SPE-188063-MS

The First Successful Nitrogen Lifting Job without Stripping Out for a Gas
Well in Saudi Arabia
Naresh K. Purusharthy (Saudi Aramco), Khalid I. Alhamed (Saudi Aramco), Saud B. Fraikh (Saudi Aramco), Sultan
A. Asel (Saudi Aramco), Nayef S. Shammari (Saudi Aramco), and Mohammed A. Atwi (Saudi Aramco), SPE, Saudi
Aramco

Copyright 2017, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Annual Technical Symposium and Exhibition held in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, 24–27
April 2017.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
of the paper have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any
position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written
consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may
not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of SPE copyright.

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the first successful in-Kingdom coiled tubing intervention in a well without conventional
stripping-out of the well leading to significant cost savings, reduced risks, and compliance to Saudi Aramco
environmental protection policies by adhering to a zero flaring initiative.

Conventionally, wells are shut-in, secured, and stripped out (depending on the operation, stripped out refers to the
disassembly and removal of directly connected piping, cathodic protection, and other production system
components) in preparation for performing any high pressure coiled tubing (HPCT) interventions (to allow crane
and HPCT units to spot and rig-up). Wells are then again re-manifolded to the production system. These stages
consume a tremendous amount of manpower, cost, time, and production loss. Unfortunately, some wells have
severe condensate loading issues, to the extent that they tend to die again, during shutdown (re-manifolding period)
after the lifting operation. A new approach was required to be developed to avoid asset depletion in problematic
wells.

The new approach suggests eliminating the need for stripping out and re-manifolding by lifting the well while it is
connected and flowing to the gas plant. Many challenges were encountered during this effort, including the limited
space for spotting equipment around the well connections, well control, and well response monitoring. In addition,
it was difficult to overcome the downstream pressure across the pressure control valve (PCV) to allow unloading
the well under its own pressure drive.

The operation served as a benchmark for future wells. The operation turned out to be a huge success in terms of
cost and safety. The avoidance of strip-out, re-manifolding, testing package, and producing to the gas plant instead
of flaring resulted in significant cost avoidance and reduction in production time.

This paper will provide an insight on the reasons behind selecting this well as a potential candidate for the job. It
will also shed light on the risk assessment aspects, both technically and environmentally, and the operational safety
backup plan that was thoroughly discussed and implemented. In addition, the challenges faced throughout the
whole process of selecting the well, conducting risk assessment, issuing the Management of Change (MOC),
designing the rigless program, and finally commencing operations will be discussed to ensure obstacles in future
operations can be minimized. At the end, lessons learned and recommendations will be shared to ensure that the
highest levels of operational efficiency are maintained for similar cases in the future.
SPE-188063-MS 2

INTRODUCTION
WELL HISTORY
This well was drilled and completed in 1996 as a vertical gas producer targeting a sandstone formation, which
showed no potential post-flowback, and so the well was suspended with cement plugs. In 2000, an upper carbonate
formation was targeted and acid fractured.

In 2008, the well was sidetracked as an openhole single lateral carbonate producer and completed with 4-1/2 in.
tubing and 7 in. packer. After acid stimulation treatment, the well flowed poorly. In late 2014, the well was
sidetracked once again as a single lateral across the same formation and completed with a three-stage MSF
completion. In 2015, acid fracturing treatment was successfully completed, but the well could not flow naturally.
HPCT nitrogen kick-off was conducted, and the well production was restored.

In January 2016, a deliverability test was performed with a separator, and downhole gauges were installed. Due to
the well’s inability to flow, the deliverability test was concluded and downhole memory gauges (DHMGs) were
retrieved after performing gradient stops.
STATIC BOTTOM-HOLE PRESSURE (SBHP) ANALYSIS
SBHP gradient stops were recorded starting from 12,500 ft, the maximum depth wireline could reach, to surface
with 5-minute stops at each depth point (total 14 depth points). The raw data was analyzed and the corresponding
pressure gradients were calculated and plotted. The SBHP plot below indicates that the wellbore was full of
condensate with an average pressure gradient of 0.322 psi/ft whereas average gas gradient is 0.16 psi/ft. The
gradient stops are plotted on Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 - SBHP Gradient Stops (Jan. 2016)

SPE-188063-MS 3

CONDENSATE LOADING
Historically, condensate accumulation in the wellbore poses a great threat to the productivity of a well as liquids
accumulate downhole resulting in a higher pressure gradient and heavier liquid column. This means more
hydrostatic pressure will be applied on the carbonate face lowering the gas velocity and reducing its capability to
carry the produced liquids.

