Attorney General Manjeet v Singh Dhillon

Facts: The respondent represented the interest of the Malaysian Bar Council by initiating a
legal proceeding against Tan Sri Dato Abdul Hamid, the then Lord President of the Supreme
Court (hereinafter referred as “Lord President”), on the charge of contempt of court. The
respondent’s ground was that the Lord President had interfered in the due administration of
justice by the following actions. The first was his instructions for the judges to not convene a
special sitting to hear his predecessor, Tun Salleh Abas, in Kuala Lumpur without his
authorization. The second was his suspension for five judges who heard Tun Salleh Abas’
application without his authorization. The attorney general applied, contending that the
respondent had committed contempt of court by scandalizing the Lord President.
Principle: The common law principle in contempt of court was expounded in the case Debi
Prasad Sharma v Emperor, where Lord Atkin included scandalization of court as part of
contempt of court. However, Spenser Wilkinson J warned in PP v SRN Palaniappan to not
follow the English courts’ decisions too closely and consider the relevancy of the conditions
in England and the country. The test that arose the common law principle was introduced in
the case In The Matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands. The test used by the
Privy Council was whether the words complained of were in circumstances calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law. This
was applied as per Section 3 of Civil Law Act 1956.
Application: The dissenting judge, Harun Hashim SCJ applied the test and concluded that
the respondent did not commit contempt of court as it is only defamatory towards the
judge itself and not the court. The other judges, Mohamed Yusoff SCJ and Gunn Chit Tuan
SCJ, concluded that the respondent was guilty because the statements meant the abuse of
judge and these words represented obstruction and interference with course of justice and
due administration of the law.

Jamil Bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah & Anor

Facts: The second respondent had been run down by a motor bus and suffered irreversible
damage, rendering her as a sub-normal child with permanent mental and physical
disabilities. The trial judge awarded a sum of $75,000 as general damages and $5,000 as
special damages with interest from the date of writ. An appeal was made and the Federal
Court rejected use of general damages and applied itemized awards in accordance with
English Law
Principle: The principle came from Section 22 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969
where the court shall exercise the right to itemize personal injuries in cases where the claim
exceeds $200. This section was applied in the lacuna of Malaysian law, which had no
provision for such cases. The statutes in Malaysia does not prevent itemization of personal
injuries and thus the Federal Court ruled for it to be applicable.
Tan Mooi Liang v Lim Soon Seng & Ors
Facts: The appellant was unanimously removed as cahier by his partners. He then sent a
notice of termination to the partners to signify his intention to dissolve partnership and
contended that it was allowed under the English Partnership Act by the virtue of Section 5
of Civil Law Ordinance 1956.
Principle: Azmi LP provided the dissenting judgement by stating that the appellant’s notice
amounts to partnership dissolution as per English Partnership Act, citing Lord Eldon in
Crayshaw v Maule. Lord Eldon held that partnership may be dissolved by any partner in a
moment’s notice. The interpretation of Section 5 of Civil Law Ordinance 1956 is referred to
the Privy Council in Terunnanse v Terunnanse, where there is a question arises not provided
by law in the country, it shall be determined by the English law. Suffian CJ and Ong Hock Sim
FJ held in majority that the English law is not applicable in the issue as Section 206 of
Contracts Ordinance has provided clear provisions on the matter and there is no valid cause
of termination according to the section.

T Damodaran v Choe Kuan Him

Facts: The respondent is a solicitor charged by the appellant (hereinafter referred to as
“vendor”) to pay him the money obtained from sale of his land to purchaser with the terms
“without encumbrance”. Afterwards, it was discovered that the land was in fact in the midst
of a proceeding with a third party who claimed interests in it. This has breached the terms of
the agreement and raises the issue whether the solicitor pays the money to the vendor or
the court.
Principle: The principle that was disputed was lis pendens, which states that as long as the
title to the property was being litigated in a court of justice parties of litigation were
incapable of alienating it because otherwise any judgement of court might be frustrated.
However, the National Land Code which governs the land law in Malaysia is modeled after
the Australian Torrens System which was deemed superior to the confusing English common
law in matters of land. Therefore, their Lordships held that lis pendes would not prevent
transfer of land as it is also provided expressly under Section 340 of the National Land Code.

Chin Choy & Ors v Collector Of Stamp Duties

Facts: The appellant executed a sale and purchase agreement with a developer for a title of
land. A memorandum of transfer was also made. However, the dispute arose in the matter
of the stamp duties, as Section 12A of Stamp Ordinance 1949 stated that the stamp duty
shall follow the money value, or the market value at the time of the execution, whichever is
higher. The time of execution was then disputed whether to be in execution of the sale and
purchase agreement or the memorandum of transfer.
Principle: The respondent submitted that the principle of once a valid sale contract is
concluded the vendor becomes trustee for the purchaser of estate in equity. The common
law principle was rejected by the learned judge on the reasoning that Section 6 of Civil Law
Act 1956 prevents any application of English law in matters pertaining to tenure,
conveyance, assurance, succession of properties. Their Lordships held that the “execution”
refers to transfer of settlement, which is the memorandum of transfer, in accordance with
the opening words of the section.

Re KO (An Infant)
Facts: The plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the “wife”) and the defendant (hereinafter
referred to as the “husband”) were a married couple with a seven-year-old son. They were
living separately due to their career and they agreed to bring the child to exchange visits to
each other’s residence on alternate weekends. When their marital relation collapsed, the
wife sought custody of the child.
Principle: The common law principle was that the welfare of the child is the most important
thing to be considered, provided by Lord MacDermont in J v C. The learned judge cited the
case Re K and Re W where the courts had decided it is best for the child to be raised by his
or her natural mother. However, S. 27 of Civil Law Act 1956 binds the judge to refer to the
Chinese customs. An affidavit was made and stated that in Chinese custom, the father
would take precedence in custody of the child. The learned judge then concluded that the
welfare of the child is more important than the customs and that the wife is a good mother,
sufficiently to compensate for her failure as a wife. The custody was granted to the wife
with reasonable access from the husband.