EVIDENCE be jailed.Furthermore, .

appellant insists that Victor Taneo's credibility is questionable because the latter had earlier
III.
Rule 130, Section 20- Witnesses 10. Giving full faith and credit to the prosecution's version of the incident, particularly to the testimonies of Dr. Sia, which
People vs. Taneo
FACTS:
1. The above-named accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
2. Co-accused Victor Taneo, alias Opao (Kalbo) testified that he is a jeepney dispatcher (barker). BebotEscoreal, another
accused herein is his long-time friend who is also a barker at Juan Luna Street, Cebu City. 11. Hence, this appeal. Appellant insists that Taneo’s credibility is questionable because the latter had earlier been
3. On December 22, 1986 at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw BebotEscoreal talking to a person. He approached
Escoreal and the latter introduced him to the person who turned out to be Roy Codilla. After knowing each other, the
conversation continued with Codilla saying that he (Codilla) planned to rob the house of his former employer, Dr. Sia,
as his revenge. Codilla then told him (Taneo) to procure money to be used in entertaining Dr. Sia's houseboy, Jose
Robert. They were briefed by Codilla that in the house of Dr. Sia are a maid and houseboy. Codilla stated that after the
robbery has been pulled (sic), Codilla will bring them to Manila. With his P20.00, they, Codilla, Arnel Go, Escoreal and
himself, boarded a jeepney towards the place of Dr. Sia.
4. While houseboy Jose Robert and househelperLanda Robert were cleaning the yard, Codilla entered the Sia premises
for the purpose of inviting Jose Robert outside. Codilla told his companions to stay behind at the corner street and to
wait for his signal. After the agreed signal of Codilla, placing his right hand on the right side of his head, they went
inside the house of Dr. Sia. Leaving behind Jose at the store, Codilla joined them. Escoreal stayed outside as lookout.
Once inside, Codilla boxed the maid hitting her in the midsection of the stomach. The maid fell on the floor and Codilla
ordered them to finish her off as she can identify them. He and Codilla got coke bottles under the dining table and
struck the maid on her forehead, head and mouth. They took from a room Sony Cassette Recorder, Sharp Cassette
Recorder and some tapes, while Arnel Go in another room, gathered some calculators.
5. At the groundfloor of Perpetual Succour Hospital, the severely injured and bloody maid managed to reveal to her (Dr.
Sia) in the presence of Corazon Gonzales and Patrolman Lopez, that Roy Codilla was the one who struck her. Landa
Robert was treated for multiple lacerations in head and face caused by a blunt object. Five hours (days) later,she died
due to compression of vital brain centers.
6. Roy Codilla, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty while Victor Taneo (voluntarily pleaded guilty. 3The trial
court4 issued an Order finding the latter guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of  reclusion
perpetua.
been charged in two criminal cases for robbery.
it describes to be straightforward, without hesitation and concise." 7 and that of Victor Taneo who "[V]ividly in
detail, . . . disclosed how he met Codilla" and how the latter "laid his plan to 'hit' the house of his former employer for
revenge,"8 and considering the statement given by Landa to Dr. Sia at the hospital — that she, Landa, was struck by Roy
Codilla — as part of the res gestae,9 the trial court,  found the accused Roy Codilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.
charged in two (2 criminal cases for robbery.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the mere pendency of criminal case against a person disqualify him from becoming a witness.
Whether or not the appellate court has the authority to disturb the findings of the trial court when the issue of
credibility of a witness is concerned.
Whether or not the court a quo correctly considered the statement given by the victim Landa Robert to Herminia as
part of the res gestae.
Whether or not defense of alibi prevails over the positive identification of the accused.
HELD:
No. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or
political belief, interest in the outcome of the case or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification.BesidesTaneo admits that these cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a
matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person from being presented as a witness unless
otherwise provided by law.35 At his arraignment, Victor Taneo voluntarily pleaded guilty to an information which
charges conspiracy. He was not discharged as a state witness — a sure guarantee of acquittal 36 — and he did not
impute criminal responsibility solely on the appellant. Thus, if he were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have
been moved by a strong, improper and ulterior motive. That motive must have been established; appellant failed to do
so. In the absence of evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses for the prosecution should have testified
falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.3

7. Accused Codilla, testified that in April 1984, he was hired by Dr. Sia as security guard of her residence. When Codilla2.
started bringing his friends to the house of Dr. Sia, the latter felt peeved because Codilla's friends were of questionable
and suspicious-looking characters. She was told by Codilla that his companions were jeepney dispatchers in the
downtown area. Not being at ease with such situation, she fired Codilla..
8. He denied the charge that he and Taneo committed robbery-homicide in Sia residence at 5:30 p.m. of December 22,
1986 because on that day he was in the house of Jose Robert, his friend, who just arrived from Manila and went home
at 10:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, passing first in his aunt's house at Camp Lapulapu..
No. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence and amply supported by an impressive array of cases is the rule that when
the issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself
and observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had
been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the results of the case. 21