A PVT study was conducted on this well in November 2010. Using pressure buildup data obtained in early 2010,
the static bottom-hole pressure was shown to be slightly above the experimentally-measured dew point pressure.

HPCT NITROGEN LIFTING

After reviewing the well history, validating the SBHP data, and confirming the condensate loading, Gas Production
Engineering and Gas Field Operations worked together to unload the wellbore by injecting and lifting the condensate
with nitrogen utilizing a HPCT unit.

Conventionally, once a well is planned and scheduled for performing a HPCT job, the procedures are to:
a. Shut-in the well and secure it with a back pressure valve (BPV).
b. Strip out the well site in preparation for site and equipment arrival.
c. Retrieve the BPV, rig-up testing package (choke manifold), perform the HPCT job, and then shut-in the well
and set the BPV again to secure the well.
d. Re-manifolding activities takes place.
e. Retrieve the BPV for the last time and the well will be back on production.

CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS

The conventional N2 lifting method is suitable for newly drilled development wells that are yet to be connected to
the production system. A rigless operation is required to stimulate and flowback the well until cleanup criteria, as
per Saudi Aramco procedures and standards, are reached. During the N2 lifting, flaring activity continues throughout
the operation. This is a necessity, and a concern, that does not come in favor to the environment. The same
procedures of reviving wells with N2 are also being performed for connected wells. It becomes a challenge when
the well is a low-pressure and has condensate loading.

Wells subjected to N2 lifting remain shut-in for about 30 days after the operation in preparation for re-manifolding.
During that period, the condensate re-accumulates downhole, creating an increasing hydrostatic pressure that
eventually kills the well resulting in wasting the resources of time, man power, and the cost of the job that was
performed with no positive outcome. From this point, a concern was raised about how to minimize shut-in time after
N2 lifting to increase the chance of flowing the well under its own pressure drive, and ensuring the Kingdom’s
resources are produced efficiently.

HPCT NITROGEN LIFTING – A NEW APPROACH

The proposal was to conduct HPCT N2 lift operations without stripping-out nor re-manifolding the well. This will
allow all fluids to be flowed into the production system and no flaring will be required. Such a job has never been
performed for a gas well in the Kingdom before. If it proves to be applicable, it will come back to the company with
substantial savings in expenditure, manpower, days of operation, and production time. Therefore, a risk
assessment, Management of Change (MOC), and safety plan had to be thoroughly studied and discussed among
the organizations involved, issued, and implemented prior to executing the job.
SPE-188063-MS 4

OBJECTIVE
This paper was prepared to describe the benefits obtained by an alternative method in lifting low-pressure wells
with N2 while directly connecting them to the production system. Implementing this method gave the benefit of
shortening shut-in time, minimizing condensate accumulation, and saving about 50% of the previous conventional
method cost resulting from eliminating the need to strip out, re-manifold, and create a test package (choke manifold)
and associated third-party service. Also, an environmental benefit emerges when three days of flaring activities was
eliminated.
PRE-OPERATION MEETING
A pre-operation meeting was held to review the operation procedures, and to go over potential hazards, risk
assessment, and MOCs as they will be detailed in the following section of this paper. Representatives from Gas
Production Engineering, Gas Rigless Operations, Gas Field Producing Operations, and service providers gathered
to discuss the proposed well intervention plan. By the end of the meeting, all responsible organizations agreed on
the operational plan and logistics associated with the job. A list of action items was agreed upon to ensure efficient
job execution with minimizing potential risks.
PRE-OPERATION SITE VISIT
Representatives of involved parties met on the wellsite to ensure all on-paper proposed wellsite layout, wellhead
HPCT stack, and bleeder system can be safely installed to ensure a smooth job execution. Attendees discussed
spotting the locations for the required 150 ton crane to support HPCT stack rig-up, nitrogen pumping equipment,
and HPCT surface equipment. The wellsite layout is shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2 - Wellsite Layout

SPE-188063-MS 5

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (MOC)

Since such a job has never been conducted before, A MOC was required for conducting HPCT operations without
stripping-out activities on a well. HPCT was be spotted and rigged up around downstream piping since no strip-out
was going to take place. Therefore, the MOC contains the details, justification, and recommendation of what is
different in this operation from an ordinary HPCT rig-up. The MOC also required inclusion of risks associated with
the type of job proposed and to clearly describe the conventional method in comparison to the new proposed
operation. Also, it includes the advantages of reduced cost, reduced down time and less environmental impact.

