Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994

RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission

which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban,
Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial
Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions.

On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma
had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her
and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma
suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital.
After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.

In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was
transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of
rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour
later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She
underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe
hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she
died.

Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus:

Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to
the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe
Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as
contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any
 showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of
contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23).

Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because
a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed
that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause
of death is non-work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher
increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25).

Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the
GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in
case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the
ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim.

On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said:

Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous
women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the
supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma
for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal
tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s)
to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of
the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted.
(Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).

On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a
syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by
vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary
circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in
angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with
myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of
one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle.
(Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101).

Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the
development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and
working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her
duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a
complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We
also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the
reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply
oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view
thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim
(Rollo, pp. 29-31).

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife.

II

Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the
ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that
as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which
appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition
was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of teaching — Banadero Elementary
School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the
school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner
asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant,
notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.

Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision
on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its
provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.

Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be
compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein
satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions
(Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and
presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies
(Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]).

Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the
ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of
contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily
discharge the onus imposed by law.

The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more
than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition
caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the
veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and
rectum.

Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than
one child, and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child — she
was already forty years old. Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus
(descensus uteri) as follows:

An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young
patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and
fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make
themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last
pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications,
as noted by Piver and Spezia.

The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or

overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments
(Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is usually
extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and
also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the
production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these
conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated
with the prolapse. Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have
 never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the
uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor (Emphasis supplied).

The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows:

Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the
pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments).
Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body
augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and
congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse.

The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth
pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and
changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth.

With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as
a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such
liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for
interpretation.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also
recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of
their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the
values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).

But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex
gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion
among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law.
The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the
present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation
decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of
increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the
risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's
working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the
necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be
presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand,
the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not
compensable because the law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four
years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of
vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She
was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that
time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
 2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the
present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p.
17, Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet,
positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general.
The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid
laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It
makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a
blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases
prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood
forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp
and paper mills and plywood mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing
vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain
cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of
radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as
follows:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed

by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work-
related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of
employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are
entitled. It provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by
employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say
that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to
the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof
cannot be presumed .

In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court
recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks
of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by
specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot
conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions
interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has
been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's
compensation law and the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the
new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The
present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission.
The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability.
(Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142
SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May
11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a
social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims
are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new
law by explaining the present system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the

constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that
the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when
his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on
appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and
rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the
worker's constitutional rights.

xxx xxx xxx

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no
notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim
with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on
the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not
compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of
administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums
to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands
for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It
does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and
it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules
on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that

should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or
not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions,
controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the
present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was
enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is
more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until
Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply
it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding
of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed
against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of
favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers
if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees
in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution
which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-
compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove
a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it
from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout
the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust
fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of
contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number
of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability
of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled
and in the increased amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated
are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for
compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased
contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is
Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in
judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the
actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other
excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may
be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing
benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the
powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision
expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128
SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664
(1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions
different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public
respondents is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan , C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I do not think that the Labor Code intended to do away with the "presumption of compensability"
prevailing under the old Workmen's Compensation Act. It must be noted that as a social legislation,
the Code is fundamentally a measure intended to afford protection unto the working class. If any
protection should be given to labor, it is in workmen's compensation cases that protection is a felt
need.

The primacy that the majority would give to the integrity of the trust fund 'to which the tens of millions
of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and
deaths occur is 1 correct but, in my view, hardly the point. In granting the petitioner compensation, I do not believe we would have
dissipated substantially the State Insurance Fund, and considering the fact that the petitioner is a victim herself.

It must likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain tumor), whose cause
medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too much to make her prove that her
illness was caused by work or aggravated by it, when experts themselves are ignorant as to what
brings it about.

I do not believe, finally, that the question in a matter for legislation. Compassion, it is my view, is
reason enough.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 27, 1981 of respondent-
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1692 entitled "Zaida G. Raro vs.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which dismissed the claim of petitioner Zaida G.
Raro for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended for her ailment
diagnosed as "brain tumor."

Petitioner assigns the following alleged errors:

First

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN

TUMOR IS ALLEGEDLY NOT A LISTED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE; HENCE,
PETITIONER IS REQUIRED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT IT
WAS CAUSED BY HER EMPLOYMENT.

Second

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN

TUMOR WHICH CAUSE IS UNKNOWN CANNOT BE CAUSED BY THE NATURE
OF PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT.
 Third

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING BRAIN

TUMOR AS A BORDERLINE CASE, HENCE COMPENSABLE.

Fourth

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION DISOBEYED THE STATUTORY

MANDATE THAT ALL DOUBTS SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR
AND IGNORED THE NATURE OF LABOR LAWS AS SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS.

The undisputed facts, summarized by the Office of the Solicitor-General, are as follows:

Petitioner was hired as clerk on March 17, 1975 by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its
office in Daet, Camarines Norte.

