a residential house was built situated at Lucena City for Mr. Ayuste’s
temporary residence.
 A DEED OF SALE was executed and signed by the parties and filed with the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City. The property was purchased from spouses Pedro and Aida David.
 On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, WITH THE VITIATED CONSENT of Mrs. AYUSTE SOLD THE
SAID PARCEL OF LAND FOR P40,000 TO MALABONGA.
 Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayuste found out that the parcel of land WAS SOLD BY
HER DECEASED HUSBAND WITHOUT HER KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT.
 In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the
name of private respondent and for the payment of moral, exemplary and actual damages.  In her
complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the deed of SALE WAS FORGED.
 The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.
  The CA however, REVERSED THE DECISION INVOKING ART. 173 CC, holding that the right
of Christina to bring an action for the annulment of the sale is barred for failure to file the same during
the existence of the marriage.

 

Issue:

 Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste
without the consent of Christina Ayuste?

HELD:

 The trial court erred in giving due course to the action for annulment of sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on February 27, 1987 by and between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellant’s husband is
declared VALID and BINDING upon the plaintiff-appellant.

The only issue which remains to be resolved is whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract
of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.

Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership WITHOUT HIS WIFE’S
CONSENT, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her
husband should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil
Code which states that:

“The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property.  Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.

A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is
VOIDABLE. The action for annulment must be brought DURING THE MARRIAGE and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife.”

In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987.  Rafael Ayuste died on October 13,
1989.  However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court
asking for the annulment of the sale.  Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned
transaction, IT WAS NOT BROUGHT DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE which was
dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste
was barred for having been filed out of time.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material.

VITUG., J, concurring opinion;

The questioned sale was concluded on 27 February 1987, before the Family Code took effect; accordingly,
the transaction could still be aptly governed by the then governing provisions of the Civil Code. Under this
Code, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property (acquired by the partnership
after the effective date of the Civil Code) without the consent, express or implied, of the wife 1 (Art. 166, Civil
Code; Bautista vs. Lovina, 98 Phil. 1006, 1956), otherwise, said the Supreme Court in Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals (130 SCRA 433, 1984), reiterating Tolentino vs. Cardenas (123 Phil. 517, 1966), the disposition would
be void. I share the view of my colleagues that such a contract, absent the wife's consent should be considered
merely voidable consistently with article 173 2 of the Civil Code under which provision, the wife could, during
the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment (Felipe vs. Heirs of
Maximo Aldon, 120 SCRA 628 [1983]; Reyes vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 369 [1967]; see Roxas vs. CA, 198 SCRA
541, 1991 which applied Art. 173 to a lease contract). Failing to do so, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of
the marriage, could demand the value of the property alienated (Art. 173, Civil Code). It might not be amiss to
say that an unauthorized sale by the husband of conjugal real property, not being the administrator thereof, or of
the exclusive parapherna of the wife, not having obtained her prior consent thereto, could be void under the
provisions of Article 1874 3 of the Civil Code.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal (or community) property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by an entirely different rule that now treats such a disposition to be void if done without the
conjoint consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouse's inability, the authority of the court (see Art. 124, 4
Family Code). The declaration that the disposition by just one of the spouses is void settles the apparent conflict
in some of the rulings during the regime of the 1950 Civil Code, in construing the provisions of said code found
in Articles 161, 162, 166, 171 and 173, in relation to Articles 1390, 7403 and 1874, thereof.

The Family Code has also abandoned the 1950 Civil Code concept of having the husband, absent a contrary
statement in a marriage settlement or in a public instrument executed by the husband or an order of a court
(Arts. 168, 190 and 196, Civil Code), as the statutory administrator of the conjugal partnership of gains (Art.
165, Civil Code) that permitted suits to bind the conjugal partnership even where the wife was not named as a
party defendant along with the husband (Stosa, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 862). Article 124 of the
Family Code, like the rule established in the system of absolute community of property (see Arts. 96-98, Family
Code), instead confers the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal property on the spouses jointly. The
marriage settlement, however, may provide for the administration of the property by one of the spouses, the
provisions of the Family Code on conjugal partnership of gain being merely suppletory thereto. In case of
disagreement in the joint administration and enjoyment of the partnership property, the husband's decision shall
prevail but the wife may avail herself of the "proper remedy" in court "within five years from the date of the
contract implementing the decision."