After the MOC has been approved by all stakeholders, the green light is obtained to perform the job. Operations
can schedule the job and coordinate with service provider for equipment availability, scheduling, and mobilizing the
equipment to location.

RISK ASSESSMENT
Another meeting was conducted to identify the possible risks associated with the operation. The identified risks
were divided into two main categories:
a. Well specific operations: Includes uncontrolled flow, working at height, change in wind direction, and high
pressure operations
b. HPCT general procedure: Risks associated with the HPCT operation, leaks, exposure to H2S, slips, etc.
are all included and measured.
Three types of risk control procedures correspond to each identified risk: engineering, admin, and PPE risk control
are all considered and discussed, as shown in Table 1.
 Risk Classifiers Risk Calculations Risk Decision Risk Controls and Assurances Evaluation
Initial Risk Adjusted
3 Risk Probability Consequence Consequences Total
Level of Control Risk Engr. Risk Admin Risk PPE Risk
Classification Classification Risk Tolerance Control
Risk 1- Reduction Score 1- Control Control Control
1-5 1-5 Percentage
25 Score 25
Have two bleedoff line Pressure on annular and CT FRC “Coveralls," H2S PS,
Fire, explosion, injuries, loss
to release the pressure monitored by pressure Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
of life, damage to properties
Uncontrolled flow 2 4 8 65% 2.8 Tolerable from the well. transducers. Equipment Safety Boots, Safety Gloves, 65%
or environment loss time &
Kill fluid will be certification validity, personal Ear Plugs, Firefighting
productivity
available on location training, SOP in place, JSA Equipment
Pressure on annular and
CT monitored by FRC "Coveralls," H2S PS,
Substitute choke
pressure transducer, Equipment certification Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
manifold with
2 1 2 72% 0.6 Tolerable PCV not functioning properly have two bleedoff line validity, personal training, SOP Safety Boots, Safety Gloves, 72%
PCV in production
to release the pressure in place, JSA Ear Plugs, Firefighting
flowline
from the well, kill fluid Equipment
must ready on location
FRC "Coveralls," H2S PS,
Sudden change in Shut-in well as when required.
Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
wind direction, Equipment certification
3 3 9 60% 3.6 Tolerable H2S monitoring system Safety Boots, Safety Gloves, 60%
only one pit validity, personal training, SOP
Ear Plugs, Firefighting
Well available on site in place, JSA
Equipment
Specific
Harness, FRC "Coveralls,"
Operations
Scaffolding certification H2S PS, Safety Glasses,
Working at heights 4 1 4 77% 0.9 Tolerable Falling, injury of personnel Scaffold access validity, personal training, SOP Hard Hats, Safety Boots, 77%
in place, JSA Safety Gloves, Ear Plugs,
Firefighting Equipment
Crane operator visiting
Long distance rig- Reducing the maximum load the site to issue a lifting
up and set up the of the crane. Falling heavy plan prior to the Crane checklist, critical lift FRC "Coveralls," H2S PS,
crane due to object such as injector, riser, operation. plan, equipment certification Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
3 3 9 64% 3.2 Tolerable 64%
permanent barrier BOP may cause injuries, Use a 150 ton crane. validity, personal training, SOP Safety Boots, Safety Gloves,
surrounding well damage to properties or following layout for in place, JSA Ear Plugs
head environment and loss of life setting up the
equipment, tag line
Cryo gloves, face shields,
Use properly citified tanks and
High Pressure Serious injury, cryo-burning, Proper barricading of FRC "Coveralls," H2S PS,
3 2 6 76% 1.5 Tolerable pipes/hoses, personnel training, 76%
