Ceniza The Neo Parmenidean A Critical An

CENIZA THE NEO-PARMENIDEAN 1
[This slightly revised paper (2015) is Chapter 3 of my book,

Filipino Philosophy: Traditional Approach. Part I, Section
1. Quezon City: C & E Publications, 2009).
C ENIZA THE N EO -P ARMENIDEAN :

A C RITICAL ANALYSIS OF H IS M ETAPHYSICS 1
ROLANDO M. GRIPALDO
This paper attempts to reconcile Parmenides

(change is illusory) and Heraclitus (change is
real). It argues that both are actualities from
different points of view.
INTRODUCTION
The logical trajectory of traditional philosophy from

the ancient Greeks to the present is to make use of the
results of the sciences, especially modern physics. The
philosophical question, “Why is there something rather
than nothing?” has preoccupied the ancient Greeks. After
having accepted the reality of this “something,” they
raised the corollary question, “What is it made of?” or
“What is the basic stuff of the universe?” Those trained
in philosophy know the Greek answers: water, air, fire,
numbers, earth, atoms, etc. The metaphysics of the
ancient Greeks was essentially a search for substance—
material or otherwise or both—as the stuff out of which
the universe, including the human being, comes into
existence.
Unverifiable metaphysical speculations were given
methodical treatment in the sciences by means of the scientific
method, which has been improved upon tremendously since
the time Francis Bacon introduced induction as the logic of
science. The philosophical problem as to the origin of life, for
example, has been given solution in biology when Charles
Darwin published his theory of evolution, which the Vatican
has eventually accepted provided God is credited for such a
process (Ceniza 2001: 30). Currently cognitive science and other
related sciences are grappling on giving solution to the
philosophical problem regarding the origin of
2 FILIPINO PHILOSOPHY
consciousness (Searle 1999: 12-19; 2004: 1-7; 1992: 127-

49). One by one, the provinces of philosophy declared their
independence as soon as they were able to perfect the use
of the scientific method. As Carnap (White 1955: 222)
suggests in the case of psychology, the sciences originally
come from the discipline of philosophy.
Wi t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n , a n d o t h e r s p r e d i c t e d t h e
demise of philosophy, which is kind of weird because
philosophy is the only discipline that, in seeking for
solutions to its problems, is actually seeking for its own
death. Some philosophers like Jaspers (Copleston
1965: 160) even place a demarcation line between the
subject matter of science (man as object) and the
subject matter of philosophy (man as subject). But as
Searle (1999: 3) argues, as soon as science has given a
solution to a philosophical problem, more and more
philosophical questions arise and the death of
philosophy is nowhere in sight.
It is in this light that I will analyze the metaphysical
excursions of Claro R. Ceniza, an esteemed colleague at the
Department of Philosophy of De La Salle University who died
of cancer on 2 July 2001. He was a lawyer but was not satisfied
with his profession and finally decided to teach what he loved
most: philosophy. He had a doctorate in philosophy at the
University of Syracuse. His doctoral dissertation was on
Parmenides.
PARMENIDEAN POSTULATES
In fragment 6 of his philosophical poem, “The way of

truth,” Parmenides (Kirk and Raven 1969) says: “That which
can be thought or spoken must be, for it is possible for it, but
not for nothing to be…” Ceniza (2001: 5-6) derives two basic
premises or postulates and one theorem from this passage:
P1. What can be thought or spoken is possible, and

what is possible can be thought or spoken.
P2. What is possible is, and what is is possible.
By using hypothetical syllogism, a theorem—or

constative derived from basic postulates—can be formulated.
T1. What can be thought or spoken is, and what is

can be thought or spoken.
Obviously, these three constatives cannot be true

since I can think of imaginary objects that do not exist. I
can also think of things falling upwards which in actual
fact do not happen because they violate the law of
gravity. Moreover, I can think of a million pesos in my
bank account even if I do not have such money and I can
think of a spaceship traveling faster than the speed of
light although our present knowledge of modern physics
and our existing technology do not warrant such a speed.
To resolve the issue, Ceniza (7-9)2 derives the negative
corollaries or immediate inferences corresponding to P1, P2,
and T1 respectively:
C1. What can be thought or spoken not-to-be is

possible not-to-be, and what is possible not-
to-be can be thought or spoken not-to-be.
C2. What is possible not-to-be is not, and what is-

not is possible not-to-be.
The corrolary of T1 is:
CT1. What can be thought or spoken not-to-be is

not and what is not can be thought or spoken
not-to-be.
I can, for example, think that I do not have a million

pesos in my bank account or I can think that there is no
spaceship that can travel faster than the speed of light. In
this regard the million pesos in my bank account and the
spaceship do not exist. The postulates (P1, P2, T1) and their
corrolaries (C1, C2, CT1) do not necessarily contradict each
other. Their derived constatives, however, which entail the
concept of contingency, involve a contradiction. For
instance, it is a contradiction “that it is possible for things
to be and also possible for them not to be at the same time.”
Concretely, it is contradictory for me to have a million pesos
in my bank account and simultaneously do not have it in
my bank account. In this sense, contingent things are
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c o r, i n o t h e r w o r d s ,
contingent objects do not exist in principle. According
to Ceniza (8), “Most philosophical problems…focus on
the ontological status of contingent phenomena—the
world, time, mind-body, relation, etc.”
MODALITY
In Section 7, Ceniza (13) tries to clarify the

components of modal logic:
…what is possible is that which can be thought

or spoken to be. The contingent is that which
can both be thought or spoken to be and thought
or spoken not to be. The necessary is that which
can be thought or spoken to be, but cannot be
thought or spoken not to be. And the impossible
is that which cannot be thought or spoken to
be, but must be thought or spoken not to be.
[Italics mine.]
In what way are these modal concepts related to each

other? According to Ceniza, the “possible is that which is
not impossible,” the “contingent is that which is possible,
but which is not necessary,” the “necessary is that which is
not possible not to be,” while the “impossible is that which
necessarily is not or is not possible to be” (italics mine).
Furthermore, Ceniza introduces two notions of Gottfried
Leibnitz: compossibility and incompossibility: “Concepts are
compossible if and only if they can co-exist, although they
do not necessarily co-exist…Concepts are incompossible if
and only if they cannot co-exist at the same time and from
the same point of view.” Both square and yellow are logically
compossible if they coexist in an object at the same time and
at the same point of view. Both red all over and green all
over an object at the same time and at the same point of view
are logically incompossible concepts.
Using the Leibnitzian concepts, Ceniza (14) now states
the following: (a) “Something is possible if and only if it is
compossible [coexists and self-consistent, or does not have
incompossible properties] with itself;” (b) “Something is
contingent if and only if it is a possible entity,” and there is
another entity which is incompossible with it (red and green

all over, for example, are possible properties of a thinkable
object but they are incompossible in that the object is either
red or green but not both); (c) “Something is necessary
if and only if it is a possible entity and it is compossible
with all entities that are possible” (space, e.g., is
compossible with all possible entities); and (d)
“Something is impossible if and only if it is
incompossible with itself (not self-consistent or
incompossible with all possible entities). Ceniza limited
himself to logical modalities as a component of his
metaphysics and excludes natural modalities (pertains
to natural laws), technical modalities (pertains to
technology), and epistemic modalities (pertains to our
present state of knowledge).
EXISTENCE OF CONTINGENT OBJECTS
A contingent entity, says Ceniza (19), involves a

contradiction and therefore cannot exist, “but this does not
mean its non-existence completely obliterates it…to ‘exist’
literally means to ‘stand out.’” A contingent entity does not
therefore simply stand out. For example, an object that is
“not green” does not necessarily mean it has no color, but
green does not stand out or does not exist in the object. Yellow
is the resultant color if we combine red and green, but red
and green are there (subsistent) in yellow although they do
not stand out. The colors of the rainbow is subsistent in white,
which is the “balanced sum of all colors of the rainbow.”
What makes contingent entities existent? Or if they
cannot exist, why do we experience seemingly contingent
objects like chairs, tables, trees, and the like? There must be
a “reason, cause or explanation for the things we experience”
(20). Ceniza (21) asks: “Why do these things exist, when
they should not—their concepts being self-contradictory?
Why this, rather than otherwise, or nothing at all, we ask?”
The answer is that “they exist because they have causes.”
For example, if the ground is wet, it must have been caused
by (i) rain, (ii) flooding, (iii) broken underground water pipe,
(iv) sprinkled water, or (V) waste water thrown on the ground.
In (i), the wetness would cover a wide area including the
roofs of houses; in (ii) the wetness will be wide but will not
include elevated grounds and roofs of houses; in (iii)

