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“On the Economic State of the Latin American Project”

Working Paper

Key Words: Regionalism, Regionalization, Globalization, Economic Integration, Latin America.

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ACRONYM GUIDE

NRT- New Regionalism Theory

CELAC- Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
FDI- Foreign Direct Investment
IADB- Inter-American Development Bank
RTR-regional trade ratio
UNASUR- Union of South American and Caribbean Nations
PTA-Preferential Trade Agreement
AU-African Union
BTA- Bilateral Trade Agreement
FTA-Free Trade Agreement
MTA- Multilateral Trade Agreement
EU-European Union
LAP-the Latin American Project
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement
CAFTA-DR-Central American Free Trade Agreement
ALBA-TCP (ALBA)- Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
WTO- World Trade Organization
IMF-International Monetary Fund
IPE- International Political Economy
EIA- Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
EMU-Economic and Monetary Union
EC-European Community

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Globalization is an intricate, multidimensional process of increasing political,

economic and social integration catalyzed by states’ and non-state-actors’ collaborative efforts.
While it is not a modern phenomenon, in the wake of the 1980s communications and technology
revolution, it gained significant traction from academics and public policy practitioners alike.
However, while the world is arguably becoming increasingly globalized, it is simultaneously
becoming progressively regionalized as well. From the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), to the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR), and the recently formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC), the quantity of regional trade agreements has exploded over the past three
decades. While regional coordination efforts certainly extend beyond the realms of economics
and trade to the social as well as the political, this present article focuses primarily on the latter,
for it appears as though present literature may be overlooking it. By applying Berg’s (2008,
2011) economic model, the regional trade ratio (RTR,) to contemporary data from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) it analyzes the extent to which Latin America can be
considered a well-integrated economic region. In doing so, I aim to bring an important aspect of
the regionalization process back into the discussion, and to posit that perhaps the situation is not
as bleak as it has been made out to be.
Section II starts by reviewing the prevailing literature on the scope, definition, and
significance of regionalism. Section III then focuses on the evolving wave of so-called post-
liberal regionalism in Latin America, and highlights the political overtones which academic
studies have been embracing. Section IV then aggregates and analyzes data on directional trade
flows from 2007-2010 between Latin American states in order to assess the extent to which an
integrated regional Latin American economy exists; and Section V concludes by discussing the
implications of the findings for the broader International Political Economy literature on
regionalism, and by offering a number of suggestions for further research on the topic.

II. Theory

In a literature review on the progress made in defining scope of regionalism, Mansfield

