Socratic Moderation and Self-Knowledge

Schmid, Walter T.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 21, Number 3, July 1983,

pp. 339-348 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1983.0062

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v021/21.3schmid.html

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 Socratic Moderation and
Self-Knowledge
W. T H O M A S SCHMID

THE TRADITIONAL ancient G r e e k c o n c e p t o f m o d e r a t i o n (o~0q~pooa3vrl) had

associated with it a wide variety o f meanings, all but the first o f which are
e x a m i n e d in the middle part o f Plato's Charmides: chastity o f sexual t e m p e r -
ance, calm, reverse and self-control (159b), modesty o r the sense o f s h a m e
(16oe), the idea o f " d o i n g one's own" and not m e d d l i n g in o t h e r people's
business (161b), p r u d e n c e and the ideal o f self-knowledge (164d).' T h e het-
e r o g e n e i t y o f these meanings is at first quite puzzling: does oc0tg0ooa3vvI
stand for o n e concept or many? ~ My own interpretation o f the traditional
concept is g u i d e d by the fact that it came out o f the aristocratic Dorian
culture, culture with a s h a r e d code o f a p p r o p r i a t e behavior and what an-
thropologists call a shame ethic, i.e., an ethic d e p e n d e n t on e x t e r n a l sanc-
tions in the f o r m o f a p p r o v a l or disapproval by others, a culture ethically
s t r u c t u r e d by a set o f values a n d institutions which play little o r no role in
o u r own individualistic, egalitarian, c o m m e r c i a l society--values and institu-
tions reflected in such H o m e r i c a n d Dorian concepts as "social station,"
"what is fitting," " h o n o r " a n d "face. ''3 Sophrosyne was a congnitive-volitional
virtue o f attentiveness to what was e x p e c t e d o f one in the aristocratic c u l t u r e
and an emotive-volitional virtue o f a p p r o p r i a t e behavior. Action in accor-

1 For a thorough study of the history of oe0qoQoo'Ov~I from Homer to the patristic literature,
see Helen North, Sophrosyne (Ithacea, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966 ).
In fact, one scholar was led to issue this warning: " . . . we must take the diversity of the
list of definitions in the Charmides at face value, and not search in vain for unity or a continuous
line of d e v e l o p m e n t . . . " (p. 1o7) Gerasimos Santas, "Socrates at Work on Virtue and
Knowledge in Plato's Charmides," in Exegesis and Argument, eds. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos
and R. M. Rorty (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. xo5-32.
See E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1951 ), esp. pp. 17--18, and James M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 115-21.

[3391
340 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

dance with sophrosyne, controlled by the sense of honor and shame, the social
conscience, was naturally held to be self-interested: no one wants to be
disgraced by his conduct, no one wants his persona to be soiled. The specific
action called for, however, may vary: thus for youth and women chastity and
modesty are "fitting," for commoners social and political deference to the
nobility ("to do one's own" and "to know one's place"), for the aristocratic
man, decorum, recognition of one's rightful station and a decent regard for
inferiors? The person who did not show proper respect for others, e.g., the
arrogant suitors in the Odyssey, did not show respect for the order all were
part of, an order which, according to the poet, was ultimately enforced by
the Gods. Such persons were not sound-minded, were fools (as Odysseus
calls the suitors, XXII, 411-418).
As the political and religious institutions of the aristocratic culture slowly
became uprooted, the integrating values of the Dorian system disintegrated
and the traditional concept of omqDQooaSvrl lost meaning. 5 It could then be
viewed as mere self-concern (e.g. Odysseus in the Philoktetes, 1259-6o, o r - - a
more extreme example--Jason in the Medea, 549, 884, 913, 1369), or merely
as control of the physical appetites (the popular meaning by the end of the
fifth century, Symposium 196c), and the status of the virtue as beneficial for
the individual possessing it came into question (Gorgias 491-492c, Thucy-
dides, II1.1o.82-83). ~ By the time of the dramatic setting of the Charmides
(432 or 431 B.C.) this process was already apparent. It is ironic that the
profound religious conception of sophrosyne as self-knowledg& is presented
almost as an afterthought by Critias, a man who will prove to be uniquely
immoderate in ancient Greek history--in his sexual behavior (see Xeno-
phon, Memorabilia 1.2.~9-3o), his political conduct (he became a leader of
the Thirty and the m u r d e r e r of Theramenes, a man renowed for his politi-

