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Title Rethinking virtue, reforming society : new directions in
Renaissance ethics, c.1350-c.1650
Page numbers of scanned item 243-275
Name of author/editor David A. Lines and Sabrina Ebbersmeyer
Name of publisher and date of Brepols, 2013
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ISBN/ISSN 9782503525242
Other information Antonino Poppi, ‘Happiness’
Date copyright checked 01/10/2020
 Happiness

Antonino Poppi*

uch like virtue, friendship, and justice, happiness constituted

a fundamental building block of the ancients’ theories of eth­
ics. But happiness uniquely brought together human action and
man’s ultimate purpose, resulting in completeness and self-sufficiency. The
Greeks called happiness eudaimonia, a term which indicates the fortunate
condition of someone who is fully satisfied and fulfilled in his inclinations
and aspirations, whether these be physical or spiritual. There was unanimous
consensus in defining happiness as the greatest good in life, universally and
instinctively sought in and for itself by every living creature. But when it
came to determining its content or which gifts could fully satisfy the human
heart, agreement was much harder. Different schools of moral thought
therefore affirmed themselves in Antiquity, almost all of them simultane­
ously deriving and distancing themselves from that of Socrates; the main
strands included the Cyrenaic, the Epicurean, the Platonic-Aristotelian, the
Stoic, and the Sceptical, each with its own vision of human life and of the
good which could render life happy.1

* Translated from the Italian by David Lines and Simon Gilson.

1 Annas, La morale dellaJ'elicita, pp. 17-42, 451-57, and passim.

Antonino Poppi (biblio.antoniodottore@unipd.it) is Professor Emeritus of Moral Philosophy

at the University of Padua. His publications include Studi sull'etica della prima Sctiola
Jrancescana (Padova: Centro Studi Antoniani, 1996), L’etica del Rinascimento tra Platone e
Aristotele (Napoli: La Citta del Sole, 1997), bitroduzione all'aristotclismo padovano (Padova:
Antenore, 2nd ed., 1991), Lafilosofia nello Studio francescano del Santo (Padova: Centro Studi
Antoniani, 1989), and Ricercbe sulla teologia e la scienza nella Scuola padovana del Cinque e
Seicento (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2001).
 244 Antonino Poppi

Happiness in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Greek tragedies and sacred mysteries both underlined the inconsistency and
fragility of human life, dominated by misfortune and chance (tyche) to such a
degree that people wished never to have been born and to leave this life as soon
as possible. By contrast, the reflections of the ancient philosophers defended
the possibility of a happy life through the acquisition of knowledge and vir­
tue; through these and a focus on inferiority, people could become stable and
autonomous, capable of resisting the blows of fortune and the fluctuations of
worldly life. Among the ancients, only the Cyrenaics extolled the maximization
of momentary and unbridled pleasure. The other philosophical schools rejected
this position and fused together pleasure, virtue, and rationality, typically privi­
leging one of these components.
In the Hellenistic era these philosophical schools fought for spiritual pre-emi­
nence. They identified philosophy simply with the search for the meaning of life
and for individual happiness in internal solitude, and they reached great heights
of ethical-theoretical knowledge in Plotinus. St Augustine himself, once he had
refuted the internal contradictions of the Academics’ scepticism, declared that if
there was a reason for philosophizing, it could only be the search lor mans beati­
tude, that is to say for his happiness.2
The obviously elitist result of such an intense and secular meditation could
satisfy only a few figures, distinguished by their nobility of soul and thought­
fulness. Its price was the disavowal of various fundamental human needs and
conditions (including suffering and evil) which are intcxtricably linked with
the contingency of history, of human freedom, and of nature itself. For all prac­
tical purposes the happiness of the ancients, limited to the sphere of individ­
ual earthly experience, remained a distant dream, focused on strenuous efforts
to achieve rest and imperturbability (ataraxia). The goal itself, with all of its
heroic appeal and counter-intuitiveness, was constantly being disproved by
human experience and yet was constantly reaffirmed in the name of an (inflex­
ible) ideological position.3

2 Cf. Sc Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX. 1; De Luise and Farinecci, Storia della felicitd;
White, BriefHistory ofHappiness.
3 Augustine asked himself, how is ic possible to argue that a man is happy because he
patiently accepts his unhappiness? Which happiness can guarantee the contemplative act of an
absolute abstract continuously interrupted by daily affairs and threatened by the fading of the
primary goods of life? (cf. De civitate Dei, Xiv. 5, XIX. 4-5).
HAPPINESS 245

Such a partial and precarious happiness called for new perspectives on mans
ultimate end and highest good. As the Gospel broke into the hearts and minds
of pagans who had been converted to the teachings of Christ, a new era began,
bringing about a progressive and wholesale transformation of ancient culture and
a new Christian understanding of God, the world, and human beings, called to
an intimate communion and personal enjoyment of Gods eternal love. In this
new vision, everyone’s life is a journey towards heaven, the only true homeland.
Man’s permanent restlessness and his heart’s irrepressible yearning for an absolute
and infinite good point to and invoke a happiness which is both transcendent
and supernatural.
Illuminated by these truths of the new faith, the Church Fathers did not adopt
(nor, however, refute en bloc) the moral doctrines of the ancient philosophers;
instead they began a delicate work of critical discernment, which was then contin­
ued by the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages. The works of Thomas Aquinas
form the best synthesis of the conclusions of philosophical reason and Christian
revelation concerning the supreme good and human happiness, from the patristic
legacy to the scholasticism of the mid-thirteenth century. Thomas’s powerful sys­
tematization was the result of a successful marriage of an attentive understanding
of the classical sources with the truths of faith. In Thomas’s Summa theologize,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia finds its fulfilment in beatitudo, understood as the union
of man with God. For it is God himself who is the ultimate good and the supreme
end of every being and of every action that takes place in the universe. Following
St Augustine, Thomas clearly demonstrates that the transcendental yearning of
man’s intelligence and will for the infinite cannot be satisfied by any finite good
immanent in history, but only by the rapturous enjoyment of a transcendent and
infinite good, namely God himself. ‘
These doctrines, which fully informed the Middle Ages, set up an instinc­
tive hierarchy of values, in which the pre-eminent place was given to supernat­
ural realities. Earthly activities were, at least in principle, subordinate to these.
Although it did not disregard earthly affairs, the societas Christiana of these cen­
turies was therefore oriented towards a monastic mentality of spiritual ascent,
in which the heavenly sphere was pre-eminent. These considerations could eas­
ily lead to a position of contemptus mundi and to lament the miseria humanae
conditionis, obscuring the biblical vision of the goodness of creation and of the
insuperable dignity and beauty of man even in his physical dimension and in his
commitment to building a harmonious human society.

4 Sec Poppi, ‘Salvezza e beand-idine’, pp. 265-304; Lauster, Dio e lafelicita.

 246 Antonino Poppi

The Novelty ofHumanism

This patristic-medieval tradition was the starting point for Renaissance reflec­
tions on the supreme good and human happiness. At the same time, there was a
lively dialectic of continuity and innovation, stimulated by the enthusiastic redis­
covery of classical sources which had been generally ignored or had been only
faintly influential in the Middle Ages. Although humanism and scholasticism
hardly represented a radical clash between barbarity and the rise of civilization,
it is nonetheless true that a new understanding of man, as well as of his achieve­
ments and destiny, was now developing. As they immersed themselves in the texts
of the ancients, the humanists gained a new sensitivity to the existential problems
of life and death, of freedom and responsibility, of work and wealth, of family life
and political involvement, of the value of word and speech in public life. These
matters had been almost wholly absent from the highly abstract, logical, and sys­
tematic thinking of the scholastics.
Crucial factors included the humanists’ direct contact with the classics, the
rise of new political institutions (such as the signorie), and the explosion of artis­
tic, literary, and religious experiences so different from those of the medieval
period. All of these induced the humanists to reclaim the autonomous value of
earthly realities and human agency, which were no longer seen as dangerous (i.e.
as potentially leading one away from the supernatural goal of life). Rather, they
were reassessed as sources of a simplejoie de vivre which — however relative and
imperfect — cried out to find its fulfilment in heavenly beatitude. None of the
humanists, in fact, endorsed the Epicurean view of pleasure as the ultimate end
tout court, nor for that matter the Stoic ideal (almost one of martyrdom) which
involved embracing virtue for itself alone. Their preference fell between these
two extremes, resting either on the Platonic ideal of disembodied contempla­
tion or on Aristotle’s more realistic eudaimonism, both of which are discussed
fully below. Ultimately, however, humanists resolved the problem of happiness
(which had once again come to the fore, with the same urgency as it had held
in the ancient world) by approaching it through the lense of Christian faith,
which provided the only valid answer to human questions. These ‘new men’ may
have been captivated by the strength and splendour of classical culture, but they
could hardly dismiss over a millennium of Christian civilization, as if no radi­
cal upheaval (i.c. the coming of Christ) had occurred since the times of ancient
Greece and imperial Rome.
A striking example of the new Renaissance view of man as a unity of body and
spirit, as a combination of earthly impulses and the hope of future transfigura­
tion, is Giannozzo Manetti’s De dignitate et excellentia hominis (1451/52). This
HAPPINESS 247

work, which explicitly contradicts the theme of the ‘misery of the human condi­
tion’ described by Pope Innocent III, reflects a new climate of opinion shared
also by Matteo Palmieri’s Della vita civile (c. 1434-36) and by his contempo­
rary Leonardo Bruni’s biographies, dialogues, and translations from the Greek.
Indeed, nearly all Renaissance thinkers try to reconcile pagan and Christian val­
ues; on occasion a few might affirm that the ethics of a certain ancient school can­
not be improved upon by human reason, but they then explicitly assign a greater
validity to the affirmations of the Christian faith.5

