Radical Right and Antisemitism

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The radical right and antisemitism
Chapter · February 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.4
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The Radical Right and Antisemitism
Oxford Handbooks Online

Ruth Wodak
The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right
Edited by Jens Rydgren
Print Publication Date: Apr 2018 Subject: Sociology, Political Sociology

Online Publication Date: Feb 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.4
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter considers the question of whether antisemitism today should be regarded as
a genuine structural feature of contemporary society or rather as a relic of an old but now
overcome European ideology. It begins by providing some working definitions of the most
prominent forms of current expressions of antisemitism. It then describes some relevant
antisemitic stereotypes as well as related strategies of denial. It summarizes the few
existing opinion polls oriented toward right-wing populism that correlate with
antisemitism. Finally, it presents two typical manifestations of antisemitism from right-
wing populist parties, analyzed in a qualitative discourse-analytical way, to illustrate
explicit as well as coded manifestations recurring across Europe (and beyond).
Keywords: radical right, antisemitism, Europe, Jews, right-wing populism, coded antisemitic rhetoric, discourse
analysis, secondary antisemitism, racist antisemitism, syncretic antisemitism, Judeus ex Machina-Strategy
MANY scholars in the area of right-wing populism believe that antisemitism has practically
vanished from the political arena and become a “dead prejudice” (Langenbacher and
Schellenberg 2011; Beer 2011; Betz 2013; Botsch et al. 2010; Albrecht 2015; Rensmann
2013; Stögner 2012, 2014) or that anti-Muslim beliefs and Islamophobia have more or
less completely replaced it (Bunzl 2007; Fine 2009, 2012; Kotzin 2013; Wodak 2015a,
2016). However, political debates continue to confront us with numerous and massive
prejudices directed against Jews as a homogeneous group. Thus should antisemitism
today be regarded as a genuine structural feature of contemporary society or rather as a
relic of an old but now overcome European ideology? As the British sociologist Robert
Fine critically observes, “Antisemitism is tucked away safely in Europe’s past, overcome
by the defeat of fascism and the development of the European Union. . . . Antisemitism is
remembered, but only as a residual trauma or a museum piece” (Fine 2009, 463). Fine
addresses the core problem of how to deal with history: the view that turns antisemitism
into a museum piece reproduces an exclusive and unmediated juxtaposition of the past
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and the present and disregards the multifaceted correspondences between them
(Benjamin 2003), or what Adorno called “the survival of National Socialism within
democracy” (Adorno 1998a, 1998b; see also Stögner 2012, 2016).
According to Wetzel (2014, 1), antisemitic prejudices, resentments and stereotypes have
proved to be very flexible, accommodating new sociopolitical developments over the
course of two thousand years. Zick and Küpper (2005) propose labeling all new variants
of antisemitism as “transformed.” They argue that the concept of transformation can
encompass all the differing realizations of an inherently consistent antisemitism,
according to the respective zeitgeists. Although racist antisemitism has become weaker
and less visible, culturally racist topoi, such as “Jews don’t belong to ‘us,’ ” “Jews are
different,” and “Jews are strangers,” remain virulent (Holz 2005). Hence antisemitism is
not, Wetzel claims, a sub-form of racism: antisemitism imagines Jews as rich,
cosmopolitan, and powerful, whereas racism usually perceives “the other” as uneducated,
barbaric, (p. 62) and marginalized. It is specifically envy that seems to trigger
antisemitism, stigmatizing Jews as privileged and wealthy; in regard to racism, however,
economic competition and fears about losing jobs seem to be the mobilizing factors.
Antisemitism occurs in various contexts—for example, in the public sphere and

anonymously in online postings and other Internet genres (Melzer et al. 2016; Wodak
2007, 2011; Schwarz-Friesel and Reinhart 2013). And antisemitism and Islamophobia can
appear together, as recent public debates about banning halal and the practice of
circumcision in Austria, Germany, and France illustrate (Erb and Kohlstruck 2016).
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that there are several antisemitisms—racist,
capitalist, cultural, religious, or syncretic; Muslim or Christian; left- or right-wing; “old”
or “new”; traditional, structural, or secondary; hard-core or latent; explicit or coded; and
soft or violent, the latter resemiotized in physical acts of hatred (Botsch et al. 2010; Fine
2012; FRA 2013, 2015; Macmaster 2001; Mammone et al. 2013; Seymour 2013; Stögner
2014, 2016; Stögner and Wodak 2014, 2015; Wodak 1989, 2011, 2015a; Wodak et al.
1990). Indeed, Marin (2000) provocatively states that after the Shoah, we are dealing
with an antisemitism without Jews and without anti-Semites (e.g., Botsch and Kopke
2016). Fine poignantly describes the many polarized debates about occurrences of
antisemitism:
To deny the issue of antisemitism in Europe on the grounds that Europe has
learned the lesson from the Holocaust, or to deny the issue of antisemitism on the
left on the grounds that the left is inherently anti-racist, or to deny the issue of
antisemitism within radical Islam on the grounds that Muslims are oppressed
within Europe and have a history of tolerance, is in every case a kind of closure, a
refusal to engage critically with the legacies of European, left and Muslim
antisemitism. (Fine 2009, 477)
The old (fascist) far right had one common denominator despite all the differences
between nations and nationalisms: antisemitism. “Jews” were constructed as the
“defining others” of those who constructed themselves as true or real members of a
Page 2 of 33

