GULU UNIVERSITY

NAME: AMOLA ARTHUR ISAAC

REG No: 18/U/1802/GBL/PS

COURSE UNIT: NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY

LECTURER: Ms. NYANGA PRISCILLA

Question.

The principle in the case of Ryland v Fletcher placed liability on a party for tort committed
against another and its immaterial whether the party was negligent or not. Discuss.
The rule in the case of Ryland v Fletcher evolved as a distinct principle of strict liability
emerging in the mid-19th century as a new form of strict liability at a time when fault was
beginning to dominate liability in tort. In this case, the defendants employed independent
contractors to construct a reservoir on their land. When digging the reservoir, the contractors
found mine workings on the land, and failed to seal these properly before completing their work
and filling the reservoir with water. Justice Colin Blackburn stated, “That the person who for his
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
To a greater extent, the case of Ryland v Fletcher placed liability on a party for tort
committed against another and its immaterial whether the party was negligent or not as
follows;
The defendant need to have brought something into the plaintiff’s land. The law distinguishes
between things which grow or occur naturally on the land, and those which are accumulated
there artificially by the defendant as rocks, 1 thistles2 and naturally collecting water do not fall
within the rule. However, in the case of Rickards v Lothian,3 vegetation deliberately planted,
water collected in bulk or in artificial configurations and rocks or minerals, such as colliery
waste which are dug up and left on land by the defendant, do fall within the rule. This is
contrasted in the case of Giles v Walker4 where the defendant was not liable as he had not
brought the thistles onto his land and there cannot be liability for a thing which naturally
accumulates on land. As a matter of fact, in the case of Rainham Chemical Waters v Belverde
Fish Guano Co,5 the rule will only apply if the landowner brings something inherently
dangerous onto his land for his own purposes, rather than for those of another person, such as a
tenant, thus placing liability on a party for tort committed against another.
Non-natural use of land by the defendant places liability on a party against another. Lord Cairns
in Ryland v Fletcher clearly stresses that this principle applies where the use of land is unnatural.

1
Pontadawe RDC v Moore Gwyn 1929 1 Ch 656
2
Giles v Walker 1890 24 QB 656
3
[1913] AC 263
4
[1890] 24 QB 656
5
[1921] 2 AC 465
Lord Porter in the case of Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd6, clearly stated, “All the circumstances of
the time and place must be taken into consideration, so that what might be regarded as
dangerous or non-natural may vary according to those circumstances.” This is contrasted with
the case of Mason v Levy Auto Parts Ltd7 where the defendants were liable when flammable
material stored on their land ignited and fire spread to neighboring property as the storage of the
materials amounted to non-natural use of the land. The issue of non-natural user was also
considered in the Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather P/C 8 in which the
question of spillages of industrial effluent which affect ground water could not be regarded as
‘non-natural’ since chemical spillages were regarded as normal in the particular industry at the
time thus placing liability on a party against another.
Furthermore, there must be something likely to do mischief placing liability on a party against
another. The substances which are collected must be inherently dangerous but this is open to
interpretation by the courts and has been subsumed into the ‘non-natural user’ rule. This is
portrayed in the case of Shiffman v The Grand Priority of St Johns 9 where court observed that
because of negligence not examining the flag pole led to the claimant’s injury places liability
onto a party thus placing liability on a party against another for tort committed whether the party
was negligent or not.
There must be an escape and foreseeability placing liability on a party against another. This is
sighted in the case of Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd 10 where court noted that there did not appear to
have been negligence on the part of the employers, and as the explosion had occurred on their
own premises, there was no escape from their property. This is contrasted in the case of
Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather P/C 11 where court noted that since the
defendants could not in their circumstances reasonably have foreseen that the seepage of the
solvent through their tannery floor could have caused pollution of the plaintiff’s borehole, they
weren’t liable under the rule in Ryland v Fletcher. The escape need not be onto the plaintiff’s

6
[1947] AC 156
7
[1967] 2 QB 530
8
[1994] 1 All ER 53
9
[1936] 1 All ER 557
10
1947] AC 156
11
[1994] 1 All ER 53
land as long as damage results into the plaintiff’s property. This is portrayed in the case of
Ponting v Noakes12 where court noted that the defendant was not liable as the Yew tree was
entirely in the confine of the defendants land and there had therefore been no escape.
However, the case of Ryland v Fletcher doesn’t place liability on a party for tort committed
against another as follows;
Consent of the plaintiff is an illustration that doesn’t place liability on a party for tort committed
against another. As a matter of fact, if the claimant receives benefit from the thing accumulated,
they be deemed to have consented to the accumulation as consent may be implied where the
parties derive a common benefit from the presence of the hazard. This was established in the old
case of Carstairs v Taylor13 where the defendant wasnot liable in the absence of negligence
because the rat gnawed a hole into the box and water leaked through it causing damage to the
plaintiff’s goods. This is also contrasted in the case of Peter’s v Prince of Wales Theatre14 where
the defendant wasnot liable because the water supply damaged was for the benefit of both
parties, thus not placing liability on a party for tort committed against another.
Act of God is also an illustration that doesn’t place liability on a party for tort committed against
another. Lord Westbury in the case of Tennet v Earl of Glasgow15 clearly stated, “This being an
event which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not found
to recognize the possibility.” This is portrayed in the case of Nichols v Marsland16 where the
defendant wasnot liable when exceptionally heavy rain caused artificial lakes, bridges and
waterways to be flooded and damage adjoining land, thus not placing liability on a party for tort
committed against another. To sum up my endorsed research, I strongly affirm that the principle
in the case of Ryland v Fletcher does place liability on a party for tort committed against another.

REFERENCES
 Pontadawe RDC v Moore Gwyn 1929 1 Ch 656
 Giles v Walker 1890 24 QB 656

12
[1849] 2 QB 281
13
[1871] LR
14
1943] KB 73
15
[1864 2 M HL 22
16
[1876] 2 EX D 1
 Rickards v Lothian 1913 AC 263
 Rainham Chemical Waters v Belverde Fish Guano Co 1921 2 AC 465
 Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd 1947 AC 156
 Mason v Levy Auto Parts Ltd 1967 2 QB 530
 Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather P/C 1994 1 All ER 53
 Shiffman v The Grand Priority of St Johns 1936 1 All ER 557
 Ponting v Noakes 1849 2 QB 281
 Carstairs v Taylor 1871 LR 6
 Peter’s v Prince of Wales Theatre 1943 KB 73
 Tennet v Earl of Glasgow 1864 2 M HL 22
 Nichols v Marsland 1876 2 EX D 1