THE BILL OF RIGHTS otherwise, they would be dismissed.
ise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC.
Facts:  grievances are absolute when directed against public
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacañang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.  No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally.  space to survive," permitting government regulation
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for intrusions."
a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.  peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
The lower court decided in favor of the company and officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of choose the men and women by whom we shall be
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for governed.”
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.  DUE PROCESS
Issue:
RESTITUTO YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike APPELLATE COURT
violated the CBA? G.R. NO. 74457 MARCH 20, 1987
Held: 
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos has given
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
complying with the requirements of Executive Order
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
No. 626, effective October 25, 1980.
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
the same was confiscated by the police station
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner
the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly
questioning the constitutionality of executive order
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering
the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained
and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the
ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Held::
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of
police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in
asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The supreme court said that
The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the Supreme
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make
it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
Due process was not properly observed. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of Php
12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,et. al. vs. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned
for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14,
1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the
powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers.
They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels;  there was also the requirement that the
guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites.
They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room,
a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on
this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room
or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in
the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic
cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause?
Held:
No. Judgment reversed.  “The presumption is towards
the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not
a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co-
Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly
fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase
"the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however,
the power must not be unreasonable or violative of
due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity?
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
 Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of
due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the
due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license
and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees
the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former,
and aside from applying the well-known legal principle
that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg.
Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to
supplement the state’s police power. In one case-
“much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-
being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People
v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."
RUBI, ET. AL. v. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO
G.R. No. 14078 March 7, 1919
Summary:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor
of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is
said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to
take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore
of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board. The action was
taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved
by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said
action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code.
Facts: 
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in
the province of Mindoro were ordered  by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped.
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation
made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under
certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian
tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped
from the reservation but was later caught and was
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.
Issue: 
Whether due process was followed in the restraint of
liberty and imprisonment due to violation of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code.
Held:
The provision is valid, as an exception to the general
rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters
that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to
Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him
the equal protection of the laws and confinement in
accordance with the said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
Doctrine:
AMERICAN DECISIONS MAY IF APPLICABLE, BE
CITED IN CASES BROUGHT TO OUR COURTS
FOR DECISION
YINLU BICOL MINING CORP.  v. TRANS-ASIA OIL
AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 207942 January 12, 2015
TOPIC:
PERSONS – EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
– REPEAL OF LAWS DOCTRINE:
Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to
November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be
impaired.
FACTS:
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area
located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was
owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
(PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to
financial losses. a. PIMI’s portion (known as the PIMI
Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to the
Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco
De Oro, or BDO).
The Government then opened the area for
exploration. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development
Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from
1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating
agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over the
area, their agreement being duly registered by the
Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In 1997 Trans-Asia filed an application for the
approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) over the area in that Regional Office of the
DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB), in Daraga, Albay.
The application, which was amended in 1999, was
granted on July 28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-
2007V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive
right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral
deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
August 31 2007: Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation
(Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had
acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO
by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the
areas covered by its mining patents were within the
areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA
September 14, 2007: Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by
letter that it would commence exploration works in
Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested
Yinlu to allow its personnel to access the areas for the
works to be undertaken. Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia
could proceed with its exploration works on its own
private property in the Calambayungan area, not in
the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents.
TransAsia found out that the registration of its MPSA
had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s request to
register the deed of absolute sale in its favor. DENR
Secretary directed MGB Regional Office V to verify
the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu.
MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the
DENR Secretary that there was no record on file
showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu.
Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their
respective position papers. DENR Sec Atienza
ordered the amendment of Trans-Asia’s MPSA by
excluding therefrom the mineral lands covered by
Yinlu’s mining patents
DENR Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr in his order found that
the mining patents had been issued to PIMI in 1930
as evidenced by and indicated in PIMI’s certificates of
title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were
validly transferred to and were now owned by Yinlu.
He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s
patents had no effect and were deemed abandoned
because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to
Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended.
He refuted Trans-Asia’s contention that there was a
continuing requirement under the Philippine Bill of
1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake
improvements in order to have the patents subsist,
and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to
register and to undertake the improvement, observing
that the requirement was not an absolute imposition.