(2010) references no fewer than twenty-two distinct conceptualizations of what it embodies. This
is not a matter of scholastic ambiguity, but rather an inevitable byproduct of the fact that
regionalism is an immensely volatile and transformative process; not a static metric that can be
easily pinpointed, quantified, and confined to a definition1. In studying regionalism, one is
actually observing the ebb-and-flow of sovereign states’ attempts to implement and sustain
collaborative public policies; therefore the lack of consensus on its definition should not be
disconcerting. Nor should it be surprising that the approaches taken towards developing a
regional space also oscillate between emphasizing the political over the economic, and vice-
versa. Regionalism is a fluid process. It is heavily influenced by endogenous domestic factors, as
well as by exogenous ones in the geo-political economy. The approach policymakers take
towards achieving it, and the ways in which it is manifested, invariably fluctuate in response to
the changing domestic and international environments. The difficult task then, is for observers to
be cognizant of its complex, fluid, and multidimensional features, so as not to approach it
through too narrow a critical lens. If one fails to simultaneously consider the political, economic,
and social breadth of the process, then it is significantly more likely that their analysis will fall-
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short.
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Regional coordination efforts date back to the post-World War II era and the Bretton
Woods plan for structuring a new global economy. While countries’ approaches towards regional
collaboration have evolved alongside the domestic and international environments, a number of
seminal reasons to engage in this strategic combination of foreign and domestic policy have
transcended time. First, countries often collude with geographically contiguous sovereigns in
order to take advantage of the benefits presented by global economic integration, while
concurrently hedging against the inevitable risk and uncertainty that accompanies it (De la Mora
2011; Hurrell 1992; “IADB” 2002; Lairson and Skidmore 2003). Second, many developing and
emerging economies use coordination as a domestic development strategy. Increasing political,
economic, and social ties with surrounding countries establishes larger markets which can then
lead to increasing economies of scale, can allow countries to better develop their comparative
advantages, and can provide smaller domestic companies with export experience in a less
volatile market (Venables 2003; Lairson and Skidmore 2003; Gardini “Trading Blocs” 2011).
Third, developing and emerging economies are progressively using regionalism as a strategy for
increasing their global competitiveness (Lairson and Skidmore 295; Hurrell 126); for as Gardini
points out: “negotiating as a bloc is much better than negotiating as an individual country”
(Trading Blocs 114).
The surge in regional-policy-coordination throughout Latin America (and the world)
can be equated to four developments within the past two decades. First, with the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, Latin American states feared that they would become economically marginalized
as the United States and Western Europe turned their attention towards the former Soviet-
satellite states. This led to many Latin American states attempting to develop a more integrated
regional space in the early 1990s (Hurrell 1992). Second, another wave of regionalist-fervor
swept through Latin America in the beginning of the new millennium as the United States
focused its energy and attention eastward towards China and the Middle East (Sanahuja 2012).
Sanahuja attributes this increased focus on regional cooperation in Latin America to both a
defensive-strategy, as well as a byproduct of increased room for political maneuvering as the
United States’ attention continued to drift elsewhere (6). Third, the gridlock in multilateral trade
negotiations that has resulted from developed-countries’ delegates’ failure to fulfill their
commitments to further liberalization during the WTO’s Doha Round, has led many developing
countries to consider regional strategies in order to realize more immediate economic gains from
increasing levels of trade. And fourth, the lack of tangible social returns that the so-called
Washington Consensus had promised to produce by the new-millennium has since resulted in
many countries focusing their efforts at the regional-level (Robert 2007).

III. ‘Post-Liberal Regionalism’ & The Latin American Project

This ‘nueva ola’ of rhetoric-charged, post-liberal regionalism in Latin America, dates

back to 2005 and includes the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples’
Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the recently
formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). While it is presently
unclear whether or not they are competing, cooperating, or collaborating in the broader region-
building process, it is clear that a consensus has been reached on a number of points: (1) the
importance of regional autonomy from the United States, (2) the implementation of socially-
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conscientious, market-driven economic growth strategies, (3) non-proliferation, and (4) the
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importance of continuing to advance region-wide social, political, and economic collaboration

(Ersing 2012).
In what might be a result of the substantial rhetoric surrounding this wave of post-liberal
regionalism, the large majority of recently published academic articles focus nearly exclusively
on the processes’ political and structural-institutional dynamics. (See, Gardini 2011; Kaspar
2011; De la Mora 2011; Riggirozzi 2010; Sanahuja 2012; Serbin 2011) Observers have nearly
ceased analyzing the economic component in recent years; one goes so far as to argue that:
“neither [UNASUR nor CELAC] could be considered an integration initiative in the standard
meaning of this term…None come close to, nor try to adapt to, the traditional economic
integration stages or taxonomies” (Sanahuja 2012: 7). While critics are correct in that that
UNASUR, CELAC, and ALBA-TCP are “overtly rejecting neoliberal economics” (Gardini
2011), are re-invigorating nationalist or ‘Bolivarian’ sentiments (Riggirozzi 2010; Sanahuja
2012), and are emphasizing the political over the economic (De la Mora 2011; Serbin 2011), the
extent to which the literature has been so quick to overlook the positive advances is rather
disheartening.
For instance, Gardini (2011) critiques the fact that in the post-liberal region-building
process, politics is taking central stage over economics rather than complementing it; however,
in looking for a contemporary analysis of Latin American economic integration I only found
studies using data up until the year 2007 (See, Berg 2011). In this analysis, Berg reported some
fairly optimistic findings on the level of Latin American economic regionalism at that time, but
no known study has looked at what has transpired since the 2008 global economic crisis
occurred. It is plausible that despite the recent political approach or agenda, significant gains
have been made on the economic front, for “the regionalization process can be intentional or
non-intentional, and may proceed unevenly along the various dimensions” (Hettne 1999: 39).
Given the recent trend towards an acutely focused analysis of the Latin American project, it
might be useful to reflect on Hettne’s original conceptualization of regionalism as an open-
process that can only be defined postfactum; as on his astute observations that “there are
different forms of regionness in different regions” (1999: 39).
It is undeniable that this wave of post-liberal regionalism in Latin America is not
following an orthodox Western progression, but I struggle to comprehend how in the wake of
China’s meteoric rise, critics continue to so quickly doubt the merits of alternative development
strategies emerging within alternative value systems. While the region’s integration may not be
progressing as efficiently as one would hope, I fear that the positive strides that are being made
are going largely un-recognized; I have found but one observer with a minutely optimistic
outlook on the recent developments: “[There appears to be] a long term trend towards potential
convergence, especially if CELAC moves on” (Tussie 2009 169). That was three years ago;
CELAC has since ‘moved on’, and the global political economy has improved tremendously.
Given Berg’s findings on the level of regional economic integration as of 2007, and the fact that
there are no known more-contemporary analyses of it, the remainder of this paper is devoted to
applying Berg’s regional trade ratio (RTR) model to data from 2007-2010.