“the wetness would cover a relatively small area, with a
center where the break in the pipe is located;” in (iv) the
area covered by wetness will even be smaller; and in (v)
the covered area will be much smaller and the water
might even be dirty. We can determine the cause of the
wetness by simply examining the surroundings.
LOGIC OF CAUSALITY
The cause (say A) implies the event or thing in

question, that is, the effect (say B). Cause A exists;
therefore effect B exists. B’s contradictory—that is,
negative-B—does not exist since B is equivalent to the
negation of negative-B. In other words, “B ceases to be
contingent since its possible non-existence is negated.
In view of its cause, “B becomes necessary,” and the
“existence of A…explains the existence of B, which
would otherwise seem contingent” (24). The cause itself
appears contingent and will require its own cause that
would clear the original cause of its contingency, and so
on.
In Section 11, Ceniza attempts to demolish the Humean
and Kantian analyses of causality. According to Hume, cause
and effect are always in conjunction such that when there is
a cause, then the effect happens, and when there is the effect,
then we immediately guess—by association—that there is
the cause. As such when the cause happens, we can predict
the effect and vice versa.
Ceniza (25) argues this is not necessarily the case:
“Observation of the effect does not always inform us what
its cause is, and observation of the cause does not always
enable us to predict what the effect would be. Once the effect
is known, the cause may not easily be predicted, and some
people even attribute the effect as doings of evil spirits or
the anger of the gods; even “the cause of AIDS was not known
for a long time.” Ceniza concludes that “since causal
connections are not always transparent, then it could be
concluded that the Humean analysis cannot be correct.”
Moreover, the Humean analysis of the cause “runs counter
to statistical laws” where “the probability that even one causal
series would recur in exactly the way it does would be
minuscule” (26). Events may be observed to occur without

us knowing their causes, and science explains the occurrence
of events in terms of causal laws and not in terms of the
Humean law of association.
In disagreeing with Hume, Kant rejected the view that
causality is a contingent phenomenon in that we feel the
necessity in causal relations. Causality cannot be explained
in terms of constant conjunctions but in terms of our
innate rational structures, the categories of the mind. The
first rational structure is at the level of intuition—space
and time, and the second rational structure is at the level
of conception—the categories. Cause and effect belong
to the category of relation, and causality is a synthetic a
priori concept, that is, a “necessary concept with
application to experience.” Causality is a subjective
structuring of the world dictated by the perceptual
category of relation of the mind. Ceniza (27) objects to
this by saying that if causality is an innate relational
category, then we need to simply find the causal
connections in our minds without undergoing a
“laborious research involving a study and analysis of
empirical data and their relationships.” We need not
therefore “construct elaborate theories which must be
tested experimentally, before we can finally arrive at the
correct causal connections.”
VERTICAL CAUSALITY: THE ARCHÉ
Causality in time is horizontal causality which looks

backward to the previous causes or the Final Cause. Events
in the universe appear to have at least prima facie separate
causes. But the universe itself as a whole appears contingent.
Since “P1 and P2, together with their corollaries, prohibit all
kinds of contingencies,” Ceniza (28) argues that it must have
its own adequate cause or logos. All horizontal causes must
somehow ultimately
join up, like so many tributaries of a river, with the

one Cause, Reason or Explanation of all things—
that which accounts for all things—the Urstuff as
the Germans call it—of the universe.
The vertical search for the Final Cause which unifies

all causes is the search for vertical causality. This means
that causal relations themselves are not contingent. This
is probably the motivation in the sciences for the search
of the Unified Field 3 that would be the Theory of
Everything. The “Big Bang is the horizontal origin of
causes, their union in time.” The Superstrings Theory,
on the other hand, “unifies all causal relations in nature.”
Einstein’s unification of space and time to space-time
implies that “time is in the universe, rather than outside
of it, the universe itself must be independent of time”
(28-29). Hence the need for vertical causality which is
independent of space-time. The ultimate unifying
cause—the Arché—must be necessary, not contingent.
It is possible that there are many worlds with different
Archés although quantum physics hints that “our own
universe as a whole contains a number of possible worlds
whose parts do not directly interact with our own” and
could have “only one Arché that unifies all possible
worlds” (31).
GENERAL CRITERION FOR EXISTENCE
Ceniza introduces a third postulate which is non-

Parmenidean. This postulate makes him distinctly a neo-
Parmenidean.
P3. What exists makes a difference, and what makes

a difference exists.
Parmenides rejects this thesis in that a difference is some

kind of non-being. Ceniza, however, argues that for a non-
contingent or necessary thing (relation, object, and the like)
to exist, it must make a difference. If it does not make a
difference at all to its surroundings—whether it is present
therein or not—then it does not exist (it may be subsistent
though). To quote Ceniza (32-33):
To make a difference, it is essential that the entity

in question (we shall understand “entity” in its
broadest sense to mean anything that can be thought
or spoken, or could make a difference, as will be
explained shortly) affects something else in a

unique fashion; that is, that it must affect things
somewhat differently from the way other entities
affect those same things. As a crude example, fire
affects its surroundings differently than ice does.
Or flood affects an area differently from the way
rain would affect the same area. Or Fred affects
people somewhat differently than ice does. It is by
the difference each entity makes in its
surroundings that the entity in question proves
its existence. One might say that, as far as we
know, an electron affects its surroundings in
exactly the same way another electron does,
since presumably, electrons are specifically
identical. But let us reply to this criticism in the
following manner: Say one electron, let us call
it A, is in the sun, and another electron, let us
call it B, is in the Pacific Ocean. Certainly A
does not affect the surroundings of B in the
Pacific Ocean the same way that B does; nor
does B affect the surroundings of A in the sun
the same way A does. Although if A were in the
place of B, and B were in the place of A, then B
would affect its (new) surroundings in exactly
the same way as A does, and A would affect its
(new) surroundings in exactly the way that B
does. Although A and B are specifically
identical, they are not numerically so. If A and
B disappears, then their respective surroundings
would be different on account of their absence.
There are two levels of existence. First is the existence

of pure ideas or forms. They are called universals in that
they can be “instantiated in more than one object.” Existence
in this regard is “existence of pure logical possibilities.” They
“exist because they are thinkable, speakable, possible, and
they make a difference to possible objects.” They exist
because “they add to the wealth of our ideas” and when
“realized as properties of things, they add to the wealth of
our experience, and to differences in the relations of things
to each other” (34). We call their existence as ideal existence.
Ceniza rejects Plato’s World of Forms.
Second is the existence of “something real in the

world.” To exist in this sense is to make a difference in
the world, that is, to causally affect something or other
in the world. The object usually makes the most
difference in the place it is located. We call this existence
as real existence. A mode of real existence is subsistence.
According to Ceniza (35), “A thing subsists when its
being there does not stand out, when it cannot be
immediately perceived as such in the place where it is
supposed to be.” In the color white, for instance, the
colors of the rainbow subsist; however, each color makes
a difference in that if we remove one color, then a
different color (rather than white) will result. It is in this
sense that we may consider subsistence as a “third kind”
of existence although not separate from, but only a mode
of, real existence. To quote Ceniza (35):
…the original colors subsist in white. They subsist

(exist within), rather than exist (stand out), because
they are there within the mixture, an essential part
of it, but not directly observable. They make a
difference through their effects—a different color
resultant would be seen, if not for their presence.
This neutral state in colors, white, is likewise

observable in other areas as in motion, where the sum of all
possible motions of an object will result in rest, its neutral
state. Thus, says Ceniza (35), “the neutral resultant state is
not the absence of either colors, motions, or other contingent
properties, but a plenum of all of them.” Ceniza (35-36)
goes on to say that Anaximander calls the neutral state of
the world as Apeiron, “the indeterminate Something in
which all the opposites subsist, waiting to be brought out
into existence by time in alternate cycles of being and non-
being.” Many philosophers believe that “the natural state
of the Urstuff or Arché, the originative principle of all
existence, is some neutral state.” Zero is the neutral state of
numbers while silence is the neutral state of noises. The
neutral state appears ontologically as some kind of non-
being, but it is actually a plenum of all beings.
Three major principles are based on the third postulate:
(1) Leibnitz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles and the
indiscernibility of identicals, (2) the principle of

