G.R. No.
L-20387 January 31, 1968 On the otherhand, the defendants Secretary
JESUS P. MORFE, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC
Facts:
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that
every public officer, either within thirty (30)
days after its approval or after his assumption
of office “and within the month of January of
every other year thereafter”, as well as upon
the termination of his position, shall prepare
and file with the head of the office to which he
belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, including a statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar: . . .”
In relation to Morfe’s alleged accumulation of
assets grossly disproportionate to his reported
incomes after his assumption to office, plaintiff
Morfe alleged that the periodical submission
of such sworn statement of assets is violative
of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and
seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination..
opportunities for official corruption and
of Justice and Executive Secretary contended
that it was a legitimate exercise of police
power, and that Morfe, having accepted a
public position, voluntarily assumed the
obligation to give information about his
personal affair, not only at the time of his
assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust.
Lower court: Law is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the required periodical
submission of sworn statement of assets and
liabilities is unconstitutional on the grounds of
it being an unlawful invasion of right to
privacy, and an insult to the personal integrity
and official dignity of public officials.
Held:
No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is constitutional. It
is within the State’s police power, and is not
violative of due process and liberty. It is also
not a violation of guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure, and is not
against the non-incrimination clause.
Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity of public officials.
The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely
aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
maintaining a standard of honesty in the
public service. It is intended to further promote
morality in public administration. A public
office must indeed be a public trust.
The State’s inherent police power enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society. However, if the police
power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone
with an alleged grievance can invoke the
protection of due process which permits
deprivation of property or liberty as long as
such requirement is observed.
If due process mandate is not disregarded,
even a public official, to protect the security of
tenure which is analogous to property, can
protect himself from an infringement of his
liberty. However, liberty, in the interest of
public health, public order, or safety, of
general welfare, in other words through the
proper exercise of the police power, may be
regulated.
In here, the reasonableness of the law makes
the prohibition valid and within the ambit of
police power.
It would be to dwell in the realm of
abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its
ever-present temptation to heed the call of
greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary
and oppressive a requirement as that imposed
upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon
assuming office. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
A periodical submission of sworn statement of
assets and liabilities after assumption of office
is within the power of the government to
impose, even if it will affect the public officer’s
liberty, for as long as due process is
observed. In subjecting the public officer to
such a further compulsory revelation of his
assets and liabilities, including the statement
of the amounts and sources of income, the
amounts of personal and family expenses,
and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.
Other Notes:
Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL
was a reasonable requirement for
employment so a public officer can make of
record his assets and liabilities upon
assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects the most rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measure
is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of
Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense
provided by the Due Process Clause
“Inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice
Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to
govern men and things within the limits of its
domain (Justice Taney, going beyond
curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding
the extension of police power to regulatory
action affecting persons in public or private life
can invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be
relied upon by public official to protect the
security of tenure which in a limited sense is
analogous to property. Therefore he could
also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged
provision is allowable as long as due process
is observed.
The standard for due process is
REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action
must not outrun the bounds of reason and
result in sheer oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of
abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its
ever-present temptation to heed the call of
greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary
and oppressive a requirement as that imposed
upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon
assuming office.  There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
Right to privacy or Right to be left alone
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information
which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
relationship such a requirement possesses
with the objective of a valid statute goes very
far in precluding assent to an objection of
such character. This is not to say that a public
officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft
of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a
further compulsory revelation of his assets
and liabilities, including the statement of the
amounts of personal and family expenses,
and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure does not
give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional
provision designed to protect a man’s conduct
from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from
justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official
dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of the action taken, may be the
basis for declaring a statute invalid.
G.R. No. 174340             October 17, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OF CAMILO L. SABIO,  vs. HONORABLE
SENATOR RICHARD GORDON
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455,
Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as
resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment, and at the
same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1:
“No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1
limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in
any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution grants the power of inquiry not
only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees.  Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of investigatory power to
the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative
functions are also available to the
committees. 