nation or people (Simmel 1950). Even the communist regimes used this stereotype in the
immediate aftermath of 1945, for example in Czechoslovakia when Rudolf Slansky and
other victims of Stalinization were labeled “cosmopolitans”—a negative code word for
Jews (Pelinka 2013; Rudling 2012, 2013). The contemporary far right and right-wing
populist parties are vehemently anti-cosmopolitan and anti-globalization—even if in some
regions, especially Western Europe, traditional (Christian and racist/biological)
antisemitism plays a significantly lesser role than in the past.
Indeed, as a Human Rights First report (2014, 30) states, antisemitism has remained a
constitutive element of neo-Nazi and right-wing populist ideologies and rhetoric across
Europe, frequently alongside anti-Muslim, homophobic, and anti-Ziganist beliefs and
stereotypes (Wodak and Richardson 2013). This could confirm, as Stögner (2014) argues,
the view put forth by Adorno et al. (1967)—that we are dealing with an authoritarian
syndrome, in which racism, antisemitism, xenophobia, homophobia, and sexism reinforce
each other and converge into one exclusionary nativist belief system, based on a völkisch,
ultra-nationalist ideology (Wodak 2015a, 2016). The authoritarian syndrome’s (p. 63) nine
facets are (1) conventionalism (rigid adherence to the conventional values of the middle
class), (2) submission (uncritical obedience to the idealized moral authority of the in-
group), (3) aggression (a law-and-order mentality that seeks to condemn and punish norm
violations), (4) lack of introspection, (5) superstition, (6) admiration of power and
strength, (7) cynicism, (8) projectivity, and (9) an excessive fixation on sexuality. One of
the few quantitative opinion polls correlating the radical right with antisemitic beliefs
also provides significant evidence for Adorno’s theory (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann
2011).
In this chapter, I first provide some working definitions of the most prominent forms of
current expressions of antisemitism, which have become the topic of many different
polarized debates. I then briefly describe some relevant antisemitic stereotypes as well as
related strategies of denial. I summarize the few existing opinion polls oriented toward
right-wing populism that correlate with antisemitism. Finally, two typical manifestations
of antisemitism from right-wing populist parties, analyzed in a qualitative discourse-
analytical way, will illustrate explicit as well as coded manifestations recurring across
Europe (and beyond).
Definitions
The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, superseded in 2007
by the Fundamental Rights Agency [FRA]) noted an upswing in antisemitic incidents in
France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands
between July 2003 and December 2004. In September 2004, the European Commission
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) called on its members to ensure that anti-racist
Page 3 of 33

criminal law covers antisemitism. And in 2006, the EUMC offered a working (standard)
definition to be used for data collection: it defined antisemitism as
a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews.

Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jews
and non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, towards Jewish community
institutions and religious facilities. (EUMC 2006)
Moreover, the EUMC added that criticism of Israel cannot be regarded as antisemitism so
long as it is “similar to that levelled against any other country.”1
In contrast, Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011, 40) define antisemitism as
social prejudice directed against Jews simply because they are Jewish. Its
particular power seems to be that it can be very flexibly argued and
instrumentalized to justify discrimination. Antisemitism takes many different
forms: political (“Jewish world conspiracy”), secular (usury), religious
(“responsible for the death of Jesus”) and racist (“Jewish character”).
(p. 64)
They also state that other scholars, especially Europeans, argue for a broader, more
sweeping definition that extends beyond Jewishness to encompass anti-Americanism,
anti-capitalism, and anti-modernism (EUMC 2006). They emphasize that “the narrower
definition of antisemitism as social prejudice is helpful when analysing the expression,
dynamics and function of antisemitism in practice and in relation to research findings on
other prejudices.”
Moreover, we are confronted with two new forms of antisemitism that emerged after the
Second World War: secondary antisemitism and antisemitism related to Israel and
“Zionism.” Quite similar to anti-Judaism (i.e., religiously based antisemitism) and to both
modern and traditional antisemitism, both new variants refer to the imaginary of a
homogeneous Jewish collective. This collective, according to prominent world conspiracy
theories, is perceived to strive for power in all socially relevant domains; alternatively,
such theories claim that the “Jewish collective” has already achieved such power and is
abusing it—claims that are frequently combined with anti-American sentiments.
Soon after the end of the Second World War, Adorno (1963) coined the term “secondary
antisemitism” (see also Kovács 2010) in order to address public opinion in postwar
Germany that claimed the Jews were exploiting Germany’s guilt over the Holocaust.
Wodak and colleagues (1990, 12; see also Wodak 2011) define this phenomenon in the
following way:
Page 4 of 33

Secondary antisemitism in post-war (Western) Europe, specifically in countries

with fascist and national-socialist past, must therefore be viewed primarily in
relation to the various ways employed in dealing with alleged or real guilt, with
alleged or actual accusations about the Nazi and fascist pasts. Discursive
manifestations may be found not only in the large, traditional reservoir of
antisemitic prejudice and in a general discourse of collective experiences and
attitudes, but in several new topoi as well. The forms of expression chosen vary
significantly: They may be manifest or latent, explicit or very indirect. But each
and every one appears to be embedded in a discourse of justification.2
Usually, accusations of antisemitic beliefs or utterances are met with justifications and
denials in political debates and in the media, typically as elements of blame avoidance
(Hansson 2015; Wodak 2006, 2007). In a nutshell, as the historian Tony Judt states, “what
is truly awful about the destruction of the Jews is not that it mattered so much, but that it
mattered so little” (Judt 2008, 14). In other words: no or few lessons were learned from
the past.
Some aspects of modern/racist antisemitism remain virulent in the form of a closed

antisemitic worldview, where all problems are explained by scapegoating Jews. This is
what I label “Judeus ex machina” (Wodak 1989, 2015a, 2016)—a mechanism that allows
blaming an imagined homogeneous collective of Jews for whatever issue might seem
opportune for political ends. This was true once again during the financial crisis of 2008:
fantasies of powerful and greedy Jewish bankers, Jewish capitalism, and (p. 65) Jewish
speculation served to trigger many stereotypes of a Jewish world conspiracy (see
Example 1, below).
Common Antisemitic Stereotypes in Right-

Wing Populist Rhetoric
The accusation of Jews being untrustworthy clearly stands in the tradition of an ancient
antisemitic trope: “Ahasver, the eternally wandering Jew.” This myth, dating back to the
thirteenth century, has been a core element of Christian hatred of Jews since the
seventeenth century and was placed at the center of National Socialist antisemitic
propaganda (Körte and Stockhammer 1995). In the nineteenth century, when European
nation-states were established, the lack of a homeland was reinterpreted as rootlessness;
forced exclusion from European societies was turned into an essential and essentialized
Jewish characteristic. The effect of this prejudice is to suspect Jews of not being wholly
reliable with regard to their loyalty to the nation-state, thereby subtly drawing on the
Christian myth that Jesus Christ allegedly damned Ahasver to eternal wandering because
of his disloyalty. Denied the capability of building an “authentic” nation in the modern
sense, Jews were regularly regarded as aliens within nations, and sometimes as
“parasites” (Musolff 2010). Thus, Jews were vulnerable to being viewed not as a distinct
Page 5 of 33

