Dantas (2021) - Blindspot The Truth

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ArticleTitle How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual Epistemic Value
Article Sub-Title
Article CopyRight The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature
(This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)
Journal Name Erkenntnis
Corresponding Author Family Name Dantas
Particle
Given Name Danilo Fraga
Suffix
Division Department of Philosophy
Organization University of California
Address Davis, USA
Division Department of Philosophy
Organization Federal University of Santa Maria
Address Santa Maria, Brazil
Phone
Fax
Email dfdantas@ucdavis.edu; danfraga@gmail.com
URL
ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2955-8492
Received 7 May 2020

Schedule Revised
Accepted 22 January 2021
Abstract This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect
are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?),
where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another).
These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a
currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a
situation of alethic maximality, where a reasoner fulfills all the alethic norms and could be used as a
standard of rationality (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function ,
which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numeric alethic value. Then I use this function to
define a notion of alethic maximality that is satisfiable by finite reasoners (reasoners with cognitive
limitations) and does not present problems with blindspots. Function may also be used in alethic norms
and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to finite reasoners and do
not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation is that the project of providing purely
alethic norms is defective. The use of function also sheds light on important epistemological issues, such
as the lottery and the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
Footnote Information
Journal : SmallExtended 10670 Article No : 377 Pages : 28 MS Code : 377 Dispatch : 4-2-2021
Erkenntnis
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00377-x
1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH
2 How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual

Author Proof
3 Epistemic Value
4 Danilo Fraga Dantas1,2
5 Received: 7 May 2020 / Accepted: 22 January 2021

6 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature 2021
7 Abstract
8 This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most com-
9 mon approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/
10 may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative
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11 approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another).
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12 These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a AQ1
13 reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently,
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14 these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, where
15 a reasoner fulills all the alethic norms and could be used as a standard of rational-
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16 ity (as they are, in fact, used in some of these approaches). I propose a function 𝛼 , AQ2
17 which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numeric alethic value. Then I
18 use this function to deine a notion of alethic maximality that is satisiable by inite
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19 reasoners (reasoners with cognitive limitations) and does not present problems with
20 blindspots. Function 𝛼 may also be used in alethic norms and evaluation methods
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21 (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to inite reasoners and do

22 not present problems with blindspots. A result of this investigation is that the project
23 of providing purely alethic norms is defective. The use of function 𝛼 also sheds light
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24 on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and the preface paradoxes,
25 and the principles of clutter avoidance and relection.
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26 1 Introduction
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Practical rationality is related to the maximization of practical value, which is

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27
28 often associated with the fulillment of the subject’s preferences (e.g. in Deci-
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29 sion Theory, see Steele and Stefansson 2016). Accordingly, epistemic rational-
30 ity (in the following, ‘rationality’) is often related to the maximization of some
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A1 * Danilo Fraga Dantas

A2 dfdantas@ucdavis.edu; danfraga@gmail.com
1
A3 Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, USA
2
A4 Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Maria, Santa Maria, Brazil
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
D. F. Dantas
31 epistemic value (e.g. in Epistemic Utility Theory, see Pettigrew 2019a). Difer-
32 ent features (e.g. of sets of beliefs) are regarded as sources of epistemic value:
33 closure, coherence, amount of evidential support, computational eiciency (see
34 Dantas 2017), etc. In recent decades, epistemologists have argued that the funda-
Author Proof
35 mental source of epistemic value is the fulillment of the truth-goal, the goal of
36 believing truths rather than falsehoods:
37 [T]he fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent
38 to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic
39 value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. ...[A]ny further source of
40 value for a belief is derivative, not fundamental: that is, it is valuable because
41 of the extent to which it promotes or otherwise serves the fundamental source
42 (Pettigrew 2019b, p. 761).
43 This paper is about this alethic aspect of rationality: the aspect of rationality related
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44 to the fulillment of the truth-goal. The existing approaches to this aspect of rational-
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45 ity are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how
46 rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative
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47 (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). These approaches often present
48 problems with blindspots, which are possible but inaccessible propositions (e.g.
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49 propositions that are possibly true but impossible to be true when believed by a rea-
50 soner, see Sorensen 1988). For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true
51 blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describ-
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52 ing a situation of alethic maximality (𝛼-maximality), where a reasoner somehow
53 fulills the truth-goal ‘completely’. An 𝛼-maximal reasoner, a reasoner who fulills
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54 all the alethic norms, is used as a standard of rationality in some evaluative frame-
55 works. Nevertheless, these approaches often fail in making sense of such a reasoner.
56 For example, does this reasoner believe a currently true blindspot? Ought she to?
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57 Instead of using alethic norms or evaluation methods to deine a notion of 𝛼-max-

58 imality, I intend to pursue the opposite direction. I will deine a function 𝛼 , which
59 accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numeric value, and then use this func-
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60 tion to deine a notion of 𝛼-maximality that does not present problems with blinds-
61 pots. Finally, I will use this notion to deine alethic norms and evaluation methods
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62 (comparative and non-comparative) that do not present problems with blindspots.

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63 It is usually accepted that rationality has a subjective character, e.g. related to what
64 a reasoner inds epistemically possible (Wedgwood 2015, p. 221). For this reason,
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65 rationality is usually related to the maximization of expected epistemic value or,

66 at least, to the maximization of epistemic value for all epistemic possibilities (e.g.
67 in Epistemic Utility Theory). The evaluation methods proposed in this paper (see
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68 Sect. 4.2) use actual epistemic value. The evaluation of (sets of beliefs of) reasoners
69 from their actual epistemic value would be an objective form of evaluation because
70 the truth-value of beliefs is often not transparent for reasoners (see fn. 7). This form
71 of evaluation should be used with caution in order to take into account the subjec-
72 tive character of rationality (see Sect. 4.2). Measures of actual epistemic value are
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How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…
73 currently used, for example, in Computational Epistemology (e.g. Douven 2013),

74 where epistemologists have full access to the truth-values of their agents’ beliefs1.
75 I am interested in investigating which approach to the alethic aspect of rationality
76 can be used for describing a notion of 𝛼-maximality that is satisiable by finite rea-
Author Proof
77 soners, i.e. reasoners with cognitive limitations (e.g. humans)2. My focus on inite
78 reasoners is due to the fact that, although (human) Epistemology is (or should be)
79 mostly concerned with human rationality, epistemologists often propose standards
80 of rationality that are only satisiable by reasoners without cognitive limitations3. I
81 take issue with this state of afairs because standards of rationality for inite reason-
82 ers may difer substantially from standards of rationality for reasoners without cog-
83 nitive limitations4. However, even if we leave to one side these concerns about inite
84 reasoning, the following objections to the existing approaches to the alethic aspect
85 of rationality are independent of these cognitive limitations. Also, my alethic norms
and evaluation methods are equally applicable to both inite reasoners and reasoners
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86
87 without cognitive limitations. However, I do ind it to be an advantage of my pro-
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88 posal that it generates a notion of 𝛼-maximality that is satisiable by inite reasoners
89 and allows for alethic norms and evaluation methods that can be used to assess inite
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90 reasoners.
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1
1FL01 Douven (2013) uses computer simulations to resist the conclusion that Bayesian conditionalization
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1FL02 should be regarded as the rational rule for updating credences on the grounds that if a reasoner uses a
1FL03
rule at odds with conditionalization, then the reasoner himself would ind that conditionalization mini-
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1FL04
1FL05 mizes expected inaccuracy (in relation to her own rule) given her own credences (Leitgeb and Pettigrew
1FL06 2010b). He constructs simulations where two reasoners, a Bayesian and an “explanationist”, who updates
1FL07 credences using a version of the inference to the best explanation, watch sequences of coin tosses and
1FL08
must estimate the extent of the coin’s bias. The Bayesian minimizes expected inaccuracy of every update,
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1FL09
1FL010 but the eplanationist minimizes actual inaccuracy at the end of the sequence (in most trials). Douven
1FL011 (2013, p. 438) remarks that “it would seem absurd to claim that it is epistemically more important to
have an update rule that minimises expected inaccuracy than to have one that actually minimises inac-
curacy”.
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2
2FL01 Informally, a inite reasoner has cognitive limitations such as inite input (perception, etc transmits only
2FL02 a inite amount of information), inite memory (memory can store only a inite amount of information),
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2FL03
2FL04
and inite computational power (reasoning can execute only initely many operations, such as inferential
steps, in a inite time interval). I discuss the notion of a inite reasoner in Sect. 3.3.
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3
3FL01 For example, although Leitgeb (2014, fn. 3) recognizes that “ultimately, we should be concerned with
3FL02 real-world agents”, his “perfectly rational reasoner” (p. 137) is logically omniscient. Finite reasoners can-
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3FL03
3FL04
not, even in principle, (explicitly?) believe all the ininitely many logical consequences of their beliefs
because of their inite memory.
4
4FL01 For this reason, I partially disagree with the remark in Leitgeb (2014, fn. 3) that it is (always) a good
4FL02 methodological strategy to describe ideal agents (without cognitive limitations), “whom we should strive
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4FL03
4FL04
to approximate”. For example, I do not believe that we should strive to be logically omniscient. In other
4FL05 words, I do not believe that we should strive to clutter our (limited) memory with (ininitely) many logi-
4FL06 cal truths and logical consequences (see Harman 1986, p. 12). This attempt would lead to a form of cog-
4FL07 nitive paralysis since we would spend all of our cognitive resources in deriving logical truths and conse-
4FL08
4FL09
quences, which would prevent us from fulilling our (epistemic or practical) goals. Also, attempting to
4FL010 believe all the logical consequences of our beliefs is not truth-conducive in general because believing the
4FL011 logical consequences of a false belief may result in an ampliication of the initial mistake. My concerns
4FL012
with inite reasoning are also related to the fact that reasoners without cognitive limitations are not fully
implementable in a computer simulation. It is an advantage of my framework that it enables the investi-
gation of 𝛼-maximal (but inte) reasoners using the tools of Computational Epistemology.
13
D. F. Dantas
91 In Sect. 2, I show that most normative and comparative evaluative approaches

92 to the alethic aspect of rationality present problems with blindspots. Normative
93 approaches either make 𝛼-maximality impossible or leave this notion undeined;
94 comparative evaluative approaches often make ‘rationality’ ambiguous between sev-
Author Proof
95 eral incommensurable notions. Consequently, these evaluative approaches often fail

96 in making sense of an 𝛼-maximal reasoner, who they often treat as a standard of
97 rationality for all reasoners. Section 3 discusses the properties of an adequate non-
98 comparative evaluation function for measuring the alethic value of a set of beliefs. I
99 use this function in a notion of 𝛼-maximality that is satisiable in the face of blinds-
100 pots and by inite reasoners. In Sect. 4, I use function 𝛼 to generate alethic norms
101 and evaluative methods (comparative and non-comparative) to assess rationality,
102 which do not present problems with blindspots and which can be applied to inite
103 reasoners. It is a inding of this Section that the whole project of providing purely
104 alethic norms would be defective. In this same section, I also discuss how the use of
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105 function 𝛼 sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the lottery and
the preface paradoxes, and the principles of clutter avoidance and relection.
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106
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107 2 Blindspots PR
108 Broadly speaking, a blindspot is a possible but inaccessible proposition, where the
109 relevant accessibility relation is determined by a propositional attitude (Sorensen
1988). In this context, a proposition 𝜙 is a true-belief blindspot (in the following,
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110
111 ‘blindspot’) for a reasoner R if 𝜙 is possibly true but is not truly-believable by R
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5
112 . For example, the proposition that I do not exist is a blindspot for me because it is
113 possible that I do not exist (e.g. I could have died as a kid), but it is not possible that
114 I do not exist while I believe that I do not exist. You, on the other hand, can believe
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115 (truly) that I do not exist (e.g. after I die). Consider the following two more abstract
116 blindspots for an arbitrary reasoner R :
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117 (bs1) R does not believe that bs1.