He noted that the suspension of PIMI’s operation in
1974 due to financial losses and the foreclosure of its
mortgaged properties by the creditor banks
(MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure that justified
PIMI’s failure in 1974 to comply with the registration
requirement under P.D. No. 463;
 that the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was the
basis for issuing the patents, allowed the
private ownership of minerals, rendering the
minerals covered by the patents to be
 segregated from the public domain and be
considered private property; and
 that the Regalian doctrine, under which the
State owned all natural resources, was
adopted only by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions
Office of the President affirmed the DENR Sec’s
Order. a. Under the Philippine Constitution, there is an
absolute prohibition against alienation of natural
resources. Mining locations may only be subject to
concession or lease.
The only exception is where a location of a mining
claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935,
when the government under the 1935 Constitution
was inaugurated, and according to the laws existing at
that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated
the area from the public domain, and the locator is
entitled to a grant of the beneficial ownership of the
claim and the right to a patent therefore.
The right of the locator to the mining patent is a
vested right, and the Constitution recognizes such
right as an exception to the prohibition against
alienation of natural resources. The right of the
appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject mining
patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the
claims of appellant.
The existence of the TCT’s in the name of appellee
further bolsters the existence of the mining patents.
Under PD 1529, also known as the Property
Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all
claims or where none exists, the ownership over the
real property covered by the Torrens title becomes
conclusive and indefeasible even as against the
government.
CA: It agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP
that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed
mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to
register the patents under PD No. 463 in order for the
patents to be recognized in its favor. a. It found that
Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest did not register
the patents pursuant to PD No. 463; hence, the
patents lapsed and had no more effect
Yinlu asserts the following:
a. The mining patents of Yinlu were registered
pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of
1902) in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of
Congress of July 1 , 1902), the governing law on the
registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing
and indefeasible.
i. Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902:
allowed citizens of the United States and of the
Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and
purchase mineral lands
ii. Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902: after
the exploration and claim of the mineral land,
the owner of the claim and of the mineral
patents was entitled to all the minerals found in
the area subject of the claim
iii. its registered mineral patents, being valid
and existing, could not be defeated by adverse,
open and notorious possession and
prescription;
b. substantive rights over mineral claims perfected
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the
changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the
mining laws
i. Constitution could not impair vested rights;
ii. Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463
would impair its vested rights under its mineral
patents if said provisions were applied to it;
iii. Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly
prohibited the application of Section 100 and
Section 101 to vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether Yinlu’s mining patents constitute vested
rights and could not be disregarded.
HELD:
YES. A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the
government for the said mining claim.
Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on
November 15 1935, the alienation of natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, was expressly prohibited.
a. The natural resources being referred therein
included mineral lands of public domain, but
not mineral lands that at the time the 1935
Constitution took effect no longer formed part
of the public domain.
b. Prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources did not apply to a mining claim or
patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.
c. McDaniel v. Apacible: A mining claim
perfected under the law is property in the
highest sense, which may be sold and
conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the
effect of a grant (patent) by the United States
of the right of present and exclusive
possession of the lands located.
d. The owner of a perfected valid appropriation
of public mineral lands is entitled to the
exclusive possession and enjoyment against
everyone, including the Government itself.
Where there is a valid and perfected location of
a mining claim, the area becomes segregated
from the public domain and the property of the
locator.
e. A valid and subsisting location of mineral
land, made and kept up in accordance with the
provisions of the statutes of the United States,
has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the present and exclusive possession of the
lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during
the entire life of the location. There is no
provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior
termination thereof.