IV. Analyzing Latin America’s Level of Economic Integration

In attempting to measure the extent to which a geographic space is economically

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integrated standard theory posits that one should look at the level of intra-regional trade in goods
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and services, financial asset holdings, and intra-regional foreign direct investment levels
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(Capanneli 2008). However due to contemporary data’s limited public availability, it is often
difficult to evaluate each of the specified variables, so “many researchers focus on trade in goods
and services to gauge economic integration among economies” (Berg 2011: 300). Having
encountered that precise problem in my research, I have narrowed the scope to focus on intra-and
extra-regional trade flows using Berg’s (2008, 2011) regional trade ratio (RTR) in the analysis. I
have chosen this model for multiple reasons. First, because it corrects for the bias which the
relative size of the regional economy has on the results produced by the standard ‘intra-regional
trade share’ calculation (Berg 302). Second, because it mitigates the bias of the number of
economies outside the region; and third, because it has been demonstrated to produce robust and
reliable results (Berg 302).
In applying the RTR to data collected from the 2007 International Monetary Fund
Direction of Trade Statistics, Berg (2011: 308,309) found a particularly high level of regional
economic integration for Latin America excluding Mexico [2.921], and a moderate level of
regional integration for Latin America including Mexico [1.487]2. While the results of this study
were published in 2011, the analysis extends to data only so far as 2007. In what follows, I
expand on his findings by applying his RTR to data for the years 2007-2010. In light of
CELAC’s and UNASUR’s politically-focused agenda and contemporary literature’s focus on
post-liberal regionalism as a politically-driven movement, little related scholarship has
addressed the latest economic developments of this dynamic process. My aim is to gain further
insight into this economic-side of the ongoing Latin American regional integration project, in
order to develop a more comprehensive picture of the present state of regional integration in its
entirety. But first we must deconstruct the underlying economic model.

Modeling the Regional Trade Ratio (RTR)

Berg’s regional trade ratio can be written in its simplified form as,

GHG%J+H%%KH%7/K+LEKL7/C**

where RTRr is the computed regional trade ratio for the specified region-R, Trr is equal to the
value of all trade occurring within region-R (the aggregation of each country’s exports to other
countries in region-R, plus the aggregation of each country’s imports from other countries in
region-R), Trw is equal to region-R’s total trade with the world, Yr is region-R’s aggregate GDP,
and where Yw is the world’s aggregate GDP (2011:308). Expressed in its expanded formal
model, the RTRr is specified as follows:

