[ GR No.

48754, Nov 26, 1941 ]

EMILIO V. REYES v. APOLONIO R. DIAZ +

FACTS:

This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the jurisdiction
of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there
is sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and
second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots
adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-
protest.

Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of
any inferior court is in issue." It has been held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the
constitutions and in the statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an
exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense." (15 C. J. 735; Johnson vs.
Wells, 91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626; Vinal vs. Continental Constr., etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228;
Starnes vs. Mutual Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597; 29 SE 452.) There is in our Constitution or in the
law aforecited nothing which may lend the word "jurisdiction" therein used a broader meaning
than jurisdiction over the subject-matter. On the contrary, having due regard to the manifest
purpose of the law, which is to confine the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to cases of vital
importance involving questions of fundamental char- acter, such, for instance, as the question of
validity of statute, treaty or ordinance, or the legality of any tax, import or assessment which may
affect the very existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death
penalty is imposed, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which
confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is dependent
exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the pleadings, but that
which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter as determined by law.

ISSUE:

RULING:
Anent the issue of estoppel, we earlier ruled that the movants are barred from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court because of their participation in the proceedings therein. In passing upon
this issue, we take heed from the pronouncement of this Court in the recent case Vargas v. Caminas:16

The Court finds that Tijam is not applicable in the present case. The general rule is that lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In Calimlim v. Ramirez, the Court
stated that Tijam is an exception to the general rule because of the presence of laches:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is
that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements
which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam]. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in [Tijam] which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in [Tijam] not as the exception,
but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue
of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

In Tijam, the lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. Hence, the Court ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.lawph!1

The circumstances of the present case are different from Tijam. Spouses Vargas raised the issue of
jurisdiction before the trial court rendered its decision. They continued to raise the issue in their appeal
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. Hence, it cannot be said that laches has set in. The exception
in Tijam finds no application in this case and the general rule must apply, that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Spouses Vargas are therefore not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by John Lu Ym and Ludo &
LuYm Development Corporation is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated August 26, 2008 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in SRC Case No. 021-CEB, now on appeal with the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 81163, is DISMISSED.