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Marx and the origin of dialectical materialism

a
Stanley Moore
a
The University of California , San Diego
Published online: 29 Aug 2008.

To cite this article: Stanley Moore (1971) Marx and the origin of dialectical materialism , Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal
of Philosophy, 14:1-4, 420-429, DOI: 10.1080/00201747108601641

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 Inquiri, 14, 420-9

MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL

MATERIALISM1

Stanley Moore
The University of California, San Diego
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Dialectical materialism was born in 1857, when Marx returned to studying Hegel.
In opposition to Hegel, Marx adopted a realist epistemology. Abandoning the
pragmatist ambiguities of his Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, he became a
materialist in the traditional sense of that word. Influenced by Hegel, Marx simul-
taneously attempted a dialectical proof for the labor theory of value. Abandoning
his positivist critique in The Holy Family, he started using dialectic to discover
beneath appearances an otherwise inaccessible reality. But his dialectic was in-
compatible with his materialism. The identification of reality with Praxis, rejected
at the level of philosophical statement, was retained at the level of economic argu-
ment. Turning Hegel upside down proved harder than Marx thought.

Current controversies concerning the philosophy of Marx focus on

two problems: the relation of the young Marx to the mature Marx;
and the relation of the mature Marx to Engels. Both can be clarified
by examining Marx's statements on philosophical issues in letters and
manuscripts dating from the middle of 1857 to the middle of 1858 —
the period of his return to the study of Hegel.2
In opposition to Hegel's idealism, Marx explicitly adopts from this
point onward a realist epistemology. The object of knowledge, he
asserts, exists independently of any act of a knowing subject. Having
abandoned the pragmatist ambiguities of his Economic-Philosophical
Manuscripts and subsequent works, he now becomes a materialist in
the restricted sense of that word.
Under the influence of Hegel's logic, Marx simultaneously attempts
a dialectical proof for the labor theory of value. From this point
 MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 421

onward, he uses dialectic as an instrument for penetrating beneath

appearances to an otherwise inaccessible reality. This approach
represents a clear departure from his positivist critique of Hegelian
dialectic in The Holy Family and subsequent works. It also contrasts
with the approach adopted by Engels, when (following his friend's
example) he too resumed the study of Hegel. The central argument of
Capital — unlike that of either Anti-Diihring or The Dialectics of Nature —
focuses on the opposition of appearance and reality.

II
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I n his Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and in his Theses on

Feuerbach (1845) Marx rejects as one-sided both idealism and tradi-
tional materialism, presenting his own position as a synthesis of the
two. In the former work he calls himself a naturalist or humanist;
in the latter, a materialist of a new type. But on epistemological
issues this change of labels is not paralleled by a change of thought.
In both works his position strikingly resembles Dewey's version of
pragmatism.
The philosophical position cryptically set forth in the first two theses
on Feuerbach can be paraphrased in six theses — three characterizing
traditional materialism and idealism, three presenting the intermediate
position of Marx:
1) The cardinal error of the old materialism has been to equate
reality with objects of immediate experience.
2) The new materialism asserts that reality is not immediately given
but is discovered through theoretical or practical activity. (I shall call
this the Process Thesis.)
3) The new materialism further asserts that this process of dis-
covery does not simply reveal, but in some degree constitutes, the
reality discovered. (I shall call this the Constitutive Thesis.)
4) Stress on this active, constitutive side of knowledge has been
developed by idealism, in opposition to the old materialism.
5) But idealism equates this process of discovery with thinking, to
the exclusion of practical activity.
6) The new materialism asserts that thinking alone is never suffi-
cient, practical activity always necessary, for discovering reality. (I
shall call this the Practice Thesis.)3
 422 STANLEY MOORE

Some ten years later, stimulated by rereading Hegel, Marx at-

tempted wholly to separate the dialectical method from the meta-
physics and epistemology of idealism. The discussion of scientific
method in his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (1857),
while reaffirming the Process Thesis, explicitly rejects both the Con-
stitutive Thesis and the Practice Thesis:
'The concrete is concrete because it is an aggregate of many char-
acteristics, that is, a unity of differences. It appears therefore in our
thought as the product of a process of synthesis, as a result and not a
starting point, although it is the starting point in reality — both for
observation and for conception.' (This reaffirms the Process Thesis.)
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'Hegel fell into error in considering reality the product of self-