9. He claimed that Dr. Sia instigated Taneo to implicate him because at one time that Dr. Sia hired somebody to lob a
grenade in the house of the wife of her boyfriend, he stopped her. That is the only reason why Dr. Sia wanted him to
Part III 1 of 30
 We have painstakingly examined the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses and find no cogent reason to disregard the rule and give way to the exception. The full faith and credit
given by the trial court to the testimonies of the HerminiaSia and Victor Taneo are supported by the evidence. In fact,
the tenor of the assigned errors and the arguments summoned to support them betray the appellant's realization of
the infirmity of his stand. Were it not for the gravity of the offense charged and the penalty imposed, this conclusion
could have written an early finis to the appeal.  qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.
3. Yes. The court a quo correctly considered the statement given by the victim, Landa Robert, to HerminiaSia as part of
the res gestae. Landa's declaration that it was the appellant who struck her was given while she was still at the ground
floor of the Perpetual Succour Hospital awaiting to be admitted for treatment. She was rushed to said hospital
immediately after the incident in question and was operated on for four (4) hours starting at 8:00 o'clock that evening
until 12:00 midnight. She died five (5) days later.
The following three (3) requisites must concur before evidence of the res gestae  may be admitted: (1) the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstance
10. Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of Acasio who was not only probably drunk, but
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration 24before he had time to think and
make up a story,25 or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, 26 or to fabricate an account, 27 and without any undue
11. Appellant also discredits prosecution witness Elsa de la Cruz by highlighting her alleged inconsistent statements, i.e.,
influence in obtaining 
it,28 aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. 29The cases are not
uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurence of the startling event from the making of the
declaration.
In the instant case, We find the interval of time between the robbery and the infliction of the injuries upon Landa
Robert, and her making of the statement, which the appellant claims to before (4) hours or more, to be sufficient and
adequate to bring such statement to be so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction or
occurrence which it illustrated or explained. Landa was brought to the hospital where she made the statement
immediately after the commission of the crime. Given her condition at that time — she was hovering between life and
death — she could have hardly been expected to conjure up a story or concoct and contrive a falsehood by falsely
imputing upon the appellant responsibility for her injuries. There is as well no doubt that the principal act in question
was a startling occurrence upon which Landa's statement about her assailant relates to. In short, all the requisites for
the admission of such statement as part of the res gestae are present.
4. No. Since the appellant had been identified, his defense of alibi must fail. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
People vs. Balanon
FACTS:
1. On 3 November 1980, Roberto Laino and Gregorio Santillan, both trustee inmates 1 of San Ramon Penal Farm, were
exchanging fist blows along the national highway in Labuan, Zamboanga City. 
2. Accused Sgt. Jerry Balanon, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army assigned at the Southern Command Headquarters2.
(SOUTHCOM), was standing nearby. As the fight progressed, Sgt. Balanon left for a nearby store.
3. Ms. Maria LuningningSinsuan and Ms. Elsa de la Cruz, both teachers in the Labuan Barangay High School were twenty
to twenty-five meters away from the protagonists. One of them shouted for help so Ms. Sinsuan went near to pacify
them saying, "Tama nayan."
Part III
One of them retorted, "Alammo Ma'am . . .," but was cut short when Balanon went to Ms. Sinsuan, then told her not
to interfere. Then he went back to the two quarreling inmates, pulled a gun suddenly from his waist, and shot them
one after another twice.
Later at six o'clock in the evening, Sgt. Balanon was picked up by some ten members of the 36th Infantry Batallion in
connection with the killing of Laino and Santillan. Subsequently, Balanon was charged with murder on two counts, both
Sgt. Balanon set up the defense of alibi and mistaken identity. He claimed he was "delivering information to an
intelligence community."
The trial court convicted Sgt. Balanon of the crime charged qualified by treachery.
Hence, this appeal.
In the present recourse, accused-appellant basically raises factual issues. He stresses his presence at the SOUTHCOM
headquarters in the morning of 3 November 1980, contrary to the testimony of prosecution witness RogeneAcasio,
also an inmate, that he was drinking liquor with Balanon and the victims.
was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public documents as well; hence, apt to fabricate his testimony.
she allegedly averred that she got a close view of the accused when she was still boarding the bus, but on cue from the
prosecutor, she said she was already on board the bus
ISSUES:
Whether or not Appellant’s alibi can stand in the face of his clear and positive identification by Acasio who,appellant
even admitted, had no ill to implicate him.
Whether or not the trial court erred for giving credence to the testimony of Acasio who was not only probably drunk,
but was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public documents as well; hence, apt to fabricate his testimony.
Whether or not inconsistency of the witness that is too trivial may affect the straightforward account of the shooting
of the victims by appellant.
HELD:
No. Appellant's alibi cannot stand in the face of his clear and positive identification by Acasio who, appellant even
admitted, had no ill will to implicate him (Balanon) in the crime. Moreover, there is no compelling reason to depart
from the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses made by the trial judge who, unlike the reviewing court, had
the occasion and opportunity to observe their demeanor and detect any badge of fabrication. But even
granting  arguendo appellant's claim to be true, this does not contradict the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses
that he shot the victims to death.
No. Probability is not evidence, and even if Acasio took alcohol, it does not follow that he was drunk. Moreover, a
drunk person is competent to testify on what he sees or experiences, however limited or hazy his perception may be.
In the same way, a hijacker or a falsifier is not necessarily a liar. Under the Rules of Court, conviction of a crime, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses. 6
No. Ms. de la Cruz could be referring to two instances when accused came close to Ms. Sinsuan, i.e., when the latter
was already inside the bus and when she was still boarding the bus, and the follow-up question of the prosecutor
2 of 30
 referred to the instance when the witnesses were still boarding. But even if we consider as inconsistent this portion of
Ms. de la Cruz' testimony, this is too trivial to affect their straightforward account of the shooting of the victims by
appellant.
While it may be unnatural for a person who has just committed a grave felony to walk back and forth and approach
bystanders amiably instead of fleeing, criminal acts are aberrations and criminals are not expected to act naturally,
especially in this case where the crime was committed in front of several witnesses.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery is not disputed since the victims were suddenly shot, unexpectedly, and were
not in a position to defend themselves.
While the victims were using their bare fists to settle their differences, the accused used a deadly firearm to silence
them. Appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the affirmance of his conviction is
imperative.
People vs. Baid
FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Eric
Baid y Ominta guilty of the crime of rape against Nieva Garcia y Saban, a mental patient, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having suffered from schizophrenia since 1988. In
December 1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her mental
condition.3 On the other hand, accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
3. On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the patients' room.He woke the
complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the same time touching her foot. Complainant took the cigarette. As she
smoked it, accused-appellant caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she afterward removed her pants. It
turned out she was not wearing any underwear. Accused-appellant also removed his pants and the two had sexual
intercourse. Afterwards, they transferred under the bed and continued their sexual intercourse. A female patient who
had been awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she went out to call the two nurses on duty.
The nurses responded but, when they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant had already put on her
pants
4. Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal examination.  He
concluded that the subject is in non-virgin state physically and there are no external signs of application of any form of
violence.The remarks stated was”vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.”
5. Accused-appellant  admitted that he knew the complainant but claimed he did not know the reason for her
confinement. He denied the allegations against him. He testified that, on the date and time referred to by the
complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters from the room where complainant
was staying. He admitted, however, that to go to the patients' room, he did not have to pass by the nurses' station. He
said he knew that, at the time in question, there were two nurses on duty and ten patients in the room.
6. The RTC rendered a judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Part III
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape.
It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been given credence by the trial
court. It is argued that: (1) there were serious inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony in
court; (2) the prosecution failed to present witnesses to corroborate her testimony; (3) complainant failed to identify
accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-legal examination were negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed
lacerations showed that complainant had sexual intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6) the
probability was that her allegations of rape were merely a product of her fantasy.
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert witness. As to the fact that
Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a person should be disqualified as a witness on the basis of mental handicap alone.
Whether or not the plausibility of an allegation of rape depends on the number of witnesses presented during the
trial.
Whether or not the defense of alibi is unavailing where the accused was identified by the victim herself who harbored
no ill motive against the accused.
Whether or not the absence of spermatozoa in genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of rape.
HELD:
No. It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap
alone.Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could
perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. 18 Her testimony indicates that she could
understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them. 
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim ("inappropriate affect") during her
testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person
suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness and memory,21 it is
established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of
memory.Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They show that
complainant's testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the probative value of her testimony, they
reinforce it.
No.The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses presented during the trial, so
much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly established the commission of the crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged accused-appellant guilty. In the absence of
bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge, his findings as to their credibility are
entitled to utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand.
No.As already stated, accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. He claimed that, at the time of the incident, he
was in his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping. For the defense of alibi to be believed, the following requisites
must be met: (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense must be proven; and (b) it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
3 of 30
 Accused-appellant's testimony itself demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First, his declaration that he was in
another room of the clinic is uncorroborated. Second, the room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of the
incident was only a few meters away from the patients' room where complainant was confined. Third, he admitted
that, as a nurse-aide, he was allowed to enter the patients' room anytime for purposes of checking on the patients.
Above all, his alibi cannot be given credence because complainant has pointed to him as the culprit of the rape. In
cases in which the accused-appellant was identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill motive against him, the
defense of alibi was rejected.
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding of lack of consent on the part of the complainant to the sexual act. As
the facts show, complainant herself admitted that she agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of
cigarette. However, it should be stressed that complainant was in no position to give her consent.
4. No. The absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant does not destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation
is never an element thereof.29 What consummates the felony is the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however
slight, to the vagina of his victim without her consent.30 Neither is it required that lacerations be found in the victim's
hymen. We have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a rape charge to prosper as long as the victim
categorically and consistently declares that she has been defiled.31 In this case, aside from complainant's positive
testimony, the medical examination of the complainant showed an abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that she
had recent sexual intercourse.32 That the deep healed lacerations found on the complainant's genitalia may have been
caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
5. The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did not by
that fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his
actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of
his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.35
People vs. CA
G.R.No. 116372
FACTS:
1. This case stems from Cadastral Case initiated by the Director of Lands, as petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Ligao, Albay.
2. In due time, Romeo Divinaflor filed his answer to the petition relative to Lot No. 10739 with an area of 10,775 square
meters situated in Oas, Albay, claiming ownership of said lot by virtue of possession for over thirty years.
3. When this case was called for initial hearing, nobody offered any opposition. Whereupon, an order of general default
against the whole world was issued. Claimant was allowed to present his evidence.
4. Originally, the land was owned by MarcialListana who began possession and occupying the same in the concept of
owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939.
Part III
On May 21, 1973, claimant acquired ownership of the land by means of deed of absolute sale (Exh. 2). He caused the
same to be declared in his name under Tax Dec. No. 1442 (Exh. 3). There was another reassessment under Tax Dec. No.
35 (Exh. 3-a). He continued planting on the land and all the products are used for the benefit of his family.
Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has "satisfactorily possessed and occupied this
land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939 very much earlier
to June 12, 1945," the court ordered the registration and confirmation of Lot 10739 in the name of the Spouses Romeo
Divinaflor and NenitaRadan.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the trial court that claimant-
appellee and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10739 since 1939 is not sufficiently supported by the
evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declaration presented by claimant took effect only in 1980 and
the certificate of real estate tax payment is dated 1990. It was further contended that the testimony of Romeo
Divinaflor was largely self-serving, he being the applicant.
The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness.
Whether or not the witness’ interest in the outcome of a case shall be a ground for disqualification.
Whether or not the adverse party has the right and privilege to object to his examination on the ground of
incompetency to testify.
Whether or not the trial court’s appreciation of the witness’ testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves
the highest respect.
HELD:
Yes.A person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the fact
and (b) he can make his perception known. 20 
True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where
the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and MarcialListana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes
by the subject land.
The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to
testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age,can be a competent witness id he is
capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. 21 The requirements of a child's competence as a witness
are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. 22 There is no showing
that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness' knowledge of
the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during
childhood that is at the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years up until he testified in court in
1990. There is reason to reject petitioner's claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession
since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana
possessing the land.
No. It is axiomatic that a witness' "interest in the outcome of a case shall not be ground for disqualification, and that
such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution in considering the witness' testimony, does
not of itself operate to reduce his credit; indeed, his testimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it) is
otherwise clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may be relied upon." 17 In this case,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Divinaflor's testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in the
premises, this Court will not and cannot take issue.
4 of 30
3. No.The issue of incompetence of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of his predecessor-in-interest since 1939 in
likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objection was never made by petitioner on the ground of
incompetence of Divinaflor to testify on this matter at any stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary rule in
evidence that:
"When a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his examination on
the ground of incompetence to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be
made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if the
incompetence appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent." 18
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as
soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered
waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. 19 The failure
of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflor's testimony results in the waiver of any
objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.
4. Yes.Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's appreciation of the witness' testimony,
truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect. Denial of the instant petition is proper in light of the
well-entrenched doctrine upholding the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 6 It is
likewise very basic that only errors of law and not of facts are revisable by this Court in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, which is the very rule relied upon by petitioner. 7
While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that follow in support thereof
pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented in
the courts a quo in complete disregard of the well-settled rule that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below." 8 Indeed, It is not the function of the Supreme Court to assess
and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by the parties particularly where the
findings of both the trila court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. 9
The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact 14 which was resolved affirmatively by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. Such factual finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling
reasons. None has been adduced in the case at bar.
People vs. Lagarto
FACTS:
1.  On 2 August 1994, PO3 Edgardo E. Koreceived an information from PO3 Mabilisan of Station 11 that a dead body in a
sack was found at around 4:30 p.m. floating in the flooded street of Del Pan near the corner of Lavizares St., Binondo,
Manila.The responding policemen immediately brought the body to the police morgue at Tres Amigos Memorial
Chapel.
2. A. certain RomezenAlquiza called the police station, inquiring about the body recovered from Del Pan, Tondo, Manila,
whose description matched his sister Angel who, had been missing since the night of 1 August 1994.
3. Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. 2 He then requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Office to autopsy Angels body. 3 Said office also issued a Certificate of
Identification of Dead Body,4 which was signed by Romezen.  a feeble-minded person could qualify as a competent witness. 90
4. Lagunday was arrested as the primary suspect in the case. During custodial investigation, and after he was apprised of
his constitutional rights, Lagunday admitted his culpability and pointed to two other men as his cohorts, namely, @
"Boboy" and @ "Boyet." In the ensuing investigation, Lagunday also positively identified LAGARTO as one of
companions on that fateful night.Accused-appellant CORDERO @ "Booster" was subsequently implicated by Lagunday
Part III
as the mastermind15 and pointed to Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon as their lookout. CORDERO was further linked to the
crime by a certain laundry woman named Ofelia Lagman, who, having washed laundry for Corderos several times;
allegedly remembered seeing on top of their washing machine a round yellow tablecloth matching the one in which
Angels body was wrapped.
Prosecution witness Herminia37 Barlam categorically pointed to CORDERO and LAGARTO as among the three men (the
other one being deceased Lagunday) she saw in the warehouse at Kagitingan St. at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994.
She witnessed how they stabbed the face and genitals of Angel, hit her with a piece of wood, raped her as she bled,
and eventually killed her. She saw how they tied her hands and feet, wrapped her lifeless form in a yellow tablecloth,
and put her inside a sack. Because of her hearing impairment, however, the defense sought to disqualify her on the
basis of incompetence and repeatedly requested that she be taken to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) to
determine if she was competent to testify.
Evaluation shows that patient is classified as having moderate mental retardation associated with deafness, which is
characterized by a subaverage intelligence quotient (between 35-55), but may achieve self-maintenance in unskilled or
semi-skilled work under sheltered conditions, but needs supervision and guidance when under social or economic
stress.
At present, she may be deemed competent based on the following finding: no evidence of insanity of psychosis, a
consistency in relating her story, she appreciates the meaning of the oath she takes as a witness before the court, and is
capable of cooperating with counsel.
 The defense attacked the damaging contents of the NCMH psychiatric evaluation report anchored on the following
grounds: (1) said report is hearsay because the doctors who prepared and issued the same were not presented in
court; and (2) it was not offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Both LAGARTO and CORDERO claim that the prosecution failed to prove the act of death of Angel Alquiza because her
death certificate was not proffered in evidence. Instead, the prosecution presented the Autopsy Report (Exh. "C"),
which allegedly cannot be considered as proof of the fact of death of Angel "because there was no proper and
sufficient identification of the victim that was mentioned in said autopsy Report."
ISSUES:
Whether or not a mental retardate or a feeble minded person could qualify as a competent witness.
Whether or not the contents of a sworn statement should prevail over testimony in open court in case of conflict.
Whether or not an autopsy report can be considered as proof of fact of death of the victim..
HELD:1. Yes. We have ruled that even a mental retardate or a feeble-minded person could qualify as a competent
witness.90.Barlam could certainly perceive and make known her perception to others. Even if she is deaf, she saw what
happened on 2 August 1994. She related what she saw to the police on 4 August 1994; to the psychiatrists who
examined her at NCMH on 26, 29, and 31 August 1994; and to the trial court on 26 August, 3 and 4 October 1994 . Did
she "intelligently" make known her perception to others, especially when she testified in court? Certainly, she did.
Everybody understood her even if some of her statements on minor points were inconsistent. A perusal of the
transcript of stenographic notes would readily reveal that counsels for the defense attempted in vain to confuse her on
relevant facts, even confronting her with her sworn statement — a clear indication that she connected with them
"intelligently."Because of Barlam's "deafness and associated mental retardation," the defense harped that she should
be disqualified from testifying. The disquisition above, notwithstanding, we have ruled that even a mental retardate or
Nature of NCHM report: Having made upon order of the trial court, such report is in the nature of an official document
in aid of judicial determination. It is not evidence for the prosecution or against the defense but a document — a
scientific report — prepared and issued by an entity totally removed from the criminal proceedings, hence, indifferent,
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 objective, and impartial. To be utilized by the trial court, it need not be offered in evidence by the prosecution because5.
the court may take judicial notice of its existence and composition. It is also for this reason that its contents cannot be
rejected on account of being hearsay.
2.No. Testimony in open court generally prevails since ex parte affidavits.Barlam's erratic behavior became manifest as
the hearing droned on, but so did the clarity and consistency of her narration. Barlam's testimony, in our opinion,6.
adequately established the liability of Lagunday, LAGARTO, and CORDERO for raping and killing Angel Alquiza. She not
only proved to be competent but also truthful in her narration of what transpired on 2 August 1994. Her sworn
statement might not entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but we have ruled that in case of conflict between the
contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the latter generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are
often incomplete and inaccurate because by their nature, they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the
affiant.98 Barlam may have strangely at times, but such idiosyncrasy has no bearing on the consistency and veracity of
her testimony. She repeatedly pointed to accused-appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO as she spoke, and slapped,
boxed, and glowered at them when she was asked by the court to identify the malefactors. Neither can we discount7.
the psychiatric report which gave Barlam a clean bill of mental health. For three days, she was examined by
professional psychiatrists, but her story remained the same. It was the same story she narrated in court, albeit with
some minor inconsistencies.It must also be noted that Barlam absolutely has no motive to falsely testify against
LAGARTO and CORDERO. The absence of evidence of any improper motive actuating her as the principal witness of the
prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive existed at the time she testified and
her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.99
3.Yes. In any case, there is no rule that specifies who may identify a victim. It is enough that such persons  knows the
10. The novel defense in this prosecution for rape is that the physical evidence of the complainant's violation was caused
one being identified. Certainly, a brother of the victim can recognize his own sister even with her manifest physical
injuries.  The prosecution cannot be faulted for not presenting other witnesses to verify Romezen's identification, the
choice of witnesses being a matter of legal strategy and prerogative. Neither was CORDERO denied any opportunity to
cross-examine him regarding such fact because the Autopsy Report is an official document the authenticity of which
is presumed. Its validly, therefore, cannot be collaterally attacked by putting Romezen on the witness stand.
People vs. Salomon
FACTS:
1. Sylvia Soria, a20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan, Gandara, Samar,
Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the
ricefield some ten meters away. There she was raped by Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met
her brother Senecio, to whom she related her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their father. That same
night, the family walked the three-kilometer distance to the police station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint
for the rape of his daughter by Salomon and Conge.1
2. Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan Tanseco, who issued a result that  a
single, linear, laceration on the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock position. There are isolated erythematous areas on both
thighs. There is also the presence of sandy particles on the genital area. Speculum exam, however, showed negative
findings.
3. Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a four-month search that they2.
were arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being detained there for one month, they were taken
back to Samar.
4. The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in detail the manner of her
ravishment by Salomon with the help of his co-accused Conge.
Part III
The prosecution presented several other witnesses, 7 including Dr. Tanseco, who affirmed her medical certificate of
the complainant's examination. On cross-examination, she declared that the laceration in Sylvia's vagina could have
been caused by penetration of a blunt instrument such as an average-sized penis. 8
The two accused flatly denied the charge against them. Conge swore that on the night in question, Sylvia arrived at
the highway and loudly demanded a lamp from the people in Epifanio de Guzman's house. He approached her and
said there was no lamp to spare, whereupon, as he turned his back to leave, she hit him in the neck with a piece of
wood, causing him to stagger. In swift reaction, he caught Sylvia by the waist and pushed her to the ground and as
she lay there exposed (she was not wearing any underwear), he angrily shoved his five fingers into her vagina. Sylvia
cried out at the top of her voice. Fearing that her relatives might come, he withdrew his hands and immediately left
the place.9
Salomon corroborated his co-accused. He testified that he saw the whole incident, being then about three-arms
length away from the highway. 10 De Guzman agreed, saying that he was also in the yard of his house at the time, and
playing his guitar, when the encounter occurred.
Judge Ricardo A. Navidad disbelieved the accused and found them guilty as charged.
In the appellants' brief (incorrectly denominated as a Petition for Review), the defense suggests that the testimony of
Sylvia Soria is flawed because she is an insane person who was confined at the National Mental Hospital a few months
before the alleged incident.
not by the male organ but by the five fingers of one of the appellants that were thrust into her vagina in anger and not
lust. The defense faults the trial judge for giving credence to the complainant. It avers that her testimony should not
have been accepted at all because she is admittedly a mental retardate and therefore unreliable  per se.
ISSUES:
Whether or not mental condition of a witness vitiate her credibility.
Whether or not absence of spermatozoa in the complainant’s vagina negate the commission of rape.
Whether or not defense of “manual rape” is inadmissible.
HELD:
No.A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,
acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and
the manner he can make them known to the court.
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to
ask her leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did
not vitiate her credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases 18 that a woman will not
expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse,
unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.
No. The lack of a finding of spermatozoa during Sylvia's medical examination did not conclusively establish an absence
thereof because the examining doctor simply did not have the necessary equipment to make a more thorough
report. 19 In fact, she suggested another examination at the Calbayog General Hospital. 20 At any rate, we have held that
the absence of spermatozoa in the complainant's vagina does not negate the commission of rape; there may be a valid
explanation for such absence, as when the semen may have been washed away or when the rapist failed to ejaculate. 21
6 of 30
3. No. Admitting the laceration in Sylvia's vagina, Salomon nevertheless maintains that it was caused not by his penis but
by Conge's fingers. Conge's purpose was to punish her and to disable her and thus prevent her from hitting him
again.The trouble with this defense is that it is too comical for words. It looks like a bawdy-house skit featuring a mad
avenger and his naughty fingers. Besides, the two accused and De Guzman have a confused recollection of how this
remarkable incident happened, the first perhaps in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence.
The theory of the defense is absurd. The trial court was correct in rejecting it. The assessment of the evidence,
especially the credibility of the witnesses, is the primary function of the judge presiding at the trial. We defer to the
findings of the trial court in the case at bar, there being no showing that they were reached without basis.
G.R. No. L-1709             June 8, 1948
ASCENCION ICUTANIM vs.FERNANDO HERNANDEZ, Judge of First Instance of Capiz, and DEMETRIO VINSON,
Provincial Fiscal
FACTS: Petitioner is charged with parricide for having killed his child of tender age. At the trial, the prosecution called
to the witness stand his wife who is the mother of the deceased child. Petitioner objected to his wife testifying against
him. The trial court overruled the objection, on the ground that the crime committed is against her; and for that reason
the rule invoked does not apply (section 26 [d], Rule 123).
Complaining that the overruling of the objection is not only against the law but also constitutes excess of jurisdiction
and a grave abuse of discretion, petitioner seeks in this Court the annulment of said order and a writ directing the
respondent court to refrain from giving it effect until it hear from this Court as to what it should do in the premises.
ISSUE: WON the wife can testify against his husband in this case
RULING: The Court denied the petition. It did not go into the merits of the question raised by the petitioner. Even if the
ruling of the respondent court is erroneous, the remedy to correct the mistake is by appeal. To allow parties litigant to
come to the SC for the correction of errors committed in the course of the trial, which may be done on appeal, would
unduly burden the Court with cases to be brought to it on appeal.
G.R. No. L-25384 October 26, 1973
JOSE CARANDANG vs.HON. JOSE R. CABATUANDO, Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional
District, Branch II, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BATANGAS, and CONSUELO D. PANDY
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Carandang was the caretaker of private respondent Consuelo D. Pandy's 1.5 hectare of coconut
land situated at Puting-Buhangin, San Juan, Batangas. He had a house inside the landholding and also owned a parcel
of land adjoining it. On February 21, 1963 respondent Pandy filed a verified petition for ejectment and damages in the
Court of Agrarian Relations of San Pablo alleging that petitioner, in gross violation of the terms and conditions agreed
upon between him and the landowner, had stubbornly refused and failed to clear the land of bushes and grasses, to
take proper care of the coconut land and improvements thereon, and to perform the necessary work in accordance
with the customs and proven practices in the locality; that petitioner had been feeding his hogs and chickens with
coconuts from the landholding; that he gathered nuts and sold copra without notifying the respondent; and praying
that petitioner be dismissed as caretaker of the landholding and be ordered to pay damages.
Petitioner, having been served, on March 8, 1963, with the summons and a copy of the complaint, and having failed to
file his answer, the agrarian court, acting on the motion filed by respondent, declared petitioner in default and set the
reception of respondent's evidence on July 2, 1963 before the commissioner of the court.On March 13, 1964,
petitioner filed, through the Office of the Agrarian Counsel, a verified motion to set aside the order of default, alleging
Part III
that the failure of petitioner to file an answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, and that petitioner had a valid
and meritorious defense, and praying that petitioner be allowed to file his answer. The courtdenied the motion for
failure of movant "to allege either in his motion to set aside order of default or in his supporting affidavit the facts
constituting his alleged valid and meritorious defense."
After respondent had presented ex parte her evidence, the court rendered its decision ordering Jose Carandang to
vacate the landholding of 1.5 hectares owned by Pandy and to pay damages.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision upon the grounds that the court erred in not lifting the order of default, and in not
determining the value of the labor and expenses in the cultivation. The agrarian court issued, upon motion, an order of
execution, but the court later set it aside for the reason that it was first necessary to determine the indemnification
that the defendant was entitled to, and the court set for hearing the motion for execution for another date.
Petitioner submitted to the court a "bill of accounting" for the value of his labor and plantings such as coconut, banana,
black pepper, jackfruit, mango, santol and star apple trees, in the total amount of P9,000.00.Subsequently, the court
ordered an ocular inspection of the landholding involved to determine the number of coconut trees that were one
year, two years, and five years old. The report of said inspectionwas submitted to the court.The court, acting on the
report of the ocular inspection, written and oral manifestations of respondent, and petitioner's affidavit regarding the
compensation claimed by him for the planting of the coconuts, considered parts of the decision satisfied, and directed
the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution ordering petitioner to vacate the landholding.The writ of execution was
served upon herein petitioner by the Provincial Sheriff.
Upon motion of respondent, the court issued an order of demolition, ordering petitioner to remove at his own expense
his house from the landholding in question not later than November 15, 1965, and that should he fail to do so, the
Provincial Sheriff of Batangas was authorized to demolish said house.
Alleging that the execution of the order of demolition "would work unwarranted hardship and irreparable damage and
injustice upon petitioner who have not been accorded his day in court and has not been paid the indemnification due
him, and not having any adequate, plain and speedy remedy," the instant petition was filed praying that a writ
of certiorari, prohibition and injunction be issued, ordering respondent court to desist from further proceedings in the
execution of its decision, enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution and order of demolition,
and, after hearing the petition, to declare null and void the proceedings in said case.
The SC ordered respondent to file their answer to the petition, and upon the posting of a bond, the SC restrained the
Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution and order demolition.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion, and
whether there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
RULING: The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner in default since the
record shows that petitioner had not been deprived of his right to be heard. The summons and copy of the complaint
were served upon him. No answer or responsive pleading had been filed within the reglementary period, so, the trial
judge, upon motion filed by respondent Pandy, declaredpetitioner in default. The action of the judge was perfectly
legal. Under Rule 20 of the rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the provisions of the rules of court relating to
courts of first instance which are not inconsistent with the rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations are applicable to
cases pending before the agrarian court. Even section 155 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No.
3844) provides that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall have all the powers and prerogatives inherent in, or belonging
to, the Court of First Instance, and it shall be governed by the Rules of Court, provided that in the hearing,
investigation, and determination of any question or controversy pending before them, the courts, without impairing
7 of 30
substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation tried to cross the street; and with the added fact that the appellant did not blow his horn despite the visual obstruction
cases. by the parked car, the Court of Appeals concluded that he failed to observe that reasonable care required of a driver of
a motor vehicle.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when after having declared petitioner in default, it proceeded to receive
respondent's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven warranted. Appellant insists that such conclusion is error, and assails the credibility and competency of witness Guzman.Hence,
The trial court simply acted in accordance with the provisions of the rules of court. Nor did it abuse its discretion when this petition.
it denied the motion to lift the order of default, for neither said motion nor the affidavit supporting it stated facts
constituting a valid and meritorious defense. Section 3, Rule 18, of the new Rules of Court, already in force as of that ISSUE: WON Guzman is a credible and competent witness
date, provided that the motion to set aside the order of default must show that the failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and that the movant has a meritorious defense. It has been held that when a
RULING: Credibility of witnesses is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
motion to lift the order of default does not show that the defendant has a meritorious defense and that his failure to
objection to patrolman Guzman's competency because he was not presented as an expert witness, nor did he see the
answer the complaint on time is legally excusable, or that anything would be gained by having the order of default set
incident actually happen, is untenable. What Guzman testified to are what he saw in his ocular investigation, such as
aside, the denial by the court of the motion to lift the order of default does not constitute abuse of discretion.The trial
the two (2) sets of bloodstains and the 15 paces distance between them, that were facts derived from his own
judge likewise legitimately exercised his jurisdiction, when he rendered the decision based on respondent's evidence,
perception.1äwphï1.ñët
and when he denied the motion for reconsideration in open court.