In the course of her employment, petitioner contracted an ailment which was diagnosed as brain
tumor. Petitioner stopped working because of said ailment.

On January 7, 1980, petitioner filed with respondent GSIS a claim for disability benefits under P.D.
626, as amended.

On November 24, 1980, respondent GSIS denied petitioner's claim on the ground that brain tumor
was not an occupational disease. Respondent GSIS also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal, respondent ECC sustained the GSIS decision.

We find this petition impressed with merit.

While "brain tumor" is not expressly or specifically referred to as an occupational disease, and while
admittedly its precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the disease is akin to "cancer of the
brain" and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or a borderline case. At any rate, the
precise work of the petitioner at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following:

As Mining Recorder II, to record and file mining instruments and documents in the
Mining Recorder's Section and to type correspondence and other documents
pertaining to the same action. (See petitioner's Brief, Rollo, p. 13).

It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration. Whether this is
specifically causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but doubts must generally be resolved
in favor whenever compensation for disease is concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw
upon petitioner the burden of showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease,
particularly when both the GSIS and ECC profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the
disease.

Nowhere is this truism more glaring than in cancer, the most dreaded of all diseases mankind has
ever known. Held the Supreme Court in the case of Acosta v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (L-55464, Nov. 12, 1981): "It is generally accepted that the exact origin of practically all
types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of
discovering the most effective cure for the malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect
ordinary persons to prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts
themselves are still in the dark."

In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore
the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. Thus in the
case of 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We ruled as follows:

While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused

under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New
Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is
significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured
by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work connection, (103 SCRA 329, 336).

... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined
even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the
ailment and the working conditions petitions should be liberalized so that those who
have less in life will have more in law ... .

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of
compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment – the cause or origin of
which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science – was in fact
caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions.
Plainly the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said
claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science
and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical
experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease.
Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the
impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or
imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276).

... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until
his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the
fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid., p.
277).

In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 1 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and
Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the
rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated:

Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment
or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved.
Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exist
For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is my humble opinion that this petition should be GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission should be SET ASIDE and
another should be rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.
Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I do not think that the Labor Code intended to do away with the "presumption of compensability"
prevailing under the old Workmen's Compensation Act. It must be noted that as a social legislation,
the Code is fundamentally a measure intended to afford protection unto the working class. If any
protection should be given to labor, it is in workmen's compensation cases that protection is a felt
need.

The primacy that the majority would give to the integrity of the trust fund 'to which the tens of millions
of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and
deaths occur is 1 correct but, in my view, hardly the point. In granting the petitioner compensation, I do not believe we would have
dissipated substantially the State Insurance Fund, and considering the fact that the petitioner is a victim herself.

It must likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain tumor), whose cause
medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too much to make her prove that her
illness was caused by work or aggravated by it, when experts themselves are ignorant as to what
brings it about.

I do not believe, finally, that the question in a matter for legislation. Compassion, it is my view, is
reason enough.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 27, 1981 of respondent-
Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1692 entitled "Zaida G. Raro vs.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which dismissed the claim of petitioner Zaida G.
Raro for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended for her ailment
diagnosed as "brain tumor."

Petitioner assigns the following alleged errors:

First

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN

TUMOR IS ALLEGEDLY NOT A LISTED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE; HENCE,
PETITIONER IS REQUIRED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT IT
WAS CAUSED BY HER EMPLOYMENT.

Second

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BRAIN

TUMOR WHICH CAUSE IS UNKNOWN CANNOT BE CAUSED BY THE NATURE
OF PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT.

Third
 THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING BRAIN
TUMOR AS A BORDERLINE CASE, HENCE COMPENSABLE.

Fourth

THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION DISOBEYED THE STATUTORY

MANDATE THAT ALL DOUBTS SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR
AND IGNORED THE NATURE OF LABOR LAWS AS SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS.

The undisputed facts, summarized by the Office of the Solicitor-General, are as follows:

Petitioner was hired as clerk on March 17, 1975 by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its
office in Daet, Camarines Norte.

In the course of her employment, petitioner contracted an ailment which was diagnosed as brain
tumor. Petitioner stopped working because of said ailment.

On January 7, 1980, petitioner filed with respondent GSIS a claim for disability benefits under P.D.
626, as amended.

On November 24, 1980, respondent GSIS denied petitioner's claim on the ground that brain tumor
was not an occupational disease. Respondent GSIS also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal, respondent ECC sustained the GSIS decision.

We find this petition impressed with merit.

While "brain tumor" is not expressly or specifically referred to as an occupational disease, and while
admittedly its precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the disease is akin to "cancer of the
brain" and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or a borderline case. At any rate, the
precise work of the petitioner at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following:

As Mining Recorder II, to record and file mining instruments and documents in the
Mining Recorder's Section and to type correspondence and other documents
pertaining to the same action. (See petitioner's Brief, Rollo, p. 13).

