US Democracy Promotion: The Clinton and Bush Administrations

Global Society, Vol. 19, No.
4, October, 2005
US Democracy Promotion: The Clinton and Bush

Administrations
BARBARA ANN J. RIEFFER with KRISTAN MERCER
Democracy promotion has been an element of US foreign policy for over five decades. On
the assumption that democracy promotion abroad is more a Democratic than Republican
issue, one could hypothesise that a recent President like Bill Clinton was more likely to
champion democracy promotion than a Republican President like George W. Bush. We
suggest in this article, however, that the Clinton and Bush records on this matter thus far
are more similar than one might expect. Moreover, we argue that structural or enduring
features of international relations and American politics make the US contribution to
enlarging the democratic community quite modest most of the time. The consistent
elevation of economic and military/security concerns over democratic progress has
had a negative effect. We conclude by offering a few brief suggestions for promoting
democracy abroad with a focus on long-term effects.
Introduction
Michael Mandelbaum has reaffirmed what Francis Fukuyama famously argued,
that when it comes to legitimating governing authority, the idea of liberal democ-
racy has eliminated all rivals.1 Even most despots feel the need to pretend to be
democrats – witness the old European communists and their constitutions and
bogus elections. Fukuyama, in particular, has frequently been misunderstood.
He was writing of the historical triumph of democratic theory, not the sure conso-
lidation of stable democracy as practice. Consistent with the observations of
Mandelbaum and Fukuyama, many actors all over the world demand the practice
of democracy.2 It is all too evident, however, that actual democratic practice leaves
much to be desired in many parts of the world. Of 191 member states of the United
Nations, the private organisation Freedom House finds 89 to have fully free, or
genuinely democratic, political systems.3 This is the highest number ever
1. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the
Twenty-first Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
2. The Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey of July 2003 reported that many Muslim countries
thought Western democracy would benefit them. See Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2004), pp. 131–142. See also, more broadly, United Nations, Human Development
Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
3. <www.FreedomHouse.org>.
ISSN 1360-0826 print=ISSN 1469-798X online=05=040385-24 # 2005 University of Kent

DOI: 10.1080=13600820500242654
386 B. A. J. Rieffer with K. Mercer
recorded in the history of the organisation, but that leaves over 100 countries listed
as partially free or unfree.
The United States and certain other actors profess to want to shore up the
current democracies that are shaky, and try to move at least some of the other
authoritarian or partly authoritarian countries towards full democracy.4 The
role of other actors with democracy-promotion programmes makes it difficult to
isolate and evaluate the strictly US contribution to this goal. The European
Union, for example, in 2004 reported a budget of E96 million for democracy pro-
motion, with the European Union targeting 32 countries in this regard.5 Other
democratic states, as well as other international organisations like the United
Nations and the Organisation of American States, not to mention many NGOs,
have democracy-promotion programmes.
As for the United States, it is also difficult to establish the extent to which
Washington is motivated by a national mission to do good in the world, a
mission consistent with its core self-image as a champion of personal freedom,
by comparison to advancing its own expedient interests on the premise that
liberal democratic states form a security community in which the probability of
armed conflict is zero.6 Perhaps it is not necessary to distinguish between the
two orientations if they combine into a US liberal grand strategy based on both
values and interests.7
Once the Republican Ronald Reagan and the Democrat Dante Fascell
worked together in the establishment of the National Endowment for
Democracy in 1984, democracy promotion became officially a bipartisan
fixture in US foreign policy.8 Yet just as Reagan differed from Jimmy Carter
on many aspects of promoting human rights and democracy, likewise
subsequent presidents can be presumed to differ. Thus, despite the difficulties
of establishing precise US motivation and contribution, it is fair to ask about
differences in shifting administrations in Washington towards democracy
promotion.
4. Linz and Stepan define an authoritarian regime as a “political system with limited, not responsible,
political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without
extensive not intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in
which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill defined limits but actu-
ally quite predictable ones”. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Conso-
lidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 38. See especially Chapter 3 for a
more nuanced distinction.
5. Commission of the European Communities, Press Release 04/32 (4 March 2004).
6. On the first point, see especially Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide
Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). For a discussion
of democratic peace theory, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold
War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Doyle, War and Peace (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1997). For an excellent critique of democratic peace theory, see Sebastian Rosato, “The
Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2003),
pp. 585–602.
7. G. John Ikenberry, “Why Export Democracy?” The ‘Hidden Grand Strategy’ of American Foreign
Policy”, The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), available: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/
intrel/exdem.htm>.
8. Jennifer Windsor, “Democracy and Development: The Evolution of US Foreign Assistance Policy”,
Fletcher Forum, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2003), pp. 141–150. Significantly, up to that time the US Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, often amended, made no mention of democracy promotion.
US Democracy Promotion 387
On the assumption that democracy promotion abroad is more a Democratic

than Republican issue,9 one could hypothesise that a recent president like Bill
Clinton was more likely to champion democracy promotion than a Republican
president like George W. Bush. We suggest in this article, however, that the
Clinton and Bush records on this matter thus far are more similar than one
might expect. Moreover, we argue that structural or enduring features of inter-
national relations and American politics make the US contribution to enlarging
the democratic community quite modest most of the time, both for Clinton and
Bush. We acknowledge, however, that the future of Bush’s stated intent to demo-
cratise the Arab-Islamic Middle East could radically transform the comparison.
We proceed as follows. The next section begins by explaining a few but key
theoretical points about democracy and democratisation. This is followed by
some historical observations that are essential to understanding contemporary
democracy promotion. The fourth section addresses the democracy-promotion
programmes and relevant foreign policy decisions of President Clinton. Next,
we look more extensively at President George W. Bush’s record on this subject,
mostly in his first term. The sixth section notes the similarities between Bush
and Clinton, despite the profound differences in political philosophy and in the
international environment. The penultimate section argues there is little evidence
to suggest that US democracy-promotion programmes have had a significant
effect globally. Furthermore, both administrations’ policies have often been incon-
sistent and even, on occasions, had a negative impact on democratic practice.
This paper concludes by addressing the likely impact of democracy promotion
in the future. We offer a few brief suggestions to enhance the impact of US
democracy-promotion efforts.
Theory and Policy Choice