nation among other European nations but as cosmopolitan “anti-nationalists.” The figure
of the anti-national Jew was also used as a projection surface for the unacknowledged
uncertainties, fragilities, and antagonisms of the modern nation-state—something that
resonates with the right-wing populist imaginary of a homogeneous nation-state.
Furthermore, within antisemitic prejudice, Jews are usually viewed as overstated

intellectuals, as people who live in their books rather than in the “real world,” thus
having no real home and not being part of any nation. The critical element ascribed to the
Jews is connected to social mobility, and thus has a strong association with the age of
emancipation. Anti-intellectualism goes hand in hand with the particular fin-de-siècle
ideology of authenticity. This ideology is connected to a conservative, even reactionary
critique of economy, anti-urbanism, and nationalism. Modest and straightforward
behavior and thinking, practicality, wholeness, and unity are some major features of this
ideology, which by definition excludes Jews (Stögner 2012).
Closely related to the two stereotypes of the “anti-national Jew” and the “intellectual Jew”
is the antisemitic image of the “Jewish Bolshevik,” which has its origins in the Russian
civil war. Opponents of the revolution, for example, accused Jews of being responsible for
the murder of the tsarist family. These accusations were the onset of horrible pogroms
with more than a hundred thousand Jewish victims (Pipes 1997). After the First World
War, this stereotype spread to the West, including Germany, Great Britain, and the United
States, and it became an important component of ideologies concerning an alleged
“Jewish world conspiracy.” (p. 66)
The stereotype of the “Jewish Bolshevik” was important in National Socialist ideology
(Musolff 2010), where it was paradoxically combined with anti-liberalism and ostensibly
anti-capitalist rhetoric. While this might seem contradictory at first glance, it turns out to
be another manifestation of antisemitism as an ideological syndrome, as a worldview
characterized by a combination of contradictory elements—syncretic antisemitism. In this
form of antisemitism, Jews are viewed as evil (finance) capitalists and as representing
Bolshevism—and these motives do not so much compete against each other as combine
(Stögner and Wodak 2014, 2015). This trope was massively employed during the financial
crisis of 2008: Jews are thus portrayed as guilty of all common woes (Wodak 2015a,
2016).
Denial of the Holocaust is the most extreme form of secondary antisemitism

(Gliszczynska-Grabias 2013; Iganski 1999; Richardson 2013a, 2013b). If the Holocaust is,
however, perceived as “myth,” then this antisemitic belief also has severe implications for
Israel’s right to exist, because the Holocaust played a central role when Israel was
founded 1948 and its commemoration is part and parcel of Israeli identity constructions
(Engel and Wodak 2009, 2013; Wodak 2015b). Moreover, narrowing the term
“antisemitism” to its genocidal form (with “Auschwitz” acting as a metonym for all evil) is
one strategy for obscuring contemporary, post-Nazi forms of antisemitism that are
characterized by latency (Stögner 2016). Closely related to this is what the British legal
scholar David Seymour labels the “dissolution of the Holocaust.” In its commodification
Page 6 of 33

within European commemoration practices, the Holocaust has become increasingly

detached from antisemitism, instead serving as the icon par excellence for the evil of old
Europe and a symbol for a modernity the new Europe has supposedly overcome:
All that remains in post-national and post-modern Europe is the memory of the
Holocaust. But it is less the memory of the Holocaust itself than a memory of the
modernity into which the Holocaust has been dissolved. Separated from the
structural conditions that made it possible, the Holocaust of the new Europe’s
memory becomes nothing more than a symbol. It is a symbol, however, not of
antisemitism, genocidal or otherwise, but of the old Europe itself, a Europe
fragmented into nation-states along with its concomitants of national sovereignty,
nationalism, and the genocidal impulse that is said to inhere within it. (Seymour
2013, 24–25)
Page 7 of 33

Antisemitism and Right-Wing Populism in

Europe: Quantitative Results
Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011) and Melzer and coauthors (2016) measured
antisemitism by using four statements that represent traditional and secondary
antisemitism, covering the anti-Jewish conspiracy theory that Jews have too much
influence in the country in question and the converse of victims and perpetrators
contained in the (p. 67) accusation that Jews try to take advantage of past persecution.
Here there is an undertone of the ancient antisemitic stereotype of the “money-grubbing
Jew.” Another statement suggests that Jews care only for their own good (implying
disloyalty to the nation). Zick and colleagues included a positive attitude suggesting that
Jews represent cultural enrichment; this item was reverse-coded so that higher values
represent rejection of the statement. The survey also included two statements designed
to capture antisemitism communicated via issues connected with Israel, but these were
excluded from the antisemitism mean scale; below I include only statements related to
secondary antisemitism (Table 4.1).3
The responses to these antisemitic prejudice statements varied considerably between

countries. Almost half of Polish respondents and 69 percent of Hungarian respondents
believe that Jews in their countries have too much influence, whereas at the other end of
the scale only 14 percent in Great Britain and 6 percent in the Netherlands are of this
opinion. The same is found for statements 8 and 9, which attribute avarice and egotism to
Jews. Here again the strongest agreement exists in Poland and Hungary—although more
than half of Portuguese respondents also agree with these statements—and the least
agreement is in the Netherlands and Great Britain, where about one-fifth judge Jews to
be profit-seeking and self-interested. In all the surveyed countries, however, a majority
agrees with the statement that Jews enrich their culture. Regarding the additional
statement on the current policies of Israel (item 11), about half of the respondents in
Portugal, Poland, and Hungary see antisemitic sentiments as being triggered by Israel’s
political activities. Hence, the significantly strongest agreement with antisemitic
prejudices is found in Poland and Hungary. In Portugal, closely followed by Germany,
antisemitism is significantly more prominent than in other Western European countries.
In Italy and France, antisemitic attitudes as a whole are less widespread than the
European average, while the extent of antisemitism is least in Great Britain and the
Netherlands.
The situation described by Zick and colleagues has remained constant in diverse
European contexts, as various country studies illustrate (e.g., Beauzamy 2013; Blatman
1997; Byford 2002; Ellinas 2013; Kovács 2010, 2013; Krzyżanowski 2013; Mayer 2013;
Mãdroane 2013; Pelinka 2013; Richardson and Wodak 2009a, 2009b; Stögner 2016).
However, the number of antisemitic hate crimes has risen, possibly—though not
necessarily—due to the growth and rhetoric of the Front National in France, Jobbik in
Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) in
Page 8 of 33