Happiness in Pleasure

This approach can be seen in the way in which humanists reproposed ancient the­
ories of happiness.6 We start with Epicurean ethics, which — even chronologically
— is the furthest away from the evangelical viewpoint and which placed man’s
supreme good in pleasure (hedone). This view, as well as Epicurus’s personality, had
already been subjected in pagan antiquity to ferocious attacks, which conveniently
misrepresented various aspects of his doctrine and engaged in a vicious damna-
tio yyiemoriae. The followers of Epicurus had been described as unworthy of the
title of humans, since they were closer, in fact, to being pigs. The Church Fathers,
unaware of Epicurus’s ascetic views and personal approach to pleasure, confused
Epicurean hedonism with that of Aristippus. Petrarch instead, in the light of vari­
ous Epicurean views transmitted by Seneca, began to defend the ancient philoso­
pher against these accusations; indeed, he felt him in some respects quite close to
his own moral vision. But it was especially after the rediscovery of Lucretius’s De
renmi Tiatura (1417) and the translation of Book x of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives
aTid Opmiotis ofEmiTieTtt Philosophers (1420) that views began to change.7

5 See Garin, ‘Introduzione’; Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 301-16; and the essay by
David Lines and Jill Kraye in the present volume, which also addresses the various Renaissance
combinations of the strands of thought discussed below.
6 On several of the figures discussed below, now see Ebbersmeyer, Ho7tio agens, as well as
her essay in this volume.
7 For further comments on the reception of Epicureanism, see the essay by David Lines
and Jill Kraye in this volume.
 248 Antonino Poppi

Cosma Raimondi

Cosma Raimondis letter in defence of Epicurus (c. 1429) maintains that the only
philosophical position truly compatible with human nature is one which sees
the supreme good as the unitary pleasure of body and soul. After all, we have
been formed by nature in such a way that nothing suits us better than to remain
physically and spiritually healthy, unaffected by any physical or spiritual evil.
Raimondi therefore exclaims, ‘How wise [Epicurus] was! What more can be said
on the matter? What else can happiness consist of ? A man whose soul is in tur­
moil cannot be happy, no more than someone whose body is in pain can fail to
be miserable.’8
Raimondi observes that all human senses and faculties are obviously preor­
dained to pleasure. Our eyes allow us to enjoy beautiful objects, our ears to take
in the sweetness of songs and sound, and the same is true of the other senses. Even
knowledge of the highest truths brings with it great joy, but when the Peripatetics
place happiness only in disembodied contemplation they err because they over­
look the connection between the joys of contemplation and the pleasures tied
to the body and to external goods. Furthermore, if we also consider all the other
activities (e.g. artistic, literary, military) which we anxiously pursue night and day,
we shall see that everything takes place with a view to gaining pleasure or in the
hope of greater enjoyment. As for virtue itself, which tells us which pleasures we
should seek and which ones we should avoid, why should it be so esteemed and
desired if it does not have in view a pleasurable life? So Epicurus was right to con­
sider pleasure the highest good, since we are moulded for it; and if we consider
the numerous and abundant goods that nature has produced for man, we can
hardly doubt that ‘the highest felicity is found in pleasure’.9
Raimondi thus disagrees completely with the Stoics, who place happiness in
virtue itself and argue that the wise man is even happy when his body is racked
by unspeakable pain; in his opinion there is nothing more absurd or foolish than
declaring someone to be happy just because his soul is virtuous, while his body
is tormented. Since people are made up of two parts, happiness cannot be truly
experienced unless both the body and the soul enjoy the goods necessary for their
perfection and completeness. The Stoics’ defence of such an unnatural compart-

8 Sec the Latin-Italian text of ‘Cosmae Raimondi Cremonensis ad Ambrogium Tignosium

quod recte Epicurus summum bonum in voluptate constituent maleque de ea re Academici,
Stoici, Peripatetici senserint’, in Garin, Filosofi italiani elel Qtiattroceuto, pp. 134-49 (p. 136);
and Raimondi, A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi’, trans. by Davies, p. 239.
9 Raimondi, A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi’, trans. by Davies, p. 242.
HAPPINESS 249

mentalization of the individual is a sign of inhuman austerity and a lack of sensi­

tivity. Raimondi therefore often refers to them as ‘lunatics’ (furiosi), whereas the
Academicians who do not recognize that anything can be certain he labels ‘sick’
(insani). One should not believe, however, that in considering pleasure the high­
est good Epicurus wished to authorize licentiousness; rather, he too considered
virtue as indispensable to his teaching, since virtue guides the bodily senses to
enjoy pleasure at the appropriate time and within the appropriate limits.10
During this forceful affirmation of the Epicurean view that pleasure is com­
pletely natural and central to the end of human life, Raimondi warns, ‘I wish it to
be understood that I am not now considering that absolute and true philosophy
which we call theology. This entire enquiry concerns the human good of man­
kind and the various competing views of ancient philosophers on the matter.’11
Likewise Raimondi does not wish to discuss whether Epicurus’s opinions may
be in contrast with the Christian vision of life; the problem is, for him, simply
a philosophical one, that of defining the most realistic and rational position
concerning mankind’s end and ultimate happiness. In a contemporary letter to
a Benedictine monk, Francesco Filelfo instead not only rehabilitates Epicurus
(whom he describes as ‘temperant, learned, and serious’), but explicitly argues
that ‘an honest pleasure is not actually much inferior, if we think about it, to true
Christian enjoyment’, inasmuch as hedone belongs both to the body and the soul
and is nothing untoward when reason keeps it within bounds. After all, the high­
est and most praiseworthy pleasure is found in the contemplation of divine truths
through wisdom, and in right action as this is sustained by the moral virtues and
directed by prudence.12

Lorenzo Valla

In Raimondi’s writings, the Epicurean view of pleasure receives an evident

Christian twist which considerably distances it from its original roots. It is very
much in this sense that Lorenzo Valla reinterprets it two years later in his cel­
ebrated dialogue first bearing the significant title De voluptate (1431), and pub-

10 See Garin, Filosofi italiani del Quattrocento, pp. 146-49, and critical documentation in
Annas, La morale della felicita, chap. XVI (‘Epicuro: virtu, piacere e tempo’), pp. 459-80.
11 Raimondi, ‘A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi’, trans. by Davies, p. 239; Garin, Filosofi
italiani del Quattrocento, p. 136.
12 See ‘Franciscus Philelphus Bartholomaeo Fracanzano’, in Garin, Filosofi italiani del
Quattrocento, pp. 150-61.
 250 Antonino Poppi

lished a couple of years later in Pavia as De vero>falsoque bono (1433). In this work
the scintillating discussion between Bruni and Panormita (Antonio Beccadelli),
so full of allusions to the classical world, serves to prove, on the basis of both phi­
lology and human experience, the inadequacy of the Stoic viewofvirtue.13 Rather,
goodness (honestas) is understood as a mere utilitarian calculation, according to
established Epicurean notions — after all, everything in nature is ordered for
the attainment of pleasure, and any pleasure whatsoever is good for man (‘omnis
voluptas bona est’). As for the Aristotelians’ commonly accepted view that con­
templation is the pinnacle of a happy life, Valla replies that there is no difference
between the philosophers joy in contemplating the heavens and that of humble
women or children who ecstatically gape at market stalls or go to theatre-shows
or games. In any case, Aristotle’s observation that the gods’ activity of contempla­
tion proves its excellence sounds very much like blasphemy, since contemplation
is nothing other than a process of growing understanding through reflection —
something which, obviously, does not become divinity.1'
It falls to the third member of the conversation, Niccolo Niccoli, to draw
together the threads of the debate by arguing that loving God is the only true
form of goodness (honestas). As he notes, this goodness is not an end in itself as
the Stoics claimed, but rather a step towards communion with God. Furthermore,
voluptas may be identified with Christian beatitude, as can be seen from the
numerous passages in Scripture where the righteous are promised that they will
‘drink from the river of [God’s] pleasures’ (Psalm 36. 9): as Niccoli says, ‘This
indicates that pleasure (not goodness) should be sought for itself both by those
who wish to be delighted in this life and by those who wish to do so in the life
to come.’15 But Valla explicitly clarifies his thinking about this new, alternative
model of Christian happiness by warning that our earthly happiness must always
be subordinate to the happiness we shall enjoy one day in heaven. Indeed, at times
we shall need to renounce and sacrifice earthly happiness as something uncertain

13 ‘Ex quo plane constat honestatem vocabulum quoddam esse inane et futile, nihil
expediens, nihil probans et propter quod nihil agendum est! Nec propter honestatem ii qui
nominati sunt aliquid egerunt [...] ostendendum cst eos de quibus mentio habetur nullam
honestatis, omnem utilitatis habuissc rationem, ad quam omnia referenda sunt’: Valla, De vero
falsoque bono, ed. by Lorch, II. XV. 2-3 (p. 62); in this edition the interlocutors are changed to
Catone Sacco, MafFeo Vegio, and Antonio da Rho.
14 Valla, De verofalsoque bono, ed. by Lorch, II. XXVIII. 6-9 (pp. 76-77).
15 *[...] ex quo debet intelligi non honcstatem sed voluptatem propter se ipsam esse
expetendam tarn ab iis qui in hac vita quam ab iis qui in futura oblectari volunt’: Valla, De vero
falsoque bono, ed. by Lorch, III. IX. 3 (p. 110).
HAPPINESS 251

and deceptive compared with the firm and eternal happiness reserved for those
who live in joyful expectation.16 This kind of conclusion matches only superfi­
cially, however, with that of the founder of the ‘Garden’, inasmuch as the anthro­
pology and theodicy on which it is based presuppose not only a sharp division
between body and soul, but also the immortality of the soul and the existence of
a God who orders nature and rewards virtue. All of these assumptions are com­
pletely alien to Epicurean thought.