There is a vast literature on democracy and democratisation, which we find
unnecessary to review here.10 For present purposes it is sufficient to note that a
classical treatment on democracy remains compelling as a core definition: democ-
racy is that political system in which the average citizen has relatively high
9. Supporting evidence can be found in Ole Holsti, “Public Opinion on Human Rights in American
Foreign Policy”, in David P. Forsythe (ed.), The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and
Outward (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), pp. 131–174.
10. For a thorough and up-to-date review, see Hans Peter Schmitz, “Domestic and Transnational
Perspectives on Democratization”, International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2004), pp. 403– 426.
After a lifetime of study, the noted political scientist Samuel Huntington has concluded that no one
theory explains why liberal democracy arises and/or is eventually stabilised. There is no single, guar-
anteed path to consolidated stable democracy. From a vast literature, see further Michael Cox, G. John
Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). See also Greg Sorensen, Democracy
and Democratization (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); and Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter,
“Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks”, in Michael T. Klare and Daniel
C. Thomas (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994);
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999); Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Charles Kegley and Margaret Hermann,
“How Democracies Use Interventions: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of Democratic Peace”,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1996), pp. 309–322.
influence through repeated and competitive free and fair elections about who
governs. Broad electoral participation in a polity, of course, requires the exercise
of certain civil rights such as freedom of opinion, speech, and association. A free
communications media is important. A genuine or liberal democracy also entails
restraints on majority rule; there must be limits on majority (or plurality) rule to
protect against discrimination against unpopular individuals, groups or causes.11
This last distinction should be stressed. As noted by Fareed Zakaria, illiberal
democracies are on the rise.12 In this seminal article, Zakaria notes that popular
elections can lead to repression, particularly of minorities, and eventually to vio-
lence. We are now only too aware of how elections in the Balkans in the 1990s
(especially in Serbia and Croatia) led not only to gross violations of human
rights but also to international armed conflict that sucked in the United States
and NATO. Whether one focuses on the Balkans of the 1990s or Sri Lanka in
contemporary times, inter alia, it is clear that elections without the restraints and
protections making up liberal or constitutional democracy can inflame passions
and encourage instability.
As for the process of democratisation, again we stress a central point without
elaborating on various nuances.13 In the contemporary world the democratisation
process is transnational, with external parties – both public and private – interact-
ing with various domestic elements in a particular setting. Increasingly it is not a
matter of whether external or domestic factors are more important but rather what
is the combined effect of these endogenous and external elements. We do not need
to try to resolve the dispute between a sociological approach stressing endogen-
ous socio-economic prerequisites for democracy, and on the other hand a more
strictly international political approach stressing the impact of external actors.
We do emphasise, however, the emerging consensus that a great threat to the
stability or consolidation of democracy is severe economic crisis. The work of
Adam Przeworski, in particular, shows the correlation between sustained econ-
omic growth (with equitable distribution) and consolidation of democracy.14 A
recent poll of Latin American voters shows that the greater the sense of economic
failure, the greater the tendency to abandon support for democratic institutions.15
Furthermore, studies have confirmed that democratic countries manifesting econ-
omic success, specifically those countries with a per capita income of $9,000 or
more, have not experienced democratic backsliding.16
11. For a classic exposition, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
See also Anthony J. Langlois, “Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separatist Thesis”,
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2003), pp. 990–1019.
12. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (1997), pp. 22–43.
He notes that Freedom House analyses political liberties (democracy) and civil liberties (constitutional
liberalism). He found that more countries scored higher on political liberties than civil liberties. Hence,
many are illiberal democracies (see p. 23). See also his The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home
and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); and Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market
Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Anchor Books, 2003, 2004).
13. Hans Peter Schmitz, op. cit.
14. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy
and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
15. Warren Hoge, “Latin America Losing Hope in Democracy, Report Says”, New York Times (22 April
2004).
16. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, op. cit.
Presumably, then, a wise democracy-promotion policy by the United States

(and others) will champion various forms of liberal or constitutional democracy
which recognise the dangers of unrestricted and chauvinistic forms of popular
sovereignty and majority rule, will be aware of the need to work with
transnational coalitions to tailor international efforts to local conditions, and
will be sensitive to the need for the economic dimensions of human security
and justice.
History and Policy Analysis

We should be cautious when it comes to US rhetoric about support for democracy
promotion abroad. This rhetoric has been repeated over the course of many gen-
erations. Beginning in the 18th century with the birth of the nation, many of the
founding fathers believed that the destiny of the new country lay in the protection
of freedom around the world.17 In reality this did not hinder the United States
from forging alliances with various authoritarian states, including Stalin during
the Second World War. Even a supposed champion of human rights like Jimmy
Carter aligned the United States with totalitarian China. Nor did US rhetoric for
freedom and human rights prevent Washington’s support for a range of dictators
such as Tito in Yugoslavia and Pinochet in Chile. During the Cold War this was
coupled with American support for overthrowing elected governments in Iran
(1953), Guatemala (1954) and, later, Chile (1973).
Moreover, historically the United States has occasionally played fast and loose
in relation to the discourse of human rights and democracy. When Washington has
found itself in controversial uses of force, more than once it has claimed to be
acting for democracy despite the origins of the intervention being otherwise.
Hence in the Spanish-American war, through Vietnam, and in Iraq from 2003,
US leaders claimed to be acting for democracy when in fact the true origins of
the intervention were much more complicated.18
Second, and related to the first point, is the fact that since international relations
is characterised by political anarchy, no wise administration can fail to give pri-
ority to national security issues. Alex Wendt may be correct in arguing that
anarchy is what states make of it,19 but the nation-state system makes national
insecurity endemic. Thus it is not surprising that when a country feels itself threa-
tened, the promotion and protection of human rights, including the political rights
associated with democracy, are given less weight.20 Hence democracy promotion
often takes a backseat to national security concerns during threatening times, and
this is as true for the United States – under Democratic or Republican leadership
– as any other state. Of course, questions remains about when and to what extent
democratic rights should be restricted in the name of national security.
At the same time, advocates of the democratic peace theory argue that
democracy-promotion programmes are, in reality, also national security
17. Tony Smith, op. cit.
18. See Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Penn State University Press,
1999).
19. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
20. David Forsythe and Patrice McMahon, Human Rights and Diversity (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2003).
programmes, on the thesis that democratic states – at least liberal democratic

states – do not engage in war with each other.21 The problem is how to get
from here to there. That is, how do we move from anarchical international
relations in which democracy and democracy promotion have to be sacrificed
to national security, to a Kantian international relations made up of democracies
that do not threaten the existence of each other? This dilemma is unresolved.
Third, there are powerful domestic pressures on US foreign policy to elevate
particular economic benefit over democracy promotion. When in the 1980s the
US Congress was debating economic sanctions on the white minority government
in the Republic of South Africa, most corporations based in the United States were
opposed to such sanctions. When the UN Security Council voted for economic
sanctions on the white minority government in Rhodesia in the 1970s, Union
Carbide successfully got the US Congress to set aside those sanctions within the
US jurisdiction. Historically speaking, most US corporations do not see them-
selves as human rights actors but rather as economic actors whose primary
responsibility is to maximise the profits of their stakeholders.
Whether US and other corporations can be persuaded to take a longer perspec-
tive and see their long-term interests in foreign democracies that are linked to the
rule of law and free trade is an interesting question. There are certain develop-
ments supportive of this transition, from the UN’s Global Compact, which is an
effort to link corporations to UN programmes, to NGOs that monitor corporate
behaviour in relation to international standards on human rights, ecology and
corruption. Nevertheless, it has been generally true that corporate pressures for
short-term economic gain have persistently trumped efforts at democracy pro-
motion that have threatened those gains. Thus various American corporations
have cooperated with various authoritarian governments in various historical
periods. There was, for example, no lack of cooperation between American
corporations and Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, or with the brutal
Argentine junta in the 1970s and early 1980s. Such cosy arrangements between
powerful American business and despotic government abroad are not supportive
of democracy-promotion programmes that threaten economic interests.
When looking at contemporary American (and European) agricultural subsi-
dies, we see that the short-term agricultural interest of American farmers and ran-
chers often conflict with the needs of transitional democracies and their
agricultural exports. American agricultural interests, with their well-organised
lobbyists, benefit from protectionist policies and subsidies even though these
policies may hurt the long-term economic viability – and thus democratic
prospects – of these partially democratic developing countries.
Having set the stage with theoretical and historical comments, we now turn to
our principal focus – a comparison of the Clinton and George W. Bush eras in
terms of democracy promotion.
Clinton and Democracy Promotion

