Rethinking China’s rise: Chinese scholars

debate strategic overstretch

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XIAOYU PU AND CHENGLI WANG *

The report of the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress sets out an
ambitious goal for China’s national rejuvenation. It envisions that China will
become a ‘global leader in innovation, composite national strength, and inter­
national influence in the coming decades’.1 In this report, Chinese leader Xi Jinping
describes China as a ‘Great Power’ (daguo) or a ‘strong power’ (qiangguo) 26 times.2
It is not surprising that a rising China seeks a more active global role. However, in
the context of shifting global power, a rising China faces dilemmas involving how
assertively to pursue its interests: acting provocatively too soon could generate
balancing and backlash, while ‘waiting too long could mean forgoing strategic
opportunities for substantial benefit’.3
Since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, scholars in and on China have been
heatedly debating China’s status and role in the world.4 The continuing debate
reveals a high level of uncertainty over China’s position on the global stage. Some
scholars see the problems in the West—such as the global financial crisis, Brexit
and the Trump presidency—as strategic opportunities for China; in particular, an
inward-looking America under Trump as providing a new strategic opportunity
*
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2017 American Political Science Association (APSA)
Annual Meeting, the International Relations and East Asia (IREA) Online Colloquium, The Global Emerg-
ing Scholars Summit hosted by Tongji University, and at an international relations seminar hosted by Nankai
University. Our thanks to Ja Ian Chong, Thomas Christensen, Benjamin Creutzfeldt, John Delury, Kai He,
Eric Hundman, Liu Feng, Men Honghua, Dong Jung Kim, Jeehye Kim, Patricia Kim, Jiyoung Ko, Sun
Xuefeng, Tang Shiping, Christopher Twomey, Xu Jin, Brandon Yoder, Zhou Fangyin, Zuo Xiying and the
reviewers of International Affairs for their helpful comments.
1
Xi Jinping, Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success
of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, report delivered at 19th National Congress of the CCP,
Beijing, 18 Oct. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping%27s_report_at_19th_CPC
_National_Congress.pdf. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were
accessible on 17 July 2018.)
2
Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, ‘Xi Jinping’s marathon speech: five takeaways’, New York Times, 18 Oct.
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-congress.html.
3
For an analysis of rising powers in general, see David Edelstein, Over the horizon: time, uncertainty, and the rise of
Great Powers, Kindle edn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), p. 218.
4
See e.g. Thomas Christensen, The China challenge: shaping the choices of a rising power (New York: Norton, 2015),
pp. 3–8; Xiaoyu Pu, ‘Controversial identity of a rising China’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 10: 2,
2017, pp. 131–49; Xiaoyu Pu, Rebranding China: contested status signaling in the changing global order (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2019); Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power rela-
tions”: a G2 with Chinese characteristics?’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 773–94; Zhang Yunling,
‘China and its neighbourhood: transformation, challenges and grand strategy’, International Affairs 92: 4, July
2016, pp. 835–68.

International Affairs 94: 5 (2018) 1019–1035; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy140

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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
for China to expand its power and influence on the global stage.5 However, others
worry that Beijing’s policy-makers might have taken steps too bold and too soon,
and they see the warning signs. In the latest version of the US National Security
Strategy, China is identified as a ‘revisionist power’ that challenges US values
and interests.6 Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against increasing Chinese

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influence across several western countries, where there are anxieties about China’s
‘sharp power’, a term used to refer to the information warfare being waged by
authoritarian regimes.7 In international relations, competition between rising
powers and established powers can be dangerous.8 To avoid confrontation and
conflict, rising powers must carefully design and implement their grand strategies,
sending reassuring messages to neighbouring countries as well as to the established
powers.9 Some scholars in China worry that there might be plausible connections
between China’s assertive foreign policy and increasing perceptions in the West
of threat from China.10 Although the new wave of ‘China threat’ discourse may
have complicated sources,11 the recent backlash against China is a wake-up call
for Beijing.
In recent years, some Chinese elites have started to rethink the strategies and
tactics of China’s rise. For instance, Renmin University Professor Shi Yinhong
has published a series of articles on this topic. In these writings, Shi suggests
that China might face a problem of ‘strategic overdraft’ or ‘strategic overstretch’
(zhanlue touzhi).12 For most scholars, the essence of strategic overstretch is similar
to the economics of cost–benefit analysis: strategic overstretch occurs if the cost of
maintaining the existing system exceeds the benefits it yields. The British historian
Paul Kennedy proposed the idea of ‘imperial overstretch’ to explain the imbalance
between strategic commitments and the economic base.13 In the Chinese context,
Shi defines strategic overstretch more broadly as the lack of focus or mismatch

5
For a recent analysis of the Chinese perspective, see Astrid H. M. Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, ‘Will
Trump make China great again? The Belt and Road Initiative and international order’, International Affairs 94:
2, March 2018, pp. 231–49. Some American scholars also think this way: see Randall Schweller, ‘Opposite but
compatible nationalisms: a neoclassical realist approach to the future of US–China relations’, Chinese Journal
of International Politics 11: 1, 2018, pp. 23–48.
6
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC, 2017), p. 25.
7
Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, ‘From “soft power” to “sharp power”: rising authoritarian influence
in the democratic world’, in The International Forum for Democratic Studies, eds, Sharp power: rising authori-
tarian influence (Washington DC: National Endowment for Democracy, 2017).
8
Graham Allison, Destined for war: can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2017); Ronald L. Tammen and Jack Kugler, ‘Power transition and China–US conflicts’, Chinese
Journal of International Politics 1: 1, 2006, pp. 35–55; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The gathering storm: China’s chal-
lenge to US power in Asia’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 3: 4, 2010, pp. 381–96.
9
For a detailed discussion of China’s reassurance strategy, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China’s
grand strategy and international security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
10
See e.g. Zuo Xiying, ‘Zhanlue jinzheng shidai de zhongmeiguanxi tujin’ [Roadmap of Sino-American rela-
tions in the era of strategic competition], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 2,
2018, pp. 79–88.
11
For a Chinese perspective, see Zhao Kejin, ‘Xin yilun “zhongguo weixielun”, xin zai na’ [New wave of
China threat thesis, what is new?], Huanqiushibao [Global Times], 2 Feb. 2018, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/
hqpl/2018-02/11576518.html.
12
Shi uses the term ‘strategic overdraft’ to translate zhanlue touzhi. But the meaning is almost the same as ‘stra-
tegic overstretch’, which is a more commonly used term in the western IR and strategic studies literature.
13
Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London:
Unwin Hyman, 1987).
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 Rethinking China’s rise
between strategic goals and tactics.14 In March 2017, a special workshop on China’s
foreign policy and strategic overstretch was organized by Zhou Fangyin at Guang-
dong University of Foreign Studies.15 Participants in the workshop included
scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University and
Nankai University, as well as policy-makers from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.16