118 (bs2) 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 , where 𝜙 is a mundane truth6 and � states that R does not believe that
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119 𝜙.
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120 Sentence bs1 is the core example of a blindspot because it has the property that
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121 bs1 is true if R does not believe that bs1. Whether bs2 is a blindspot depends on
122 some presuppositions. It seems reasonable to presuppose that a rational reasoner
123 believes the ‘easy’ logical consequences of her beliefs resulting from conjunction
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124 introduction or conjunction elimination. In this case, bs2 would be a blindspot for a
5
5FL01 In general, a blindspot for a propositional attitude A and a reasoner R is a proposition that is possibly
5FL02 true but cannot have attitude A taken towards it by R . I am dealing only with the case of A = true-belief.
5FL03
A proposition 𝜙 is truly-believable by R if it is possible that 𝜙 is true while believed by R.
6
6FL01 A mundane truth is a contingent truth that is not about (the beliefs of) the reasoner (e.g. the proposition
6FL02 that snow is white).
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125 rational R because if R believes that bs2, then R believes its conjunct 𝜙, but then
126 the second conjunct of bs2 (i.e. � ) is false and bs2 itself is false. Sentence bs2 would
127 not be truly-believable by a rational R . If bs2 is a blindspot, then it is a complex
128 blindspot, i.e. a blindspot with components that are not blindspots. Complex blinds-
Author Proof
129 pots are interesting because they often have components that are harmless truths
130 (e.g. 𝜙 in bs2), which only form a blindspot when they are in a conjunction with the
131 other components. Any harmless truth can be a component of a complex blindspot.
132 2.1 Blindspots and Norms
133 The goal of a normative approach to the alethic aspect of rationality is to provide
134 the correct and complete set of alethic norms about what a rational reasoner ought
135 to believe and may believe7. A set of norms does not automatically generate a notion
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136 of 𝛼-maximality, but it seems reasonable to presuppose that an 𝛼-maximal reasoner
137 believes all and only that which she ought to believe and only that which she may
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138 believe. This is the case because alethic norms are supposed to model the fulillment
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139 of the truth-goal, which an 𝛼-maximal reasoner does completely. The crudest norm
140 of this kind is the following:
141 (n1) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if 𝜙 is true.

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142 The problem with n1 is that it makes 𝛼-maximality impossible because of blinds-
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143 pots ( Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007). Let R be 𝛼-maximal. Then R believes that
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144 bs1 if R ought to believe that bs1 (𝛼-maximality), but also R ought to believe that
145 bs1 if bs1 is true (n1) and bs1 is true if R does not believe that bs1 (bs1). Then
146 R believes that bs1 if R does not believe that bs1, which is a contradiction. Carr
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147 (2020) investigates a similar problem for n1 (and related norms) using propositions
148 that are closely related to blindspots. She shows that the problem persists in diferent
149 modal interpretations of n1.
Modiied versions of n1 were proposed in order to avoid this general problem of
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150
151 blindspots. Boghossian (2003) avoids the problem by rejecting one direction of n1.
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152 He accepts
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153 (n2) If R ought to believe that 𝜙, then 𝜙 is true,

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154 but rejects:

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7
7FL01 Philosophers often distinguish between subjective and objective norms (e.g. Carr 2020), where the
7FL02 subjective but not the objective norms are sensitive to the information that is available to the reasoner
7FL03
7FL04
(e.g. what is epistemically possible for the reasoner). For this reason, subjective norms are often deliber-
7FL05 ative, in the sense of being action-guiding. Alethic norms are objective because the truth-value of beliefs
7FL06 is often not transparent for reasoners. Consequently, these norms are often not deliberative, except in
7FL07 some cases when the relevant truth-values are transparent (e.g. contradictions and blindspots). The same
holds for evaluation methods.
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D. F. Dantas
155 (n2′) If 𝜙 is true, then R ought to believe that 𝜙.
156 The retraction from n1 to n2 avoids the general problem of blindspots. It does not
157 follow from n2 that R ought to believe a blindspot. But n2 is too weak in the sense
Author Proof
158 that, regardless of 𝜙 being true or false, it does not entail an obligation (Raleigh
159 2013, p. 248). If 𝜙 is true, n2 does not entail anything. If 𝜙 is false, n2 entails that
160 R does not ought to believe that 𝜙, but not that R ought not to believe that 𝜙. As a
161 consequence, n2 underdetermines the description of 𝛼-maximality: n2 states what 𝛼
162 -maximal reasoners do not (ought to) believe, but it states nothing about what they
163 (ought to) believe, which defeats the purpose of deining a notion of 𝛼-maximality.
164 This problem is revealed, for example, by the fact that n2 is fulilled when reasoners
165 do not have beliefs. In other words, norm n2 does not model the positive part of the
166 truth-goal: ‘believe the truths’.
167 Raleigh (2013, p. 249) and Whiting (2010) propose a diferent norm:
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168 (n3) R may believe that 𝜙 if 𝜙 is true.
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169 This formulation also avoids the general problem of blindspots. It does not follow
170 from n3 that R ought to believe a blindspot. But n3 has a diferent problem with
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171 blindspots: it is a consequence of n3 that a reasoner is permitted to believe a cur-
172 rently true blindspot, and yet if the reasoner were to believe that blindspot, n3 itself
173 would forbid that belief. Raleigh argues that this is a good feature of his proposal:
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174 It seems to me that as much as we may have an intuition that attempting to

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175 believe a blindspot that happens to be true should be discouraged, we also have
176 a conlicting intuition that we would like to believe such a true proposition...
177 A feature of my proposal is that there is no truth-norm forbidding belief in a
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178 currently [true] non-believed blindspot, but there is a norm that kicks in the
179 moment that one ventures to believe the blindspot. I think this ‘may’ be seen
180 as a virtue rather than a vice, in that it does justice, as far as possible, to both
of these conlicting intuitions (Raleigh 2013, p. 252).
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181
I do not believe that appealing to our conlicting intuitions about blindspots helps
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182
183 here because the instantiation of n3 for a blindspot contradicts the very deinition
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184 of the epistemic ‘may’8. Suppose that R does not believe that bs1. Then bs1 is true
185 and n3 states that R may believe that bs1. If R may believe that bs1, then there must
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186 exist a permissible epistemic situation in which R believes that bs1. However, no
187 such permissible epistemic situation exists according to n3 itself: in all situations in
188 which R believes that bs1, bs1 is false, and n3 forbids R to believe that bs1. Another
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189 problem is, again, that n3 is fulilled by not having beliefs.
8
8FL01 In deontic logic, ‘may’ is usually modeled as diamond-like (as requiring truth in a permissible situa-
8FL02 tion, where a permissible situation is one in which nobody does what is not permitted by the norms). The
8FL03
diamond does not aggregate over conjunctions in the standard modal logics.
13
190 Another strategy to deal with the initial problem consists of adding conditions to
191 n19:
192 (n4) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and truly-believable by R).

Author Proof
193 (n5) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and would be true were R to believe that
194 𝜙).
195 Norm n4 avoids the general problem of blindspots. Since bs1 is not truly-believable
196 by R , it does not follow from n4 alone that R ought to believe that bs1. However,
197 it follows from n4 and some reasonable assumptions that R ought to believe a com-
198 plex blindspot (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2013, p. 110). Let this be the problem of
199 complex blindspots. Suppose that R does not believe that 𝜙. Then � is true and
200 truly-believable by R , and it follows from n4 that R ought to believe that � . Also, 𝜙
is true and truly-believable by R and it follows from n4 that R ought to believe that
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201
202 𝜙. Given this, R ought to believe that 𝜙 and R ought to believe that � . If ‘ought’
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203 aggregates over conjunctions, then R ought to (believe that 𝜙 and believe that � ).
204 Since 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 is an easy logical consequence of 𝜙 and � , then a rational R ought to
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205 believe that 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 , which is bs2. It is usually accepted that ‘ought’ aggregates over
conjunctions10. In this case, it follows from n4 that a rational R ought to believe that
206
207
208 holds for n5 and related norms (n4’ and n5’, see fn. 9).
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bs2, which contradicts n4 itself because bs2 is not truly-believable by R . The same
209 Both the general and the problem of complex blindspots are avoided by n6 and
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210 n7:
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211 (n6) R may believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and truly-believable by R).

212 (n7) R may believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and would be true were R to believe that 𝜙).
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213 According to n6, it is not the case that R may either believe that bs1 or believe
214 that bs2 because both bs1 and bs2 are not truly-believable by R . Also, we cannot
215 reinstate the argument for the problem of complex blindspots from n4-n5 to n6-n7
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216 because it is usually not accepted that ‘may’ aggregates over conjunctions (see
217 fn. 8). The problem with n6 and n7 is the underdetermination of the description of
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218 𝛼-maximality: these norms state what 𝛼-maximal reasoners may believe, but it does
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219 not say anything about what they (ought to) believe. This defeats the purpose of
220 deining a notion of 𝛼-maximality. This problem is, again, revealed by the fact that
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221 n6 and n7 are fulilled when reasoners do not have beliefs. Again, these norms do
222 not model the positive part of the truth-goal.
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9
9FL01 There exist interesting versions of n4 and n5 without the clause ‘𝜙 is true’ (let those be n4’ and n5’),
9FL02 but similar problems hold for n4 and n5 and to n4’ and n5’. About norms n4’ and n5’, see footnote 40.
10
10FL01 In deontic logic, the ‘ought’ is often modeled as box-like and the box aggregates over conjunctions in
10FL02 the standard modal logics.
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D. F. Dantas
223 2.2 Blindspots and Evaluations
224 The goal of an evaluative approach to the alethic aspect of rationality is to assess the
225 rationality of reasoners using some measure related to the fulillment of the truth-
Author Proof
226 goal. In a comparative evaluative approach, a reasoner is evaluated in comparison

227 to another reasoner. A comparative evaluation of rationality may state, for example,
228 that a reasoner R is at least as rational as a reasoner R� (in the following, R ⪰ R�). It
229 seems reasonable to presuppose that comparisons of rationality should form a tran-
230 sitive and connex relation (i.e. a total preorder). This is the supposition that, for all
231 reasoners R , R� and R��, if R ⪰ R� and R� ⪰ R��, then R ⪰ R�� and either R ⪰ R�
232 or R� ⪰ R . Most comparative evaluation methods fail in forming a total preorder of
233 rationality because of blindspots.
234 A very crude comparative evaluation method could be based on set inclusion11:
F
235 (m1) R ⪰ R� if t(R� ) ⊆ t(R) and f (R) ⊆ f (R� ),
O
236 where t(R) is the set of R ’s true beliefs and f (R) is the set of R ’s false beliefs.
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237 Method m1 has some plausibility because false beliefs can render a reasoner irra-
238 tional, but this method fails in forming a transitive and connex notion of rational-
PR
239 ity because of blindspots. According to m1, R ⪰ R� is false when R� holds some
240 true belief that R does not hold or R holds some false belief that R� does not hold.
241 Then R ⪰ R� and R� ⪰ R are both false when R� believes some truth that R does
not believe and R believes some truth that R� does not believe. There are as many
D
242
243 versions of bs1 as there are reasoners. For example, if bs1 is a blindspot for R , then
TE
244 bs1� is a blindspot for R�, etc. Suppose that the bs1s are the only existing blindspots.
245 Further, suppose that both R and R� believe all and only the truths except for those
246 that are blindspots for them. Then R believes all and only the truths except for bs1
EC
247 and R� believes all and only the truths except for bs1�. In this case, R should be at
248 least as rational as R� and vice versa (R ⪰ R� and R� ⪰ R ). However, according
249 to m1, it is false that R ⪰ R� or R� ⪰ R because bs1 ∉ t(R) and bs1 ∈ t(R�), but
R
250 bs1� ∈ t(R) and bs1� ∉ t(R�). Method m1 generates incommensurable partial order-
251 ings of rationality, where ‘rational’ is ambiguous between incommensurable notions
R
252 (one for each ordering).