Even without a patent, the possessory right of
a qualified locator after discovery of minerals
upon the claim is a property right in the fullest
sense, unaffected by the fact that the
paramount title to the land is in the
Government, and it is capable of transfer by
conveyance, inheritance, or devise.
a. the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain when
the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective, it does not come within the
prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources; and the petitioner has the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms c. It has been observed that, generally, the
and conditions prescribed by law. term “vested right” expresses the concept of
present fixed interest, which in right reason
Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 and natural justice should be protected against
require registration and annual work obligations, arbitrary State action, or an innately just an
Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly imperative right which an enlightened free
provides that the provisions of PD No. 463 shall not society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
apply if their application will impair vested rights under individual rights, cannot deny
other mining laws Section 99. Non-impairment of
Vested or Acquired Substantive Rights. d. Republic v. Court of Appeals: that mining
rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of
Changes made and new provisions and rules laid 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935
down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair Constitution were vested rights that could not
vested or acquired rights in accordance with order be impaired even by the Government.
mining laws previously in force shall have no
retroactive effect. In the present case: the mining patents of Yinlu were
issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which are were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935
procedural in nature shall prevail. Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its
predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in
a. A right is vested when the right to the disputed mineral lands that could not and should
enjoyment has become the property of not be impaired even in light of their past failure to
some particular person or persons as a comply with the requirement of registration and
present interest. It is “the privilege to enjoy annual work obligations.
property legally vested, to enforce
contracts, and enjoy the rights of property
conferred by existing law” or “some right or
interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy”
b. The due process clause prohibits the
annihilation of vested rights. ‘A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment,
by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power’
 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-
ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
as amended by RA 7659..
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was
a clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.
 Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less
evidence for providing the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum.
Held:
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them. There is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessary
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification,
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in
relation and with reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the
provisions of R.A. 7080
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative
declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special
law, especially since in the case of plunder that
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop
and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster
the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society
and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival
of people it governs over.
Note:
 A statute establishing a criminal offense
must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against the specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause
or by construction.
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has
acquired such exalted statute in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague
when it lack comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in
its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to be regulated by a statute draw with narrow
avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled specificity.
discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the The possible harm to society in permitting
Government muscle. The first may be some unprotected speech to go unpunished
“saved” by proper construction, while no is outweighed by the possibility that the
challenge may be mounted as against the protected speech of others may be deterred
second whenever directed against such and perceived grievances left to fester
activities. because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
 The test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
language conveys a sufficiently definite statutes have general in terorrem effect
warning as to the proscribed conduct when resulting from their very existence, and, if
measured by common understanding and facial challenge is allowed for this reason
practice. It must be stressed, however, that alone, the State may well be prevented from
the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a enacting laws against socially harmful
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
to be upheld – not absolute precision or cannot take chances as in the area of free
mathematical exactitude. speech.
 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value of
all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify along attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement
that the persons making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not

EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. COMELEC, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81  September 22, 1986
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in
the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of
the elections, the bitter contest between the two came
to a head when several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s
men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held,
and the post-election developments were to run true
to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to
question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private
respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was
void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the
Constitution. respondent missing.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the 2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on
Commission on Elections directed the provincial Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winner in the election?
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7,
1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
Held:
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before
1. No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and
the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the
the disappearance of the office in dispute between the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was
petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom
set aside as premature, having been made before the
have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient
lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the
justification for dismissing this case. But there are
petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23,
larger issues involved that must be resolved now,
1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision
once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose
Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the
is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this
province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this
Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong
Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis
on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has
that it should have been decided by COMELEC en
become moot and academic.
banc.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of
The case was still being considered when on
legal questions but also the conscience of the
February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law
cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later,
but we must also give him justice. The two are not
Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of
always the same. There are times when we cannot
the 1987 Constitution.
grant the latter because the issue has been settled
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, and decision is no longer possible according to the
contending it to be moot and academic. law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
Issues: nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the demands that we act then, not only for the vindication
of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
2. No. The applicable provisions are found in Article
XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the
power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
three divisions. All election cases may be heard and
decided by divisions except contests involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be
heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided
within ninety days from the date of their submission
for decision.
We believe that in making the Commission on
Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and
city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full
authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto,
including those arising before the proclamation of the
winners.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of
Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of
the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it
might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar
with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest
strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The
respondent’s theory would make this gambit possible
for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary
in nature, could be hastily decided by only three
members in division, without the care and deliberation
that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this
case that were it not for the supervening events that
have legally rendered it moot and academic, this
petition would have been granted and the decision of
the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set
aside as violative of the Constitution.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan
144 SCRA 392 (1986)
Facts: 
An investigating committee was created to determine
the facts on the case involving the assassination of
Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority
reports showed that they are unconvinced on the
participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen.
Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as
opposed to the military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and
Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration. 
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally
preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but
was recalled upon the intervention of President
Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of murder
charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so
that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of
justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation
of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to
exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to
present vital documentary evidence and prayed for
nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an
impartial tribunal.
Issue:  cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal
of the accused from the charges against them.
Held:  The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was
deprived of due process and fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates
the due process clause. There could be no
double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower
court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the
remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or
trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was
a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and
closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with
due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of
acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure
in observing due process during the trial therefore the
judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy
with lack of due process on the account of collusion
between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the
rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused. 
petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered
the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void.
An order for a re-trial was granted.
ANG TIBAY VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. NO. L-46496             FEBRUARY 27, 1940
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a
leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the
lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while  no
members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that
NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:  
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is
entitled to a new trial.
HELD: 
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence
so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further,
the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts
by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible
but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like
the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the
requirements of due process. For administrative
bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
 The right to a hearing which includes the right decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
of the party interested or affected to present his own inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached. Agabon vs. NLRC
GR No. 158693
 Not only must there be some evidence to
FACTS:
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must
be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as
mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
gypsum board and cornice installers from January
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed
a conclusion.
for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint
 The decision must be rendered on the for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties contending just cause for the dismissal because of
affected. petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there
 The administrative body or any of its judges, was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to
therefore, must act on its or his own independent backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, that the dismissal was not illegal because they have
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in abandoned their work but ordered the payment of
arriving at a decision. money claims.
 The administrative body should, in all
ISSUE:
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
HELD: said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia
was meted with demerits and touring hours because
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the of said infraction.
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins
the employer to give the employee the right to be Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked
heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he
resume his employment. For a valid finding or incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO
abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out
with the second as the more determinative factor of his control because his OR class was dismissed at
Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs The Superintendent of the
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To
Philippine Military Academy
be deduced that the employees has no more intention that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the
751 SCRA 469 interview with the teachers concerned, the OR
to work.
teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm
Summary: and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the his examination paper, he is dismissed from said
Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014.
employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the class and may be excused to leave the classroom,
On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson
employee. This became known as the Wenphil hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
examination in their Operations Research (OR)
Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule. that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was
subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to
dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR
3pm. However, after he submitted his exam paper,
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not class, each student was dismissed as they submit
Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said
for any of the justifiable or authorized by law. Where their examination, and were not dismissed as a class;
teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia
the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it
complied and as a result, he was late for his next
due process should not nullify the dismissal but the was not because such transaction was initiated by the
class (English). Later, the English teacher reported
employer should indemnify the employee for the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of
Cudia for being late.
violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should his query to the teacher), although there were at least
be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of two students with Cudia at that time querying the
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late
“dismiss now, pay later” which we sought to deter in teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a
because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The
Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of
tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter
warrants the payment of nominal damages. saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence
concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR
he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
class was dismissed late because the OR teacher
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor
Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor
Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when
he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a
result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum
standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any
violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet
from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter,
the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets,
conducted an investigation. After two hearings and
after the parties involved were heard and with their
witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8
found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA
rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the
acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice
of chambering where the members, particularly the
dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to
avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the
chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his
initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0.
Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s
holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal
was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the
PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent
letters to various military officers requesting for a re-
investigation. It was their claim that there were
irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a
result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA
(CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was
alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated
Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy
of communication. Eventually, the CRAB ruled against
Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of
Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor
of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best
recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme
Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that
the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that
the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia
based on its findings.
HELD:
I. Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s
prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him
as well as to give him his supposed academic awards
is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court,
cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet
as well as his awards is a discretionary act.
Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or
government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to
perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an
educational institution – and such performance is
beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue
herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible
officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the
duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and
to determine whether or not a government branch or
instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into
military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy.
Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets,
when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered
parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when
they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said
cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise
due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is
true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be
prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he
attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet
facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests
are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his
honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due
process of law and the PMA, even as a military
academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus,
when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon
which he was dismissed from the PMA, such
controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due
process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is
not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be
seen in the below discussion, PMA presented
evidence that due process was, in fact, complied
with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to
decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part
of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact,
Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the
investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted
by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to
explain the report against him. He was informed about
his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge
against him and given the right to enter his plea. He
had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting
members, he was found to have violated the Honor
Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the
review process at the Academy level – from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group).
Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-
General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the
case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the
President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable
rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb
the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that
a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to
dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from
the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among
those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of
Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet
is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express
provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there
is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the
President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision
and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is
well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom
or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning has
been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the
part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to
study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to
exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a
cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said
cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied –
which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from
the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a
big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It
does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the
discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be
imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to
abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known
all of these.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. HON. FELIXBERTO
T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong
Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of
Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same
case, a petition for bail was filed by the private
respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there
was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition
cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
and was granted by the respondent judge subject to
the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but
was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post
bail
HELD:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail,
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that
the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in
Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available
only in criminal proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international
law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the
individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court
departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an
extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. JOSE
EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 140945             May 16, 2005
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint
cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for
no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he
is a stranger.
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari filed
by the National Housing Authority assailing the
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51646, granting respondent’s petition for
annulment of judgment.
FACTS:
After the death of Salindon, her heirs executed an
extra-judicial settlement where the property was
transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros
Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-
Kulphongpatana. However, in a decision in G.R. No.
L-60544, entitled "Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs.
Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding Judge of Branch
VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al.," rendered by the
Court on May 19, 1984, the award in favor of Salindon
was nullified and set aside for having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, and petitioner was declared the owner of
the property.
Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off
by the Quezon City Treasurer’s Office on April 23,
1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos.
The highest bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the
Register of Deeds refused to register the final deed of
sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition
for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which
was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 84).
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment,
Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage,
Cancellation of TCT and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business
Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
RTC dismissed this second case on the ground of litis
pendencia.
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the trial court’s judgment, particularly
paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the
nullity of any transfer, assignment, sale or mortgage
made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged
extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent,
since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-
10071, he was prevented from ventilating his cause,
right or interest over the property, and the judgment
was not binding on him, as the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
The CA granted the petition and declared null and
void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision insofar as petitioner’s title to the
property is concerned. The CA found that respondent
was not a party to Civil Case and the trial court did not
acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also
ruled that the judgment violated respondent’s right
against deprivation of the property without due
process of law.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA, petitioner took the present recourse.
Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the
trial court’s denial of its motion to include respondent
as defendant. Petitioner also claims that the auction
sale of the property by the City Treasurer of Quezon
City is void ab initio because it was never supposed to
be included in the auction sale as petitioner, which
has been declared by the Court in G.R. No. L-60544
as the owner of the property, is exempt from payment
of taxes. Hence, Sarte cannot claim any right over the
same and respondent, having bought it from Sarte,
does not acquire any better right thereto. Petitioner
also alleges that respondent is not a buyer in good
faith because the latter was aware of the pending
litigation involving the property.18
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3
of the trial court’s decision on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.
HELD:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy.
Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for
annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1)
extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process.
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the
judgment or final order and resolution are void.21 A
trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons.22
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was
never made a party to Civil Case. It is basic that no
man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he
is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound
by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed
paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision decreed that
"(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of
whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this
case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her
agents or assigns before or during the pendency of
the instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title issued in
connection with the aforesaid transactions by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise
ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such
TCTs."
Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment,
as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject
property from Sarte, and title was already transferred
to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondent’s title to be nullified without being given
the opportunity to present any evidence in support of
his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more,
it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law.24 Clearly, the trial
court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its
dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the
consequence of the trial court’s denial of its motion to
include respondent as defendant in Civil Case.
True, it was not petitioner’s fault that respondent was
not made a party to the case. But likewise, it was not
respondent’s fault that he was not given the
opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever
prompted the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion to
include respondent as defendant is not for the Court
to reason why. Petitioner could have brought the trial
court’s denial to the CA oncertiorari but it did not.