It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration. Whether this is
specifically causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but doubts must generally be resolved
in favor whenever compensation for disease is concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw
upon petitioner the burden of showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease,
particularly when both the GSIS and ECC profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the
disease.

Nowhere is this truism more glaring than in cancer, the most dreaded of all diseases mankind has
ever known. Held the Supreme Court in the case of Acosta v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (L-55464, Nov. 12, 1981): "It is generally accepted that the exact origin of practically all
types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of
discovering the most effective cure for the malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect
ordinary persons to prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts
themselves are still in the dark."
In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore
the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. Thus in the
case of 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We ruled as follows:

While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused

under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New
Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is
significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured
by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work connection, (103 SCRA 329, 336).

... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined
even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the
ailment and the working conditions petitions should be liberalized so that those who
have less in life will have more in law ... .

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of
compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment – the cause or origin of
which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science – was in fact
caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions.
Plainly the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said
claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science
and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical
experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease.
Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the
impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or
imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276).

... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until
his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the
fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid., p.
277).

In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 1 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and
Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the
rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated:

Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment
or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved.
Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exist
For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is my humble opinion that this petition should be GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission should be SET ASIDE and
another should be rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 220168, June 07, 2017

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILIPPINES, INC./MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., LTD.

AND/OR MS. EILEEN MORALES, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF RICARDO S. GANAL,
GEMMA B. BORAGAY, FOR HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN NAMED: RIGEM GANAL & IVAN CHARLES GANAL; AND CHARLES F.
GANAL, REPRESENTED BY SPOUSES PROCOPIO & VICTORIA
GANAL, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 25,
2015 and August 18, 2015, respectively, in CA-GR. SP No. 133128. The assailed CA
Decision reversed the October 21, 20133 and November 21, 20134 Resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which, in turn, affirmed the July 26, 2013
Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC NCR OFW [M]-00-10-16061-12 and denied
petitioners' subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.6 The LA Decision dismissed herein
respondents' complaint for the payment of death and other benefits, salaries as well as
damages.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On September 16, 2011, herein petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler
aboard the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-Standard Employment Contract, which
was executed by and between the parties. On September 20, 2011, he commenced his
employment.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April 15, 2012, a party was organized for the
crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh.
After finishing his shift at 12 midnight, Ganal joined the party. Around 3 o'clock in the
morning of April 16, 2012, the ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he
directed him to return to his cabin and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's
order. Thus, a ship officer, a security watchman and a member of the crew were
summoned to escort Ganal to his cabin. The crew members attempted to accompany
him back to his cabin but he refused. They then tried to restrain him but he resisted
and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran towards the ship's railings and,
without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crew members
immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direction where he jumped and
the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms thereafter. Contact was
also made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for Ganal, to no avail.
Ganal was later found dead and floating in the water. The subsequent medico-legal
report issued by the Philippine National Police showed that the cause of his death was
asphyxia by drowning.

Subsequently, Ganal's wife, Gemma Boragay (Boragay), for herself and in behalf of
their minor children, filed a claim for death benefits with petitioners, but the latter
denied the claim.

Thus, on October 29, 2012, Boragay, filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of
death and other benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal's contract,
as well as moral and exemplary damages.

On July 26, 2013, the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
The LA held that respondents' allegations are self-serving and hearsay; they failed to
present evidence to substantiate their allegations; on the other hand, petitioners were
able to present documentary evidence, consisting of affidavits of Ganal's fellow crew
members who have direct and actual knowledge of what occurred on board the MV
Stadt Hamburg and who attested to the fact that Ganal willfully jumped overboard.
Nonetheless, the LA ordered herein petitioners to pay respondents the amount of
US$5,000.00 as financial assistance.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the LA, respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC.

On October 21, 2013, the NLRC issued a Resolution denying respondents' appeal and
affirming the Decision of the LA. The NLRC ruled that petitioners have duly proven that
Ganal's death is not compensable as it was the result of the deliberate and willful act of
Ganal and, thus, is directly attributable to him.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its November
21, 2013 Resolution.

Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

On February 25, 2015, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which reversed the
October 21, 2013 and November 21, 2013 Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA held that
Ganal jumped into the sea while he was overcome by alcohol and completely
intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental faculties to comprehend the
consequence of his own actions and keep in mind his own personal safety.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated August 18, 2015.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds, to
wit:

I. PETITIONERS DULY PROVED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT SEAFARER GANAL

VOLUNTARILY JUMPED INTO THE OPEN SEA. THUS, CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS' FINDINGS, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS SHIFTED TO THE RESPONDENTS TO
SHOW THAT SEAFARER GANAL WAS NOT IN HIS OWN MENTAL FACULTIES WHEN HE
COMMITTED SUCH ACT.