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA
ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA
ABRILLE,Respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have FOUR
CHILDREN, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, adjacent to a parcel
of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single (TCT No. T-26471.)
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the development bank of the philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the
spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her children.

By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, PATROCINIA AND
WILFREDO RAVINA.

Mary Ann OBJECTED AND NOTIFIED the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the
house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5].

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together
with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance
with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They
waited OUTSIDE THE GATE UNTIL EVENING UNDER THE RAIN. They sought help from the Talomo
Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann
alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at
school.
ISSUE:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT
NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL
AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW
AND EVIDENCE.10

RULING: Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of
Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange.11 They allege that the subject lot was
acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his
sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-
26472, respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting
and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was
issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it
was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the latter.

We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides,
 "ALL PROPERTY of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of
Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No.
T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to
show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.1

Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if
done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court.

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date
of sale and execution of the deed.

On the second issue, Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that
petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised
by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Ann’s written consent.

On the last issue of award of damages, the claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which
respondent and her children were REMOVED FROM THE FAMILY HOME DESERVES OUR
CONDEMNATION. While respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in
connivance with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The
respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.”[22]When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly,
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. [23] It is patent in this case that petitioners’
alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to
the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property,
or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property
relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention
of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within
the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

CASE:

PARTOSA-JO V. CA

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the LEGAL WIFE OF JOSE JO, herein private respondent.  The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. 
Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated. 

RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support BUT NONE OF THAT FOR THE
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY. 

Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court.  The complaint on the separation
of property WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. 

Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her PREGNANCY and for him to visit and support her.  They never agreed to be
separated permanently.  She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her. 

The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:

ARTICLE 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not
affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
Xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property or separation of property.

The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code, which states:

ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
 A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months
or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima
facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary MODIFICATION instead of
dismissing the case filed.  For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.  The fACT THAT JO DID NOT ACCEPT
HER DEMONSTRATES THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF RESUMING THEIR CONJUGAL
RELATIONSHIP.  From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima.  Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the
petitioner, sufficed to CONSTITUTE ABANDONMENT as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.

 Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal
PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES BE DIVIDED BETWEEN THEM, SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE.  The
division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons. 

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN

FACTS:
Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful married life.
They were blessed to have one son.
Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour.
The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour.
Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.
Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on 2001.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Partial settlements are as follows:
P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be
withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the
deposit in the joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at
P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties;

The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be
for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the
store in full settlement thereof.

The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the
plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;

The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00
as,his share thereon and in full ettlement thereof;

The house and lot shall be to the common child.

The PETITIONER FILED FOR OMNIBUS MOTION PRAYING FOR THE REPUDIATION OF THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS PREVIOUS LAWYER DID NOT
INTELLIGENTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY APPRISE HIM OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS of
the said agreement.

The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.

ISSUE:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN
STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM
WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PRE-
REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM
SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.

HELD: The petitioner contends that the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS VOID because it circumvents the
law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the
conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner said that her share should be
forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.

But nevertheless, the spouses voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with
court approval under Article 134 of the Family Code:

Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial
separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing
in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, IT NEVER BECAME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since
adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These arguments are
specious.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the
properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a
marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Article 2035 reads:
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
Furthermore, Art. 43 only pertains to cases falling under SUBSEQUENT marriages.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence DO NOT IMPOSE SUCH DISQUALIFICATION. The conviction of adultery DOES NOT
CARRY THE ACCESSORY OF CIVIL INTERDICTION.
Neither could it be said that the PETITIONER WAS NOT INTELLIGENTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY informed
of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel
about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now
claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident.

Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the
latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a)
CASE:

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. EUGENIO JOSE, THE
ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants.

FACTS: Herein respondent owned and operated a jeepney which got involved in an ACCIDENT
OF COLLISION, with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23,
1969 causing death to 7 and physical injuries to.