O
253 Following Joyce (1998), epistemologists have proposed frameworks that use prin-
254 ciples of Decision Theory to motivate norms of rationality (see Pettigrew 2019a,
NC
255 for a survey). The resulting ield is the Epistemic Utility Theory (EUT), which has
256 developed the best evaluation methods available in the literature. Some frameworks
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11
11FL01 An anonymous reviewer has proposed method m1, which is very crude indeed. I have introduced
11FL02 m1 as a dialectical tool for discussing problems of evaluation methods in general. Another anonymous
11FL03
11FL04
reviewer has pointed out that m1 would be inadequate independently of blindspots. If the objects of
11FL05 beliefs are centered propositions, then a reasoner cannot believe the propositions centered in another
11FL06 reasoner, which results in incommensurable partial orderings of rationality independently of blindspots.
11FL07 This result is expected due to the nature of centered propositions and de se beliefs. However, I want to
11FL08
maintain my arguments independent of whether the objects of beliefs are sentences, uncentered, or cen-
tered propositions.
13
257 in EUT follow three steps (see Fitelson and Easwaran 2015, p. 73). The irst step is
258 to deine the ideal set of beliefs, which is usually taken as unproblematic:
259 Step 1 is straightforward. It is clear what it means for a set 𝙱 of this type to be
Author Proof
260 perfectly accurate/vindicated in a world w. The vindicated set 𝙱∗w is given by:
261 𝙱∗w contains 𝙱(p) (𝙳(p)) just in case p is true (false) at w (Fitelson and Easwaran
262 2015, p. 75),
263 where 𝙱(p) means ‘believe that p’ (belief-value 1) and 𝙳(p) means ‘disbelieve that
264 p’ (belief-value 0).12 The second step is to deine a measure of epistemic disutility
265 (inaccuracy), as the ‘distance’ between the set of beliefs of a reasoner and the ideal
266 set of beliefs. An adequate measure of inaccuracy should fulill some properties,
267 which are often fulilled by a Brier score (see Pettigrew 2016, ch. 4 and my fn. 16).
268 The third step is to use the measure of inaccuracy and some principle of Decision
F
269 Theory (e.g. dominance) in an argument for some norm of rationality. Joyce (1998),
270 for example, argues for Probabilism, i.e. the norm that rational reasoners ought to
O
271 have credence functions that are coherent with the axioms of Probability (see Kol-
272 mogorov 1950). His argument exploits the fact that if a reasoner’s credence func-
O
273 tion does not fulill Probabilism, then there is another function that is less inaccurate
than hers in all situations that she inds possible (dominance).13
274
275
276
PR
Fitelson and Easwaran (2015); Pettigrew (2016), among others, follow these three
steps. Consequently, they use the (supposedly, 𝛼-maximal) ideal set of beliefs as a
277 standard of rationality,14 where the rationality of regular reasoners is evaluated by
D
278 comparing their sets of beliefs with that standard. This procedure presupposes the
279 existence of the ideal set of beliefs, but this may not be the case in situations of
TE
280 blindspots. If the ideal set of beliefs contains a belief of value 1 for all and only
281 the truths and a belief of value 0 for all and only the falsehoods, then the value
282 of the belief that bs1∗ (the proposition that the ideal set of beliefs does not con-
EC
283 tain a belief of value 1 for bs1∗) is not deined. This problem resembles that of n1.
284 A ‘solution’ could be simply stipulating that the ideal set of beliefs has a belief of
285 value 0 for bs1∗, but then regular reasoners would be evaluated incorrectly for hav-
R
286 ing a true belief that bs1∗. Another solution would be restricting the framework to
partial orderings, where an ideal set of beliefs would be a standard of rationality
R
287
288 only for some reasoners. For example, R would be a standard of rationality only
O
289 for reasoners who do not believe that bs1, R� only for reasoners who do not believe
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12
12FL01 A similar deinition is found in Pettigrew (2016, p. 3): “My proposal is that the accuracy of a credence
U
12FL02 function for a particular agent in a particular situation is given by its proximity to the credence func-
12FL03
12FL04
tion that is ideal or perfect or vindicated in that situation. If a proposition is true in a situation, the ideal
12FL05 credence for an agent in that situation is the maximal credence, which is represented as 1. On the other
hand, if a proposition is false, the ideal credence in it is the minimal credence, which is represented as 0”.
13
13FL01 For another example, Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b, Sect. 6.2) argues for Conditionalization, i.e. the
13FL02 norm that a rational reasoner ought to update her credences after learning some new evidence using
13FL03
Bayesian conditionalization (see fn. 1).
14
14FL01 The ideal set of beliefs would be treated as a standard of rationality because it would always be
14FL02 favorably compared to any other reasoner. Not all frameworks in EUT use the ideal set of beliefs as a
14FL03
standard of rationality. For two exceptions, see Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a); Easwaran (2013).
13
D. F. Dantas
290 that bs1�, etc. In this case, ‘rational’ would be ambiguous between incommensurable
291 notions. Suppose that two regular reasoners r and r’ are equally rational: they have
292 the same beliefs with the exception that, while r believes that bs1� (but not that bs1),
293 r’ believes that bs1 (but not that bs1�). Then it would be the case that R ⪰ r and r ⪰
Author Proof
294 r’, but not that R ⪰ r’. The rationality of R and R� would also be incommensurable:
295 it would not be the case that either R ⪰ R� or R� ⪰ R . This problem resembles that
296 of m1.15
297 3 ˛ -Model
298 In this Section, I propose a non-comparative evaluative function 𝛼 , which measures

299 the alethic value (𝛼-value) of a set of beliefs. Function 𝛼 accepts a set of beliefs 𝙱 as
300 input and returns a numerical value x (𝛼(𝙱) = x ). The value of 𝛼(𝙱) depends on the
F
301 amount of truth and falsehood in the set of beliefs 𝙱 (t and f, respectively). The com-
putation of the values of t and f is straightforward for the case of binary truth- and
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302
303 belief-values (full beliefs). In this case, t and f are, respectively, the number of true
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304 and false beliefs in 𝙱:
∑ PR
305
t= 1 − |v(𝜙) − b(𝜙)| (1)
𝜙∈𝙱
306
∑
307
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f = |v(𝜙) − b(𝜙)|, (2)
𝜙∈𝙱
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308
309 where v(𝜙) returns the truth-value of 𝜙 (0 when 𝜙 is false and 1 when 𝜙 is true) and
310 b(𝜙) returns the belief-value of 𝜙 (0 when the reasoner disbelieves that 𝜙 and 1 when
EC
311 the reasoner believes that 𝜙). I focus on the case of binary truth and full beliefs, but
312 Eqs. (1) and (2) may also be used for cases involving gradational truth or belief.16
313 To avoid the value of f (inaccuracy) collapsing to ininity, proponents of EUT
often restrict their frameworks to inite agendas (the set of objects that can be
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314
315 believed), regarding which reasoners are opinionated (e.g. Leitgeb and Pettigrew
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316 2010a; Fitelson and Easwaran 2015; Pettigrew 2016). The reasoners of EUT have
O
NC
15
15FL01 Caie (2013) attacks Joyce’s argument for Probabilism using an “obvious truth” that is related to bs1.
15FL02 He argues that a rational reasoner is guaranteed to be probabilistically incoherent given that she is mod-
15FL03
15FL04
erately sensitive to her credences and has high credence on that obvious truth. Fitelson and Easwaran
U
15FL05 (2015, p. 86) discusses some solutions to this problem, which depend on presuppositions about the
objects of beliefs. Pettigrew (2016, p. 4) restricts his framework to situations without blindspots.
16
16FL01 In a gradational notion of truth, v(𝜙) has continuously many values between 0 and 1: 0 when 𝜙 is
16FL02 absolutely false, 1 when 𝜙 is absolutely true, and the values between 0 and 1 meaning diferent degrees
16FL03
16FL04
of truth. In a gradational notion of belief (credences), b(𝜙) has continuously many values between 0 and
16FL05 1: 0 for absolute certainty that 𝜙 is false, 1 for absolute certainty that 𝜙 is true, and the values between
16FL06 0 and 1 for other degrees of certainty. Epistemologists (e.g. Pettigrew 2016, ch. 4) sometimes argue that
16FL07 the measures of t and f should have the form of a Brier score for cases involving credences. If you accept
16FL08
these arguments, the following equations (Brier ∑ scores) could be used for measuring t and f in the 𝛼-
model for the cases involving credences: t = 𝜙∈𝙱 1 − (v(𝜙) − b(𝜙))2 and f = 𝜙∈𝙱 (v(𝜙) − b(𝜙))2.
∑
13
317 a ixed number of beliefs about the same (all) items in the agenda and the evalua-
318 tion methods developed in this ield can only be used to compare reasoners with the
319 same number of beliefs.17 I do not restrict my framework to inite agendas. On the
320 contrary, I assume that the agenda is ininite.18 In order to avoid that t (comprehen-
Author Proof
321 siveness) or f collapse to ininity, I will simply require 𝙱 to be a inite set of beliefs
322 (see Sect. 3.3). Consequently, my reasoners are not opinionated and may have a
323 varying number of beliefs. Also, function 𝛼 can be used to compare reasoners with
324 diferent numbers of beliefs.19 I do not presuppose that 𝙱 has much structure. My
325 reasoners can suspend judgment about some 𝜙 (𝜙 ∉ 𝙱 and ¬𝜙 ∉ 𝙱). They can (but
326 they shouldn’t, see Sect. 4.2) believe contradictions (b(𝜙 ∧ ¬𝜙) = 1) and they can
327 have inconsistent beliefs (b(𝜙) = b(¬𝜙) = 1). They can also fail to believe the logi-
328 cal consequences of their beliefs (𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 ∈ 𝙱 but 𝜙 ∉ 𝙱). In general, the measures of
329 t and f used here consider the belief-value of each belief independently of the other
beliefs (e.g. the belief-value of 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 ∈ 𝙱 is independent of that of 𝜙, 𝜓 ∈ 𝙱).
F
330
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331 3.1 ˛ -Value
O
332 Intuitively, the 𝛼-value of a set of beliefs should be higher the greater the amount
333
334
PR
of truth in the set and lower the greater the amount of falsehood in the set. Also, if
function 𝛼 is to be used in a notion of 𝛼-maximality, then it should be possible for a
335 reasoner to somehow ‘maximize’ her 𝛼-value. In this context, function 𝛼 must fulill
336 the following requirements, where 𝛼(t, f ) is 𝛼(𝙱) with t and f being computed using
D
337 Eqs. (1) and (2) or some other measure. e.g. Brier scores (t, f ≥ 0):
TE
338 (r1) 𝛼(t, f ) strictly increases with respect to t;

339 (r2) 𝛼(t, f ) strictly decreases with respect to f;
(r3) 𝛼 has an upper bound.
EC
340
341 See Table 1 for functions 𝛼1-𝛼5, which are either straightforward functions or func-
342 tions that have been used in the literature. These functions are rather arbitrary, but
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R
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17
17FL01 An opinionated reasoner has an opinion (a belief-value) for every member of the agenda. If the
NC
17FL02 agenda is ixed, then all reasoners that are opinionated for that agenda hold credences for the same
17FL03
17FL04
objects. Consequently, they hold the same number of beliefs. For an exception, Easwaran (2013) works
17FL05 with ininite agendas, but only with local measures of inaccuracy (i.e. that is, measures of the inaccuracy
17FL06 of individual credences). Local measures of inaccuracy could ground a notion of rationality for the hold-
U
ing of particular credences, but not for reasoners in general.

18
18FL01 The agenda is always maximal in this sense. If the objects of beliefs are propositions, then no assump-
18FL02 tion is needed because there are ininitely many propositions. If the objects of beliefs are sentences, then
18FL03
18FL04
I assume that the relevant languages have enough expressive power (e.g. recursion) for expressing ini-
nitely many truths/falsehoods (see Sect. 3.2).
19
19FL01 For this reason, I need two equations: t measures the comprehensiveness of the set of beliefs and f
19FL02 measures its inaccuracy. In comparing reasoners who are opinionated regarding a ixed agenda (and, con-
19FL03
19FL04
sequently, have the same number of beliefs), only one (either one) of these two equations is needed (e.g.
19FL05 EUT only uses the measure of f). This feature has to do with a diference in the interpretation of the ful-
illment of the truth-goal (see Sect. 4.2).
13
D. F. Dantas
343 studying their properties is a good way to understand the desirable properties of
344 function 𝛼.
345 Requirement r1 models the positive part of the truth-goal: the more truth the bet-
346 ter. When I say that function 𝛼 strictly increases wrt t, I mean that if t� > t , then
Author Proof
347 𝛼(t� , f ) > 𝛼(t, f ). Therefore, this requirement states that having more truth in the set of
348 beliefs always increases its 𝛼-value. Function 𝛼1(t, f ) = t∕(t + f ), which measures the
349 proportion of truth in the set of beliefs, does not fulill r1. If f = 0, then 𝛼1(t, f ) = 1
350 for all t > 0. Therefore, it would be false that 𝛼(t� > t > 0, 0) > 𝛼(t > 0, 0). Function
351 𝛼2(t, f ) = (t − f )∕(t + f ), which measures the diference between the proportions of
352 truth and falsehood, also does not fulill r1. Function 𝛼2 is undeined for t = 0 and
353 f = 0 and, consequently, it is undeined whether 𝛼2(t� > 0, 0) > 𝛼2(0, 0). (This last
354 criticism also holds for 𝛼1.) Requirement r2 models the negative part of the truth-
355 goal: the less falsehood the better. When I say that 𝛼(t, f ) strictly decreases wrt f,
356 I mean that if f � > f , then 𝛼(t, f � ) < �(t, f ). Therefore, this requirement states that
F
357 having more falsehood in the set of beliefs always decreases its 𝛼-value. Functions
𝛼1 and 𝛼2 also do not fulill r2 (e.g. they are undeined for t = 0 and f = 0). Func-
O
358
359 tion 𝛼3(t, f ) = t − f (used in Trpin and Pellert 2019), which measures the diference
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360 between truth and falsehood in a set of beliefs, fulills requirements r1 and r2.
361 It follows from r1 and r2 that function 𝛼 must be deined for all values of t and
PR
362 f. If 𝛼(t, f ) was undeined for a given value of t, then it would be undeined whether
363 𝛼(t� > t, f ) > 𝛼(t, f ) and the function would not strictly increase wrt t. The same
364 holds for f, �(t, f � > f ) < �(t, f ), and function 𝛼 not strictly decreasing wrt f. Then,
for all values of t and f, there must exist an x such that 𝛼(t, f ) = x . This fact has an
D
365
366 important consequence: since, for all (real) numbers x and y, either x ≥ y or y ≥ x ,
TE
367 then, for all values of t, t� , f , and f �, either 𝛼(t, f ) ≥ 𝛼(t� , f � ) or 𝛼(t� , f � ) ≥ 𝛼(t, f ). Con-
368 sequently, function 𝛼 can be used to measure and compare the 𝛼-values for all (inite)
369 sets of beliefs.20
EC
370 Requirement r3 is related to the existence of 𝛼-maximal reasoners. An 𝛼-maximal