It can be said that the Congress’ power of
inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal.  The Court’s
high  regard  to  such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that  “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault  that  “the
operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation,  is a
proper subject for investigation” and  that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with
the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions,
Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article
VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the
PCGG members and staff from the
Congress’ power of inquiry.  This cannot be
countenanced.  Nowhere in the Constitution is
any provision granting such exemption.   The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being
broad,  encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes. It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.”
PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional
because it is not within the legislative
power to enact; or it creates or establishes
methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates
the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been
repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions
on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI,
Sec. 21), the principle of  public accountability
(Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure
(Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of  access to
public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose
a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.  Right to Privacy
NOTES:
Power of inquiry
 The Court's high regard to such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that "the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the
executive branch." Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault
that "the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation" and that "the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate."
 The power of inquiry is inherent in the
power to legislate. The power of inquiry
– with process to enforce it- is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
 Corollarily, Sec. 4(b) also runs counter to
the following constitutional provisions: Art.
II, Sec. 28 (policy of full public disclosure),
Art. III, Sec. 7 (right of the people to
information on matters of public concern)
 One important limitation on the
Congress' power of inquiry is that "the
rights of persons appearing inor affected
by such inquiries shall be respected."
This means that the power of inquiry
must be "subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on
government action." (i.e. Bill of Rights)7.
 The Bill of Rights guarantees the right
to privacy. In evaluating a claim for
violation of the right toprivacy, a court
must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and,if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.
 The legislative inquiry focuses on acts
committed in the discharge of duties as
 officers and directors of the said
corporations. Consequently, the
directors of POTC, Philcomsat have no
reasonable expectationof privacy over
matters involving their offices in a
corporation where the government has
interest.Certainly, such matters are of
public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.
 The right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling
state interest.
 The right of the people to access
information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right toprivacy
of financial transactions
Right against Self-Incrimination
 The right against self-incrimination may
be invoked by the said directors and
officers of Philcomsat only when the
incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in
advance thenature or effect of the
questions to be asked of them.
 That this right may possibly be violated pendency of any prosecution of
or abused is no ground for denying the criminalor administrative action should
Senate Committeestheir power of not stop or abate any inquiry to carry
inquiry. When this power is abused, out a legislative purpose.
such issue may be presented before the
courts.
Contempt Power of the Legislative
 The exercise by the legislature of the
contempt power is a matter of self-
preservation as that branchof the
government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial
branch, asserts itsauthority and
punishes contempts thereof.
 The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis.
Sub Judice
 It is contended that the Senate is barred
from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
 Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules
of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation provide that the filing or
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff of Armed Forces of the Philippines v.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO
FACTS:
The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo,
farmers from Bulacan were abducted,
detained in various locations, tortured by
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were
members and supporters of the New People’s
Army (NPA).
After eighteen (18) months of restrained
liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts,
were able to escape. Ten days after their
escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
before the Supreme Court to prevent military
officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights.
Existing petition was treated as Amparo
petition. The Supreme Court granted the Writ
of Amparo and ordered the Court of Appeals
to conduct the summary hearing and decide
the petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the
victims is sufficient for amparo petitions.
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of
liberty is necessary to invoke the right to
security of a person
HELD:
1. Yes. Much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the veracity
of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written
and oral statements. Their statements
can be corroborated by other evidence
such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they
can identify in the places where they
were detained.
2. Yes. Covered by the privilege of the writ,
respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened
with an unlawful act or omission. The
right to security of person is “freedom
from fear.” In The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “a
world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people.”
Moreover, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat.
NOTE:
Writ of Amparo
 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of Amparo, several of
the above Amparoprotections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second
 paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power
"to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."  The documents, papers, and things seized
 The writ of Amparo serves both
preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It
is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses; it is
curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators
as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In
the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deter
the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
 The remedy provides rapid judicial relief
as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence
to make the appropriate reliefs available
to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility balance sheets and profit and loss statements
requiring substantial evidence that will and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the
require full and exhaustive proceedings. subject of the offense for violations of Central
Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, vs. HON. JOSE W.