Poland, Sweden Democrats, Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ, Freedom Party of

Austria), and Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida,
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) and Alternative für Deutschland
(AfD, Alternative for Germany) in Germany. It is not possible to establish any clear causal
connection between the rise of the right and antisemitic hate crimes, but the
aggressiveness of right-wing and extreme-right propaganda certainly contributes to a
more general climate that supports hate crimes against all “others,” thus also against
Jews (Wodak 2015a, 2016). Of course, the obvious rise of right-wing populist parties
(p. 68) (p. 69) has many reasons, which cannot be explored in any detail in this chapter
(but see, e.g., Arzheimer, Chapter 8 of this volume). Since 2008, the refugee situation,
economic crises, rising unemployment, and identity crises are just a few factors driving
the move to the far right. Antisemitism accompanies this phenomenon, but not
everywhere in the same way: in countries with a fascist and National Socialist past,
antisemitism seems to be an inherent part of right-wing populist and extreme-right
parties (hence in Greece, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, Romania, and
Ukraine). Meanwhile, in other countries, mostly in Western Europe, rising anti-Muslim
sentiments have caused right-wing parties to align with respective Jewish populations in
their aim to instrumentalize such anti-Muslim attitudes in their election campaigns
(Denmark, France, Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands). In the latter group of
countries, the aforementioned polarized debates about Israel dominate, whereas in
Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe, modern and Christian antisemitic tropes
frequently recur. Indeed, several leaders of right-wing populist parties frequently travel
to Israel to emphasize their sympathies; however, in Israel, they prefer to meet with
Israeli extreme right-wing parties, with whom they share their exclusionary rhetoric and
form anti-Muslim alliances (e.g., Betz 2013).
Page 9 of 33

Table 4.1 Summary: Results from Cross-Country Survey on Antisemitic Attitudes
Page 10 of 33
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No. Item Germany Great France Netherla Italy Portugal Poland Hungary
Britain nds
7 Jews have 19.7 13.9 27.7 5.6 21.2 19.9 49.9 69.2
too much
influence
in
[country].
8 Jews try 48.9 21.8 32.3 17.2 40.2 52.2 72.2 68.1
to take
advantag
e of
having
been
victims
during
the Nazi
era.
9 Jews in 29.4 22.5 25.8 20.4 26.9 54.2 56.9 50.9

general
do not
care
about
anything
or anyone
Page 11 of 33

but their
own kind.
10 Jews 68.9 71.5 60.6 71.8 49.7 51.9 51.2 57.3

enrich
our
culture.
Additiona
l
statement
s
11 Consideri 35.6 35.9 - 41.1 25.1 48.8 55.2 45.6

ng
Israel's
policy, I
can
understa
nd why
people do
not like
Jews.
(Adapted from Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 57)
Page 12 of 33

Accordingly, Bachner (2013, 6) summarizes the radical right-wing Swedish situation with
respect to antisemitic beliefs being mainly triggered by secondary antisemitism (and this
applies more or less to other countries in Western Europe):
Notions of Jewish power, manipulation and conspiracies continue to play a key

role in antisemitic thinking and propaganda in Sweden. They appear in extreme
and explicit forms, and form a crucial part of ideology and propaganda within
parts of the far right and the radical Islamist milieu. But they also figure in more
subtle and coded forms within mainstream political discourse. As shown by survey
studies, these notions, specifically when applied to the global scene, also seem to
have support from a not insignificant minority of the Swedish population.
In contrast, Kovács and Szilágyi (2013, 218) interpret the Hungarian reemergence of
antisemitism in the far right as related to identity politics (this could apply to Ukraine and
Romania as well):
However, present-day antisemitism does not represent anti-modernity, but is

rather a code for a political identity. The argumentation strategies created to
legitimize this antisemitic discourse—the application of such topoi as equal rights,
justice and humanitarianism—are designed to express the difference from the
“old” discourse and to achieve legitimacy within the current dominant paradigm.
The new antisemitic discourse represents a reformist version of the old antisemitic
myth.
Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011) combined six dimensions of prejudice to create a
GFE (group-focused enmity) index. Calculated as the mean value of six individual GFE
elements, it expresses the overall intensity of group-focused enmity. The internal (p. 70)
consistency (reliability) of this index, composed of anti-immigrant attitudes, antisemitism,
racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism, and homophobia, is confirmed empirically for
Europe as a whole, and at the country level. In all countries, all six prejudices are so
closely related that they can be treated as a single dimension. Group-focused enmity is
most prevalent in Hungary and Poland, where it is identifiable among nearly two-thirds of
respondents.
In a next step, Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011, 77) investigated the correlation of the
GFE with party affiliation and the endorsement of authoritarianism and law-and-order
politics. Taking the European countries together, they found significant relationships
between group-focused enmity and authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and a
negative attitude toward diversity. This implies that respondents who exhibit prejudice
against weak groups are also likely to espouse ideological convictions that oppose
equality for different groups. In this way, we actually find empirical evidence for Adorno
and colleagues’ (1967) theory of the authoritarian syndrome (see above). These results
also imply that right-wing populist parties that endorse anti-Muslim beliefs and ultra-
Page 13 of 33

nationalism are highly susceptible to antisemitism, homophobia, and sexism (Zick,

Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 102):
The further [to the] right respondents place themselves in the political spectrum,
the more likely they are to hold prejudices against the target groups under
consideration. . . . The relationship between political orientation and extent of
prejudices is found in all the countries, but is particularly close in the
Netherlands, Germany, Italy and France. The same applies to the relationship
between a negative image of the EU and group-focused enmity, although the effect
is considerably weaker overall and especially in Portugal, Poland and Hungary. We
also found a clear relationship between the feeling of political powerlessness and
the tendency to target weak groups: the stronger the feeling of political
powerlessness the greater the extent of group-focused enmity. This tendency is
particularly clear in the Netherlands and Portugal. Support for the death penalty
is also associated with stronger prejudice; this relationship is found in all the
countries, but is especially strong in Great Britain and France. Furthermore, we
found that a desire for a strong leader clearly correlates with the extent of group-
focused enmity in all the countries.
Defining Antisemitic Rhetoric: The “Judeus ex

