Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T.

Sualog | MALTBxJRT 1

Chapter I Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
1.2. Construction and Interpretation, In General
Furthermore, in our jurisdiction, the legislature intended to give the
Definitions from Henry Campbell Black, author of Black’s Law term construction the same signification as interpretation as
Dictionary: evidenced in Article 8:

Construction  as applied to written law, is the art or process of Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful either by reason of If interpretation is not the same with construction and they cannot
apparently conflicting provisions or directions, or by reason of the be used interchangeably, then judicial decisions construing the laws
or the Constitution should never form part of the legal system of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Philippines. Since the distinction between construction and
Interpretation  art or process of discovering and expounding the interpretation is blurred in practical sense and their real object is
intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning of one and the same, the two terms can be used interchangeably.
which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others.
1.4. Significance of Construction and Interpretation
One is construing when the purpose is to know the meaning of the
law itself by looking into the intention of the authors through the Construction and interpretation guides or assists the Courts as well
use of extrinsic aids. One is interpreting the law when the purpose as legal practitioners in unfolding and establishing the real meaning
and purpose of an ambiguous and obscure term or provision of the
is to know the intended signification of the word or phrase used in
the law only, based on the meaning which its authors designed it to law. It provides for certain rules, legal maxims, doctrines,
convey through the use of intrinsic aids. principles, tools, and techniques that can be observed, used or
applied in the ascertainment and determination of legislative intent
However, in the book entitled Brief Making and the Use of Law or intent of the framers in order to give effect to a statutory or
Books: The attempt to introduce a distinction between the two constitutional command.
terms has not been accepted by the profession. For practical
purposes any distinction may be ignored, in view of the real object 1.5. Statutory Construction vis-à-vis Constitutional
Construction
of both interpretation and construction, which is merely to
ascertain the meaning and will of the lawmaking body, in order that Constitutional construction  art or process of discovering and
it may be enforced.
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
As decided in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union v. with respect to its application to a given case.
National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court Constitutional construction Statutory construction
confirms that construction is the same with interpretation. There is Subject: constitution Subject: laws lower than the
no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and constitution like statutes,
scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope ordinance and their implementing
of a statute, he is interpreting it. rules and regulations
Intent: interpreter seeks to Intent: interpreter seeks to
1.3. Construction and Interpretation Can Be Used ascertain the intent of the framers ascertain and discover the intent
Interchangeably of the constitution in light of the of the legislature.
realization of the purpose of the
The common denominators between these two concepts are: people in the adoption of the
constitution.
1. They are both utilized in case of ambiguity in the law -
-- in the language used or in its application; and

Ambiguity  arises when the term or provision of the law is Chapter II

susceptible of two or more different meanings. It arises when the RELEVANT CONCEPS AND PRINCIPLES TO CONSTRUCTION
facts constituting controversy are not explicitly provided for in the AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
law. Ambiguity comes in when its literal application defeats its very 2.1. Three Branches of the Government
purpose, results to injustice and leads to absurdity.
The government of the Philippines consists of three co-equal and
2. They have the same object---to ascertain the meaning independent branches:
and will of the authors of the law in order that law may
be enforced. Executive Legislative Judiciary
Executive Power is Legislative Power; Judicial Power is
When the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be vested in the vested in the vested in one
given its literal meaning. This is based on the presumption that the President of the Congress of the Supreme Court and
words employed therein correctly express its intent and preclude Philippines.1 Philippines in such lower courts
even the courts from giving it a different construction. consisting of a Senate as may be established
and a House of by law.3
When the literal application of the law defeats its very purpose, Representatives.
results to injustice and leads to absurdity, construction and
And to the extent
interpretation are resorted to, in order to ascertain the meaning and reserved to the
will of the authors of the law in order that law may be enforced. people; initiative and
This is in accordance with: referendum.2

1 3
Consti., Article VII, Section 1. Const., Article VIII, Section 1.
2
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 2
EP is the power to LP is the power to JP is the power to 2.6. Types of Legislation
administer and make, amend, and apply or interpret
enforce laws. repeal laws. laws. Bill Joint Concurrent Simple
Resolution Resolution Resolution
- general - no real - used for - Deals
The relationships among the three branches are governed by two measure difference matters with
constitutional mandates: the principle of separation of powers; and or a between affectin matters
legislative bill and a g the entirely
principle of checks and balances.
proposal. joint reso. operatio within
- it is n of the
2.2. Principle of Separation of Powers
generally both prerogati
used houses. ve of one
This principle is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in
when house of
one person or group of persons that might lead to irreversible error dealing Congress
or abuse. It is intended to secure action, to forestall over action, to with a , such as
prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency. single adopting
item or or
Belgica v. Ochoa, citing Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral issue. receiving
Commission: refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three its own
fundamental powers of the government. Each department has rules
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is - examples: - no real - fix the - used to
proposal difference time of express
supreme within its own sphere. Lack of independence would result
or recos ; may also adjourn the
in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary dealing be used ment of opinion
or self-interest assertions of another or others. with the for a of a
economy, proposing Congres single
2.3. Principle of Checks and Balances increasing amendme s and to house on
penalties nts to the express a current
This principle means that every branch of the government does not for Constituti the issue,
encroach over the powers of another. It is intended to secure certain on. “sense call for a
coordination in the working of the various departments of the crimes, of congress
government. No branch of government is clothed with too much regulation Congres ional
on s” on an action on
power because each branch exercise some “check” over the three
common issue an issue
branches. It is created to maintain harmony of the government as a and trade. affecting
whole. national
issue
2.4. Principles of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances - prefixed - e.g. Joint - S. Ct. - P. S. Res.
vis-à-vis Principle of Judicial Independence with S/H Resolution Res. (Senate)
(if coming No. 1 – *usually and H.
In the modern of constitutional State, the principle of an from the Resolution designat Res.
independent Judiciary has its origin in the theory of separation of Senate or Extending ed in (HoR)
powers, whereby the three separate branches of government HoR) the Period the
followed of Senates
constitute a system of mutual checks and balances aimed at
by a Existence
preventing abuses of power to the detriment of a free society. This number of the
independence means that both the Judiciary as an institution and assigned Joint
also the individual judges deciding particular cases must be able to to the Congressi
exercise their professional responsibilities without being measure onal
influenced by the Executive, the Legislature or any other based on Power
inappropriate sources. the order Commissi
in which on.
Maglasang v. People: The Supreme Court is supreme --- the third it is
introduce
great department of government entrusted exclusively with the
d.
judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, - force of - force of - no force - no force
public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon law if law if of law; of law
the judgments or declare them ‘unjust.’ passed by approved it is not
both by both referred
The Spirit of Laws (Montesquieu): There is no liberty if the power chambers chambers to the
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive and & signed Pres.; it
powers. Were it joined the legislative, the life and liberty of the signed by by the must be
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would the Pres. Pres or passed
or repassed in the
be then legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
repassed by same
might behave with all the violence off an oppressor. by Congress form by
Congress over a PV. both
A. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT over a chambe
presidenti rs
2.5. Legislative Power al veto.