coordinating, self-absorbed, spontaneously operating thought. For the
method of advancing from abstract to concrete is merely a way of
thinking in which the concrete is grasped as concrete in our minds:
it is by no means the process that produces the concrete.' (This denies,
for theoretical activity, the truth of the Constitutive Thesis.)
'The whole as it appears in our heads as a thought whole is a pro-
duct of the brain, which grasps the world in the only way possible for
thinking — a way which differs from the artistic, the religious, or the
practical-minded grasping of this world. But as long as we occupy our
brains with it only speculatively, theoretically, the real subject con-
tinues to exist as it did before, outside our heads in its independence.'
(This denies the Practice Thesis.)4
In 1867 Marx published the first volume of Capital. There his
position on these issues reaffirms his standpoint of 1857, in contrast
with that of 1844 and 1845. Analyzing in his discussion of commodity
fetishism the connection between exchange ratios and labor costs, he
asserts that cumulative observation and theoretical analysis are
jointly sufficient for penetrating beneath the appearance of exchange
value to the reality of value. And he remarks that this epochal scientific
discovery, while removing all appearance of contingency from the
determination of value magnitudes, in no way alters the mode in
which that determination takes place. Practical activity on the part of
its discoverers is neither a condition for discovering this truth nor a
constitutive element of the truth discovered. The scientific discovery
of the labor theory of value does not exemplify the unity of theory and
practice. 5
How then does Marx's philosophical position, after his retreat from
pragmatism, differ from that of the old materialists? Apparently, only
 MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 423

the Process Thesis distinguishes his views from theirs. Yet, upon
examination, the contrast asserted in this thesis turns out to be illusory.
It might be argued that Epicurus and Lucretius, for example, equate
reality with objects of immediate experience; but it can be proved that
Democritus and Hobbes, for example, subscribe to the Process Thesis.6
The conclusion seems inescapable that on none of the epistemological
issues raised in the Theses on Feuerbach does Marx's position after 1857
represent a novel kind of materialism.

Ill
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I n such works as The Holy Family (1845) and The Poverty of Philosophy
(1847) Marx totally rejects the Hegelian dialectic, as pseudo-reasoning
that leads to pseudo-knowledge. His exposure, in the former work, of
the secret of Hegel's speculative construction can be summarized in
four steps:
1) From the common properties of real apples and pears, Hegel
forms the abstract idea of fruit.
2) He then imagines that this abstract idea, as an entity existing
outside him, is the essence or substance of the pears and apples.
3) Why then, he asks himself, does this substance manifest itself
sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear ? Why this appearance of
diversity ?
4) Because, he answers, fruit is not static, undifferentiated, dead —
but dynamic, self-differentiated, alive. Different fruits are externaliza-
tions of the life of the one fruit, fruit itself.7
Some ten years later, after restudying Hegel's Logic, Marx views the
dialectic differently. His task is no longer simply to expose, but to
extract the rational kernel of dialectical method from the mystical
hull of absolute idealism.8 From this date onward his successive
critiques of political economy are built around contrasts derived from
Hegel's Doctrine of Essence —between essence, or substance, on the
one side, and appearance, or accident, on the other. Marx uses dia-
lectic as an instrument for penetrating beneath the accidents of com-
modity exchange to the substance of labor cost.
This line of analysis first appears in the Grundrisse (1857). Discussing
the role of tools and raw materials in the process of production, Marx
writes:
 424 STANLEY MOORE

The instrument is used as an instrument, the material taken as raw

material for labour. In coming into contact with labour, in being
taken as its means and for its object, they are taken as objedifications
of living labour, elements of the labour process. They change their
form, while preserving their substance; and, from the standpoint of
economics, this substance is objectified labour time. . . . Labour is
the living, forming fire, the flux and temporality of things, their shap-
ing in the life of time.9

This dialectical analysis is expanded and complicated in The Critique

of Political Economy (1859), Theorien iiber den Mehrwert (1863), and
Capital (1867). In Capital, Marx's account of the connection between
exchange ratios and labor costs is stated in terms of the contrast be-
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tween appearance and substance, accident and essence. This contrast

provides the key, not only to the structure of the opening chapter,
but to the structure of the three volumes taken as a whole.10
In consequence, the critique of Hegel's speculative construction
presented by Marx in 1845 can be turned against the opening chapter
of Capital. The argument of that chapter can also be summarized in
four steps:
1) Searching for a common property in terms of which quantities
of different commodities can be equated for exchange, Marx forms the
idea of abstract labor.
2) He then concludes that this idea of abstract labor, as an entity
existing outside him, is the essence or substance of the exchange
values of the different commodities.
3) Why then, he asks, does this substance manifest itself sometimes
in one kind of commodity, sometimes in another? Why this appear-
ance of diversity?
4) Because, he answers, abstract labor is not static, undifferentiated,
dead —but dynamic, self-differentiated, alive. The values of different
commodities are externalizations of one labor process, the productive
activity of society as a whole.11
However, this account of Marx's speculative construction exhibits
a complication which does not occur in the account of Hegel's. Accord-
ing to the first two steps —which summarize the first two sections of
the opening chapter of Capital — values of different commodities are
the substances of which exchange ratios are forms of appearance. But
according to the last two steps — which summarize the concluding
section on the secret of commodity fetishism —values of different
 MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 425