II. THE RULINGS OF THE LOWER LABOR TRIBUNALS, UNANIMOUSLY HOLDING THAT
SEAFARER GANAL COMMITTED SUICIDE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN UPHELD TO DENY THE
RESPONDENTS' CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS. INTOXICATION ALONE DID NOT SERVE
TO RENDER INUTILE SEAFARER GANAL AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS FULL MENTAL
FACULTIES EQUIVALENT TO INSANITY. SEAFARER GANAL, DESPITE HIS
INTOXICATION, DELIBERATELY JUMPED INTO THE OPEN SEA CAUSING HIS
INSTANTANEOUS DEATH.7
Petitioners' basic contention is that respondents are not entitled to death and other
benefits, as well as damages, they are claiming by reason of the demise of their
predecessor-in-interest during the effectivity of his contract of employment, because
his death is directly attributable to him and was a result of his willful act.

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in a petition for review on certiorari, this Court's
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any showing that the
factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly
erroneous.8 This Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor
cases.9 Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.10 They are binding upon this
Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown
that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.11

However, it is equally settled that one of the exceptions to the above rule is when the
factual findings of the quasi-judicial agencies concerned are conflicting or contrary with
those of the CA.12

Considering that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are opposed to those of
the CA, it behooves this Court to look into the evidence presented to resolve the
present petition.

It is settled that the employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is
governed by the contracts they sign at the time of their engagement.13 As long as the
stipulations in said contracts are not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public
policy, they have the force of law between the parties.14 Nonetheless, while the seafarer
and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and
Regulations require that the POEA-Standard Employment Contract be integrated with
every seafarer's contract.15

Thus, in case of death of the seafarer, Section 20(B) of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-
Going Ships, as amended in 2010, provides as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of
Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand
US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not
exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment.

2. Where death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared war zone or
war risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled. The employer shall
undertake appropriate war zone insurance coverage for this purpose.

3. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and
distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seafarer is entitled
to under Philippine laws from the Social Security System, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration, Employee's Compensation Commission, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund).

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-
related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the
seafarer under this Contract.

b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local
government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case
death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in
accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency
equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses
at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing
the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as
amended, the death of a seafarer by reason of any work-related injury or illness during
the term of his employment is compensable.

On the other hand, Section 20(D) of the same Standard Terms and Conditions states
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,

disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional
breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.
Also, under Article 172 of the Labor Code, which may also be made applicable to the
present case, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees Compensation
and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on liability,16 to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 172. Limitations of liability. - The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the
compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death
was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or
another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.
As defined under the above-cited Standard Terms and Conditions, work-related injury,
or in this case, death, is any injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the accident takes place.17 By the use of these words, it
was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar
to the nature of work in the scope of the workmen's employment or incidental to such
employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or
hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such
employment.18 Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not
traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded.19

In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in the
course of his employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place where he
was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not arise out
of such employment. The occasion where Ganal took alcoholic beverages was a grill
party organized by the ship officers of MV Stadt Hamburg. It was a social event and
Ganal attended not because he was performing his duty as a seaman, but was doing an
act for his own personal benefit. Even if the Court were to adopt a liberal view and
consider the grill party as incidental to Ganal's work as a seaman, his death during such
occasion may not be considered as having arisen out of his employment as it was the
direct consequence of his decision to jump into the water without coercion nor
compulsion from any of the ship officers or crew members. The hazardous nature of
this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which
any person on board the MV Stadt Hamburg, such as a passenger thereof or an
ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as
Ganal had.

The necessary question that follows then is whether Ganal's act was willful. Considering
his apparent intoxication, may Ganal's death, which resulted from his act of jumping
overboard, be considered as directly attributable to him? Contrary to the findings of the
CA, both the LA and the NLRC found and ruled in the affirmative. After a careful review
of the records of the case, this Court agrees with the findings and ruling of the LA and
the NLRC.

The Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioners, consisting of the testimony of the crew members present at the time of the
unfortunate incident,20 as well as the accident report made by the master of the
vessel,21 prove the willfulness of Ganal's acts which led to his death. The term "willful"
means "voluntary and intentional", but not necessarily malicious.22 In the case
of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 the
seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed an unlawful aggression
against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter
fought back and in the process killed the seaman. This Court held that the
circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and
willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. In the same manner, in the
instant case, Ganal's act of intentionally jumping overboard, while in a state of
intoxication, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own life which is
directly attributable to him.

Moreover, contrary to respondents' contention, petitioners took the necessary

precautions when: (1) the ship captain advised Ganal to proceed to his cabin and take a
rest; (2) Ganal was assisted by no less than three crew members who tried to persuade
him to return to his cabin; (3) when he refused, the crew members tried to restrain him
but he escaped and immediately ran away from them and, without warning, jumped
into the sea. As earlier discussed, the law does not intend for an employer to be the
insurer of all accidental injuries befalling an employee in the course of the latter's
employment, but only for those which arise from or grow out of the risks necessarily
associated with the workman's nature of work or incidental to his employment. Ganal's
act of jumping overboard was not, in any way, connected with the performance of his
duties as ship oiler. Neither could petitioners have reasonably anticipated such act on
the part of Ganal. Thus, having proven their defense, the burden now rests on the
shoulders of respondents to overcome petitioners' defense.