Machina” Strategy
Syncretic Antisemitism
It is important to emphasize that “antisemitic language behavior” may imply explicitly

held and/or articulated hostility toward Jews, but it necessarily implies the presence
(p. 71) of prejudicial assumptions about “the Jews” as a group. For example, the slogan
“Kill Jews” painted on the Sigmund Freud monument in Vienna in 1988 clearly does
contain an explicit, albeit anonymous, imperative call for the most hostile of actions
against Jews. On the other hand, a Jewish joke, which can have various meanings
depending on the setting, the participants, and the function of the utterance, also forms
part of what we term “antisemitic language behavior,” but only in circumstances where
the joke expresses anti-Jewish prejudices (Wodak et al. 1990). Thus, analyzing the context
of an utterance is indispensable in determining whether an utterance expresses
antisemitic prejudice or not. Which antisemitic content is expressed depends, among
other things, on the setting (public, private, or media), the formality of the situation, the
participants, the topic, and the presence or absence of Jews. Antisemitic language
behavior, moreover, covers a wide range of speech acts, ranging from explicit remarks or
appeals for action to mere allusions. Antisemitic language behavior includes all levels of
Page 14 of 33

language, from text or discourse to the individual word or even sounds (for example, the
Yiddish intonation of certain words or phrases), when used in derogatory ways.
Ideally, systematic in-depth linguistic analysis of hate speech and antisemitic utterances
of Holocaust denial should draw on:
• Historical analysis of antisemitism and its verbal expressions (i.e., “coded language”)
• Sociocognitive analysis of collective memories and frames guiding the acquisition of
specific knowledge so as to be able to understand “coded language”
• Sociopolitical analysis of ongoing debates and the political parties taking part in
them (these two dimensions form the broad context)
• Genre theory, considering, for example, the functions of TV interviews and TV
discussions (persuasive strategies, positive self-presentation and negative other-
presentation, populist rhetoric, etc.)
• The setting, speakers, and other elements of specific utterances, that is, the narrow
context
• The co-text of each utterance
• Linguistic (i.e., pragmatic and/or grammatical) approaches, such as presuppositions,
insinuations, implications, et cetera, as characteristics of specific “coded
antisemitism.”
As Jews are perceived as the universal and ultimate evil in such antisemitic rhetoric,
contradicting moments can be combined within one argument, in the sense of the “Judeus
ex machina” strategy (see above). Nowadays, the various roots of antisemitism (drawing
on nationalist, religious, and racist ideologies) are usually merged into what I label
syncretic antisemitism. This implies that any traditional stereotype can be employed
when it is useful for political debate. (p. 72)
Strategies of Blaming and Denying
Teun van Dijk has described strategies for denying racism in great detail (1992, 89ff.). He
claims that
one of the crucial properties of contemporary racism is its denial, typically

illustrated in such well-known disclaimers as “I have nothing against blacks,
but . . .” . . . The guiding idea behind this research is that ethnic and racial
prejudices are prominently acquired and shared within the white dominant group
through everyday conversation and institutional text and talk. Such discourse
serves to express, convey, legitimate or indeed conceal or deny such negative
ethnic attitudes. (van Dijk 1992, 87–88)
Page 15 of 33

Theodor W. Adorno in his seminal 1963 lecture “Was bedeutet Aufarbeitung der
Vergangenheit?” maintained that in German (and also Austrian) discourse about the Nazi
past and the Shoah, roles were reversed. Thus, Jews were causally linked to the Shoah
and victims were turned into quasi-perpetrators—that is, the Jews themselves were
blamed for their suffering. Subsequently, a “justification discourse” evolved that
projected guilt onto aggression via what Anna Freud labeled “identification with the
aggressor.” Frequently, these justificatory strategies led to “secondary antisemitism,” as
previously mentioned. In short, a no-win situation was created whereby Jews were
constructed either as guilty of the Shoah in the first place or as subsequently exploiting
history for their own interests whenever the terrible past was mentioned. Below I
summarize the most important strategies and patterns that occur in the antisemitic
justification discourse mentioned above (e.g., Angouri and Wodak 2014):
The first major strategy negates the very context of the occurrence of antisemitism, at
least at the explicit level (i.e., act denial), via three possible means: (1) “This occurs
everywhere” (equation), or “All countries, all wars are the same” (fallacious
generalization; tu quoque); (2) a claim of ignorance combined with a refusal to take a
stance; (3) individuals claim victimhood for themselves or for the entire country, thus
shifting the blame onto others.
The second major strategy raises the discussion to a more general level. Using the
strategy of scientific rationalization, some people launch into extensive analyses of
prewar Germany, discussions about the past, debates about Israel, and so forth. Many
utterances make use of arguments embedded in a topos of history, drawing on collective
memories and fallaciously equating the context of the Second World War and war crimes
with current contexts. Such narratives, for example, might serve as justification for the
reemergence of Golden Dawn as a necessary consequence of Greek history and a
predictable (thus justifiable) response to crisis management (Angouri and Wodak 2014).
The third macro strategy consists of positive self-presentation: the speaker narrates
stories that portray him/her as having performed “good and praiseworthy deeds,” of
helping those in need whenever possible. Speakers claim to have acted responsibly so
that they are morally without blame. This strategy can be further developed as (1) trying
(p. 73) to understand what happened or (2) trying to justify and/or deny the existence of
“problems” triggered by the rise of the right wing, and so forth.
The fourth macro strategy serves to relativize the facts. People using this strategy will (1)
start to enumerate similar problems and occurrences in other nations (balancing,
equating); (2) adopt further strategies seeking to provide a (pseudo-)rational causal
explanation for a specific incident (e.g., fallaciously blaming the victims); (3) employ the
“Not we, but them” strategy, which attributes the specific utterance to somebody else,
another typical fallacy of shifting blame; or (4) simply deny the fact that the Shoah
happened at all (act denial) and attribute such “narratives or reports” to some kind of
Page 16 of 33

international (frequently Jewish) conspiracy. This fourth technique constitutes Holocaust