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where Txz is country-x’s exports to and imports from country-z, given that x and z are countries
within Latin America (region-R), and that x!z. Where Txw is country-x’s exports to and imports
from the world, and where ‘world’ excludes country-x from its calculations. Where Yx is
country-x’s aggregate GDP, Yw is the world’s aggregate GDP, and all calculations are done for a
specified year.
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Berg then divides the ‘intraregional-trade calculation’ ("x"zTxz) by 2 in order to avoid

double-counting figures as both an export and an import. He then divides the total ‘intra-regional
trade’ ("x"zTxz) by the region’s ‘total trade with the world’ ("xTxw-"x"zTxz÷2); and once
again divides this result by 2 so as to avoid double counting. He points out that “this avoidance
of double counting of regional trade is peculiar to the RTR, based on its regional perspective”
(Berg 2011: 309) . I follow the same procedures in completing my calculations.
Table 1 illustrates the results of my calculations. The RTRr calculated for 2007 in this
present study, produced exactly the same findings as Berg’s 2007 calculation
[RTRr(2007)=1.48]. This baseline comparison informs us that the model is accurately being used
within this study, and that the differing data sources and country-set have had no impact on the
resultsi. Moving beyond the baseline-comparison, we find that the calculated RTRr decreased
substantially to 1.02 in 2008 as the international financial crisis hit, but then bounced-back in
2009 to 1.69, a significant increase even over pre-recession levels. And in a most encouraging
movement, in 2010 it soared +0.84 to 2.53, a 49.61 percent increase over the 2009 RTRr. While
time-constraints have prohibited me from furthering this study’s robustness through a
comparison of non-Latin American RTRs, we can begin to better contextualize the results by
noting that North America’s3 RTR for 2007 was calculated at 1.142 (Berg 2011: 308).
These findings demonstrate that Latin American economic integration is undoubtedly
increasing; that despite the many pessimistic perspectives on the region’s progression, there is
some cause for optimism. Simply because Latin America’s approach towards region-building has
largely rejected neoliberal economics, has taken on a more political-dimension, and has yet to
produce the desired political results, does not mean that there have not been positive strides
made. Rather, it could be speculated that in gaining more autonomy from the United States, and
in rejecting the Washington Consensus for its own development strategy, the region is finally
beginning to find its own way.
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V. Concluding Remarks

In today’s interconnected international political economy, the search for policy

measures that can more effectively manage the increasingly complex process of global
integration is tremendously important for a state’s survival. Regional coordination, though
certainly not a panacea solution, is certainly contributing to sovereign states’ ability to mitigate
the negative consequences of global integration, while harnessing the potential benefits.
However, it is immensely intricate, and by deconstructing what must be holistically approached
as a complex and fluid process with many variables, into a dichotomized and acute focus on
either the political or the economic, one stands the increasing chance of failing to see the much
broader events which are slowly transpiring.
Even if her critics are proven right, and Latin America fails to fully capitalize on the
political projects which are presently underway, the relatively high level of regional economic
integration is by itself, a reason for increasing optimism. High levels of economic integration
between neighboring sovereigns as part of a regional space must not be underestimated. The
benefits go well beyond increasing levels of trade, and have been shown to result in, or to
contribute to: increased government accountability and administrative transparency (Mansfield
2010); increased regional security and political cooperation, or decreased armed conflicts
between sovereigns (Mansfield 2010; Weisbrot 2010; “IADB” 2002); and the perpetuation of
further political commitments to economic liberalization (Venables 2003; “IADB” 2002).

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WORKS CITED

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—."Does Latin America Comprise Transnational 'Subregions'?" The World Economy

(2011): 298-312.

De la Mora, Luz Maria and Rodriguez, Dora. “Why is it Worth Rethinking Latin American
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Devlin, Robert and Estevadeordal, Antoni Eds. "Bridges for Development Policies and
Institutions for Trade and Integration". Inter-American Development Bank (2003):1-255

—.Venables, Anthony J. "Chapter 3 Regionalism and Economic Development": 51-75

Ersing,B.A. “Complementing, Competing, or Converging? CELAC & The Latin American

Project”. Washington & Lee University, Undergraduate Capstone, Working Paper #1, May
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—. "Many Americas: Too many Solutions?" Regional Readings of Global

Order/Disorder: European and Western Hemisphere Perspectives. Bath, UK, March 2011. 1-7.

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“IMF”, International Monetary Fund. Data and Statistics, Updated April 11, 2012.
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Laisron, Thomas D. and Skidmore, David. “International Political Economy the Struggle for
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Mansfield, Edward D. and Etel Solingen. "Regionalism." Annual Review of Political Science
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American States Online, (2007) Accessed:< www.oas.org> 8 Feb.- 2012.