commodities are themselves forms of appearance, externalizations of

the productive activity of society. Marx develops his concept of value
in terms of two conflicting contrasts between appearance and reality:
value is at once the appearance of the reality of production and the
reality of the appearance of exchange.12 To dig beneath this paradox
is to discover what is distinctive in his version of dialectical material-
ism.
The analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital can be compared with
Hegel's analysis of physical objects. Both are exposures of pseudo-
independence. For Hegel physical objects are alienated mental activ-
ity, that is, they are creations of mind which appear to be independent
of mind. For Marx commodity values are alienated social activity,
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that is, they are creations of men which appear to be independent of

men. Suppose, however, that Marx had made this statement of
commodities, rather than of commodity values. He would then be
asserting that some physical objects — namely, those which become
commodities — are alienated social activity, creations of men which
appear to be independent of men. And why not other physical
objects as well ? Such a conclusion might prove compatible with the
pragmatist views Marx held in 1844 and 1845. It would certainly
prove incompatible with the materialist views he held after 1857.
Marx's problem in the opening chapter of Capital is to develop a
dialectical proof for his labor theory of value that is compatible with
his materialist philosophy. His first paragraphs contrast use-values,
which derive from the properties of material substances, with exchange-
values, which do not. He then attempts to prove —by arguments
borrowed from Hegel — that exchange-values are forms of appearance
of commodity values, which he characterizes as social substances.
Later, in his critique of commodity fetishism, he attempts to prove —
by further Hegelian arguments — that these social substances are
pseudo-substances, forms of appearance of society's productive activity.
This strategy seems to protect Marx's materialist epistemology and
metaphysics from falling victim to his dialectical method of analysis.
The dissolving power of that method is applied only to social sub-
stances, not to material substances. Yet the protection he provides is
illusory. The dialectic of essence and appearance draws no distinction
between culture and nature. If it is valid for one, it can be extended
to the other.13
The goal of Marx's argument is to establish the truth of the labor
theory of value. Yet the proof he offers is invalid. As might be expected,
 426 STANLEY MOORE

the set of premises from which he argues the reality of social substances
is inconsistent with the set from which he argues the unreality of such
substances.14 What he proposed was to extract the rational kernel of
dialectic from the irrational hull of idealism. What he accomplished
was to encase an irrational kernel of dialectic within the rational
hull of materialism.

IV
Around the middle of 1858, Engels —stimulated by his friend's exam-
ple — returned to the study of Hegel.15 But the version of dialectical
materialism he presents in The Dialectics of Nature (1873-86), Anti-
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Diihring (1878), and Ludwig Feuerbach (1886) differs significantly from

that of Marx.
Within the writings of Hegel — excluding his Phenomenology, which
is in a class by itself — a division can be made between his elaborations
of the dialectical method in general and his applications of that method
to specific areas of knowledge. General elaborations of his method are
presented in the two versions of his Logic. Through a critique of
traditional logic and scientific method, he there attempts to demon-
strate the superiority of a logic and scientific method which emphasize
context, change, conflict, and emergence. Specific applications of this
method are presented in his philosophies of nature, history, politics,
art, religion, and history of philosophy. There, assuming the correct-
ness of his method, he approaches the study of nature and culture
from a standpoint emphasizing context, change, conflict, and emer-
gence. In reading a work belonging to this second category, it is possible
to accept the method provisionally, as an approach to a particular
subject matter, and to judge it piecemeal by its fruits.
The versions of dialectical materialism developed by Marx and
Engels do not differ significantly in reflecting Hegel's use of dialectic
as a method for approaching specific areas of knowledge. Both Marx
and Engels approach the study of nature and culture from a standpoint
emphasizing context, change, conflict, and emergence.18 Where the
two versions differ decisively is in the extent to which they incorporate
the central premise of Hegel's Logic, from which he attempts to demon-
strate the universal validity of his method. That premise — sub-
sequently christened by Russell the Doctrine of Internal Relations —
underlies the contrast between substance, or essence, and appearance,
or accident, in Hegel's Doctrine of Essence. It is central for the dialectic
 MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 427