Later Reactions

In the later Renaissance these early humanist attempts to Christianize Epicurus’s

ethics and theology reverberated throughout Europe,X/ leading to a more criti­
cal approach to the defamatory accusations spread in antiquity on his character
and teaching. A significant example is Francisco de Quevedo’s learned Defensa
deEpicuro contro la corniin opinion (1635), which treats Epicurus as broadly use­
ful in Christian teaching, including on points such as the immortality of the
soul and divine providence.18 The humanists’ reappraisal of Epicurean natural­
ism, however, probably attained its most complete theoretical expression in two
works by Pierre Gassendi {De vita et moribus et placitis Epicuri, and Syntagma
philosophiae Epicuri, both 1649). In these works the French thinker, following in
the footsteps of Epicurus, sets against the Platonic-Aristotelian summa a new syn­
thesis of thought. At the same time, Gassendi too gives Epicurus’s endorsement
of voluptas a Christian orientation towards supreme (i.e. heavenly) bliss, which is
reached through the exercise of virtue. Thomas Hobbes’s naturalistic hedonism,
almost contemporary with that of Gassendi, is rooted instead in an emphasis on
individual human passionality. Hobbes marks an irreversible turning point away

16 Valla, De vero falsoque bono, ed. by Lorch, ill. X-XI (pp. 110-11); he can therefore
conclude: ‘Et confutavi sive damnavi utrorunque dogma epicureorum atque stoicorum docuique
apud neutros atque adeo apud nullos philosophos esse vel summum vel expetendum bonum, sed
potius in nostra religione consistere, non in terris assequendum sed in celis’ (ill. XV. 1 (p. 116)).
17 See, for example, Nobili, De bominisfelicitate, where, despite disagreeing with Epicurus’s
doctrine, in the last chapter of Book II he identifies happiness with genuine voluptas: ‘Ea autem
quam mens ex virtute agendo, aut res praestantissimas contemplando capit, vera ac germana
voluptas est, ac divino illi beatarum mentium gaudio simillima (p. 151); he assigns to voluptas
also a spiritual connotation, as fully outlined in his two subsequent books De vera et falsa
voluptate.
18 See Quevedo, ‘Defence of Epicurus against Commonly Held Opinions’. On Quevedo
also see the essay by David Lines and Jill Kraye in this volume.
 252 Antonino Poppi

from the classical/Christian view of happiness, since he jettisons the idea that
harmony and fulfilment mark those who reach their end (telos); rather, Hobbes
opens the way to a solipsistic restlessness consisting of a ceaseless struggle to lay
hold of happiness. This efforts success is only very partial and imperfect, since
happiness is in fact an unattainable goal.19
Whereas, in the Catholic world, it was possible to view pleasure (which
included mans spiritual dimension) as the supreme good, in Protestant theology
pleasure was regarded with diffidence if not hostility, on the basis that corrupt
human nature can find its true end (i.e. happiness) only through faithful obedi­
ence and the regeneration of the Holy Spirit.20 Already in his Moralis philoso-
phiae epitome (1537) Philipp Melanchthon repeatedly expressed his distaste for
Valias exaltation of the false and unworthy doctrine of Epicurus against that of
all other philosophers. Melanchthon offers a lengthy confutation of Epicurus’s
logic in declaring that pleasure is the ultimate end of human nature. By so doing
Epicurus assigns to man’s corrupt condition the status of an absolute standard.
Melanchthon sees similar problems in Valla’s view that pleasure is a means by
which nature seeks its own preservation, whereas virtue (as the case of Socrates
testifies) results in self-destruction. Melanchthon observes that this reasoning
contains afallacia accidentis, for the death of Socrates was caused not by virtue,
but by the injustice of the Athenians.21

Happiness in Virtue
Contrary to Epicurean views, Stoic ethics immediately found a warm welcome
in early Christianity, to the extent that many viewed the writings of Cicero and
especially Seneca as inspired by the gospel of Christ. The Stoics saw virtue as the
supreme good and vice as the only real evil. They felt compelled to follow nature
as a manifestation of divine reason. They praised the intense self-control which

19 See De Luise and Farinetti, Storia della J'elicita, chap. XV (‘Hobbes: l’ansia di felicita
dell’uomo moderno’), pp. 205-18; chap. XVI (‘II ritorno di Epicuro’), pp. 219-22.
20 See Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 314, 385; Bellucci, ‘Natural Philosophy’; Scrohm,
‘Ethics in Early Calvinism’. See also the essay by Risto Saarinen in this volume.
21 ‘Quarc Valla merito vituperatur a prudentibus, quod cum satis contumeliosus fuerit in
caeteros philosophos omnes, uni assurgit Epicuro. Cum autem Epicuri sententia et falsa sit et
indigna bonis viris, ac praecipue christianis, prorsus cam repudiandam et explodendam e scholis
esse censeo’: Melanchthon, Moralis pbilosophiae epitome, p. 19; from ‘Quid sentiendum est de
Epicuri opinione qui defendit voluptatem esse finem bonorum’ (pp. 19-26), a refutation which
also appears in the first book of the 1550 Ethicae doctrinae elementa.
HAPPINESS 253

extinguishes the passions. They were indifferent to external goods and to fortune.
They promoted an egalitarian view of society in which every individual world
citizen enjoyed equal freedom. In all of these ways, Stoic philosophy came very
close to the ascetic and political ideals of late antique and medieval Christianity,
a fact which contributed to its widespread admiration. In the fifteenth century
an additional factor was the translation of the Lives and Opinions ofEminent
Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius (Book vii concerns the school of Zeno) and
Politian’s translation of Epictetus’s Manual.
But the Stoics’ fascination with an extreme and heroic dedication to duty, as
well as the affinities mentioned above, could not blind Renaissance writers to
the great distance between the Stoics’ immanentistic metaphysics and fatalis­
tic anthropology and those of Christianity. For this reason their admiration of
Stoic positions is nearly always tempered by deep-rooted reservations — first of
all concerning virtue as the only true, self-sufficient good, equivalent to supreme
happiness. A virtuous disposition, Renaissance writers argued, is only a means
leading to happiness, and in any case happiness cannot be limited to the spirit
but must involve even the most humble, physical aspects of human existence. For
these reasons, they considered the Stoics’ indifference to earthly goods and the
blows of fortune as unrealistic and illusory, leading many critics to mock their
ideal of the wise man, who was supposedly happy even while being broken on the
wheel. Likewise, the Stoics’ teaching on the serenity and imperturbability of the
soul (apatheia) was considered both inhuman and self-contradictory, along with
its corollary that the passions must be uprooted. After all, they reasoned, passions
are the soil from which virtue springs.22
Coluccio Salutati expresses these very objections in his reply (21 February 1401)
to Francesco Zabarclla. The only, meagre consolation that Zabarella could offer the
Chancellor of Florence on the occasion of his son’s death was that vice is the only
true evil and that — since death comes to us all — it is useless to complain. ‘But
how can one not mourn his son’s death?’ asked Salutati. This dramatic experience
led him away from his earlier Stoic leanings, and he sought refuge instead in the
more reasonable Aristotelian position, which assigned moral worth to the passions.
Salutati found additional support for this re-evaluation in the Gospel’s description
of Christ as a man who deeply loved, felt pity and wrath, suffered, and wept.23

22 For further comments on Renaissance attitudes towards the passions, see Sabrina Ebbers-
meyers essay in this volume.
23 See an extract of this letter in Salutati, A Letter to Francesco Zabarella’, trans. by Witt;
and Garin, ‘Introduzione’, pp. 26-30 on the figure of Salutati.
 254 Antonino Poppi