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Most of the papers presented were later published as a special issue of the Journal
of Strategy and Decision-making (Zhanlue jueche yanjiu) in 2017. Chinese scholars also
published their opinions on the topic through other journals and media outlets.
Luo Jianbo, a professor at the Central Party School of the CCP, published an
influential essay calling for the Chinese government to prioritize domestic welfare
rather than seeking world leadership.17 Through various media outlets, Tsinghua
Professor Yan Xuetong has argued that China should clarify the priority of its
national interests and avoid ‘strategic rash advance’ (zhanlue maojin).18
Why has the topic of strategic overstretch become increasingly salient in China’s
foreign policy community? Why do Chinese scholars take different positions on
the issue? What are the implications for Chinese foreign policy and international
relations? This article aims to provide an updated analysis of Chinese strategic
debate that will shed new light on Chinese foreign policy. The first section explains
why the debate over China’s strategic overstretch is interesting and important.
The second section analyses the context of the debate, highlighting the changing
domestic and international contexts. The third section interprets the scholarly
debate. The fourth section discusses implications for Chinese foreign policy. The
conclusion summarizes the findings and implications.

Why does the debate matter?

The debate over strategic overstretch may seem an unlikely and counter-intuitive
phenomenon in Chinese foreign policy. First, while most studies on the topic in
the western IR literature focus on cases of empire, hegemonic power or established
powers,19 contemporary China is instead a rising power. Second, Chinese internal

14
Shi Yinhong, ‘Chuantong zhonguo jingyan yu dangdai zhongguo shijian: zhanlue tiaozheng, zhanlve touzhi
yu weida fuxing wenti’ [Traditional Chinese experience and contemporary Chinese practice: strategic adjust-
ment, strategic overdraft, and national rejuvenation], Waijiao pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 6, 2015, pp. 57–68.
15
Guangdong University of Foreign Studies has recently become one of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s key
partners of policy research. The other key partners include, among others, Peking University, Fudan Univer-
sity and Tsinghua University.
16
Xiaoyu Pu attended this workshop in March 2017.
17
Luo’s article was originally published in the Financial Times (Chinese edition), and later was widely distributed
in China’s social media. But it was eventually censored in China and was also taken down from its original
website. Some overseas Chinese websites still have the article. See Luo Jianbo, ‘Zhongguo de jiushizhu xintai
yao bude’ [China should avoid the mindset of a world saviour], Xianggangshangbao [Hongkong Business], 25 May
2017, http://www.hkcd.com/content/2017-05/25/content_1049740.html.
18
Yan Xuetong, ‘Zhongguo yinggai mingque guojialiyi paixu, fangfan zhanlue maojin’ [China should clarify
priority of national intersts, avoid strategic rash advance], Fenghuangwang [Phoenix Satellite TV Website],
3 Aug. 2017, http://pit.ifeng.com/a/20170803/51555156_0.shtml.
19
For research and debate on strategic overstretch in the western context, see Kennedy, The rise and fall of the Great
Powers; Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, ‘Graceful decline? The surprising success of Great Power
retrenchment’, International Security 35: 4, 2011, pp. 7–44; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C.
Wohlforth, ‘Don’t come home, America: the case against retrenchment’, International Security 37: 3, 2013, pp.  7–51.
1021
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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
debate over strategic overstretch may present a contrast with China’s image on the
global stage.20 It is widely known that China under Xi Jinping has pursued a much
more ambitious and assertive foreign policy at both regional and global levels.21
Why would Chinese elites consider strategic overstretch a potentially important
problem? Third, given tightening political control and censorship in China,22

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it is surprising to find any discussions that deviate noticeably from the official
pro­paganda line. By demonstrating the existence of diverse opinion in China, our
study might potentially challenge the image of the monolithic Chinese state.23
The scholarly debate provides a window on Chinese foreign policy. An
increasing amount of research focuses on the relationship between the academic
world and foreign policy making in China.24 China’s foreign policy-making process
has become increasingly complicated, with different institutions and government
agencies sometimes advocating different interests.25 The increasingly complex
decision-making process has created space for a variety of voices to emerge. To
conceptualize the relationship between scholars and the foreign policy-making
process in China, Huiyun Feng and Kai He suggest that there are four models: the
epistemic community model, the free market model, the signalling model and the
mirroring policy model.26 These different models highlight different relationships
between scholarly debates and policy-making circles in China. It should be noted
that these four models are heuristic frameworks that may help us understand the
relationship between the academic world and the policy process in China; they
are not meant to be mutually exclusive.
We propose an information model that combines the insight from both the
mirroring policy model and the signalling model. In the proposed information
model, the relationship between academic research and policy decision-making is
a two-way process. First, IR scholars can serve as a ‘mirror’ to reflect the orienta-
tion of Chinese policy-makers. This might reflect a general cross-national pattern
20
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
21
Xiaoyu Pu, Dingding Chen and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Debating China’s assertiveness’, International Security
38: 3, 2014, pp. 176–83; Nien-chung Chang Liao, ‘The sources of China’s assertiveness: the system, domestic
politics or leadership preferences?’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 817–33; Nordin and Weissmann,
‘Will Trump make China great again?’.
22
Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, ‘How censorship in China allows government criticism
but silences collective expression’, American Political Science Review 107: 2, 2013, pp. 1–18; Margaret E. Roberts,
Censored: distraction and diversion inside China’s great firewall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
23
We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
24
Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, ‘Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes: evolving roles and
increasing influence’, China Quarterly, no. 171, 2002, pp. 597–616; David Shambaugh, ‘China’s international
relations think tanks: evolving structure and process’, China Quarterly, no. 171, 2002, pp. 575–96; Quansheng
Zhao, ‘Epistemic community, intellectuals, and Chinese foreign policy’, Policy and Society 25: 1, 2006, pp.
39–59; Bonnie Glaser and Evan Medeiros, ‘The changing ecology of foreign policy-making in China: the
ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”’, China Quarterly, no. 190, 2007, pp. 291–310; Huiyun
Feng and Kai He, ‘How Chinese scholars think about Chinese foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Political
Science 51: 4, 2016, pp. 694–710; Huiyun Feng and Kai He, ‘Why Chinese international relations (IR) scholars
matter: understanding the rise of China through the eyes of Chinese IR scholars’, paper presented at Griffith–
Tsinghua workshop, ‘Chinese scholars debate International Relations’, December 2016, Beijing; Xu Jin and
Li Wei, Gaige kaifang yilai zhongguo duiwai zhengce bianqian yanjiu [The study of China’s foreign policy change
in the opening and reform era] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2016).
25
Qingmin Zhang, ‘Bureaucratic politics and Chinese foreign policymaking’, Chinese Journal of International
­Politics 9: 4, 2016, pp. 435–58.
26
Feng and He, ‘Why Chinese international relations (IR) scholars matter’.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
of academic–policy relationship as well as some Chinese characteristics. As many
IR scholars take a problem-driven approach to research, it is natural that their
research might resonate with the concerns of policy-makers in their country.27 In
the Chinese context, too, the government has used funding opportunities to shape
the research agenda of scholars.28 Second, scholarly research serves an important