T h e h a r m o n y that characterizes t h e traditional sophrosvne is basically not an internal har-

m o n y or c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n what o n e believes a n d what o n e desires, o r a n internal-
e x t e r n a l h a r m o n y b e t w e e n what o n e says a n d what o n e does, b u t a p u r e l y e x t e r n a l c o r r e s p o n -
d e n c e b e t w e e n w h a t o n e actually does a n d is a n d w h a t is e x p e c t e d o f o n e in light o f his objective
station.
5 O f c o u r s e this refers primarily to A t h e n s ; in S p a r t a a n d o t h e r city-states t h e D o r i a n
system r e m a i n e d intact until late into t h e fifth c e n t u r y .
6 See H e l e n N o r t h , "A Period o f O p p o s i t i o n to S o p h r o s y n e , " Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philologzcal Association 78 (1947), PP. 1- 17.
7 See T. G. T u c k e y , Plato's Charmides ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1951), pp.
9 - 1 o | o r an excellent s h o r t discussion o f t h e Delphic " K n o w thyself," which in t h e wider s e n s e
m e a n t : "Realize y o u r mortal condition; r e m e m b e r t h e limits o f h u m a n p o w e r a n d s h u n hybris."
For a c o n t e m p o r a t y philosophical analysis o f self-knowledge, see David W. H a m l y n , "Self-
K n o w l e d g e " in The Self, ed. T h e o d o r e Mischel (Totawa, N.J.: R o w m a n a n d Littlefield, x977),
pp. a 7o-'~oo.
 SOCRATIC MODERATION 341
cal moderation, Xenophon, Hellenica, II.3), and his intellectual endeavors
(his play, the Sisyphus, included what it seems was the first clear avowal of
atheism in Greek literature). It is tragically ironic that the title character of
the dialogue, Charmides, who was a kind of representative of all that was
potentially good in the aristocracy and a youth distinguished for his sophro-
syne, fell or stayed u n d e r the influence of his uncle and came finally to serve
the tyranny, dying with Critias in the last battle against the victorious demo-
catic forces (who themselves established the regime that would kill Socrates.) s
One aspect of the historical background to Socratic moderation, then, is
that of a traditional self-regarding virtue that was oriented toward the values
of honor or prestige and disgrace or shame in the eyes of one's audience, a
notion the meaning or ethical claim o f which was already disintegrating by
the time of the Charmides. The other important aspect of the historical back-
ground was provided by the rationalistic movement of the fifth century, a
movement only partially defined by sophists and rhetoricians such as Pro-
tagoras and Gorgias. 9 The broader aspect of this movement inclued material
progress, the proliferation of the arts and sciences Aristotle refers to in the
Politics (VIII, 1341a27-33 ), and a growing confidence in man's ability to
gain rational control of nature and h u m a n life--all of which involved a
philosophic self-image of man, the image associated with the mythical figure
of Prometheus.'" (All of this in contrast, apparently, to the gloomy, fearful
religious outlook that dominated the sixth century.") Socrates' own insis-
tence that knowledge is the only sound basis for practice and j u d g m e n t must
be understood against the background, but so must his conception of mod-
eration and h u m a n wisdom. The Apology tells the story of his discovery that
although the people of his time had achieved genuine knowledge in fields of
technical expertise, they confused this limited knowledge with wisdom, or
thought they also had genuine knowledge in moral and political life, which
they did not have (2 xa-23 b, esp. 22a). Thus Socrates was to add to the two
main fields of application of the virtue of moderation--sexual conduct and
interpersonal relations (which had a civic or political aspect)--a third field:
intellectual life. The primary aim of this paper is to examine the latter, most
famous and unique aspect of Socratic moderation. ~

s The ominous last lines of the Charmides (176b-d) foreshadow this relationship.
See Michael J. O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina, Press, 1967), pp. 56-82.
'" O'Brien, Socratic Paradoxes, p. 61.
" See Dodds, Greeks, pp. 28-63.
"~ North asserts there are three aspects to Socratic moderation: his self-knowledge, his
self-restrained eros, and his • ("self-control") or ct~)~6~)• ("self-sufficiency," "indepen-
dence"). See Sophrosyne, p. 153.
342 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