of Capital. Yet in. the philosophical writings of Engels it is barely

mentioned, much less stressed.17
Marx, not Engels, is the founder of dialectical materialism. And
in his version, even more than in that of Engels, the dialectic is in-
compatible with the materialism. The identification of reality with
Praxis, now rejected at the level of philosophical statement, is never-
theless reasserted at the level of economic argument. It is one thing
to propose standing Hegel on his head — and something else to
succeed in that endeavor.
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NOTES
1. A slightly different version of this paper was read before the American Philo-
sophical Association, Pacific Division, at Berkeley, California, in March, 1970.
2. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858, Dietz
Verlag, Berlin 1953 ; 'Marx an Engels um den 16. Januar 1858',. 'Marx an Engels
1. Februar 1858', 'Marx an Lassalle 31. Mai 1858', Marx/Engels Werke, Dietz
Verlag, Berlin 1956-1968, Vol. 29. The early Lukács, arguing against Vorländer
the importance of Hegel's dialectic for Marx's thought, stresses the significance
of Marx's return to the study of Hegel's Logic in 1857 : Geschichte und Klassen-
bewusstsein, Malik Verlag, Berlin 1923, pp. 8-9. Yet Lukács makes no attempt
to compare what Marx wrote on philosophical issues before that date with
what he wrote after it.
3. Marx, 'Thesen über Feuerbach' (MEW, Vol. 3), theses 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, I I ;
Marx, 'Hegeische Konstruktion der Phänomenologie' (MEW, Vol. 3), through-
out; Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie (MEW, Vol. 2), Ch. 6, Sect. 3, Div. 4,
Para 4 ; Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (MEW, Ergänzungsband,
Erster Teil), Privateigentum und Kommunismus, Sect. 4, throughout;
Kritik der Hegeischen Dialektik, ad. 2, Paras. 2-3. Throughout his philosophical
writings Engels— in contrast with the early Marx — definitely affirms the
Process Thesis, doubtfully affirms the Practice Thesis, and definitely denies
the Constitutive Thesis. The early Lukács, opposing Marx to Engels on this
issue, attacks the latter's account of our knowledge of physical objects for
identifying practice — in its dialectical-philosophical sense — simply with
experiment and industry. The source of that error, he suggests, is a copy theory
of knowledge which fails to recognize the Constitutive Thesis as an integral
component of the dialectical method Marx acquired from Hegel. See Engels,
Ludwig Feuerbach (MEW, Vol. 21), Ch. 2, Para. 6; Ch. 4, Para. 4; Engels,
'Einleitung zur englischen Ausgabe der "Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der
Utopie zur Wissenschaft" ' (MEW, Vol. 22), paras. 22-23; Lukács, Ge-
schichte und Klassenbewusstsein, pp. 145-7, 218-25. And compare Lenin, Material-
ism and Empirio-Criticism, Collected Works, Vol. 14, Foreign Languages Publishing
House, Moscow 1962, Ch. 2, Sects. I, 2, 6, throughout.
4. Marx, Grundrisse, Einleitung, Sect. 3, Paras. 1-2. The accepted title for this
manuscript dates back to 1903, when Kautsky published it as the Introduction
 428 STANLEY MOORE

to Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie. An English translation is available in

Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Charles H. Kerr and Co.,
Chicago 1904. In'attacking Engels for holding a copy theory of knowledge,
Lukacs neglects to discuss these passages from Marx. See the preceding note.
5. Marx, Kapital, Vol. I (MEW, Vol. 23), Ch. I, Sect. 4, Paras. 8-10.
6. In his Theses on Feuerbach Marx does not separate his affirmation of the Process
Thesis from his affirmation of the Practice Thesis. But in other works, where
he considers these issues separately, he recognizes that the Process Thesis has
been denied by some materialist philosophers and affirmed by others. See Marx,
Differenz der demokritischen und epikurischen Naturphilosophie (MEW, Ergänzungs-
band, Erster Teil), Pt. I, Div. 3, Sect. A, throughout; Marx/Engels, Die heilige
Familie, Ch. 6, Sect. 3, Div. 4, on Bacon and Hobbes.
7. Marx/Engels, Die heilige Familie, Ch. 5, Sect. 2, throughout. See also Marx,
Misère de la Philosophie, Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe, Div. 1, Vol. 6, Marx/Engels
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Verlag, Berlin 1932, Ch. 2, Sect. I, observation I, throughout.