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feedback function for policy-makers. Chinese scholars are increasingly partici-
pating in policy deliberation processes hosted by a range of government institu-
tions. These scholars may be able to shape foreign policy through various channels,
including consultations with policy-makers, internal reports, conferences, public
policy debates and so on.29 The scholarly debate could help the Chinese govern-
ment to test the waters with potential policies. In the foreign policy process, it
makes sense to collect reactions from both domestic and international audiences,
and the scholarly debate can facilitate this process.30
As we emphasize the policy relevance of Chinese scholarly debate, so we should
also note some caveats. First, China has a vibrant scholarly community of IR
specialists, and there are genuine academic debates on a variety of issues.31 Think-
tanks in China do not just promote the government policy agenda; they can also
potentially play a public advocacy role to promote policy change.32 In this sense,
we are not claiming that all scholars simply serve the propaganda purposes of the
Chinese government. Second, while we suggest that scholarly discussions serve
an important information function in shaping China’s foreign policy, we do not
exaggerate the role of scholars. In most cases, the scholarly discussions might shape
the implementation of policy, but they do not shape the fundamental direction
of policy decisions.33

Context
China’s international profile has changed dramatically in recent years, and the
debate over strategic overstretch occurs in a new era for Chinese foreign policy.
Just as in the cases of the British empire or American hegemony, the strategic
debate is shaped by economic circumstances and a changing international environ-
ment. The current debate over strategic overstretch is a part of China’s wider
discussions on its identity and role since the global financial crisis or even earlier.34
27
Jack Snyder, ‘One world, rival theories’, Foreign Policy, no. 145, 2004, pp. 52–62.
28
For instance, government funding shapes the research agenda of international law in China. See Anthea
Roberts, ‘China’s strategic use of research funding on international law’, Lawfare/Brookings Institution, 8
Nov. 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-strategic-use-research-funding-international-law.
29
Zhao, ‘Epistemic community, intellectuals, and Chinese foreign policy’, pp. 39–59.
30
Feng and He, ‘Why Chinese international relations (IR) scholars matter’, pp. 694–710.
31
David Shambaugh, ‘Coping with a conflicted China’, Washington Quarterly 34: 1, 2011, pp. 7–27; Pu, ‘Contro-
versial identity of a rising China’.
32
Xufeng Zhu, ‘Government advisors or public advocates? Roles of think tanks in China from the perspective
of regional variations’, China Quarterly, no. 207, 2011, pp. 668–86.
33
Xu Jin, ‘Debates in IR academia and China’s policy adjustments’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 9: 4,
2016, pp. 459–85.
34
Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power relations”’; Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun
Breslin, ‘Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China’, International Affairs 91: 2, March
2015, pp. 245–66; Barry Buzan, ‘China in international society: is “peaceful rise” possible?’, Chinese Journal of
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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
Within this wider context, several factors are especially salient in shaping the
context of the Chinese debate.
The global financial crisis impelled China to centre stage in global economic
governance. To some extent, China’s economic status has outgrown the expecta-
tions of the country’s political and intellectual elites. In a 2005 Foreign Affairs article,

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Zheng Bijian, a political adviser to the Chinese leadership, emphasized: ‘China’s
economy is one-seventh the size of the United States’ and one-third the size of
Japan’s.’35 It is likely the Chinese elites did not expect that, only five years later in
2010, China’s economy would surpass Japan’s. Since the global financial crisis shook
the legitimacy and leadership of the United States on the global stage, Chinese
scholars and commentators have been talking more about the rapid change of the
international order and China’s changing role in this shifting order.36 In particular,
there has been vociferous debate on whether China should keep the legacy of
Deng Xiaoping’s strategic guidance of tao guang yang hui (generally understood as
meaning a ‘low-profile’ approach).37 Deng’s strategic thinking about China’s inter-
national posture has had an enduring impact on China’s diplomacy. While China
has emerged from being a marginalized actor to become an emerging superpower
on the world stage, some Chinese elites still think that their country should keep
a low profile in international affairs.38 Others think it should pursue a strategy
of ‘striving for achievement’.39 Some take a middle approach, emphasizing that
‘continuity through change is a realistic description of China’s present interna-
tional strategy’.40
The election of Donald Trump as US president has generated uncertainty in
international relations. As America under the Trump presidency has become more
inward-looking, China has implemented a much more active global diplomacy,
taking new international initiatives and hosting many multilateral meetings.41
Does a more inward-looking America provide a golden opportunity for China to
play a more prominent role on the global stage? According to strategic thinker and
CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria, the answer is absolutely yes: ‘Trump could
be the best thing that has happened to China in a long time.’42 In the view of He
International Politics 3: 1, 2010, pp. 5–36. For analysis of China’s striving for status and role before the global
financial crisis, see Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and
hedging’, International affairs 82: 1, Jan. 2006, pp. 77–94; Yong Deng, China’s struggle for status: the realignment of
international relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
35
Zheng Bijian, ‘China’s “peaceful rise” to great-power status’, Foreign Affairs 84: 5, 2005, p. 19.
36
Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘After unipolarity: China’s visions of international order in an era of US
decline’, International Security 36: 1, 2011, pp. 41–72; Yong Deng, ‘China: the post-responsible power’, Wash-
ington Quarterly 37: 4, 2014, pp. 117–32; Pu, ‘Controversial identity of a rising China’.
37
Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, ‘Lying low no more? China’s new thinking on the tao guang yang hui strat-
egy’, China: An International Journal 9: 2, 2011, pp. 195–216.
38
Wang Jisi, ‘The view from China’, Foreign Affairs 97: 4, 2018, p. 184.
39
Chen and Wang, ‘Lying low no more?’; Xuetong Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile to striving for achieve-
ment’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 7: 2, 2014, pp. 153–84.
40
Yaqing Qin, ‘Continuity through change: background knowledge and China’s international strategy’, Chinese
Journal of International Politics 7: 3, 2014, pp. 285–314.
41
It should be noted that some of China’s new initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, were proposed long before Trump’s presidency. Trump is important in shap-
ing China’s policy thinking, but not all the changes are a result of his arrival in power in the US.
42
‘Trump could be the best thing that’s happened to China in a long time’, Washington Post, 12 Jan. 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-could-be-the-best-thing-thats-happened-to-china-in-
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 Rethinking China’s rise
Yafei, a former vice foreign minister of China, the political developments of 2017
have accelerated the arrival of the ‘post-American era’, which started with the 2008
financial crisis.43 For many years, the United States urged China to take up the role
of a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the American-led global order, while China for its
part generally played a more passive role as a large developing country. Since the