Instead, it filed Civil Case for Annulment of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate
Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT, and Damages,
against herein respondent Sarte and others.
Unfortunately for petitioner, this was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on
the ground of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the
undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a party to
Civil Case and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial
court’s judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on
him.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
 The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the
City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled
in favor of the City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM

CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
 G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 HELD:
EQUAL PROTECTION

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement
of Private Rights
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord
7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private
rights of their patrons.
The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution.
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void
as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for
wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes
only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash
up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people.
The SC further reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare.
People vs. Cayat
68 Phil. 12 (1939)
Facts:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, and a member of the non-
Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections
2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and
possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it
unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a
member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of
Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native
wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the
law.
 Issue:
Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the
grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violates due process clause,
and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held:
 It is an established principle of constitutional law that
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based
upon “accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for
the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian
tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the
geographical area and more directly, to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora,
supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable,
for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to
insure peace and order in and among non-Christian
tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class
evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in
its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not
an argument against the equality of its application.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs.  THE
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010  The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x  Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.
ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., vs.  EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
G.R. No. 193036  Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
 --- Justice Jose P. Laurel 
Facts: 
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to
the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency. 
action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor. 
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives. 
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President
on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). 
Issues:  The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make
to overwhelming political undertones that clothe an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the described as "(a)n administrative function, the
standing to file their respective petitions and question Court stands firm in its oath to perform its exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
Executive Order No. 1;  constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an
overreaching significance to society. inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the and collection of facts concerning a certain
principle of separation of powers by usurping the Power of the President to Create the Truth matter or matters." 
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate Commission
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;  In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;  Having been constitutionally granted full control of "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
the Executive Department, to which respondents settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x.
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the belong, the President has the obligation to ensure Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
equal protection clause; and  that all executive officials and employees faithfully of a judgment." 
comply with the law.
4. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be
injunctive relief.  With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors,
Held:  affected by the fact that the investigating team and the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at
Legal Standing of the Petitioners  former used the offices and facilities of the latter in best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
conducting the inquiry.  Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
assertion that the petition covers matters of Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate  recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional The distinction between the power to investigate and aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
issues in the petition which deserve the attention the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court indictments for violations of graft laws. 
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59
and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of Violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
transcendental and paramount importance not Thus: 
only to the public but also to the Bench and the The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because
Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of The legal meaning of "investigate" is it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by contend that it does not apply equally to all members
interested to know the status of the President’s step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace of the same class such that the intent of singling out
first effort to bring about a promised change to the or track; to search into; to examine and inquire the "previous administration" as its sole object makes
country. into with care and accuracy; to find out by the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in respondent and her children and issued a series of
virtually all administrations previous to that of former WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
President Arroyo.  Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared 9262. 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official equal protection clause of the Constitution. Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that
state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
inhibitions cover all the departments of the women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
government including the political and executive women's intimate partners.
departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.  RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order ISSUE: 

No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find GARCIA v. DRILON violative of the equal protection clause.
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
and corruption during the previous 699 SCRA 352 HELD:
administration"only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. FACTS:   No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
of the questioned executive order.  Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an classification. The non-identical treatment of women
affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
Decision  wounded private respondent which spawned several equal footing and to give substance to the policy and
quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
The issue that seems to take center stage at present unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann. men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise culturally endowed differences between men and
of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial The private respondent was determined to separate women.
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
legislature and the executive department, is away their children and deprive her of financial RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive
exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, support. He warned her that if she pursued legal protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
which is expected to be the protector of the battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her important governmental objectives of protecting
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time to hold office. This deprived her of access to full human rights, insuring gender equality, and
and again, this issue has been addressed by the information about their businesses. Hence, no source empowering women. The gender-based classification
Court, but it seems that the present political situation of income. and the special remedies prescribed by said law in
calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its favor of women and children are substantially related,
action lest it continually be accused of being a Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.  there was imminent danger of violence against objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate
review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of
the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, et. al. v. PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et. al
FACTS:
The Supreme Court permanently enjoined Davao City
from enforcing and implementing Ordinance No.