denial.
Examples
In the following, I briefly discuss two examples of antisemitic occurrences that illustrate
an instance of traditional antisemitism (Example 1) and an instance of secondary
antisemitism (Example 2). Of course, the boundaries are blurred, as in both cases a range
of stereotypes are expressed that draw on the huge reservoir of syncretic antisemitic
tropes, thus manifesting the “Judeus ex machina” strategy.
In the first example, the stereotypes of the “wealthy and greedy Jew” and a “Jewish world
conspiracy” are insinuated, and Jews are blamed for the financial crisis—thus an old
prejudice is revived. In the second case, we are dealing with the strategy of victim-
perpetrator reversal: Jews are blamed for the problems of current Hungarian politics, and
the plight and suffering of Jews during the Second World War and the Shoah are
euphemized and even denied. Such strategies are frequently used to deflect guilt, on the
one hand (guilt for the collaboration of many Hungarians with the Nazi extermination
machinery); on the other hand, excluding the “Jewish other” serves to strengthen
nationalist identity politics.
Such expressions of antisemitic prejudice are indeed typical. In the first case, we are
dealing with a politics of denial, with a range of disclaimers and coded exclusionary
rhetoric (and images), and with a subsequent vehement and polarized public debate,
indicating a breach of taboos that exist in postwar Western Europe. Nevertheless, by
instrumentalizing antisemitic tropes, such provocations support the agenda of right-wing
populist parties: they immediately dominate the media for a period of time, triggering
what I have labeled the “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile” (see Wodak 2015a, 2016).
In the second case, no sanctions occur. Such explicit antisemitic prejudices can be
encountered in East European countries with high percentages of antisemitic beliefs and
a virulent antisemitic tradition. In any case, it becomes apparent how right-wing populist
parties successfully attempt to mobilize public opinion and their electorate by addressing
antisemitic beliefs. (p. 74)
Page 17 of 33

Click to view larger

Figure 4.1 Caricature posted by H. C. Strache on
Facebook on August 18, 2012
Example 1: Caricatures, secondary antisemitism, and the FPÖ’s

strategy of provocation
On August 18, 2012, the leader of the FPÖ, H. C. Strache, posted a caricature on
Facebook (Figure 4.1, below) that recontextualized a U.S. caricature from 1962 (Figure
4.2) into a caricature that—as many readers and viewers immediately observed—alludes
to antisemitic caricatures from Nazi times that were published daily in the 1930s in the
infamous German newspaper Der Stürmer. After a predictable scandal had erupted over
the explicit antisemitic features of the caricature, most newspapers in Austria and
Germany published editorials and news reports about this incident. Strache was also
interviewed on television on August 20, 2012.4 He first denied having altered the original
caricature; he then denied that the stars visible on the cufflinks of the banker were stars
of David; and finally he categorically denied any resemblance to antisemitic caricature.
The explicit differences between Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are easy to detect: the nose of the
sweating and greedily eating banker has been changed to a crooked, so-called Jewish
nose, and each cufflink has been decorated with a star of David. These two changes both
insinuate and resonate with images of the Nazi past: the stereotypical image of “the ugly
Jewish banker” who exploits the poor (metonymically embodied by the image of a poor
worker from the 1960s) and patronizes the government, which tries to ingratiate itself
with the powerful and rich Jew by serving him an opulent meal and pouring wine. In
Figure 4.3, the relevant segments have been enlarged.
By making these changes and posting the altered caricature with an extended comment
(see Figure 4.1), Strache utilized the theme of the financial crisis in at least three ways:
to accuse the government of wrong policies and of submitting to the EU, to create a
scapegoat that can be blamed for current woes by triggering traditional antisemitic
stereotypes of a world conspiracy and powerful Jewish bankers and capitalists, and to
provoke a scandal and thus attract media attention and set the news agenda. The (p. 75)
caricature is accompanied by a text box on the left that explains the caricature in some
detail and accuses the government of selling out to EU policies and foreign “punters.”
This insinuates some other well-known anti-Jewish stereotypes: a world conspiracy and
the Jewish capitalist. Text 1, below, taken from the beginning of a TV interview on ORF
II’s nightly news program on ZIB 2 on August 22, 2012 (four days after the caricature
Page 18 of 33

was posted), illustrates the politics of denial propagated by Strache (“AW” is Armin Wolf,
anchorman; “HCS” is Strache):5
Text 1

Figure 4.2 The original American caricature from
1962

Figure 4.3 The “greedy banker,” enlarged section
(http://derstandard.at/1345164507078/Streit-um-
antisemitisches-Bild-auf-Strache-Seite, accessed May
4, 2013)
Page 19 of 33

(p. 76)
After being asked whether he is now “proud” of being discussed in so many serious
newspapers and on radio stations across Europe, Strache utters his first denial (lines 7–
8): “No, this is absolute nonsense, I got this caricature shared by a user.” Wolf
immediately falsifies this claim and shows that Strache actually posted this caricature
himself by pointing to a printout of the relevant Facebook page (line 9). Strache then
concedes that he first said something wrong and starts—by way of justification—to
explain the caricature as illustrating the unfair and unjust redistribution of money taken
away from the Austrian people. Here, Wolf interrupts (line 16) and qualifies the bankers
Page 20 of 33

as Jews (“who are Jews in your caricature”). At this point, the second round of denials
starts and Strache says (lines 16–19):
Text 2
(p. 77)
Via a well-known disclaimer (“I have many Israeli . . . Jewish friends”), Strache denies
that the caricature should or even could be read as antisemitic, a typical intention denial:
the fallacious argument (post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy) is obvious—if his many Jewish
friends do not classify the caricature as antisemitic, then it cannot be antisemitic. Such
disclaimers are widely used to prove that an utterance cannot be categorized as racist,
sexist, or antisemitic because Turkish (or Arabic, or female, or Jewish) friends share the
speaker’s or writer’s opinion. Moreover, the justification implies that if one has Jewish
friends, then one is incapable of saying anything antisemitic (see Wodak 2015a for an
extensive analysis).
After this unsuccessful denial, Wolf points to the stars of David on the cufflinks and asks
who might have put them there, if not Strache himself. In his third attempt to deny
wrongdoing and antisemitic stereotypes, Strache refuses to recognize the stars of David
on the cufflinks (lines 23, 24) and starts a counterattack with an ad hominem argument:
he claims that Wolf obviously cannot see well, his glasses are probably not strong enough.
Even if one magnified the cufflinks, Strache further claims, no stars of David would be
visible. Wolf then shows a star of David he has brought with him to the studio and asks
Strache if he can spot any similarity (line 32); Strache again makes a denial and states
that the picture on the cufflinks is blurred and that there is no star but actually
something like a diamond. After this fifth (act of) denial, he refers to his “Jewish friends”
again, who, Strache claims, believe that somebody is intentionally conspiring against him.
In this way, Strache accuses the media and the public of conspiring against him, by
quoting his “Jewish friends”—another typical justification strategy, claiming victimhood
Page 21 of 33

via victim-perpetrator reversal. Wolf continues his line of questioning and asks Strache
why he apparently finds it impossible to simply apologize for posting such a caricature
and why he would rather use a strategy of victim-perpetrator reversal instead of an
apology. Strache answers by repeating his denials: there are no stars of David; the
caricature is not antisemitic (this staccato question-answer sequence continues for
several minutes). (p. 78)
Text 3
Page 22 of 33