Other humanists arrived at different conclusions. Leonardo Brunis Isagogicon

moralisphilosophiae (1425) attempted an impossible reconciliation of Epicurean,
Stoic, and Aristotelian positions on the supreme good.24 Leon Battista Alberti
expressed his Stoic orientation in his open admiration for the heroic moral
strength of the virtuous man, who does not give in to the uncertainty of fortune
but builds his happiness on his search for beauty and truth.25 Angelo Poliziano, in
a famous letter to Bartolomeo Scala (c. 1480), used his discussion of Simplicius’s
commentary on Epictetus’s Manual as an occasion to exalt the rarefaction of
the Stoics’ view of man, which saw the body as simply an external instrument of
the soul. He also allowed the possibility of giving vent to one’s emotions in spe­
cific tragic circumstances, as long as this was done in moderation.26 Montaigne
denounced as presumptuous the Stoic teaching which assigns virtue wholly to
human effort and happiness to one’s own merit. Christians know, after all, that sal­
vation and happiness are gifts of God’s grace — a concept which the movements
springing from Martin Luther’s Reformation would especially insist upon.27

Pietro Pomponazzi

The figures discussed above were men of letters, and as such they were typi­
cally more sensitive to fine points of philology than to the rigours of philoso­
phy. It may therefore be more surprising to see a famous Aristotelian like Pietro
Pomponazzi opt for Stoic solutions, both in his well-known treatise De immor-
talitate animae (1516) in connection with happiness, and in Defato in connec­
tion with human freedom.28 In chapter XIV of his work on the immortality of
the soul, Pomponazzi asserts in the first instance that human happiness is the
result of individual participation in the triple intellect (speculative, active, pro­
ductive). The speculative intellect is characteristic of the gods, while man has only
a weak and inconstant version of it. The productive intellect is common to man
and beast and necessary for human survival. The intermediate, active intellect
is proper to man, who exercises it through the moral virtues. It is the only one

24 The Latin text of Brunis Isagogicon moralis disciplinae is published with an Italian
translation by Garin, Filosofi italiani delQiiattrocento, pp. 104-11.
25 On Alberti, see Garin, Filosoji italiani del Qiiattrocento, pp. 37-39, 248-53.
26 See Poliziano, ‘A Letter to Bartolomeo Scala’, trans. by Kraye.
27 See Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 366-67, 369-70.
28 On Pomponazzi s adherence to Stoic determinism, see Poppi, ‘Fate, Fortune, Providence’,
pp. 653-60.
HAPPINESS 255

which can bring about happiness to individuals and cities, since everyone is under
an obligation to live well and avoid vice, while it is hardly necessary for all to be
philosophers or skilled craftsmen. If human beings are to be happy and at peace,
therefore, everyone must participate fully in the practical or active intellect, since
it is only through the moral virtues that a united and peaceful society can be cre­
ated. As for the speculative and productive intellects, it is enough that people
participate in them partially.29
Since man is mortal (‘simpliciter mortalis’), he must not aspire to such an
immortal and complete happiness as the contemplative life of the gods; never­
theless he need not fear death, ‘since fear of the inevitable is pointless, and in
death he sees nothing evil’.30 Pomponazzi observes that, although man is mortal,
he enjoys greater happiness in practising virtue — even to the point of giving his
life for his country and his friends, to the high praise of the community — than
in giving himself over to vice with its resulting blot of infamy. After all, death is
‘a nothingness’; the only good is virtuous action, whereas the only evil is vice.
Both must be followed or avoided independently from what may await us after
death. Pomponazzi adds that God would not be unjust if there were no after­
life and therefore no reward for the good or punishment for the wicked in the
hereafter. After distinguishing the essential from the accidental forms of reward
and punishment, Pomponazzi argues that the essential reward of virtue is virtue
itself, which makes man happy and secure, whether in favourable or adverse cir­
cumstances. Conversely, the essential punishment of vice is vice itself, which is
the most miserable condition imaginable, as described by Aristotle in his portrait
of the tyrant.31
Clearly these aspects of happiness analysed by Pomponazzi derive from a Stoic
anthropology. In this perspective, man is a temporary expression of a strictly
determined natural world, and he is destined to dissolve in the eternal cycle of
natures forms, which he is unable to transcend. Pomponazzi sought to propose a

29 ‘Quart universalis finis generis humani est secundum quid de speculative) et factivo
participare, perfecte autem de praccico. Universus enim perfectissime conservaretur, si omnes
homines essenc studiosi et optimi, sed non si omnes essent philosophi vel fabri vel domificatores’:
Pomponazzi, De immortnlitate animae, ed. by Gentile, p. 93.
30 ‘[...] cum vanus sit timor de inevitabilibus; nihilque mali conspiciat in morte’:
Pomponazzi, De immortnlitate nnimne, ed. by Gentile, p. 96.
31 ‘Praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsamet virtus, quae hominem felieem facit [...] poena
namque vitiosi est ipsum vitium, quo nihil miserius, nihil infelicius esse potest [...] Itaque omnis
virtuosus virtute sua et felicitate praemiatur’: Pomponazzi, De hnmortalitate animae, ed. by
Gentile, pp. 100-01.
256 Antonino Poppi

version of happiness on a human scale — practical, midway between contempla­

tive flights and a purely material activity — but was nonetheless aware of the fra­
gility of such a solution. After arguing that the doctrine of the immortality of the
soul cannot be settled by reason alone, in the last chapter Pomponazzi strongly
emphasizes the importance of trusting Christian revelation and the great doctors
of the Church. Here Pomponazzi affirms the immortality of the soul with no
hesitation whatsoever; he is aware of how essential this premise is to human life
and action, in that it orients them either towards the contingent and earthly or to
the transcendent and eternal.32

Justus Lipsius

In contrast with Pomponazzi s hesitations, the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius

strongly praised the Stoic ideal of the wise man as something to strive for, even
though he conceded that it was ultimately unattainable. Lispius saw Stoicism
as an answer to the tragic crisis of the European wars of religion, since it con­
sidered control of the passions (adfectus) as the only real avenue to peace. After
all, it is only by distancing themselves from external goods and cultivating virtue
that people can quell the tumultuous passions which will otherwise lead to hate
and conflict. In his Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam (1604) Lipsius reas­
serts the main principles of Stoicism, defending them from the attacks of rival
philosophical schools. He emphasizes the distinctive doctrine that ‘virtue is the
supreme good’ along with its corollary that ‘happiness consists only in virtue’ and
has no need of external goods, which are hostages to fortune. Virtue has its seat
in reason and is therefore within our power — it is beyond the vagaries of fate,
it is solidly fixed, and we therefore need not fear losing it, unlike wordly goods.
Lipsius notes that Epictetus’s observations concerning a wise man’s inner free­
dom, security, and peace coincide beautifully with the teaching of the Scriptures
and the Church Fathers. For them wisdom, or virtue, is the only good, is blessed
by God, contains in itself all the other goods, and cannot be either increased by
bodily goods or diminished by the arrows of fortune. As a result, the writer asks
‘Could Zeno have explained these cardinal doctrines any better?’33

32 Pomponazzi, De bnmortalitate animae, ed. by Gentile, cap. XV, pp. 1 18-23.

33 See Lipsius, Manuductio, II. XX (‘Sola igitur virtucem sufficere ad beatitatem, nec externa
auc fortuita requiri’), pp. 113-20; ‘An pocuit Zeno capitalia ista dogmata disertius efferre?,
pp. 116-17. On Lipsius, also see the essay by David Lines and Jill Kraye in this volume.
HAPPINESS 257

In his examination of various paradoxes relating to Stoic doctrine, Lipsius is

conscious of the delicacy of the fourth one, namely that the wise man is happy
even in the midst of suffering. But since the Stoics hold that pain is not an evil, it
follows that happiness can be preserved even in the midst of torment. The wise
man experiences pain, but he does not fear it. He realizes that it is not physical
realities which make things good or bad, but rather virtue. So outside of the soul
evil cannot exist. Even if one were to find himself in the bull of Phalaris, he could
rightly exclaim, ‘How sweet this is! How little it affects me!’ (‘quam suave est
hoc!, quam hoc non euro!’). No wonder that Epicurus was able to die serenely
despite the severe pain which racked his diseased body.34
Lipsius s enthusiasm for Stoic ethics rested especially on the works of Roman
writers and Church Fathers. His teaching was somewhat naive in identifying
Stoicism with the Christian view of man’s action and end, without commenting
on the deep differences between the two systems’ metaphysical and anthropolog­
ical views. Lipsius had a profound effect on early seventeenth-century humanism
in England, France, and especially Spain, where his works gave rise to a flourish­
ing Neo-Stoic movement. A particular case is Francisco de Quevedo’s Doctrina
estoicn (1635), which is marked by Lipsius’s instinct for conciliation to the point
of making Stoic ethics derive from the biblical book ofJob.3'* An especially vigor­
ous and original expression of Neo-Stoicism was offered by Baruch Spinoza: his
Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (published posthumously in 1677) treats
virtue as a form of freedom, achieved through reason, from slavery to the pas­
sions. It finds its culmination in the supreme happiness of the ‘speculative love of
God’ (‘amor Dei intellectualis’).

