SDJHDSALD

Concealment

Anaya v. Palaroan

GR no. 154994 June 28, 2005

Facts:
During the court proceedings on the action for the annulment of his marriage to Aurora,
where Fernando claims that his consent to the marriage was obtained through force and
intimidation, and in response, Aurora forwarded her counterclaim which was granted,
and while the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged his pre-marital
relationship to a close relative of his. This non-disclosure of the pre-marital relation was
seen by Anaya as a ground for annulment and as such included it in its evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure of a premarital relationship be regarded as a
concealment which constitute a ground for the annulment of the marriage.

Ruling:
Article 46 of the Family code outlines the different circumstances where fraud is
considered to be attendant to the case. In the present case, the subject is on the non-
disclosure of a premarital relationship. This is not among those enumerated under
article 46 of the Family Code. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment.
Action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

CYNTHIA BOLOS V. DANILO BOLOS

GR no. 186400 October 20, 2010

Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the
petition after trial on the merits of the case. A copy was received by Danilo Bolos,
thereby, prompting him to file a notice of appeal without filing a motion for
reconsideration. As such, this resulted to the former’s denial in due course, i.e., for
failure to file the required appeal for reconsideration or new trial. Even so, Danilo filed
the required motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied. The decision became
final and executor and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Consequently, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Danilo prayed that he be declared psychologically
incapacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC. The
appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under AM no. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Consideration of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009 resolution, denied the motion for extension of time
considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in issuing the decision stating that the
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under AM no.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in the case.

Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there must be no attempt to its interpretation. AM no 02-11-10 –
SC clearly provides that its application only covers those marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988. The Court finds itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase under the Family Code in AM no.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petition” rather than to the word “marriages”. Hence,
the appellate court was correct in denying the petitioner’s motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the
said motion for reconsideration is not extendible.
Property Regime of Unions without Marriage

MERCADO-FEHR V. FEHR

GR no. 152716 October 23, 2003

Facts:
In March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and
moved in with respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. Consequently, Suite
204 at LCG Condominium was purchased in instalment basis and registered and issued
in the name of the petitioner when the final payment was already made. The
relationship bore a fruit, begot their first child, Michael Bruno. This prompted them to get
married in March 14, 1985.

Elna Mercado-Fehr filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity against her husband Bruno Fehr. After trial on the
merits, the trial court granted the petition. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of
property existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of
complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rights
previously acquired by creditors. The trial court issued an order resolving the various
motions filed by respondent after the case has been decided.

Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the
adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. The said
property was purchased on instalment basis while the parties were still living together
without the benefit of marriage, as such, Article 147 of the Family Code should govern.
As a result, the trial court resolved the motion, there being a marriage declared void ab
initio, the rule on co-ownership applies. The court, however, noted that the parties have
already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale
thereof, proportionately among them and their children.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code should govern in the partition of the
properties.

Ruling:
The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and
how the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned. The
condominium unit was acquired during their cohabitation. Hence, the rule on co-
ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code should apply.

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are
attendant to the present case. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent
suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were
later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36
of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on

instalment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were
already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner
and respondent. As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply.
Suit among members of the same family/ Necessity of earnest efforts toward
compromise

SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR no. 134787 April 24, 1967

Facts:
Nicanor T. Santos and Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are siblings, whose parents,
spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, are now both dead. In 1956, all the
children of the latter executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering properties left by
their parents.
Misunderstandings, however, lead Consuelo and her husband to file a suit to recover
the former’s inheritance from her parents.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1 (j), Rule
16 of the Rules of Court be applied.

Ruling:
Article 151 of the Family Code provides that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If
it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule
shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.

This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine litigation conducted between

members of the same family. It must be shown that earnest efforts must have been
made toward a compromise before such litigation takes its course.

A complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It can
be inferred from the facts of the case that there were no such allegations contained in
the complaint. A complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the
introduction of evidence, effectively, supplying the necessary averments of a defective
complaint.
Grounds for Action to impugn legitimacy

BABIERA V. CATOTAL

GR no. 138493 June 15, 2000

Facts:
Sometime in 1990, Flora Guinto, a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera, gave birth to a baby girl in the latter’s house. The father of the child was a
carpenter. Without their knowledge, the child was registered bearing the name of
Hermogena as the mother, forging her signature. During those times, Presentacion
claimed that she was 15 years old and she witnessed all that had happened.