verifiability (confirmability or falsifiability) in the
sciences, and (3) Ockham’s Razor. The first principle
states that identical things are indistinguishable and vice
versa. If A (red) is identical to A (red), then they are one
and the same thing, indistinguishable from each other.
The second principle says that a thing’s existence is
verifiable or confirmable by its effects, or else it is false
or falsifiable. Its existence must make a difference in its
surroundings. And the third principle stipulates that
entities must not be multiplied without necessity, that is
to say, unobservable entities or those without effects on
their environment “should not be ‘added’ to one’s
ontology” (37). Ghosts and goblins do not affect us
directly. It is our beliefs in ghosts and goblins that affect
us. We do not interact with the world directly but we
interact in terms of our beliefs and the sensations we
experience. Experience and education are important for
humans in order to eliminate non-existent entities in their
personal ontologies.
Ceniza discards Berkeley’s criterion of existence, viz.,
perceivability, since it will redound simply to the existence
of sensations or phenomena (appearances). On the basis of
P1, P2, and P3, Ceniza’s criteria of existence are
conceivability and making a difference (40). The very
conceivability of universals constitutes their existence, but
in the real world, “the conceivable…must have perceivable
effects (must make a difference) in the observable world.”
He rejects the positivists’ judgment that “unobservable [or
nonverifiable] entities are mere theoretical fictions.”
Knowing has two levels: (a) we know some things in
the world almost directly such as “colors, sounds,
movements, smells, bodily sensations.” But (b) “trees, rivers,
mountains, lions, and people” are known, firstly, through their
external appearances and, secondly, through their unique
effects on their environments.
NUMERICAL IDENTITY: REFERENT OF CAUSALITY
Ceniza distinguishes between generic and numerical

identities. A generic identity is an identity in kind or an identity
from the perspective of the class to which they belong in
common. Two persons, from the viewpoint of their humanity,

are in that respect generically identical. Generic identity can
be arranged in a hierarchy of higher and lower such that the
highest is the summum genus and the lowest is the infima
species. Aristotle divided classes into ten categories—
substance, quality, quantity, place, time, relation, posture,
state, action, and passion—with each category having a
summum genus and an infima species for its members.
Numerical identity, on the other hand, pertains to
the identity of one individual with itself over a period of
time. It entails a spatio-temporal continuity with itself.
As Ceniza (47-48) contends:
The tree I now see before me is numerically

identical with the seed I planted some years back,
because that seed (which no longer exists as a
seed) and the tree before me are—presumably—
spatio-temporally continuous…
For humans…the continuity of their respective
memory trains is the more strict criterion for
numerical identity, although the spatio-temporal
continuity of the body is also regarded as a
criterion, if there is no problem with the memory
of the individual in question.
Is numerical identity possible? Is not the world a series

of static pictures as in a film, or a series of apparent moving
lights in a movie marquee such that the “apparent wholes
that seem to tell a story [are] mere illusions?” (58) According
to Parmenides, all the varieties and changes we experience
in the world are illusions and there is only one
undifferentiated object, the “It is.” Ceniza believes that these
varieties and changes are real over time and the objects
bearing them have numerical continuities. Although there
are rare exceptions to numerical identity (see Ceniza 1981),
in general there “would probably be no concept of causality
without the idea of numerical identity” (49).
GENERIC IDENTITY AND UNIVERSALS
Universals have ideal existence. They are ideas which

are classes and which are genera of different degrees of
generality. They exist as logical possibilities, that is, they

are self-consistent and compossible with themselves.
They are unique and by virtue of their uniqueness, each
universal makes a difference to the wealth of our ideas.
Since the universal color blue can generically apply to
each species (e.g., blue shoes, blue dress, etc.), then
though the universal cannot be distinguished from itself,
the instances of that same universal can be distinguished
from each other.
As logical possibilities, universals exist only in a
purely formal sense and the world of universals exists
only in a figurative sense. Universals are immutable,
necessary, objects of thought, sources of immutable
truths, one in many since they are “unique archetypes
of their existential instances” (54, 56), and logically
prior to their existential instances. Moreover, there is
a universal for every species (redness, e.g.) and for
every genus (color, e.g.).
Ockham objects to universals since they can be
reduced to properties of concrete objects. Motion is that
property of an object whose place has continuously
changed while fatherhood is just a relation of a man to his
offspring. Aristotle, on the other hand, locks the universal
in the instantiated object, that is, form and matter in the
physical world are joined together. Ceniza (55) counters
that as a universal, “motion is simply the logical possibility
of objects continuously changing place, and fatherhood is
the logical possibility of the relationship of a man to his
offspring.” As against Aristotle, Ceniza (55) contends that
Aritstotle
...p r e c l u d e ( s ) t h e e x i s t e n c e o f u n i v e r s a l s
before there were things that instantiate them,
in which case the existence of universals
would be contingent. Was there no circleness
b e f o r e t h e r e w e r e c i r c u l a r t h i n g s ? Was the
universal flying machine inexistent before
there were flying machines? How then could
flying machines be conceived or made?
Not all universals are generic, there are also

concrete ones, which “are not modeled upon logical
possibilities…but on concrete objects existing

experientially and historically in the real world” (56).
The universal meter in Paris, for example, is made of
platinum iridium. It is now said to be “more accurately
defined in terms of light waves equal to 1,650,763.73
wave-lengths of the red-orange light of the krypton-86
isotope under certain conditions” (56). Ceniza (57) cites
other concrete universals like the gram, the year, the
flag, the national dress, a person’s biography, a nation’s
language, etc. They have the characteristics of (a)
conditional (contingent) necessity, (b) being subject
to causal laws, and (c) being also logically possible
in some sense.
THE ARCHÉ
Existence in the Real World
For a thing to exist in the real world, it must have interactive

relations with other things, it must make a difference. But real
things are both form and matter. “A table,” says Ceniza (61),
“remains an idea until it is physically embodied. Then it becomes
a real table, and from that time on, it participates in interactive
relations with other things in the world.” How it can participate
depends on the nature of its form or physical structure. To know
the physical body, one must link it to the Arché since what one
directly perceives are the appearances of objects. Locke says
that that body which unifies the appearances of an object is “I-
know-not-what,” while Berkeley and Hume argue that there is
nothing behind the perceivable appearances. Kant relegates the
thing-in-itself to the realm of the unknowable. But those
unknowable things-in-themselves constitute the Arché.
The Arché is a necessary Being, which is a plenum of
opposites. As such it contains the universe or the entire
plurality of universes within itself. It is a neutral state which
originates everything in the real world.
Cosmological Argument
How do we arrive at the Arché? By arguing from

the observable cosmos or plurality of things to the
unobserved beginning and the origin of everything,
which is the One Being or Arché. This type of arguing is

called the cosmological argument. To quote Ceniza (64-
65):
…every contingent event or entity must have a

cause or set of causes. The cause itself, if apparently
contingent, must have its own cause or set of causes,
which is not contingent—which, in other words, is
necessary in and of itself. The reason for this
is, if every member in the series is contingent,
the series itself would be contingent, and hence,
cannot explain any member of the series, since
contingent entities (or series) cannot
exist…Hence there must be a first cause which
is necessary in and of itself.
Since Parmenides starts with Necessary Being, it

becomes difficult for him to logically connect his Being
with the contingent and constantly changing entities of
the world. He treats the real world ontologically as a mere
illusion. It was difficult to reconcile time (changing
world) and eternity (Necessary Being). Modern or
theoretical physics tries to resolve this issue by conceiving
of time to be in the universe, in space-time: “Change
happens in the universe” but the universe, which is outside
the realm of space-time, “remains the same and forever
does not change” (65). Being is not only necessary and
immutable, but also atemporal, that is to say, Being is
eternal or has no beginning and no end. Thus we have
bridged the gap between, or have interconnected,
Parmenides (no flux) and Heraclitus (flux). Ceniza
believes that this physical Arché is the Unified Field of
physics or the Superstrings Theory which unifies the four
fundamental forces of nature: “gravity, electromagnetism,
the strong force which binds the atomic nuclei together,
and the weak force, which is said to be responsible for
some forms of radioactivity” (102).
Teleological Argument
Is there purpose in the universe? Does it have an end? If

there is a first cause, can there be a final cause? Ceniza (70)
thinks there is orderliness in the universe and it is

manifested in the unity of causal laws oriented toward an
orderly system. The Law of Entropy, applies only “on
small and limited scales, [and does] not seem to work for
the universe at large.” The Anthropic Theory holds that
the universe “seems oriented toward the emergence of
intelligent living beings, such as man.” The Arché is the
ordering principle of the universe. It is similar to
Anaximander’s Apeiron, Parmenides’ Being, Lao Tzu’s
non-Being, the Hindu indeterminate Brahman, the Jewish
and Christian Nameless One, and the Buddhist Sunyata.
Epistemological Argument
Ceniza links knowing to what he calls

epistemological order. To quote him (75-76):
To know anything at all is to know that it is

ordered…Ignorance is disorder of the
intelligence…the object of knowledge possesses an
ordering beyond what one knows about it…if
knowledge is possible at all of the world, or of some
of its components, then order is present in the world,
to the extent that the world can be known. A world
fully known is a fully ordered world…A completely
disordered world cannot be known. A completely
disordered world is non-being, for the concept of
complete disorderliness is self-contradictory. In
fact, an object with self-contradictory properties
may be taken as our model of complete disorder.
There is no such object. [Such an object is]
impossible…not compossible with itself…[It is] not
possible…not thinkable, for non-being in the strict
sense of the term cannot be known. In fact, the term
non-being is self-contradictory. It is something that
is not a thing.
Since “knowledge presupposes some kind of ordering