That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been COHABITING WITH ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife.  

Herein petitioner was held by the lower court to be JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE (with
respondent), as respondent’s paramour/common-law wife, to the damages arising from the accident TO THE
HEIR OF THE DECEASED, VICTOR JUANIZA.-
 
Lower court based their decision on
 
Art. 144,NCC:
 
“When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their  wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on ownership”
 
ISSUE:
 
WON petitioner can be held liable for the obligations arising from the accident to which respondent’s property
was involved; or
 
 
WON common-law relationship, WHERE ONE PARTY IS INCAPACITATED TO MARRY, automatically
adopts co-ownership by virtue of the CCRuling:-
 
RULING: NO. RESPONDENT SHALL NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THEDAMAGES.

RATIO:- Art. 144 pertains only to those common-law relationships where neither of the parties suffer from
any legal impediment to marry.-
 
Herein respondent is legally married to another woman and is thus incapacitated to marry herein petitioner.-
 
Co-ownership cannot apply to the relationship.- Herein respondent is not considered a co-owner of the jeepney.-
 
Moreover, the jeepney was registered only under the name of Jose.

Chapter 7. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage OR under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the PROPERTY acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, UNTIL AFTER THE
TERMINATION OF THEIR COHABITATION.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their COMMON CHILDREN. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon TERMINATION OF THE COHABITATION. (144a)

CASES:

MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by Ofrecinio

Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY,respondents.
This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through
the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.

The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales lived together as husband and wife in
Banganga, Davao; that out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein plaintiffs.
During the period of their cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired
the parcels of land. Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the
DEFENDANTS-SPOUSES IN 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not
controverted by the pArties; that since thereof, THE DEFENDANTS-SPOUSES HAVE TAKEN
IMMEDIATE POSSESSION THEREOF CONTINUOUSLY UP TO THE PRESENT.

Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying
for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession
thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid
REALTIES WERE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THEIR PARENTS, having been acquired during their
lifetime and through THEIR JOINT EFFORT AND CAPITAL; and that the sales of the of the said lands in
favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by
their father, Melbourne Maxey, WITHOUT THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT; and that they came to
know of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.

On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and assert by way of
affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties 'm question
having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in 1953,
based upon the reasonable belief that the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and that
since then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.

Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953,
his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, SOLD THE PROPERTIES TO THE
RESPONDENT SPOUSES, MR. AND MRS. BEATO C. MACAYRA.

THE TRIAL COURT applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice demands that the
woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or
only for man's comfort and passion."

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne
Maxey.
XXX"there appears no evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation in the, acquisition of the
properties involved therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing that
Regina Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of these properties in controversy, both plaintiffs
and defendants' evidence show that it was through Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone that these properties were
acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at all to have contributed in any manner to all its
acquisition.XXX

RULING OF COURT: The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument
that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal.

The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the parcels of land in question
were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey.

The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales took place
only in February 17, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two
because the acquisition of the said properties was through THEIR JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY.
The second and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given
by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in
performing her role as mother to them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to
constitute the parcels of land in question as common properties acquired through the joint efforts to their
parents.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal
provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil Code
is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed properties were exclusively those of the petitioner's
father because these were not acquired through the joint efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from
the interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean "monetary contribution".

The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that vested
rights were prejudiced. We do not think so. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30,
1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their
corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during
cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court.

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial precedents
but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry. EVEN IF IT IS ONLY THE MAN WHO WORKS, THE
PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE MAN AND WIFE RELATIONSHIP BELONGS THROUGH
A FIFTY-FIFTY SHARING TO THE TWO OF THEM.

Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "YES" because there is no showing
that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.

The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can
this be said of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties
are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a
share under the applicable law.

The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina
Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00
purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-
half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of
P650.00 on the other.

VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749.  July 31, 1996

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in
the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner
and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”.  During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Arguments:

                Petitioner: Petitioner argues that:

(1)    Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated,
(2)    Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses
(3)    Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129,
(4)    It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.

Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE GOVERNED BY THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP (Art 147
Family Code).  Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts.  A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
CONSIDERED AS HAVING CONTRIBUTED THERETO jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.