Happiness in the Contemplation ofthe Divine

Those humanists who were sympathetic to the teachings of Epicurus or Zeno

constituted a minority when compared with the followers of Plato. The
Latin West had always been fascinated by Plato’s literary power and the verti­
cal impulses of his thought, even though it was in contact with his works only
through a limited number of translations and Greek commentaries. Thus a slen­
der but influential tradition, informed by the teachings of Plato and Plotinus,
had leavened patristic thought and the early Middle Ages. Knowledge of Plato’s

34 Lipsius,Miimuluctio, III. VI (‘IV parad. Sapiencem vcl in tormencis beatum esse’), pp. 149-51.
35 See Quevedo, ‘Defence of Epicurus against Commonly Held Opinions’, pp. 210-25;
Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 372-74.
258 Antonino Poppi

thought remained small36 (though highly suggestive) up to the time of Petrarch

and the first teachings of Greek — based on the Platonic dialogues — in the
main universities of fifteenth-century Italy. (This teaching was typically offered
by Greek emigres, who had fled Byzantium and the Turkish invasions.) Plato’s
god could be, and was, compared with the Creator of the Bible. And there were
other obvious points of contact with Christianity, including the immortality of
the soul and the view that mans happiness can find its fulfilment only in the here­
after. It is then that the soul, freed from the prison of the body, can both contem­
plate the Good and enter into mystic union with the One. Although on other
points there was less agreement with Christian doctrine (e.g. the community of
wives outlined in the Republic), several Renaissance literary scholars and philoso­
phers embraced Platonic teachings, seeing in them the highest expression of the
possible concordance between natural reason and Christian faith. The cardinal
Johannes Bessarion saw in Plato an anticipation of the religion later fully revealed
by Christ. Obviously, this did not authorize anyone to make the mistake of aban­
doning the Scriptures and become a follower of Plato, but it was possible to take
from his philosophy some principles tied to genuine Christian theology.3'

Marsilio Ficino

The most eminent representative of this current of thought was undoubtedly

Marsilio Ficino, who in 1462 was officially charged by Cosimo the Elder to
translate into Latin the entire body of Platonic works. The villa of Careggi thus
became the central point from which the ancient texts of Plato and his follow­
ers radiated out throughout Europe, in a challenge to the Aristotelianism which
reigned in the universities of the time. In his most theoretical work, the Tljeologia
Platonica (1474), which deals with the immortality of the soul, Ficino explains
that Gods light and goodness permeate the entire universe, divided into five lev­
els of hypostases, in which the human soul occupies the middle rung between
(at the highest end) God and the angels and (at the lowest end) bodies and mat-

36 Throughout the medieval period, Plato was known directly only through the Aleno,
Pbaedo, the Partnenides and the first chapters of the Timaeus. See the essay by David Lines and
Jill Kraye in this volume.
37 See John Bessarion, In calumniatorem Platonis, II. 5, text in Garin, Filosoji italiani del
Qjiattrocento, pp. 280-83; and Bessarion, ‘Against the Slanderer of Plato’, trans. by Deitz and
Monfasani. On Plato’s renewed fortunes in fifteenth-century Italy, see Hankins, Plato in the
Italian Renaissance.
HAPPINESS 259

ter. The human soul therefore links the intelligible and the material worlds. God
has placed within the soul an irreppressible yearning to know the supreme truth
and the supreme good in which human happiness lies. But this desire cannot be
fulfilled in this life, which is bound by the finite and the material, so it defers its
fulfilment to a future, immortal life. The soul is constantly attracted to this goal
by Beauty, which provokes the will to desire and love.38
Ficino remains close to the Symposium as he illustrates the phases of the souls
ascent from the initial apprehension of the physical beauty of the body to the
love for the intelligible beauty of the soul. The process culminates in the ultimate
rapture of a beatific union with Gods absolute beauty and love, the only source of
true joy: ‘So, if the most delightful of all delights is to possess the beloved object,
what can be supposed more delightful than possessing that object which is beauty
itself and goodness itself?’39 Ficino also poses the typically scholastic question of
whether this beatitude consists chiefly in the speculative act of contemplation
or in the joy that results from it in the will. In his youthful commentary on the
Pbilebus his Thomistic training inclined him towards an intellectualist position,
but later on he took the opposite view, as is evident from the TheoLogia Platonica
and from his letter on happiness to Lorenzo de’ Medici.40 Here too one can easily
see both how deeply Ficino’s Platonism is steeped in Christian thought and the
extent to which the original Platonic system has been rebuilt from the ground up
with borrowings from revealed doctrine in view of an apologetic end — namely,
to confute other philosophical schools, which by their materialism and imma-
nentism left no room for faith. Even in the case of happiness, Ficinos deep affinity
with Plato allows him to reach an original result by fusing together two different
perspectives which for him are so complementary that they ultimately become
hard to separate.

38 See the chapters of Ficino, ‘The Platonic Theology: Selections’, trans. by Deitz.
39 Ficino, Platonic Theology, VI, 249.
40 This letter represents the synthesis of a conversation which took place between the
two at Careggi, and it is like a small treatise on ‘Qujd est felicitas, quod habet gradus, quod
cst aeterna’. See Letter 115 in The Letters ofMarsilio Ficino, trans. by Language Department, I,
171-78. Whilst appreciating the Aristotelian notion of happiness as the ‘summus actus summae
potentiae circa summum obiectum’, following ‘noster Plato’, Ficino denies that this can take
place in this earthly life where intellect and will are always disturbed, but it will take place in the
fruition and fusion with God in the next life, and there the ‘gaudium est praestantius visione’, it
is the prize and aim of love, which surpasses knowledge: ‘Frui igitur summo bono ad voluntatem
potius quam intellectum pertinere videtur’; see Ficino, Opera omnia, pp. 662-65. For further
details (and Lorenzo’s composition), see the essay by David Lines and Jill Kraye in this volume,
pp. 38-40.
 260 Antonino Poppi

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola

Whereas Ficino always remained personally hostile to Aristotelianism, his disci­

ple Francesco Cattani da Diacceto tended towards a reconciliation of Platonism
with both Christianity and Aristotelianism, even though he remained faithful
to his teachers philosophical positions. The conciliatory tendency was even
stronger in the greatest Renaissance philosopher, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.
His immense learning is reflected in the nine hundred theses which he wished
to dispute in Rome with scholars from all over the world. Pico’s effort embraced,
within a synthesis of stunning scope, the cultures, philosophies, and religions of
all times and peoples in a heroic effort to bring peace and concord to the entire
human race. In his famous introductory oration to the disputation, known as De
hominis dignitate (1486), Pico not only lyrically extolls man on account of his
intermediate nature between the heavenly and the earthly, but views his incom­
parable superiority as consisting in the freedom given to him with such generosity
by his Creator. Other beings are governed by precise laws; man instead is left on
his own and must determine his own nature and fate through his free will. Man is
thus practically his own artificer, free to mould himself as he sees fit: the Creator
tells Adam, ‘Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life,
which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be
reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.’12
Such an exalted position obliges man to scorn a beastly existence and aspire
with all his strength to live like the celestial spirits, displaying the unfailing judge­
ment of the angels seated on heavenly thrones, the contemplative splendour of
the cherubim, the fiery love of the seraphim; this love is the supreme happiness,
whereby ‘whoso [...] is a lover, is in God and God in him, nay, rather, God and
himself are one’.43 In this oration delivered to the pope and cardinals, and even
more explicitly in the Heptaplus (a masterful commentary on the days of crea­
tion), Pico brings together reason and faith, Christian and pagan philosophies
and theologies in order to define the happiness of man, which requires first of all
a willingness to resist ‘the torrential wave of pleasure which crashes upon us like
a mass of water’. We must direct all our energies towards the only true end — the
union of that small spark of our intelligence with that first Mind which cncom-

1 Sec Panegyricus in amorem in Cattani da Diacceto, ‘Panegyric on Love’, trans. by Deitz.

42 Pico della Mirandola, ‘Oration on the Dignity of Man’, ed. by Cassirer, Kristeller, and
Randall, p. 225; cf. Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, ed. by Garin, p. 107.
*3 In Pico della Mirandola, ‘Oration on the Dignity of Man’, ed. by Cassirer, Kristeller, and
Randall, p. 228; cf. Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, ed. by Garin, p. 113.
HAPPINESS 261

passes all intelligence. But this union is not possible without the mediation of
Christ, the God-man, the only one powerful enough to bring man into union
with divine happiness.44
Within Pico’s vision of happiness it is hard to separate the Platonic element
from that furnished by Christian mysticism, even though Pico’s conception does
not reach the extremes of Francesco de’ Vieri, who saw in the Timaeus a fore­
shadowing of the doctrine of the Trinity.45 Pico manages, even more clearly than
Ficino, to fuse man’s experience of sensual love (erds) with the pleasure resulting
from union with God. Others too (includingGirolamo Benivieni, Pietro Bembo,
Baldassarre Castiglione, and some Hebrew thinkers) would later embrace this
interpretation of happiness as a mystical experience of divine love.46 And even
some notable Renaissance Aristotelians, such as as Alessandro and Francesco
Piccolomini and Antonio Riccobono, recognized Plato’s teaching concerning
man’s true happiness as superior to that of Aristotle, given Plato’s attention to a
life beyond this earthly one and the possibility of union with the supreme good.47
Others, including the French humanist Jacques Lefevre d’Etaples, tried to graft
Platonic and Christian considerations onto the tree of Aristotelian philosophy,
an operation which is especially evident from the notes by Lefevre s close disciple
Josse Clichtove.'8