DIOKNO
under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups,
FACTS:
namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices
Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the
of the aforementioned corporations and
corporations they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank
(b) those found seized in the residences
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
of petitioners herein.
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42
void for being violative of the constitution and
search warrants against petitioners
the Rules of court by:
personally, and/or corporations for which they
(1) not describing with particularity the
are officers directing peace officers to search
documents, books and things to be
the persons of petitioners and premises of
seized;
their offices, warehouses and/or residences to
search for personal properties “books of
(2) money not mentioned in the
accounts, financial records, vouchers,
warrants were seized;
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
(3) the warrants were issued to fish
other documents showing all business
evidence for deportation cases filed
transactions including disbursement receipts,
against the petitioner;

(4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash
money were not delivered to the issuing
courts for disposal in accordance with
law.
The prosecution counters that the search
warrants are valid and issued in accordance
with law; The defects of said warrants were
cured by petitioners consent; and in any
event, the effects are admissible regardless of
the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the
writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted
dissolving insofar as paper and things seized
from the offices of the corporations.
ISSUE:  performed particular acts, or committed specific
WON the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD:   As a matter of fact, the applications involved in
NO. The search warrant is invalid. The SC
ruled in favor of petitioners.  legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
The constitution protects the people’s right Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
against unreasonable search and seizure. It (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged
provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon in the aforementioned applications — without
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in reference to any determinate provision of said
the manner set forth in said provision; and laws or codes.
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of The warrants authorized the search for and
these are met.  seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners regardless of
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Thus, openly contravening the explicit command
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”  of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to
In other words, no specific offense had been defeat its major objective: the elimination of
alleged in said applications. The averments general warrants. 
thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract.  However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot
assail the validity of the search warrant issued
As a consequence, it was impossible for the against their corporation because petitioners are
judges who issued the warrants to have found the not the proper party. 
existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof The petitioners have no cause of action to assail
that the party against whom it is sought has the legality of the contested warrants andof the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
omissions, violating a given provision of our simple reason that said corporations have their
criminal laws.  respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of
this case do not allege any specific acts the interest of each of them in said corporations,
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR.,
BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC. vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the
validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrants issued by the CFI
Judge Cruz-Pano valid.
HELD:
No. The search warrants issued by the
respondent judge is invalid.
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, ... after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this
Court ruled that "the oath required must refer
to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in
said joint affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search
Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued
by respondent judge on December 7, 1982
are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
Notes:
 Laches is failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable
 time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
 In the determination of whether a search
warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it
has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This
would seem to be especially true where
the executing officer is the affiant on
whose affidavit the warrant had issued,
and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building
described in the affidavit, And it has also
been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court
file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched."
 Probable cause for a search is defined
as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES,
FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and
GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS vs. THE HON.
RAMON P. MAKASIAR
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition raised by one of
the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for
an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest.
The petitioner assailed that his constitutional
right was violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause.
Beltran's interpretation of the words
"determined personally" convinced him that
the judge is solely responsible to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in
his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the warrant of
arrest was issued.
HELD:
No. The Court did not find any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
judge.
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly
 describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.”
What the Constitution requires is that the
issuing judge must satisfy himself first with the
criteria in finding probable cause. And to
satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Constitution mandates that he
shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. L-60349-62 December 29, 1983
CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, et.al.
vs. HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D.
VILLANUEVA
Facts:
Petitioners filed informations in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary
Investigation and Examination had been
conducted and that prima facie cases have
been found. Upon receipt of said informations,
respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of
issuance of warrants of arrest. After the
hearing, respondent issued an order requiring
petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of
prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidence in support of the informations to aid
him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the findings of probable cause by
petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and
mandamus to compel respondent to issue
warrants of arrest. They contended that the
fiscal’s certification in the informations of the
existence of probable cause constitutes
sufficient justification for the judge to issue
warrants of arrest.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for
the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the
supporting affidavits and other documentary
evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.