(see: table under 2.1)

2.7. Legislative Process; how a bill becomes a law
The Senate is composed of twenty-four Senators who are elected at
1. Introduction of a bill by a member of Congress.
large. The House of Representatives is composed of more than two
- member may introduce a number of bills;
hundred and fifty members, who are elected either from the
- may have joint sponsorship and carry several members’ names
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
- embraces only one subject which should be expressed in the
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
title
their respective inhabitants; or through a party-list system of
- signed by its author/s
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
2. Filed with the secretary of the either of the House of Rep. or
the Senate
- bill is given a corresponding number and calendared for First
Reading
3. First Reading
- Secretary General reads only the title and numbers of the bill
- Speaker/ Senate President (as the case may be) refers the bill
to the appropriate Committee/s
4. Committee Consideration/ Action
- Committee evaluates it to determine the necessity of
conducting public hearings
a. If necessary: schedules the time of public hearing, issues
public notices and invites resource persons form the
public and private sectors, the academe, and experts on
the proposed legislation
b. If not necessary: schedules the bill for Committee
discussion/s
- In both cases, the Committee may afterwards introduce
amendments, consolidate bills on the same subject matter, or
propose a substitute bill
- Prepare the corresponding committee report and then approve
it
5. Calendaring for Second Reading
- - Approved committee report is submitted to the Committee on
Rules for calendaring for Second Reading
6. Second Reading
- Secretary general reads the number, title and text of the bill,
and the following takes place:
a. Period of Sponsorship and Debate – author delivers
sponsorship speech on the floor; members of the Hor/
Senate (as the case may be) engage in debate,
interpellation, turno en contra, and rebuttal to highlight
the pros and cons of the bill.
b. Period of Amendments – incorporates necessary changes
in the bill proposed by the committee or introduced by the
members of the HoR/Senate themselves on the floor.
c. Voting – Members vote on the second reading version of
the bill. If approved, the bill is calendared for third
reading. The voting may be:
i. Viva voce – aye for affirmative or nay for opposed.
ii. Count by tellers – Speaker/ SP names one Member
from each side of the question to count the Members
in the affirmative and those in the negative.
iii. Division of the House – the Speaker/ SP shall ask
those in favour to rise, followed by those against.
iv. Nominal voting – the SG shall call, in alphabetical
order, the names of the Members who shall state
their vote as their names are called.
7. Printing and Distribution of Copies of the Bill’s Final Version
- printed copies of the final version are distributed to the Members
three days before the scheduled Third Reading
- three-day period can be dispensed with when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency
8. Third Reading
- SG reads only the number and title of the bill
- roll call or nominal voting is held
- no amendments allowed
- affirmative vote of a majority of the Members present
- yeas and nays entered into the journal
9. Other chamber’s action on the same bill
3
- similar bill should also be introduced in the other house and it
should follow the same procedures (first, second, and third
readings)
- if the other house-approved version is compatible, then the final
version’s enrolled form is printed
- however, if there are certain differences, a bicameral conference
committee will be created
10. Bicameral Conference Committee
- called to reconcile conflicting provisions of both versions of the
senate and HoR
- Conference committee submits report on the reconciled version of
the bill, duly approved by both chambers
- reconciled version in its enrolled form is printed
NOTE: enrolled bill means that it is signed by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by
both the Secretary of the Senate and Secretary General of the House
11. Presentation of the Bill to the President
- must be the enrolled bill
12. Approval of the Bill
Three ways:
1. If the President signs the bill.
2. If the bill is vetoed, the bill and the message by the President
citing the reason for the veto is transmitted to the House where
the bill originated (aka by the house who introduced it first).
If the Congress decides to override the veto, both Houses shall
proceed separately to reconsider the bill or the vetoed items of
the bill. It shall become a law if the bill or its vetoed items are
passed by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of each House,
voting separately.
3. If the President neither communicates his veto of the bill to the
House where it originated, nor signs it within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; the bill becomes a law as if he had
signed it.
12. Assignment of Republic Act Number
NOTE: A joint resolution having the force and effect of a law goes
through the same process.
2.8. Principle of Non-Delegation of Power and Its Exception
Based on Article VI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by:
a. Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and
b. The people, through the process of initiative and
referendum.
This premise mandates that Congress generally cannot delegate its
legislative power to another department. Delegata potestas non
potest delegari. This is the principle of the non-delegability of
legislative power.
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in
character may be delegated.
An example would be the Legislature’s act of delegating to executive
officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and
promulgate Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs). The rule
making authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express
legislative purpose or to effect the operation and enforcement of a
law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather
administrative in nature. The filling up of the details of the law for
its enforcement is supplementary rule-making and ascertaining of
facts to bring the law into actual operation is contingent rule-
making.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
Belgica v. Ochoa, quoring People v. Macaren: the rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
Requisites of IRRs:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
Rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just
as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. They
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality.
B. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
2.9. Executive Power
EP  vested in the President of the PH who is elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
President is also the Head of the State, Head of the Government and
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
2.10. Its Nature and Scope
Marcos v. Manglapus: laid down the existence of residual powers of
the President. The 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what
is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.”
The EP is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
2.11. Relevant Powers of the President to Constitution and
Interpretation.
Among the presidential powers are: appointing power, military
power, pardoning power, borrowing power, diplomatic power, and
budgetary power.
The following powers are relevant to statutory construction:
2.11.1. Power to Enforce Laws
The oath of the President specifically provides that he shall
faithfully and conscientiously fulfil his duties as President of the
Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, and execute its
laws. The Administrative Code of 1987 imposes a duty on the
President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
2.11.2. Power of Control
Pres has control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.
Control  power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
2.11.3. Power to Issue Orders, Rules and Regulations (Ordinance
Power)
Ordinance Power  power of the President to issue orders, rules
and regulations that relate to the implementation and execution of
laws, and govern the internal management of executive
departments, bureau, and offices. These ORRs are subjects of
statutory construction.
4
Chapter 2, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987
enumerates the rules and regulations that the President or the
Executive Branch may issue:
Executive Orders  Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in
executive orders.
Administrative Orders  Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Proclamations  Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence
of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order.
Memorandum Orders  Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular office or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders.
Memorandum Circulars  Acts of the President on matters
relating to internal administration, which the President desires to
bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or
compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
General or Special Orders  Acts and commands of the President
in his capacity as C-I-C of the AFP shall be issued in general or
special orders.
Article 7, par. 3: Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
2.11.3.1. Executive Act
Executive Act  broad enough to encompass decisions of
administrative bodies and agencies under the executive
department.
2.11.14. Power to Inform Congress
Section 23 [Article VII]. The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
This power is exercised once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for the opening of the regular session of the Congress of the
Philippines. This is known as the State of the Nation Address
(SONA).
In his speech, the President presents the state of the country by
enumerating what he has accomplished so far, discussing his
administration’s short term and long term plans, setting his
programs and projects, and proposing new legislative measures
that will accomplish or achieve those plans, programs, and projects.
He gives information, situations or circumstances that serve as
bases thereof. Otherwise, members of Congress may not find a
justification for the passage of his proposed legislative measure.
Thus, in case a provision becomes ambiguous, the Court may
determine legislative intent out of the information, situations or
circumstances that the President gave. They may serve as extrinsic
aids in determining legislative intent.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 5

C. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT These acts cannot be done in accordance with the legal maxims
casus omissus pro omisso habendus est and expressio unius est
2.12. Judicial Power exclusio alterius.
JP  is vested in one SC and in such lower courts as may be JC JL
established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to The Court reads into the law In the guise of exercising its
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally something that is contrary to its power to construe or interpret,
demandable and enforceable (traditional concept), and to express provision and justify the fills in the gaps in the law that
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion same as correcting a perceived cannot be justified by the spirit of
inadvertence. the law or by the doctrine of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
necessary implication.
or instrumentality of the government (broadened view; limits the Revise the most arbitrary and Takes place in the discharge of the
political question area). unfair action of the legislature, rule-making power when the
and rewrite the law to conform rules crafted by it diminishes,
The SC is also vested with the power of judicial review  power with what they think should be increase, or modify existing
to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, the law. substantive rights.
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional.4
The present Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to
2.13. Illustration of Hierarchy of Courts in the PH; relationships promulgate rules that would protect and enforce the constitutional
between and among courts in terms of Jurisdiction rights of the people. This rule-making power of the SC complements
the plenary legislative power of Congress:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
Appellate Court admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
Supreme Court the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
Appellate Courts rights.

Court of Appeals Court of Tax

Sandiganbayan 2.16. Duty of the Court to Apply the Law
Appeals
The rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the Court has no alternative but to apply the same
Trial Courts Regional Trial according to its clear language. It must be given its literal meaning
(Second Level Courts/ Shari's and applied without any interpretation or construction.
Courts) District Courts
Case:

Luis K. Lokin, Jr., as the second nominee of Citizens Battle Against

Metropolitan Trial Courts Corruption (CIBAC), Petitioner v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Trial Courts Metropolitan Circuit Trial and the House of Representatives, Respondents (2010): CIBAC manifested
(First Level its intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchornized national and local
Courts
Courts) elections. CIBAC President Villanueva submitted a list of five nominees from
Municipal Trial Courts which its representatives would be chosen in case they receive the required
number of qualifying votes: (1) Emmanuel Villanueva; (2) petitioner Luis K.
Shari'a Trial Courts Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang. However, prior to the elections, Villanueva filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees; and thereby
withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugma, and Galang, substituted Armi
Jane R. Borja as one of the nominees.

2.14. Power to Apply or Interpret COMELEC: in favour of the amended list and approved the withdrawal and
substitution done by President Villanueva since his acts are presumed to be
In the exercise of the Court’s judicial power, they either apply or within the scope of his authority.
interpret the law to a given case. Article 8 of the Civil Code uses the Petitioner: challenges the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 5, the
word ‘or’ between the words COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
“applying” and “interpreting”.
Issue: W/N COMELEC can issue IRRs that provide a ground for the
Apply the law  clear and unambiguous substitution of a party-list nominee not written in RA No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby
Power to interpret  when there is an actual case or controversy implements.
which involves a law that is ambiguous, or the actual case involves
Held: Section 13 of Reso No. 7804 is invalid.
doubtful and difficult question of law
The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its
2.15. Judicial Construction vis-à-vis Judicial Legislation nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. 6 The

4 6
Consti., Article VIII, Section 4(2) Section 8 of RA No. 7941: No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
5 shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC, except in cases
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. --- A party-list nominee may be substituted only
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases,
the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. An
administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
2.17. Does Construction Involve Questions of Law or Fact?
Question of Law  Arises when there is doubt as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts. It must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them.
Question of Fact  Arises when doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.
If the case or petition can be resolved solely on what the law
provides under the undisputed facts then the issue therein is a
question of law, and the rules on construction and interpretation
can be resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable interpretation
of the law involved.
Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation (THDC) v. Atty.
Francisco Escano, Jr.: respondent Atty. Escano alleged that the seven
grounds raised by THDC involved questions of facts, rather than rule of law,
which are not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court
concluded that the argument is misleading since a perusal of the present
petition shows that the issues raised by THDC are questions of law, as the
same can be resolved solely on what the law provides under the undisputed
facts.
2.18. Stare Decisis
Stare Decisis is derived from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non
quieta movere  to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things
that are settled or follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled.
Stare Decisis  “let the decision stand.” It is a general procedural
law principle which deals with the effect of previous but factually
similar disposition to subsequent case. It creates a doctrine which
is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like
cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same
jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or
overruled by a court of competent authority.
Basis of SD in our jurisdiction is entrenched under:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Judicial decisions  decisions of the SC only and not of the lower
courts.
2.19. Is the Supreme Court Bound to Follow the Principle of Stare
Decisis?
Yes, the SC is bound to adhere to the principle, unless there are
powerful countervailing considerations that will require deviation
therefrom. This rule proceeds from the principle of justice that like
cases ought to be decided alike. Under Article VII of the 1987
Constitution:
Section 4. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.
2.20. Importance of the Principle of Stare Decisis in Statutory or
Constitutional Construction
7 8
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
6
The application or interpretation made in a prior case should be
likewise made applicable to the subsequent factually similar cases.
It constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted.
Two landmark cases decided by the SC wherein the principle was
thoroughly explained to establish that the doctrines laid down in
the prior cases were not controlling to these landmark cases.
2.21. First Landmark Case: In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta and
De Castro v. JBC
In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
(1998): Chief Justice Narvasa did not recognize the appointments of Hon.
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta because he believed that they were made in
violation of Section 15 of Article VII 7 which prohibits the President from
making an appointment within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term.
Held: The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) 8 and
99 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provide therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments
comes into effect only once every six years.
The appointments were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to
appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or
influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the
period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a strong public policy for the
prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.
Arturo M. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo: the controversy arose from the compulsory retirement
of CJ Puno seven days after the presidential election. Valenzuela was weak
because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers
rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Valenzuela
undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of
the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments.
Furthermore, had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of the
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. Thus, JBC
was directed to resume its proceedings or the nomination of candidates.
Motion for reconsideration: contended that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning
Valenzuela.
Held: No basis. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be
followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a
doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.
2.23. Second Landmark Case: Philconsa v. Enriquez, LAMP v.
Secretary of Budget and Management, and Belgica v. Ochoa
Belgica v. Ochoa: decisions in the Philconsa and LAMP do not bar the
relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” under
the principle of stare decisis.
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision was resolved by the Court. Petitioners contend that the
power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and
activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power. The Court reached the following main conclusions: (1)
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
9
Section 9. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 7
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the “power of the Public Laws Private Laws
purse” belongs to the Congress; (2) the power of appropriation carries with Governs the conduct of state, Any portion of a law that governs,
it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the government, public officials and defines, regulates and
appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to employees, their relationships administers the relationships
be; and (3) the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress with each other, and their among private individuals,
are merely recommendatory. The Philconsa resolution was a limited response relationships with the people. corporations, and organizations.
to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring Affects the society as a whole. Affects an individual, a family, or
post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. a small group.
Constitutional law, criminal law, Civil law, labor law, commercial
LAMP case was dismissed on a procedural technicality. It has not set any administrative law, and tax law. law, corporation law.
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive
issues in these cases. Stare decisis would not apply.