371 reasoner should somehow fulill the truth-goal ‘completely’, which is related to her
372 somehow reaching the upper bound of function 𝛼 . If an 𝛼-maximal reasoner must
R
373 somehow reach the upper bound of 𝛼 , then function 𝛼 must have an upper bound.
374 Requirement r1 entails that if t is unbounded (i.e. if there are ininitely many truths
R
375 in the agenda, which I am assuming), then the upper bound of 𝛼 cannot be a maxi-
mum21. Then the upper bound of 𝛼 must be a supremum (but not a maximum)22.
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376
377 Functions 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 do have an upper bound, but it is a maximum (1). The function
NC
378 𝛼3 does not have an upper bound. In sum, functions 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 do not fulill r1-r3;
U
20
20FL01 Independently of whether t and f have continuous values, it would be interesting to require that 𝛼 is
20FL02 diferentiable at every point (and, consequently, that it is a continuous function). In this case, the irst
20FL03
derivative of 𝛼 could measure some sort of ‘alethic potential’ (more in the last paragraph of Sect. 3.3).
21
21FL01 The maximum of a function is the largest member in its image. Suppose that 𝛼(t, f ) = max(𝛼).
21FL02 Requirement r1 entails that 𝛼(t + 1, f ) > 𝛼(t, f ) and that 𝛼(t + 1, f ) > max(𝛼), which is a contradiction.
21FL03
The idea is that a reasoner can always hold an extra true belief and that function 𝛼 must react to it.
22
22FL01 The supremum of a function 𝛼 is the least upper bound of the image of 𝛼 , deined as a quantity s such
22FL02 that no member in the image of 𝛼 exceeds s, but if 𝜖 is any positive quantity, then there is a member in the
22FL03
image of 𝛼 that exceeds s − 𝜖 . All maxima are suprema, but some suprema are not maxima.
13
379 function �3 fulills r1 and r2, but not r3. Requirement r3 also prevents the value of
380 �(t, f ) collapsing to positive ininity.23
381 Functions �1 and �2 can be ixed for requirements r1-r3 by adding con-
382 stants c, d > 0 to their numerators or denominators (see functions �4
Author Proof
383 and �5 in Table 1)24. Both functions �4 and �5 fulill requirements r1-r3.
384 For example, function �5 fulills requirement r1 because if t� > t , then
385 (t� − f )∕(t� + f + c) > (t − f )(t + f + c)25; function �5 fulills requirement r2 because
386 if f � > f , then (t − f � )(t + f � + c) < (t − f )(t + f + c) (the proof is similar to that in
387 fn. 25); function �5 fulills requirement r3: it has a supremum that is not a maxi-
388 mum (1).26 The choice of a speciic function � that yields the optimal results is a
389 diicult and, maybe, an empirical question.27 For now, I prefer function �5, partially
390 for aesthetic reasons: I like the fact that this function naturally indicates the rela-
391 tive �-values for accuracy (close to 1), inaccuracy (close to -1), and suspension of
belief (close to 0, although sets of beliefs can have �-value close to 0 by balancing
F
392
393 accuracy and inaccuracy). Function �5 can have diferent values of c. For simplic-
O
394 ity, I will choose a c that is very close to 0. Finally, function �5 is such that true and
395 false beliefs have the same weights. I cannot think of principled reasons for using
O
396 diferent weights, but there are adequate functions � with diferent weightings (e.g.
�5� (t, f ) = (2t − f )∕(2t + f + c)). In the following, ‘function � ’ refers to �5 with c
397
398
399 �4).
PR
very close to 0, but the arguments should hold for all functions that fulill r1-r3 (e.g.
D
TE
23
23FL01 To prevent function � collapsing to −∞, we could require it to have an inimum (but not a minimum).
23FL02 The inimum of a function � is the greatest lower bound of the image of � and the minimum of a function
EC
23FL03
23FL04
is the smallest member in its image. I do not want to discuss this requirement here because it is marginal
23FL05 to the investigation of the notion of �-maximality. Nevertheless, functions �4 and �5 have inima that are
not minima (0 and -1 respectively). I refer to the inimum of function � in Sect. 4.2.
24
24FL01 Constant c deines the ‘sensitivity’ of the function: the smaller the c, the greater the beneit for having
R
24FL02 more truth in the set of beliefs and the greater the penalty for having more falsehood in the set of beliefs.
24FL03
A similar notion may be applied to d. An anonymous referee has called my attention to the fact that
R
24FL04
Laplace’s rule of succession has the form of �4, where d = 1 and c = 2 (let’s call this �L).
25
25FL01 Suppose that t� > t . Multiplying both sides by (f + c + f ), it follows that t� (f + c + f ) > t(f + c + f ).
O
25FL02 Distributing, it follows that t� f + t� c + t� f > tf + tc + tf . Adding (−t� f − tf ) to both sides, it fol-
25FL03
25FL04
lows that t� f + t� c − tf > tf + tc − t� f . Since tf = ft and t� f = ft� (commutativity), this is
NC
25FL05 equivalent to t� f + t� c − ft > tf + tc − ft�. Adding (tt� − ff − fc) to both sides, it follows that
25FL06 tt� + t� f + t� c − ft − ff − fc > tt� + ft + tc − ft� − ff − fc. Since t� t = tt� and ft = tf , this is equivalent to
25FL07 t� t + t� f + t� c − ft − ff − fc > tt� + tf + tc − ft� − ff − fc (commutativity). From distribution, it follows
25FL08
that (t� − f )(t + f + c) > (t − f )(t� + f + c). Dividing both sides by (t + f + c)(t� + f + c), it follows that
(t� − f )∕(t� + f + c) > (t − f )∕(t + f + c).
U
26
26FL01 The value of (t − f )∕(t + f + c) decreases only wrt f and strictly increases wrt t. Then
26FL02 limt→∞ (t − 0)∕(t + 0 + c) = 1 is the function’s upper bound because the value of t dominates that of c.
26FL03
26FL04
Since the value of (t − f )∕(t + f + c) strictly increases wrt t and t is unbounded, this upper bound is not a
maximum.
27
27FL01 There is much work to be done in order to shrink the class of admissible functions � , but I do not
27FL02 think that the outcome of this will be the selection of one admissible function (the function � ).
27FL03
27FL04
For example, I cannot think of a principled way of specifying the ‘correct’ relative importance
27FL05 between believing the truth and not believing the falsehood, so as to distinguish, for example, �5 and
�5� (t, f ) = (2t − f )∕(2t + f + c).
13
D. F. Dantas
Table 1 The behavior of Function r1 r2 r3

some functions regarding
requirements r1-r3, where �1(t, f ) = t∕(t + f ) × × ×
c, d > 0 are constants. The
checks indicate the requirements �2(t, f ) = (t − f )∕(t + f ) × × ×
Author Proof
that the functions fulill �3(t, f ) = t − f ✓ ✓ ×

�4(t, f ) = (t + d)∕(t + f + c) ✓ ✓ ✓
�5(t, f ) = (t − f )∕(t + f + c) ✓ ✓ ✓
400 3.2 ˛ -Maximality
401 In this Section, I use function � in a model of �-maximality that is satisiable by

402 inite reasoners and does not present problems with blindspots. An �-maximal rea-
403 soner must somehow fulill the truth-goal ‘completely’, which is modeled by the
F
404 upper bound of � . There are two issues with this idea. The irst is that since the
O
405 upper bound of � is a supremum (but not a maximum), this function does not return
406 its upper bound for any set of beliefs. The second is that function � measures the �
O
407 -value of a set of beliefs, but there are diferent notions of belief. I think that these
408 issues are often overlooked because the discussion (especially the discussion about PR
409 alethic norms) is often built upon informal notions about what it is for a reasoner to
410 hold a belief. To avoid this problem, I will introduce a formal model of a reasoner,
411 which enables formal deinitions of diferent notions of belief.
D
412 Deinition 1 (Reasoner) A reasoner R = ⟨L, 𝙱, 𝜋⟩ is a triple, where L is a formal

TE
413 language, 𝙱 is a set of sentences in L, and 𝜋 is a function 𝜋 ∶ 2L × 2L × ℤ+ → 2L.
A reasoner is composed of a formal language (L) that models the concepts avail-
EC
414
415 able for the reasoner, a ‘belief-set’ (𝙱) that models the reasoner’s memory, and an
416 update function (𝜋 ) that models the reasoner’s pattern of inference. A fact about pat-
417 terns of inference is that reasoners can execute diferent inferences from the same
R
418 premises. This fact is expressed in the model using a function 𝜋 that accepts as input
R
419 the current set of beliefs (𝙱), an ‘evidential’ input (𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃) that models the evidence
420 available for the reasoner, and a numeric input (positive integer): 𝜋(𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃, 𝙱, 1)
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421 models inference 1 from 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃 and 𝙱, 𝜋(𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃, 𝙱, 2) models inference 2, etc.
422 This model has three components that have not appeared in our discussion: L, 𝜋 ,
NC
423 and 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃. The language L will be used to delimit the reasoner’s agenda, which I
424 assume to be denumerable.28 The other two components, which are important in the
425 deinition of a notion of �-maximality that does not present problems with blinds-
U
426 pots, will be discussed in the following.
28
28FL01 The use of sentences in this model should not be seen as a commitment to speciic objects of beliefs
28FL02 (see fn. 11), but as modeling the objects of beliefs (e.g. propositions). The assumption that agendas are
28FL03
28FL04
denumerable is substantive because sets of propositions can have higher cardinalities, but it is weaker
than the restriction to inite agendas. I will talk informally of propositions as the objects of beliefs.
13
427 The model of a reasoner can be used to deine several notions of belief. For exam-
428 ple, informally, a reasoner explicitly believes the propositions represented or ‘stored’
429 in memory. In the model, a reasoner explicitly believes the sentences in her belief-
430 set.29 Reasoners cannot reach the upper bound of � given their momentary sets of
Author Proof
431 beliefs (explicit, implicit, or accessible beliefs, see fn. 29). We could try to avoid
432 this problem by adding artiicial conditions to � , such as, for example, ‘if t is ininite
433 and f is inite, then �(𝙱) = max(�) = 1’.30 This would partially ix the problem, but,
434 in addition to its ad hoc lavor, it is unclear what to do when t and f are both ininite.
435 We may choose an arbitrary value (e.g. �(𝙱) = 0), but any choice would be inad-
436 equate. Suppose that two reasoners R and R� hold ininitely many true and ininitely
437 many false beliefs, that they hold the same false beliefs but that, for each true belief
438 that R� holds, R holds that same belief and another (independent) true belief. The
439 result that �(𝙱) = �(𝙱� ) seems to be wrong because R seems to be in a better epis-
temic position than R� (m1 gets it right).
F
440
441 The procedural component in the model of a reasoner (the pattern of inference,
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442 𝜋 ) is used for dealing with this problem. Reasoners cannot reach the upper bound
443 of � given their momentary sets of beliefs, but they can try to always enhance their
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444 �-value, continuously approaching the upper bound of � . For example, if a rea-
445
446
447
PR
soner with an initial belief-set 𝙱0 receives a sequence of inputs 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃1 , 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃2 , … ,
𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i , …, she could try to update her initial belief-set from the available evi-
dence generating a sequence of belief-sets 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , … such that the value of
448 �(𝙱i ) approaches the upper bound of � in the limit of this sequence. Reasoners can
D
449 execute diferent inferences from each possible pair of 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i and 𝙱i , but there is
450 the inference that a given reasoner would ‘in fact’ execute from each given pair
TE
451 of 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i and 𝙱i . Let a reasoner’s reasoning sequence be the sequence of belief-
452 sets 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , … that results from those inferences that the reasoner would ‘in
453 fact’ execute from the available information if her cognitive resources were suffi-
EC
454 cient (memory and time).31 In this context, I propose the following notion of �
455 -maximality:
R
456 Deinition 2 (�-maximality) A reasoner R with reasoning sequence 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , …

is �-maximal if limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�).
R
457
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29
29FL01 Informally, reasoners implicitly believe the logical consequences of their explicit beliefs. In the
29FL02 model, reasoners implicitly believe the logical consequence of their belief-set. Informally, reasoners have
29FL03
U
29FL04
the accessible belief that 𝜙 if they explicitly believe that 𝜙 after some amount of reasoning (Konolige
29FL05 1986, p. 19). In the model, the accessible beliefs of a reasoner are the sentences in 𝜋(𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃, 𝙱, i) for
some i.
30
30FL01 In this case, the supremum of � would be a maximum. However, with some mathematical juggling,
30FL02 one could argue that the new function fulills r1-r3 (e.g. that “∞ + 1 = ∞”, or something similar).
31
31FL01 Function 𝜋 determines a sequence 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , …, where 𝙱0 = 𝙱 is the reasoner’s initial belief-set
31FL02 and 𝙱i+1 = 𝜋(𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1 , 𝙱i , i + 1). This sequence could be used to represent the reasoner’s reason-
31FL03
31FL04
ing sequence, although nothing in the following depends on this choice. The condition ‘if her cogni-
31FL05 tive resources were suicient’ is necessary (for inite reasoners) because reasoning sequences are ininite
sequences.
13
D. F. Dantas
458 An �-maximal reasoner is a reasoner who approaches the upper bound of function
459 � in the limit of her reasoning sequence. Broadly speaking, function � in this notion
460 of �-maximality can be seen as measuring the �-value of the (explicit) beliefs that
461 a reasoner adopts at some stage of her reasoning sequence and are not withdrawn
Author Proof
462 subsequently. Let those be stable beliefs (‘stable’ in the sense that, once adopted,
463 these beliefs are not withdrawn).32 The notion of stable belief is related to that of
464 psychological certainty, i.e. the property of a belief that is incorrigible (e.g. even in
465 the face of additional reasoning or evidence).33 In this case, the set of stable beliefs
466 (i.e. 𝙱𝜔) may be interpreted as the set of all the (explicit) beliefs that a reasoner is
467 psychologically certain of at some stage or other of her reasoning sequence. In the
468 following, ‘belief’ refers to explicit beliefs and ‘belief𝜔’ to stable beliefs.
469 To show that Deinition 2 is satisiable in the face of blindspots, I will construct a
470 reasoner R∗ who approaches �-maximality without believing𝜔 any of her blindspots.
471 This construction relies on a sequence of 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃s, which is related to a posteriori
F
472 reasoning. Neither the notion of �-maximality nor the problems of blindspots are
necessarily related to a posteriori reasoning. In addition, there are a priori reason-
O
473
474 ers who approach �-maximality without believing𝜔 their blindspots.34 I have chosen
O
475 this particular construction for two reasons. The irst is that the sequence of 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃s
476 provides an ordering in which propositions are considered, which is relevant in deal-
PR
477 ing with complex blindspots. This ordering could also be provided by the numeric
478 parameter of 𝜋 , but the exposition is more natural using 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃s. The second is that
479 R∗ is used in Sect. 4, where I use the �-model in alethic norms and evaluation meth-
ods. The construction of R∗ highlights the epistemic conditions in which a rational
D
480
481 reasoner does not believe𝜔 her blindspots despite having evidence that they (or their
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482 components) are currently true.

483 Let R∗ be a reasoner such that: (i) R∗ is in a perfect epistemic situation (i.e. has
484 access to all and only the true evidence)35; (ii) R∗ forms beliefs according to the
EC
32
32FL01 The notion of stable belief is related to that of P-stability in Leitgeb (2014, p. 140), where a belief is
R
32FL02 P-stable when it is suiciently probable given any compatible proposition that is available for the rea-
32FL03
32FL04
soner (e.g. as evidence). There are two diferences, though. The irst is that P-stability is concerned with
R
32FL05 the relation between full beliefs and credences. The second is that the notion of stable beliefs considers
32FL06 the order in which these other propositions are considered (which is crucial in dealing with complex
O
32FL07 blindspots). In the

⋃ model, the stable beliefs of a reasoner R with reasoning sequence 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , … are
32FL08 ⋂
in the set 𝙱𝜔 = i j≥i 𝙱j . If 𝙱𝜔 is ininite, �(𝙱𝜔 ) is undeined. That’s why stable beliefs provide only a
“very rough” interpretation of the measure limi→∞ �(𝙱i ), which is not the same as �(𝙱𝜔 ).
NC
33
33FL01 This is the notion of psychological certainty: “A belief is psychologically certain when the subject
33FL02 who has it is supremely convinced of its truth. Certainty in this sense is similar to incorrigibility, which
33FL03
33FL04
is the property a belief has of being such that the subject is incapable of giving it up” (Reed 2011, p. 2).
U
33FL05 A reasoner is incapable of giving up her beliefs𝜔 in the sense that these are the beliefs that she ‘in fact’
does not give them up even in the face of all available evidence.
34
34FL01 For example, a reasoner who completely ignores her 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃s and has reasoning sequence
34FL02 𝙱0 = ∅, 𝙱1 = {𝜙 ∨ ¬𝜙}, 𝙱2 = {𝜙 ∨ ¬𝜙, (𝜙 ∨ ¬𝜙) ∨ ¬(𝜙 ∨ ¬𝜙)}, etc is �-maximal without believing𝜔 her
34FL03
34FL04
blindspots, but this strategy for approaching �-maximality is problematic with regard to inite reasoners
(see Sect. 3.3).
35FL01
35
I am assuming that it is possible for R∗ to form ininitely many true beliefs𝜔 (and, consequently, to
35FL02 approach �-maximality) from the available evidence in such a perfect epistemic situation. That assump-
35FL03
35FL04
tion would not hold if, for example, the situation were entirely composed of (true) blindspots for R∗.
However, such would be a case of skeptical rather than of a perfect epistemic situation (see fn. 38).
13
485 evidence; (iii) R∗ has an adequate access to her beliefs (see Egan and Elga 2005, p.
486 83); and (iv) R∗ minimally revises her beliefs. Let L be composed of the sen-
487 tences 𝜙1 , 𝜙2 , … , 𝜙i , … and let #𝜙i = i be the index of 𝜙i . That (i) is modeled as
488 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1 = {𝜙i+1 } if 𝜙i+1 is true and 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1 = ∅ otherwise. That (ii) is modeled
Author Proof
489 as function 𝜋 being such that if 𝜙 ∈ 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1, then 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱i+1. That (iii) is modeled
490 as R∗ being able to decide the truth-value of beliefs when it depends only on her
491 holding some belief or not. That (iv) is modeled as function 𝜋 being such that if she
492 can decide that 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱i is false, then there is a j > i such that 𝜙 ∉ 𝙱j . For simplicity,
493 I assume that j = i + 1, but ‘minimum revision’ in (iv) means that she could per-
494 form the revision as gradually as she wants (i.e. at any subsequent stage of the rea-
495 soning sequence). Let 𝙱∗0 = ∅. Informally, R∗ does as follows at each stage i + 1 of
496 her reasoning sequence: R∗ inspects every 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱i ; if she can decide that 𝜙 is false,
497 then she withdraws the belief that 𝜙 from 𝙱i+1; then R∗ considers 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1; if some
𝜙 ∈ 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1, then she adds 𝜙 to 𝙱i+1.
F
498
499 R∗ does not believe𝜔 her blindspots. Suppose that #bs1 = i. Sentence bs1 is true
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500 in stage i and bs1 added to 𝙱∗i . But bs1 is false in stage i + 1 and bs1 is withdrawn
501 from 𝙱∗i+1. Since bs1 is not considered during subsequent stages, R∗ does not
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502 believe𝜔 that bs1. The situation is similar to other blindspots. I am not presupposing
that R∗ believes𝜔 the ‘easy’ logical consequences of her beliefs𝜔. However, even if
503
504
505
PR
this was the case, she would not believe𝜔 that bs2 as a logical consequence of her
believing𝜔 that 𝜙 and that � because she never believes𝜔 both that 𝜙 and that � . Sup-
506 pose that #𝜙 = i and #� = j . Either i < j or i > j . If i < j , then 𝜙 is true at stage i and
D
507 𝜙 is added to 𝙱∗i , but � is false at stage j and � is not added to 𝙱∗j . If i > j , then � is
true at stage j and � added to 𝙱∗j ; 𝜙 is also true at stage i and 𝜙 is added to 𝙱∗i . But R∗
TE
508
509 can decide that � is false at stage i + 1 and � is withdrawn from 𝙱∗i+1. The situation is
510 similar for other complex blindspots.
R∗ approaches �-maximality. It is the case that limi→∞ t = ∞ because R∗ is in
EC
511
512 a perfect epistemic situation and forms beliefs according to the evidence. It would
513 be the case that limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) ≠ sup(�) only if limi→∞ f = ∞. But the value of f is
514 only higher than 0 when the number of blindspots with all of their components in
R
515 𝙱∗i is higher than 0, but, whenever this happens at stage i, one of these components
is withdrawn at stage i + 1, such that limi→∞ f = 0 (i.e. R∗ does not believe𝜔 her
R
516
517 blindspots).
O
NC
518 3.3 Finite Reasoners
519 Informally, a inite reasoner has cognitive limitations such as inite input (percep-
U
520 tion, etc transmits only a inite amount of information), inite memory (memory can
521 store only a inite amount of information), and inite computational power (reason-
522 ing can execute only initely many operations, such as performing an inferential step,
523 in a inite time interval). In the model of a reasoner, a inite reasoner is as follows:
524 Deinition 3 (Finite reasoner) A reasoner R = ⟨L, 𝙱0 , 𝜋⟩ is inite if L is recursively

525 enumerable, 𝙱0 contains initely many sentences, and 𝜋 is a recursive function,
526 whose inputs (𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i and 𝙱i ) can contain only initely many sentences.
13
D. F. Dantas
527 That L is recursively enumerable (r.e.) is a requirement for L being learned by