Held:
Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification
for the existence of probable cause and on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But,
such certification does not bind the judge to
come out with the warrant. The issuance of a
warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on
the part of issuing magistrate.
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s
certification and require submission of the
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
the conclusion as to existence of probable
cause.
Petition dismissed.
Estrada v. Ombudsman (2015)
FACTS:
Sometime in November and December 2013,
the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two
(2) criminal complaints for plunder, among
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-
respondents in the two complaints filed their
counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his
“Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings”
(the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was
made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent
‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been
furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence
on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request, which is not the subject of the
present certiorari case.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Estrada was denied due
process of law
HELD:
NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s
constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires
the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his
Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to
specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a
copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter
such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the
investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and
other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x
x." At this point, there is still no counter-
affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly,
what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously,
the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents
are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can
thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the
issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the
conduct of a preliminary investigation is only
for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent
in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has
been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief”
as to the fact of the commission of a crime
and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that
there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of
the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented and the facts obtaining
therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused,
we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in
preliminary investigations is not akin to those
in administrative proceedings as laid down in
the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The
quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, is greater than the
evidence needed in a preliminary investigation
to establish probable cause, or to establish
the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay
refers to “substantial evidence,” while the
establishment of probable cause needs “only
more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.”
In the United States, from where we borrowed
the concept of probable cause, the prevailing
definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to
what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is
required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on
hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the
same as substantial evidence because
substantial evidence excludes hearsay
evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application
of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood or
probability of guilt to substantial evidence of
guilt.
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal
duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically named, as
well as the counter-affidavits of some of other
co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in
abeyance the disposition of the motions for
reconsideration because the Ombudsman
granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of
the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally
respond to the claims made by his co-
respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
complied with the existing Rules on
preliminary investigation and even
accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the
Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could
not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion.
Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements
mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
are not applicable to preliminary investigations
which are creations of statutory law giving rise
to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish
preliminary investigations without running
afoul of the constitutional requirements of due
process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for
preliminary investigations do not comply and
were never intended to comply, with Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary
investigations do not adjudicate with finality
rights and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires
substantial evidence for a decision against the
respondent in the administrative case.In
preliminary investigations, only likelihood or
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary
investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable
cause. The respondent in an administrative
case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has
no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing
officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at
the same time. In preliminary investigations,
the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same
time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the
Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This
explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
does not apply to preliminary investigations.
To now declare that the guidelines in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental
and essential requirements in preliminary
investigations will render all past and present
preliminary investigations invalid for violation
of constitutional due process. This will mean
remanding for reinvestigation all criminal
cases now pending in all courts throughout
the country. No preliminary investigation can
proceed until a new law designates a public
officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those
serving sentences by final judgment would
have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process.
Thus, petition dismissed for being premature
and it constitutes forum shopping.
Homar v. People (2015)
FACTS:
The petitioner was charged for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The
Information states that on or about August 20,
2002, the petitioner was found to possess one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 grams of as shabu. The
petitioner pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for
the prosecution. he testified that on August
20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, while
proceeding to the area onboard a mobile
hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a “No
Jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard. They
immediately accosted him and told him to
cross at the pedestrian crossing area. The
petitioner picked up something from the
ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter,
Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the
petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a
plastic sachet containing what he suspected
as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a
sinumpaang salaysay on the incident. The
petitioner was the sole witness for the
defense. He testified that he was going home
at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation
sunglasses and other accessories at the
BERMA Shopping Center.
After crossing the overpass, a policeman and
a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his
refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused
him of being a holdupper, and forced him to
go with them. They also confiscated the
kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords.