A g o o d starting point for the discussion o f Socratic m o d e r a t i o n is the

final account o f the c o n c e p t in the Charmides, as given by Socrates himself:
Then only the temperate person [6 o,.bqb0c0v] will know himself and be able to
examine what he really knows and does not know, and have the power to discern
what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know,
and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be
unable. And so this is being temperate or temperance and knowing oneself [~6
ot0dp0ovi~tv "~e xa~ or I xa~ ~6 ~avx6v c0br6v ytyv(bo• one should
know what one knows and what one does not know. (167a)
T h r e e things stand out in this passage: (1) m o d e r a t i o n and self-knowledge
are jointly d e f i n e d as to know what you know and d o not know; (2) mod-
eration and self-knowledge seem to be the result o r p r o d u c t o f the elenctic
process; and (3) the m o d e r a t e m a n seems not only to have been the patient
or subject o f examination, but is said to be able to practice it, with the
implication that he does. ( O f c o u r s e t h e r e is also a f o u r t h point: the pas-
sage refers unmistakably to Socrates: c o m p a r e the definition with Apology
21d and 29b on Socrates' self-knowledge; with 21c and 22d especially o n
his recognition o f knowledge or i g n o r a n c e in others. ':~) T h u s the descrip-
tion o f the Socratic, m o d e r a t e m a n at 167a, when c o m b i n e d with the ear-
lier r e m a r k s in the Charmides a b o u t the relationship between Socrates'
elenctic powers and the p r o d u c t i o n o f psychic health, o~0qg0oofv, in the
soul o f the i n t e r l o c u t o r ( t 5 6 b - i 5 7 c ) , presents the elenchus as a psychothe-
r a p u e u t i c medical practice which, w h e n applied to oneself and others, leads
to intellectual a n d psychic m o d e r a t i o n , a n d presents 6 o63qope0v~ as the
l o g o t h e r a p e u t i c healer who by practicing his art also brings a b o u t and
preserves his own psychic health. T h e Charmides, however, does not discuss
thematically why Socrates might have t h o u g h t all this true o f his craft, a n d
in fact the dialogue ends aporetically, so that it is not all obvious that the

':~ For a m o r e c o m p l e t e c o m p a r i s o n , see R o s a m u n d K. S p r a g u e , Plato's Philosopher-King (Co-