Early Statements
It is well known that Clinton announced early on in his first administration that
democracy promotion would be one of three main pillars in his foreign policy
21. See above, note 6.
(the other two being support for economic development and national security).
He maintained this rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion in his second
inaugural address.22 Anthony Lake, Clinton’s first National Security Advisor, fol-
lowed up the president’s early statements with a very general strategy statement
about democracy promotion, and Brian Atwood, head of the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID), said that democracy promotion would be one of
AID’s five strategic goals. The Center for Democracy and Governance was estab-
lished in that agency to coordinate democracy programming.23 Clinton started the
Community of Democracies, a grouping of democratic governments that met
periodically, basically modelled on the (British) Commonwealth.
In Clinton’s second administration, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
articulated a self-interested basis for democracy promotion:
Promoting human rights is – and must remain – an integral part of US

foreign policy. When governments respect human rights, they contribute
to a more stable, just and peaceful world. When they do not, they often
engender strife, for regimes that run roughshod over the rights of their
own citizens may well show similar disregard for the rights of others.
Such governments are also more likely to spark unrest by persecuting
minorities, sheltering terrorists, running drugs or secretly building
weapons of mass destruction. As a global power with global interests,
our nation will be more secure, our armed forces less at risk, and our citi-
zens safer and more prosperous in a world where international standards
of human rights are increasingly observed.24
Democracy Programmes
Despite the statements above, there was in fact no long-term strategic approach to
support liberal democracy abroad during the Clinton presidency that cut across
various executive agencies. General programmatic statements exist, but they fail
to provide sure and specific guidance for US policy in concrete situations.25
Various agencies including the Departments of Defence, Justice, and State, AID,
the US Information Agency (USIA), and the National Security Council were
involved in activities relating to democracy promotion. Moreover, Congress
continued to fund the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Asia
Foundation, and the US Institute for Peace, all of which, especially NED with
an annual budget of nearly $30 million during the Clinton administration, had
programmes and activities related to democracy abroad.26
22. Clinton’s second inaugural address (20 January 1997), available: <www.freep.com/news/
inaug/..
23. Windsor, op cit., p. 145.
24. Quoted in Barbara Ann J. Rieffer and David P. Forsythe, “US Foreign Policy and Democratic Tran-
sitions”, in Albrecht Schnabel and Shale Horowitz (eds.), Human Rights in Societies of Transition (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 2004), p. 169. See also Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward,
Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p. 505.
25. For an AID general statement, see “USAID’s Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building
Democracy”, available: <http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/strategy.htm>. See also Carothers,
Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999).
26. Ibid.
If we look at matters toward the end of the Clinton era, for fiscal year 1999 the
State Department reported that it and AID and USIA were spending $622.9
million for democracy assistance.27 This was a very small amount compared
to US spending for all international affairs of about $22 billion, not including
defence spending of about $305 billion. This shows clearly that building and
assisting countries pursuing democracy was not the highest priority in Clinton’s
foreign policy. If we look at Eurasia, however, we find that because of special
US interest in and appropriations for this area, almost 40% of the 1995 inter-
national budget request was related to advancing market democracies.28 A
few examples will illustrate the disjointed and meagre nature of US democracy
programmes.
For example, during 1999 AID’s “democracy and governance” activities
received only $137 million. Since AID ran democracy and governance pro-
grammes in about 50 countries, its resources were obviously spread thin. For
example, the United States apparently hoped to produce liberal democracy in
former Yugoslavia by spending $18 million in fiscal 1998, a paltry sum in the
context of public allocations.29
The above figures do not include what the Defence Department spent in
support of liberal democracy in places like Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo; or what
the Justice Department spent abroad through its foreign Rule of Law programmes.
It has been reported that the Pentagon spent about $20 million per annum in Haiti
between 1994 and 1999.30 By comparison, in any one year in the mid-1990s the US
Justice Department alone was spending more than $70 million on its Rule of Law
programmes abroad. These relatively brief examples demonstrate the minimal
financial commitment to democracy promotion and the disjointed way in which
it is carried out.
It is well known that US democracy-assistance programming normally func-
tioned in three areas: (1) support for elections, (2) for such state-building areas
as independent judiciaries and civilian control over the military, and (3) for
NGOs and other elements of civil society. In so far as this latter area of activity
was said to be crucial for the creation and consolidation of democracy, it was an
open question whether an outside party like the United States could advance
the cause to any great extent. That is, in so far as successful democracy depended
on “social capital” like trust and willingness to join democratic private organis-
ations, it remained a matter of debate whether the United States could affect
such values and orientations in another polity (or even do something about the
decline of trust in governing institutions in the United States itself).31 During
27. Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, “In Focus: US Democrati-
zation Assistance”, Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 4, No. 20 (1999), available: ,www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.. See further Thomas Carothers, “Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance”, in American
Democracy Promotion, pp. 181–199; and Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, op. cit.
28. Kevin F.F. Quigley, “Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions in Modern Italy”, Orbis (Spring
1996). However, subsequent analysis would show that, of the monies actually appropriated, most
went on economic reform, not political/democratic reform.
29. The Milosevic Regime versus Serbian Democracy and Balkan Stability, Hearing, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. (10 December 1998) (Washington:
GPO, 1999), p. 41.
30. Washington Post (31 August 1999), p. 8.
31. See further Kevin F.F. Quigley, “Making Democracy Work”, discussing the scholarship of Robert
Putnam and Francis Fukuyama.
the Clinton administration, AID put some $30 million into trying to build social
capital through support of NGOs in Eastern Europe, but the absence of a scientific
blueprint, plus Washington’s micromanaging of matters, led to very limited
results.32
The Clinton administration achieved a 1999 federal budget that provided
$925 million, a 20% increase, to the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union through the “Freedom Support” initiative. This was designed
“to jump start the political and economic transition to market democracies”.33
The real emphasis was market restructuring. The budget includes clauses that
prohibit the appropriation of funds if “the government is not making progress in
implementing economic reforms based on market principles and private owner-
ship”. No similar clauses impede appropriation if authoritarian or illiberal policies
develop.34
Broader Considerations
Beyond the specific programmes developed by various agencies of the US
government to aid in democratic transitions, foreign policy decision making
based on broader considerations also affects democracy abroad. For example,
the Clinton administration, like other US governments, found the Mubarak
government of Egypt so important in efforts to achieve moderation towards
Israel and general stability in that part of the world that virtually no effort
was made to address bogus elections and systemic political repression.35 The
American need for cheap, reliable oil meant that virtually no effort was
made to address the democracy deficit in places like Kuwait or Saudi
Arabia. The domestic backlash against American deaths in Somalia in 1993
meant that Clinton abandoned state- and nation-building efforts in that
fractured state.
In fact, the Clinton administration, reflecting the “New Democrat” syndrome,
displayed such an interest in traditional economic and security advantages at
times, and was so sensitive to parochial domestic opinion, that Clinton’s first
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) in
the State Department was perpetually unhappy and on the brink of resignation.36
Both of the Assistant Secretaries of DRL in the Clinton administration complained
about the meagre resources for democracy and human rights, and about the
priority given to other aspects of US foreign policy.37
32. Ibid.
33. Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc 105-177, Vol. 1
(Washington: GPO, 1999).
34. The Freedom Support initiative was in addition to the Support for Eastern European Democracies
initiative. Both elevated economics over democracy in both theory and practice. Some have argued that
promoting free market democracy is likely to lead to ethnic conflict as a result of competition. See Chua,
op. cit.
35. See Denis Ju. Sullivan, “The US Egypt Partnership: Are Human Rights Included?”, in Debra
Liang-Fenton (ed.), Implementing US Human Rights Policy (Washington: USIP, 2004), pp. 401 –434.
36. See William Shattuck, Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars & America’s Response (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003).
37. Ibid.; see also Harold Koh, “US Human Rights Policy: Challenges for the Future”, USIP, summary
of presentation (16 February 2001), available: <www.usip.org/newsmedia/releases/pre2002/
nb200010216.html>.
Mixed Record in General