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2016 US election, however, world politics has entered an uncertain and turbulent
period, in which the United States and China in particular seem to be shifting in
their roles on the global stage. At the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in
Davos in January 2017, President Xi, drawing on China’s own experience, actively
defended globalization and offered a vision of inclusive, sustainable development.44
Xi also made a major speech at the UN in Geneva, highlighting the vision of
building a shared future for humankind; he even talked about humanitarian issues,
saying: ‘In the face of frequent humanitarian crises, we should champion the spirit
of humanity, compassion, and dedication and give love and hope to the innocent
people caught in dire situations.’45 Meanwhile, in his inauguration speech, US
President Donald Trump attacked American global engagement and highlighted
the ‘America first’ principle.46
In recent years, China has pursued a more active foreign policy. No longer
do Chinese leaders typically emphasize the ‘low-profile’ approach to global
affairs; now leaders and intellectuals alike enthusiastically embrace such concepts
as ‘global governance’ (quanqiu zhili) and the ‘China solution’ (zhongguo fangan).
Both these concepts have been mentioned with increasing frequency in China’s
social science journals. A content analysis of Xi’s speeches shows that he too has
mentioned ‘global governance’ specifically more and more often in recent years
(see figure 1). Furthermore, the politburo of the CCP has held two special sessions
on global governance, at which two IR scholars—Qin Yaqing and Gao Fei from
the China Foreign Affairs University—were invited to give lectures to high-
ranking Chinese leaders.47
Despite occasional triumphalism in the Chinese media, China’s top elites remain
for the most part sober-minded.48 As China increasingly plays a more active role
on the global stage, some elite figures emphasize that it should take a positive and

a-long-time/2017/01/12/f4d71a3a-d913-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.a1214900a0ef; Nana
de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘US–China relations and the liberal world order: contending elites,
colliding visions’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 113–32.
43
He Yafei, ‘The “American century” has come to its end’, Global Times, 20 Aug. 2017, http://www.globaltimes.
cn/content/1062243.shtml.
44
Xi Jinping, ‘President Xi’s speech to Davos in full’, World Economic Forum, 17 Jan. 2017, https://www.
weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum/.
45
Xi Jinping, ‘Speech by Xi Jinping at the United Nations office at Geneva’, China.org.cn, 25 Jan. 2017, http://
www.china.org.cn/chinese/2017-01/25/content_40175608.htm.
46
Donald J. Trump, ‘The inaugural address’, The White House, 20 Jan. 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
inaugural-address; Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’, Inter-
national Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1013–38.
47
‘Xi Jinping emphasizes the importance of building a more fair and reasonable institution of global gover-
nance for China’s development and world peace’, Xinhua.net, 13 Oct. 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2015-10/13/c_1116812159.htm; ‘Xi Jinping proclaims to strengthen cooperation in transforming the
global system of governance and promoting the peace and development of humanity’, Xinhua.net, 28 Sept.
2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-09/28/c_1119641652.htm.
48
Wang, ‘The view from China’, p. 184.
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Figure 1: Use of phrases ‘Global Governance’, ‘China Solution’ and their
synonym in Xi Jinping’s speeches and Chinese social science journals, 2012-
Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
2017.
Figure 1: Use of phrases ‘global governance’, ‘China solution’ and their synonyms
in Xi Jinping’s speeches and Chinese social science journals, 2012-2017.
450 14
400 12
350
10

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300
250 8
200 6
150
4
100
50 2
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Academic articles: 'global
124 175 188 227 393 424
goverance'
Academic articles: 'China
0 1 2 5 42 134
solution'
Xi Jinping: 'global governace' 0 3 7 11 9 12

non-zero-sum approach to global governance. For instance, Qin Yaqing empha-
sizes three
themes in China’s approach to global governance: multilateralism;
public goods provision; and the positive role of Chinese culture.49

Interpretations
As Chinese scholars debate strategic overstretch, what are the points of agree-
ment and difference among them? This section addresses this question by
analysing original Chinese materials from several sources: first, the special issue
of the Journal of Strategy and Decision-making (mentioned above), which published
revised papers from the Guangzhou workshop in 2017; second, articles published
by leading Chinese scholars in journals and media outlets that directly discuss
strategic overstretch; third, some Chinese articles focusing on specific policy issues
that indirectly reflect the discussions of strategic overstretch; and finally, several
rounds of interviews with Chinese scholars and policy-makers conducted by Pu.50
It should be noted that the materials were selected qualitatively rather than on
the basis of standardized criteria. This distinguishes our work from other studies
that analyse Chinese IR journals in a more quantitative way.51 While the external
validity or the extent to which the results of our study could be extended to a
49
Pu’s discussion with Qin Yaqing, president of China Foreign Affairs University, Ningbo, China, 18 May 2018.
Qin has elaborated some of his ideas in published work. See Yaqing Qin, ‘Rule, rules, and relations: towards
a synthetic approach to governance’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 4: 2, 2011, pp. 117–45; Yaqing Qin,
A relational theory of world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 318–56.
50
The interviews were conducted in two formats. First, in 2017 and 2018, Pu made five trips to China for meetings
and research, during the course of which he took the opportunity to discuss the topic with dozens of leading
Chinese scholars and several policy-makers. For instance, this author met all participants of the Guangzhou
workshop in March 2017, and also interacted with Chinese strategic thinkers and senior diplomats in Beijing
in August 2017. Second, in early June 2018, Pu sent an email to six influential Chinese scholars, requesting
them to update him with new thinking on the debate. These interviews helped to identify new contributions
to the debate, and also to clarify the mechanisms by which academic and policy circles interact in China.
51
See e.g. Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’; Zeng and Breslin, ‘China’s “new type of Great Power
relations”’.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
wider context might be limited, the purpose of the article is not to demonstrate
how widely these ideas might be distributed in China’s foreign policy community;
rather, our aim here is primarily to analyse the internal logic and policy context
of the debate. Our qualitative approach also has some advantages: we pay close
attention to the influence of the scholars in China’s foreign policy community,