in and among the ideas or things that are the objects of
knowledge,” it therefore presupposes a logical orderer or an
Arché, “if the object known is something real.” The orderer
must be unchanging and necessary.
Ontological Argument
“Nothing” or “Non-being” as used in philosophy has

two senses. As Henri Bergson uses it, “nothing” is the same
as “empty space.” “Nothing in that room” means the room is
empty. As used by Jean-Paul Sartre, “nothing” is “no definite
thing.” The self for Sartre, in this respect, is a non-being,
no essence at all, unlike other things. Since the self has
no essence, it is free to be, that is, “to determine what
particular thing it will be. Being free, and not being
anything at all, the self can be whatever it will itself to
be” (77). As used by both Bergson and Sartre, “nothing”
or “non-being” is a neutral state, a plenum of all
possibilities within it.
The other sense of “nothing” is the one used by
Parmenides, “the more logically appropriate sense,” that is,
“non-being” in its absolute sense means “there is no such
thing as non-being” since the word itself is self-contradictory.
Nothing comes from Nothing. “Nothing” in this sense has
no objective reference and cannot be thought or spoken of.
No Non-Being can exist in this sense, for its denial entails
the existence of its opposite, Being, by virtue of the double
negative, that is, if it is not the case that non-Being exists,
then Being must be. This is a simpler version of the
ontological argument which antedates St. Anselm some 1,500
years ago. The only problem of Parmenides was that he could
not connect his necessary Being with the contingent, mutable
world which he considers illusory.4
Moral Argument
The moral argument presupposes a moral and causal

order and in that sense it is a species of both the teleological
argument (the fact that it is a type of order) and the
cosmological argument (the fact that it is caused) although
people may not be able to agree on “what sort the ultimate
universal telos is” (72). The moral order is no different from
the rational order and therefore a rational being is basically
a moral being.
We may distinguish between rationality and intelligence.
Intelligence is a tool or instrument of the will and must be
obedient to the will. As goal-oriented, intelligence serves
the interests of the will. The will dictates intelligence to “find

the most efficient way to achieve its goal.” As such,
“intelligence and power go nicely together.” In that sense,
intelligence is amoral precisely because the will, without
guidance from the rational conscience, is amoral. It is also
asocial in that it uses human and nonhuman materiel for the
will’s ends. On the other hand, reason is not primarily goal-
oriented but it seeks to discover and universally implement
“rules, principles, and laws applicable to humans as social
beings.” Reason is social and owes allegiance to the society of
all persons, its laws, and its higher moral norms which are
discovered by reason.” Reason seeks to make the will “obedient
to the rules, principles and laws accepted or acceptable by
society, although quite often it does not succeed in doing so”
(72). A principled person is one who governs himself by
accepted rules, principles, and laws of society, and by the “ideal
rules and principles discovered by reason.” Where there is a
conflict, e.g., between a local rule and a national rule, or between
the letter and the spirit of the law, or between law and love,
“reason must decide contextually” (73).
As a product of ratiocination, morality is “ideally
built into the conscience of the person.” The conscience
acts as a moral agent. Reason is a universalizing
principle that subjects the human being to a universal
rule: “It takes the person’s standards for well-being and
happiness as the basis of a universalizable rule applicable
to everyone” (73). This moral principle is the foundation
of the negative and positive versions of the Golden Rule,
and the expansion of the principle not only to humans
but to all other creatures as well. Albert Schweitzer’s
“reverence for life” rule and Jeremy Bentham’s
“utilitarian principle to all creatures that can feel pain”
are examples.
Ceniza completely agrees with Kant that “the postulate of
reason is the universalization of one’s act” (73). Reason applies
to classes and its drive is towards universalization and justice:
“What is true for one rational being…is mutatis mutandi, true
for all, under like conditions” (74). Ceniza believes that the Arché
does not directly interfere with human affairs, but makes its
“presence in events ‘felt’ through moral rationalizations.” In this
regard, “the moral principles derived from reason are also
commands and revelations handed down from the Arché (or
God) itself.” In a manner of speaking, therefore, “God is reason

working in the human conscience” (74).
SPACE
Let us begin with common sense space, which is

basically Euclidean (three dimensional). It is (a) infinite, (b)
infinitely divisible, (c) uniform (homogeneous) and
featureless (without irregularities), (d) isotropic
(unidirectional), (e) necessary (without opposites), (f)
ontologically neutral (no contraries, no bias, a plenum for
all possibilities), (g) timeless (no changes), and (h) one
(a unity). The common sense space is what we normally
describe as the flat, empty space.
But Leibnitz says that this empty space, though
conceivable, cannot exist in and by itself since there are
no reference points in it. Without the coordinates
(observable reference points), nothing can be said to be
moving in empty space. Leibnitz believes space cannot be
prior to its contents, but rather its contents must be prior to
space. The existence of space is relative to its contents, or
that space can only exist if it has contents. Moreover, if to
exist is to make a difference, or to have an interaction with
other things or parts in the real world, then an absolutely
neutral space cannot exist since it has no interacting parts.
At the most, according to Leibnitz, such an absolute space
can exist only as an idea (ideal existence).
Another critique of common sense space is that there
seems to be a contradiction in thinking that it is infinite
(without boundaries), for to think of it as boundless is to be
unable to ontologically connect it with the things within it
which have boundaries or reference points. This is the
difficulty of Parmenides who claimed, after describing the
character of Being—“whose features,” says Ceniza (85), “are
very similar to those of common sense space”—that the real
world is a mere illusion or appearance.
LIMITEDNESS OF THE HUMAN MIND
One aspect of the limitedness of the human mind

pertains to the view that there can only be one space and
therefore only one universe. But, Ceniza says (86):
if the criterion for real existence is interaction

among really existent entities, then there can be as
many worlds or universes—with their respective
spaces—as there can be sets of interacting things,
each of which does not interact with any other set
outside of it. Each set of mutually interacting things
would be one world.
Assuming that heaven, hell, and earth coexist in

separate spaces with interacting parts, then we shall have
three separate universes even if we assume space to be
Euclidean. We now know, of course, that there are
different spaces as in the geometries of Bernard Riemann
(elliptical world) and of Janos Bolyai and Nicolai
Lobachevski (hyperbolic world).
Modern physics has gone beyond common sense space
or even Leibnitz’s space. Space is no longer thought of as a
container of material objects, as Plato said in the Timaeus.
We now have a dynamic unified universe of space-time,
matter, and energy. This whole space-time structure of matter
and energy is the unity of the Being and the World of Seeming
of Parmenides. Modern physics does not consider the two as
logically separate but they form a necessary unity.
The Unsolvability of Problems of Real Being Before
Prior to the advent of theoretical physics, the problems

of real Being were unsolvable. As Ceniza (89) argues:
[For] as long as philosophers retained the

common sense concept of space, as least
subsconsciously, as their conceptual framework for
ontology and metaphysics, then the gulf between
the essential characteristics of Being demanded by
the Parmenidean postulates and the real world of
experience, supposed to be explained by such
Being, is unbridgeable.
For example, how can a non-temporal Being give rise

to temporal beings? How can we derive an asymmetrical
universe from a purely symmetrical Being? How can
contingent things coexist with a necessary Being? How can

a material object (being) arise from a non-material thing such
as empty space (non-being)? How does time come into
existence from eternity?
Ceniza (90) believes that “Euclidean space is a
rational construct based intuitively on the Parmenidean
postulates.” It is not an empirical space. For one, the
infinity of space cannot be based on “our having
experienced space as infinite.” Secondly, the isotropic
(the same in all directions) character of space is not
empirical. An object thrown upward will go down, but
one thrown downward will not go up, or one thrown
outward will not normally go back. Thirdly, space is
supposed to be neutral, but we experience contents in
it. And so on.
We now know that we can have alternatives to
Euclidean space. Bolyai and Lobachevski’s hyperbolic
space looks like the space of the saddle while Reimann’s
space looks like the space of the globe. Einstein made
use of Reimann’s geometry where the shortest distance
between two points is the arc of a great circle (which
means that space is curved) and where parallel lines will
eventually meet at some particular point. Einstein’s
Special Theory of Relativity unites space and time,
matter and energy while his General Theory of
Relativity characterizes space-time as Reimannian. The
Superstrings Theory of David Schwartz and Michael
Green has considered space-time, matter, energy, and all
the forces of nature as not ontologically separate entities
but as “intimately related to each other and as causally
influencing each other” (91). Matter and energy do not
exist separately in space and in time, but are intertwined
with the structure of multi-dimensional space-time.
What, then, are the characteristics of space-time?
(a) It is not infinite, but limited. (b) It has no fixed
boundaries but can “expand or contract depending on
the historical epoch of the space-time being considered.”
(c) It is not really empty but “a plenum of physical
opposites, which momentarily are instantiated in what
are called ‘virtual particles’ only to vanish again” and
merges, so to speak, with the plenum. And (d) It is
contained in the universe, not the universe in it.
Toward Solving the Philosophical Puzzles
The Superstrings Theory, likewise dubbed as the