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA agreed with herein respondents and concluded
that prior to jumping overboard, Ganal "was no longer in control of his actions because
of excessive alcohol intake."24 The Court, however, finds that this conclusion is not
based on substantial evidence. The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that there was no competent proof to show that Ganal's state of intoxication during the
said incident actually deprived him of his consciousness and mental faculties which
would have enabled him to comprehend the consequences of his actions and keep in
mind his personal safety. Respondents failed to present evidence to overcome the
defense of petitioner and show that, prior to and at the time that he jumped overboard,
Ganal was deprived of the use of his reason or that his will has been so impaired, by
reason of his intoxication, as to characterize his actions as unintentional or involuntary.
In fact, there is not even a post mortem report to indicate Ganal's blood alcohol
concentration level at the time of his death as to give the lower tribunals or the courts
an idea of how much alcohol Ganal was able to imbibe. Neither was there anything in
the PNP medico-legal report which would indicate such blood alcohol content. There was
also no affidavit from any of the ship officers or crew members, who witnessed the
unfortunate incident, which would show that Ganal appeared to be distraught or out of
his mind. Ganal may have become unruly by reason of his inebriation but such
recalcitrant behavior does not necessarily prove that his subsequent act of jumping
overboard was not willful on his part. Stated differently, the fact alone that he refused
to be escorted to his cabin, that he resisted efforts by other crew members to restrain
him and that he jumped overboard without hesitation or warning does not prove that
he was not in full possession of his faculties as to characterize his acts as involuntary or
unintentional.

This Court has held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating
liquor, it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that
said person was extremely drunk, as a person may take as much as several bottles of
beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the
alcoholic drink.25 It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of
death or injury and the burden lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense.26 In
the present case, the Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that respondents failed in
this respect.
Neither does the Court agree with the ruling of the CA that while herein petitioners
were able to prove that Ganal jumped into the open sea while in a state of intoxication,
they failed to meet the burden of proving that Ganal intended to terminate his own life.
Petitioners do not carry the burden of establishing that Ganal had the intention of
committing suicide. Petitioners' only burden is to prove that Ganal's acts are voluntary
and willful and, if so, the former are exempt from liability as the latter becomes
responsible for all the consequences of his actions.

Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was
just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious
negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or
contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his
own personal safety.27 In any case, regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners were able
to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should not be
held responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard.

As a final note, it is true that the beneficent provisions of the Standard Employment
Contract are liberally construed in favor of Filipino seafarers and their dependents.28
The Court commiserates with respondents for the unfortunate fate that befell their
loved one; however, the Court finds that the factual circumstances in this case do not
justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by them as beneficiaries.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated February 25, 2015 and August
18, 2015, respectively, are SET ASIDE. The October 21, 2013 and November 21, 2013
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 08-000774-13
(NLRC NCR OFW [M]-00-10-16061-12) are REINSTATED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94167             January 21, 1991

MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD., petitioners,

vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIA
SENTINA, respondents.

Victorino Alba for petitioners.

Rodolfo B. Dizon for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman who commits suicide. How
about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of
which he was killed? Is the employer similarly exempt from liability? This is the issue in this case.

Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI)
for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a
period of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.

On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier,
Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the
messhall and took a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates
who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He
became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was
then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between
the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed
away on January 17, 1988.  Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.
1

On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses,
unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-
896. After submission of the answer and position papers of the parties a decision was rendered by
the POEA on July 11, 1989, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Mabuhay
Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to pay complainant Cecilia S.
Sentina the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00)
representing the deceased's death benefit and burial compensation, the sum of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
 representing unpaid shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay plus ten percent (10%) of the total
judgment award by way of and as attorney's fees.

All other claims are ordered dismissed

SO ORDERED. 2

A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First
Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated
March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision. 3

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied by said public respondent in a
resolution dated June 29, 1990.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari wherein the following grounds are invoked:

The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that "The payment of Death
Compensation Benefit only requires that the seaman dies during the term of the contract,
and no other."

That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that even if the subject
seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such nonetheless does not
constitute a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own life."

That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding, that the death of the late
4/Engr Romulo Sentina is compensable. 4

The petition is impressed with merit.

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format for Filipino seamen employed in ocean going
vessels states that —

No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death

resulting from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided however that
the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable
to the seamen.

The same provision of the standard format also provides —

In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the amount of

x x x           x x x          x x x

b. P210,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master electrician. (Memo
Circular No. 5 effective March 1, 1986)

In interpreting the aforequoted provision in its decision, the POEA held that payment of death
compensation benefits only requires that the seaman should die during the term of the contract and
no other. It further held that the saving provision relied upon by petitioners refers only to suicide
where the seaman deliberately and intentionally took his own life. 5
Public respondent in affirming the said POEA decision made the following disquisition

It is not difficult for us to understand the intent of the aforequoted "Part II, Section C, No. 6 of
the POEA Standard Format" that to avoid death compensation, two conditions must be met:

a) the subject death much have resulted "from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the
seaman;" and

b) such death "directly attributable to the seaman" must have been proven by the
"employer."