In the present case, Belgica calls for a more holistic examination of: (1) the 3.2.4. According to their force: Mandatory/ Prohibitory vis-à-vis
inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative Directory Laws
as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (2) the intra-relation
of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Mandatory Law Prohibitory Law Directory Law
Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification Commands the doing, Operates to Provides for either a
but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the performance, or restrain the direction or an
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, observe of an act. commission of an instruction, the
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a Something must be act, or command observance of which
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle. done. a person from not is a matter of
doing an act. convenience. It has no
Furthermore, Philconsa is riddled with constitutional inconsistencies which Something must obligatory force.
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. The former not be done. Violation is a mere
validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress irregularity.
on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. As held in the case NOTE: Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or
of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, it has effectively overturned prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
Philconsa’s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of their validity.
the separation of powers.
3.2.5. According to their effect and operation

Prospective Law Retroactive Law

Applies to acts, situations or Applies to acts, situations, or
events that will happen after its events that happened even before
effectivity. The law looks its passage or enactment. The law
CHAPTER III
forward. looks backward.
LAWS: CONSTITUTION, STATUTE, AND ORDINANCE
A. Law
3.2.6. According to the terms used for their expression
3.1. Definition
Two concepts: Affirmative Laws Negative Laws
General or abstract sense Specific sense or material sense Couched in affirmative terms Expressed in negative terms. It is
The science of moral rules A rule of conduct, just obligatory, generally a prohibitive law.
founded on the rational nature of promulgated by legitimate NOTE: A particular law may be classified as general, substantive,
man, which governs his free authority, and of common public, mandatory, affirmative, and prospective.
activity, for the realization of the observance and benefit.
individual and social ends, of a B. The Subjects of Construction and Interpretation
nature both demandable and
reciprocal. Constitutional construction and Statutory construction and
interpretation interpretation
Subject: constitution Subjects: laws lower than the
3.2. Classification of Law constitution which include
statutes, ordinance and the
3.2.1. According to the extent of their enforceability or administrative IRRs issued
applicability: GSL pursuant thereto.

General Laws Special Laws Executive orders, administrative

Enforceable throughout the entire
territory of a state. It is applicable
to all people or applicable to all
persons in the same class if the
law applies to a specific class.
3.2.2. According to whether a right is created or a procedure of
the enforcement of a right is provided
Substantive Laws
Creates a right, and imposes and
obligation.
3.2.3. According to the persons affected
Limited to specific territory of a
state or is applicable to a
particular person.
Example: Local law
Procedural Laws
Provides for the mechanisms or
steps by which a right may be
enforced or a wrong may be
redressed.
orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders,
memorandum circulars, general
or special orders issued by the
President.
NOTE: Contracts are not subjects of statutory and constitutional
constructions. Their interpretation is generally covered by the Civil
Code10 and the Rules of Court11.
CONSTITUTION
3.3. Definition and Purpose
Constitution  a written enactment by the direct action of the
people providing for the form of government and defining the
powers of the several departments, thus, creating a fundamental
law which is absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanated.

10 11
Articles 1370-1379. Interpretation of Contracts. Rule 130.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 8

Purpose: prescribe the permanent framework of the system of National Assembly established by
government and assign to the different departments their virtue of the 1935 Constitution.
respective powers and duties, and to establish certain fixed first First, Unicameral (1935), then
Bicameral (1941).
principles on which government is founded.
Republic Act (RA) 1st – 7th Congress (1946-1972)
3.4. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
Congress of the PH after the
restoration of the PH
If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law Independence on July 4, 1946.
or contract is null and void without any force and effect. The Presidential Decree (PD) President Marcos
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Made after the proclamation of
Martial Law on September 21,
3.5. Constitution vs. Statutes 1972.
Batas Pambansa (BP) Batasang Pambansa (1978-1986)
Constitution Statute
Usually states general principles, Must provide the details of the Established by virtue 1973
and builds the substantial subject of which it treats. Constitution: first, the Interim
foundation and general Batasang Pambansa (1978), then
framework of the law and the Regular Batasang Pambansa
government. (1984).
NOTE: a constitutional provision is a higher form of statutory law, Executive Order (EO) President Corazon C. Aquino
wherein the people may provide that it shall be self-executing
where the object is to put it beyond the power of the legislature to Pursuant to Section 1, Article II of
the Provisional Constitution and
render such provision nugatory by refusing to pass laws to carry
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
into effect. Constitution.
Republic Act (RA) 8th --- Present Congress
Case:
Under the 1987 Constitution.
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Petitioner v. La Trinidad Water
District, Respondent (2011): TMPC filed with the National Water Resource
Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to
operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang. LWTD claimed
3.9. Parts of a Statute
that under Section 47 of PD No. 198, its franchise is exclusive.
These different parts of a statute serve as intrinsic aids in
Held: Unconstitutional. The President, Congress, and the Court cannot create construction.
directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in
character. The Constitution expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of 1. Official Citation  nomenclature of the statute and its number
franchises that are exclusive in character.
which is the cardinal, ordinal, and nominal number of the
Section 47 of PD No. 198 allows the Board of Directors (BOD) and the Local statute.
Water Utilities Administration (LMUA) to create directly franchises that are a. Cardinal – how many statutes had been passed
exclusive in character. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a already before this particular statute
statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic
b. Ordinal – order of the particular statute
law to which all other laws must conform. The duty of the Court is to uphold
the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. c. Nominal – a way to identify the statute
2. Title  name by which the statute is known. It can either be
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates long or short.
any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by
a. Long title  situated outside the main text of the
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void, and without any force and effect. Thus, statute. It comes before the enacting clause and
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount, and supreme law of preamble. It contains one subject and generally
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. describes the statute’s purpose and effects.
b. Short title  formal name by which the statute may
STATUTE be cited. It is usually designated in a specific section
in the statute.
3.6. Definition
3. Enacting Clause  declares the legislative authority of the
Statute  the law enacted by the legislature. It must be expressed legislature that enacted the statute and gives the statute the
in a form, and must be passed in accordance with the procedures, force of law.
provided by law for its validity. 4. Preamble  enumerates the aims or objectives of a statute. It
declares the principles and states the policies that guide the
3.7. Nomenclature of Statutes in the Philippines since 1901 legislature in enacting the statute.