Protestant Reformers

Theologians of the Reformation instead took a more cautious and demanding

attitude; they pointed out that, by ignoring original sin and the corruption of
human nature, Plato and the other ancient philosophers did not realize that man’s
efforts could never suffice to attain to happiness and salvation. They insisted that
these are only possible through God’s grace, deriving from the cross of Christ.49

44 See Pico de Mirandola, Heptaplus, p. 323.

45 See de’ Vieri, Compendio della dottrina di Platone translated in de’ Vieri, ‘Compendium
of Platonic Teachings’, trans. by Monfasani.
46 See Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, vol. I, chap. 8; vol. II, chap. 2; Kraye, ‘Moral
Philosophy’, pp. 353-56.
47 See Poppi, Lettea del Rinascimento, pp. 29-48, 198-213, and passim.
48 See, for example, Lefevre d’Etaples, Artificialis introductio per modum Epitomatis. The
whole area of French interpretations of the Ethics is in need of further exploration; lor a useful
orientation, see Luca Bianchi’s essay in this volume.
49 See Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 323-24, 359; Lauster, Dio e lafelicita, pp. 91-98.
262 Antoniiio Poppi

Melanchthon’s thinking on this point is extremely clear. His lectures on ethics

constantly ask, ‘What is the relationship between philosophy and the Gospel?’
(‘Quid interest inter philosophiam et evangelium?’), as he outlines a clear distinc­
tion between what the revelation of the Gospel offers us (i.e. the remission of
sins and reconciliation with God) and the usefulness of moral philosophy. The
latter may indeed uncover natural laws, yet it is unable to explain the causes of
our natures infirmity, along with its concomitant monstrosities. Nor is it able to
indicate the true end of human life, which it identifies not with God, but rather
with virtue as an end to itself or even with pleasure.50
The Calvinist Anthony de Waele demonstrates a clear preference for Plato
over Aristotle. First he denounces a series of deficiencies and errors in Aristotelian
ethics, with its exclusive concern for man and points of contradiction with the
Gospels and both tables of the Mosaic Law. He then concludes that ‘if, therefore,
we wish to study Aristotle’s ethics without running the risk of error, it is neces­
sary for us to correct every part of this discipline according to the standard of the
Word of God and to use the Word of God to supply whatever is lacking in this
discipline’51 As to the end of life, Anthony says, Plato’s opinion is much closer
to theological truth than that of Aristotle: Plato places the supreme good in the
vision and fruition of God, although he too ignores the true cause of the mind’s
illumination and the will’s purification which allow one to reach this end. These
are made possible only by the grace of Christ, through faith and the free gift of
the Holy Spirit.52

Happiness in the Culmination ofthe Contemplative Life,

Accompanied by External Goods
Whereas Platonism especially appealed to writers and thinkers who mainly found
employment outside the universities (most often in the service of princes), uni-

50 Melanchthon,Moralispbilosophiaeepitome, pp. 9-11, and see the passages in Melanchthon,

‘The Elements of Ethical Doctrine’, trans. by Monfasani, from the Etbicae doctrinae elementa:
‘Since, however, philosophy has nothing to tell us about the cause of this infirmity or its remedies,
we recognize that we require some other doctrine, beyond philosophy, namely, the announcement
of promises or the Gospel. And we very much need to keep in mind the distinction between
philosophy and the Gospel, which I shall speak of here and about which it is often necessary to
speak’(pp. 109-10).
51 Walaeus, Compendium etbicae aristotelicae\ Walaeus, ‘A Compendium of Aristotelian
Ethics’, trans. by Monfasani, p. 123.
52 See Walaeus, ‘A Compendium of Aristotelian Ethics’, trans. by Monfasani, p. 124.
HAPPINESS 263

versity teachers followed the teachings of Aristotle, whose works formed, since
the thirteenth century, the backbone of the Arts subjects throughout Europe.
The same was true of moral philosophy, which was taught by explaining the text
of the Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes even in the original Greek.53 In the Ethics,
Aristotle starts by explaining the end (i.e. the human good) of this practical dis­
cipline and then describes the means (i.e. the virtues) which lead an individual
to enjoy the good life in thepolis. Already at the outset Aristotle dismisses the
styles of life (the bioi) which confuse pleasure and honour with happiness. He
also rejects, out of love for the truth, the universal and abstract idea of Good
proposed by his teacher Plato. Instead, he places happiness in the activity which
is most proper to man, which is the activity of virtue according to the highest
faculty of the human soul (reason), which is able to embrace the highest reali­
ties, including the divine. Indeed, the perfect and self-sufficient good, sought for
itself and nothing else, consists in this speculative apprehension, which must last
throughout ones lifetime; and, since this activity is to be that of a real person,
bound by time and space, perfect happiness requires the goods of the body and
of fortune, without which life would become most miserable, as was the case of
Priamus (Book I, chaps 3-10).
Aristotle himself remarks on the composite character of this ideal of happi­
ness, which he defines as an activity of the rational part of the soul according to
virtue. Such an activity is inherently pleasurable and is accompanied by external
goods (whether these be necessary or merely useful). This vision brings together
elements such as contemplation, virtue, and pleasure, without an attempt to focus
exclusively on any particular one of them, and it always keeps the rational soul as
a primary reference point.54 Aristotle thus outlines a realistic earthly happiness,
which takes into account the hylomorphic nature of man and concedes that, in
this world, true happiness will rarely be achieved. In this life, speculative happi­
ness is not enough, because everyone must take into account the passions’ resist-

53 See the full analysis and documentation of the Renaissance tradition of Aristotle’s
Ethics, starting from the great medieval commentators, in Lines, Aristotle's Ethics’ in the Italian
Renaissance.
5-1 In certain Renaissance commentators the unified Aristotelian view of happiness is split
into two types of beatitude: ‘alterum quod in actionibus honestis atque virtuti consentaneis,
alterum quod in contemplatione, verique perspicientia consistit’ (Nobili, De ho minisfelicitate,
p. 17). In the same way, Theodor Zwinger, who gives Aristotle’s concept of happiness a strong
theological twist in the preface to his Aristotelis de moribus ad Nicomachum, writes that, since
man is both mortal and immortal, his beatitude is also of two kinds, the one worldly, the other
celestial or heroic, and consists ‘partim in fruitione et possessione boni, cuius comitem esse
diximus voluptatem, partim in cognitione boni, quae gloria est’ (pages not numbered).
 264 Antonino Poppi

ance to moral virtues, in addition to material deprivation, illness, and the arrows
of misfortune. It was this very ambiguity that provided the fodder for criticisms
of the Aristotelian view of the supreme good. The Stoics were especially unhappy
with its emphasis on the necessity of external goods for the happiness of the sage.
Such a demand seemed to negate the self-sufficiency of the virtuous man, debas­
ing his independence and nobility as he was forced to come to terms with the
useful and the pleasurable.55
When Christian theologians of the thirteenth century encountered Aristotle’s
writings, they reacted with either admiration or rejection. St Bonaventure saw
Aristotle’s refusal to countenance the doctrine of Ideas as the source of some of
the major philosophical aberrations of his day. St Thomas instead welcomed and
valued almost the entire rediscovered legacy of pagan ethics. He integrated it
with and filtered it through the Christian vision of the ultimate end of life and of
man’s supreme beatitude (which he saw as fellowship with God). According to
Thomas it was possible, through a special and divine gift, for reason and the will
to see and enjoy God directly, in the here and now.

Renaissance Reactions to Aristotle

Thomas’s approach won the day. As mentioned above, very soon the Nicomachean
Ethics became the standard textbook for moral philosophy in the Arts faculties of
universities and in the schools of the religious orders. When Platonizing philolo­
gists taught the work, they admitted the need to follow Aristotle on methodo­
logical and pedagogical grounds even though they affirmed the superiority of the
heavenly beatitude proclaimed by Plato. They sought to reconcile the two ancient
philosophers even in the case of significant issues on which they clearly disagreed.
As for the universities of the Reformation, despite Luther’s abhorrence of the
Ethics, figures such as Melanchthon, Lambert Daneau, Anthony de Waele, and
John Case often turned to Aristotle when dealing with the good.56 Even though,
as discussed above, many theologians of the Reformation made a clear distinction
between theology (which deals with the kingdom of God) and ethics (which