The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the claim that the deceased suddenly darted from behind the parked car.
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that herein petition was given notice and opportunity to be heard before
Neither did the trial court do so, considering the lack of corroboration of petitioner's version, and the circumstance
judgment was rendered. He was not denied of his right to due process of law.
that the victim, being a grown-up man, and not a child, would not have ignored the noise of the oncoming vehicle,
there being no reason shown for his disregarding the obvious danger.
Did the trial court commit a grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision based on respondent's evidence on
the ground that said evidence was self-serving? The law itself provides that a party or any other person interested in
At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to the truck when he, as alleged by
the outcome of a case may testify (Section 18, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The testimony of an interested witness should
appellant, suddenly darted across the street, does not exculpate the accused, since the latter was driving at excessive
not be rejected on the ground of bias alone, and must be judged on its own merits, and if such testimony is clear and
speed.The fact that a pedestrian came into the path of the car suddenly and so close that the driver could not stop and
convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record, it may be believed. Neither can said testimony be said to be
avoid striking him will not excuse the driver, where the car was being driven at an unreasonable rate of speed under
self-serving. This Court has said that self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does
the circumstances.
not include a party's testimony as a witness in court.

From the above discussions it is evident that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion and it did not exceed its
jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioner, if he was not satisfied with the trial court's decision, was appeal. This petition
for certiorari must necessarily be denied.
G.R. No. L-22995             June 29, 1967
WILLIAM ADDENBROOK Y BARKER vsPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: About 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the front bumper of the Stanvac Service Truck with Plate No.
2740, Manila, 960, while travelling southward along Marquez de Comillas being driven then by accused William
Addenbrook, and in front of House No. 1010, came into contact with the body of a pedestrian WenceslaoRisaldo with
the result that the latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General Hospital by accused and his helper in the truck
named AmandoValeriano, but was dead on arrival, it having been found that he had received abrasions on the left
forehead, and contusions with lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints, and right buttocks and waist
and fracture of the skull, so that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence
against accused resulting in his conviction.
Upon impact of the van against the victim, the latter fell and rolled to a distance of fifteen (15) paces, as shown by two
(2) sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the
occurrence of the incident. From these facts, the appellate court found it difficult to believe that the van was travelling
at a slow and reasonable speed. Considering further that as postulated by the accused himself, his view of the street
was partly blocked by a parked car in front of house No. 1010, Marquez de Comillas, from behind which the deceased
While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to take the wisest choice in a
sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising.
RULE130 SECTION 22 - DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975
AVELINO ORDOÑOvs.HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I
and CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: AvelinoOrdoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter,
Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint was signed by the twenty four year old victim. In support of that
complaint, Catalina BalanonOrdoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that
on that same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino threatened
to kill Leonora and Catalinaif they reported the crime to the police.Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further
revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged
in court with that offense.
Catalina said that the rape committed by Avelino against Leonora was mentioned during the investigation and trial of
Avelino for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoño.

Part III 8 of 30
During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she was no
longer afraid to denounce Avelino because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa.
The case against Avelino, where Leonora was the complainant, was elevatedto the Court of First Instance. The Fiscal
presented Catalina as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense
counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Sec. 20 (b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.Counsel claimed that AvelinoOrdoño had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying
against him.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino’smotion for the reconsideration of the adverse
ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis.
the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said
sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running
upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still
moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast.
Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found
the child dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on: (1) the
affidavit, Exhibit C which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by the justice of
the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the
rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the appellant.

ISSUE: WON the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife
within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule
RULING: The Court adopted the decision laid down in Cargill vs. State, wherein the court said that when an offense
directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception  to the statute that one
shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the
other.Using this criterion, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence, the rape perpetrated by the father against
his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother).
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the wife of the accused is admissible as evidence against the latter
RULING: The Court held that the rule contained in section 265 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on
the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger
of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life
even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger
of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the daughter is However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually utters reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital
the word  Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord. and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
Thus, in this case, when AvelinoOrdoño, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of October 11,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word,
Avelino desisted.That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with
incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too obvious to require much
elucidation.

In Wilkinson vs. People, it was held that the wife was a competent witness against the husband in a prosecution for
rape committed by the husband against his stepdaughter, who is the wife's natural daughter because the crime was
"an outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as well as a crime against humanity itself". The court
adopted the interpretation that "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other" may
refer to a crime where the wife is the individual particularly and directly injured or affected by the crime for which the
husband is being prosecuted.

The trial court did not err in holding that Catalina could testify against her husband, Avelino, in the case where he is
being tried for having raped their daughter, Leonora.

G.R. No. L-568             July 16, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.JUAN FRANCISCO

FACTS: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as
detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from the chief of
police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching
Part III 9 of 30
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under
circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter,
testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the
prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to
do so, as it did in rebuttal; and then the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course,
against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various
possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might
be instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral
and social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read
the same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the
law of common sense. Presuming the husband who so testified against his wife to be endowed with common sense, he
must be taken to have expected that the most natural reaction which the said testimony would give rise to on the part
of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same
testimony, namely, the imputation that it was his wife who killed their little son. Upon the part of the prosecution,
because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and added what was really
a  new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. And upon the part of the wife, because of the
reasons already set forth above. Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have
intended all its aforesaid natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband — himself exercising the
very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be taken to have waived
all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at
the outset.
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the all-important role of the State in this case. The State being interested in
laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right
to offer the rebutting testimony in question, even against the objection of the accused,  because it was the latter
himself who gave rise to its necessity.  It may be said that the accused husband thought that he would have more
chances of convincing the court of his pretended innocence if he pointed to his wife as having caused the death of their
child, instead of simply denying that he was the author of the fatal act. To this we would counter by saying that if he
was to be allowed, for his convenience, to make his choice and thereby impute the act upon his spouse, justice would
be partial and one-sided if both the State and the wife were to be absolutely precluded from introducing the latter's
rebutting testimony.
incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the incompetency,
the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity or for some other reason.
If the objection could have been taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not be
available on writ of error. If, however, the objection of a party is overruled and the ruling has been excepted to, the
party may thereafter examine the witness upon the matters as to which he was allowed to testify to without waiving
his objections to the witness's competency.
It will be noted, as was to be expected, that in the last above-quoted section, the author mentions certain specific
cases where the courts concerned hold that there was waiver, but for obvious reasons neither the author nor said
courts have attempted to make an enumeration of all possible cases of waiver. In the very nature of things, it would be
impossible to make a priori such a complete enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. So long as the Legislature itself
does not make its own statutory and exclusive specification of cases of such waiver — and we doubt that it ever will —
no complete and exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be attempted by the courts, for in the absence of such
legislation the cases of waiver will be as indefinite in number as indefinite are and always will be the varying and
unpredictable circumstances surrounding each particular case.
To illustrate, Mr. Wharton says above that the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a
witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner, the reason being
that the State is  entitled  to question the spouse so presented as to all matters germane and pertinent to the direct
testimony. In the same way, and for a similar reason, when the herein appellant gave his testimony in question in his
defense, the State had the right to rebut the new matter contained in that testimony consisting in the imputation
upon his wife of the death of the little boy. And that rebuttal evidence, which was rendered necessary by appellant's
own testimony, could be furnished only by his wife who, as he fully knew, was  alone  with him and their son at the
precise place and time of the event. This right to rebut is secured to the State, no less than to the accused, by Rule 115,
section 3, paragraph (c), the provision further authorizing the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the
other party to offer "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." So that if the waiver that we
here declare to flow from the above-mentioned testimony of appellant does not happen to be among those which
were mentioned in the cases cited by Mr. Wharton, that is no reason against the existence of said waiver.

As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself is the other that it may be waived.

Waiver of incompetency. — Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution
against the other may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her
privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner. It is well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a witness in his
behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane and pertinent to her testimony on direct
examination. It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered as
witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to the
admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony admitted, especially
if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts have held that the witness's
testimony is not admissible even with the other spouse's consent. Clearly, if the statute provides that a spouse shall in
no case testify against the other except in a prosecution for an offense against the other, the failure of the accused to
object does not enable the state to use the spouse as a witness.

Waiver of objection to incompetency. — A party may waive his objection to the competency of a witness and permit
him to testify. A party calling an incompetent witness as his own waives the incompetency. Also, if, after such