The interplay of traditional and immediate national security concerns, economic
advantage, and democracy promotion, plus sheer neglect of certain situations,
meant that the Clinton record on democracy abroad was highly uncertain or
mixed. One of America’s leading experts on democracy promotion, when review-
ing the Clinton record, found much inconsistency – between regions and within
them. Thomas Carothers found that Clinton had pushed democracy harder in
Latin American than the Middle East, had made genuine efforts in Eastern and
Central Europe but with many limitations and shortcomings, had been interested
in democracy in Africa but devoted few resources to it, and so forth.38 In general,
Carothers found Clinton foreign policy on the matter to be a blend of realism and
liberalism, trying to advance democracy when other interests allowed, but often
giving priority to traditional security and economic concerns.39
This summary was, in general, replicated by the contents of “American Democ-
racy Promotion”.40 Clinton’s highly mixed record on democracy promotion comes
into bold relief if we look at noteworthy cases of advance and retreat.
Noteworthy Attempts
In both Bosnia and Kosovo the Clinton administration finally – if belatedly – took
bold initiatives for (peace and) democracy, mobilising impressive multinational
support along the way. In Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Accord, mediated by
Richard Holbrooke for the Clinton administration, and after the US-led NATO
bombing of Serbia over Kosovo, Washington made major and sustained efforts
at democratisation. True, the Clinton administration was slow to act in Bosnia.
True, the Clinton team acted in Kosovo in part to regain its reputational costs
after its negligence in Bosnia. Nevertheless, Clinton, without much domestic
support,41 managed to end the worst of the human rights violations then occur-
ring in both places, and seriously tried to leave both Bosnia and Kosovo (and
the rest of the Balkans for that matter) much more democratic than before. The
final chapter has yet to be written in these stories.
Also, in Haiti, in an admittedly slow and stumbling way, the Clinton adminis-
tration took certain domestic political risks to reverse military government and try
to advance democratic government. It was certainly true that Clinton was motiv-
ated to act partly because of domestic pressures, namely domestic opposition to
more Haitian boat people arriving in US jurisdiction, along with pressures from
the congressional Black Caucus to deal with root causes of Haitian unrest. But
whereas the previous administration, and indeed Clinton early on, had been
content with a naval interdiction policy that ignored the root causes of flight,
the Clinton team eventually came around to addressing Haiti’s endemic
repression and mismanagement.
38. “Examining the Clinton Record on Democracy Promotion”, Carnegie Endowment (12 September
2000), available: <www.ceip.org/files/events/ClintonEvent.asp?p¼1_EventID¼197>.
39. Ibid.
40. Op. cit.
41. See especially Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).
It was the misfortune of Clinton to be saddled with Father Aristide as the

elected leader of Haiti, whose personal defects contributed to ongoing political
polarisation and violence and economic mismanagement of that poverty-stricken
and under-educated island. Nevertheless, Clinton was the first US president to
confront the root causes of exploitative authoritarianism in Haiti. The results
thus far have definitely been short of impressive, in part because of Washington’s
short-term focus and absence of long-term staying power, although a good
argument can be made that the future would be even more problematic had
Cedras and other self-enriching authoritarians been allowed to continue their
reign.
Noteworthy Retreats
It is evident that former DRL Assistant Secretary Shattuck regards China as
the place where American economic interests clearly trumped US concern
with human rights.42 The Clinton team, starting with the effort to link China’s
human rights performance to trade, abruptly shifted course in 1994 in
favour of “constructive engagement” – notwithstanding the fact that “cons-
tructive engagement” had been a Republican moniker designed to justify
business as usual with the racist white minority government in the Republic
of South Africa.
The Clinton approach to Beijing became – in fact and not just in semantics –
similar to past policy towards Pretoria: quiet dialogue on human rights issues,
including democracy, with the continuation of economic and trade matters as
desired by major US corporations. Clinton had failed to enlist broad Western
support for pressuring China on rights and democracy. China had cleverly
exploited those divisions. Thus Clinton’s early policy was unsustainable, as
French and other European companies positioned themselves to take the business
that might be denied to American enterprises. Clinton and Secretary of State
Warren Christopher had appealed to American business circles to be principled
and socially responsible, but the corporations were having none of it in the
cut-throat competition of international economics.43
The US policy finally adopted may in fact turn out to have been the right choice.
Not only the divisions in the West but also China’s own virulent nationalism may
have made a frontal assault through open economic sanctions impossible to
sustain. It may yet be true that encouraging the rule of law and economic
growth may spur an indigenous democracy movement of some power over the
long run. There is open talk in China of democracy within the one-party
system, as well as freedom of discussion in intellectual circles about the merits
and demerits of Western-style democracy and individual human rights. So
again, as on Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, the final chapter has yet to be written
on democratisation and the Clinton record.
42. In addition to Freedom on Fire, see “Inching Forward: Human Rights Policy in the Clinton Admin-
istration – Conversation with John Shattuck”, Institute of International Studies, University of Califor-
nia-Berkeley, available: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Shattuck/shattuck04-con.html>.
43. Karl Schoenberger, Levi’s Children: Coming to Terms with Human Rights in the Global Marketplace
(New York: Grover Press, 2000).
Overall Evaluation
Carothers is right to say that the Clinton record on democracy promotion was
semi-realism. That is, there was mixture of realism and liberalism, of trying to
advance democracy as a reflection of a liberal approach to world affairs, but
only where traditional security and economic concerns did not interfere. Burma
became a target of US sanctions under the repressive SLORC, but not China.
This record is not totally dissimilar from that of George H.W. Bush, who of
course was the first president not to be faced by the overbearing constraints of
the Cold War.44 As both Shattuck and Koh have made clear, the Clinton era was
a time when the rhetoric of democracy promotion was never matched by
resources for that project.45 In this regard it bears noting that, in particular, Repub-
lican Congresses after the Cold War cut most spending for foreign affairs in
general, and not just for democracy promotion.
George W. Bush and Democracy Promotion

Early Statements
George W. Bush’s first inaugural address represented a classic statement of
traditional American exceptionalism, with the United States pictured as a
shining city on a hill, divinely blessed to show the world the path to
greater personal freedom.46 In so doing, the second President Bush, unlike
the more pragmatic first, established his link to Ronald Reagan’s view of an
American mission in the world. The religious dimension to American excep-
tionalism seemed more devoutly developed by George W. Bush in comparison
to Ronald Reagan.
The Bush National Security Strategy Statement of 2001 was not a statement
reflecting classic realist approaches to a narrow notion of national security, featur-
ing balance-of-power politics à la Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, but promi-
nently featured democracy promotion as part of a revolutionary reshaping of both
national security and US foreign policy in general.47 These foundational docu-
ments plus a variety of other statements during his first administration indicated
clearly that while George W. Bush would not be hesitant to use force in pursuit of
national security, if necessary unilaterally and pre-emptively, the spread of
democracy would also loom large in US policy. There was an official strategy
for promotion of democracy and human rights,48 but as was true in the Clinton
administration this strategy statement did not provide clear guidance for US
policy in specific situations.
44. USAID under George H.W. Bush had adopted a Democracy Initiative, and that administration
cooperated with the World Bank in imposing democratic conditionality on loans to Kenya and
Malawi. Windsor, pp. 143 –144. In would seem that the record of George H.W. Bush was not all that
dissimilar from that of Jimmy Carter, whose push for rights and democracy in the Western Hemisphere
was certainly different from his policies towards China, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and other countries of
strategic and economic interest.
45. Koh, op. cit.; Shattuck, “Inching Forward”, op. cit.
46. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>.
47. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.
48. US Department of State, “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2003–2004”,
available: <www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2003/>.
Democracy Programmes
President George W. Bush continued many of the programmes pursued by
Clinton to promote democracy, especially those long mandated by Congress.
The Bush administration still emphasised the importance of elections and
the development of civil society to promote access to the political system.
Additionally, Washington sought to create the necessary institutional aspects
of a democratic system such as the rule of law and legislative and judicial
reform.49
As had been true under Clinton, funding for democracy promotion came from a
crazy quilt of authorisation measures and administrative decisions. The State
Department’s human rights bureau (DRL) and the quasi-independent USAID
both claimed leadership roles. The former managed some Economic Support
Funds (ESF) targeted for democracy programmes, including DRL’s Human
Rights and Democracy Fund with budgets totalling over $100 million for fiscal
years 2001 – 2004.50 AID managed several congressionally authorised programmes
(SEED, FSA) in addition to its own budgetary allocations. Other democracy pro-
gramming by the Justice Department and the Defense Department escaped
State Department coordination.
The Bush administration, obviously with the support of Congress, increased
some funding that wound up in democracy projects, directly or indirectly.
AID’s budget was increased to over $14 billion after Bush took office in 2001.
This reflects largely the broadened mandate of AID because of the war on
terrorism, and the willingness of Congress to fund a variety of projects undertaken
in pursuit of enhanced US national security, broadly defined.51 Of the $14 billion,
AID democracy and governance programmes were increased to $199.9 million in
fiscal year 2003 and $192.5 million in fiscal year 2004.52 When special programmes
are added to basic funding for AID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance, and when DRL’s share of ESF are included, US
funding for official democracy promotion remained at around $700 million per
annum.53 NED also saw continued support during the Bush administration. In
fiscal year 2002 funding for NED was $48.5 million. NED received over $41
million for fiscal year 2003 from the State Department. The requested budget
for fiscal year 2005 has almost doubled this figure to $80 million. Under
Clinton, NED had been run at about $30 million.
As was true under Clinton, and equally true under Reagan and George H.W.
Bush for that matter, various forms of US democracy promotion have not
escaped criticism at home and abroad as unacceptable interference in a country’s
domestic affairs. Several of the American actors under NED (the National Demo-
cratic Institute and International Republican Institute) provided “soft money”
49. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2000).
50. <www.state.gov/g/drl/c7607.htm>.
51. Speech given by Andrew Natsios, Administrator, United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (21 April 2004), US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC. See also <www.nytimes.com>
(22 February 2004).
52. <www.usaid.gov/policy/buget/>.
53. Roger P. Winter, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance, USAID, testimony, House International Relations Committee (9 July 2003), available:
<http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.library.unl.edu/universe/document?-m¼980a17d33709c95d9>.
campaign contributions to political parties in other countries in an attempt to