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and Chinese materials are analysed on the basis of their theoretical frameworks as
well as their policy implications.
Most Chinese scholars agree that the topic itself is a useful one for China’s
foreign policy community to study. From the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to
the deployment of the Chinese military overseas, the country is actively involved
in various issues of global governance. China needs a well-designed strategy
to maintain a favourable environment for its rise. Even though some scholars
dispute the contention that it already has a problem of strategic overstretch, they
acknowledge the positive value of discussing the problem as a valuable reminder
for Chinese policy-makers.52 One senior military strategist said: ‘I believe the
Chinese leaders are wise enough not to make the mistake of strategic overstretch.
However, it is still useful for some scholars to discuss such an issue.’53
As Chinese scholars and analysts take different positions on the subject, how
do we classify the debate theoretically? In a general sense, grand strategy refers to
‘the distinctive combination of military, political, and economic means by which
a state seeks to ensure its national interests’.54 Three questions are related to grand
strategy: what are the core interests? What are the major threats? How can a
nation defend its interests against those threats?55 In this article, we focus on three
dimensions of grand strategic debate: goals, means and time horizon.
Regarding the goals of China’s grand strategy, Chinese scholars have different
interpretations of the priorities of China’s national interests. According to Shi
Yinhong, China is using both ‘strategic military’ (zhanlue junshi) and ‘strategic
economics’ (zhanlue jingji) to fulfil its long-term goal of expanding its power in
Asia and the western Pacific. The key question is how to keep an internal balance
between ‘strategic striving’ (zhanlue tujin) and ‘strategic prudence’ (zhanlue
shensheng).56 Shi identifies some worrisome trends: in the security domain, China
has had an increasingly tense relationship with several regional countries owing to
maritime disputes, and in economic statecraft, the BRI has dramatically expanded
the Chinese presence in many regions. Shi cautions that the country’s foreign
52
Liu Feng, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’[Strategic overstretch: a conceptual analysis], Zhanlue jueche
yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3, 2017, pp. 25–30; Zhou Fangyin, ‘Fengfa youwei de shouyi
yu chengben’ [The cost–benefit analysis of striving for achievement], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy
and Decision-making] 3, 2017, pp. 56–68.
53
Pu’s discussion with General Gong Xianfu, vice-chairman of the China Institute for International Strategic
Studies, Beijing, Aug. 2017. It should be noted that this attitude is widely shared within China’s foreign policy
community. See also Liu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’.
54
Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China’s grand strategy and international security (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2005), p. 17.
55
Wang Jisi, ‘China’s search for a grand strategy: a rising Great Power finds its way’, Foreign Affairs 90: 2, 2011,
pp. 68–79.
56
Shi Yinhong, ‘Guanyu zhongguo duiwai zhanlue youhua he zhanlue shensheng wenti de sikao’ [Thoughts
on strategic improvement and strategic prudence in foreign policy], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal] 23: 6,
2015, pp. 1–5.
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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
policy might have focused on too many projects. In this process, it might lose its
focus in the implementation of its strategy. According to Yan Xuetong, a wise
foreign policy starts from a clear definition of national interest. China’s ‘core
national interests’ is a vague concept in Chinese academic discourse, despite its
increasing use by the government to legitimize its diplomatic actions and claims.

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While there are some agreed bottom lines, there remains a lack of clarity about
what issues deserve to be defined as core interests.57 China has not yet developed
a coherent foreign policy strategy largely because it does not have a clear defini-
tion of its identity and status.58 Not surprisingly, China’s foreign policy often
demonstrates a contradictory tendency in practice. Using a metaphor, Ye Hailing,
a senior analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), suggests that
Chinese foreign policy often has contradictory goals, just like a person who is
chasing two rabbits in opposite directions.59 In Shi Yinhong’s analysis, China’s
problem with strategic overstretch is obvious and has resulted in tense relation-
ships with neighbouring countries as well as the distractions arising from too
many concurrent projects. Yan Xuetong thinks that China is still a rising power,
not a global power, and that it should therefore give priority to its regional inter-
ests in Asia, rather than global interests.60 Scholars such as Shi and Yan believe
China has a problem with strategic overstretch or a strategically rash advance, as
they think its national interests should be more limited.
Others, however, think the concept of strategic overstretch is not applicable to
Chinese foreign policy. Nankai University Professor Liu Feng suggests that the
concept of strategic overstretch is poorly defined, and is often used in an inappro-
priate way.61 Liu defines strategic overstretch more rigorously and narrowly, and
argues that it occurs only where (1) the cost of expansion exceeds the capabili-
ties of resource absorption and mobilization, and (2) the strategy ultimately
causes permanent damage to a Great Power.62 Tsinghua University Professor
Sun Xuefeng emphasizes that strategic overstretch is primarily applicable in the
context of hegemonic power, empire or established power.63
Regarding the means of defending China’s interests, there are different inter-
pretations of the postures the country has taken. Some think China has become
overstretched and in doing so has generated regional tensions. However, other
scholars interpret China’s actions as defensive—the implicit assumption being that
if its posturing is largely defensive, it should not be viewed as strategic overstretch
no matter how costly its foreign policy behaviours might be. For instance, while
57
Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’.
58
Pu, ‘Controversial identity of a rising China’.
59
Ye Hailing, ‘Zhanlue mubiao xuanze, zhanlve youxian fangxiang yu zhanglve touzhi de kenengxing’ [Choice
of strategic goal, strategic priority, and the possibilities of strategic overstretching], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu
­[Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3, 2017, pp. 12–17.
60
Yan Xuetong, ‘Waijiao zhuanxing, liyi paixu yu daguo jueqi’ [Diplomatic transformation, prioritizing of
interests, and the rise of Great Powers], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3,
2017, pp. 4–12.
61
Liu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’.
62
Liu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’.
63
Sun Xuefeng, ‘Zhanlve xuanze yu jueqiguo zhanlve touzhi’ [Strategic choice and strategic overstretching of
rising powers], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3, 2017, pp. 31–41.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
Shi Yinhong suggests that China’s overstretch might cause tensions with neigh-
bouring countries and the United States,64 scholars such as Zou Zhibo and
Zhou Fangyin argue that China is essentially defending its own sovereignty and
rights.65 This divide between defensive and expansive posturing is also reflected
in the discussions of the South China Sea disputes and Sino-American tensions.