Theory of Everything (see “The string theory: A theory
of everything,”at the Internet) though probably still
incomplete, is a good candidate for our theory of the
Arché. To quote Ceniza (93):
As far as we can make it out, we now have a physical

Arché which is a space-time of at least eleven
dimensions, and which unites all real things in the
universe. This Arché’s history, according to physicists,
begin with the Big Bang, a cataclysmic process that
starts the emergence of the varied entities of the universe
by separating the four forces of nature beginning with
gravity, and so on. Material things soon begin to appear
and form an orderly cosmos of quasars, galaxies, stars,
planetary systems, some with life in them, which evolve
into higher and more complex forms, and finally
culminating in beings which can reflect and speculate
on the nature of the universe itself. This expanding
cosmos, it is predicted, will soon stop expanding and
start the process which will end in the so-called Big
Crunch, and then perhaps the whole process will begin
all over again with another Big Bang.
Note, however, that this pulsating universe could only

be one of the many universes, but the entire cosmos itself,
“does not undergo this cyclical process” (93) since the whole
universe—the super Arché itself—is not in time, but contains
time as part of its structure. In other words, modern physics
has given us some solutions (Ceniza 93) on, at least,
...the ontological problem of where the world came

from, how it began, why it is the world that it is
and not otherwise, and how it will end. The problem
also encompasses how to reconcile time and
eternity, whether the universe is infinite or not (it
is not) and whether time too is infinite or not (it
also is not). Furthermore, the issue of whether there
are other worlds than our own…is implied in the
so-called many-universes theory….
Possibility of Multiple Archés
According to Ceniza (95), in interpreting Parmenides,

“[W]hat is not possible not to be necessarily is,” or “every
existent thing is a necessarily existent thing.” There are,
however, two types of necessity: (a) that which is necessary
in and of itself, while the other is (b) that which is
conditionally necessary, that is, one whose necessary
existence depends on a necessity of either type (a) or (b).
The existence of an airplane is a necessity of type (b) since it
requires a sufficient cause or reason to exist, that is, the maker
of the airplane. On the other hand, there must be a sufficient
cause for the existence of the maker since the maker is a
contingent being which requires a cause to exist, and so on,
but this chain of causes or reasons cannot go on forever and
will require a necessary being of type (a), the ultimate Cause
or Arché.
It is, however, possible to have many universes,
each one of which has its own Arché. Ceniza believes
that each Arché, together with its subuniverses, will be
independent of the other Archés with their respective
subuniverses. They would coexist with each other and
be compossible with one another. They are like contents
of different dreams in different minds, separate and yet
coexisting with one another. They do not interact with
e a c h o t h e r. Ceniza (98) maintains that we cannot
“discount the epistemic possibility that there may be
only one Arché which comprehends all possible
universes.”
TIME
When did time begin and why did it begin at all?

Where did the past go, where did the present come from,
and what is the existential status of the future?
According to Ceniza (101), one classical solution is
the doctrine of eternal return. This doctrine was first
propounded by Pythagoras, then by Aristotle, and finally
by Friedrich Nietzsche. This doctrine stipulates that
everything that ever happens “will recur again and again
exactly as they happened before and in the same
succession” (101). In this view, the infinity of time is
eliminated since there is only one great year, the Great

Year of the continual recurrence of events. The cycle is
not spiral but circular: “everyone is in a manner of
speaking immortal and the universe itself is eternal.”
Our experience of time, however, is finite and
therefore this doctrine of eternal recurrence has not
solved the temporal problem of why we experience this
particular present events and not another, or why this
particular series of events and not another series of
events.
Ceniza (102) heavily relies for the solution to this
problem of time on modern physics, particularly the
Superstings Theory of ten or eleven dimensions. The
implication of quantum mechanics shows that time is not
linear but multilinear or a “vastly branching phenomenon.”
This means, “as illustrated in movies and television shows
about time travel,” that “the past continues to exist and the
future already exists.” In this respect, in the so-called many-
worlds hypothesis, “the present does not only have one future
but many possible futures all co-existing simultaneously.”
Whatever will be the final judgment of the “physics of the
future,” Ceniza (103) opines that
...this view of time is free from the problem of

contingency, for here, every moment of time is
in a sense present, past and future. Time is
limited in duration, beginning perhaps with the
Big Bang and will begin again. Hence, it is also
free from the problem of infinity.
Ceniza (103) offers the answers to the classical questions

about time:
Q. Why is the present moment exactly the way I

now experience it?
A. All moments of time are present to some
conscious being, or to some process in the
universe or other.
Q. When did time begin, and why did time begin
when it did?
A. Time did not begin at all. Or you can begin it
anytime you like, although the more

conventional one might begin it with the Big
Bang. But this is a matter of choice. The Big
Bang, if there was such a thing, is part of the
history of the universe, and cannot be
otherwise.
Q. In all the billion years of its history, why is it
that I am now experiencing the present
moments of the universe, so infinitesimally
momentary as it is?
A. You are part of the history of the universe.
You are always there. All moments of time
are present to some conscious being or process
in it.
Q. Is time eternal or not?
A. It is both eternal and not, as all cyclical
processes are both eternal and not. It has no
beginning, and it has no end. Although
conventionally, we might begin time with
the Big Bang and end it with the Big Crunch.
Order in Disorder?
Kelvin’s second law of thermodynamics states that the

universe tends toward more and more disorder, until finally
it will be in the state of total disorder. This total disorder,
however, is characterized by total uniformity. (This appears
to be what is known as chaos theory.) Ceniza (104) earlier
argues in relation to the properties of space that total
uniformity represents total order while lack of uniformity
represents total disorder, “and causes us to ask, why this
rather than otherwise?” He concedes that our concept of
order and disorder depends upon the ordering principle
that we assume. The second law of thermodynamics
seems to apply on a limited basis and is essentially
founded on the Democritean/Leucippian model of
interaction of atoms or things through impacts or
collisions. It holds true for matter (gases, liquids, and
loose aggregates like sand), “located within relatively
small volumes of space.” The universe, Ceniza believes,
interacts on the basis of the Empedoclean model of
attraction and repulsion of the four basic forces such as
gravity, electromagnetism, the strong force that holds

atomic nuclei together, and the weak force that governs
some radioactive phenomena. Ceniza (105) opines that
the second law of thermodynamics does not probably
apply to the universe as a whole. What applies is
something opposite to Kelvin’s law, and the universe is
not a random, but an end-oriented, one. It is oriented
towards life, to the formation of “more and more
complex—and more and more varied…organizations of
physical bodies.” As Ceniza (105) contends:
If Kelvin’s law were operative in the universe

from the Big Bang onwards, then it would have
been impossible for the material constituents of the
universe to form galaxies, solar systems, planetary
systems, and to have aggregated separate molecules
of different elements into unitary aggregates, and
then to have given rise to living things of higher
and higher degree of organization (in appropriate
cases, where conditions were favorable). The
elements and combinations of elements in the
universe, on the contrary, seem to be disposed
toward organization into more and more complex
forms, under appropriate conditions, rather than to
disorganization into simpler and simpler forms.
The Titus-Bode law on the proportionate distances of

the planets from the Sun is basically a correct view, says
Ceniza (105), that would indicate the possibility of life in
solar systems like ours in the universe. The relative distance
of the earth from the sun is just the right distance conducive
to the emergence of life and thinking beings, and the
probability is great that solar systems like ours (sun-like
with earth-like planets) can be found in the universe.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Rene Descartes distinguishes between mind and

matter. Prior to him, this problem was taken for granted
in that the mind (or soul) was the explanation and
solution to the problem of the existence of living things.
Non-living things are incapable of self-motion in that
they do not have minds. Many ancient people considered