Page 23 of 33

(p. 79)
In line 74, Wolf shifts to the meta-level and frames the entire discussion as a provocation
strategy intentionally triggered by Strache to attract media attention. This interpretation
is—not surprisingly—again denied by Strache (a goal denial). The interview continues
with other questions about Strache’s program for autumn 2012.
Example 2: Jobbik—identity construction, antisemitism, and victim-

perpetrator reversal
In a recent study about racism and antisemitism as manifested in the propaganda of the
Hungarian Jobbik since 2000, Kovács and Szilágyi (2013, 221–223) argue that the
strategy of victim-victimizer reversal has become a recurring element of explicit
antisemitic discourse in present-day Hungary, different in some aspects from the virulent
antisemitism of the 1940s. This traditional and quite ubiquitous strategy turns the tables:
the victims are transformed into powerful perpetrators, and the perpetrators into victims.
A variation of this posits that the victims are themselves to blame for their terrible and
dangerous fate, inviting it, acting irresponsibly, or deserving some form of “poetic
justice.” Furthermore, the authors illustrate that the topoi of danger and threat are
necessarily integrated with the strategy of victim-victimizer reversal. Let us look at two
examples (see Kovács and Szilágyi 2013, 221, for an extensive analysis):
Text 4
Decisions made by your kind [of people] are always dictated by whatever happens
to “pay off” at a particular point in time, whatever is profitable for you, that is,
whatever results in money or power. Common values are replaced by anti-fascist
slogans and anti-Hungarian sentiment, and other ways of bringing “our kind” [of
people] under control. (“Morvai Krisztina: Két emberkép között folyik a harc,”
Alfahír, August 27, 2008)
Your kind (intend us to be) obedient subjects, servants and domestics, in an

impoverished and maimed Hungary that has been turned into a third-world colony.
(“A Népszava megint Morvai Krisztinát gyalázza—Krisztina nyílt válaszlevele
Várkonyi Tibornak,” Alfahír, December 5, 2008)
The discourse leaves little doubt as to the identity of the “other.” Formulated in economic
terms, and thus referring to the traditional stereotype of the “rich and greedy Jew,”
Krisztina Morvai, representative of Jobbik in the European Parliament, accuses Jews
(“your kind of people”) of trying to dominate Hungary and the Hungarian people;
moreover, apart from seeking domination, Jews are, she argues, per se disloyal (anti-
Hungarian), thus evoking the stereotype of the “disloyal Jew” (an old religious antisemitic
stereotype insinuating Judas’s betrayal of Jesus Christ). She continues by arguing that
Jews would also strive to turn Hungary into a poor country, thus taking everything away
Page 24 of 33

from Hungarians and turning the latter into servants, implying that Jews actually possess
the power to do so (stereotype of the “mighty, powerful Jew”). (p. 80)
Text 5 combines positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (thus group

construction) with the defamation of Jews (argumentum ad hominem) and the attribution
of various traditional negative stereotypes to them. Furthermore, the text suggests that
Jews are dangerous and powerful and would thus intentionally damage Hungary and the
Hungarians.
Text 5
If, after the fifty years of your communism, there had remained in us even a speck
of the ancient Hungarian prowess, then after the so-called change of regime your
kind would not have unpacked your legendary suitcases, which were supposedly
on standby. No. You would have left promptly with your suitcases! You would have
voluntarily moved out of your stolen . . . villas, and . . . you would not have been
able to put your grubby hands on the Hungarian people’s property, our factories,
our industrial plants, our hospitals. . . . We shall take back our homeland from
those who have taken it hostage! (“A Magukfajták ideje lejárt: Morvai Krisztina
reagál az Élet és Irodalom cikkére in Barikad,” Alfahír, November 12, 2008)
Text 5 accuses Jews of having been part of, and collaborated with, communist Hungary by
referring to it as “your communism,” hence rewriting history (topos of history). By
claiming sarcastically that Jews would have left voluntarily (or stayed voluntarily) with
their “legendary suitcases,” thus alluding in an extraordinarily euphemistic way to the
forced deportation of Jews to Nazi extermination camps, where they were only allowed to
carry one suitcase with their belongings, the author relativizes or even denies the
Holocaust in order to avoid responsibility for the bad economic situation currently faced
by Hungary. Moreover, Jews are accused of having stolen the Hungarians’ property, thus
of never having owned any legitimate property in Hungary; here, the fallacy of shifting
the blame is used. This fallacious accusation implies that Jews are not Hungarians; they
are construed as an out-group, as strangers “at hand” (Kovács 2010), not part of the
Hungarian Volk. In this way, the tables are turned and victims are transformed into
perpetrators, despite the well-established fact that Jewish property was stolen
(“Aryanized”) by the Nazis and their Hungarian collaborators, not vice versa. In short,
Jews are blamed for all of Hungary’s problems and economic disasters, a typical
fallacious argument (straw man fallacy, combined with the fallacies of shifting the blame
and hasty generalization). Kovács and Szilágy suggest that these rhetorical elements are
“means, in the current antisemitic discourse, for constructing a narcissistic national self-
image and self-identity” (2013, 222). In other words, antisemitism functions as a code for
a “real” Hungarian political identity, part of a nativist body politics.
Page 25 of 33