528 a inite reasoner.36 If L is r.e., then L is initary, i.e. all sentences in L have a inite
529 length (which is related to inite memory). The 𝙱i being inite models inite memory.
530 The 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i being inite models inite incoming of information. Function 𝜋 being
Author Proof
531 recursive is related to inite computational power. If 𝜋 is recursive, then every belief
532 that the reasoner holds is associated with the execution of at most initely many
533 inferential steps, which models the reasoner being able to execute only initely many
534 operations in a inite time interval.
535 Finite reasoners can approach �-maximality without believing𝜔 their blindspots.
536 For example, R∗ is a inite reasoner if we presuppose that L is r.e., which I will
537 presuppose.37 This result is somewhat unsatisfactory because most often inite rea-
538 soners (e.g. humans) are not in perfect epistemic situations. However, a inite rea-
539 soner R , who is in an imperfect epistemic situation (but has the features ii-iv), can
540 approach �-maximality without believing𝜔 her blindspots as well if: (i’) R is in a
F
541 very good epistemic situation where a very good epistemic situation is one in which
it is possible to believe𝜔 ininitely many truths from the evidence but at most initely
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542
543 many falsehoods.38 In this case, limi→∞ t = ∞ and limi→∞ f = x , where x is inite,
O
544 which entails that limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�). Considerations about the blindspots of R∗
545 also hold for R because those rely only on features ii-iv. PR
546 Finite reasoners can approach �-maximality only deriving logical truths at
547 every stage of their reasoning sequence (see fn. 34 for an example), but I think
548 that there is something epistemically defective about this pattern of inference.
Here is a sketch of an argument to be developed in another paper. Function � is
D
549
550 such that every new true belief adds an �-value lower than the previous one (e.g.
TE
551 �(t + 2, f ) − �(t + 1, f ) < �(t + 1, f ) − �(t, f )). Finite reasoners would be in tension
552 between increasing their �-value and decreasing their alethic potential (the irst
553 derivative of � , see fn. 20). A consequence of this tension is that they would be
EC
554 required to delay adopting true beliefs when they can adopt them later. Supposedly,
555 reasoners can always delay the derivation of logical truths (and logical consequences
556 of beliefs), but not the adoption of empirical beliefs because the relevant 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i may
R
557 not be available later. In this case, inite reasoners would be required to delay indei-
558 nitely the derivation of logical truths (and logical consequences of beliefs) unless
R
559 there is non-alethic (e.g. practical) value attached to it. When developed, this would
O
NC
36
36FL01 Davidson (1965, p. 387) argues that a inite reasoner can only learn a language if it is constructive,
36FL02 in the sense of having compositional syntax and semantics. Davidson himself requires those languages
36FL03
to contain initely many semantic primitives, but we only need to require that it is r.e. (see Haack 1978).
37
The 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i of R∗ are composed of at most one sentence. R∗’s initial belief-set is empty and all her
U
37FL01
37FL02 other 𝙱∗i , which are such that max(|𝙱i+1 |) = |𝙱i | + 1, are also inite. R∗’s function 𝜋 is recursive because
37FL03
37FL04
it executes only initely many basic operations at each stage i + 1: R∗ reviews initely many beliefs in 𝙱∗i ,
37FL05 withdraws initely many beliefs from 𝙱∗i+1, then considers at most one input in 𝙸𝙽𝙿𝚄𝚃i+1 and adds at most
one belief to 𝙱∗i+1.
38
38FL01 We could talk about a regular epistemic situation, where R can form ininitely many true and ini-
38FL02 nitely many false beliefs𝜔 from the evidence, and of a skeptical situation, where it is possible for R to
38FL03
38FL04
form ininitely many false, but at most initely many true beliefs𝜔 from the evidence. It is possible to
38FL05 approach �-maximality in a regular epistemic situation, but there is no infallible way to do so (from the
evidence). It is impossible to approach �-maximality (from the evidence) in a skeptical situation.
13
560 be a veritistic argument for the principle of clutter avoidance (Harman 1986, p. 12).
561 See Sect. 4.1 and footnote 4 for more about memory cluttering and inite reasoners.
Author Proof
562 4 Discussion
563 Function � may be used to generate norms and evaluation methods that can be
564 applied to inite reasoners and that do not exhibit the problems discussed so far.
565 4.1 ˛ and Norms
566 In Sect. 2.1, I have surveyed several alethic norms, which exhibit problems with
F
567 blindspots and, consequently, are unsatisfactory for our purposes of deining the
568 notion of �-maximality. While the ‘may’ norms underdetermine this notion, the
O
569 ‘ought’ norms yield contradictions when confronted with blindspots. I will focus
on ‘ought’ norms because the ‘may’ norms inevitably underdetermine the notion of
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570
571 �-maximality. Norms n1-n3 exhibit the general problem of blindspots. This prob-
572
573
574
PR
lem is avoided by norms n4-n5 (n4’-n5’), but these norms still have the problem of
complex blindspots (see fn. 40). The ‘ought’ norms also have the problem of finite
reasoning: they require those reasoners to hold ininitely many (explicit?) beliefs,
575 which they cannot do. The approaching of the upper bound of function � in the limit
D
576 of a reasoning sequence (i.e. limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�)) is a property of (the reasoning
577 sequence of) a reasoner, which is not reducible to changes in the momentary sets
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578 of beliefs of that reasoner. Consequently, the epistemic value of having a pattern of
579 inference such that limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�) does not directly ground norms regard-
580 ing the holding or not of speciic beliefs. Nevertheless, the use of function � pro-
EC
581 vides some insights into this normative project. For example, consider the following
582 norms:
R
583 (n8) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �),

(n9) R ought to believe𝜔 that 𝜙 if �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �).
R
584
O
585 where 𝙱 + 𝜙 means 𝙱 ∪ {𝜙}, and 𝙱 − 𝜙 means 𝙱 ⧵ {𝜙}.

586 The left-right direction of n8 states that a reasoner ought to hold a belief only if
NC
587 it increases the �-value of her set of beliefs. Since the value of � strictly increases
588 wrt t and strictly decreases wrt f, this direction states that a reasoner only ought to
589 believe propositions that are true when believed by her. The right-left direction of
U
590 n8 exhibits the problem of inite reasoning because there are ininitely many 𝜙 such
591 that �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �). This problem is avoided by n9. The left-right direction of
592 n9 states that a reasoner ought to be certain only of propositions that increase the �
593 -value of her set of beliefs. The right-left direction of n9 avoids the problem of inite
594 reasoning because a inite reasoner can hold ininitely many beliefs𝜔 (e.g. R∗). How-
595 ever, n9 has a residual problem of inite reasoning because there are ininitely many
596 uninteresting truths such that �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �). This is the problem of memory
597 cluttering (see Harman 1986, p. 12 and my fn, 4).
13
D. F. Dantas
598 Norm n9 does not exhibit the general problem of blindspots. The blindspot bs1,
599 for example, is true if R does not believe that bs1, which means that bs1 is true if
600 bs1 ∉ 𝙱. Therefore, it is false that �(𝙱 + bs1) > 𝛼(𝙱 − bs1) and R does not ought
601 to believe that bs1, independently of whether R currently believes that bs1 or not.
Author Proof
602 The same holds for any other blindspot. Norm n9 also does not have the prob-
603 lem of complex blindspots: for example, a reasoner does not ought to believe that
604 bs2 as a logical consequence of her beliefs that 𝜙 and that � because it is not the
605 case that she ought to believe that 𝜙 while believing that � and vice versa.39 If R
606 believes that 𝜙, then � is false and R does not ought to believe that � (it is false that
607 �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �)). If R believes that � , then 𝜙 is still true, but believing that 𝜙
608 turns the belief that � false and �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �) is false40. However, norm n9
609 has a residual problem of complex blindspots. The avoidance of the problem of com-
610 plex blindspots involves a norm prescribing beliefs for some (but not all) compo-
611 nents of a complex blindspot.41 Such a prescription should have a principled way for
F
612 distinguishing which components are to be believed and which are not, but n9 distin-
guishes those cases based only on relative order (maintain what you believed irst).
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613
614 Norm n10 does not have any of the problems discussed so far (residual included):
O
615 (n10) R ought to believe𝜔 that 𝜙 if 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱∗𝜔. PR
616 Norm n10 may be interpreted as stating that a reasoner ought to be certain of a belief
617 at some stage of her reasoning sequence if it is ideally warranted.42 This norm does
D
618 not have the problem of inite reasoning for the same reason as n9. Norm n10 also
619 does not exhibit either the general problem or the problem of complex blindspots
TE
620 because 𝙱∗𝜔 does not contain a blindspot or all components of a complex blindspot,
621 although it may contain some such components (see Sect. 3.2). Norm n10 partially
EC
39
39FL01 In order to satisfy some ‘ought’, a (inite) reasoner must adopt or withdraw beliefs (one at a time), but
R
39FL02 each change in her set of beliefs generates a new set of ‘oughts’ that are ‘active’ for her. This dynamical
39FL03
character of n8-n9 circumvents the problem of complex blindspots (compare with that of n3).
R
40
40FL01 Suppose that 𝙱 has an amount t of truth (including � ), an amount f of falsehood, and that the truth-
40FL02 value of the other beliefs remain ixed. Since 𝙱 + 𝜙 has the same amount t + x − x = t of truth as 𝙱 − 𝜙
O
40FL03
40FL04
(+x for 𝜙, −x for � ) and an amount f + y > f of falsehood larger than 𝙱 − 𝜙 (+y for � ), it is false that
40FL05 �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �). Then R does not ought to believe 𝜙. Norms n4, n4’, n5, and n5’ (see fn. 9) are cor-
NC
40FL06 rect when R starts with 𝜙, but if R starts with � , then 𝜙 would still be truly-believable/true were R to
believe that 𝜙.
41
41FL01 A norm cannot prescribe belief for all components of complex blindspots because it would be pre-
41FL02 scribing belief for the blindspot as an easy logical consequence of its components. The norm cannot
41FL03
U
41FL04
prescribe the absence of belief for all components because it would fail to prescribe belief for harmless
truths.
42
42FL01 Consider Pollock’s notion of ideal warrant: “Ideal warrant has to do with what a reasoner should
42FL02 believe if it could produce all possible relevant arguments and then survey them” (Pollock 1995, p. 133).
42FL03
42FL04
In some sense, R∗ produces all the relevant conclusions because she has access to all and only the true
42FL05 evidence and forms beliefs accordingly. In this sense, 𝙱∗𝜔 is the set of true beliefs that are warranted in a
42FL06 perfect epistemic situation (which is closely related to ideal warranty). The reasoner R∗ can be seen as an
42FL07 ‘epistemic counterpart’ of a given rational regular reasoner R . Then 𝙱∗𝜔 can also be seen as a counterfac-
42FL08
tual expansion of R ’s pattern of inference: these are the beliefs R would hold if she had suicient cogni-
tive resources, was in a perfect epistemic situation, and fulilled the conditions ii-iv in Sect. 3.2.
13
622 avoids the problem of memory cluttering. There are ininitely many beliefs in 𝙱∗𝜔,
623 but these beliefs are not uninteresting in at least one sense: these are beliefs that are
624 based on the total (true) evidence. Since n10 does not require reasoners to believe
625 all the elements of 𝙱∗𝜔 (but only to believe𝜔 them), in some sense, this norm only
Author Proof
626 requires a reasoner to adopt beliefs when urged by the evidence. Norm n10 also
627 does not have the residual problem of blindspots because the components of com-
628 plex blindspots that are left out from 𝙱∗𝜔 are always the self-referential ones. This is a
629 principled way for distinguishing which components of blindspots are to be believed
630 and which are not.
631 Norm n10 is arguably not purely alethic because the construction of R∗ depends
632 on non-alethic considerations, such as ‘R∗ forms beliefs according to the evidence’.
633 Since this is the only norm I know that avoids the problems of blindspots and inite
634 reasoning, I am skeptical about the project of providing (purely) alethic norms
because of blindspots. Carr (2020) draws similar conclusions from propositions that
F
635
636 are closely related to blindspots. Despite relying on non-alethic considerations, n10
O
637 is still an objective norm (see fn. 7). The idealization that R∗ is in a perfect epis-
638 temic situation is indispensable for an alethic norm based on her beliefs𝜔 because
O
639 it is this idealization that provides alethic import to the norm.43 Regular reasoners
640
641
642
PR
most often are not in a perfect epistemic situation and usually do not have control
over this, but n10 is insensitive to the actual epistemic situation of the reasoner.
Consequently, n10 is usually not deliberative, except for cases where the truth-value
643 of propositions is transparent for the reasoners.
D
4.2 ˛ and Evaluations
TE
644
645 In Sect. 2.2, I have surveyed two comparative evaluation methods, both of which
present problems with blindspots. The main problem was that they fail in generat-
EC
646
647 ing a notion of rationality that is a transitive and connex relation, where, for all rea-
648 soners R , R� and Rprime�, if R ⪰ R� and R� ⪰ Rprime�, then R ⪰ Rprime� and either
649 R ⪰ R� or Rprime ⪰ R . This failure results in ‘rationality’ being ambiguous between
R
650 incommensurable notions. The � model can be used to measure the �-value in two
R
651 ways. The irst is to measure the �-value of momentary sets of beliefs. The compari-
652 son between the �-values of momentary sets of beliefs may, in some cases, generate
O
653 deliberative evaluations of the rationality of holding or not some beliefs. The second
654 is to measure the �-value associated with a reasoner as the limit of the �-value of
NC
655 her momentary sets of beliefs as she advances her reasoning sequence. With some
656 qualiications, this second form of measurement can generate (non-comparative and
657 comparative) methods for evaluating the rationality of reasoners that avoid the prob-
U
658 lem of incommensurable notions of rationality.
43
43FL01 Consider the 𝙱𝜔 of a reasoner R who difers from R∗ only because R is in an imperfect epistemic situ-
43FL02 ation (e.g. R in Sect. 3.3). Norms deined in terms of 𝙱𝜔 simply lack alethic import. Since we don’t know
43FL03
43FL04
much about R ’s epistemic situation, any belief can be in 𝙱𝜔 (excluding those related to blindspots and
contradictions).
13
D. F. Dantas
659 The �-value of a momentary set of beliefs should not be interpreted as a meas-
660 ure of the rationality of a reasoner for two reasons. The irst reason is that the �
661 -value of a momentary set of beliefs varies depending on speciic functions �44. In
662 this context, it is not clear whether �(𝙱) = x means anything in particular (a real
Author Proof
663 quantity). On the other hand, comparisons between the �-values of sets of beliefs
664 are more robust: for example, they are invariant up to positive linear transforma-
665 tions (if �(𝙱) > 𝛼(𝙱prime ), � prime (t, f ) = �(a ∗ t + b, c ∗ f + d), and a, b, c, d > 0, then
666 𝛼 prime (𝙱) > 𝛼 prime (𝙱prime )). The second reason is that the �-value of a momentary set
667 of beliefs is simply a poor indicator of a reasoner’s overall rationality. For example,
668 a reasoner with mostly false initial beliefs (low �-value) can approach �-maximality
669 by using the available evidence for correcting her beliefs. This reasoner should be
670 regarded as at least as rational as a reasoner who was lucky enough to have mostly
671 true initial beliefs (high �-value), but who was incompetent in approaching �-maxi-
672 mality using the available (and, possibly, mostly veridical) evidence.
F
673 The comparison between the �-values of momentary sets of beliefs may, in some
cases, generate deliberative evaluations of the rationality of holding some beliefs,
O
674
675 but this only happens when the result of the comparison is transparent for the rea-
O
676 soners. This is the case, for example, for blindspots. A rational reasoner should
677 not believe that bs1 because, for any 𝙱, �(𝙱 + bs1) < �(𝙱 − bs1). A rational rea-
PR
678 soner should also not believe that ¬bs1 because, for any 𝙱 of a rational reasoner,
679 �(𝙱 + ¬bs1) < �(𝙱 − ¬bs1).45 Consequently, a rational reasoner should suspend
680 judgment about bs1. Kroon (1993) argues that this is the correct prescription for this
case because both bs1 and ¬bs1 fail both the evidential and the coherence conditions
D
681
682 for rational belief.46 How could a rational reasoner be permitted to withhold judg-
TE
683 ment about a proposition that she is in the position to know to be true? The answer
684 is related to my results in Sects. 2.1 and 4.1 and in Carr (2020): it is not reasonable
685 to require a reasoner to believe all true propositions because, in the case of bs1,
EC
686 she is in the position to know that believing bs1 or ¬bs1 results in decreasing her �
687 -value.
688 Momentary evaluations can also be deliberative in the case of inconsist-
R
689 ent sets of propositions. Since function � strictly decreases wrt f, a rational rea-
690 soner should never believe (they should disbelieve) a contradiction because
R
691 �(𝙱 + � ∧ ¬�) < �(𝙱 − � ∧ ¬�). Now, a contradiction is a unitary inconsist-
O
692 ent set. The situation is not so straightforward for larger inconsistent sets, where
NC
44
44FL01 For example, if t = 2 and f = 1, �4(t, f ) ≈ .6667 and �5(t, f ) ≈ .3333 (where c, d are close to 0). See
U
44FL02 footnote 27.
45
45FL01 A rational reasoner R should not believe that bs1 for the reasons stated above. The proposi-
45FL02 tion ¬bs1 is equivalent to the proposition that R believes that bs1. Then, for a rational reasoner,
45FL03
45FL04
¬bs1 should be false and �(𝙱 + ¬bs1) < �(𝙱 − ¬bs1). In general, if bs1 ∉ 𝙱 and ¬bs1 ∉ 𝙱, then
�(𝙱 + bs1) = �(𝙱 + ¬bs1) < �(𝙱 + bs1, ¬bs1) < �(𝙱).
46
46FL01 This is the problem of bs1 with the “coherence condition”: “The agent doesn’t accept p [bs1] because
46FL02 he recognises that if he does accept p, and continues to be a good reasoner, then he is in a position to run
46FL03
46FL04
a modus ponens argument to not-p and thereby come to recognise unconditionally that the proposition
46FL05 he accepts is in fact false” (Kroon 1993, p. 383). The other three arguments in Kroon (1993) are on page
382 and in his footnote 8.
13
693 the result depends on factors that usually are not transparent for reasoners.47 This
694 problem may be avoided, in some cases, using a diferent strategy. Consider a lot-
695 tery composed of n tickets, where exactly one is the winner. Consider the incon-
696 sistent set composed of ‘ticket 1 is not the winner’,..., ‘ticket n is not the winner’,
Author Proof
697 and ‘exactly one ticket is the winner’. Independently of the other beliefs of a rea-
698 soner, as n grows, the �-value of believing all the propositions in this inconsistent set
699 dominates that of suspending judgment or disbelieving them because, for all t and f,
700 limn→∞ �(t + n, f + 1) > 𝛼(t, f ) > 𝛼(t + 1, f + n). In this case, if n is large enough, a
701 rational reasoner should believe all the propositions in this inconsistent set.48 How-
702 ever, a rational reasoner should not believe the conjunction of these propositions,
703 which is a contradiction. This result is in line with the solution to the lottery para-
704 dox proposed in Kyburg (1970, p. 56), which relies on probabilistic considerations.
705 Similar considerations apply to the preface paradox (see Makinson 1965), where
Kyburg’s probabilistic solution is not directly available. This strategy needs to be
F
706
707 further developed in another paper.
O
708 The rationality of a reasoner should be related to how much her pattern of infer-
709 ence is truth-conducive. This feature, in turn, is related to how the �-value of her
O
710 momentary sets of beliefs changes as she advances her reasoning sequence. In Dei-
711
712
713
PR
nition 2, I propose that a reasoner R with reasoning sequence 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , … is �
-maximal if limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�). Then it could be thought that limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) is
a measure of rationality. I do not think that this is correct. The irst problem with
714 this measure is that it is not deined for all reasoners. Consider an undecided rea-
D
715 soner, who starts with no beliefs and, at every other stage of her reasoning sequence,
716 adopts and withdraws the same belief. Her value of limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) is undeined
TE
717 because the �-value of her beliefs oscillates as she advances her reasoning sequence.
718 The second problem is that this measure seems to return incorrect diagnoses some-
719 times. Consider a detached reasoner, who starts with no beliefs and, at each stage of
EC
720 her reasoning sequence, adopts two new true beliefs and withdraws her oldest belief.
721 The �-value of her beliefs grows strictly monotonically and limi→∞ �(𝙱i ) = sup(�),
722 but I do not think that this reasoner should be seen as rational.
R
723 These problems are avoided using the following measure:

R
724 �⃗ (R) = lim �(𝙱i ∩ 𝙱� ) (3)

i→∞
725
O
726 If 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱i ∩ 𝙱𝜔, then 𝜙 ∈ 𝙱i+j ∩ 𝙱𝜔 for every j ≥ 0. Then �(𝙱i ∩ 𝙱𝜔 ) grows monotoni-
cally and function �⃗ always returns a value. Consequently, function �⃗ can be used to
NC
727
47
U
47FL01 For some factors, the more true beliefs a reasoner holds, the less attractive it is for her to believe the
47FL02 propositions in an inconsistent set; the larger the proportion of truth in the set, the more attractive it is
47FL03
47FL04
for her to believe the propositions in the set; etc. For example, consider the inconsistent set {𝜙, ¬𝜙},
47FL05 function �5 with c close to 0 and a 𝙱 that does not contain 𝜙 or ¬𝜙. If 𝙱 is such that t = 1 and f = 0, then
�(𝙱 ∪ {�, ¬�}) < �(𝙱 ∖ {�, ¬�}); but if t = 0 and f = 1, then �(𝙱 ∪ {�, ¬�}) > 𝛼(𝙱 ∖ {�, ¬�}).
48
48FL01 This result also supports our intuition that it is epistemically less defective to hold a large body of
48FL02 beliefs that turns out to be inconsistent than a small inconsistent set of beliefs (e.g. an outright contradic-
48FL03
48FL04
tion). For example, we blame Frege much less for subscribing to the inconsistent system in The Founda-
48FL05 tions of Arithmetic than a reasoner who believes an outright contradiction. My argument here appeals,
not to the greater diiculty of spotting the inconsistency, but to alethic considerations alone.
13
D. F. Dantas
728 evaluate any reasoner R . The value of �⃗ (R) is deined when both t and f approach
729 a inite number. In this case, the result is obtained by simply substituting these val-
730 ues in function � . Speciic results depend on speciic functions � (e.g. if both t and
731 f approaches the same x, then �⃗ 5(R) = 0), but comparisons are more robust. The
Author Proof
732 value of �⃗ (R) is also deined when the value of t or f (but not both) approaches
733 ininity. These results are general: if t approaches ininity while f approaches a inite
734 x, then �⃗ (R) = sup(�); if f approaches ininity while t approaches a inite x, then
735 �⃗ (R) = inf (�), the inimum of � . Regular reasoners are most often in regular epis-
736 temic situations (see fn. 38), where often both t and f approach ininity. Function �⃗
737 is able to discriminate those cases, depending on how t and f grow relatively to each
738 other. Speciic results depend on speciic functions � , but comparisons are more
739 robust: if t and f grow at the same rate, then �⃗ 5(R) = 0; if t grows twice as fast as f,
740 �⃗ 5(R) ≈ .3333; if f grows twice as fast as t, �⃗ 5(R) ≈ −.3333.49
741 What does 𝙱i ∩ 𝙱𝜔 mean? Should function �⃗ be seen as a measure of rational-
F
742 ity? The members of 𝙱i ∩ 𝙱𝜔 are the beliefs that the reasoner is certain of at the
stage i of her reasoning sequence. In this case, the function �⃗ would tie up rational-
O
743
744 ity and psychological certainty in a way that is related to the relection principle
O
745 (Goldstein 1983).50 In this interpretation, oscillation (as in the undecided reasoner)
746 has the same �-value as suspension of judgment, which may be correct. However,
PR
747 the function �⃗ falls short of being a measure of rationality because a reasoner may
748 maximize function �⃗ by mere luck. For example, a stubborn conspirator, who forms
749 certainties ignoring the evidence and happens to be in an epistemic situation where
all of his conspiracies are true, may maximize function �⃗ , but were he in any other
D
750
751 situation, his ill-formed certainties would be signiicantly mistaken. I do not think
TE
752 that this reasoner should be seen as rational. This problem is avoided if we average
753 the results of �⃗ (R) over a large number of situations. This would be an interesting
754 objective evaluation method for rationality (see fn. 7).
EC
755 This form of measurement is feasible, for example, in Computational Episte-

756 mology, where epistemologists have full access to the truth-values of their agents’
757 beliefs. Examples of investigations in this ield are Douven (2013); Trpin and Pel-
R
758 lert (2019); Olsson (2011). In a typical investigation, computational epistemolo-