sway elections. In Slovakia, NED funding attempted to defeat the democratically
elected Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. More recently, NED has financially
assisted groups in Venezuela in their attempts to overthrow President Hugo
Chavez. Several hundreds of thousands of dollars were distributed to anti-
Chavez groups.54 IRI president George Folson praised the coup that briefly
ousted Chavez.55 Support for such extra-legal rebellions and coups d’état is
highly controversial, and probably inconsistent with the goal of promoting
indigenous democracy.56
Similar criticisms, from the Kremlin and members of Congress, have arisen
concerning US activity prior to Ukraine’s recent presidential election. Between
2002 and 2004 the Bush administration disbursed close to $60 million on activities
related to the development of civil society (promotion of NGOs) and electoral
participation. AID reportedly spent $28 million on projects relating to democ-
racy.57 Perhaps most interesting was the American Bar Association’s allocation
of $400,000 to tutor Ukrainian judges, including a number of current supreme
court judges, in election law.58 ABA’s Central European and Eurasian Law Initiat-
ive (CEELI) was one programme in AID’s election projects.59 This assistance
appears, at least initially, to have helped in promoting a more democratic political
system in that Ukraine’s Supreme Court overturned the 21 November 2004 vote
count, citing voter fraud. In addition, it ordered an additional round of elections
which resulted in a significantly improved voting process and gave victory to
opposition leader Viktor Yishchenko.60
Like Clinton before him, Bush continued to place heavy priority on Eurasia in
official democracy programming, again because of congressional mandate. Bush
officials reported that since the start of SEED and FSA programming, some
$15.9 billion had been expended for the development of market democracies in
that region.61 Tellingly, 53% of this funding went on economic reform, and only
17% directly to democracy projects (with other amounts going to health
programmes and humanitarian assistance).62 This distribution indicated the
emphasis on market reform of much interest to American corporations looking
for safe investments and reliable trade, although such an emphasis in funding pri-
orities could be rationalised in terms of helping to create the sound economic
54. Reported by The Guardian, available: <www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,706802,

00.html>. If one looks at an independent auditor’s report of NED between 2001 and 30 September
2002, one notes grants of over $350,000 distributed. This report can be found at <www.ned.org/publi-
cations/02annual/02finance.pdf>. Some critics have argued that over $2.2 million was allocated to
anti-Chavez parties between 2000 and 2001. See <www.venezuela.foia.info/>.
55. <www.iri.org/pdfs/venezula.htm>.
56. For criticisms of NED, see <www.antiwar.com> and Barbara Conry, “Loose Cannon: The
National Endowment for Democracy”, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 27 (8 November 1993). She
argues that NED meddles in other countries’ affairs with taxpayers’ money.
57. <www.usaid.gov>.
58. <http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/ukraine/ukraine_2004_elections_activities.html>.
59. <www.abanet.org>.
60. <www.iri.org/12-27-04-ukrainestatement.asp>; <www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1786_uk_
press_122704.htm/>; and <www.enemo.org.ua%20/>.
61. Kent R. Hill, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, USAID, testimony, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (2 April 2003), available: <http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.library.unl.edu/
universe/document?-m¼980a17d33709c95d9>.
62. Ibid.
system widely thought to be necessary for consolidation of democracy in the long

term.
Broader Considerations
George W. Bush saw himself as a wartime president, with his place in history
defined by his response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.63 It
became clear that his top priority was preventing further attacks on the home-
land, which required tough security policies both at home and abroad. It is
not surprising, then, that traditional security concerns pre-empted consider-
ations of human rights and democracy in the short term in a number of situ-
ations. For example, the Bush administration needed the diplomatic and
military support of countries that bordered Afghanistan and Iraq, regardless
of their domestic records on human rights and democracy. Democracy
promotion in places like Uzbekistan was downgraded in the light of pressing
diplomatic and military objectives.
Bush priorities were clear in other countries like China, where an interest in
security cooperation was reinforced by economic calculation. Bush wanted
China’s cooperation in dealing with Islamic radicals (not to mention moderation
regarding Taiwan and other security issues), and continued trade as usual.
China’s position was also important to the Bush team on a whole series of
issues in the UN Security Council (e.g. the Sudan). So consistent with Clinton’s
strategy of constructive engagement, the Bush administration mostly avoided
public criticism of China’s lack of democracy.
Apart from considerations linked to opposing Islamic radicals (jihadists), the
Bush administration engaged in several controversial policies that raised ques-
tions about its commitment to democracy abroad. We have already mentioned
Washington’s brief support for those in Venezuela who sought to remove Hugo
Chavez, the elected president. Similarly in Haiti, the Bush administration
arranged the departure of President Aristide whom the Clinton administration
had strongly supported as the duly elected head of state.
Both in Venezuela and Haiti, Bush policies could be rationalized in terms of
trying to remove a highly problematic elected leader who was undermining the
long-term prospects for consolidation of constitutional democracy. But particu-
larly in Venezuela, there was such hemispheric opposition to Bush’s efforts to
be rid of the left-leaning Chavez that Washington had to back off from its official
and open support of those acting unconstitutionally. (One is never sure what
covert US programmes might remain in place.)
It bears noting that Venezuela, like Nigeria, is a fragile democracy or partially
free country with an important trade in oil for the United States. So considerations
of democracy are intertwined with the US need for reliable and cheap oil,
especially from outside the volatile Middle East.
Mixed Record in General