even non-living things like air, fire, or breath as a life-
force. By the time of Galileo, these material life-forces
have been demythologized and ceased to be identified
with life.
Descartes identifies the essence of mind as thought
without extension while the essence of body is extension
without thought. The two are ontologically different. On
the basis of P1, we can conceive of the mind without the
body as in spirits or conceive of the body without the
mind as in automatons. Hence the mind and body are
contingent. The body follows the laws of nature while
the mind has the principle of self-motion. By applying
P2, “there can be no essential relation between them,”
that is, the relation is contingent or non-existent.
Descartes eventually thought that both interacted in the
pineal gland.
Philosophers who followed Descartes inherited this
problem. The materialist Hobbes reduced the mind to the
operations of the brain, Spinoza considered mind and body
as dual aspects of Nature and so consistently act together,
Leinitz believed that mind and body behaved separately but
consistently in a pre-established harmony, Berkeley reduced
the body as a mental fiction (whose existence depends upon
its being perceived), and so on. So far, there seems to be no
satisfactory solution on sight.
Ceniza (111-12) extends the issue to the problem as to
whether all things have minds, and concluded that so far, “it
can be argued…that everything has mental as well as physical
dimensions to its being.” Such was the “belief of the early
Greek hylozoists, including Parmenides.” Ceniza (116) says
that the solution to the problem of consciousness as
propounded by Aristotle in terms of matter and form “is
essentially correct.” For matter cannot have properties
without form and form cannot interact in the real world
without matter. Forms, or universals, do not interact and are
immutable. The ideas of Jose Rizal and of Andres
Bonifacio, for example, do not and cannot interact, but
both persons can interact and change ideas.
Consciousness is “awareness guided by interest”
and “one does not need to have a substantial [material]
self in order to be conscious.” As Ceniza (116) argues:
…a being, with specific or generalized interests,

which possess some memories, and which can
recognize objects and other objects more or less
like itself with which it comes in contact with,
or if it cannot recognize them at first, to be able
to recognize them; a being which can
communicate with others, which knows more
or less what it wants, which can get around its
environment with some degree of facility, which
can have some sort of attitude, for or against
the things and events around it, all of these are
indicators of consciousness; and if any being
we encounter exhibits them, then we can say
that it must be conscious, that it must be aware
of the objects that catch his interest. To be
conscious is to be aware of one’s surrounding
or environment, to be able to make some value
judgments about the things in it in relation to
one’s own interests and needs, to be able to make
distinctions and choices.
THE SELF
On the one hand, the self has a numerical identity,

which refers to the identity of the individual with itself.
Identical twins living in the same house have different
histories and different memory trains. Although the
numerical identities of things may generally have the
spatio-temporal continuity as criterion, for humans
“memory is perhaps the ultimate criterion, although for
ordinary cases, spatio-temporal continuity is often
regarded as adequate” (118). Assuming reincarnation is
true, then the continuity of memory is more basic than
spatio-temporal continuity “since clearly there is no
spatio-temporal continuity between the death of a
previous embodiment and the birth of the next.” For an
individual suffering from multiple personalities,
memory will not be sufficient since the person has many
memory trains exhibiting different characteristics and
so the spatio-temporal continuity is necessary for
identification of the individual. Ceniza (119) says that
we “may regard the numerical identity of a person as
his objective self,” the one as seen by others and as s/he

himself/herself “sees objectively as part of a community
of persons.”
On the other hand, there is the generic self which is
the “class or classes to which the person belongs” (120).
In this regard, one and the same person may be classified
as “a father, a citizen, a teacher, a Rotarian, a husband,
an adult, a workaholic, an employer, etc.” In most
instances, the person accepts these classifications and
behaves accordingly. These classifications are
significant for one’s self-identity and self-identification.
In a sense, this role-playing is a kind of function which
one can do in varying degrees of aptitude. Thus one can
be a good father to someone and a bad father to another.
Confucius argues that we all play roles in society. If we
do not play well, a “rectification of names” is necessary,
that is, that we either change the roles to ones we can
play best, or that we are ourselves replaced with others
(by those affected by our bad role-performance).
Ceniza (121-25) believes that there is one more type of
self that transcends the numerical and generic self, that is,
the transcendental self which one “identifies himself
completely or well-nigh completely.” This “transcendental
identity…gives meaning and purpose to his life, deep down.
It is that identity which one would like to live for, fight for,
and even die for.” It answers the question, “Who am I really?”
and the related questions, “What is man?” “What is the
purpose of life?” and “What is the highest good?” The answer
to these questions usually transcends or goes beyond his
numerical and generic self. It gives him an ethical direction.
It is “generally other-centered…[or] centered on what one
regards as his ultimate values.” It is the “search for one’s
Arché—the being or concept that would integrate his life.”
One who has found this Arché “is no longer in doubt about
who one truly is, and this enables one to proceed through
life with utmost certainty about his true telos.”
The transcendental self is intentional and relational, or
outward-oriented: “it is directed towards some basic interest
or value.” If one does not have an ultimate interest or value,
he is “like a moat floating in the wind…without
direction”; if he “has two or more incompatible interests
or values,” he is “practically torn within one’s self.”
Consciousness, according to Ceniza (122), “is

determined by one’s values and interests. Things that one
does not value are consigned to his periphery and are easily
forgotten since they are outside the range and scope of his
being. Paul Tillich, says Ceniza, considers one’s ultimate
concern as his god. He “identifies his innermost being with
what he regards as his god.” The ultimate concern, of course,
can be “money, or power, or country, or a spouse, or
whatever,” and when one loses his ultimate concern—when
one loses the meaning of his life—then the only way out
is to die, to commit suicide, for in essence he is
subjectively gone.
NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE
The universe is the Necessary Being, the Arché, which

is possibly thought or spoken (P1) and so thought or spoken.
But by whom? Since the Necessary Being is self-sufficient
and cannot be related to the contingent objects in the universe
itself, then Being itself must have thought itself, or that Being
is a self-thinking thought. This must be the reason why
Parmenides considers Being and Thinking as identical: “the
universe is a thought that thinks and realizes itself.” Aristotle
also thinks in this way when he says that the necessary being
is Pure Act, or Pure Form, or Pure Thought, or Pure Idea that
is separate from the material world which is a combination
of form and matter. Pure Act or pure existence is the ideal
which material objects try to approximate; hence, it is not
part of and does not interact with the world. Hegel is likewise
a neo-Parmenidean by adopting the view that “what is rational
is real and what is real is rational.” The universe and its
contents are not separate but form a logical whole. Ceniza
(127) expresses a type of Spinozistic determinism: the Arché
is “all powerful, since everything that happens in the world
happens because the happening is part and parcel of its own
being. Nothing can happen otherwise.” In Arché’s context,
“all things that are, are good,” and beautiful and orderly since
there is “perfect symmetry,” which “is a common attribute
of the true, the good and the beautiful.” While not interacting
with the parts of the world, the Arché enters the world in
terms of morality and holiness “through the emergent rational
structure of humans and similar beings.”
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Tradition in Contemporary Metaphysics
Traditional or classical metaphysics attempts to unify

all the diversities observable in the world. Metaphysics is
the First Philosophy of the ancient Greeks as they discussed
the other traditional branches of philosophy (ethics,
aesthetics, epistemology, politics, natural philosophy,
logic) in relation to it. Modern philosophy in the hands
of Descartes made epistemology the First Philosophy
and metaphysics became secondary. Descartes was
primarily interested in searching for an “indubitable fact”
that cannot be subjected to skeptical doubt.
Epistemology through the cogito was his foundation in
constructing his metaphysics. Then followed the
epistemological debates between the rationalists and
empiricists that eventually ended in Kant’s attempt to
reconcile both camps. After Kant, however, the attitude
of skepticism continued. Post-Kantian philosophy split
once again into the logical and positivistic attitude of
John Stuart Mill and the idealistic, humanistic attitude
of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. And once again, the attempt
to reconcile both attitudes by means of an encompassing
metaphysics that incorporate a logic of history called
the Hegelian dialectics was formulated. For a while, this
worked. But the skeptical quest for epistemic truth and
existential significance came to fore again.
Russell and Moore were young Hegelians when they
eventually rejected Hegelianism and declared that we can
know only little truths and not the whole truth. Russell in
particular rejected the Hegelian dialectics as not
representative of how human minds think, and helped in
mapping out the foundations of modern (symbolic) logic.
He introduced a philosophical method that he called logical
analysis. Moore, on the other hand, believed that our common
sense metaphysical beliefs could be discerned in ordinary
language. Both Russell and Moore founded what is now
known in contemporary philosophy as the analytic tradition.
Russell, of course, was influenced by Frege and others.5
While listening to a lecture on Hegelian ideas,
Kierkegaard made up his mind that in the “I-We” dichotomy,
the individual’s interests are primary and the individual