759 gists design a computer simulation, where artiicial agents (designed to exhibit the
R
760 epistemic strategy to be evaluated) update their beliefs interacting with an environ-
O
761 ment (maybe, including other agents) that is randomly generated from ixed param-
762 eters. The goal is to investigate the impact of the epistemic strategy (e.g. Bayes-
NC
763 ian conditionalization) on the alethic value of the agents’ beliefs. Computational
U
49
49FL01 There are cases in which, when both t and f approach ininity, function �⃗ returns its upper bound. For
49FL02 example, consider a reasoner R with a reasoning sequence such that, at stage 1, the value of f is 1 and the
49FL03
49FL04
value of t is such that �⃗ (𝙱i ∩ 𝙱� ) ≈ sup(�) − 1∕2. In the subsequent stage, the value of f increases by 1
and the value of t is such that �⃗ (𝙱i ∩ 𝙱� ) is approximately sup(�) − 1∕4, �⃗ (�) − 1∕8, etc.
50
50FL01 The relection principle states that you should defer your beliefs to those beliefs that you expect to
50FL02 hold in the future. The measure in Eq. 3 is related to the relection principle in the sense that all the
50FL03
50FL04
beliefs that are relevant to your rationality are beliefs that you have in the later stages of your reasoning
50FL05 sequence. In some sense, you only have rational beliefs that you hold in the later stages of your reasoning
sequence. There are arguments in favor of the relection principle in EUT (e.g. Easwaran 2013).
13
764 epistemologists usually average the alethic impact of an epistemic strategy over
765 many trials in the way stated above,51 although their measurements of alethic value
766 often amount to functions other than � or �⃗ . For example, Trpin and Pellert (2019)
767 use �3 with t and f measured using Brier scores. These other measures are only suit-
Author Proof
768 able for the task because epistemologists usually investigate agents who are opinion-
769 ated regarding ixed and inite (often, unitary) agendas. Functions � and �⃗ are more
770 adequate measures of alethic value for the investigation of non-opinionated agents,
771 agents with varying numbers of beliefs or with ininite agendas.52
772 The measure of rationality using function �⃗ does not directly generate a compara-
773 tive evaluation method, but an obvious way of generating such a method would be
774 as follows:
775 (m2) R ⪰ Rprime if �⃗ (R) ≥ �⃗ (Rprime ),
F
776 where �⃗ (R) would be averaged as stated above. Method m2 generates a notion of
O
777 rationality that is a transitive and connex relation. The measure of �⃗ (R) always
returns a real number. For all real numbers x, y, and z, if x ≥ y and y ≥ z , then
O
778
779 x ≥ z . Consequently, for all reasoners R , Rprime and Rprime�, if R ⪰ Rprime and
780 Rprime ⪰ Rprime�, then R ⪰ Rprime�. For all real numbers x and y, either x ≥ y or
PR
781 y ≥ x . Consequently, for all reasoners R and Rprime, either �⃗ (R) ≥ �⃗ (Rprime ) or
782 �⃗ (Rprime ) ≥ �⃗ (R). Therefore, method m2 avoids the problem of incommensurable
783 notions of rationality. Most methods of evaluation fail in evaluating and comparing
D
784 the rationality of reasoners with ininite sets of beliefs (see Treanor 2013, p. 580).53
Function �⃗ and method m2 are able to evaluate and compare the rationality of rea-
TE
785
786 soners with ininitely many beliefs𝜔. In fact, they are able to discriminate diferent
787 levels of rationality for reasoners with ininitely many true or false beliefs𝜔 (or both).
EC
788 5 Conclusions
R
789 A conclusion of Sect. 4.1 was that the project of providing purely alethic norms for
(inite) reasoners is defective because of blindspots. Nevertheless, the fulillment of
R
790
791 the truth-goal is still a source of epistemic value, whose measurement can be used in
O
792 evaluations of rationality. The existence of blindspots also has consequences for this
NC
51
51FL01 Computational epistemologists most often consider the mean alethic value (e.g. Trpin and Pellert
U
51FL02 2019; Olsson 2011), but it may be interesting to consider other statistical averages, such as the mode (e.g.
51FL03
the “in most trials” of Douven 2013, see fn. 1), the median, etc.
52
52FL01 Trpin and Pellert’s measure can be used to deal with non-opinionated agents with a varying number of
52FL02 beliefs because function �3 fulills most requirements in Sect. 3.1 (more speciically, r1 and r2), but their
52FL03
measure may collapse to ±∞ when dealing with ininite agendas because �3 does not fulill r3.
53
53FL01 For example, some frameworks in EUT measure the (in)accuracy of a regular set of beliefs as its
53FL02 distance to the ideal set of beliefs (Fitelson and Easwaran 2015; Pettigrew 2016). This distance may col-
53FL03
53FL04
lapse to +∞ when dealing with ininite agendas. For this reason, these frameworks are often restricted to
53FL05 inite agendas (e.g. Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a; Fitelson and Easwaran 2015; Pettigrew 2016), where
Easwaran (2013) is an exception. Method m1, on the other hand, does not exhibit this problem.
13
D. F. Dantas
793 project, such as, for example, the diiculty in making sense of �-maximality (e.g.
794 the ideal set of beliefs). There are two strategies for avoiding this problem. The irst
795 strategy is to adopt a weaker notion of �-maximality, where two reasoners who disa-
796 gree in doxastic states regarding blindspots can be both �-maximal (e.g. the notion
Author Proof
797 in Deinition 2). The second strategy is to forget about �-maximality and settle for
798 purely comparative evaluations. The frameworks in EUT that do not rely on the
799 ideal set of beliefs (e.g. Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a; Easwaran 2013) can follow
800 this second strategy, provided that they ofer a solution to the problem of incom-
801 mensurable notions of rationality, either by restricting the framework to situations
802 without blindspots (e.g. Pettigrew 2016), by subscribing to a speciic theory about
803 the objects of belief (e.g. Fitelson and Easwaran 2015, p. 86), or something else.
804 The frameworks in EUT highlight the subjective character of reasoning by con-
805 sidering all situations that the reasoner inds possible (e.g. in measures of expected
806 inaccuracy); the �-model highlights the procedural character of reasoning by con-
F
807 sidering how beliefs are adopted and withdrawn (e.g. in limiting evaluations). This
diference in focus endows these approaches with diferent ainities. EUT seems to
O
808
809 be better equipped to support deliberative norms from analytical arguments. The �
O
810 -model, on the other hand, is more easily conjoined with procedural investigations
811 that use measures of actual epistemic value (e.g. Computational Epistemology).
PR
812 Analytical arguments for deliberative norms may use synchronic or diachronic eval-
813 uations. The synchronic evaluations of EUT produce, for example, arguments for
814 Probabilism (e.g. Joyce 1998). The synchronic form of evaluation is hampered in
the �-model by the existence of diferent functions � . The diachronic evaluations in
D
815
816 EUT produce, for example, arguments in favor of Bayesian conditionalization (e.g.
TE
817 Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010b). The diachronic form of evaluation in the �-model
818 may be used in arguments for deliberative norms, but only in speciic cases, such as,
819 for example, in the analysis of the lottery paradox in Sect. 4.2. This form of argu-
EC
820 mentation needs to be further investigated. There is also the possibility of using the
821 �-model ‘instantaneous’ measures in arguments, as in the sketch of the argument for
822 the principle of clutter avoidance in Sect. 3.3. This form of argumentation also needs
R
823 to be further investigated. The limiting evaluations of the �-model are diicult to
824 implement in analytical arguments. For example, the choice of an ‘actual situation’
R
825 would be rather ungrounded in an analytical argument.

O
826 The analytical strategy is much less applicable to the evaluation of complex epis-
827 temic strategies and situations. This is an example from Social Epistemology, where
NC
828 the goal is to investigate how the adoption of epistemic practices afects the aggre-
829 gated alethic value of groups of agents: which practice is epistemically more defec-
830 tive, lying and bullshitting? Frankfurt (2005, p. 61) claims that “bullshit is a greater
U
831 enemy of the truth than lies are”, but I do not think that there are analytical argu-
832 ments for either conclusion. The computational approach is more fruitful in those
833 cases. Olsson (2011), for example, constructs computer simulations where agents
834 update their credences from the interaction with other agents and compare the alethic
835 values of practices averaged over randomly generated social networks. In Olsson’s
836 framework, alethic value is measured using the V-value (Goldman 1999, Sect. 3.4).
837 This measure, which is related to t alone, is only suitable for the task because the
838 framework only deals with agents who are opinionated regarding a ixed (unitary)
13
839 agenda. The limiting evaluations of the �-model would be more adequate measures
840 of alethic value for the investigation of non-opinionated agents, agents with a vary-
841 ing number of beliefs, or agents with ininite agendas. The limiting aspect of these
842 measures can be estimated by simulating the target process with inputs of increasing
Author Proof
843 sizes and by extrapolating analytically the behavior of the resulting function.
844 Some diferences between the �-model and the frameworks in EUT result
845 from how these frameworks interpret the fulillment of the truth-goal. For exam-
846 ple, the truth-goal may be interpreted as requiring every belief update to minimize
847 (expected) inaccuracy (e.g. Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010b), but it also may be inter-
848 preted as demanding a pattern of inference to be part of the long-term achievement
849 of having the most comprehensive and accurate set of beliefs about the world (i.e.
850 maximizing actual �-value).54 There is another diference in this regard, which, I
851 think, favors the �-model. The truth-goal has two parts: believe the truths (compre-
hensiveness) and do not believe the falsehoods (accuracy). The �-model consid-
F
852
853 ers both sub-goals: comprehensiveness is measured by t, accuracy is measured by
O
854 f, their results being integrated by the function � . The Brier score alone, as used
855 in EUT, is a measure of (in)accuracy, but not comprehensiveness; the V-value is a
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856 measure of comprehensiveness, but not of accuracy. These sub-goals are redundant
857
858
859
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when we are dealing with reasoners who are opinionated regarding a ixed agenda
(and have the same number of beliefs), but this is not the case when, for example,
we are dealing with agents who explore the environment and form beliefs about new
860 propositions. As Easwaran (2013, p. 122) puts it: “Situations in which the agent
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861 comes to have credences in new propositions seem very diferent from the stand-
862 ard examples where an agent just learns that some proposition is true. ...Bayesians
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863 already know that these cases are diicult ones to account for”. The �-model pro-
864 vides a way of dealing precisely with these cases.
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877 Douven, Igor. (2013). Inference to the best explanation, dutch books, and inaccuracy minimisation. The
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921 Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
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Received 7 May 2020

2 How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual

5 Received: 7 May 2020 / Accepted: 22 January 2021

21 (comparative and non-comparative) that may be applied to inite reasoners and do

Practical rationality is related to the maximization of practical value, which is

A1 * Danilo Fraga Dantas

57 Instead of using alethic norms or evaluation methods to deine a notion of 𝛼-max-

62 (comparative and non-comparative) that do not present problems with blindspots.

65 rationality is usually related to the maximization of expected epistemic value or,

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

73 currently used, for example, in Computational Epistemology (e.g. Douven 2013),

91 In Sect. 2, I show that most normative and comparative evaluative approaches

95 eral incommensurable notions. Consequently, these evaluative approaches often fail

117 (bs1) R does not believe that bs1.

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

132 2.1 Blindspots and Norms

141 (n1) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if 𝜙 is true.

153 (n2) If R ought to believe that 𝜙, then 𝜙 is true,

154 but rejects:

155 (n2′) If 𝜙 is true, then R ought to believe that 𝜙.

174 It seems to me that as much as we may have an intuition that attempting to

189 problem is, again, that n3 is fulilled by not having beliefs.

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

192 (n4) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and truly-believable by R).

211 (n6) R may believe that 𝜙 if (𝜙 is true and truly-believable by R).

223 2.2 Blindspots and Evaluations

226 goal. In a comparative evaluative approach, a reasoner is evaluated in comparison

252 (one for each ordering).

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

298 In this Section, I propose a non-comparative evaluative function 𝛼 , which measures

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

338 (r1) 𝛼(t, f ) strictly increases with respect to t;

ing of particular credences, but not for reasoners in general.

370 Requirement r3 is related to the existence of 𝛼-maximal reasoners. An 𝛼-maximal

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

Table 1 The behavior of Function r1 r2 r3

that the functions fulill �3(t, f ) = t − f ✓ ✓ ×

400 3.2 ˛ -Maximality

401 In this Section, I use function � in a model of �-maximality that is satisiable by

412 Deinition 1 (Reasoner) A reasoner R = ⟨L, 𝙱, 𝜋⟩ is a triple, where L is a formal

413 language, 𝙱 is a set of sentences in L, and 𝜋 is a function 𝜋 ∶ 2L × 2L × ℤ+ → 2L.

426 pots, will be discussed in the following.

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

456 Deinition 2 (�-maximality) A reasoner R with reasoning sequence 𝙱0 , 𝙱1 , … , 𝙱i , …

482 components) are currently true.

32FL07 blindspots). In the

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

518 3.3 Finite Reasoners

524 Deinition 3 (Finite reasoner) A reasoner R = ⟨L, 𝙱0 , 𝜋⟩ is inite if L is recursively

527 That L is recursively enumerable (r.e.) is a requirement for L being learned by

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

565 4.1 ˛ and Norms

583 (n8) R ought to believe that 𝜙 if �(𝙱 + �) > 𝛼(𝙱 − �),

585 where 𝙱 + 𝜙 means 𝙱 ∪ {𝜙}, and 𝙱 − 𝜙 means 𝙱 ⧵ {𝜙}.

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

658 lem of incommensurable notions of rationality.

How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: An Investigation on Actual…

723 These problems are avoided using the following measure:

724 �⃗ (R) = lim �(𝙱i ∩ 𝙱� ) (3)