Ernesto Guevara v.

Rosario Guevara
G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943, 74:479

FACTS:

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the
formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he died. WHEN HE DIES, His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever
been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only
legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the
registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying
the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last will and testament in
her custody, presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to
prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon
that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory
or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an acknowledged
natural daughter. (CAN PROBATE BE DISPENSED WITH?) NO.

RULING:

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of
the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for
probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with
that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly
provides that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court”; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be
dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means
provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under
the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners, 
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad
testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca,
their niece and that while each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits
of the lands mentioned.

Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the
Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.

When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but
because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When
the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to
the prohibition on joint wills. On appeal, the order was reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was
probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final
judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect
the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.

The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is
concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.

The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and
not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be
given effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of

the will subject to such probate.
Pedro Gallanosa v. Ubaldo Arcangel
G.R. No. L-29300, 21 June 1978, 83 SCRA 675

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis executed a will. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless
and survived by his brother Lito. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his
second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to
the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla’s son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3
parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, the legal heirs filed an
action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the
1939 decree of probate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled.

RULING:

No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance
with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be
set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment
was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the
discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to its voluntariness of execution cannot
be questioned anymore.
Sofia Nepomuceno v. CA (MISTRESS! PASS UPON INTRINSIC VALIDITY)

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died.
Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had
been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the
free portion of his estate to petitioner.

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina
Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on
the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On
June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be
valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
Azaola v. Singson 1960 (CODOY 1999)
FACTS:

When Fortunata Yance died, Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the probate of the former’s
holographic will, whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of
the deceased Cesario Singson. Francisco witnessed that one month before the death of the testator,
the same was handed to him and his wife.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife,
and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same
was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957and not on November 20, 1956 as
appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the
writing of the testatrix,the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented “did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.” Petitioner
appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the will’s
authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the
production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if
its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE: W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:

Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty
of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the
existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses “who know the handwriting and signature of the testator” and who can declare (truthfully,
of course, even if the law does not so express) “that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator”. There may be no available witness of the testator’s hand; or even if so familiarized,
the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert
evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts
to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will),
and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity.
Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony
that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand,
if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still,
and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention
of the testator be carried into effect.

RUBEN AUSTRIA VS. HON. REYES (INSTITUTION OF HEIRS)

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed
with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s
legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of
Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent
in accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should
have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the
compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived
into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her.
The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana”
(compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for
the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could
not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a
false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.

HELD:

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs
must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it
must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in
a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we
look at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate,
which largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land
which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her
part to give the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to
them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would
subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Sabi nila, she was under the belief that they were her compulsory heirs—such was
merely speculative of what was on her mind. The words sapilitiang tagapagman were
borrowed from the words of the law on succession.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,
as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment,
that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free
from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving
full expression to her will must be in order.