Part III 10 of 30
 When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he could not, let us repeat, justly
expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the   only  witness
available, namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of
criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of said testimony of her
husband, or to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of
her own offspring. A decent respect and considerate regard for the feelings of an average mother will tell us that such
a moral and social stigma would be no less injurious to her than a criminal punishment. And if the wife should, in such
a case and at such a juncture, be allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should at least be the
same as that of her husband. This is only simple justice and fairness dictated by common sense. Since the husband had
testified that it was his wife who caused the death of the little boy, she should be allowed to say that it was really her
husband who did it. We hold that it is not necessary, to justify such rebuttal evidence, and to declare the existence of
the waiver upon which it was based, that the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case by reason of such
testimony of her accused husband. The rule of waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses generally does not
require this prerequisite in the case between husband and wife. Rather the rule makes the determination of the
question hinge around the consequences which by common sense, in justice and in fairness, should be deemed to have
been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to flow from his act of giving that testimony. At any rate, the
trial court not only had the power to allow the State to utilize the wife as rebuttal witness, but also the discretion to
permit "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." But even restricting the wife's testimony to
merely contradicting her husband's version that she was the one who killed their child, there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the killer. With the testimony of both spouses upon the point, instead of that of
the accused alone, let justice take its course.
Arroyo vs. CA
G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri,
and Eduardo Arroyo. He alleged that his wife had a sexual relation with Arroyo on November 2, 1982 at the Neris’
condominium in Baguio. The lower court ruled in favour of Dr. Neri.
While the case was pending, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation praying that the case against petitioners be dismissed as he
had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity. Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal
or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming a basis for their motions Dr. Neri's manifestation.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been violated.
2. Whether or not Dr. Neri's recantation be a basis for the granting of a new trial.
Ruling:
It was claimed that Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been disregarded when her admission
to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed lain with petitioner Arroyo was taken into
account by the trial court.
Part III
Dr. Neri testified that when he showed the photographs whuch showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with
another man, and it was at this point that Ruby Vera Neri admitted to her husband that Eduardo Arroyo was her lover
and that they went to bed in Baguio on 2 and 3 November 1982.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and confession or admissions from respondent-accused. In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace
officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs.
Neri's admission should have been rejected.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted the offense.
Further, the husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in criminal cases for a
crime committed by one against the other.
It is settled that not all recantations by witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial. The question whether a
new trial shall be granted on this ground depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the
witnesses submitted on the motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is
the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the
adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the
accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was
executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only after the trial court had
already rendered its decision
Once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on
adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse.
Such enforcement relatesto protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
Lacurom vs Jacoba
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006
Facts:
An administrative was filed by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. Complainant charged respondents with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer
against defendant Federico Barrientos. The Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Judge Lacurom. Judge Lacurom issued a
Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The motion contained words which are rude, inappropriate,
disrespectful and humiliating. Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba
Law Firm.
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Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt
of court for the contents of their motion Velasco-Jacoba claimed that Judge Lacurom knows beforehand who actually
prepared the subject Motion; records will show that she did not actually or actively participate in the case. Velasco-
Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to
detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice.
Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing,
Atty. Ellis Jacoba stopped and asked her to sign the motion because it was due that day. She signed the pleading
handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband.
Judge Lacurom issued another order directing Ellis Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. He denied
that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba
invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court
Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. IBP
Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of
Governors reduced the length of suspension to three months. IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty for violating the Code of Professional Responsilbility.
Whether or not Ellis Jacoba can invoke the marital rule on evidence.
Ruling:
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him. Counsel who signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be
meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect
and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission that she signed the pleading prepared by her husband, therefore, she violated
Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her
to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39
With regard to Ellis Jacoba, he asserted the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author
of the motion.
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which
he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.
Part III
The court held that the marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to
Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend
ably his client’s cause. He used of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the
courts and trust in judicial administration.
People vs. Carlos
Gr No. 22948 March 17, 1925
Facts:
Respondent was convicted of murder by CFI of Manila. The victim of the alleged murder was Dr. Pablo G. Sityar who
performed a surgical operation upon the wife of the respondent. It was revealed upon to the respondent by his wife
that the doctor outraged her. Notwithstanding this, they still consulted the doctor on their illnesses.
While the respondent was confined in Philippine General Hospital, he received a letter from the victim asking for
immediate settlement of the account for the professional service rendered to the respondent’s wife. The respondent
went to the office of the victim and found him there alone. Thereafter, the respondent attacked and stabbed the
victim.
The respondent admitted that he killed the victim but he maintained that he did so in self-defense. Being incensed on
the insults made by the deceased and remembering the outrage inflicted by the deceased against his wife, he
challenged the deceased and eventually causing the death of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the privilege communication between husband and wife may be admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
The lower court found the crime was effected with premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This can only be
sustained by taking into consideration a letter written to the respondent by his wife showing that the writer feared that
the respondent contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
The respondent objected on the admissibility thereof because it is a privilege communication. However, the numerical
authority is to the effect that where a privilege communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouse, the
privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible.
Further, the respondent contended that documents obtained in illegal searches are not admissible in evidence in
criminal case. The court held that the illegality of the search and seizure should first have been directly litigated and
established by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the things seized, so that after such motion, and then only,
the illegality would be noticed in the main trial and the evidence thus obtained would be excluded. Here, the illegality
12 of 30
of the search and seizure was not directly litigated and established by a motion, made before trial, for the return of the
things seized.
However, the letter should be excluded. The letter was written by the wife of the respondent and if she had testified in
the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness stand and
the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter, it might have been admissible. The fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication
of acquiescence or assent in his part. Thus, the letter is pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the
constitutional right of the defendant to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity
to cross examine them.
United States vs. Teresa Concepcion
Gr No. 10396 July 29, 1915
Facts:
Herein defendant was charged with a violation of Opium Law.
On December 2, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the defendant where she was living with her husband.
While the policemen were searching the house, the husband of the defendant ordered the latter to take the can of
opium on the bed and throw it. The policemen were able to take possession of the can. The policemen at that moment
evidently believed that the opium belonged to the husband and they arrested him. It was until more than 10 months
that a complaint was presented against the present defendant. The trial court found her guilty for the crime charged.
Issues:
Whether or not defendant’s conviction was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of her husband without her consent.
Ruling:
The fact that the defendant took possession of the opium under the pillow as ordered by her husband cannot be used
as basis for her conviction, and is not such a possession of opium as is intended to be condemned by law. The very act
thereof was not denied by the defendant. She certainly did not intend, even remotely, to have in her possession the
opium. She did exactly what any other faithful wife would have done under similar circumstances. There is no proof
that she used the opium nor she knew the can contained opium. Consequently, there is no proof of animus possidendi.
As to the second issue, the defendant based her contention on the rule that prohibits a husband from giving testimony
against his wife without her consent, except in civil action between husband and wife, and in criminal action where the
crime was committed by one against the other. Therefore, the testimony of the husband is not admissible if the wife
objected.
Further, the testimony given by her husband was not in the present case. It was given in another case where he was
the defendant and in which he was charged with the illegal possession of the opium in question. During the trial, he
testified in his own behalf. It was the testimony given in that case which was presented as proof in the present case.
Hence, his testimony is not admissible.
Lezama vs Rodriguez
G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
Facts:
Part III
Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. filed an action in the Court of First Instance
for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance. The defendants
were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama.
The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the
La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, that summons was served not on
the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas,
Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company.
In their answer, the defendant spouses, while admitting that the company was placed under receivership, maintained
that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had authority to
receive in behalf of the company the court summons. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that
they did not contest Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had
incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by
the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over the objection of the petitioners
invoking that a husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.
While the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita
Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry in the books
of the corporation.
Dineros, the company receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or against
her husband," but rather as an adverse party in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the
adverse party without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband
Ruling:
The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make it
appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called
upon to testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme.
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked
questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony
will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her
husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's
own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc
upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to
soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
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It is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be
examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone, and his or her testimony could operate only against
himself or herself. The court held that it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud
between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge.
It is also argued that to prevent one spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife as an
instrument of fraud. This argument overlooks the fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the sake of
discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the means of the other's
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow
examination of one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN
F. MANALOTO, respondents.
G. R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
Facts:
Private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document by his
spouse Victoria Manaloto. He allegedly forged the signature of Victoria in a Deed of Sale wherein he sold a house and
lot belonging to their conjugal property in favor of PoncianoLacsamana. At the trial, the prosecution called Victoria to
the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxxxxxxxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other.
The prosecution opposed the said motion on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending
that it is a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. However, the respondent judge granted the
motion, disqualifying Victoria from testifying for or against her husband. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case filed against respondent may be considered as a criminal case for a crime
committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Ruling:
Yes, the case is an exception to the rule on the marital disqualification, as a criminal case for a crime committed
by the accused-husband against witness-wife.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon them is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed byone against the
other.
Part III
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person
who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable
that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
Taken collectively, the actuation of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved, nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions,
"identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise,
in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the
martial disqualification rule.
Rule 130, Section 23- Dead Man Statute
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by her husband CANDIDO
ESPIRITU, GREGORIO GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, Et Al., Petitioner,
v.
ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T. GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO, assisted by ANGELO CARDEÑO,
PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc., Et Al., Respondents.
G. R. No. L-58164 September 2, 1983
Facts:
Andres Guerrero inherited the disputed land upon the death of his father, Isidro Guerrero. Andres physically
possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese
occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister Cristina Guerrero and allowed her to have the property cultivated
and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests as long as she needed the property. In June 1943, Andres died and was
survived by his widow, SegundaLaquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina
continued as a trustee of the deceased Andres.
In 1971, people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land approached the plaintiffs in order to
secure their consent to the sale of the property. Plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their
cousin, Manuel Guerrero. They discovered that Manuel was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a
“Deed of Sale of land” purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero. Petitioners filed a complaint and alleged that the
Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that Cristina
Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it. During the trial, the heirs of Cristina
Guerrero namely, Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes testified as a witness of the plaintiffs that having
had previous information that the disputed lot was borrowed from Andres Guerrero and that Cristina merely
mortgaged it to Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerrero filed a motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness
on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the New Rules of Court. The trial court granted the motion and declared that
Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify.
Issue:
Whether or not the witnesses were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case.
Ruling:
No, the witnesses should not have been disqualified.
Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the New Rules of Court states that:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.  The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a)  Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
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unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such became of unsound mind."
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties
in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but
Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina
Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being
sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P.
VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA,
LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,  Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.
GR NO. L-27434 September 23, 1986
Facts:
Praxedes Villanueva negotiated to buy 3 haciendas known San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
which was owned by TABACALERA. As Villanueva did not have enough funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the
consent of Tabacalera, offered to sell Hacienda Darria to Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as
a guarantor for Villegas in favor ofTabacalera. Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to Vicente fields no. 3,
4, and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. The amount of P12,460.24 was debited from the account of Vicente to
complete the purchase price. Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property. He thus went to Vicente for the
purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to sell however, as the amount of 12,460.24 had already been debited
from Vicente’s account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would be merely
leased to Vicente for a period of 5 years.
Tabacalera executed a formal deed of sale in favor of Villanueva covering the three haciendas. In 1950,
Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted. Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and
damages against petitioner Goni in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Villanueva. Vicente sought to
recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de maria basing his entitlement on the contract/promise to sell
executed by Villanueva in his favor. The case proceeded to trial. Then party-plaintiff Vicente presented himself as
witness, who over the objection of therein defendants testified on facts occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Vicente. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the
present appeal by certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Gaspar Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, which constitutes a claim upon his estate in violation of the dead man’s statute.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent may testify.
Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from
testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being
anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man
Statute, which provides as follows:
Part III
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as
to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim
or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had
been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are
properly the "representatives" of the deceased. Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for
petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the
representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime.
It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When
defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased
person.
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the
Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, 
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Vicente Chuidian filed a complaint and prayed that the defendants Razon be ordered to deliver certificate of
stocks representing the share holdings his deceased father Juan Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. With an order to restrain
the defendants from disposing of the said shares of stocks. Defendants alleged that he owned the shares and the same
remained in his possession. It was alleged that the late Juan Chuidian did not pay any amount whatsoever for the 1,500
shares in question.
On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the
name of Juan T. Chuidian.From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Enrique
Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought
any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.Razon alleged that after organizing the E.
Razon, Inc., Razon distributed the shares, previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to
some friends including Juan Chuidian. That the shares of stocks were registered in the name of Juan only as nominal
stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares were owned and held by the Razon.
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 The CFI declared Razon as the owner of the said shares of stock. IAC reversed the decision and ruled that Juan
Chuidian is the owner. IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the Dead Man’s Statute rule.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellate court misapplied the Dead Man’s Statute in excluding Razon’s testimony.
Ruling:
No, the appellate court did not misapply the DMS rule in excluding Razon’s testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to matters
in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as
to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind."
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of Razon to the affect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the
defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by
the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by
the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was
not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as
regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the
prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Rule 130, Section 24- Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communication
The United State v. DalmaceoAntipolo
G. R. No. L-13109 March 6, 1918
Facts:
DalmaceoAntipolo was charged with the murder of one FortunatoDinal. Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of
FortunatoDinal, testified as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations. The fiscal
objected to the testimony of Susana upon the ground of her incompetency to testify as the widow of Fortunato. That
the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases requires the consent of the husband before she can testify. The
trial judge sustained the objection and thus Susana was disqualified to testify. Dalmaceo was convicted of homicide.
Hence, this appeal.
Part III
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Susana Ezpeleta.
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Susana Ezpeleta.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither
husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which
one or both shall be parties.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58
is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to
relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of
revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express
purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into
the cause of his death.
On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the
husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such
cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement. The
wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. It can not be contended that
the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was
evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of
the defendant.
Fortich vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120769 February 12, 1997
Facts:
Stanley J. Fortichwas employed for 5 years as an area salesman of the softdrinks division of San Miguel Corporation in
Dipolog City. His job required him to collect various sums of money from the retailers and buyers of the company along