0309-07 or "An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as
an Agricultural Practice in All Agricultural Activities by
All Agricultural Entities in Davao City."  regardless of the ordinance's salutary
The ordinance was challenged by Pilipino Banana
Growers and Exporters Association Incorporated
(PBGEA) after it took effect on March 23, 2007 –
more than a month after it was approved by then
Mayor Rodrigo Duterte.
A regional trial court granted the prayer for a
preliminary injunction, but later on declared the
ordinance as valid and constitutional.
Petitioners Davao City, and Wilfredo Mosqueda et al,
who intervened and argued in favor of the ordinance,
appealed to the CA and sought injunctive relief. The
CA issued a temporary restraining order.
But the CA thereafter reversed the earlier RTC
decision and declared Section 5 of the ordinance as
void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive.
Section 5 bans aerial spraying in the territorial
jurisdiction of Davao City 3 months after the effectivity
of the ordinance.
Petitioners then brought the issue to the SC, but the
High Court unanimously denied the consolidated
petitions on certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. The ordinance violates the due process
clause - The High Court said Davao City "must
not act arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
purpose."
On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be
inadequate time for the city to shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively depriving
the city an efficient means to combat disease.
But the High Court disagreed with PBGEA that the
buffer zone required by the ordinance is in violation of
due process since the purpose is to minimize the
effects of aerial spraying.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection
clause - The SC said equal protection was violated
since the ordinance made no substantial distinctions
when it prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of
the substance or the level of concentration of the
chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-
meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao
City regardless of the size of landholdings.
3. The ordinance is an ultra vires act - According to
the SC, the city disregarded regulations implemented
by the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA),
including its identification and classification of safe
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals, the SC said, is a function
lodged with the FPA and not with local government
units.
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance
"without inherent and explicit authority to do so" the
SC said the local government performed an ultra vires
act.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833 April 07, 2015
FACTS :
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012
as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a
first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied
for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the
following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated
December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment,
Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that
he was not included in the list of candidates for the
said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a
letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration
of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not
pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive
Officer, through a letter dated February 3, 2014, that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the
JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his
name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner
has been a judge only for more than a year, he was
excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to
take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE :
WON  the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal
function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
Held :
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
"The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within
the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of
selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary
and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's
constitutional mandate, a determination must be
made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance
of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that
the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or
the authority to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of
the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus,
when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the
JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the
petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. The remedy of
mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and
the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to
second-level judge is not properly compellable by
mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of
sound discretion by the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An
action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy
includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not
involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no
person possesses a legal right under the Constitution
to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to
judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any
person
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail
because this Court does not have original jurisdiction
over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.18 The special civil
action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty
over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the
present petition. But in any event, even if the Court
will set aside procedural infirmities
TECSON vs. COMELEC
GR No. 161434, March 3 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections.  In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a
petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of
candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. 
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme
consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate
of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was
the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.
indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the
age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangansinan.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may
have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen.
And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939,
governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe,
Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or
illegitimate.
Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being in violation of
the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden
under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative
Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a
production nor a license tax which Ormoc City its
charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, or
the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that
it also violates RA 2264 because the tax is on both
the sale and export of sugar.
ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance is valid.
HELD:
NO. The SC held that it violates the equal protection
clause for it taxes only sugar produced and exported
by petitioner and none other.

Even though petitioner, at the time of the enactment

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. THE
TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-23794             February 17, 1968
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance
No. 4, imposing "on any and all productions of sugar
milled at petitioner's, municipal tax of 1% per export
sale. Petitioner paid but were under protest.
of the ordinance, was the only sugar central in Ormoc,
the classification should have been in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as petitioner, for the coverage of
the tax.
Though, petitioner can be refunded, they are not
entitled to interest because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected as the ordinance provided a
sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same
being then presumed constitutional until declared
otherwise.
People vs. Jalosjos
G.R. No. 132875-76
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having
been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this
a covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City
Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of
the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-
equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed
to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives and to leave his cell.