Nomenclature/ Abbreviation/ Legislature/ Competent

The present Constitution doesn’t have a preamble, but the aims
Sample Authority
Public Act (Act) Philippine Commission and or objectives for the enactment may still be found from the
Philippine Assembly (1901-1935) explanatory note  cover letter of the bill that became the
statute. It gives the purpose, laws down the reason, and
1901 – Legislative Acts of the PH provides an overview or explains the necessity for the bill’s
Commission
After 1907 – PH Commission
enactment.
(upper house) and PH Assembly
(lower house) 5. Body - main body of the statute follows the Preamble. The body
After Jones Law or PH Autonomy or its part is subdivided into:
Act of 1916 – PH Senate and PH
a. Section  numbered in bold type and written as
HoR
Commonwealth Act (CA) Commonwealth Congress (1935- Section [number].
1946)
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
b. Epigraph  brief statement of what each section is
about. It is heading of each section.
c. Subsection  numbered in standard type and
enclosed in brackets.
d. Paragraph  an association of sentences that gives
a point or an idea. Usually one may have one
paragraph but there is no limitation on the number
of paragraphs per section.
Towards the end of a statute there are other formal
sections. These may include:
6. Separability Clause  if any provision, part or portion of the
statute shall be declared unconstitutional, the other provisions,
parts or portions which are not affected shall remain valid and
effective unless the remaining provisions, parts or potions will
no longer stand as a good law.
7. Repealing Clause  indicates the prior law that it revokes in
case of an express repeal. It may also provide a general
statement that other laws contrary to or inconsistent with the
provisions of the statute or any part thereof are repealed,
amended and/or modified accordingly.
8. Effectivity Clause  states when the law will take effect or
become effective.
9. Definition Section  gives the meaning of key terms in the
text of the statute.
10. Interpretation Section  rule on how the statute shall be
interpreted in case of ambiguity in any provision thereof.
11. Saving clause  limits the application or operation of a new
statute to already existing rights, obligations and procedures
when the new statute will affect them. It avoids the
impairment of vested rights, existing obligations and
contracts.
Case:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party-List v. COMELEC (2009): Petitioner alleges the title of RA
No. 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither
embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA No. 9369.
Respondents claim that the title is broad enough to encompass topics which
deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its
purpose of encouraging transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
Doctrine: requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to
achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may
be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory act need not be further stated.
Held: RA No. 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution (One
subject One title). RA No. 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act
amending ra no. 8436, entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the Commission on
Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National
or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises,
To Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pampansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic
Act no. 7166 and Other Related Elections Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and
For Other Purposes.’ The provisions of RA No. 9369 assailed by petitioner deal
with amendments to specific provisions of RA No. 7166 and BP Blg. 881. The
assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA No. 9369 which
is to amend RA No. 7166 and BP Blg. 881, among others.
ORDINANCE
3.10. Definition
Ordinance  law passed by the legislative bodies of the local
government units.
9
3.11. Ordinance v. Resolution
Ordinance Resolution
A law Merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific
matter
Possesses a general and Temporary in nature.
permanent character.
Third reading is necessary for Not needed, unless decided
its enactment. otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.
3.12. Test of a Valid Ordinance
Requisites:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Cases:
Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College (2013): SSC owns properties in
Marikina, which are enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina
City enacted ordinances, in accordance with their police power, which
prohibited the building of walls and fences within a five-meter allowance
from the front monument line and the building line of an establishment and
religious/educational institution, and to make fences 80% see thru.
Petitioners sent a letter to respondent to demolish and replace their fence to
follow said ordinances. In return, respondents filed a petition for prohibition
with an application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. RTC granted petition, and CA affirmed.
Held: The ordinances in question are not valid exercises of police power. To
successfully invoke the exercise of police power for enactment of an
ordinance, the Court used two tests; rational basis (which checks if they
rationally further a legitimate gov’t interest), and the strict scrutiny test. Both
ordinances in question failed said test, the five-meter allowance ordinance
violating Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and the 80% see-thru
ordinance being a violation of the right to privacy, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila: Manila Mayor Lim signed into a
law an ordinance which prohibited “Short-time Admission” in hotels, inns, et
al. in the City of Manila. Petitioners, components of the Anito Group of
Companies (which own and operate hotels + motels in Metro Manila),
challenged the validity of said ordinance. Petitioners argued that it is
unconstitutional due to it violating to the right to privacy and freedom of
movement, and that it is an invalid exercise of police power. RTC rendered
said ordinance null and void, and CA reversed RTC’s decision.
Held: The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
use of the covered establishment for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use, and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall under
the ambit of the Police Power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends
do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
C. Doctrine of Vagueness v. Doctrine of Overbreadth
Doctrine of Vagueness  A statute suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
aspects:
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
(1) It violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and
(2) It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
Overbreadth doctrine  decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. Its application is limited to a facial kind of challenge and
applicable only to free speech cases.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism
Council: Petitioners assailed for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under
R.A. No. 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Held: The overbreadth doctrine was not applied because RA No.
9372 is a penal statute which does not regulate speech so as to
permit a facial analysis of its validity using such doctrine. On the
other hand, the vagueness doctrine was not applied in the case
because petitioners established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA No. 9372 that would
warrant a vagueness analysis.
Chapter IV
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
4.1. In General
Legislative intent  purpose of the legislature in enacting the law,
or the meaning the legislature seeks to convey.
In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow
the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest
manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. This is
based on the Latin maxim ratio legis est anima legis or the reason of
law is the soul.
4.2. Rules in Determining Legislative Intent vis-à-vis the
Interpretation That Must Be Accorded to the Law
In statutory construction, the interpretation based on letters is
considered first before an interpretation based on spirit and reason.
4.2.1. Literal Rule
Verba legis  plain-meaning rule; where the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal interpretation.
Related Latin maxims:
Index animi sermo  speech is the index of intention.
Verba legis non est recedendum  from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
Where a literal meaning would defeat the clear purpose of the
legislature; or would result to contradiction, injustice or absurdity,
the court considers the spirit and reason of the law.
4.2.2. Purpose Rule
In construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept
in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. Hence, between two interpretations,
the one that defeats the purpose for which the law is enacted shall
10
be disregarded and the order that achieves the intended purpose of
the legislature shall be upheld.
4.2.3. Mischief Rule
Mischief  the problem or the evil which the legislature wants to
solve or put an end.
The focus of this rule is the mischief which the law seeks to
suppress. In construing a law, the evil and the remedy for its
suppression should be kept in mind and the law should be construed
in the light of the evils sought to be remedied. If the law aims to
solve a problem, any ambiguity in the law should be resolved in such
a way as to favour such aim.
4.2.4. Golden Rule
Ordinary words must be given their ordinary and natural meanings,
and special or technical words their special or technical meanings,
unless the meaning would result to absurdity.
4.3. Legislative Intent Can Be Discovered from the Four Corners
of the Statute
Municipality of Nueva Ecija, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte: In order to discover said intent, the whole
statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be
considered. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must
be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.
4.4. Care Should Be Taken that Every Part of the Statute be Given
Effect
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a
statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President: Ombudsman was dismissed from
service, and a disciplinary case was initiated against a Special Prosecutor, by
the Office of the President. The issue is whether the Office of the President
has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman. The court was confronted of two
apparently conflicting provisions of Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA No. 6770).
Section 21 declares that the Office of the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, while Section
8(2) grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Held: A harmonious construction of these two provisions leads to the
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over the petitioners. In perusing