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Regarding China’s maritime disputes, there are different opinions in China: some
propose that China should take a more assertive posture while others suggest that
it should seek accommodations with neighbouring countries.66 Regarding Sino-
American relations, some scholars speculate that China’s high-profile behaviour
(including exaggeration of China’s rise in domestic propaganda) might poten-
tially increase the threat perception of China in western countries, leading to
an increasing backlash from the United States.67 However, others suggest that
Sino-American relations are driven by structural factors and America’s domestic
politics, not assertive behaviour on China’s part.68
There are also different relative emphases on military and economic means in
China’s foreign policy. CASS scholar Gao Chen partially agrees with Shi’s analysis
on strategic overstretch. In evaluating China’s strategic challenges, Gao makes a
distinction between the security and economic domains. In the economic domain,
she argues, China is facing a danger of overstretch, as the efficiency of China’s
economic statecraft is problematic. However, in the security domain China’s
problem is the opposite: it is not that China is overstretched, but that it has not
done enough.69 The competing logics of security and economic means may be
especially relevant in discussion of the BRI. China has put huge resources into
implementing the BRI, and it has become Xi Jinping’s signature project. The
country has often implemented a strategy to promote political influence through
economic means, and the BRI can be viewed as an extension of this strategy.70 But
the BRI faces many challenges, including security threats, geopolitical competition
and regional backlash.71 While China might want to mitigate its security challenges

64
Shi, ‘Chuantong zhonguo jingyan yu dangdai zhongguo shijian: zhanlue tiaozheng, zhanlue touzhi yu weida
fuxing wenti’, pp. 57–68.
65
Zou Zhibo is a senior research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Science. Zhou Fangyin is a professor
and programme director at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. See Zou Zhibo, ‘Yu shiyinhong jiu
zhanluetouzhi shangque’ [Debating strategic overdraft with Shiyin Hong], Fenghuangwang [Phoenix Satel-
lite TV Website], 26 Sept. 2016, http://news.ifeng.com/dacankao/bianshiyinhong/1.shtml; Zhou, ‘Fengfa
youwei de shouyi yu chengben’.
66
Fangyin Zhou, ‘Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy’,
International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 869–90; Feng Zhang, ‘Chinese thinking on the South China Sea and
the future of regional security’, Political Science Quarterly 132: 3, 2017, pp. 435–66.
67
Zuo, ‘Zhanlue jinzheng shidai de zhongmeiguanxi tujin’.
68
Gao Chen, ‘Zhongmei jinzheng tiaojianxia dui “wending fazhan zhongmei guanxi” de zai shengshi’
[Re-examining the proposal of “developing stable Sino-American relations” in the context of Sino-American
competition], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 2, 2018, pp. 14–25.
69
Gao Chen, ‘Zhongguo zuowei juqi daguo de zhanlve touzhi wenti tanxi’ [The analysis of the strategic over-
stretch of China as a rising power], Zhanlue jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3, 2017,
pp.  49–55.
70
Xiaoyu Pu, ‘One Belt, One Road: visions and challenges of China’s geoeconomic strategy’, Mainland China
Studies 59: 3, 2016, pp. 111–32.
71
Xue Li, ‘Zhongguo “yidai yilu” zhanlue miandui de waijiao fengxian’ [The diplomatic risk of China’s One Belt
One Road strategy], Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review], no. 2, 2015, pp. 68–79; Zhang Yunling,
‘One Belt, One Road’, Global Asia 10: 3, 2015, pp. 8–12; Peter Ferdinand, ‘Westward ho—the China dream and
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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
through economic incentives, whether the BRI can mitigate its existing security
problems is debatable.72
The final factor shaping strategic thinking considered here is the time horizon.
While most scholars would agree that the essence of strategic overstretch is
similar to economic cost–benefit analysis, the political nature of strategic evalu-

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ation brings fundamental uncertainty and complexity to the discussion. Zhou
Fangyin highlights the time horizon as an important uncertain factor. The impact
of foreign policy is often apparent only in the long term, and it is difficult to use
short-term outcomes to judge the success or failure of a foreign policy initiative.
Instead of evaluating China’s strategy with reference to short-term interests and
returns, Zhou therefore suggests a long-term view be taken in judging Chinese
foreign policy. He argues that a grand strategy yields returns over a long period;
accordingly, it would be normal to see spending on a strategy exceeding its returns
during the early stages of its implementation. As long as the deficits are not persis-
tent, and the burden is not unsustainable for the national economy, there will be
no strategic overstretch.73
Time horizon is also related to another matter: the speed of China’s rise. Both
Yan Xuetong and Liu Feng suggest that the expansion of China’s power is a
natural tendency: a rising China should increase its power and raise its status in
the international arena. In this sense, strategic overstretch is largely not applicable
to a rising China.74 For established powers, the fundamental question is the scope
of their military and diplomatic presence, and there is a real danger of strategic
overstretch. For rising powers such as China, the key risk is not the scope and
direction of their expanding influence, but the speed and priorities of their rise.
According to Yan and Liu, China’s key problem is ‘strategic rash advance’ (zhanlue
maojin).75 Agreeing with Yan and Liu, Feng Chuanlu argues that China’s growing
influence in the Indian Ocean is not a case of strategic overstretch, but an inevi-
table expansion of influence as China’s interests are expanding internationally.76
Other scholars disagree. For instance, according to Jiang Peng, a maritime power
(such as the United States) could potentially strengthen alliances with China’s
neighbouring land powers to balance against China. A rising China should avoid
such a strategic overstretch problem by strengthening cooperation with neigh-
bouring countries.77
Above all, Chinese scholarly debate on strategic overstretch may reflect the
concerns of Chinese policy-makers, given the current pursuit by China of a more
ambitious foreign policy. There are many inherent difficulties and uncertainties

“One Belt, One Road”: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 941–57.
72
Pu, ‘One Belt, One Road’.
73
Zhou, ‘Fengfa youwei de shouyi yu chengben’, pp. 56–68.
74
Yan, ‘Waijiao zhuanxing, liyi paixu yu daguo jueqi’; Liu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’.
75
Yan, ‘Waijiao zhuanxing, liyi paixu yu daguo jueqi’; Liu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi: yixiang gainian fenxi’.
76
Feng Chuanlu, ‘Zhanlue touzhi yihuo zhanlue shenzhang’ [Strategic overstretch or strategic growth], Yinduy-
ang jingjiti yanjiu [Study of Indian Ocean Economy], no. 4, 2017, pp. 1–24.
77
Peng Jiang, ‘Hailu fuhexing daguo jueqi de “feili xianjin” yu zhanlue touzhi’ [The trap of Philip II and the
strategic overstretch of the rising of ocean and land powers], Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific
Studies], no. 1, 2018, pp. 4–29.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
regarding strategic evaluations. CASS scholar Xu Jin suggests that the key feature
of strategic judgement is that it is an art belonging to political leaders.78 Chinese
scholars have different understandings of China’s national interests, and they also
differ on how strategic outcomes should be evaluated.