l u m b i a , S.C.: University o f S o u t h C a r o l i n a Press, 1976), pp. 3 6 - 3 7 . T h e ( ; r e e k o f 1 6 7 a B - 4, in
particular, is very similar to t h e G r e e k of Apology '~1 d 4 - 6 . B u t G r e g o r y Vlastos has p o i n t e d o u t to
m e that Socrates does not say in t h e Apology that he k n o w s what he knows a n d does n o t know, only
that he d o e s n o t t h i n k h e k n o w s what he does n o t know. T h i s is a n i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e , b u t it
does n o t c o m p e l us to reject 167a as a n a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f Socratic m o d e r a t i o n a n d self-
k n o w l e d g e , given t h e r i g h t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t it m e a n s to " k n o w what you know a n d d o n o t
know." As I u n d e r s t a n d it, it m e a n s to know y o u r m o r a l beliefs in t h e m a n n e r Socrates k n o w s
t h e m - - t h e m a n n e r he d e m o n s t r a t e s in the Apology, Crito a n d Gorgias; a n d yet to also k n o w that
you do n o t possess final or infallible m o r a l k n o w l e d g e - - t o be aware, in t h e m a n n e r o f t h e
philosophically h u m b l e m a n as described in this article, o f t h e i n h e r e n t l y discursive a n d c o n s e n -
sual n a t u r e o f m o r a l k n o w l e d g e . I s h o u l d a d d t h a t m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e substantial issues
involved in this m a t t e r benefitted greatly f r o m Vlastos's o w n p a p e r , "Socrates' Profession o f
Ignorance" (unpublished manuscript).
 SOCRATIC MODERATION 343
definition o r description were m e a n t to be taken as Socratic o r early Pla-
tonic d o c t r i n e (see 175a-d).
In the later works, however, Plato begins to present explicitly the ratio-
nale f o r the Socratic m e t h o d , a n d thus provides the basis for an interpreta-
tion o f Socratic m o d e r a t i o n and self-knowledge that is consistent with the
definition a n d description o f the m o d e r a t e m a n given at Charmides 167a.
T h e key passages are in the Meno (82e, 8 4 a - b ) , the Laws (863c), the Sophist
(229a-c), and the Philebus (49a), which b e a r on the relationship between
moral i g n o r a n c e or folly and a r r o g a n c e (see also Apology 2 l c - d ) ; and in the
Meno ( 8 4 a - b ) a n d especially the Sophist (2~9e-231a), which discuss the way
in which the elenchus works ideally. T h e f o r m e r passages i n t r o d u c e the
notion o f c o m p l e x ignorance, which is not the m e r e lack o f knowledge, but
the delusion o f k n o w l e d g e which you do not have (Laws 863c, Sophist 229c).
This kind o f i g n o r a n c e is quite c o m m o n - - a l m o s t e v e r y o n e has it in relation
to practical wisdom (again Apology 2 l a - 2 3 b ) - - a n d it is the great and single
evil o f h u m a n lives (Meno 77 e, Gorgias 4 7 9 b - c ) . 14 T h e p e r s o n with c o m p l e x
moral i g n o r a n c e thinks he knows what counts in life, so he is u n i n t e r e s t e d in
questioning his values, he is only interested in getting on, in learning what
will help him get what he is already set on. Moreover, this i g n o r a n c e is itself
complex, because moral delusion is f u r t h e r c o m p o u n d e d by moral conceit.
T h o s e who think they know, but d o not, e r r not only about the object (the
right goals and values), but also a b o u t themselves: they have an inflated view
o f themselves, they think they are s u p e r i o r to those who do not share their
wisdom (Sophist 2 3 o c - d , Philebus 49a). Note that this distinction with com-
plex i g n o r a n c e suggests a way in which m o d e r a t i o n and wisdom might have
d i f f e r e n t opposites, o r d i f f e r e n t aspects o f the same vice, moral folly, as their
specific o p p o s i t e s - - m o d e r a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to a r r o g a n c e , some f o r m o f
wisdom to ignorance.
T h e elenchus is s u p p o s e d to release the interlocutor f r o m the twofold
b u r d e n o f superiority and wisdom and set him on the path o f self-initiated
r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f what is worthwhile in life in the following m a n n e r :
[Noble sophists] question a man on those matters where he thinks he is saying
something although he is really saying nothing. And as he is confused they easily
convict his opinions, by bringing them together and putting them side by side, and
thus showing that they are contrary to each other at the same time in the same

'4 Compare the beginning of Descartes's Discourse on Method: "Good sense is mankind's
most equitably divided endowment, for everyone thinks that he is so abundantly provided with
it that even those with the most insatiable appetites and most difficult to please in other ways do
not usually want more than they have of this." The PhilosophicalWorks of Descartes, Vol. 1, trans.
Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1972 ), p. 81.
344 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
respect about the same things. W h e n the man sees this he becomes angry with
himself and gentle toward others. T h u s he is relieved o f great a n d o v e r b e a r i n g
opinions about himself, a n d this relief is the pleasantest for all to h e a r and the surest
for the patient. For j u s t as the physicians o f the body believe that the body cannot
benefit from the n o u r i s h m e n t it receives until the internal hindrances are r e m o v e d ,
so do those who p e r f o r m this purification believe that about the soul. She cannot
profit from the knowledge offered to her, until the elenchus is applied and the m a n
is refuted and b r o u g h t to shame, thus purifying him from opinions that h i n d e r
learning and causing him to think he knows only what he does know and no more.
(Sophist 2 3 o b - d )