It is evident that the overall Bush record on democracy promotion was not all that
dissimilar from Clinton’s record. There was a blend of realism, or state-centred
63. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
notions of security requiring the use of force, and calculations of balance-of-power

politics. At the same time, especially where traditional notions of security and
economic advantage did not interfere, the Bush team displayed a genuine interest
in what Clinton had called the enlargement of the democratic community.
The Bush record was also one of semi-realism and semi-liberalism, with great
variation in policies towards different countries and regions. This will become
even clearer when we look at notable initiatives and retreats in democratisation
efforts.
Notable Initiatives
After the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, President
Bush authorized military attacks on the Taliban’s Afghanistan, where the govern-
ment was intertwined with the al-Qaeda network. Upon the completion of major
combat, the Bush administration sought to create democratic government in
Afghanistan, and in 2004 country-wide elections resulted in Hamid Karzai becom-
ing not just interim president but a constitutional president. The political pattern
in Afghanistan mirrored Clinton’s policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, where use of
military force was followed by a US-led multinational effort to move the situation
towards constitutional democracy.
As in Bosnia and Kosovo, so in Afghanistan, a major post-combat concern was
not just the holding of free and fair elections but the social integration and econ-
omic growth of the country. In Afghanistan, it was proving far more difficult to
unify the various ethnic groups of the country, and to find an economic substitute
for the illegal opium trade, than to organise national elections. Yet the
Bush administration was given wide credit for its pro-democracy efforts in
Afghanistan, which included treating women as equal citizens under law.
Neither the British nor the Russians had been able to pacify Afghanistan in the
past. The Bush administration was not only trying to stabilise and unify the
country but make it governed by constitutional democracy. Whether US leader-
ship for initiating democracy in Afghanistan would fare better than in other
places like Haiti was an interesting, if unresolved, question.64 Even the security
situation remained highly problematic outside Kabul.
Also noteworthy, but even more controversial, was the Bush administration’s
new efforts at democratic development in the Global South. One of the most sig-
nificant new initiatives taken by the Bush administration to promote democracy
abroad was the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). This account attempts
to help decrease poverty in the developing world and enhance personal
freedom. President Bush expressed these sentiments when he laid out the motiv-
ation for the MCA in Monterrey, Mexico:
The MCA “will reward nations that root out corruption, respect human
rights, and adhere to the rule of law . . . invest in better health care,
better schools, and broader immunization . . . [and] have more open
markets and sustainable budget policies . . .”
64. Certain American realists thought it foolish to pursue democracy promotion in Afghanistan; see
Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2004). The
author works for the CIA.
Congress has approved $1 billion for fiscal year 2004. The president has pledged
to provide $5 billion per year by fiscal year 2006, although this target seems unli-
kely to be met by Congress, especially given growing economic woes (trade
deficit; a weak dollar; growing debt, etc.). To qualify for a grant from the MCA
a developing country must meet certain objective criteria as established by
Freedom House (Civil Liberties and Political Rights), the World Bank Institute
(Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of
Corruption, etc.), and the IMF (Inflation, Three Year Budget Deficit).65
By establishing good governance standards for eligibility, the Bush adminis-
tration is attempting to avoid wasting US foreign aid on a corrupt host nation.
Furthermore, the MCA tries to improve health, education and economic growth
in developing countries. These are all necessary to improve the long-term pro-
spects for a healthy and stable democratic political system. The first countries
selected for MCA funding are Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia,
Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu.
When looking over the initial list, countries such as Benin and Ghana have
clearly made progress in the development of economic and political reforms.
Other countries set to receive funding do not seem as deserving. For example,
Armenia, Bolivia, and Honduras show little signs of progress when looking at
Freedom House numbers since 2000. The selection of Georgia also raises some
questions. While elections in January of 2004 ushered in President Saakashvilli,
an individual who has displayed a respect for freedom and market reforms, the
changes in this former Soviet republic have not been sustained long enough to
instil confidence in the overall direction of Georgia. Thus some of the initial selec-
tions for MCA funding appear to have less to do with objective determinants than
with political calculations.
The MCA is a unilateral initiative and does not therefore fit all that well with
UN and other multinational efforts at democratic development. Also, there is a
widespread fear that MCA funds will be used more for economic than political
reform, as has been the case with some US funding for market democracies in
Eurasia.
Nevertheless, George W. Bush has shown more interest in democratic develop-
ment than other Republican Presidents of late, and he has persuaded a Republican
Congress to provide at least some increased funding in this regard.
Noteworthy Retreats
When one examines the Bush administration’s approach to Pakistan one finds that
democratic reforms are clearly secondary to security concerns. In US policy
towards Pakistan, the war on terrorism has taken precedence over democracy
promotion.
At the time of Pervez Musharaf’s coup, there was much talk in the United
States and the West about sanctions and a restoration of democracy. But after
11 September 2001, the Bush administration has been comforted by President
Musharaf’s anti-fundamentalist beliefs. On 24 May 2004 Musharaf, in a televised
65. Christopher Marquis, “Overhaul by US Will Reroute Aid for Poor Nations”, New York Times
(22 February 2004), available: <www.whitehouse.org>.
speech, warned young people against Islamic extremists who fuel hatred of the
West.66 General Musharaf has been supportive since 11 September 2001, and
President Bush has continuously praised the general despite the authoritarian
nature of his government and the undemocratic circumstances of his rise to
power and unwillingness to step down as head of the army. Bush showed his
gratitude by conferring on Pakistan the status of major non-NATO ally. The
benefits of this status include additional foreign aid (over $600 million soon
after 11 September 2001) and enhanced military cooperation, including defence
R&D programmes. Other major non-NATO allies include Israel and South
Korea.67
Musharaf may be a benign dictator but Pakistan is clearly not a well-functioning
democracy. Musharaf’s defence of some of his undemocratic restrictions is that by
opening the political system to more democratic participation, it will lead to the
election of Islamists. This is an unattractive possibility from Washington’s point
of view. The administration’s rhetoric continues to stress the importance of
democracy, but it is unwilling to press regimes that are strategically important
to the war on terror.68
Also, the Bush administration, and especially the White House itself, has been
notably reticent about Russia’s declining democracy and in particular President
Putin’s concentration of power in the Kremlin.69 As the quality of Russia’s
democracy has declined, the Bush team has given priority to other interests
such as cooperation on security issues. Russia did not support the US invasion
of Iraq, and recently the Kremlin has been more outspoken in its criticisms
of the United States, especially with regard to the nature of the following US
occupation. Washington and the Kremlin share an interest in the suppression
of jihadists, whether the precise point of controversy is Chechnya or Iraq,
Moscow or New York. The Bush team also had other security interests in a coop-
erative Putin regime, such as in relation to the control of weapons of mass
destruction.
For these security reasons, reinforced by certain economic interests, the White
House has been quiet about the illiberal democracy that clearly exists in Russia.
Elections in Russia are somewhat free, although there are serious flaws. This
partly accounts for a Freedom House rating of “5” – the worst possible score –
for both political freedoms and civil liberties since 2000.70 Recent parliamentary
and presidential elections fell short of democratic standards according to
foreign observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
66. Reuters (24 May 2004).