He was likewise investigated for alleged
possession of shabu and detained for one
day. He was criminally charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen
knife but he was eventually acquitted. CA
affirmed the decision.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The shabu, which was allegedly recovered
from the petitioner, is inadmissible as
evidence because it was obtained as a result
of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his
right against unreasonable search and
seizure. The petitioner has not committed,
was not committing and was not attempting to
commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In
fact, no report or criminal charge was filed
against him for the alleged jaywalking.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
HELD:
NO. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It
is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur:
(1)The person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence of
or within the view of the arresting officer. The
prosecution has the burden to prove the
legality of the warrantless arrest from which
the corpus delicti of the crime -shabu- was
obtained. For, without a valid warrantless
arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu
resulting from a warrantless search on the
petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search
and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged
shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence
against him.
The indispensability of the intent to arrest an
accused in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. The Court held that the shabu
confiscated from the accused in that case was
inadmissibleas evidence when the police
officer who flagged him for traffic violation had
no intent to arrest him. Due to the lack of
intent to arrest, the subsequent search was
unlawful.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a
downtown beat which he had been patrolling
for many years, observed two strangers
(petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a
street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store
window, which they did for a total of about 24
times. Each completion of the route was
followed by a conference between the two on
a corner, at one of which they were joined by
a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a
stick-up," the officer followed them and saw
them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks
away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a
policeman, and asked their names. The men
"mumbled something," whereupon McFadden
spun petitioner around, patted down his
outside clothing, and found in his overcoat
pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol.
The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a
revolver, and ordered the three to face the
wall with their hands raised. He patted down
the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and
seized a revolver from Chilton's outside
overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands
under the outer garments of Katz (since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which
might have been a weapon), or under
petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he
felt the guns. The three were taken to the
police station.
Petitioner and Chilton were charged with
carrying concealed weapons. The defense
moved to suppress the weapons. Though the
trial court rejected the prosecution theory that
the guns had been seized during a search
incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the
motion to suppress and admitted the weapons
into evidence on the ground that the officer
had cause to believe that petitioner and
Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the
officer, for his own protection, had the right to
pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might
be armed.
The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and
between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for
weapons and a full-blown search for evidence
of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found
guilty, an intermediate appellate court
affirmed, and the State Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no
substantial constitutional question" was
involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, "protects people, not places,"
and therefore applies as much to the citizen
on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the
abstract propriety of the police conduct, but
the admissibility against petitioner of the
evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly
be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative
techniques, and this Court's approval of such
techniques should not discourage remedies
other than the exclusionary rule to curtail
police abuses for which that is not an effective
sanction. Pp. 392 U.S. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop
and frisk" procedures such as those followed
here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 392 U.
S. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt
to find weapons is a "search" under that
Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
 5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is
warranted in the circumstances of a given
case in believing that his safety or that of
others is endangered, he may make a
reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous
regardless of whether he has probable cause
to arrest that individual for crime or the
absolute certainty that the individual is armed.
Pp. 392 U. S. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever
practicable, secure a warrant to make a
search and seizure, that procedure cannot be
followed where swift action based upon on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat is required. P. 392 U. S. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular
search and seizure must be assessed in light
of the particular circumstances against the
standard of whether a man of reasonable
caution is warranted in believing that the
action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S.
21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a
legitimate function of investigating suspicious
conduct when he decided to approach
petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. hypothesis that they were contemplating a
22. daylight robbery and were armed. P. 392 U. S.
28.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an
individual whose suspicious behavior he is (b) The officer's search was confined to
investigating at close range is armed may, to what was minimally necessary to determine
neutralize the threat of physical harm, take whether the men were armed, and the
necessary measures to determine whether intrusion, which was made for the sole
that person is carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. purpose of protecting himself and others
24. nearby, was confined to ascertaining the
presence of weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence
of probable cause to arrest must be strictly 7. The revolver seized from petitioner was
circumscribed by the exigencies of the properly admitted into evidence against him,
situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-26. since the search which led to its seizure was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short 392 U. S. 30-31.
of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being Affirmed.
possessed of information justifying arrest.
Pp. 392 U. S. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of
petitioner and his companions and the limited
search which he made were reasonable, both
at their inception and as conducted. Pp. 392
U. S. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his
companions were consistent with the officer's