T h u s t h e S o c r a t i c m e t h o d s h o u l d l e a d to b o t h e g o d e f l a t i o n a n d a s p e c i a l
form of self-knowledge on the part of the interlocutor: he should now know
h e is n o t wise a n d t h a t h e is in n e e d o f l e a r n i n g w h a t is t r u l y m e a n i n g f u l in
life, i.e., h e s h o u l d t u r n to p h i l o s o p h y (see Laches 2 o l a - c , C h a r m i d e s 1 7 6 a ).
T h e p r o b l e m w i t h t h e a c c o u n t o f e l e n c t i c e d u c a t i o n in t h e Sophist, h o w -
e v e r , is t h a t it n e v e r s e e m s to w o r k t h a t w a y in t h e S o c r a t i c d i a l o g u e s , e x c e p t
p e r h a p s w i t h T h e a t e t u s a n d t h e s l a v e - b o y , w h e r e t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n is a b o u t
n o n - m o r a l m a t t e r s . G e n e r a l l y p e o p l e g i v e u p (e.g., E u t h y p h r o , M e n o ,
L a c h e s , Nicias) o r g e t m a d ( C r i t i a s , T h r a s y m a c h u s , Callicles), a n d p r a c t i c a l l y
n o o n e is w i l l i n g to a d m i t h e h a s b e e n r e f u t e d . '5 It t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e r e is a
k i n d o f c i r c l e i n v o l v e d in e l e n c t i c e d u c a t i o n : t h e p e r s o n n e e d s to p r a c t i c e
m o d e r a t i o n o r h u m i l i t y a n d s e l f - k n o w l e d g e in o r d e r to c o n t i n u e in t h e p r o -
cess i t s e l f h e n e e d s to r e c o g n i z e h i m s e l f t h a t "I d i d n ' t k n o w I was t a l k i n g
a b o u t , " to c o n f r o n t in h i m s e l f his o w n i g n o r a n c e , f o r t h e m e t h o d to b e
g e n u i n e l y p u r g a t i v e ; this a l o n e will r e l e a s e h i m f o r t h e l e a r n i n g a t t i t u d e . '6
I n t h e m o r a l c o n t e x t p r e s u p p o s e d b y t h e e a r l y d i a l o g u e s , this m e a n s t h a t t h e
p e r s o n m u s t b e w i l l i n g to e n d u r e s u f f e r i n g h u m i l i a t i o n , p u b l i c r i d i c u l e f o r
b e i n g r e f u t e d , j u s t in o r d e r to p e r s i s t a n d p r o g r e s s in t h e p r o c e s s o f S o c r a t i c
l e a r n i n g - - a n d this m e a n s h e m u s t b e w i l l i n g to v a l u e t r u t h a n d a d m i t e r r o r ,
e v e n at t h e c o s t o f o t h e r , c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g r e a t e r v a l u e s s u c h as h o n o r (dis-
g r a c e ) a n d p l e a s u r e ( d i s c o m f o r t ) . '7 I n w a r d acts of" S o c r a t i c m o d e r a t i o n , u n -

,5 There are but a few possible exceptions: Laches (see 194a-b), who, however, earns
Nicias's accusation at the end of the dialogue (2ood); Charmides, who, however, drops out of
the dialogue because he wants to see his uncle tested (Socates calls him a rascal for this, 161d);
and the boys in the Lysis, though see Lysis's first reaction to refutation at 21 la. This leaves one
or two boys and no men who respond appropriately to the Socratic elenchus.
'r M. J. Burnyeat in "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration," Bulletin of the Institute of
Classical Studies of the University of London 24 (1977), pp. 7-x6 describes this circle in the follow-
ing way: "In other words, Socratic education can only be successful with someone like Theaete-
tus, who is aware of and can accept his need for it; that much self-knowledge is an indispensable
motivating condition, for always the greatest obstacle to intellectual and moral progress with
Socrates is people's unwillingness to confront their own ignorance." (p. 1~)
,7 For a more complete discussion of this theme, see my "Socrates' Practice of Elenchus in
the Charmides," Ancient Philosophy ~ (1981), pp. a41-47.
 SOCRATIC MODERATION 345