the Congressional deliberations, the manifest intent of Congress was to
provide for an external authority. Such legislative design is simply a measure
of “check and balance” intended to address the lawmaker’s real and valid
concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another
from administrative liabilities.
Chapter V
PRESUMPTION
5.1. Definition
Professor James Bradley Thayer: presumption aids to reasoning and
argumentation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the
purpose of some given inquiry. They may by grounded on general
experience, or probability of any kind; or merely on policy and
convenience.
5.2. Effects of Presumption in Construction and Interpretation
A presumption affects the burden of proof. He who claims the
contrary has the duty to present evidence necessary to establish his
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
claim by the amount of evidence required by law. One who
challenges the unconstitutionality of a law has to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality
being enjoyed by such law.
The presumption will likewise guide the Court in arriving at the
right interpretation. In case the text of the law is susceptible to two
or more sensible interpretations, the Court should consider the one
that will uphold justice or will make the law effective since the law
presumes that the legislature intends justice and fairness to prevail.
5.3. Relevant Presumptions
Presumption against Unconstitutionality, Presumption against
Violation of International Law, Presumption against Injustice,
Presumption against Absurdity, Presumption against
Ineffectiveness, Presumption against Undesirable Consequences,
Presumption against Implied Repeal, and Presumption against
Retrospective Operation of Laws.
5.4. Presumption Against Unconstitutionality
The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every
presumption should be indulged in favour of the constitutionality
and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.12
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In case
of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a law based
on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved
it.
5.5. Requisites for Judicial Inquiry in Constitutional Litigation
(a) There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(b) The person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
(d) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mora of the
case.
5.5.1. A. Actual Controversy
An AC is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, and that
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication, that is,
the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it.
5.5.1.1. Moot and Academic Principle
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits. An academic discussion of a case
presenting a moot question is not necessary, because a judgment on
the case cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.
5.5.1.2. Exception to the Moot and Academic Principle
The Court can still validly exercise its power of judicial review
and decide cases which are otherwise moot, if:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
12
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management, citing Farinas v. The Executive Secretary.
11
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
3. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
5.5.2. B. Legal Standing
Locus standi  a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.
a. In private suits – standing is governed by the “real-parties-in-
interest” rule.13 Every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.
Real party in interest  the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
b. In public suits – plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action and does so as a representative
of the general public.
Direct injury test  the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result.
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
(1) The cases involves constitutional issues;
(2) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;
(4) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
(5) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
5.5.3. C. Earliest Opportunity
Section 5, Article VIII. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
5.5.4. D. Lis Mota
It means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the
statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that
the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. [Apply presumption of
constitutionality]
13 Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
5.6. ‘Not Constitutional’ or ‘Unconstitutional’
Unconstitutional. The statement recognizes the presumption of
constitutionality that every statute enjoys. Such statement
presupposes that the one challenging the constitutionality of the
statute had discharged his burden of presenting evidence necessary
to establish his claim by the amount of evidence required by law in
order to overcome such presumption.
The statement that the statute is not constitutional negates the
presumption of constitutionality because it gives an impression that
the statute has never been constitutional.
5.7. Effects of the Unconstitutionality of a Provision of a Statute
General rule: where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
The valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it
by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact
the other.
Exception: when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
vitiate the rest.
5.8. Presumption Against Violation of International Law
Basis of the Presumption
The primary basis of this presumption is the incorporation clause
(Article II, Section 2) of the Constitution which states that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the land.
The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda
demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the
part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty
must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly,
treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.
5.8.1. International Law vs. Administrative Issuances
Deutsche Bank AG Manila v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2013): In
accordance with Sec. 28(A)(5) 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997, petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent the amount
of P67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent branch profit
remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted
to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for prior taxable years.
Petitioner: requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a
confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the
RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Respondent: The requirement of prior application under Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 1-2000 (RMO No. 1-2000) is mandatory in character.
Thus, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances which partakes the
nature of a statute and have in their favour a presumption of legality.
CTA: denied the claim and ruled that prior application for a tax treaty relief
is mandatory, and noncompliance with this prerequisite is fatal to the
taxpayer’s availment of the preferential tax rate.
Ruling: Those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty cannot totally be
deprived of the benefit on the sole ground of failure to file the tax treaty relief
application before the transaction as required under RMO No. 1-2000. A state
that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the
fulfilment of the obligations undertaken. Thus, laws and issuances must
ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties
entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would
negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
12
agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for
any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
5.9. Presumption Against Injustice
Art. 10., NCC. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines: The case involved a crime of
rape committed by a foreign tourist against a Filipino minor and the execution
of the final judgment in the civil case for damages on the tourist’s dollar
deposit with a local bank. The local bank and the Central Bank refused to
recognize the writ of execution invoking the said section. The Court held that
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused and that would negate Article 10 of the Civil Code. The Court ordered
respondents Central Bank of the PH, the local bank, and the accused to comply
with the writ of execution issued in the civil case for damages and to release
the dollar deposit of the accused to satisfy the judgment.
5.10. Presumption Against Absurdity
An interpretation that causes inconvenience and absurdity is
not favoured.
The primary basis of this presumption is the Golden Rule which
allows a departure from the literal interpretation if it would result
to injustice or lead to absurdity.
5.10.1. When is there absurdity?
There is absurdity when the literal interpretation:
1. Causes unnecessary inconvenience;
2. Requires the doing of something that is impossible;
3. Creates internal inconsistency or incompatibility within a
statute or a particular provision thereof, or creates
repugnancy to what the statute or the particular provision
provides for; and
4. Makes the law illogical, incoherent or incompatible with
the legislative intent or intent of the framers of the
constitution.
5.10.1.1. The literal interpretation requires the doing of
something that is impossible
This is based on the maxim Lex non cogit ad impossibilia which
means that the law does not require the impossible.
5.10.1.2. The literal interpretation creates internal
inconsistency or incompatibility within a statute or the
particular provision, or creates repugnancy to what the statute
or the particular provision provides for.
Brent School v. Zamora: the entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in Article 289 of the Labor Code clearly appears to
prevent circumvention of the employee’s right to be secure in his tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment
was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former over the latter. Unless, thus, limited in its purview,
the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated
by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects
and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.
5.10.1.3. The literal interpretation makes the law illogical,
incoherent or incompatible with the legislative intent or intent
of the framers of the Constitution.
Gamboa v. Teves: the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution was interpreted as referring only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors (common shares only), and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred
shares; the Court did not construe the term “capital” broadly in order to avoid
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
the glaring anomaly (absurdity) that might be created by giving such term a
broad definition.
Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Development and/or
Philippine Estate Corporation (2013): The Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC)’s debts to various government financial institutions was