MERCADO-FEHR VS FEHR October 23, 2003

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebu and moved in with Bruno in Manila.
They had their first child in December the same year. THEY PURCHASED A CONDOMINIUM UNIT
(Suite 204) at LG Ccondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983.

THEY GOT MARRIED IN MARCH 1985.

In 1998, TRIAL COURT declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under FC
36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
However, the court found after a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the
Court finds the following properties to be EXCLUDED FROM THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the
same is owned by petitioner’s parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) SUITE 204 OF THE LCG CONDOMINIUM covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
14735, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx

Suite 204 was said to be EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF BRUNO because it was purchased on
INSTALMENT BASIS using Bruno’s exclusive funds prior to the marriage. Their properties
were also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with ARTICLE
147 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

ISSUE:
WON Suite 204 is Bruno’s exclusive property

HELD: No

RATIO:
FC 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were capacitated to marry each other; 2) they
lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Evidence shows that the property was acquired during their cohabitation and in
applying FC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983,
at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as
common property of petitioner and respondent.

3-way partition of properties does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. As regards the settlement of the common properties of
petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) 
CASES:
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA
CRUZ, respondents.

Facts:  Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A
few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang,
respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire
duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good, HE REFUSED to live with his wife and child. 

When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a NINETEEN YEAR OLD
ERLINDA AGAPAY, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both JOINTLY PURCHASED A PARCEL
OF AGRICULTURAL LAND located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee. 

To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form
of COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. 

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina
filed a complaint OF CONCUBINAGE on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.

Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the
HOUSE AND LOT IS HER SOLE PROPERTY having bought with her OWN MONEY. RTC affirmed in
favor of the petitioner WHILE CA REVERSED the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.   However, their marriage
is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina.  Only the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions.  It is required that there be an actual contribution.  If actual contribution is not proved, there will
be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) 
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
store.  However, she failed to persuade the court that she ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTED MONEY to but the
subjected riceland.  When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who
was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government.  Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic
how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share.  Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-
ownership with Miguel over the same.  Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia.  Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.  The
judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property revealed the falsehood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22
years old.  The lawyer testified that MIGUEL PROVIDED THE MONEY for the purchase price and
directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation.  Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the plaintiffs in an ACTION FOR EJECTMENT filed before Branch
82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila AGAINST GUILLERMA TUMLOS, TOTO TUMLOS AND
GINA TUMLOS.

In their complaint the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building; that
through tolerance they had allowed the Tumloses to occupy the apartment building for the LAST SEVEN
YEARS, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months,
defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month both as RENTAL, which agreement was NOT COMPLIED WITH by the said
defendants; that they have demanded several times the defendants to VACATE THE PREMISES, as they
are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Spouses have also demanded payment
incurred for the last seven years. Such demands were unheeded thus this present action of the spouses.
The MTC promulgated its decision on January 22, 1997.

The defendants appeals to the RTC, alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS
THEIR LOVE NEST. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their
two (2) children for around then (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of is marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when Mario accused her of being unfaithful
and demonstrated his baseless jealousy.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD: The Supreme Court REJECTED the claim that Guillerma Tumlos and Mario Fernandez were co-
owners of the disputed property. The claim of co-owenrship was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. No
other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As previously
stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-husband without
the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two children. Such contentions and documents should not have
been considered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before the trial court
MTC.

Even if the said allegations were true, the claim of co-ownership still fails. MARIO FERNANDEZ IS
VALIDLY MARRIED TO LOURDES FERNANDEZ, Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry
each other. Thus, the property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is that FOUND IN ARTICLE
148 of the Family Code.

Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other,[22] or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void [23] from the beginning.[24] It
does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife.[

It is clear that actual contribution is required by its provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions
to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Such provision
is not included in article 148 of the Family Code.

If actual contribution of the party is not proven then there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares as stated in Agapay,

On the Support issue, petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim
regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts
to an admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the children’s right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.

We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their
possessory right over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of
the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE andGINA S. REY, respondents.
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was MARRIED, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation.