derstood as humility before truth, must therefore occur at every significant

step in the elenctic process, even---or especially--at the most advanced level
of Socratic inquiry and education, when the person's whole way of life may
be at stake and he may have to shamefully acknowledge that his former
beliefs about life and himself were wrong, that his values were false, e.g.,
Alcibiades (see Symposium 215d-216c).
Ultimately there is a psychic and intellectual sea change envisaged as the
final state and disposition resulting from the elenctic process as it is depicted
in the passages in the Apology, Charmides and Sophist, a disposition I will call
"philosophic humility," i.e., Socratic moderation and self-knowledge. Two
aspects of this state are covered by the Charmides description. First, there is
the state I will call "reasonableness," which at the simplest level is the willing-
ness to submit one's beliefs with an open mind to examination and to "let the
logos decide" if they are sound, rather than one's own will or pride or
feelings of hope or fear (see especially Crito 46b-c, Charmides 165b, 166d,
Gorgias 458a, 488b, 5o6a). Moderation in this sense liberates the person from
the self-aggrandizing tendency to overreach himself in knowledge-claims,
from the impossible burden of false wisdom, of having to know, and it
releases him for the freedom and values of the reasonable man; thus the
elenchus can help a man to moderate or make reasonable his moral understand-
ing. The opposite kind of person, e.g., Euthyphro, can never learn, because
he is convinced that he has to instruct others of the truth, not learn himself"
(9b), and because he is certain that if his thoughts seem contradictory, it is
not that they are that way, but that his partner in dialogue has made them
seem that way (1 lc-d). The second aspect of philosophic humility is philo-
sophic self-knowledge or h u m a n wisdom, the knowledge of oneself" and
others which roots in the insight of moral ignorance, of the essentially im-
perfect and non-technical nature of" human knowledge about the matters of
deepest concern, and therefbre of human beings who have such limited
knowledge (see especially Apology ~3a-b). Self-knowledge in this sense liber-
ates the person from his tendency to be overbearing out of a belief in his
own superiority and wisdom, and from the impossible burden of having to
be right, i.e., of having to defeat the opposing arguments, releasing him for
the freedom and values of the philosophic man, who does not care about
being wiser than others, only about what makes sense (see Charmides 166d-e,
Hippias Major 288d); thus the elenchus can help a man moderate or make
reasonable his self-understanding. The dynamic aspect of philosophic humil-
ity is strangely ignored in the Charmides passage, though it is implied--the
active disposition to test oneself and others out of the fear that one may be
wrong (Charmides ~66d) and the conviction that this is the only way anyone
can continue to enjoy the freedom and values of the moderate and reason-
able life, the examined or philosophic life (Sophist ~3od-e).
346 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Thus far I have examined the historical background, the nature o f So-
cratic moderation and self-knowledge, and the rationale for thinking that
the elenctic process would purify or liberate the interlocutor who persists in
it to the stage of self-transformation. In closing I want to consider briefly the
relation of Socratic moderation and self-knowledge to wisdom, focusing on
two issues: (1) the argument in the Charmides that oe0qo~oo~v~ is worthless
because wisdom alone is the necessary and sufficient condition for the well-
being of the agent: and (2) the way in which moral self-knowledge is medi-
ated by moral knowledge of the other. (1) T h e argument at the end of the
Charmides goes roughly as follows: Sophrosyne is understood as the ability to
determine by examination who has and does not have knowledge and the
corresponding disposition to then live in accordance with what one learns--
to live "the life according to knowledge" [~6 ~toTvl~Sve0g ~]v]. But this
quality, Socrates argues, is worthless unless we also have another t h i n g - - t h e
knowledge of good and evil, wisdom (I73a-174d). If we have this knowl-
edge, however, we need nothing else, for it alone is the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for our happines (I74d-175a). Note that this implies that
wisdom is possible without moderation and vice versa, that the virtues are
not inter-entailing. The argument is sound; but it presupposes that the
object of the testing art is knowledge, that is technical knowledge, rather
than moral knowledge or wisdom, i.e., people's understanding of the Good.