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Implications
Even though the overstretch debate has not yet changed Chinese foreign policy
in any fundamental way, it may reflect rethinking among Chinese elites about the
strategy and tactics of China’s rise on the global stage. These academic discussions
have important policy implications.
First, the debate reflects the strategic prudence and continuity of Chinese
foreign policy even as China has entered into a new era under the leadership of
Xi Jinping. Largely abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach in global
affairs, China under Xi has implemented a much more active and assertive foreign
policy. Some Chinese diplomats have started to talk about China’s leadership in
global governance more explicitly.79 As economic circumstances often shape
discussions of the trajectory of Great Powers, some Chinese analysts and officials
may have overestimated China’s rise and America’s decline since the global
­financial crisis.80 The debate over strategic overstretch reflects the emergence of
a cautious voice in China’s foreign policy community. Shi Yinhong’s argument
has stimulated deep reflection on the challenges and problems in China’s regional
diplomacy.81 Fudan University Professor Tang Shiping cautions about the
tendency to overestimate China’s capabilities to remake the international order.82
Such a cautious attitude is not restricted to certain Chinese scholars; some senior
officials express a similar point of view. During his visit to Australia in 2017,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cautioned against an inflated expectation of
China’s global role, saying that ‘China has no intention to lead anyone, nor does
it intend to replace anyone … As the largest developing country, China is moving
to work tirelessly for upholding the legitimate rise and interest of the developing
countries.’83 For many decades, Chinese officials have avoided describing China
as a potential superpower. Chinese officials associate superpower status with
hegemony, which has negative connotations in the Chinese context. While the
international audience increasingly views China as an emerging superpower that
should take a leadership role, Chinese intellectuals and policy-makers are not
78
Xu Jin, ‘Cong yishu de jiaodu kan zhanlve touzhi’ [The art of analysing strategic overstretching], Zhanlue
jueche yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-making], no. 3, 2017, pp. 42–8.
79
Reuters, ‘Senior Chinese diplomat: China will assume world leadership if needed’, Business Insider, 23 Jan. 2017,
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-diplomat-says-china-would-assume-world-leadership-if-needed-2017-1.
80
Zhen Qin, ‘Jinrong weiji yu zhongguo jueqi de lishi jiyu’ [Financial crisis and the historic opportunity of
China’s rising], Qiushi, no. 1, 2009, pp. 59–63; Joseph S. Nye, ‘American and Chinese power after the financial
crisis’, Washington Quarterly 33: 4, 2010, pp. 143–53.
81
Shi, ‘Guanyu zhongguo duiwai zhanlve youhua he zhanlve shensheng wenti de sikao’.
82
Shiping Tang, ‘China and the future international order(s)’, Ethics and International Affairs 32: 1, 2018, pp. 31–43.
83
Julie Bishop and Wang Yi, ‘Australia–China foreign and strategic dialogue’, transcript of joint press confer-
ence, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 7 Feb. 2017, http://
foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2017/jb_tr_170207.aspx.
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well prepared for China’s sudden high profile in global affairs, and some of them
continue to downplay the country’s elevated position.84
Second, the debate serves a useful feedback function for Chinese policy-
makers.85 While some Chinese scholars might doubt whether strategic overstretch
is applicable to China, designing and implementing a prudent grand strategy is

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an enduring challenge for all Great Powers. The problem of overstretch could
be further driven by domestic politics. According to Jack Snyder, some interest
groups often justify their parochial interests in terms of national security, and
promote the myth of security through expansion.86 In his masterpiece The myths
of empire, Snyder tells a dramatic story of imperial Japan. Shortly before the attack
on Pearl Harbor, a Japanese colonel returned from a fact-finding mission to the
United States and provided a report to the chief of the Japanese army’s general
staff. According to the colonel’s analysis, the United States was capable of ten
times the war production Japan could muster. The chief of staff commended the
colonel for an excellent report, burned it, and had the author fired.87 In ignoring
prudent strategic analysis such as this, Japanese elites initiated an unwinnable war.
In the new era of Chinese foreign policy, the BRI is especially significant, having
the potential to transform China’s domestic and foreign policies in the years to
come. At the 19th CCP Congress, the BRI was enshrined in the party constitu-
tion.88 This could give political weight to Xi’s hallmark initiative, as institutions
and government agencies in China now have political incentives to implement the
BRI. But the new status of the BRI in the CCP constitution might also create new
political dynamics: will opposing the BRI be viewed as a politically risky behav-
iour, almost as bad as opposing the CCP? Contemporary China is different from
imperial Japan. Chinese leaders should be wise enough not to destroy any honest
internal analysis of the BRI. The scholarly debate provides a useful feedback
mechanism for Chinese policy-makers as they implement many projects related
to the BRI.
Third, the time horizon is especially interesting in relation to China’s foreign
policy and international politics. In international politics, the relationship between
the rising power and the established power is often difficult. In power transition,
two factors are key to shaping the power dynamics and the potential for conflict:
the extent to which the rising power is catching up with the established power,
and the extent to which the rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo within
the existing order.89 The Chinese debate on strategic overstretch reflects a third
dimension of power transition: the speed of China’s rise and of the power shift.90
84
Pu, ‘Controversial identity of a rising China’.
85
Pu’s correspondence with Zhou Fangyin, 8 June 2018.
86
Jack Snyder, Myths of empire: domestic politics and international ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1991), pp. 14–19.
87
Snyder, Myths of empire, p. 112.
88
‘“Belt and road” incorporated into CPC constitution’, Xinhua, 24 Oct. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm
89
Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy, ‘Power shifts and problem shift: the evolution of the power transition
research program’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 43: 6, 1999, pp. 675–704.
90
For a book that brings the time horizon into theoretical discussion of power transition and the rise of China,
see Edelstein, Over the horizon.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
If China is eager to catch up with the United States in a short time, it will be more
difficult for the US to accommodate China’s increasing demands. However, if the
process of power shifting is gradual and incremental, this might create additional
space for both the rising power and the established power to make mutual adjust-
ments. According to IR scholar David Edelstein, the time horizon is important for