55 See Annas, La morale della felicita, chap. XIX (‘Teofrasto e gli stoici: forzando la
questione’), pp. 527-61.
56 Regarding contemplative happiness, which brings man nearest to divine life, John Case
exclaimed in wonder: ‘Good heavens, how brightly the light of nature shines in Aristotle, who
knew these things which many illuminated by the light of grace do not understand’; see Case, ‘A
Mirror of Questions’, trans. by Kraye, p. 64. On Case, see the essay by David Lines and Jill Kraye
in this volume.
HAPPINESS 265

concerns the present world), many of them defended the usefulness of Aristotle’s
moral philosophy, with regard both to the virtues and to man’s ultimate end: after
all, ethics could prepare one for the superior law of the Spirit.57
However, not all in the Catholic and Lutheran camps shared this enthusiasm
for Aristotle’s Ethics. Erasmus, Juan Luis Vives, Omer Talon, and others con­
sidered it to be far too incompatible with the Gospels, especially because of its
emphasis on purely earthly happiness and external goods. Such a view excluded,
after all, the immense ranks of the poor to whom Christ had especially directed
his Beatitudes. Other stumbling blocks included the notion of virtue as the fruit
of a purely human effort apart from grace, and a concept of law in which obedi­
ence to God played no role.58 On other matters, Aristotle’s wavering concern­
ing the individual human intellect and the immortality of the soul could pose
an even more serious threat to the Christian faith. This is not the place for an
extended examination of the issue, but the reaction to works such as Agostino
Nifo’s commentary on Averroes and the treatises of Pietro Pomponazzi points to
intense nervousness on the matter, which in the works of Crisostomo Javelli was
quelled by appealing to the views of Plato.59
For humanists of the fifteenth century, the problem of happiness took on a
new form, reflecting social changes and the new directions imposed by an urban,
merchant bourgeoisie. Although as believers they were deeply convinced that the
only complete happiness for man lies in God and the hereafter, they explicitly
focused on the happiness available in this world. They thus asked whether the
active life of politics, commerce, and craftsmanship was superior to the contem­
plative life represented by the liberal arts, literature, and philosophy. According
to their (none too faithful) interpretation, Aristotle had privileged the active life
tied to virtues such as prudence, whereas Plato had emphasized wisdom. Figures
such as Salutati, Bruni, Bartolomeo Fazio, Platina, and others recognized without
difficulty the excellence of contemplation, yet they warned that, as long as we are
here on earth, we have a compelling human and Christian duty to look after our
neighbours in the various classes of society. We must therefore overcome the ster-

57 See Saarinen, ‘Ethics in Lucher’s Theology’ and his essay in this volume; Melanchthon,
‘The Elements of Ethical Doctrine’, trans. by Monfasani, p. 112: ‘The true light of reason,
implanted in man by nature, accords with the law of God’; Antonius de Waele, ‘A Compendium
of Aristotelian Ethics’ trans. by Monfasani, pp. 120-29; Case, ‘A Mirror of Questions’, trans. by
Kraye; on Daneau’s Ethices Christinnae libri tres (Geneve, 1577), see Strohm, ‘Ethics in Early
Calvinism’, especially pp. 276-79.
58 See Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, pp. 342-48.
59 Nifo, De beatitud'me animae.
266 Antonino Poppi

ile individualism which drives us to solitude, reflected in the monks'fuga mundi.

To a friend who had decided to abandon civic involvement because of a crushing
bereavement, Salutati wrote that ‘contemplation is better, I agree; yet it is not
always so, nor for everyone. The active life is inferior, but often preferable’,60 as
one can see from numerous examples in Scripture, in the life of Christ, and in
the teaching of St Augustine. Cristoforo Landino, on the other hand, insisted
together with some other followers of Ficino on the complementarity of the two
lives. He assigned pre-eminence, however, to the contemplative life, as a mean­
ingful reward for having fulfilled one’s various daily duties.61
This new approach to the problem of happiness had some pedagogical and
academic ramifications, provoking professional disputes regarding the superior­
ity of the humanistic subjects versus the scientific ones, or of the practical sub­
jects versus the purely theoretical ones. These were connected with lively debates
about study programmes and how best to form mature men and virtuous citi­
zens.62 The case made by fifteenth-century humanists in favour of the active life
was argued again, this time with stronger speculative rigour, in several discus­
sions by literary men and philosophers of the sixteenth century, in particular in a
few dialogues by Sperone Speroni {Delmodo di studiare, 1530; Dialogo della vita
attiva e contemplativa, 1542) and in Alessandro Piccolomini’s pedagogical trea­
tise De la institutione di tutta la vita de I’homo nato nobile, e in citta libera (1542).
The latter work notes that, unlike Plato who believed that happiness can only be
reached in the hereafter, Aristotle recognized that both forms of happiness are
possible in this world — the theoretical and the practical. Doubtless the first of
these is more important, but we are more interested in civic happiness, which
is more proper to man and consists in acting virtuously, guided by prudence,
according to the law of the Gospel. Therefore, he concludes, ‘Neither the law of
Christ, nor the teachings of Aristotle, maintain that speculation and reason are
sufficient to become happy and perfect. Rather, it is action {Voperar) which leads
us to such perfection.’63

60 Salutati,Epistolariot ed. by Novati, ill, 305.

61 See the texts of Landino and others in Garin, Filosoji italiani del Qiiattrocento.
62 Sec especially the texts (in Latin with Italian translation) in Garin, La disputa delle arti
tiel Qiiattrocento.
63 See Poppi, ‘II prevalere della vita activa”, pp. 177-205 (p. 204); the quotation from
Piccolomini (‘non men la leggie di Cristo, che i precetti d’Aristotele, voglion che non basti
lo speculare e lo intendere, per diventar feliee e perfetto; rna che l’operar sia quello che a tal
perfettion ne conduca’) is found in the first Venetian edition of 1542, fol. I6r.
HAPPINESS 267

Francesco Piccolomini

Francesco Piccolomini, an Aristotelian who taught at the University of Padua,

also followed this conciliatory line with Platonism, but with greater philosophi­
cal and historiographical acumen and speculative depth. In his original summa of
moral doctrine (1576) he asks whether the supreme good is to be found in action
or in contemplation, and therefore which intellectual virtue one should pursue,
whether prudence or wisdom. He concludes that, in absolute terms (but also rela­
tive to our earthly life) wisdom is more worthy and therefore to be preferred; but
with regard to the necessities of human life, prudence is more necessary. So both
virtues and types of life are indispensable for our existence; although they differ
in nobility, they are both insufficient by themselves.64
Piccolomini’s Uniuersa philosophic, de moribus (1583) is among the most
important treatises of moral philosophy of the sixteenth century. In it Piccolomini
explicitly dedicates the ninth step of the work [c. eighty pages in folio) to an anal­
ysis of the supreme good, as the end towards which the virtues, treated in the
earlier steps, tend. Faced with the enigma of a happiness sought after with intense
passion by all, but reached by none, Piccolomini begins with a prayer to the ‘celes­
tial minds’ who contemplate the Good; he asks them to enlighten him, thus help­
ing him to understand the Good and the end of life. AH agree — Piccolomini
continues — that true happiness (eudaimonia) shines in all its splendour only in
God, who is happiness itself [ipsa beatitudo)-, on the other hand, there is a great
difference of opinion as to whether man can be happy in this life, and this point
is hard to solve. Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics affirm this possibility, against
the evidence of human limitations and suffering in this world. Theologians
instead insist that true happiness is only attainable in the hereafter.65
Despite objections from many quarters, Piccolomini endorses Aristotle’s
view of happiness, which consists not in virtue alone, but in the good and per­
fect act which derives from a virtuous disposition, which lies at its base. Free
from impediments and complemented by the goods of nature and fortune, that

64 See Piccolomini, Universe philosophic de moribus, v, chap. 40, p. 308; cf. Poppi, ‘11
problcma della filosofia morale’, pp. 59-78, and Poppi, ‘11 prevalere della vita active, pp. 205-13.
65 Thus he concludes: ‘cum singulae philosophorum de summo bono sentenciae a caeceris
sectis, quae sunc iudices plures ec congruenciores, damnentur, iure colligere valemus opiniones
omnes philosophorum dc summo bono esse inanes et falsas; nec alia de causa nisi quia apud
nos id quaerunc quod a nobis longissime distat’ (Piccolomini, Universe philosophie de moribus,
ix, chap. 4: ‘An homo in hac vira valeac esse foelix’, p. 473); cf. Piccolomini, ‘A Comprehensive
Philosophy of Morals’, trans. by Kraye.
268 Antonino Poppi

perfect and lasting act produces in its subject a joy and tranquillity which make
him supremely happy.66 In the light of numerous Aristotelian passages and of
Aristotle’s reservations concerning Plato’s Philebus, however, Piccolomini shows
that pleasure does not (as St Thomas thought) belong to the essence of human
happiness. Rather, as John Duns Scotus pointed out, with pleasure it is the same
as with beauty: beauty is not the result of the proportioned disposition of the
members of the body, but radiates out of this as a consequence. In the same way,
pleasure, which is an important aspect of happiness, is its outcome, just like
a flower, and unites us more closely and sweetly to the object of the supreme
good.67 Already from these considerations one can guess Piccolomini’s attitude
towards the Stoic view of happiness.68 If this receives some credit in one chapter
(vm. 10), in the next Piccolomini instead argues that the Stoics are out of touch
with reality and that their notions are contrary to the evidence of the senses and
contradict their own principles.69
Piccolomini next tackles the problem of how happiness unites man with God.
His discussion — which depends on Plato’s Epinomis and on the Neoplatonic
doctrine of the One’s descent to the mind, to the souls, and to matter — outlines
the process by which the intellective soul ascends from the world of the sensible,
through religion and piety, in order to find union with the Mind. It is from the
Mind that it receives fullness of being, of life, of eternal happiness as it becomes
similar to God, in a mystic ecstasy similar to that described by the theologians.
And even Aristotle (though tied only to what is proper to man and achievable