Thus, even if arguendo, the appellants may successfully prove that the subject seaman's
death resulted from the fight he himself created, such, nonetheless does not constitute a
"deliberate or willful act on his own life." On this ground alone, the instant appeal would
already fail. 6

The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to
compensation.  The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract,
1âwphi1

and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in
consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are
limitations to the liability to pay death benefits.

When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is
directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is
covered by this provision.

By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or
committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own
defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death
of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable
to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall
picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler
fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not
compensable.

Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on liability.

Art. 172. Limitations of liability. — The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the
compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death was
occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or another,
notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.

Private respondent pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for compensation of private
respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it was not favorably acted upon by its
principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co., Inc. because of the circumstances that led to the death of
Sentina.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the POEA dated July 11, 1989
and the resolutions of public respondent dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 affirming the same
are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 115497. September 15, 1996.]

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT SHIPPING

CORPORATION and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioners, v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CONSTANCIA
PINEDA, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; FILING OF A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT OR ORDER; REQUIRED; FAILURE TO
DO SO CONSTITUTES A FATAL INFIRMITY. — We note that the petition suffers from
serious procedural defects that warrant its being dismissed outright. Petitioners acted
prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration with the public respondent
before bringing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a fatal infirmity.." . .
The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against the acts of public Respondent. In the instant case, the plain and adequate
remedy expressly provided by the law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the questioned decision." "(T) he filing of such a
motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects
of the case. Petitioner’s inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount
to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent Commission to cleanse
itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed."
". . . And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner
has permitted the subject Resolution to become final and executory after the lapse of
the ten day period within which to file such motion for reconsideration." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES IF SUPPORTED

BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, ARE GENERALLY ACCORDED NOT ONLY THREAT RESPECT
BUT EVEN FINALITY AND ARE BINDING UPON THE COURT. — A petitioner
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases where a grave
abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown to have
been committed by the respondent Commission, and this Court’s jurisdiction to review
decisions or resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of its
evaluation of the evidence. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the factual findings
of quasi-judicial agencies like the respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial
evidence, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly demonstrate that
respondent Commission had arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had
misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such
evidence had been properly appreciated.

3. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENT BASIS

FOR JUDGMENT IN CASES FILED BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE OR QUASI-JUDICIAL
BODIES. — We have held that claims of overseas workers against their foreign
employers should not be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts
usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required
evidence to prove their demands. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides
that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact,
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

4. ID.; ID.: ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — The

circumstances prior to and surrounding PINEDA’S death, however, provide substantial
evidence of the existence of such mental defect or disorder. Such mental disorder
became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during
said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport’s immigration are on his own. We
can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or
seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably
unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of income, and after
having been absent from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor
can we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife and searing away
passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full
possession of his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves
to produce a firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in full
control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than
substantial evidence is required.

5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS; STANDARD

FORMAT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SEAMEN; PROVISION THEREOF EXEMPTING
EMPLOYER FROM LIABILITY; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; REASONS. — The
POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai
policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the
provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exempting the employer
from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased
suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have
been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been
impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be
Characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart
from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental condition, petitioners
"should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said
seaman to travel home alone," and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the
death of Pineda. Indeed, "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not
end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioners are) duty bound to
repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of
employment,"

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR DISTINGUISHED FROM THE CASE OF MABUHAY
SHIPPING SERVICES INC. VS. NLRC AND CECILIA SENTINA. — The instant case should
be distinguished from the case of Mabuhay, where the deceased, Romulo Sentina, had
been in a state of intoxication, then ran amuck and inflicted injury upon another
person, so that the latter in his own defense fought back and in the process killed
Sentina. The cause of Sentina’s death is categorized as a deliberate and willful act on
his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman Pineda was not similarly situated.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FOREIGN EMPLOYER TO SEE TO IT

THAT THE TERMINATED EMPLOYEE IS DULY REPATRIATED. — Petitioner’s reliance on
De Jesus v. Employee’s Compensation Commission is misplaced, as the death and
burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employee’s
Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These
claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local
agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this
country, i.e., the point of hire. Though the termination of the employment contract was
duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that
Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the
Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly Provides for the
duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accidental
death, dismenberment and disability of overseas workers. "Section 4. Duration of
Insurance Coverage. — The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the
premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the
worker’s contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of the contract of
employment; provided that is no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be
less than one year." The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract
to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was
expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The
uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had
been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home
alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the
landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had
grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Are the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable
for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after having been discharged, was
killed in transit while being repatriated home?

The instant petition 1 seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution 2 dated
March 30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission 3 dismissing
the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 1992 4 of
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C.
Joson, which ordered that: 5
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, respondents are hereby jointly
and severally held liable to pay the complainant the following amounts: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. P130,000.00 as death compensation benefits.