transferred to the National Government (NG), through the Committee of
Privatization/Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and the Bureau of Treasury. As
a result, the APT slated the privatization of PNCC for maximum cash
generation, and announced a public bidding of the NG’s stocks, receivables,
and securities in the PNCC. Dong-A Consortium, of which respondent is a part,
signified its intention to bid.
APT declared that respondent, among others, qualified as bidders. It also
announced that the indicative price of PNCC properties was Php 7Billion,
which shocked the bidders. The bidders, nevertheless, pushed through with
the bidding, with Dong-A Consortium having the highest bid of
Php1.22Billion, which was rejected by APT due to not meeting the indicative
price. Respondent filed a Complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of
Award and/or Damages against PMO (who replaced APT by virtue of PD 323)
and PNCC. The RTC ruled that PMO committed GAOD by refusing to explain
the basis for the indicative price, thus violating the public’s right to
information and the State’s policy of full transparency. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s Decision.
Held: The people’s right to information does not warrant the award of the
bid to Dong-A Consortium. The court does not condone the incongruous
interpretation of the courts a quo that the public’s right to information merits
both an explanation of the indicative price and an automatic award of the bid
to Dong-A. this absurdity is not favored.
5.10.2. Absurdity in Procedural Laws
Procedural laws of mandatory in character in terms of compliance
may be relaxed if the strict adherence thereto would result to
absurdity and manifest injustice.
5.11. Presumption Against Ineffectiveness
An interpretation that would make the law effective by achieving its
intended purpose should be favoured. The language of the law must
be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute since the
primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent.
5.12. Presumption Against Undesirable Consequences
There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favoured,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
5.13. Presumption Against Implied Repeal
5.13.1. Repeal
Repeal  abrogation of an existing law by the passage of a later
law that revokes the former. It can either be express or implied.
Express repeal  happens when there is a provision in the later
law that specifically indicates the prior law that it seeks to repeal.
The later law must identify either the title or number of the prior
law. *It can be usually found in the repealing clause of the later law.
Implied repeal  arises when the later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the prior law and their
harmonization is not possible.
5.13.2. Repeal by Implications is Not Favored
General rule: repeals by implications are not favoured. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
13
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
The Article speaks of an express repeal. The wise policy is for the
judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that
they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give
effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to
a coordinate department of the government.
Two accepted instances of implied repeal:
(1) Takes place when the provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case,
the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one.
(2) The second occurs when the later act covers the whole subject
of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus,
it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
5.13.3. Repeal v. Amendment
Repeal  complete abrogation by the enactment of a subsequent
statute.
Amendment  an alteration in the law already existing, leaving
some part of the original still standing.
5.13.4. Examples of Repeals
Express repeal  see 5.13.1.
General repealing clause  a clause which predicates the intended
repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
in existing and prior acts.
If no GAC present, then it indicates that the intent was not to repeal
any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. If it falls in
the latter situation, then it is an implied repeal.
5.13.5. Desuetude
A statute is not repeal by non-use. Article 7 of the Civil Code states
that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or
practice to the contrary.
Cases:
Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc (2013): PGMA
issued EO No. 156 (2002) which imposes a partial ban on the importation of
used motor vehicles. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. attacked the validity
EO No. 156 for having been superseded by EO No. 418 (2005) which modified
the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles.
Held: No, EO No. 418 did not repeal EO No. 156. The subsequent issuance of
EO No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter
the policy of the executive department to prohibit the importation of said
vehicle. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal prev. administration issuances. EO 156 is very explicit in its
prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, EO
No. 418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on
used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes the importation ban.
Penera v. COMELEC (2009): Before proceeding to file her Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC), Penera had a motorcade around the town. The motorcade
included various vehicles laden with posters that showed the names of their
candidates and the positions they sought. One of the trucks had a public
speaker that announced Penera’s candidacy for mayor. COMELEC ruled in
Penera’s disqualification case, stating that these acts constitute election
campaign before the start of the campaign period. Penera argued that she was
not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Sec. 15 of RA No. 8436
as amended by Section 13 of RA No. 9369.
Held: The law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other
than printing of ballots. Congress has laid down the law --- a candidate is
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. The
Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that
“any person who files his CoC within the filing period shall only be considered
a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. The law also states that any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period.
Lledo v. Lledo (2010): Carmelita Lledo filed an administrative case against
her husband, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo charging him with immorality,
abandonment, and conduct unbecoming of a public official. The Court
dismissed him from the service and forfeited all retirement benefits and leave
credits. Cesar Jr. asked the Court for retroactive application of the Court’s
ruling subsequent to his father’s dismissal, wherein the Court ruled that
despite being dismissed from the service, government employees are entitled
to the monetary equivalent of their leave credits since these were earned
prior to dismissal. GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund
since an employee/member who had been dismissed from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he
has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise.
Held: The court granted Atty. Lledo’s son’s petition and directed GSIS to
return to Atty. Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus
interest of three percent per annum, compounded monthly. The court re-
examined the laws governing the GSIS. Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186, as amended reads:(d) Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary
separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and
voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum,
compounded monthly. Two laws were passed amending Commonwealth Act
No. 186. These are PD 1146 and RA 8291.The repealing clause of P.D. No. 1146
reads: Section 48 Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law specifically
inconsistent herewith shall be considered amended or repealed accordingly.
On the other hand R.A. No. 8291’s repealing clause states:
SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. All laws and any other law or parts of law
specifically inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly: Provided, That the rights under existing laws, rules and
regulations vested upon or acquired by an employee who is already in the
service as of the effectivity of this Act shall remain in force and effect:
Provided, further, That subsequent to the effectivity of this Act, a new
employee or an employee who has previously retired or separated and is
reemployed in the service shall be covered by the provisions of this Act.
Following the decision in Mecano vs. COA, the court classified the two
clauses as implied repeals and ruled that none of the said laws substituted
the provision of Section 11 (d) of the Commonwealth Act No. 186. Therefore,
the said act should apply to the instant case.
5.14 Presumption against Retrospective Operation of Laws
General rule: laws shall have prospective effect.
Chapter VI
MAXIMS, DOCTRINES, RULES, AND GUIDELINES IN
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
6.1. Dura Lex Sed Lex
The Latin maxim means “the law is harsh but that is the law.”
Justice Renato Corona: When the law is clear, there is no other
recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness.
Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to
oppress one in order to favour another. The Court has the duty to
adjudicated conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision
of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and
justice.
14
Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian
Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final. An appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR,
14
6.2. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus
The Latin maxim means that “where the law does not distinguish,
neither should the Court.” Words or phrases of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification.
Cases:
Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego v. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City (2013):
Petitioner was charged with violation of RA No. 9262. He insists that the act
which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA
No. 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Held:
While it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA No. 9262 to be applicable, it is
not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then the punishable acts refer to all
acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship.
Spouses Plopenio v. Department of Agrarian Reform (2012): Petitioners
offered their entire landholdings to the DAR for acquisition and distribution
pursuant to RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Public
respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication.
Dissatisfied with their offer, the petitioners rejected the notice and referred
the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Camarines Sur for summary administrative proceedings. PARAD affirmed the