67. Steven Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 5 (2003), pp. 104–117, avail-
able: <www.bbc.co.uk> (17 June 2004).
68. See the exchange between Paula Dobriansky of the Bush State Department and Thomas Carothers
in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2003), pp. 141 –145. See also Human Rights Watch, Annual Report 2002,
available: <www.hrw.org>.
69. Pamela Jordan, “Russia’s Accessions to the Council of Europe and Compliance with European
Human Rights Norms”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2003), pp. 281–307; Rick Fawn, “Russia’s
Relations with the West over Chechnya”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 18,
No. 1 (2002), pp. 3–21; Rouben Azizian, “A Marriage of Convenience: Russia and US Foreign
Policy”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2003), pp. 151–159.
70. Some scholars have presented a more optimistic view of the progress in Russia, arguing that
given its economic growth (middle-income economy), Russia is progressing as expected. See Andrei
Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “A Normal Country”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2004), pp. 20–38.
Europe. They reported ballot stuffing and misappropriation of funds.71 Further-

more, Russia does not have a free, independent press. Most independent TV chan-
nels have been forced off the air, leaving only state-controlled television, which is,
of course, highly favourable to President Putin. This is to say nothing of the
repressive situation in Chechnya.72 When one adds the intimidation of business-
men and the recent arrest in October 2003 of the oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
one sees the illiberal nature of Russia’s democracy coming through.
And when the Secretary of State articulated public criticism of Putin’s Russia
both in relation to freedom within Russia73 and Putin’s support for tainted elec-
tions and politicians in the Ukraine,74 Bush and his spokespersons remained
notably quiet.
The Case of Iraq

In invading Iraq in March 2003, President Bush offered several justifications: the
presence of weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein’s links to al-Qaeda,
and the evil nature of his regime. There was also the fact that Iraq controlled
the second greatest known oil reserves in the world. The Hussein government
had plotted to kill the senior Bush. In addition, Bush officials had discussed
using force for regime change in Iraq even before the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001.
While there is much controversy about this subject, and while it will be some
time before many relevant facts are fully determined, two points are already
clear: (1) the Peceny thesis is once again confirmed: when US use of force
becomes controversial, governments in Washington fall back on the argument
of democratisation. That is the argument that carries the most clout with Congress
and public opinion, given the American self-image of a country that advances per-
sonal freedom in the world. (2) Relatedly, after the conclusion of major combat, the
Bush administration worked to produce early elections in Iraq, just as it had in
Afghanistan, in order to advance the notion of legitimate action, regardless of
the absence of weapons of mass destruction or any proven substantive links
with al-Qaeda. The Bush team emphasized not just the evils of the old regime
but the merits of new democracy in Iraq, in an effort to obscure the fact that
Saddam Hussein, for all his evil in Iraqi society, had posed no clear and present
danger to the United States at the time of the invasion.
Thus the Bush policy of democracy promotion in Iraq – very costly in terms of
blood and treasure – was important not only to the Iraqi nation but also to the
legitimacy, if not the legality, of Bush’s policies and place in history in general.
71. “The election process overall did not adequately reflect principles necessary for a healthy demo-
cratic election process” (www.osce.org).
72. Numerous reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch detail the lack of political
and personal freedom in Chechnya over the last five years. For example, a report in April 2004 by
Human Rights Watch described the killing of nine civilians, presumably by Russian forces. “Russia:
Nine Civilians Extrajudicially Executed in Chechnya Amid Evidence of New Atrocities, United
Nations Human Rights Commission Must Take Action” (13 April 2004), available: <www.hrw.org>.
73. The Associated Press, “Powell Shows Concern about Russia Voting” (14 March 2004), available:
<www.nytimes.com>.
74. Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Bush’s Words Contradict Agenda; Praise for Putin Clashes
with US Promotion of Democracy”, Washington Post (15 September 2004).
The Bush invasion of Iraq, as is well known, was hugely controversial in

the world, even if American voters in 2004 returned George W. Bush to the
White House for a second term. Many American voters apparently saw a resolute
leader who could be trusted with US security, whereas much of the rest of
the world saw a dangerous leader who threatened their security and sense of
welfare.
Unresolved: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East

An additional proposal from the Bush administration is the Greater Middle East
Initiative (GMEI). This seeks to encourage democracy, women’s rights, free
markets, and an independent media and judicial system. It has not been
warmly received by the Arab world, and certainly not by many authoritarian
Arab governments. Some do not believe that reform can or should be imposed
from the outside.
Some funds allocated through this policy have been used to promote free trade
in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Algeria. More specifically,
$6 million was set aside to assist Morocco “open its markets to US competition”,
while $1 million was allocated to help Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Algeria join the
World Trade Organisation.75 This again offers evidence of Washington giving pri-
ority to economic interests over developing democracies abroad. Whether the
GMEI will have a significant impact on the region remains to be seen.
One of the justifications for the war in Iraq offered by the Bush administration
was the ability to create a democracy in Iraq, which would be an example to other
countries in the Middle East.76 It was argued by some, including Paul Wolfowitz,
that democratising Iraq would have a positive, contagious effect throughout the
region. President Bush echoed this sentiment: “The rise of a free and self-govern-
ing Iraq will deny terrorists a base of operations, discredit their narrow ideology
and give momentum to reformers across the region.”77 At the time of writing,
national elections are scheduled for Iraq, amid widespread insecurity. It
remains to be seen whether Iraq under US influence and protection moves
towards stable democracy and power sharing among Shiites, Sunnis, and
Kurds, or towards civil war. The CIA has filed pessimistic reports, and US officials
spoke openly of the United States having to keep significant forces in Iraq for 4 –10
years. Some believe that “the idea of a quick and easy democratic transformation
is a fantasy”.78
Similarities between Bush and Clinton

One can recall that on 11 October, during the 2000 election campaign, then-
Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush promised that he, unlike
75. Farah Stockman, “Autocratic States Gain from US Democracy Fund”, International Herald Tribune
(7 July 2004).
76. James Fallow, “Blind into Baghdad”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 293, No. 1 (2004), pp. 52– 77.
77. George W. Bush, Speech at Army War College, Carlisle, PA (24 May 2004), available: <www.ny-
times.com>.
78. Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne and Daniel Brumberg, “Democratic
Mirage in the Middle East”, Policy Brief 20, Brookings (October 2002), pp. 1–8.
President Clinton, would not send American troops all over the world on
(democratic) nation-building projects because he opposed nation building.79
Thus the change in presidents in 2001 should have ushered in significant
changes, given the divergent political philosophies of Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush. When looking at the two most recent administrations,
however, one is struck by the similarities between the two. This was true
despite the emergence of terrorism and the jihadists as major foci in US
foreign policy. Both Clinton and his predecessor often elevated economic
(China and Russia) and security interests (Pakistan, Egypt) over democracy pro-
motion during their tenure in office, despite their different political leanings. At
the same time, in other places, both genuinely pursued democratisation (Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan). While funding for democracy promotion increased under
Bush compared to Clinton, this was probably because even a Republican Con-
gress became convinced that enlarging the democratic community of states
helped to undermine terrorism and other forms of anti-Americanism and
extremism. Even with increased funding, democratic programming remained
meagre compared to other public expenditure such as the size of the Defense
Department budget (at the time of writing over $400 billion).
The Impact of Policies and Programmes

Given the lack of a consistent response from Washington over the years in
support of democracy abroad, and the minimal funding set out for this
goal, it is not surprising to find that there is little evidence of a democratic
revolution throughout the world over the last 10 years. If one looks at the
Freedom House survey results during the Clinton and Bush administrations,
one is struck by the lack of democratic progress. There has been only a
marginal increase in the number of countries that are now considered to be
free. During Clinton’s two terms in office, nine additional countries were
categorized as free. In the three years of George W. Bush’s presidency,
three additional countries are now considered free.80 These numbers do not
overwhelm us with democratic progress. Furthermore, the number of countries
rated as not free also increased slightly (42–48) over this 11-year period.
Other studies have also presented bleak conclusions. In a recent study,
Stephen Knack, a senior research economist at the World Bank, determined
that there was little evidence to suggest that foreign aid promoted democracy
in the over 100 countries studied.81 Furthermore, we have witnessed countries
such as Pakistan and Egypt recede in their democratic status over the last few
years. For example, Freedom House has given Egypt the next to worst poss-
ible scores on both civil and political freedoms. If anything, Mubarak and
Musharaf feel more immune from American pressure on democracy since
11 September 2001. Given these factors and the lack of political pressure on
79. “I do not think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building”, Michael Ignatieff,
“Nation-building Lite”, New York Times Magazine (28 July 2002).
80. <www.freedomhouse.org>.
81. Knack looked at whether countries receiving more foreign aid exhibited improved democratic
scores on the Freedom House democracy indexes. See “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”, Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2004), pp. 251– 266.
leaders such as Mubarak and Musharaf, an evaluation of American democracy