2. P18,000.00 as burial expenses." cralaw virtua1aw library

The Facts

The proceedings below originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed by
Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping
Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were
found by the POEA Administrator: 6

"As can be gathered from the records of the case, it was alleged that deceased seaman,
Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessel, ‘MV Amazonia’,
owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period
of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both
parties with a monthly basic salary of US$276.00 plus fixed overtime rate of US$83.00
and a leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month; that on October 2, 1989, he met his death
when he was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok, Thailand; that considering that the
deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life
by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.

x          x           x

In its Answer/Position Paper, respondent agency averred that deceased seaman signed
a contract of employment as Oiler for a period of nine (9) months with additional three
(3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly salary of US$276.00,
fixed overtime rate of US$83.00; that on December 21, 1988, deceased seaman joined
the vessel MV Amazonia and proceeded to discharge his duties as Oiler; that on
September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of
Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines
necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked
on his free will and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination
to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax transmission from the Department
of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty
on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police report submitted to the
Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who ‘approached and tried
to stab the police sergeant with a knife and therefore he was forced to pull out his gun
and shot Pineda’; that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to
the provisions of Par. 6, Section C, Part II, POEA Standard Format of Employment
which state(s) that ‘no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
(in)capacity, disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the
seaman;’ that the deceased seaman died due to his own wilfull (sic) act in attacking a
policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense." cralaw virtua1aw library
After the parties presented their respective evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered
his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial
expenses.

Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public Respondent. In a Decision dated

March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA.

Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari per Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

The Issues

The petitioners made the following "assignment of errors" : jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that herein

petitioners are liable for death compensation benefits despite the fact that there is no
direct evidence proving that Pineda was mentally sick at the time of repatriation.

Respondent NLRC committed a serious error of law in not upholding the provisions of
Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA standard format Contract of Employment.

Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding for compensability

of Pineda’s death when respondents (should read ‘petitioners’) have proven that his
death was not work-connected." cralaw virtua1aw library

The principal issue in this case is whether the petitioners can be held liable for the
death of seaman Jeremias Pineda.

The petitioners challenge the factual bases of the NLRC Decision, and argue that there
was "no evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, that the deceased Pineda, at
the time of his repatriation was not in full control of his mental faculties", and that
"there (was) no showing that seaman Pineda acted strangely when he disembarked
from the vessel" in Dubai where he was discharged, and from which point he flew to
Bangkok without any untoward incident during the entire trip. They thus insist that they
were under no obligation to have Pineda accompanied home when he was discharged at
the end of the contract term of nine months, that they were in no position to control
the deceased’s movements and behavior after he was repatriated and therefore should
not be held answerable for the deceased’s own voluntary acts, and that the deceased
could have, while in Bangkok, ingested some drugs or other mind-altering substance
resulting in his aggressive behavior and untimely demise.

The Court’s Ruling

Procedural and Substantive Defects

At the outset, we note that the petition suffers from serious procedural defects that
warrant its being dismissed outright. Petitioners acted prematurely, not having filed any
motion for reconsideration with the public respondent before bringing the instant
petition to this Court. This constitutes a fatal infirmity.

". . . The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against the acts of public Respondent. In the instant case, the plain and adequate
remedy expressly provided by the law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the questioned decision." 7

"(T)he filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to

correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner’s inaction or negligence under the
circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the
respondent Commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to
vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. . . ." 8

". . . And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner
has permitted the subject Resolution to be come final and executory after the lapse of
the ten day period within which to file such motion for reconsideration." 9

But even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be overlooked, the instant petition
nevertheless suffers from serious substantive flaw. The petition assails the Resolution of
the respondent Commission as lacking factual and legal bases to support the same. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases where a
grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown
to have been committed by the respondent Commission, and this Court’s jurisdiction to
review decisions or resolution of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of
its evaluation of the evidence. 10 Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial
evidence, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are
binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly demonstrate that
respondent Commission had arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had
misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such
evidence had been properly appreciated. 11

First Issue: No Direct Evidence of Mental State?

At any rate, even disregarding for the nonce the substantive as well as procedural
defects discussed above, a judicious review of the records of this case turns up no
indication whatsoever that the respondent Commission committed any grave abuse or
acted beyond or without jurisdiction. On the contrary, the petitioners’ contention that
the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with
approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which
recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick
prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of his mental
faculties.

First, a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA Administrator. We
have held that claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not be
subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other
complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their
demands. 12 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 13 In this
instance, seaman Pineda, who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not
reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric examination,
assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that
time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he was already
discharged and without employment — his contract having already run its full term —
and he had already been put on a plane bound for the Philippines. This explains the lack
or absence of direct evidence showing his mental state.

The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide substantial
evidence of the existence of such mental defect or disorder. Such mental disorder
became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during
said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport’s immigration area on his own. We
can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or
seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably
unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of income, and after
having been absent from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor
can we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife and scaring away
passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full
possession of his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves
to produce a firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in full
control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than
substantial evidence is required.

Second Issue: Employer Exempted from Liability?