Nitrogen loss time and productivity high pressure areas. Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
JSA
Safety Boots, Ear Plugs
Lifting procedure, crane
Loss of life injuries — operator and rigger certificate,
Lifting Equipment Damage to property or crane/ forklift daily checklist
3 4 12 72% 3.3 Tolerable * Load calculation , Proper PPE 72%
Failure environment. Lost time and crane/ forklift inspection,
productivity, chemical release SAWCOD sling wire, and
shackles inspection color code
Major injuries — Damage to CT manual, SOP, risk
property or environment. Lost CT integrity certificate, assessment, pressure test,
Pin Hole 3 3 9 69% 2.8 Tolerable Basic PPE, gas detection 69%
time and productivity, chock valve integrity record, CT supervisor
chemical release certificate, well control
Minor injuries — Lost time &
Falling Objects 4 2 8 63% 2.9 Tolerable safe guard JSA, warning tape Basic PPE 63%
productivity
Struck by/Struck Minor injuries — Lost time & Lifting procedure, rigger
3 2 6 35% 3.9 Tolerable 0 Tag line, basic PPE 35%
Against productivity, chemical release certificate
Major injuries — Damage to
JSA, training in wearing and Mandatory PPE, full Body
Fall from Heights 4 3 12 75% 3.0 Tolerable properties or environment. guardrail 75%
working with body harness harness
Lost time & productivity.
Minor injuries — Lost time & Safety inspection checklist,
Trips and Slips 5 2 10 38% 6.2 Moderate 0 Mandatory PPE, 38%
productivity, chemical release house keeping
Loss of life injuries —
Damage to properties. Lost PM services, proponent Proper PPE for electrical
Electrical Hazards 1 4 4 71% 1.2 Tolerable GFCI, Grounding 71%
time & productivity, checklist work
explosion and fire
Minor injuries for the time
Improper Manual
5 2 10 26% 7.4 Moderate being and serious injury over 0 Safety technique manual lifting Basic PPE 26%
HPCT handling technique the long term
General Loss of life injuries —
Procedure Damage to property or
ESD, restraint, relive Pressure test, iron certification,
High Pressure 3 5 15 76% 3.7 Tolerable environment. Lost time & Proper PPE 76%
valve JSA, SOP,
productivity, explosion and
fire
Loss of life injuries —
Trenching around
Damage to properties or Guideline, training, JSA,
Chemical equipment. Soda ash
4 4 16 70% 4.9 Tolerable environment. Lost time & signage, barricade, HAZCOM Chemicals, proper PPE 70%
Exposure/ contact around trench,
productivity, explosion, and program, MSDS, CHB, label
secondary containment
fire
Program, SOP, manual, H2S,
Injuries — Damage to
Pressure control training, JSA, signage,
Hydrocarbon properties or environment.
3 3 9 73% 2.4 Tolerable equipment, engineering barricade, pressure test, iron Basic PPE, gas detection 73%
Leaks Lost time & productivity,
program certificate, operation
explosion, and fire
certification
Loss of life injuries — Program, SOP, manual, JSA,
ESD, restraint, relive
Damage to properties or signage, barricade, iron
Overrating/ valve, POP off, rapture
4 5 20 72% 5.7 Moderate environment. Lost time & certificate, operation Proper PPE 72%
Overpressure disk, auto shut down
productivity, explosion and certification, relive valve and
system on pump
fire pop-off valve certificate
Procedures, signage & warning
Noise 4 2 8 32% 5.4 Moderate Loss of hearing or deafness 0 Wear ear muff/plug 32%
tape.
Program, SOP, manual, H2S,
FRC "Coveralls," H2S PS,
Explosion, fire, serious Pressure control training, JSA, signage,
Safety Glasses, Hard Hats,
Exposure to H2S 3 3 9 74% 2.3 Tolerable injury, fatality, damage the equipment, engineering barricade, pressure test, iron 74%
Safety Boots, Safety Gloves,
equipment and environment program certificate, operation
Ear Plugs, SCBA
certification