Sanahuja, Jose Antonio. "Post-Liberal Regionalism in South America: The Case of UNASUR".
European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Papers.
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Tussie, Diana. "Latin America: contrasting motivations for regional projects." Review of
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APPENDIX

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!"#$ ABCB ABBD ABBE ABBF

Country !"#$%&' ()*#$%&' (!"#$%&' )*#$%&' (!"#$%&' ()*#$%&' !"#$%&' ()*#$%&'
ARGENTINA 68,132,647 56,488,503 55,667,474 38,768,092 70,018,744 57,409,532 55,778,392 44,706,156
BARBADOS 313,379 1,195,759 322,438 1,340,355 453,911 1,745,637 313,815 1,298,319
BELIZE 337,949 705,162 255,667 664,817 304,654 836,891 265,613 683,909
BOLIVIA 6,872,778 5,336,069 5,332,566 4,441,058 6,840,679 4,958,799 4,860,195 3,455,811
BRAZIL 201,913,240 181,647,374 152,992,509 127,703,747 197,940,378 173,195,240 160,259,916 126,654,326
CHILE 0 0 51,892,910 38,180,596 69,086,910 56,616,753 65,739,268 42,741,330
COLOMBIA 39,818,767 40,680,934 32,852,202 32,810,149 37,625,039 39,611,318 30,010,763 33,043,662
COSTA RICA 9,270,886 13,438,801 8,533,282 11,284,425 9,378,805 15,156,781 8,927,461 12,755,990
DOMINICA 35,598 214,034 0 0 39,949 231,820 36,781 195,155
ECUADOR 17,489,597 20,590,112 13,686,264 15,089,264 18,510,313 18,580,166 13,799,995 13,492,550
EL SALVADOR 3,364,643 7,744,275 2,309,770 6,414,726 2,620,560 8,471,839 2,178,516 7,438,478
GRENADA 0 0 0 0 30,201 376,574 0 0
GUATEMALA 5,811,557 12,029,901 4,997,998 10,074,699 5,376,021 12,838,247 4,527,224 11,846,690
GUYANA 939,352 1,452,319 730,671 1,119,017 833,909 1,416,291 799,761 1,030,399
HONDURAS 2,584,294 6,787,742 2,627,952 5,954,080 3,106,124 8,153,207 2,391,270 6,532,482
JAMAICA 1,337,197 5,226,260 1,315,828 5,065,123 2,430,151 8,396,694 2,223,757 6,749,687
MEXICO 298,471,194 301,478,710 229,618,134 234,379,103 292,638,248 310,127,268 272,050,966 283,266,297
NICARAGUA 1,847,585 4,189,661 1,392,810 3,479,979 1,487,062 4,293,791 1,194,329 3,538,427
PANAMA 725,151 9,143,985 820,979 7,799,884 1,144,691 9,048,959 1,120,431 6,873,951
PARAGUAY 4,533,734 10,039,500 3,191,261 6,939,241 4,389,893 9,011,926 2,744,987 5,840,177
PERU 35,203,957 27,940,168 26,737,402 21,830,714 31,287,352 29,894,963 27,140,470 20,417,025
St. Vincent 40,995 337,186 50,020 332,693 52,151 372,321 47,644 325,996
St. Lucia 214,245 645,496 421,524 1,165,227 164,565 657,030 717,160 615,132
St. Kitts 32,049 270,368 0 0 51,722 324,238 34,332 272,512
TRINIDAD &
10,921,824 6,446,522 9,104,846 6,891,579 18,646,966 9,588,376 13,418,569 7,694,421
TOBAGO
URUGUAY 6,726,965 8,508,534 5,493,214 6,594,344 5,948,797 8,924,994 4,495,891 5,626,333
VENEZUELA 0 0 1,617,965 38,442,476 5,257,445 46,362,766 16,963,137 41,909,442

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Source: Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB"). DATAINTAL Sistema de Estadistica de Comercio, 2012.
Notes: Values Listed in Thousands of USD

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