promotion does not receive very high marks.
Conclusions
In sum, democracy-promotion activities under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
were poorly funded and widely dispersed to many countries and operating
through various agencies. The United States generally offered small amounts of
funding to transition countries without much meaningful or long-term strategy.82
The results have not been spectacular.
In addition, some countries (Poland, Slovenia) that have developed into liberal
democracies over the course of the last decade have done so largely on their
own.83 Furthermore, US diplomacy under the two most recent administrations
has often overlooked authoritarian leaders and military takeovers if they furth-
ered either national economic or national security interests. Thus, democracy pro-
motion under both Clinton and Bush has often taken a backseat to other more
pressing issues.
This, not surprisingly, does not help the democratic cause. Citizens of other
countries resent Washington’s condescending attitude concerning “the promised
land” of democracy. Leaders in the Arab world have rejected President Bush’s
Greater Middle East Initiative as imperialistic. This is especially true when the
prophet of democracy is hypocritical when dealing with its own pressing national
interests.84 India, for example, is sceptical of American sincerity about democracy
promotion, given the support to Musharaf and other military dictators over the
last 50 years.85
That George W. Bush fought a war in Iraq, without much international support,
in part for the promotion of democracy, is unconvincing to many around the
world when at the same time the president is willing to accept authoritarian
leaders in neighbouring countries.86 This is evident from overwhelmingly
unfavourable mass opinion in regions such as the Middle East.87
82. See especially Thomas Carothers, “Aiding – and Defining – Democracy”, World Policy Journal,
Vol. 13, No. 1 (1996), pp. 97 –109.
83. Slovenia desired to be accepted into the Council of Europe and eventually into the European
Union; the Council of Europe has become the ante-chamber for the European Union, which makes
both together a major pull factor for liberal democracy. See further David P. Forsythe, Human Rights
in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 5.
84. Our historical record is not one to boast of. The United States gave financial and military support
to overthrow President Arbentz in Guatemala in 1954. Washington supported the military coup that
overthrew Allende in Chile in 1973. The United States also assisted in coups that overthrew Goulart’s
government in Brazil in 1964 and Mossedeq in Iran in 1953. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi moved Iran
further away from democracy, as did Col. Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala. Both had terrible long-
term effects. Stephan Kunzer, “Iran and Guatemala, 1953– 4 Revisiting Cold War Coups and Finding
them Costly”, New York Times (30 November 2003).
85. Guatam Adhikari, “India and America: Estranged No More”, Current History, Vol. 103, No. 672
(2004), pp. 158–164.
86. David P. Forsythe, “US Foreign Policy and Human Rights in an Era of Insecurity: The Bush
Administration and Human Rights after 9/11”, Woolery Lecture Address at Bethany College,
Bethany, WV (25 February 2004).
87. For example, Brian Knowlton reports that Egyptian mass opinion was unfavourable to the United
States by a margin of 11 to 1. See “A Global Image on the Way Down”, International Herald Tribune
(5 December 2002).
Even if a sudden change were to occur in Washington and democracy pro-

motion were to become a priority, there are still additional reasons to offer a
gloomy picture of the effects of these programmes. When one also acknowledges
that some countries have an uphill battle in developing a liberal democracy
owing to their history, economic stagnation, or illiberal culture, one is left
feeling less than optimistic about a new world order made up of liberal democ-
racies.88 In some places, Haiti perhaps, it is difficult to conceive of anything less
than a full military occupation that would greatly increase the prospects of
Haitian democracy. Afghanistan also appears to be a country with an uphill
battle as it continues to struggle in its moves towards democracy. In some
regions such as the Middle East there are obviously many factors at work
(economic stagnation, the Israeli – Palestinian problem, humiliation, an identity
crisis as a result of globalisation) and the United States cannot alleviate all of
these problems, especially when Washington has limited credibility in the
Arab world.
While we are generally pessimistic about the impact of US foreign policy on
democracy promotion abroad, we offer a few passing suggestions that might
assist in this endeavour. First, Washington should learn to live with Islamic
democracies even if they are less than ideal from a Western point of view.
Criticisms of Iran while it was clearly taking strides towards democracy in the
1990s and early 2000, as well as ignoring democratic progress in Algeria prior
to 1994, only harm global democratic development. In addition, statements
from Rumsfeld and others that deny the possibility of an Islamic party coming
to power democratically suggest hypocrisy.
Furthermore, Washington needs to develop and commit to a long-term demo-
cratic strategy. Democracies do not develop overnight; they require a long-term
investment in economic development, and stable and accountable institutions.
The United States must be patient and remain engaged in democracy promotion
in a country not only during one administration but also over the course of a
number of administrations. It will only be through a decades-long commitment
that Washington will see some countries consolidate their democratic political
systems.
One way in which this should be accomplished is through an invigorated effort
to improve educational standards. The US needs to do more at the local level to
develop goodwill with foreigners. In this regard, it is instructive to look at the
success of Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. One of the reasons why Hamas has so much support in Palestine is
because it, unlike the Palestinian Authority, provides needed services to the
people. Hamas provides medical services, food services, and runs summer
camps, schools, and mosques. Through these activities Hamas has cultivated
loyalty among the people. This is also true of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
The United States would be wise to emulate some of these practices. Providing
educational alternatives to madrasas would be an important first step. Not only
would the United States shelter some children from the hatred taught at some
88. For some enthusiasts democracy is possible everywhere. Samuel Huntington is more cautious.
He notes, however, that poverty is an obstacle to democracy. “Poverty is a principal and probably
the principal obstacle to democratic development. The future of democracy depends on the future of
economic development. Obstacles to economic development are obstacles to the expansion of democ-
racy” (Huntington, op. cit., p. 311).
of these religious schools but also this would give the United States an opportu-
nity to teach children, at an early stage in their lives, the concepts of democracy
and freedom. This would have lasting rewards as future generations would not
be hostile to the United States or democracy. The efforts at the MCA may
be steps in a positive direction if political calculations are eliminated from the
selection process.
Winston Churchill once remarked: “democracy is the worst form of government
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.89 While
democracy may be the most humane form of government, the United States has
not, under either Bill Clinton or George W. Bush, done a very good job of assisting
other countries to achieve this political system.
89. Dimitri Simes, “America’s Imperial Dilemma”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (2003), pp. 91–102.

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Global Society, Vol. 19, No.

US Democracy Promotion: The Clinton and Bush

BARBARA ANN J. RIEFFER with KRISTAN MERCER

ISSN 1360-0826 print=ISSN 1469-798X online=05=040385-24 # 2005 University of Kent

On the assumption that democracy promotion abroad is more a Democratic

Theory and Policy Choice

Presumably, then, a wise democracy-promotion policy by the United States

History and Policy Analysis

programmes, on the thesis that democratic states – at least liberal democratic

Clinton and Democracy Promotion

Promoting human rights is – and must remain – an integral part of US

Mixed Record in General

It was the misfortune of Clinton to be saddled with Father Aristide as the

George W. Bush and Democracy Promotion

campaign contributions to political parties in other countries in an attempt to

54. Reported by The Guardian, available: <www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,706802,

system widely thought to be necessary for consolidation of democracy in the long

Mixed Record in General

notions of security requiring the use of force, and calculations of balance-of-power

66. Reuters (24 May 2004).

Europe. They reported ballot stuffing and misappropriation of funds.71 Further-

The Case of Iraq

The Bush invasion of Iraq, as is well known, was hugely controversial in

Unresolved: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East

Similarities between Bush and Clinton

The Impact of Policies and Programmes

leaders such as Mubarak and Musharaf, an evaluation of American democracy

Even if a sudden change were to occur in Washington and democracy pro-

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