Presentacion presented pieces of evidence to prove her claim. She averred that her
mother, Hermogena, could not have borne a child at the age of 54 while her father was
already 65. Even so, there was no proof that would show that she was pregnant,
carrying Teofista. Moreover, the fact about the condition of Hermogena, being too old to
give birth, why wouldn’t the family risk her life and not bring her to the hospital and
instead undergo hilot to deliver the child. Notable irregularities were also seen in the
birth certificate. It did not contain any signature of the local civil registrar but contained
the signature of Hermogena which when compared to her other signatures, it did not
match.

Presentacion Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte a petition for
the cancellation of the entry of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City.
Teofista, in her response, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
former has no cause of action and that her legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked.

Issue:
Whether or not Presentacion has the legal capacity to file an action to impugn the
legitimacy of Teofista.

Ruling:
Teofista avers that Presentacion has no legal capacity to sue her because Article 171 of
the Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or in
special circumstances, his heirs. The Court, however, considered the petition
misplaced. Presentacion has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section
2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that a real party in interest is one who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the partition which the latter filed against the former.

Furthermore, what is being asserted under Article 171 is not applicable to the case
because it only applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of wife’s
child. It presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the wife. The present
case does not exhibit such, the child was never even related to the family as she was
only the child of the househelper.

Another is the issue on the application of the assailed provision under Article 170 on the
prescription of the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child within one year form the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, or in a
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birt took
place or was recorded.
Probative value of DNA Tests in paternity cases

JESSE LUCAS V. JESUS LUCAS

GR no. 190710 December 17, 2007

Facts:
Elsie, the mother of Jesse, migrated from Davao to Manila and stayed at the house of a
certain Belen. She would accompany the latter on her work and, eventually, on one
occasion, met Jesus Lucas. Elsie and Jesus developed a romantic relationship and
borne out of the relationship was Jesse, herein petitioner.

Almost about two years after the baptism of Jesse, financial support was extended to
them by his father but when their relationship turned sour and they decided to live
separate ways the mother refused to accept the money offered by Jesus as support.
Several attempts were made by Elsie to make Jesse and Jesus meet but her efforts of
doing so were frustrated.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it essentially ruled that DNA testing can
only be ordered after the petitioner establishes prima facie proof of filiation.

Ruling:
It is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. The
Court appreciates the appellate court’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA
testing without corroborative evidence.

The Rule on DNA evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use o DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity, the possible sources of
error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results are evidence as well
as the probative value of the DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis is utilized effectively and properly,
and shall not be misused and/or abused and more importantly, shall continue to ensure
that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Who may adopt

IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM

AND MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM

GR no. 168992 May 21, 2009

Facts:
Monina Lim married Primo Lim on June 23, 1974. The two were childless so they
decided to adopt. Custody of minors Michelle and Michael were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban. The couple raised the two children as if they were their own. They
were registered with a surname of Lim, enrolled in exclusive schools and recognized
with the same surname in their school records and documents.

On November 28, 1998, Primo Lim died and after 2 years Monina married an American
citizen. Monina, then, decided to adopt the two through the amnesty granted under
Republic Act 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. At the time fo
the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. The latter gave their consent by
executing an affidavit of consent. Olario also executed an affidavit of Consent.

Issue:
Whether or not Monina validly adopted Michelle and Michael despite her remarriage.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that petitioner, Monina, and her husband should have jointly filed the
petition for adoption due to the fact of the remarriage, citing Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. The provision under Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 is clear. It reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
 
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the
adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
 consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
 
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
 
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
 
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4 th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
 
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
 
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
 
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
 
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
 
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
 
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

Monina’s claim that the affidavit of consent suffices is untenable. Additional

requirements must still be complied.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption
is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated
child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Use of Surname by Women

IN RE: JULIAN LIN WANG

GR no. 159966 March 30, 2005

Facts:
Julian Lin Carusalan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa and Sing-Foe Wang, who
were not yet married then. Eventually, when his parents got married his name was
changed to Julian Lin Carusalan Wang. He had a sister but born of a different mother.
His parents decided to stay in Singapore and would enrol him there. However, they
were apprehensive about the use of Julia’s name especially his middle name, which
might become a laughing stock because in Singapore they don’t use the letter “R” and
instead use “L”. This might also be a cause of questioning as to the difference of the
middle names of the siblings. These are just among the reasons raised for the request
to change the name of Julian.

Issue:
Whether or not the change in the name be allowed for the reasons stated above.

Ruling:
The reason advanced by the petitioner for the request to drop his middle name is
merely for convenience, it, being only sought to avoid discrimination when he studies in
Singapore. This is not among the grounds recognized by law. Considering that he is
still a minor, it shall be his own discretion to initiate such request when he reaches his
majority age. Also, it is maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a
middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to
giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine
law which is controlling.
Rights of Illegitimate Children

BRIONES V. MIGUEL

GR no. 156343 October 18, 2004

Facts:
Out of the relationship of Joey Briones and Loreta Miguel was a child named Michael
Kevin Pineda. The two however separated, and consequently, Loreta married a
Japanese national while she was residing in Japan.