his designated route.
On June 5, 1979, petitioner received a memorandum signed by herein respondent Felipe T. Galleon in his capacity as
District Sales Supervisor, ordering the petitioner to stop plying his route and collecting the sums owed by customers to
the company for the alleged non issuance of invoices to several customers. He was likewise directed to report directly
the sales office every working day at the prescribed company time.
On June 11, 1975, private respondent submitted a second inter office memorandum addressed to the Regional Sales
Manager summarizing the findings of an initial he conducted on the matter, which he concluded with the following
paragraph:
“In addition, I would like to further inform the management that S/M Stanley Fortich is an avid mahjong player and
cockfighting enthusiast. Inspite of several advices, there seems to be no change in his lifestyle. Also, respondent had a
similar case last September 11, 1978.”
The petitioner was found guilty of misappropriation ofcompany fund and thereafter dismissed.
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Petitioner filed a complaint for Damages Arising from Libelagainst the private respondent. He claims that the second
memorandum was a libelous report.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed trial court's decision on appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether private respondent's inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of privileged communication rule.
Held:
Yes.
Malice exist when there is an intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause. An imputation is legally malicious
if done without any reason that would justify a normally conscientious man in so making the imputation to be
malicious, there are exceptions to this rule. The record indicates that this case falls under the settled exceptions to the
rule: the private respondent's inter-office memorandum falls within the ambit of privileged communication rule.
The rule on privileged communications allows the latitude of expression embodied in the private respondent's second
memorandum.
Lezama vs. Rodriguez
No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
Facts:
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, his capacity as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together
with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the CFI for the annulment of a judgement rendered against the
La Paz Ice Plant in favor Marciano C. Roque in an action for the collection of 150,000.
The complaint alleged that during the pendency of receivership, defendants Marciano Roque and spouses Jose Manuel
and PaquitaLezama(petitioners) colluded to obtain a judgment by default against the company.
The spouses denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim because
they knew it to be a legitimate obligation evidenced by the minutes of the Board of Directors of the corporation. Said
minutes was also attested and signed by the defendant spouses.
At the hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to PaquitaLezama to testify as “a witness summoned by
the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court.” The request was granted over the objection of the petitioners
invoking the Marital
Issue:
WhetherPaquitaLezama, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, be examined as a hostile witness by the
adverse party without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband under Sec 20(b) of Rule
130?
Held:
No. Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile
witness when both spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal
party. Section 6 of Rule 132 (Rule on Direct Examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses) is a mere concession, for the
Part III
sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or wife from becoming means of the other's
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow
examination of one's spouse in situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
Alvarez vs Ramirez
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a criminal case for arson pending before the RTC. Herein
petitioner is the accused Maximo Alvarez who is also the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of the respondent.
Esperanzawas called to testify in the stand against her husband, the petitioner.Petitioner then through his counsel
filed a motion to disqualify her on the grounds of marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the
motion.
The trial court issued an Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from
the records. Prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed order.
Private respondent Ramirez file a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The CA rendered a decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in above mentioned criminal case.
Held:
Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband.
Like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other.One exception to said rule is where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such case, identity of interest
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on the identity is non-existent.
As shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of marriage between petitioner and Ezperanza is no longer an interest the
State aims to protect.
Genato vs Silapan
Adm. Case No. 4078. July 14, 2003
Facts:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan.
17 of 30
Their legal relationship started when complainant's retained lawyer Atty. Benjamin accommodated respondent in the
building and made him handle some of the complainants cases.
Complainant and respondent engage to subsequent transactions that lead to the filing by the complainant of a criminal
cases against respondent for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In his answer in the foreclosure case, the respondentalleged that the complainant ask him to offer bribe money to the
review committee of the DOJ where the resolution of the complainant's criminal case was pending and in the event
said petition for review is denied, he wanted the respondent to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned in said
case and even to the presiding judge for his acquittal. Respondent also alleged that he refused to do such act because
the complainant confessed to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that he was charged of in
the mentioned case.
Complainant denies foregoing allegations. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking
their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefore.
The Court referred the administrative case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The Board of
Governors of IBP found the respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension.
Issue:
Whether respondent’sdisclosure of complainant's alleged intention to bribe government official is within the purview
of their privileged communications.
Held:
No.
The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those
made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
complainant’s alleged intention to bribe the government officials in relation to this case, the communication is not
covered by the privilege as a client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a
lawyer to advise client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client
privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Nevertheless, it was improper for the respondent to use such disclosures against the complainant in the foreclosure
case as it was not the subject matter of the litigation therein and the respondent's legal advice were not being
attacked. The Court agreed that respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of
fidelity sufficient to warrant imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
Lim vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992
Facts:
Juan Sim, herein private respondent, filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with herein petitioner, Nelly Lim, on
the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia before, during, and
after the marriage and until the present.
Part III
During the trial, private respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness Dr. Lydia
Acampado, a doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel orally applied for the issuance of a
subpoena ad tesificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify.
Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privilegedsince the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Despite the opposition, the subpoena was issued.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard the urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena filed
by the petitioner's counsel. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr.
Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.Counsel for
private respondent countered that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on
any information acquired from petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the
witness to testify.Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, was qualified as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical
questions related to her field of expertise.
Petitioner filed with the public respondent a petition for certiorari and prohibitionto annul the aforesaid order of
respondent Judge and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado's testimony.The CA denied
the petition as well as her motion to reconsider the same.
Issue:
Whether the testimony given by Dr. Acampadoin open court a privileged communication.
Held:
No.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed , the following requisites must concur:
The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
Such person acquired the infornatiob while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
The information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings lead Us to no other course of action but to agree with the
respondent Court's observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was
presented and qualified as ab expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings
the doctor obtained while attending the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from
the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
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Rule 130, Section 36- Hearsay Rule
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly
in an effort to ease the marital strain.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio
Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree from
the Tribunal MetropolitanumMatrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of
"incapacitasassumendioneraconjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter."
on 30 July 1982, the Court of First Instance granted the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court.  In his
petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer.
In the trial, Edgar tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to
on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma.
Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, "that would thwart the physician-
patient privileged communication rule,"And then submitted a Statement asserting among others that "there is no
factual or legal basis whatsoever for (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity, such ground being completely false, and
fabricated.
the trial court overruled the objection “because the very issue in this case is whether or not the respondent had been
suffering from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in the
complaint, the respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between
patient and physician.”
The counsel of Ma Paz elevated to the CA by certiorari which was dismissed and the motion to reconsider is likewise
denied. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the contents of the psychiatric report may be admitted into evidence.
CONTENTION:
Petitioner agrues that  argues that since  in two separate complaints, one of double murder and the other of frustrated murder.
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have
acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical
report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and
privileged relation with a patient.
Part III
Respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a
physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be
barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner."
Also, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived, and this petitioner expressly did when
she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to
the Tribunal MetropolitanumMatrimoniale which took it into account in deciding the case and declaring their marriage
null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to
specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer which amounts to a waiver.
HELD:
YES.
The requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. 
Moreover, with regards to the testimony, petitioner invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that
it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-45283-84 March 19, 1982 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
LUCILA VALERO y VARILLA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Lucila Valero alias Rosing and Alfonsito Valero alias "Pipe" were accused in the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan
After the preliminary investigations, the complaints against Alfonsito Valero were dismissed "on the ground that he is a
deaf-mute and, therefore, all the proceedings against him were beyond his comprehension". Lucila Valero remained as
the sole defendant. After the trial in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan where the records were later forwarded for
appropriate proceedings, the trial Court convicted Lucila Valero of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated
murder and imposed upon her the extreme penalty of death.
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Hence, this automatic review.
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense conflict as to the source of the poisoned bread. The evidence of the
prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, a deaf-mute brother
of the defendant Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila Valero who gave the bread to Pipe for delivery to the minor
children. On the other hand, the defendant Lucila Valero denies that she ever bread to her deaf-mute brother, Pipe, for
delivery to the minor children. The evidence for the defense tends to show that the Velasco children might have eaten
one of the sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning rats in his garden.
Out of the nine witnesses for the prosecution three witnesses, namely Rodolfo Quilang, Federico Jaime, and Ceferino
Velasco were presented to prove that the defendant Lucila Valero gave the poisoned bread to her deaf-mute brother
Pipe with the alleged instruction to deliver the bread to the Velasco children.
Rodolfo Quilang, among the nine witnesses, testified that he saw the defendant Lucila Valero deliver "something
wrapped in a piece of paper"  to her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction by sign language to deliver
the same to the Velasco children. Quilang never saw what was inside the piece of paper.
In his affidavit,Quilang stated that he actually saw Pipe deliver the wrapped object to the children. However during the
trial, he declared on cross-examination that he did not see such delivery.
On the other hand, both Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime did not see the delivery by the defendant to her deaf-
mute brother "something wrapped in a piece of paper". They never saw or heard her giving any instruction to Pipe to
deliver the wrapped object to the children. Both claimed that they  learned or obtained the information from Pipe after
interviewing him by means of sign language.
There is nothing in the aforequoted testimony indicating that the deaf-mute, Pipe, pointed to her sister Lucila Valero as
the source of the poisoned bread.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is established based from the testimonial evidences from the
witnesses.
HELD:
No. The evidence is purely hearsay. 17 The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the principle of res inter alios
acta.  The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.  prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by claiming that it is a
part of the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the source of the poisoned bread was the
defendant, the children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet poisoned. Even prosecution witnesses Ceferino
Velasco and Federico Jaime admitted on cross-examination that their interpretations of the sign language of Pipe were
only guess work.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give
such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. 20 But
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has no probative value.
Part III
Trial court’s decision is reversed. Accused is acquitted.
G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA Dagupan City.They put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier arrested.They interviewed LuzvimindaMorados,
who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.Together with Morados, they
reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter
inside the house.The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was
absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms, they saw
subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated.Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
During the trial, Lt. Quijardo testified that according to Luz Tanciangco it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said
items. But when asked by the court if he identified Bernie, he said that he is not the proper person to tell the real
identity of Benrie but the intelligence of Pangasinan PC Command.
ISSUE:
WON such testimony of Lt. Quijardo is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
The aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal
knowledge.It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence.
However, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.Likewise, the records do not show
any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the
subversive items.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not
proceedings.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-979 October 25, 1995
JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, RTC-BRANCH 10, APARRI, CAGAYAN, complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE ADOLFO B. MOLINA, MCTC, GONZAGA-STA. TERESITA, CAGAYAN, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation in a criminal case, failed to
exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was,
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merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the offense
charged.Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge.
Respondent admitted that he was the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation of the above entitled case and
finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as
the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri,
Cagayan.
Respondent explained that since the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office,
which has the final say and disposition on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court, should carry the brunt of the responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause.
In its report, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be admonished to be more careful in the
determination of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE:
WON hearsay evidence can be a basis of probable cause.
HELD:
No. Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only
when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in
the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This is in conformity with the
constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in determining
probable cause, an elementary legal principle must not be compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of
probable cause. The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative
value whatsoever.
 Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone
make this determination.
Respondent judge is REPRIMANDED with warning.
G.R. No. L-28482 January 30, 1971
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. When Cecilia Bernal,
neighbor of the spouses saw appellants approach the house of Silvino carrying a long gun. Appellants ponted the gun
at the bamboo wall of Daria’s house and shot her husband. The widow, testified that right after being shot, she rushed
Part III
to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one
hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow,
Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers (Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively). They
were convicted by the CFI of Abra guilty of murder and were sentenced life imprisonment.
two accused appealed the conviction and assigned the following errors:
ISSUE:
1. The lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the
prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused;
2. The lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son of the deceased, clearing the
accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in court by the fiscal before whom the same was executed;
HELD:
1. No. the court find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. She stated that she did
not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by. But this brief observation does not necessarily
mean that he was not actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved when both the
said accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza
using a short weapon that could have been carried concealed in his person.
2. No. The alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate Mariano Taeza's testimony. But
while the said affidavit was identified by the Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he
also stated that he did not know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit
"2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said exhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant
and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him. 
Affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this
reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants,
affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, the court find Exhibit "2" of no probative value, and that the lower
court did not err when it rejected the same. 
Judgement on appeal is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
G.R. No. L-24877 June 30, 1969
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs. GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, and BELESANDE SALAR, accused.
FACTS:
Accused, Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador, Belesande Salar, Anastacio Cadenas and Andres Cagadas were charged of
Robbery with Double Homicide and Rape. Pursuant to their conspiracy, the accused Belesande Salar after having fatally
assaulted the wife, Emilia Dalit, and while she was alive and helpless, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
21 of 30
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the said Emilia Dalit at the residence referred to where the aforementioned
crime was committed. The accused pleaded guilty during the arraignment.
The trial court, without taking any evidence, but taking stock of the affidavits of admission of the three accused, as
attached to the record, the trial court found that the Commission of the crime charged was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, ignominy, evident premeditation, dwelling and abuse of confidence for all the
three accused, and recidivism as regards the accused Gaudencio Mongado (who was a parolee at the time of the
commission of this crime), all offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty.
The court, accordingly, sentenced the three, Gaudencio Mongado, Belesande Salar and Jilly Segador (Anastacio
Cadenas and Andres Cagadas were to be tried separately) to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of robbery with
double homicide and rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code, to
indemnify jointly and severally the hearirg of the victims Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit in the amount of P6,000 each,
plus P596.15, the value of the things taken by the accused but not recovered, with 3/5 of the costs.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the affidavits constitutes as “hearsay” evidence
HELD:
Yes, because the affidavits were not formally offered and admitted in evidence.
It is clear error on the part of the trial court to consider the affidavits of admission of the three accused attached to the
record in appreciating aggravating circumstances against them. Affidavits are generally classed as hearsay evidence;
they are objectionable on hearsay grounds; they are not admissible evidence of the facts they narrate. These affidavits
must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence before the court may consider their contents.
The fundamental rule on this point is found in Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." It is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence adduced. Here, the affidavits of admission have not been formally
offered, much less admitted in evidence. They cannot be taken into account.
G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
On January 17, 1989, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao for killing his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr. together with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita.
The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-appellant's brother Leo Quidato,
appellant's wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. According to appellant’s wife, Gina Quidato
accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to
her father-in-law's house to get money from the latter. Likewise, the prosecution offered in evidence affidavits
containing the extra-judicial confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The Malita brothers confessed to their
participation in the crime, executing affidavits detailing how Bernardo was killed. The two brothers were, however, not
presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two
Part III
were assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly, the prosecution presented MTC Judge George
Omelio who attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers.
The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for
breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardo's death certificate was "hypovolemic shock secondary to fatal
hacking wound on the posterior neck area."
On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and
Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the police. Aside
from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested accused-appellant.
On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police
Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their
intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of
counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits.
Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a
CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom.
ISSUE/S:
(a) Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as they were obtained in violation of the
constitutional right of appellant to confront witnesses
(b) Whether or not the testimony of the appellant’s wife is disqualified
HELD:
(a) No, they should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should be ACQUITTED.
The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s affidavits. However, the failure to present the affiants in the
witness stand gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves
take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify
and cross-examine him.
RATIO:
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration." The inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The
confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be
said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.
Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence
even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel- is inadmissible in evidence. 12 It is
undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they
signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day.
(b) Yes, Gina Quidato's testimony, must also be DISREGARDED.
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Accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the
court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it
involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie,
which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-
appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating
the marital disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law
students.
The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s affidavits. However, the failure to present the affiants in the
witness stand gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves
take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify
and cross-examine him.
G.R. No. 119359 December 10, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROBERT CLOUD, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
One Josephine Aguilar was at St. Luke’s Hospital to have some stitches removed from her daughter’s head. Her
attention was caught by a very young boy, less than three years old, who was brought to the hospital by his
grandmother. The boy was all covered with dried blood. What struck Josephine was that the grandmother was
hysterically yelling, “"Pinatay siya ng sariling ama!", Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walang awa sa anak niya…hayop siya".
This bothered Josephine’s conscience so she asked for help from a civil liberties organization lawyer.
The defense of the defendant father was he was not at home when the incident happened and it was possible that the
child fell from the stairs. He mentioned that his son was a very sickly child and has difficulty in breathing.
The prosecution's primary evidence that it was appellant who beat up and killed the boy was the testimony of its
principal witness Josephine Aguilar who declared that she heard appellant's grandmother herself shouting that it was
appellant who killed his own son by beating him to death. The said grandmother, Rufina Alconyes, was not presented
in court, since at the time of the trial she was already dead.
The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that grandmother constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule
since they were part of the res gestae.
Those inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) "Pinatay siya ng kanyang ama" (he was killed by his own
father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walang awa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . .
without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant did not allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and
when the boy started to cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son very hard, tied his hands, and continued
beating him until excreta came out of his anus. The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw
does not merely constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay
rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of its contents."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the testimony on the outburst of the grandmother has evidentiary value
Part III
HELD:
Yes Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae, they
having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these
were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The report
made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually there and personally heard the statements of
Alconyes which she recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the doctrine
of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the
truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.
The testimony of the witness as to the said statements of the grandmother is not hearsay, and is admissible as an
independently relevant statement.
Ratio:
The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not merely constitute an independently
relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the
intrinsic truth or falsity of its contents." Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are
admissible as part of the res gestae, they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome,
occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior
opportunity to contrive the same. The report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually
there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she recounted in court. Her account of said statements
of Alconyes are admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not
the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of
the death of the victim.
G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE
OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
“The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render
the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The
proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau
of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-
Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the
Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost
or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.
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On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the
City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention
without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be
reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the
habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal
ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records
HELD:
Yes. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or
not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently
shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner's continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment,
and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment is not authorized. Petitioner's remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim
is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a
copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish
the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter
that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the
burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and
Part III
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
Rule 130, Section 37- Dying Declaration
G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodolfo P. Liwanag for accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and
Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St.,Baliuag, Bulacan.
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was
then sitting at their sofa watching the television set. Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the
former's house to visit a friend. When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down
prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her and asked her: "Apo,
Apo, what happened?" Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said “Si Paqui”. After saying these words, she let
go of Alvin’s hands and passed away. Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her. “Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in
her own blood.” When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood. Consequently,
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was
likewise missing. The same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the goundfloor ransacked. Herminia found beach
walk step-in, more or less one (1) meter from where the victim was lying. Herminia was able to recognize the said step-
in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to
Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein accused-appellant, Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime Robbery with Homicide.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the dying declaration made by Eulalia Diamse is admissible
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court ACQUITTED the accused.
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not
mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that
his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in
respect of such fact. The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded
little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he
wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.
24 of 30
That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis
upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court
simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust
some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we
cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable
to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances
are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had
robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have
taken place two weeks before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of
moving a person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no
identification was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room
where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of
the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration
and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that
appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse.
G.R. No. 101799 November 6, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. PACIFICO DUNIG y RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Pacifico Dunig was formally charged with the murder of Marilyn Canatoy, then 14 years old, in an information filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The allegation was that on April 5, 1990, in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, he
repeatedly stabbed and thus killed the said girl, the attack being accompanied with treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, These were Maylin Montes, her sister, Katherine Montes, and their
mother, Teresita Montes. Maylin Montes, said that at about 3 o'clock in the morning, she saw Dunig stab Marilyn in
the neck three times. The three girls ran to Andrade's house about 8 meters away where her father and mother were
staying. Marilyn did too, and collapsed at the door.
Katherine Montes, also saw Dunig running away after she heard her Ate Marilyn screaming. She said she ran to the
house ahead of Marilyn and she heard the stricken girl say, "Nanay, nanay, sinaksak ako ni Pico." "Pico" is Dunig's
nickname.
Teresita Montes, the girls' mother, said that she saw Pico and her niece Marilyn quarreling. At about 3 o'clock the
following morning, she was awakened when Marilyn knocked at her door. Marilyn's neck was bleeding, and she cried
to her: "Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil sinaksak ako ni Pico." A minute later, she died. Behind
Marilyn were Maylin, Katherine and Flory.
Part III
Dunig's defense was alibi. He said that on the night in question, he was alone in a nipa hut in Matinbubong, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, where he went to sleep at 9 p.m. and awoke the following morning at 6 o'clock. He swore he was
not in the resthouse where, and at the time, Marilyn was killed.
Judge Amado M. Calderon, disbelieving him, found him guilty as charged. This Court, after considering the evidence,
holds that the conviction cannot stand.
Alibi is unquestionably a weak defense, and it is clearly so in the case at bar. Dunig has not presented a single witness
to corroborate him. There is also the admitted fact that the nipa hut where he supposedly slept was only a kilometer
away from the scene of the crime.
However, we have repeatedly stressed that a person's conviction must rest not on the weakness of his defense but on
the strength of the prosecution. The accused can rely on the constitutional presumption of his innocence. It is for the
prosecution to overcome that presumption with convincing proof that the accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be
absolved. In the case at bar, we find that the prosecution has not proved its case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a dying declaration is admissible
HELD:
No, the Court in this case ACQUITTED the accused because his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence on the theory that a person who knows he is on the verge of
death is not likely to make a false accusation. However, the declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be
based on an erroneous identification of the declarant's killer.
If it is true that the victim did make the statement before she died, it should qualify as a dying declaration and so can
be considered an exception to the hearsay rule. Nonetheless, it cannot be automatically accepted as a truthful
accusation and is still subject to the test of credibility.
In the case at bar, it has been established by the testimonies of the Montes sisters that the resthouse was dark, if not,
indeed, completely dark. Like the other there girls who were sleeping with her, Marilyn could not possibly have seen
the person who was attacking her. At best, she could probably only surmise it was Dunig, but that was a most uncertain
identification. A surmise is not evidence. A man's honor and liberty cannot be forfeited because the victim supposedly
pointed to him as her killer although she could not possibly have seen the person who was stabbing her in the dark.
The evidence of the prosecution is a slender reed. It cannot sustain a conviction. The defense is weak, but the
prosecution is even weaker, based as it is mainly on the narration of the alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have
seen the killing, one in total darkness and another in near total darkness that enabled her to see a shadow that passed
by her. The tales are implausible and so the Court cannot accept them.
The following observations in People vs. Pecardal are appropriate:
A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But the same justice that calls for retribution
cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt has not been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe puniens et vere
praeveniens. Even as this Court may punish, so too must it protect. Conceivably, the conviction of the accused-
appellant could add another victim in this case.
25 of 30
Accordingly, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and must be
released immediately. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE VS AMACA
FACTS:
Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the
prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the victim was brought to the hospital
after the shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical
operation conducted by another doctor. At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer functioning
normally, while his pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was admitted at
10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even with immediate medical attention,
the victim could not survive the wounds he sustained. Another witness testified, PO Mangubat, a police officer , who
interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat testified that he saw the victim already on
board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the
former answered he was shot by Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the
reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die. He was able to
reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood
in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her
son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case. The former because of the "financial help"
extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable
settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the
victim's ante mortem statement.
The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortem statement to Police Officer Mangubat
positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome the accused’s defense of alibi.
However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo
declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the accused
2. Whether or not the dying declaration of victim should be admitted
DECISION:
1.YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate
appellant's criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial
help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant.
It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from
prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in
effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her
right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil
liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the death of Wilson
Vergara.
Part III
2.YES. The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to
accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at
the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak the truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death;
(2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the
declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present
case.
Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in
the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much
less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police
Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.
Declarant is a competent witness
The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously
mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter.
Homicide only not murder
Appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident
premeditation and night time, although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. The Information readily reveals
that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is
necessary to qualify the crime to murder. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the
accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him. “The failure to allege treachery in
the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution. Moreover, treachery and night time may not be considered even
as generic aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to
convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely adopted (1) such means of attack to render
the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery
or even evade capture.
PEOPLE VS SISON
FACTS;
On January 21, 1992, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4)
unidentified persons (designated as John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder. Since
only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded against them only. Upon arraignment, both pleaded
not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial. Cesar Abaoag, brother of the victim Fernando Abaoag, testified that he
saw, among others, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger, stabbed
Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck
below the jaw. Before he expired, Fernando managed to tell his wife "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit and
that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion. In defense, appellant
26 of 30
professed his innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim. They
both offered denial and alibi. The trial court found them guilty of murder qualified by treachery and cruelty.
ISSUES
1.Whether or not there was a dying declaration
DECISION
1.The trial court correctly characterized this as a "dying declaration,” having been made under the consciousness of
impending death. The victim was already weak his wife saw him and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he
sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the hospital. When Felicitas saw her husband, he told
her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live, thus:
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying declaration under
Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b)
the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates
to the facts or circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent
to testify had he survived.
Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. We find no ulterior motive on
the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations of her husband.
Rule 130, Section 38- Declaration Against Interest
PEOPLE VS BERNAL
FACTS:
On August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking
spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men.
Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was Payat. When he said yes, one of
them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him. They then hastily took him away. Racasa
immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latters mother of the abduction. The theory of the
prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit
affair with Bernals wife, Naty and this was the motive behind the formers kidnapping. Enriquez testified that sometime
in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even
gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she (was)
a married woman. On December 10, 1993, the court rendered judgment finding Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of BienvenidoOpenda, Jr. Bernal assails the lower
court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him
when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Openda’s declaration against his own interest be admissible in evidence
DECISION:
Part III
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive
may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that
declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant
had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez,
definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in
evidence13 because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
NDC, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GERTRUDES LUCAS VDA. DE RAYMUNDO
FACTS:
On April 27, 1960, respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda. de Raymundo filed a claim for workmen's compensation for the
death of her husband, Luis Raymundo, on January 23, 1954. In a complaint before Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, she averred that her husband was employed at the National Development Co., petitioner in this
case, for more than 12 years, his last designation being machine tender in the Finishing Department; that as machine
tender, Luis Raymundo's work consisted of lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed and wet cloth and
mixing chemicals for use in dyeing and printing textiles and that because of strenuous work done mostly at night and
because of exposure to sudden changes in temperature, her husband began to lose weight, complained of headaches
and chest pains and later spat blood. On account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from the service of petitioner
on May 6, 1953; eight months after (on January 23, 1954), he died of pulmonary tuberculosis. In due time, petitioner
filed its answer denying liability. It alleged that Luis Raymundo never contracted tuberculosis while in its employ and
that at any rate "tuberculosis is not an occupational disease incident and/or peculiar to the work of the claimant and
that the claim was barred by prescription, the complaint having been filed beyond the three-month period provided in
section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Hearings were held after which a decision was rendered ordering petitioner to pay to respondent. On review, this
decision was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Subsequent attempt to have the award
reconsidered proved unsuccessful as the Commission en banc found nothing to warrant a modification, much less a
reversal, of its decision.
27 of 30
Petitioner contends, however, that both respondent's testimony as well as Exhibits should have been excluded, hearsay, but it cannot be presumed to have reached a right result if some important piece of evidence which have
because the first is self-serving while the second are hearsays. Petitioner adds that while the death certificate (Exh. "E") swayed the result has been erroneously excluded on technical grounds.
is admissible to prove the fact and date of death, it is not competent to prove the cause thereof.
Here, aside from the evidence objected to, there is some other substantial evidence supporting the award. Aside from
ISSUES: respondent's testimony, there is in the record the testimony of BienvenidoDizon, a former co-employee of Luis
Raymundo. There is likewise evidence of the payment of gratuity to Raymundo on account of his illness.
(1) whether the evidence presented by respondent is admissible to support an award in her favor;
In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo's illness was aggravated by the nature of his
(2) Whether the testimony and evidence are self-serving employment and that Dr. Vito Cruz' affidavit that he treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct. This presumption is
3. whether the action has prescribed intended to reverse the burden of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to establish by substantial
evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated by the nature of the job. Petitioner has failed to overcome the
DECISION evidence and presumptions in favor of respondent. It has chosen merely to rest its case on the statement of its medical
officer that the deceased employee never met an accident while in its employment.
1. Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides in part:
2.The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided in section 49 would be meaningless if it did not
x xx all parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person or by counsel or by any other agent include the right to testify in his own behalf. Indeed, the Rules of Court enjoins that "neither parties nor other, persons
or representative, to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to interested in the outcome of a case shall be excluded." For while a party's interest may to some extent affect his
cross-examine the witnesses against them. The Commissioner may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in credibility, his interest alone is not a ground for disregarding his testimony. The argument that the testimony of an
dispute the following matters, in addition to the sworn testimony at open hearing: interested party is self-serving and therefore is inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of self-serving
1. Reports of attending examining physician. evidence and the ground for its exclusion. Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it
does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence,
2. Reports of investigators appointed by the Commissioner. that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn
3. Reports of the employer, including copies of time sheets, book of accounts or other records. and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.
4. Hospital records in relation to the case. Nor is there merit in the claim that the exhibits were erroneously admitted in evidence. While they may be hearsay by
common law rules of evidence, they are nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Act. Section 49 is patterned
In addition, section 44 establishes certain presumptions:
after similar legislation in the United States, especially New York, where the widespread adoption of Workmen's
In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the Compensation statutes was accompanied by a demand for a more simple and summary method of procedure and
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary proof than those given by the common law. As noted in a leading article.