It is petitioners’ contention that "Pineda’s death caused by his own willful act of
attacking a Thai policeman and getting shot at in self-defense is not compensable",
inasmuch as Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA’s Standard Format Contract of
Employment for Seamen states that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or

death resulting from a (deliberate or) willful act on his own life by the seaman(,)
provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability
or death is directly attributable to the seaman." (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, petitioners contend that this Court already held in the case of Mabuhay
Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC and Cecilia Sentina 14 that the employer is not liable
for the willful act of an employee on his own life. Further, Article 172 of the Labor Code
provides for a limitation on the liability of the State Insurance Fund when the "disability
or death was occasioned by the employee’s intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill
himself or another, notorious negligence . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman
Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of
the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased’s
strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around
Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own
self: 15

"(CAD) IN REPLY TO TELEX SENT TO EMBASSY BY ADM. SARMIENTO/DELA ROSA OF

OWWA/DOLE RE CAUSE KINDLY ADVISE HIS OFFICE THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED
BANGKOK 1515H ON BOARD XC903 ON STOP OVER FLIGHT FROM DUBAI ON HIS WAY
TO HONGKONG PROCEEDING TO MANILA. UNFORTUNATELY PINEDA FAILED TO TAKE
THE SAME FLIGHT OUT AT 1630H, CHECKED OUT OF IMMIGRATION, WENT OUT OF
AIRPORT AND WANDERED OUT AND FEW DAYS LATER MET HIS UNTIMELY DEMISE.
PLS. REFER TO OURAD DATED 5 OCT 89 QUOTING FULL TEXT OF POLICE REPORT
ADDRESSED TO THIS EMBASSY RECOUNTING INCIDENT LEADING TO FATAL
SHOOTING OF PINEDA. KINDLY FURNISH OWWA/DOLE FULL TEXT OF SAID REPORT
FOR THEIR INFO.

PER REPORT RECEIVED FROM AIRPORT PERSONNEL PINEDA WAS ACTING STRANGELY,
REFUSED TO BOARD HIS SCHEDULED FLIGHT AND DISAPPEARED FROM AIRPORT.
POLICE REPORT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS STRANGE BEHAVIOR LEADING TO HIS ARREST,
THEN RUNNING AMOK AND CAUSING TROUBLE TO PASSERS AND ATTEMPT TO STAB
THE DUTY POLICEMAN WHO TRIED TO PACIFY HIM.

PINEDA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM SOME MENTAL DISORDER AS CAN
BE GLEANED FROM HIS PERSONAL LETTERS DISCOVERED AMONG HIS PERSONAL
EFFECTS. HE COMPLAINED OF SUFFERING FROM SEVERE HEAD PAINS AND EVEN
REPORTED TO CAPTAIN OF A SHIP ABOUT THREATS ON HIS LIFE BY FELLOW SEAMAN
WHICH INVARIABLY LEAD (sic) TO HIS BEING REPATRIATED HOME WHICH GREATLY
AFFECTED HIS DISPOSITION.

SUGGEST DOLE CONTACT CAPTAIN OF M/V AMAZSON (sic) AND ASCERTAIN AS TO

WHY PINEDA HAVE (sic) TO DISEMBARK AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPATRIATED. IF
PINEDA WAS ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDER AS FEARED, HE SHOULD
HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL HOME ALONE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ACCOMPANIED BY A PHYSICIAN." (Emphasis supplied)

The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the
Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the
aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exempting the
employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the
deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he
must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must
have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise
characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart
from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental condition, petitioners
"should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said
seaman to travel home alone", 16 and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the
death of Pineda. Indeed, "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not
end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioner are) duty bound to
repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of
employment." 17
The instant case should be distinguished from the case of Mabuhay, where the
deceased, Romulo Sentina, had been in a state of intoxication, then ran amuck and
inflicted injury upon another person, so that the latter in his own defense fought back
and in the process killed Sentina. Previous to said incident, there was no proof of
mental disorder on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentina’s death is categorized as a
deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman Pineda
was not similarly situated.

Incidentally, petitioners conjecture that the deceased could have been on drugs when
he assaulted the policeman. If this had been the case, the Thai police and the Philippine
Embassy in Bangkok would most certainly have made mention thereof in their
respective reports. But they did not do so.

Third Issue: Was Death Work-Related?

Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda’s death "is not one of the
occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case of De Jesus v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, 18 this Court held that." . . for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex ‘A’ of the Rules (the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions." 19

Petitioner’s reliance on De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being
claimed in this case are not payable by the Employees’ Compensation Commission and
chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the
responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of
the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country, i.e., the point
of hire. Though the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai,
still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly
repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the
mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accidental death,
dismemberment and disability of overseas workers: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. — The minimum coverage shall take effect
upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for
the duration of the worker’s contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of
the contract of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the
insurance coverage be less than one year." (Emphasis supplied)

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by
its agreement to assure the safe return of said workers. The uncaring attitude displayed
by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say
the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically
owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision
assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.