Held:
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings will virtually make
him a free man.
The performance of legitimate and even essential
When the voters of his district elected the accused- duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness free a person validly in prison.
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
legislative results which he could accomplish within necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic exercise of government authority to regulate even if
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so interests are disregarded.
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office. We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
aberrant situation not only elevates accused- and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also law and apply to all those belonging to the same
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction class.
system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993 (227 SCRA
displayed.
703) 
FACTS:
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
This is a petition raised by the members of the lower
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
courts who assails the constitutionality of Section 35
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular.vs.
Prado
It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se
to withdraw the franking privilege of the Judiciary but
not on other offices of the government, such as:  the
President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in
the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers.
However, the respondents contend that there is no
discrimination since the law is based on the valid
classification in accordance of the equal protection
clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary department
will be affected with it but also other offices like Office
of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language;
the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; etc. Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates
the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection
clause. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.  murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of
The Court finds its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege. Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado
Himagan vs. People
“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members
Charged with Grave Felonies
FACTS:  of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan,
Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and
attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975,
Himagan was placed into suspension pending the
a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Sec
42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of
over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to
equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal
protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD:  
No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in
the legislative discussions.  prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him
are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed.
The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
PETITIONER, vs BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS
G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004
FACTS:
    On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central
Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
    On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last
proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on
the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
    (c) Establish a human resource management
system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
    A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board’s
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component
of the Bangko Sentral’s human resource development
program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible
with the principles provided for under Republic Act
No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however, that compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19
and below shall be in accordance with the rates
petitioner’s challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or
those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2)
the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL
(non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is “a classic case of class legislation,”
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the
BSP personnel’s position. 
    Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:
a.    the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that
the questioned proviso does not appear in the original
and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 
b.    subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-
and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL
actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing
professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the
BSP;
c.    the assailed proviso was the product of
amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to
the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one
senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;
d.    GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all
exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within
the class of rank-and-file personnel of government
financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon; and
e.    the assailed proviso has caused the
demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers’.
    
    In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a
separability clause, which will allow the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question
without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994
BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced
since 1994 when the proviso was implemented.
Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable
proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents’
implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction;
and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
through this petition for prohibition, which this Court
should take cognizance of, considering the
transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.
    Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause
and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is
construed in harmony with other provisions of the
same law, such as “fiscal and administrative
autonomy of BSP,” and the mandate of the Monetary
Board to “establish professionalism and excellence at
all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management.”
    The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the
provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the
classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated
policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism
and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing
laws and policies of the national government.      While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure
ISSUE:
    Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the
equal protection of the laws."
HELD:
A.    UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF
EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II
OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection
challenges indubitably show that the classification
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in
its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal
protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate - so long as
the classification is not unreasonable. 
B.     THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF
SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM
THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
well within the legislature’s power, we hold that the
enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-
and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity
out of the challenged proviso.
    The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every
instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally
valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.
    A statute valid at one time may become void at
another time because of altered circumstances. Thus,
if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary
or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a
former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.
    The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries.  the denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation
    Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for
a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.
The deference stops where the classification violates
a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary
role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not
suffice.
    Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the
propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision.
It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is
not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone
has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by
R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption
of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly
been filed.
    Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise
judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion
given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational
basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be
given deferential treatment.
    But if the challenge to the statute is premised on
of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny
ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down
view would call for the abdication of this Court’s
solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act
is a private person or the government itself or one of
its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck
down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the
problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly
those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we
have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline
passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation - made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution - to settle it. 
    In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates
on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic
class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are
limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of
the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing
higher and better education and opportunities for
career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in
life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who
have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all.” Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.

    To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit

greater concern from this Court. They represent the
more impotent rank-and-file government employees
who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no
specific right to organize as a collective bargaining
unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest
unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and
they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment.
Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some
more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting
time. Unless the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s duty
to save them from reasonless discrimination.

    IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued

operation and implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is
unconstitutional.