The elenchus, however, is basically unable to test technical expertise (it is a
part of philosophic self-knowledge to see and prove this, see Charmides
17oa-171d); the elenchus is really only suited to test moral knowledge or
the conceit of wisdom Apology 22d). Therefore the argument of the Char-
mides refutes a different conception of sophrosyne than the Socratic concep-
tion outlined above. According to that account, Socratic moderation, philo-
sophic humility, results from the elenctic examination of one's own and
others' moral knowledge, such that one comes to know what one knows and
does not know about good and evil, not what one knows and does not know
about technical subjects. If that account is right, Socratic moderation in the
form of reasonableness is a necessary condition for wisdom, since no one
who has not suffered the process which liberates from the conceit or arro-
gance of wisdom can be freed for the learning attitude, the attitude which
makes truth the guiding value in the ongoing life of learning, the examined
or philosophic life. It is the commitment to truth as value which distin-
guishes the philosophic life, not the content of one's beliefs. Moderation in
this sense is not the same as wisdom, but it is that without which wisdom
could not be present. Wisdom without it would not be wisdom but the
conceit of wisdom, i.e., dogmatism and arrogance, even if the actual content
of the beliefs happened to be right.
 SOCRATIC MODERATION 347
(~) C o r r e s p o n d i n g to s e l f - k n o w l e d g e is self-blindness, which m e a n s a b o v e
all i g n o r a n c e o f o n e ' s g e n u i n e c o n c e r n s a n d values a n d o f the beliefs which
reflect those values. T h e p e r s o n w h o is blind to h i m s e l f is d r i v e n by goals
a n d values he has n e v e r e x a m i n e d , p r o b a b l y n e v e r e v e n consciously recog-
nized. H e m a y h a v e a w e l l - d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t i o n o f h i m s e l f a n d m a y p u r s u e
his goals with g r e a t vigor a n d intelligence, but he will lack self-knowledge. I f
the a c c o u n t I h a v e sketched o f the elenctic process is right, h o w e v e r , it is its
very n a t u r e to e x p o s e the g e n u i n e values a n d beliefs o f the interlocutor, his
soul, a n d hold t h e m u p f o r public e x a m i n a t i o n (see Nicias's description,
Laches 18 7 - 1 8 8 b ) . T h e i n t e r l o c u t o r w h o manifests c o u r a g e by persisting in
this self-revealing process a n d w h o is willing to h u m b l y a c k n o w l e d g e in-
wardly a n d o u t w a r d l y his i g n o r a n c e will discover h i m s e l f in the c o u r s e o f
Socratic education. But t h e r e is a n o t h e r aspect to the Socratic m e t h o d which
I have i g n o r e d u p to now, an aspect which is crucial to Socrates's o w n
practice o f m o d e r a t i o n a n d s e l f - k n o w l e d g e a n d the relation o f that practice
to m o r a l wisdom. T h i s is the m a t t e r o f knowing the other as a soul, o r m o r a l
s e l f - k n o w l e d g e m e d i a t e d by m o r a l k n o w l e d g e o f the other. T h u s Alcibiades
was b r o u g h t by Socrates to the very e d g e o f self-knowledge, because he
d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h love Socrates' soul a n d the values o f the alternative
Socratic o r philosophic way o f life in it, a n d because he saw in that m i r r o r his
own soul. ~ F o r the first time in his life Alcibiades was b r o u g h t to s h a m e ,
forced to realize that "deficient as I a m , while I ' m s p e n d i n g my time o n
politics, I ' m neglecting m y s e l f " (Symposium 2 I6a). Yet the t r a g e d y o f Alcibi-
ades was t h a t he could not a b i d e the ugliness a n d humiliation this self-image
involved, so he fled f r o m the revelation back into egotism a n d the a d o r a t i o n
o f the crowd, a n d t h e r e b y failed to c o n f i r m the s e l f - k n o w l e d g e he m i g h t
have a c h i e v e d by the a p p r o p r i a t e decision o f c o m m i t m e n t . '~
A very m e d i o c r e p e r s o n like C h a e r o p h o n , on the o t h e r h a n d - - a n d in this
respect all the o t h e r s p r e s e n t at the b e g i n n i n g o f the Charmides are j u s t like
him, e x c l u d i n g S o c r a t e s - - s h o w s how the opposite, c o m p l e t e lack o f m o r a l
s e l f - k n o w l e d g e in a given situation can be m e d i a t e d by the failure to see the
o t h e r as a soul. T h u s w h e n he speaks to Socrates a b o u t the boy, leering that
Socrates "would f o r g e t C h a r m i d e s has a face, if he saw his n a k e d eidos"
(154d), C h a e r o p h o n (some p h i l o s o p h e r ! ) shows he does not see C h a r m i d e s