1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act; 3.There are several reasons why petitioner cannot set up this defense. First, petitioner failed to controvert the claim,
which means that it cannot now be heard to say that the claim was not filed on time. Second, it paid gratuity to
2. That sufficient notice thereof was given; Raymundo under a policy of retiring employees suffering from tuberculosis. Under this circumstance the delay in the
filing of the claim is excused. Third, petitioner has shown no damage as a result of the delay in the filing of this case,
3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death
another circumstance which, under section 27, excuses delay in filing claims.
of himself or another;
Rule 130, Section 42- Part of the Res Gestae
4. That the injury did not result solely from intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; and
G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991
5. That the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
correct. (As added by sec. 24, Republic Act No. 772).
vs.
Indeed, enactments of the type of section 49 were precisely aimed at the hearsay rule, for the rejection of hearsay
evidence, often of strong probative value, was one of the grievances of working people against the procedure of the EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
old employer's liability law.9 Not that hearsay evidence is adequate to support an award for compensation, but that as
aptly observed. Facts:

[A] compensation board which wants to avoid reversal on admissibility-of-evidence grounds can beat do so by On February 24, 1989, 11 o'clock in the evening, while Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima and her husband were sleeping
admitting everything and excluding nothing. It can be presumed to apply the appropriate discount to various kinds of inside their house in Kalookan City, they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the