8. 'Marx an Engels um den 16. Januar 1858', Para. 4; 'Marx an Lassalle 31. Mai
1858', Para. 3; 'Marx an Kugelmann 6. März 1868' (MEW, Vol. 32), Para. 2;
'Marx an Dietzgen 9. Mai 1868' (MEW, Vol. 32), excerpt; Marx, Kapital,
Vol. 1, Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage, Paras. 16 to end.
9. Marx, Grundrisse, Ch. 3, Sect. 1, Div. 29, Para. 3.
10. Marx, Kapital, Vol. I, Ch. 1, Sect. 1, Paras. 5-14; Sect. 3, Para. 2; Ch. 4, Sect. 2,
final para, and note; Ch. 17, Paras. 6, 7, 20; Ch. 18, Para. 3; Vol. 3 (MEW,
Vol. 25), Ch. 2, Para. 6; Ch. 9, seventh-from-last para.; Ch. 12, Sect. 3, Para. 3;
Ch. 48, Div. 3, Paras. I, 6, 15.
11. The first two steps summarize Sections 1 and 2 of Marx's opening chapter; the
last two summarize Section 4.
12. Section 3 of Marx's opening chapter provides a transition from the first con-
trast to the second; their incompatibility is the ground of its obscurity. For more
detailed criticism see Moore, 'The Metaphysical Argument in Marx's Labour
Theory of Value', Cahiers de L'Institut de Science Économique Appliquée, Series S :
Etudes de Marxologie, No. 7 (1963), particularly Sects. 2, 5.
13. One way of dealing with this difficulty is to characterize Marx's dialectic in
terms that restrict it to society and exclude it from nature. Another is to charac-
terize Marx's materialism in terms that divorce it from the traditional materialist
position on the epistemological status of physical objects. Both solutions are
endorsed by Lukacs in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein; and in each case he
contrasts the position he attributes to Marx with that of Engels. See notes 3,
above, and 16, below.
14. See Moore, 'Metaphysical Argument', Sects. 2, 5, 6.
15. 'Marx an Engels um den 16. Januar 1858', Para. 4; 'Engels an Marx 14. Juli
1858' (MEW, Vol. 29), Paras. 4-6.
16. The early Lukacs asserts that Marx and Engels differ on this point—that Engels
followed Hegel but misunderstood Marx in extending the dialectical method to
our knowledge of nature. Yet to render his contention plausible, he bases it on
a characterization of Marx's dialectical method so restrictive that it is incon-
sistent, not only with Marx's own account of that method, but with the account
given by Lukacs himself a few pages earlier. Compare Lukács, Geschichte und
Klassenbewusstsein, pp. 15-17; Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, Nachwort zur zweiten
 MARX AND THE ORIGIN OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 429

Auflage, Paras. 16 to end; Lukács, op. cit., pp. 8-9. As to whether Engels mis-
understood Marx on this issue, see Marx, Kapital, Vol. I, Ch. 9, Para. I I ;
'Engels an Marx 16. Juni 1867' (MEW, Vol. 31), Para. 6; 'Marx an Engels 22.
Juni 1867' (MEW, Vol. 31), Para. 5; Engels, Anti-Duhring (MEW, Vol. 20),
Pt. 1, Ch. 12, Paras. 23-24. Lukács cites the relevant passages from Capital and
Anti-Duhring some hundred pages later, in discussing another issue: Geschichte
und Klassenbeuwstsein, p . 183.
17. For Marx's statement of the Doctrine of Internal Relations, see Kapital, Vol. 1,
Ch. 1, Sect. 3, Pt. 1, Div. 3, Paras. 1-8. Compare Engels, 'Karl Marx: "Zur
Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie" ' (MEW, Vol. 13), Pt. 2, Paras. 1-10. For
an analysis of the role this doctrine plays in the argument of Capital, see Moore,
'The Metaphysical Argument', throughout. For Engels on the dialectic of
essence and appearance, substance and accident, see Diakktik der Natur (MEW,
Vol. 20), Notizen, Pt. 2, Note 1, Para. 5; Pt. 3, Sect. 2, Note2; Note 14, through-
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out; Anti-Duhring, Pt. I, Ch. 8, Paras. 27-30. Engels characterizes the relation
of things to processes, not by contrasting appearance and essence, but by con-
trasting part and whole: Anti-Duhring, introduction, Ch. I, Paras. 8-13;
Feuerbach, Ch. 4, Paras. 4-6. For Lukács's reading of the latter passage, see
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, p . 218.