'~ On the theme of the other soul as the mirror by which one knows one's own soul, see the
possibly spurious Atcibiades I 129a-13oe and 132d- 133c. Socrates can be a mirror fi)r Alcibiades
to see himself and can cause him to feel shame because Alcibiades discovered how Socrates,
whom he loves, views the things Alcibiades values (216d-e). On seeing "inside" Socrates and his
speeches, see also ~ld-22a.
'~ On Alcibiades' flight from Socrates, see Ilham Dilman's superb Moralit~ and the Inner Life
(London: MacMillan Press, 1979), pp. 41-45 .
348 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

as a "face," i.e., as a p e r s o n , a soul. B u t S o c r a t e s insists t h a t this is t h e o n l y

way to really see h i m (154e). ~" E s s e n t i a l to S o c r a t e s ' k n o w l e d g e o f h i m s e l f as
b o t h l e a r n e r a n d t e a c h e r , as b o t h a possibly e r r i n g a n d possibly h e l p i n g soul,
is t h e k n o w l e d g e o f o t h e r s as souls, n o t as b o d i e s to covet, e v e n w h e n his
o w n b o d y w o u l d h a v e it o t h e r w i s e ( 1 5 5 c - 1 5 6 d ) . T h u s t h e r e is always a moral
h o r i z o n to t h e Socratic m e t h o d o f e l e n c t i c i n q u i r y . It is a p r o c e s s c a r r i e d o u t
by a m a n w h o k n o w s h i m s e l f a n d t h e o t h e r as m o r a l souls w h o s e fates a r e
p o t e n t i a l l y at stake i n t h e d i a l o g i c e n c o u n t e r . T h i s , finally, is w h y h e is
w i l l i n g n o t o n l y to s u f f e r b u t to d i s p e n s e t h e e l e n c t i c m e d i c i n e : h e is c o n -
v i n c e d t h a t t h e c o n c e a l m e n t o f t r u t h is m o r a l l y d a m a g i n g to t h e souls o f his
i n t e r l o c u t o r s , a n d t h a t to h e l p t h e m f r e e t h e m s e l v e s f o r t h e e x a m i n e d life is
to h e l p f r e e t h e m f o r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m s e l v e s as souls i n n e e d o f t h e G o o d
(Apology 2 9 e - 3 o b , Gorgias 458a). ~'

University of North Carolina at Wilmington

~" Note that during Charmides' entrance all but Socrates are transfixed in erotic wonder,
gazing at Charmides as if he were a "'statue" 054a). To appreciate Chaerophon's remark, we
might have'to think of the same remark made in relation to a vey beautiful young woman: it is a
made with the eye of an erotic, not the eye of a gymnastics coach. See Kenneth J. Dover, Greek
Homosexualty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 155-56. On the theme of
loving the soul vs. loving the body, see also Alcibiades I 13xa- 3.
~' This article was written during my participation in the National Endowment for the
Humanities seminar on "The Philosophy of Socrates," directed by Gregory Vlastos at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, summer 1981. I am grateful to Professor Vlastos and other
participants, including Jon Fjeld, Glenn Lesses, Charlotte Witt, Maureen Henry, Gregory
Pence, Stanley Malinovich and Dan Graham for their encouragement and friendly criticism.