Conclusion
While listing general characteristics of the radical right (including right-wing populist
parties), Skenderovic (2009, 22) argues that
after the Second World War, overt statements of modern antisemitism, making use
of blunt categorisations, have largely vanished from the public sphere and have
become confined to marginal extreme right groups. . . . However, what
(p. 81)
some have termed “post-Holocaust” or “post-fascist” antisemitism has remained a

potent force of anti-Jewish hostility in contemporary societies and is most
commonly found among political and intellectual actors associated with the
radical right.
Skenderovic maintains that this form of antisemitism implies that a coherent antisemitic
ideology has vanished. However, the manifold occurrences and examples across all right-
wing populist parties combined with the forms of denial provide evidence that antisemitic
rhetoric continues to be part and parcel of right-wing populism in almost all of its
variants, more or less explicitly and more or less coded.
Research to date seems to have neglected the different histories of Eastern, Central, and
Western Europe as well as the various antisemitic stereotypes and tropes that are
functionalized time and again for political ends. Anti-Muslim sentiments have not been
substituted for antisemitic beliefs; quite the contrary, in fact, as they frequently occur
together. Moreover, new forms of antisemitism have emerged in attempts to cope with
alleged or real accusations about war crimes and the Shoah. It has also become obvious
that a gap in the literature exists: much more quantitative and qualitative research is
needed to investigate in detail the relationship between party affiliation and antisemitic
beliefs as part of the authoritarian syndrome.
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Notes:
(1.) This definition has triggered vehement debates, specifically statements added with
respect to criticizing Israel in ways that could be regarded as antisemitic, such as
“Denying the Jewish people the right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the
existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavor; applying double standards by requiring
of Israel a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation; drawing
comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis; and holding Jews
collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel” European Parliament, Working
Group on Antisemitism. Available online at http://www.antisem.eu/eumc-arbeitsdefinition-
antisemitismus
(2.) Accordingly, Fine (2009) provides an extensive summary of the debate between
“alarmists” and “deniers.” Alarmists, he maintains, view antisemitism as an immutable
element of European history; the deniers, however, challenge the salience of any current
antisemitic manifestations. Of course, criticism of Israel and Israeli actions can be uttered
in an antisemitic way, but need not. At the same time, however, it is equally fallacious to
assume that Israel or all Israelis would endorse the same opinion—that is, to presuppose
that Israel is a homogeneous nation and not divided into many political parties or other
political movements and groups endorsing many different views.
(3.) I have to neglect the most recent ADL survey, as this does not distinguish between
political affiliations or political positionings with respect to antisemitic beliefs (see ADL
2015). Indeed, I believe there exists a huge gap in survey research on the relationship
between antisemitism and right-wing populist parties.
(4.) For more details, see “Streit um antisemitisches Bild auf Strache-Seite,” Der
Standard, August 19, 2012; and “Strache-Karikatur: SPÖ empört über ÖVP,” ORF, April 5,
2013.
(5.) The transcript here follows rudimentary transcription rules developed for
conversations. Such a transcript allows following the dynamic of the conversation and
presents all voices as they interact, overlap, and interrupt each other. This is a simplified
presentation of the full transcript, which follows the HIAT rules for transcription.
Page 32 of 33

Ruth Wodak
Ruth Wodak is Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies at Lancaster

University, UK, and affiliated with the University of Vienna. Besides various other
prizes, she was awarded the Wittgenstein Prize for Elite Researchers in 1996 and an
honorary doctorate from University of Örebro in Sweden in 2010. She is member of
the British Academy of Social Sciences and a member of the Academia Europaea. In
2008, she was awarded the Kerstin Hesselgren Chair of the Swedish Parliament at
University of Örebro. ↵Her research interests focus on discourse studies, identity
politics and politics of the past, language and/in politics, prejudice and
discrimination, and ethnographic methods of linguistic fieldwork. Recent book
publications include The Handbook of Language and Politics, coedited with B.
Forchtner (Routledge, 2017), The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist
Discourses Mean (Sage, 2015; German translation Politik mit der Angst Konturen,
2016), Right-wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, coedited with M.
KhosraviNik and B. Mral (Bloomsbury, 2013), Analyzing Fascist Discourse: European
Fascism in Talk and Text, coedited with J. E. Richardson (Routledge, 2013), The
Discourse of Politics in Action: “Politics as Usual” (rev. ed., Palgrave, 2011),
Migration, Identity and Belonging, with G. Delanty and P. Jones (Liverpool University
Press, 2011), and The Discursive Construction of History: Remembering the German
Wehrmacht’s War of Annihilation, with H. Heer, W. Manoschek, and A. Pollak
(Palgrave, 2008).
Page 33 of 33
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The radical right and antisemitism

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Abstract and Keywords

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Antisemitism occurs in various contexts—for example, in the public sphere and

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a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews.

In contrast, Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann (2011, 40) define antisemitism as

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Secondary antisemitism in post-war (Western) Europe, specifically in countries

Some aspects of modern/racist antisemitism remain virulent in the form of a closed

Common Antisemitic Stereotypes in Right-

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Furthermore, within antisemitic prejudice, Jews are usually viewed as overstated

Denial of the Holocaust is the most extreme form of secondary antisemitism

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within European commemoration practices, the Holocaust has become increasingly

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Antisemitism and Right-Wing Populism in

The responses to these antisemitic prejudice statements varied considerably between

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Poland, Sweden Democrats, Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ, Freedom Party of

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Table 4.1 Summary: Results from Cross-Country Survey on Antisemitic Attitudes

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9 Jews in 29.4 22.5 25.8 20.4 26.9 54.2 56.9 50.9

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10 Jews 68.9 71.5 60.6 71.8 49.7 51.9 51.2 57.3

11 Consideri 35.6 35.9 - 41.1 25.1 48.8 55.2 45.6

(Adapted from Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 57)

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Notions of Jewish power, manipulation and conspiracies continue to play a key

However, present-day antisemitism does not represent anti-modernity, but is

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nationalism are highly susceptible to antisemitism, homophobia, and sexism (Zick,

Defining Antisemitic Rhetoric: The “Judeus ex

It is important to emphasize that “antisemitic language behavior” may imply explicitly

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Strategies of Blaming and Denying

one of the crucial properties of contemporary racism is its denial, typically

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“problems” triggered by the rise of the right wing, and so forth.

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international (frequently Jewish) conspiracy. This fourth technique constitutes Holocaust

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Example 1: Caricatures, secondary antisemitism, and the FPÖ’s

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