Table 1 - HPCT Nitrogen Lift without Stripout Risk Assessment

 SPE-188063-MS 7

PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION

Out of the site visit and the meetings that followed, wellsite layout was developed indicating how the rig-up will take
place with the downstream and production instrumentations are in place. The following points highlight the complete
rig-up components:
1. Quad and combo BOP as per the Well Integrity Manual and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for
high-pressure service (HPS) rating wells.
2. Flow-Cross to be used as a contingency for testing equipment (choke manifold).
3. Single blind/shear ram and another backup ram below the flow-cross to eliminate the need to rig-down
and re-stack in case of utilizing a choke manifold.
4. Nitrogen and fluid pumps connected to the CT reel, CT/Tbg annulus and TCA. This type of connection
would eliminate the need of a BSP.
5. A flowline opened to the gas plant.

Lubricator

Hydraulic Connections 1

Figure 3 - HPCT wellhead stack rig-up

SPE-188063-MS 8

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
Prior to the commencement of the HPCT operation, a pre-job safety meeting was held at the wellsite. The meeting
was attended by gas production engineer, rigless site foreman, gas gatheirng manifold (GGM) foreman, field
services representatives, and HPCT crew. During the meeting, the hazard assessment checklist and operational
procedures were discussed by highlighting key points that all parties need to be aware of. The meeting also
discussed the areas of responsibility of all personnel along with the lines of communications during the job. Also,
attendees reviewed the critical lifting plan. The meeting also touched on the contingent testing equipment that might
be needed in case the well’s pressure could not overcome the downstream pressure.

Due to the absence of choke manifold and testing lines, two operators were on location to locally control the PCV
(Figure 4) and to install a sampling pot (Figure 5) downstream of the venturi meter. The sampling pot is used to
collect samples during the job by a certified operator.
Figure 1 - Sampling Pot

Figure 4 - Pressure Control Valve (PCV) Figure 5 - Sampling Pot

Before commencing the job, a notification email was sent to the gas plant to inform operators about the expected
time of pumping and the estimated volumes of nitrogen and condensate that will be pumped and produced during
the job.

After that, the well was opened to start the HPCT operation. The challenge was to overcome the downstream
pressure (DSP) across the PCV. Therefore, while the PCV is closed, HPCT started to run in hole (RIH) to 2,000 ft
to build the upstream pressure (USP). At 2,000 ft, nitrogen was pumped at 500 scf/min until USP exceeded the
DSP (the total volume of nitrogen pumped was around 30,000 scf). Then, the PCV was opened to 10%, with no
clear indication of USP stabilization. As a result, it was decided to continue RIH to 3,000 ft while pumping nitrogen
at 600 scf/min. At that point, USP was building up gradually. Therefore, it was decided to bean up the PCV to 60%,
which resulted in a sudden increase of USP as shown in Figure 6. RIH was continued to 4,000 ft while pumping
300 scf/min and monitoring USP, to ensure the wellbore is unloaded. PCV was beaned down to 30% and USP was
stabilized. A decision was then made to pull out of hole (POOH) to surface and monitor the well performance until
the USP was stabilized.

To shorten the shut-in period associated with rigging down HPCT, the HPCT wellhead stack was rigged-down,
followed by connecting and pressure testing the wellhead cap and three-way dumping valve. Then, the well was
put back on production before fully rigging down HPCT surface equipment.
SPE-188063-MS 9

Figure 6 - HPCT Nitrogen Kickoff

Depth Nitrogen Rate CT Speed Time Stage Vol Cum Vol

# Description
(ft) (scfm) (fpm) (min) (scf) (scf)
1. CT @ 2,000 ft 2,000 2,000 300-600 0 0 33,000 33,000
2. RIH 2,000 3,000 600 25 1,000 22,000 55,000
3. Stop and wait for nitrogen 3,000 3,000 600 0 0 39,105 94,105
4. RIH 3,000 4,000 300 20 1,000 15,585 109,690
5. Stop and wait for nitrogen 4,000 4,000 300 0 0 5,829 115,519
Table 2 - Pumping Schedule and Nitrogen Consumption
SPE-188063-MS 10

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. HPCT interventions without stripping are possible to perform with the proper planning, preparation, and
communication between all parties.
b. It is critical to grease wellhead valves, pre- and post-job, to ensure the wellhead’s integrity is maintained.
c. HPCT operations that involve any kind of solid returns, i.e., descaling, fill cleanout, milling, etc., should be
flowed through the flow-tee (the green component in Figure 5) without stripping out, but to the flare pit.
d. All the equipment must be tested prior to the operation to ensure they are fully functioning.
e. HPCT jobs that involve the usage of the sampling pot require the presence of a certified operator to collect
samples during job execution.
f. In the absence of a testing choke manifold, it is recommended to provide sampling pot operators with the
necessary tools and equipment needed to measure fluid return properties, i.e., pH, salinity, BS&W, etc.
g. For a future similar operation, rig-up safety scaffolding platforms should be used around the wellhead area
to protect permanent flowlines and instrumentations from damage due to any falling object.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) for granting permission to
present the results of this work and publish this paper.