must not be sacrificed for the interests of the state or the
collective. He considered the “I” as the truth while the
“We” as the untruth. Kierkegaard started a sustained
polemic against the collective and for the significance
of the individual’s life. For this reason, he is considered
the father of existentialism or what is now known in
contemporary philosophy as the continental tradition.
Meanwhile, Bacon’s inductive method, once perfected,
enabled some branches of philosophy to become independent
sciences through the verification process. With the influence
of Hume and the early Wittgenstein, the logical positivists
capitalized on the principle of verifiability and rejected
metaphysical constatives as incapable of being rendered true
or false. Truth and falsity are the major components of
cognitive meaningfulness. Carnap, in particular, considered
metaphysics as simply an expression of preferences or
emotions and must be relegated to the arts such as lyrical
verses. There is a tacit acceptance that eventually science can
solve the problems of metaphysics. So the function of logical
analysis for Carnap will only be the clarification of the
meaning of the language used by the scientist and the ordinary
man. The linguistic turn of the early phase of analytic
philosophy is said to have ended with the later Wittgenstein
who maintained that philosophical puzzles are errors of
language which when clarified will simply dissolve. There
are only a few genuine philosophical problems, according to
Wittgenstein, which can be tackled seriously such as the
problem of other minds, freedom and determinism, and the
like, and may soon be given philosophical solutions. The
second phase of the analytic tradition began with Austin who
extended Wittgenstein’s “use theory of meaning,” that applies
to words or phrases, to the theory of speech acts, which applies
to meanings of sentences. From here, it is only a step towards
the Philosophy of Mind, which is considered today as the
First Philosophy in the analytic tradition, since some
utterances are not mere speech acts but have references to
beliefs and attitudes which have a bearing on the psyche
(Searle 1999: 16; see also Searle on consciousness in the
Internet).
The belief that science can ultimately offer solutions
to ontological problems resulted in different reactions
to Jaspers and Heidegger. Jaspers says that subjectivity

is the subject matter of philosophy and not objectivity,
which is the subject matter of science. Heidegger (1996:
7-12), on the other hand, argues that the whole approach
of traditional metaphysics is a mistake since it focuses
on ontic issues or questions about categories of substance
rather than on genuine ontological issues or questions
about categories of human existence. The first phase of
continental philosophy (existentialism, phenomenology,
hermeneutics) is said to have ended with Heidegger
(Pinkard 2001: 191). The second phase of continental
philosophy began as the cultural dimension of the onset
of the post-industrial or post-capitalist society, in what
is known as postmodernism—a set of philosophical
cultural currents such as anti-foundationalism, post-
structuralism, incredulity to metanarratives, post-
Marxism, heterologies, etc.
Beneath these two traditions are two other philosophical
currents: neopragmatism and process thought. In the history
of contemporary philosophy, pragmatism (emphasis on logic
and life) is the bridging mechanism of the early phases of
analytic (emphasis on logic) and continental (emphasis on
life) philosophical traditions. Rorty’s neopragmatism is
considered both post-analytic and post-postmodernist (at best
late-postmodernist). Neopragmatists are described as “beter
postmodernists than many so-called postmoderns because
[they] wanted to understand both universality and
particularity, identity and difference, wholeness and
fragmentation” (Ozmon and Craver 1999: 360).
Neopragmatism basically attempts to bridge the gap between
traditional and nontraditional philosophy, and in that sense
the neopragmatists are labeled as ecumenical philosophers
or “ecumenists” (Engel 1999: 224).
Whitehead’s process philosophy is the other current. It
is different from the “descriptive metaphysics” (Strawson
1963; Moore 1953) of the analytic tradition. Process
philosophy tries to understand the totality of the universe on
the basis of the incomplete findings of the sciences,
particularly modern physics. Though Russell (1945: 833; see
Gripaldo 1971), through logical analysis, has arrived at
his “neutral monism” by trying to reconcile the
paradoxical positions of physics (matter is less and less
material) and physiological psychology (mind is less and

less mental), Whitehead offers a more comprehensive
description of the totality of the cosmos than Russell. It
is in this Whiteheadean tradition that Ceniza offers his
metaphysical excursions. In Whitehead (1969),
Chandler (2001), and Ceniza, there is a continuation of
traditional (non-Heideggerian and non-analytic)
metaphysics aided by the sciences, especially theoretical
physics.
Existence
It is interesting that Ceniza’s concept of existence is

not one out of nothing (empty space) which for Parmenides
does not exist (not a something) but one out of a plenum,
which is a neutral state, being the zero summation of all
there is as the color white is the plenum of all colors, the
number zero is the plenum of all negative and positive
numbers, etc. In a sense, everything that exists simply stands
out from the plenum which has been there, subsisting, all
along. In the color gray, for example, which stands out in
tints, subsist the colors white and black.
The other meaning of “standing out” or existence, for
Ceniza, is “making a difference.” This definition is something
essentially empirical or observational. Ceniza’s concept of
existence is similar to the existential definition of existence
where the contingent world is there and the human being is
“thrown into the world” to make a difference, that is, to create
or develop his/her own essence. It is like one being thrown
into the sea to drown (to be nothing) or to learn to swim (to
be something, to make a difference whatever that may
be). To just biologically exist is not to truly live, and in a
world of non-authentic existence where one does not
stand out, the person simply subsists.
Ceniza’s concept of existence also applies to
universals in that they are pure ideas: they do not exist
in a separate World of Ideas as in Plato’s metaphysics.
They have an ideal existence—not real existence in the
real world—although they certainly are thinkable,
speakable, and possible, that is, they make a difference
to possible objects and they add up to our wealth of ideas.
In a sense, therefore, ideal existence is somewhere

between Plato’s World of Ideas and the nominalists’ puffs
of air (just words): they are logical possibilities and as
such they are conceivable. They exist in virtue of their
conceivability. But can we not posit here a Realm of
Possibilities that includes logical possibilities? There
seems to be no logical contradiction is such a realm, but
the most that can be said about it is that it subsists in the
real world. Contents of it will exist only when they are
thought (conceived) or when they become real
properties of things in the real world in that they add to
the wealth of our experience.
The Parmenidean postulates and corollaries, by
double negation, make a contingent object or world
existent (a something rather than nothing). His offered
solution—which reveals his epistemic bias—is
observationally empirical, that is to say, what links this
double negation to—or what obliterates the contradiction
involved in—a contingent entity is, for Ceniza, the
reason, or cause, or explanation for our experiencing
them. Although he relies on “cause” all throughout his
book, Ceniza takes it as the reason (logos) or explanation
for the being of a thing.
Space-Time
We might think that the linking of space and time into

space-time will not make a difference in the metaphysical
perspective of the universe. In the traditional perspective,
time is infinite and the universe is in time. The linkage of
space-time and the rejection of Euclidean geometry in
modern physics result in the view that space-time is in
the universe. While space-time is reversible, it is finite
though boundless. There is still to me the problem
between phenomenological time and real time which
Ceniza, to my mind, has not sufficiently explained. The
former is our experience of time, the one referred to by
Immanuel Kant as a form of sensuous intuition. The latter
is the measure of “before and after,” the time we see in
our watches and clocks. According to Henri Bergson,
we intuit phenomenological time but we intellectually
grasp real time, which is an abstraction of the former.

Even if we combine space and time as space-time, space-
time will still be a form of sensuous intuition. Without
the person, there will be no experience of space-time.
There might be undifferentiated motion or change taking
place in the universe, but there will be no experience
and measure of the four coordinates of space-time unless
we posit the existence of the person.
The universe is a vast expanse while the person is
infinitesimally a finite being. Under certain conditions, any
part of the universe is his past or future. It is in this sense
that we can say space-time is in the universe. One may stand
in a classroom and looks back at the door. S/he knows
that behind the door a moment ago before s/he entered
the room was his/her past and in a short while behind
the door when s/he goes out will be his/her future. But
the experience of the past and future will always be a
present phenomenological experience of space-time. A
person’s past is in his/her memory while the future is
something s/he anticipates or looks forward to. Is space-
time reversible? It seems to me abstractly that it is, but
the experience of space-time is always
phenomenological and irreversible.6
The Arché
The idea of horizontal and vertical causality enables us

to better understand the idea of the First Cause. If contingent
entities cannot exist because they involve internal
contradictions, then they must have causes, but these causes
themselves must be contingent unless each one of them will
have a unifying cause that stands by itself as necessary. But
then the search for such a unifying cause cannot be achieved
horizontally. We must find it vertically, that is, behind the
horizontal causes must exist one vertical cause that will unify
them and which is necessary. That necessary cause is the
First Cause. This is the Arché, or some would say, God. In
addition to the causal or cosmological argument, Ceniza
presented other arguments to justify the existence of the
Arché: ontological, moral, etc.
Ceniza believes that the whole universe is itself the
Arché which contains multiple subuniverses. He grants

that there might be other universes with different Archés
distinctly separate and non-interacting with each other.
But he entertains the possibility that there is only one
Arché.
This one Arché, for Ceniza, is the plenum of all that
there is. James Jeans (1966: 383) pictures this plenum as a
field of force similar to a “deep-flowing stream” where there
are many activities such as eddies and bubbles, etc.
Whitehead (1959: 240-41) calls this as the field of constant
flux. Russell’s “neutral monism” refers to this Arché as
neither mental nor material, while Chandler (2001; see
Gripaldo 2002) refers to it as Cosmic Consciousness or
Cosmic Mind. Ceniza’s rendering of the Arché is much closer
to Chandler’s in that he thinks it is a “self-thinking thought,”
a type of hylozoism that dates back to the ancient Greeks,
including Parmenides, and epitomized in Aristotle’s work
which considers the First Cause as Pure Form or Pure
Thought. This Arché appears to be the metaphysical
expression of what in science is the superstrings theory (see
Schwartz 1997:1-16).
What is significant in Ceniza’s work is his attempt to
reconcile the apparent indifferent Being (“The One” or the
“It is”) of Parmenides and the contingent world of change of
Heraclitus. Where Parmenides failed to connect Being with
beings and where Heraclitus likewise failed to connect beings
with Being, Ceniza, to my mind, has succeeded in connecting
the two aspects of the universe.
The Self
Chandler says that the relationship between Cosmic