Part III 28 of 30
door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited
the accused, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down
and the two (accused and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and
the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from
the two, however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the accused was, she found out that the
two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused
knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare,
nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya" she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so
she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded
to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when
she still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended
his help by helping them in carrying the victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind
and put down the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even
without the latter's help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived bringing
with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused; she spent about
P100,000.00 in connection with burial and wake of her husband.
The day after, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam he together with some
Kalookan policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm whom the accused threw at the grassy area
particularly at the back of the latter's house; aside from the firearm they also recovered two (2) spent bullets and three
live ammunitions.
Trial Court held the accused guilty of violation of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting
incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae.
Held:
No. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he
heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are,
however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted
in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal
significance may also be received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what
the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-
appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true,
which he did in this case.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-
appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time
Part III
the testimony was given. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima,
wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an objection.
Ruling:
The trial court duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. Based on the testimonies of Rosalina Magat
vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim; Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Kalookan Police Force, NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay.
Despite, failure to evidence or substantiate illegal possession and treachery. There being no proof that accused-
appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a
firearm. And no witness could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented to prove treachery.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the trial court, and as Modified,
FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE. SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY
of prision mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY of reclusion temporal as
Maximum, with the accessory penalties.
G.R. No. L-13288 June 30, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSE NARANJA, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
In the afternoon of December 28, 1956 at night, in barrio Caraol-Malimpin, municipality of Dasol, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, while Maria Diaz was pounding rice in her yard, the accused arrived and was thereupon told
by her to stop coming to her house because her husband (the deceased) knew that she and the accused had been
carrying on illicit relations; that the accused had asked her to leave her husband and, as she refused, he indicated that
he would seek means to separate her from her husband; that before leaving in that afternoon of December 28, 1956,
the accused told her to wait for him in the evening; that, when she required about this purpose, the accused answered
that he would kill his compadre (the deceased) who was then harvesting palay in the farm; that in the evening of
December 28, 1956, as the dogs were barking, her husband went out of the house and proceeded to the place where
there was stocks of palay; that, becoming impatient for her husband's return, she went to the kitchen where she saw
the accused at the stairs; that the accused confessed to her that he had killed her husband whose dead body she ought
to take and bury; that cautioning her not to tip anyone, the accused informed that her husband lay dead at the creek
east of the house; that she awakened her mother and children and told them about the occurrence; that, upon advice
of her mother, she requested her neighbors, Santiago Balderas and one surname Baraan, to help her bring her
husband's body to the house.
Trial court convicted the accused of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and
armed with a blunt instrument, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, and beat to
death one MAMERTO SIGNEY, alias Berto, with the use of the said blunt instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not confession of the accused to Maria Diaz is strong evidence falling under the res gestae rule.
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Held:
Yes. Maria Diaz made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased; and the implementation of his
evil design is borne out by the actual and physical facts of the case. The testimony of Santiago Balderas to the effect
that, when Maria Diaz came to his house for help, she told him that her husband was dead and could be found at a
certain place, amply proves the fact of the crime as confessed by the accused. The presence of the bluish black spot at
the nape of the deceased, Mamerto Signey, and the opinion of Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the medulla
oblongata could have caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of the accused to Maria Diaz.
Ruling:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the accused. So ordered.
G.R. No. 136303 July 18, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES, accused-appellants.
Facts:
In the evening of April 27, 1997, SP02 Asim Mamansal and Alicia Villamor and her two helpers went home to Alicias
house in Magsaysay when the former was shot. Alex Siago, a barangay kagawad, testified that he was one of the first
persons to go to the victim after the latter was shot. Patricio Fuertes and Samuel Angelio then brought the victim to the
hospital where the victim conversed with Sonny Boy Redovan, nephew of the victim; Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo, the
surgeon; Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum; Mila Arimao Mamansal, the wife of the victim, Asmyra
Mamansal, daughter of the victim.
Sonny Boy Redovan, Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum alleged that SP02 Asim Mamansal (deceased) revealed
hhis assailants to them before his death.
Trial court convicted the accused of murder qualified by treachery.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged dying declaration of Asim Mamansal as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res
gestae.
Held:
No. Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae
refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.58
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.1âwphi1 The
following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the
res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction
and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant
Part III
when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the
statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.59
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these
statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him,
an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around
10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he
allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment.
Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded
the victim opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements
allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res
gestae.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony
Baltazar Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other
legal grounds.
G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.
SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
Facts:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, the spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito
attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at
the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man took her
husband's gun and left hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away.
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found
one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified
as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of
the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants
fled immediately after the shooting incident.
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.
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Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he
could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.

Trail court convicted the accused-appellants of robbery with homicide sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs.

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were appealing
the decision to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court
of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement
of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime falls under the exception of the hearsay
rule and therefore be admitted as evidence against the appellants.

Held:

No. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless
these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the
latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the
situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-
accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives
the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide
open for cross-examination and rebuttal.

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and
cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be
made with the assistance of counsel. 21 These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were
never observed.

While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in
substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its
case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's
evidence is weak.

Prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.

Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, who was drinking nearby when the three assailants passed about 5
meters away, made no mention or identification on who shot Agapito Gambalan.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and
Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

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