Private RESPONDENT FILED A COMPLAINT FOR PARTITION AND RECOVERY OF PERSONAL

PROPERTY WITH RECEIVERSHIP against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of
their house, be reimbursed to her.

The court ordered petitioner to file the pre-trial brief but he failed to do so. The trial court declared him in
default. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Gina was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

A decision was rendered in favor of Gina. The CA affirmed the decision and ruled that the propriety of order
which declared the petitioner in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rule now requires the filing of pre-trial brief and the defendant’s
non-compliance entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE: I. WON there are actual contributions from the parties;

II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Gina to present evidence ex parte.
HELD:
I. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, (which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
and multiple alliances of the same married man). Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions …” PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS
REQUIRED.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. She alleged that
from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in
the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish
dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household
effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00

However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record
are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, NO
SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE EXACT AMOUNT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES THEREIN.
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be PRESUMED TO BE EQUAL.

II. Under Seciton 6 of Rule 18 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-
trialbrief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, the plaintiff may present evidence
exparte and court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file amotion for
reconsideration showing his failure has a valid and meritorious defense.In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his
failure to file pre-trial is justified because he was notrepresented by counsel.

The justification is not sufficient to set aside the order directing privaterespondent to present evidence ex parte,
in as much as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to berepresented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a
lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion forextension to file answer, the required answer stating therein the special
and affirmative defenses, andseveral other motions.If it were true that petitioners did not understand the importance of
order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court and file a motion for extension of time to file the
brief.Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasivereason to
relax the application of the rules. In civil cases, while assistance of a lawyer is desirable, it isnot indispensable.

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.

Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the
latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela,
Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.

Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.

In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, PACITA VILLANUEVA, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties.

Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.

In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him
up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at
the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the
present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas’ illegitimate children who has been receiving the
income of these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their
father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was
already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk
about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was
reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by plaintiff,
through her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement
was reached by the parties.

Further, plaintiff’s witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax declaration
marked Exhibit “T” was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of
purchase of the property, defendant PACITA VILLANUEVA HAD NO MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD.

The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of Eusebia.

The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the trial court. The appellate court found that Pacita
failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that the subject properties are conjugal.
The appellate court dismissed Pacita’s defense of prescription and laches since she failed to have the issue
included in the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer with her co-petitioners.

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.

RULING OF COURT: The only issue proper for resolution is the question of whether the subject properties
are conjugal. Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16] are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for
Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacita’s exclusive property.

The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are
not conjugal.

Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations presented before the trial court are in the name
of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this serves as proof of Nicolas’ exclusive ownership of these properties.
Petitioners are mistaken. The TAX DECLARATIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF TO
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 116 OF THE FAMILY CODE. All property
acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered, is presumed
conjugal unless proved otherwise.

Petitioners point out that Pacita had the means to buy Lot No. 152. Even if Pacita had the financial capacity,
this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No.
152 is conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own money to pay for Lot No. 152. Petitioners
failed to prove this.

Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot No. 152 was
acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property of Nicolas and Eusebia. Petitioners keep belaboring this
point in their petition and memorandum. Petitioners’ argument is flawed. The cohabitation of a spouse with
another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.[33]
Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral.

Finally, petitioners’ reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code[34] is misplaced. A reading of Article 148
readily shows that there must be proof of “actual joint contribution” by both the live-in partners before the
property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of
contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that
actual joint contribution is proven first.

BELCODERO V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
1.  Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and they had 3 children.

In 1946 he abandoned them and  lived with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as common law wife
Josefa Bosing). They had one child, Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.

2. He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while STILL MARRIED TO JULIANA.

3. Alayo purchased parcel of  land on  installment basis in1949 and his deed he named Josefina Bosing as his

wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed executed in 1959.

4. Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra-judicial partition

and sale of the lot, which was described as ’CONJUGAL PROPERTY‘. Josefa’s share went to Josephine for
P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.

5. In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Curt and

Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.

ISSUES:
1. The husband acquired ownership while living with a paramour, after deserting his wife. Property bought
prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code but the final deed was ensued after. And the Family Code took
effect1988.