Mind and the individual self is similar to the Brahman-Atman
relationship. Ceniza also says that the Arché is similar to the
Brahman of Hinduism. In that case, the self or soul for Ceniza
is similar to Atman.
In the problem of identity, Ceniza presents a triad picture
of the self: generic, which situates the self in the hierarchy
of classes; numerical, which enables the individual to change
while at the same time somehow remaining the same; and
transcendental, which identifies with the ultimate
value(s) that the individual considers worth living for,

fighting for, or even dying for. Transcendental identity is
the type of self that one wants to be as s/he interacts with
things and people in the world. This view of the self, I think,
is comprehensive and completely accounts for the self as
empirically observed in the world. As to the spiritual nature
of the self, it is obvious that for Ceniza the self goes back to
the Arché where it belongs, i.e., when its embodiment is
gone.
CONCLUSION
Ceniza (1997-98: 70-93) is known in the Philippines

for connecting probability and logic in reasoning. His
tradition is the continuation of the type of philosophy which
dates back to the ancient Greeks where both metaphysics
and logic coexist and not necessarily in conflict with each
other. He belongs to the tradition in contemporary
philosophy that Alfred North Whitehead started in that
Whitehead is known for his collaboration with Russell in
writing a logical set of works, Principia mathematica
(1964), and for writing a metaphysical tract, Process and
reality (1969). Analytic philosophers reject metaphysics as
something grand, which is unverifiable for its alleged claim
of truth, as against small truths as reflected in constatives
that are verifiably known as true or false. Continental
philosophers likewise reject traditional metaphysics either
because it searches for substantial Being rather than for
existential Being, or simply because it is a grandiose
metanarrative rather than the down-to-earth petit narratives
of generally the marginalized. But in addition, continental
philosophers reject the method of logical analysis itself for
its epistemic bias at hairsplitting or language-chopping as
to what can be known or what can be meant which, according
to them, are insignificant to what matters most in life; viz.,
the meaning of one’s own existence.
But there is one important aspect in the Whiteheadean
metaphysical tradition which both Chandler and Ceniza
followed: the reliance on the results of modern science,
especially theoretical physics. While the ancient Greeks did
not have the benefit of modern scientific reasoning, they
relied heavily on what was empirically known at the time
(the “crude science” they had then) to construct their

metaphysical tracts. The marriage, so to speak, between
philosophy and science (see Whitehead 1966), which the
ancient Greeks began crudely, is very much alive today in
contemporary traditional metaphysicians who believe that
the meaning of one’s existence cannot be divorced from the
meaning of where one substantially comes from, that is, his/
her substantial origin. In Ceniza we find the hope that the
gap between substantial meaning and existential meaning
can be bridged.
REFERENCES
Boslough, John. 1989. Stephen Hawking’s universe. New

York: Avon Books.
Ceniza, Claro R. 2001. Thought, necessity and existence:
Metaphysics and epistemology for lay philosophers.
Manila: De La Salle University Press.
__________. 2003. Parmenides’ ontological argument.
Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (2).
__________, Jose Ramon G. Albert, and Joseph E. Martire.
1997-98. Probability logic: An introductory paper towards
a merging of logic and probability. Σοφια: International
Journal of Philosophy 27 (1).
Chandler, Keith. 2001. The mind paradigm. San Jose:
Authors Choice Press.
Copleston, Frederick. 1965. Contemporary philosophy:
Studies of logical positivism and existentialism. London:
Burns and Oates.
Engel, Pascal. 1999. Analytic philosophy and cognitive
norms. The Monist 82 (2).
Gripaldo, Rolando. 1971. The soul and Bertrand Russell.
Philippines Free Press, 10 April.
__________. 2002. Review of Keith A. Chandler’s The mind
paradigm: A unified model of mental and physical reality.
Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (2).
Hawking, Stephen W. 1989. A brief history of time from the
Big Bang to black holes. New York: Bantam Books.
Heidegger, Martin. 1996. Being and time. Translated by
Joan Stambaugh. New York: State University of New
York Press.
Jeans, James. 1966. Some problems of philosophy. In

Man & the universe: The philosophers of science. New
York: Washington Square Press.
Kirk, J. S. and J. E. Raven. 1969. Pre-Socratic philosophers.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moore, G. E. 1953. Some main problems of philosophy.
London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.
Ozmon, Howard A. and Samuel M. Craver. 1999.
Philosophical foundations of education. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Pinkard, Terry. 2001. Analytics, continentals, and modern
skepticism. The Monist 82 (2).
Russell, Bertrand. 1962. What is the soul? In In praise of
idleness. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc.
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York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.
__________ and Alfred North Whitehead. 1964. Principia
mathematica. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, John H. 1997. Recent developments in
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gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid+19640>. Accessed: 29
January 2004.
Searle, John R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind.
Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
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future_of_philosophy.rtf>. Accessed: 12 January 2004.
__________. N.d. The problem of consciousness. <http://
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metaphysics. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
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Ceniza The Neo Parmenidean A Critical An

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CENIZA THE NEO-PARMENIDEAN 1

[This slightly revised paper (2015) is Chapter 3 of my book,

C ENIZA THE N EO -P ARMENIDEAN :

This paper attempts to reconcile Parmenides

The logical trajectory of traditional philosophy from

consciousness (Searle 1999: 12-19; 2004: 1-7; 1992: 127-

In fragment 6 of his philosophical poem, “The way of

P1. What can be thought or spoken is possible, and

By using hypothetical syllogism, a theorem—or

T1. What can be thought or spoken is, and what is

Obviously, these three constatives cannot be true

C1. What can be thought or spoken not-to-be is

C2. What is possible not-to-be is not, and what is-

The corrolary of T1 is:

CT1. What can be thought or spoken not-to-be is

I can, for example, think that I do not have a million

In Section 7, Ceniza (13) tries to clarify the

…what is possible is that which can be thought

In what way are these modal concepts related to each

another entity which is incompossible with it (red and green

EXISTENCE OF CONTINGENT OBJECTS

A contingent entity, says Ceniza (19), involves a

include elevated grounds and roofs of houses; in (iii)

The cause (say A) implies the event or thing in

minuscule” (26). Events may be observed to occur without

VERTICAL CAUSALITY: THE ARCHÉ

Causality in time is horizontal causality which looks

join up, like so many tributaries of a river, with the

The vertical search for the Final Cause which unifies

GENERAL CRITERION FOR EXISTENCE

Ceniza introduces a third postulate which is non-

P3. What exists makes a difference, and what makes

Parmenides rejects this thesis in that a difference is some

To make a difference, it is essential that the entity

explained shortly) affects something else in a

There are two levels of existence. First is the existence

Second is the existence of “something real in the

…the original colors subsist in white. They subsist

This neutral state in colors, white, is likewise

indiscernibility of identicals, (2) the principle of

NUMERICAL IDENTITY: REFERENT OF CAUSALITY

Ceniza distinguishes between generic and numerical

common. Two persons, from the viewpoint of their humanity,

The tree I now see before me is numerically

Is numerical identity possible? Is not the world a series

GENERIC IDENTITY AND UNIVERSALS

Universals have ideal existence. They are ideas which

generality. They exist as logical possibilities, that is, they

Not all universals are generic, there are also

possibilities…but on concrete objects existing

Existence in the Real World

For a thing to exist in the real world, it must have interactive

How do we arrive at the Arché? By arguing from

which is the One Being or Arché. This type of arguing is

…every contingent event or entity must have a

Since Parmenides starts with Necessary Being, it

Is there purpose in the universe? Does it have an end? If

thinks there is orderliness in the universe and it is

Ceniza links knowing to what he calls

To know anything at all is to know that it is

Since “knowledge presupposes some kind of ordering

“Nothing” or “Non-being” as used in philosophy has