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understanding competition and cooperation in Great Power politics.91 Despite the
fact that Great Powers have strategic incentives to compete, cooperation is likely
to emerge under two conditions: when existing powers are focused on short-
term benefits, deferring anticipation of any long-term threats; and when rising
powers prefer to maintain cooperation that fuels their rise, rather than acting in
ways that raise concerns. The leaders of the established power tend to procrasti-
nate when dealing with long-term threats associated with a rising power, as they
hope to profit from short-term cooperation.92 In this sense, cooperation between
declining and rising powers is more common than we might think, as long as the
process of power shifting is long and incremental. To assure the continuity of
cooperation from established powers, rising powers must avoid acting too assert-
ively and too soon, which is likely to generate balancing and backlash from the
established powers.
Finally, China has moderated its foreign policy behaviour in several respects.93
For instance, it has recently improved its relationship with several neighbouring
countries, including India, Japan and the Philippines.94 Regarding the Sino-
American relationship, China has tried to maintain a stable relationship with the
United States under the Trump presidency.95 Recently, there has been a backlash
against increasing Chinese influence not only in the United States, but also in
Australia, New Zealand, Germany and other western countries.96 In response to
this backlash, there has been some rethinking of and reflection on Chinese foreign
policy. Shi Yinhong has called for the rethinking of a Chinese ‘triumphalism’,
which has been driven by rising nationalism, China’s rising power and domestic
propaganda.97 Supporters of China’s triumphalism advocate that the country
should take a tougher position in disputes about sovereignty and marine inter-
ests. Shi argues that on the contrary China should moderate its positions, and
that it is especially crucial to improve relationships with neighbouring countries.98
According to Peking University Professor Wang Jisi, while some American elites
worry about China’s perception of US decline, their Chinese counterparts are still
91
Edelstein, Over the horizon.
92
Edelstein, Over the horizon.
93
Shi Yinhong, ‘Deng Xiaoping zhihou de zhongguo: tanshuo guocheng zhong de duiwai guojia zhanlue’
[China after Deng Xiaoping: the search process for national foreign strategies], Meiguo yanjiu [Chinese Journal
of American Studies] 32: 3, 2018, pp. 27–8.
94
Shi, ‘Deng Xiaoping zhihou de zhongguo’, pp. 27–8.
95
Shi, ‘Deng Xiaoping zhihou de zhongguo’, p. 28.
96
Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘How sharp power threatens soft power’, Foreign Affairs, 24 Jan. 2018, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power.
97
Shi, ‘Deng Xiaoping zhihou de zhongguo’, pp. 20–22. Shi also provides a more detailed critique of ‘trium-
phalism’ in one of his earlier articles: see Shi Yinhong, ‘Zhongguo zhoubian xinwei zhong chengyou de
“shenglizhuyi”: dongneng he fuzhaxing’ [The ‘triumphalism’ in China’s neighbouring diplomatic behav-
iours: motivations and complexity], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Modern International Relations], no.10, 2013, pp. 3–5.
98
Shi, ‘Deng Xiaoping zhihou de zhongguo’, pp. 20–22.
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 Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang
debating whether the US is declining, and no consensus has emerged.99 According
to Renmin University professor Fang Changping, the top elites and many intel-
lectuals in China may still be cautious about their country’s power and status,
while Beijing’s propaganda system may have overemphasized China’s rise.100 In
responding to backlash from the US, Zhong Wei, a professor at Beijing Normal

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University, has said that the Chinese government should play down the signifi-
cance of the ‘Made in China 2025’ project.101 Recently, the Chinese propaganda
system indeed has somewhat downplayed the theme of China’s rise and America’s
decline.102
As discussed above, we cannot claim that the scholarly debate has fundamen-
tally shaped China’s foreign policy, but there is at least a clear correlation between
the emergence of a cautious voice in the academic world and the adjustment of
Chinese diplomacy in the policy world. While there are important limitations
regarding how the scholarly debate could shape policy, the debate may provide
valuable feedback as policy-makers implement and adjust policy in specific areas.

Conclusion
While most studies on strategic overstretch focus on cases of hegemonic or estab-
lished powers, Chinese scholars have started to debate the question of strategic
overstretch at home in recent years. This continuing debate reveals a high level of
uncertainty over China’s status and role on the global stage.
This debate is a part of China’s grand strategic debate in a wider context, and
has been further shaped by events. The global financial crisis has dramatically
increased China’s profile in global affairs. The election of Donald Trump to the
US presidency has also brought a new element of uncertainty to the international
system, and there are wide expectations that China should play a more active role
on the global stage. Largely abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach,
China has implemented a much more ambitious foreign policy. The BRI has the
potential to transform China’s domestic and foreign policies.
Most Chinese scholars agree that the debate over strategic overstretch is
valuable for China’s foreign policy community. They disagree on the extent to
which China already has such a problem. Some feel that strategic overstretch is
primarily applicable in the context of hegemonic power, empire or established
99
Wang, ‘The view from China’, p. 184.
100
Fang Changping, ‘Meiguo xiangdui shuaitui jiaju zhanlue jinzheng, zhongguo xuzai pinggu zhongmeiguanxi
yi weiyu choumou’ [The relative decline of US intensifies strategic competition, and China must rethink
Sino-American relations], The Paper, 14 March 2018, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2028051.
101
Frank Tang, ‘Is it time Beijing ditched “Made in China 2025” and stopped upsetting the rest of the world?’,
South China Morning Post, 4 June 2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2149223/it-time-
beijing-ditched-made-china-2025-and-stopped-upsetting.
102
Tara Francis Chan, ‘China quietly pulled a propaganda film celebrating its tech giants days after the US sanc-
tioned one of them’, Business Insider, 26 April 2018, https://www.businessinsider.nl/us-investigating-huawei-
breaching-iran-sanctions-2018-4/. In a recent commentary in People’s Daily, the CCP’s mouthpiece highlights
the enduring strengths of American hegemonic power, criticizing Trump’s exaggeration of America’s decline.
See ‘Telangpu bianben jiali, shi shihou geita suanqing jibi zhang le’ [Trump becomes relentless and it is time
to reckon the accounts], People’s Daily, 6 April 2018, https://m.21jingji.com/article/20180406/herald/10afdb6a
46551334ec73580decc8245e.html.
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 Rethinking China’s rise
power, and that for China, as a rising power, the expansion of power and influence
is inevitable: indeed, that by definition a rising power will expand its power and
influence. For an established power or empire, the key question is the scope of
its military presence, and there is real danger of strategic overstretch. For a rising
China, the key danger is not the scope or direction of its expanding influence,

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but the speed of its rise. In this sense, some Chinese scholars focus the discussion
on the idea of ‘strategic rash advance’ rather than strategic overstretch. There are
many inherent difficulties and uncertainties regarding strategic overstretch. A wise
foreign policy must start from a clear definition of national interest, but China
has different priorities and understanding of its identity, role and national interest.
There are also fundamentally different interpretations of China’s posturing as
defensive or expansive.
While the debate has not yet changed Chinese foreign policy in any fundamental
way, it may reflect the rethinking of Chinese elites on the strategy and tactics of
China’s rise in a new era. In responding to rising backlash and pressure, some
Chinese thinkers are calling for a moderation of Chinese ‘triumphalism’. While
it is hard to prove that the Chinese scholarly debate has fundamentally changed
Beijing’s foreign policy, there is at least a connection between the emergence of a
cautious voice and the moderation of this policy. The scholarly debate may both
reflect the concerns of policy-makers and also provide them with constructive
feedback.

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