66 According to Piccolomini ‘constat demum sententiam pcriparecicorum magis esse con-

similcm communi usui loquendi, sensibusque, ac experientiae magis respondere’ (Piccolomini,
Universaphilosophia de moribus, ix. 12, p. 485).
6/ Moreover he concludes, summo hominis bono haec tria iure optimo competere debent:
proxima eius principia sunt virtutes; essentia et forma est actio ex virtute prodiens; affectiones
eius sunt iucunditas, interna animi tranquillitas, constans quaedam securitas, et similia’
(Piccolomini, Universa philosophia de moribus, IX. 19, p. 495).
68
‘Colligendum itaque cum stoicis esse videtur: id quod ad recte, honeste, laudabiliter
et bene vivendum est satis, etiam esse satis ad felicitatem; virtus huiusmodi est, ea itaque sola
ad felicitatem est satis’: Piccolomini, Universa philosophia de moribus, vm. 10, p. 401. For an
overview of Piccolomini s attitude towards the Stoics, see Kraye, ‘Eclectic Aristotelianism’,
pp. 70-75.
69 ‘Praeclarae profecto sunt stoicorum sententiae, splendidissimisque verborum apparatibus
illustratae, a rei tamen natura abhorrent, sensibus adversantur, cumque eorum principiis
manifestissime pugnant’: Piccolomini, Universa philosophia de moribus, vm. 11, p. 401; as is
apparent, the author reveals here a fundamental opposition between the two schools, rather
than a simple nominal difference.
HAPPINESS 269

through natural means) sees our union with God in the exercise of moral virtues
and of contemplation, or, in other words, in affection and knowledge.70
As he discusses in which faculty of the soul happiness properly resides, Piccolo-
mini then recalls Aristotle’s view that happiness is found in man as a compound,
inasmuch as action concerns both body and soul. The theologians, instead, have
divided themselves into the Thomist camp (which places happiness in the intellect)
and the Scotist (which emphasizes the inclination of the will). Piccolomini favours
the former, since he believes the supreme good consists in contemplation, so that
happiness ‘more truly pertains to the intellect’ (‘verius intellectui competit’).71
Piccolomini’s intellectualism thus leads him to disregard Christianity’s fundamen­
tal emphasis on freedom and love (nearly unknown in the ancient world), and
despite his numerous caveats he essentially incorporates the entire dimension of
the affects into the intuitive act of contemplation.

The Coimbra Commentary

Another Renaissance synthesis of Aristotelian teaching on happiness is the com­

mentary on the Ethics published by the Jesuits of the College of Coimbra in 1593
— this work’s third disputation treats ‘De felicitate’. This is not a full literal analysis
of Aristotle’s work, in the spirit of some medieval commentaries. Rather, it presents
a few main themes of the work with special relevance to the course in theology,
which in the Jesuit ratio studiorum came upon the heels of moral philosophy. The
nine clear disputations are complemented by a fine use of philology and by the
authority of the Ethics's chief interpreters, especially Thomas Aquinas. In the arti­
cles on Question III, happiness is described (following Aristotle) as an operation of
the soul, not a faculty or a disposition (habitus) as some interpreters would have it.
In order to resolve the standard theological riddle as to its location within the soul,
happiness is divided into supernatural and natural; both of these can be further
subdivided: the former, into supernatural happiness pertaining to this life or to
that to come; the latter, into practical and speculative forms of natural happiness.
The Coimbra commentary, authored by Emmanuel de Goes, describes man’s
supreme and supernatural happiness in the hereafter as consisting in the contem­
plation of God (‘intuitiva divinae naturae contemplatio’), not in the fruition of

70 Cf. Piccolomini, Universephilosophic de moribus, IX. 31-37, pp. 513-24.

1 ‘Quia praescrcim summum bonum est, vel cum theologis illud futurae vitae, vel cum
Aristotele concemplatio praesentis vitae, ideo colligo eos rectius loqui qui summum bonum potius
ad intellectum quam ad voluntatem pertinere affirmant’: Piccolomini, Universe philosophic de
moribus, ix. 40, p. 531.
270 Antonino Poppi

the will (as postulated by Duns Scotus) nor in the combination of vision and
fruition affirmed by St Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, and Alexander of Hales.
Supernatural happiness in the present life consists instead in the acts of love by
which we draw near to God and to heavens full happiness. As a result, this hap­
piness lies in the will and not in the intellect. Finally, natural happiness is the
result of the exercise of the speculative intellect and not of practical action, since
contemplation is the most noble and perfect operation of the soul by which we
can hope to possess God in this life.72 By now the concept of happiness is very
different to that of the ancients: pride of place is assigned to the supernatural
beatitude of Christian revelation, with the sustaining role played by the theologi­
cal virtue of charity. The question of Aristotle’s purely earthly happiness (whether
theoretical or practical) is very much relegated to the background. This outcome
is clearly the result of a new vision of man. Biblical and evangelical considera­
tions continue to treasure the valuable contributions of antiquity, but also deeply
change (and, indeed, renew) the image of man and his ultimate end in the West.

Unattainable Happiness
The tensions and contradictions among the various schools discussed in this essay
show that at the root of their different solutions to the problem of happiness lies
an insoluble logical problem. It is no wonder, then, that already from Antiquity
sceptics denied the possibility of firm knowledge; indeed, they held that only by
suspending judgement and refusing to adhere to any particular opinion (epoche)
could one be free from the spectre of false appearances and from the dogmatism
of the other philosophers. In other words, they espoused a concept of‘negative
happiness’.73 With great difficulty Stoics, St Augustine, and others proved that
radical scepticism is not only self-contradictory, but also destroys man’s human­
ity by denying him the exercise of reason, the very thing which is proper to him.

/2 Cf. Aristotle, In libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum, pp. 19-35; Coimbra Commentators,

‘Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics””, trans. by Kraye; Lines, Aristotle’s 'Ethics’ in the
Italian Renaissance, pp. 362-64. Supernatural happiness in this life is the result of the theological
virtue of charity, which activates the subject to move towards the happiness which will come
about in the immediate vision of God: ‘Quod ad supernaturalem huius vitae beatitudinem
spectat, cum istiusmodi beatitudo sit tendentia quaedam ad supremam illam felicitatem de
qua disseruimus, utique oportet cam in actione charitatis supernaturalis potissimum contineri,
quia talis tendentia maxime fit per actus meritorios, quos partim elicit, partim imperat charitas”
(Aristotle, In libros Ethicorum ad Niconiachum, pp. 29-30).
73 See Annas, La morale dellafelicita, ch. XVII (‘Gli scettici: imperturbability sen/a opinioni”),
pp. 481-97.
HAPPINESS 271

In the Renaissance and the early modern period, a growing lack of confidence in
the possibility of objective metaphysical thinking led to a resurgence of scepti­
cal positions, as is clear especially in Montaigne’s Apology for Raymond Sebond
(1580). Echoing Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne argues that, if happiness is tied to
knowledge, then happiness is unattainable, given that firm knowledge is impos­
sible. We are not destined to the pure contemplation (theoria) dreamed of by the
philosophers, but rather to imperturbability (ataraxia). We must therefore live in
serene acceptance of our human limitations, aware that happiness can only be a
gift of God which elevates and transforms our nature.74
The real difficulty involved in such an approach (which in effect abandons the
search for a solution to the problem of happiness) is not just one of knowledge,
as if one might arrive at the correct solution if only our thinking processes were
more trustworthy. The real roots of the conundrum lie much deeper, in the sphere
of mans own being, and are related — as the humanists were well aware — to the
human condition as an intermediate level of being, suspended between the finite
and the infinite, between matter and spirit, between body and soul. We are open
to and yearn for the infinite in both our cognitions and affections, yet we find
only limited and unsatisfactory answers which match the finiteness of our being.
If our strength is insufficient to help us cross the bridge leading from the low­
est to the highest ontological extreme, then the prospect of achieving complete
happiness seems impossible, perhaps even irrational. We must content ourselves
then with an imperfect happiness which shifts under our feet, which becomes
greater or smaller according to the opportunities or risks connected with nature
and fate. The only other alternative is to proudly consider ourselves to be happy
on the basis of our clear conscience and virtue, even though all of the worlds
suffering should bear down upon us. But in either of these situations it would be
more proper to speak not of happiness, but of a painful resignation to (or a forced
acceptance of) an inevitable reality. We would still carry in our soul the pain of
an incurable wound, of an unanswered prayer. The only real solution to such an
existential condition is to realize that human reason stands in a vertical relation­
ship to the supreme good, that is, God. For it is only from above that one can
await with expectation an undeserved invitation to participate freely in happiness
— Gods own happiness, which is fellowship with His life. 5

4 See Silver, ‘Montaigne, An Apology for Raymond Sebond”.

5 Sc Augustine clearly understood this enigma of the human condition when writing the
famous introduction to his Confessions (i. 1): ‘You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our
heart is restless until it rests in you’ (my translation).
f

272 Antonino Poppi

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