Michael was under the custody of Briones, his retired parents assisted him in rearing
the child. On one occasion as Loreta visited the residence of Briones, they lured the
latter into allowing them to bring the child for recreation at SM Departmnet store but only
to find out that they would not return the child to him.

This prompted Briones to file a petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child be given to Briones.

Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, except when the court finds causes making the mother unfit
for her role. But in the present case there was no showing the mother cannot fulfil her
obligation that would deprive her of her right to gain custody of the child.

It is also important to note whether the parents were married to determine how the
custody would go about. The Court of appeals erred in applying Section 6 of Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court. Such provision presupposes that the parents of the minor are
married but separated by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are
living separately de facto. In the present case, the court found out that Joey and Loreta
were never married, thus, the discretion of the child as to whom he wishes to live with
cannot be put into effect.
Tender Age Presumption Rule

PABLO-GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO

GR no. 154994 June 28, 2005

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4 year old son. Jocelyn brought with her their son when she left their conjugal
home.

Consequently, the petition was granted by the RTC due to the failure of Jocelyn to
appear despite several notice sent to her known address. A house helper testified that
she doesn’t care about the child, that she even saw her slapping her son. Another
witness said that she was having a relationship with a person of the same gender as
hers.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the RTC and placed the child
under the custody of the mother.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
Crisanto failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Joycelyn is unfit to perform
her obligations as a mother to the child.

No evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities
(lesbian) or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result

Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court
shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”

No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,”
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article
363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads:
“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
Acts contra bonos mores

WASSMER V. VELEZ

GR no. L-20089 February 19, 1993

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to marry each other but on the day of
the marriage, September 4, 1954, Francisco did not appear at the wedding ceremony
and instead left a note for her bride-to-be that they should postpone the wedding
because his mother does not like her. But Francisco was never seen again.

Beatriz then filed a suit against Velez but he was rendered in default for failing to appear
before the hearing despite several notice sent to his address. The court tried to
convince both parties to come to a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement
but the efforts did not yield.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in the case.

Ruling:
Ordinarily, breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, one may
incur civil liability when expenses have already been made to prepare for the wedding,
and the tarnished reputation of the family because of the embarrassment brought about
by the failed wedding. But the plaintiff must show sufficient evidence that the defendant
acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
Guidelines in determining psychological incapacity

REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR no. 154994 June 28, 2005

Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started cohabiting, living a common-law
relationship. Toshio was a Japanese national who would necessarily go back and forth
from Japan to Philippines.

Sometime in 1987, as Toshio went to Japan and while Lolita was in the Philippines, they
decided that they would get married 1 year thereafter. Their child was born, but he had
to go back to Japan promising the latter that he will return but he never kept his promise
and even if he returned he never visited her and their son and had only provided
financial support for only two months.

This prompted Lolita to file a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Summons was
served to his house but the known address was no longer where he resides. As a result,
they deemed it necessary to cause its publication in the newspaper.

Issue:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligation.

Ruling:
It is not enough that one’s act of abandonment would render him psychologically
incapacitated. In the present case, instead of constantly alleging that her husband could
not fulfil his obligation, Lolita could have just presented psychological examination or
evaluation of her husband which would definitely strengthen her case. The definition of
psychological incapacity does not evolve on the idea that one neglects or refuses to
fulfil his obligation, it must be based on one’s inability or incapacity to perform essential
marital obligation.
Who is entitled to support

MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC

GR no. 189516 June 8, 2016

Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were married in June
16, 1978. They had 5 children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity they decided to
separate and their children were all in the custody of their mother.

Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel Francisco before the Provost Marshall
Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She demanded that they be entitled to
75% of the retirement benefits of Col. Otamias as their monthly support since the
children were all living with her.

Issue:
Wherther or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the
financial support of his legitimate family

Ruling:
The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was
coerced or defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law
between parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was
in accordance with the provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no
reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.

Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the
wives of other retired military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this
case. Attached to the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the
military, who have received a portion of their husbands' pensions.

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall
not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if
a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this
Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due
such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be
applied to settle such accountabilities.cralawred
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has
enough funds to support himself and his family.
On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the Family Code.
Article 194 of the Family Code defines support as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.cralawred
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood,
are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194 except
only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause
imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.

Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or

illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only
the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable
provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be
deducted from the share of the spouses obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute
community or of the conjugal partnership.