Old Civil Code (Article 1407), “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.”

a. Whether the property was acquired in 1949 when he first started paying installment or in1959 when

the deed was finalized, RESULT IS THE SAME. Property belongs to conjugal partnership of
Alayo and legal wife Juliana.

Under old and new Civil Code ―all property is presumed to belong to conjugal partnership unless it
is provided that it is exclusive to either spouse.
 
b. Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had the title transferred to Josefa‘s name. She implicitly
recognized Alayo‘s ownership when she and Josephine filed extrajudicial partition of the said property
 the partition would have conformed with partition in intestacy had they been sole and legitimate heirs of
Alayo.

2. Common law spouses
a. In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the co-ownership rule had been repudiated when either of the spouses
had impediments to marry

b. Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not deviate from old rules. Art 148 says that: when one of the
parties is validly married to another, his or her share of the co-ownership shall accrue to the
conjugal property of the valid marriage. But the provisions can‘t apply to this case without
interdicting prior vested rights, so the provisions don‘t apply.

3. Constructive trust
a. Acc to Art 1456: If property is acquired by mistake the person obtaining it is trustee for implied trust
b. The applicable reconveyance period is tenyears. Under the Torrens System the prescriptive period
starts when transaction is registered and a Certificate of Title is issued. Josephine Belocdero got the
Certificate in1974 and Juliana filed the case in 1980.

4. New evidence
a. Juliana married again, but no legalseparation was brought to Alayo during hislifetime si this holds no
relevance

DECISION:

Trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that —

. . . Josephine
Bosing executed a deed of reconveyance of the property in question to the legal heirs of
the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by
way of attorney's fees and expenses in litigation, TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages, pus TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS exemplary damages to prevent future frauds.

The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's order for reconveyance but
reversed the decision on the award for damages, thus —

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendant Josephine
Bosing is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property granting the same to the legal heirs
of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and REVERSED insofar as it awards actual, moral and exemplary
damages.

SC- Affirmed, property goes to Juliana.

LUPO ATIENZA V. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, LUPO, a MARRIED MAN,
COHABITED WITH YOLANDA AS HUSBAND AND WIFE. During their coverture, they allegedly
acquired a real property (BEL-AIR MAKATI) and registered it under the name of Yolanda.

Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted.

He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-
ownership.
Yolanda contended that SHE ALONE WAS THE OWNER AS SHE ACQUIRED IT THRU HER OWN
SAVINGS AS A BUSINESSWOMAN.

The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, BUT THE CA REVERSED IT AS HE FAILED
TO PROVE MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE SAME.

On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the
property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484,
NCC, FOR AS LONG AS THEY ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY DURING THEIR EXTRAMARITAL
UNION, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-
ownership.

 Held:  It is not disputed that the PARTIES HEREIN WERE NOT CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH
OTHER BECAUSE LUPO ATIENZA WAS VALIDLY MARRIED TO ANOTHER WOMAN at the time of
his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.  PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED.
            
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

In 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, THERE WAS NO PROVISION GOVERNING PROPERTY
RELATIONS of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.             

The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. CONTENTIONS MUST BE PROVED BY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND RELIANCE MUST BE HAD ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
PARTY’S OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT UPON THE WEAKNESS OF THE OPPONENT’S DEFENSE.
             It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount
needed therefore.
            
 The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate
his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say
so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the PETITIONER
FAILED TO OVERCOME HIS BURDEN OF PROOF. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
             
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF HIS CLAIM IS EITHER INSUFFICIENT OR IMMATERIAL TO WARRANT THE TRIAL
COURT’S FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED PROPERTY FALLS UNDER THE PURVIEW OF
ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO
PRESENT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE OF HER SOLE OWNERSHIP. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She PRESENTED HER CLIENTELE AND THE
PROMISSORY NOTES EVINCING SUBSTANTIAL DEALINGS WITH HER CLIENTS. SHE ALSO
PRESENTED HER BANK ACCOUNT STATEMENTS AND BANK TRANSACTIONS, WHICH
REFLECT THAT SHE HAD THE FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO PAY THE PURCHASE PRICE OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.