valuation made by Land Bank. Petitioners filed before the Special Agrarian-
RTC (SAC-RTC) who then ruled that the PARAD Decision had already attained
finality because the petitioners failed to file their appeals on time. Petitioners
then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before the Supreme Court.
Held: Immediately dismissible because the petitioners resorted to a wrongful
mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitioners directly with the
Supreme Court. In accordance with Rule 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law 14, petitioner should have appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and
regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals
therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states that
appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a
distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely
with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule
that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to
whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
6.3. Generalia Verba Sunt Generaliter Inteligencia
The Latin maxim means that “general words are understood in a
general sense.”
General Rule: A word which has general and restrictive meanings
must be understood in its general sense. The general meaning
prevails over the restricted meaning.
Exception: When it was clearly intended that the word must be
understood in its restricted sense.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
et al.: “promulgation” interpreted in the context in which it is
generally understood---to make known. Black’s Law Dictionary: to
publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or
obligatory. Constitutional Commission did not restrict
“promulgation” to “publication”
Case:
People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante (2009): Victoria Amante was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at
the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold
as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which
she headed. No liquidation was made after almost two years and so on
December 22, 1995, a demand letter was issued by the City Auditor asking
respondent to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours from
receipt of the demand. Upon the recommendation of the Commission on Audit
(COA), the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas)
resolved to file an Information for Malversation of Public Funds. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) found probable cause to indict respondent
Amante and thus on May 21, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP)
filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 (The Auditing Code of the Philippines).
Respondent Amante asserted that Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
said criminal case because she was then a local official who was occupying a
position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 provides that
the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the
accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
Held: In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those
that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated
by the same law. Specifically mentioned are members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides
that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the
alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The provision of the law shows
that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only
to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's
office.
Moreover, Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of
a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation
and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.
6.4. Number --- Singular and Plural
Basic rule of statutory construction is that a word covers its
enlarged and plural sense.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC: the term “any candidate” should be
construed also to mean some or all candidates. The term “any
person” is applicable to two or more persons.
6.5. Gender---Masculine and Feminine
Word that imports the masculine gender shall also include the
feminine gender and vice versa, unless a contrary intention appears.
6.6. Reddendo Singula Singulis
The Latin maxim means “that the words in different parts of a
statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to
each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible,
rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where
15
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.”
15
words under consideration appear in different sections or are
widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.
Amadora v. Court of Appeals: maxim was applied in interpreting
Article 218015 of the Civil Code. The provision should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall
be answerable. Following the canon of RSS “teachers” should apply
to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of
arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.”
6.7. Ejusdem Generis
The Latin maxim means “of the same kind.”
Where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
Purpose: to give effect to both the particular and general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as including all that is embraced in said class and the general
words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words. If the law-making body
intended the general terms to be used in their restricted sense, it
would not have made an enumeration of particular subjects but
would have used only general terms.
6.7.2. Illustration: A, B, C, D E F, and others. The meaning of others
shall be limited to the same kind or class of the specific terms it
follows.
Case:
Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. The Province of Benguet (2013): Petitioner
Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which
has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. Provincial Board
of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59 of the tax
ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to
"resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."
Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the
taxing powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local
Government Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy
of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or
similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided.
The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of
amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the
LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment
synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."
Held: Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not
barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of
percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as
otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception.
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement
taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the
LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether
amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places hinges on
whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase
follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or
where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement
Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or
viewing the show or performances.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are
visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or
operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.
6.7.2. Non-Applicability of the Ejusdem Generis
Belgica v. Ochoa: petitioners contended that Sec. 8 of PD No. 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” gives the President
unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used.
Respondents urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis in
order to construe the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President to refer only to other purposes related” to energy
resource, development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government.
Court agreed with the petitioners’ contention. It does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used. The subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government”
under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include---or be restricted---things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: (1) The phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase “for such purposes” may limited; (2)
The said phrase also exhausts the class I represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and (3) The Executive department
has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position
that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government.”
6.8. Noscitur A Sociis
The Latin maxim means “known by his associates.” The proper construction
of a particular word, term or phrase that is susceptible to various meanings,
may be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase
in question is founded or with which it is associated.
6.8.1. Illustration
People v. Delanar: the accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article
3 of RA No. 7610 when he delivered and pimped an 11 year old to. The accused
was considered a de facto guardian which was not sufficient to justify the
imposition of the higher penalty. According to noscitur a sociis, the correct
construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be
made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
found. Section 31(c) of RA No. 7610 contains a listing of circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the
imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity. The words with which “guardian”
is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship.
6.9. Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est vis-à-vis
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
6.10. Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est means that “a
case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”
The omission of a person, object or thing from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally.
16
6.11. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius states that the
“express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others.” Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare
tacitum --- “what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.”
The legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in
a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
These two legal maxims can function together. They both relate to
the omission of a person, thing or object in a statute.
The casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that the omission
of a person, object or thing from an enumeration has been
intentionally made and the omitted thing, person or object is
understood to have been excluded therefrom pursuant to expression
unius est exclusion alterius. Thus, the Court has no power to add a
clearly omitted and excluded person, thing or object by mere
judicial construction.
Cases:
Canet v. Decena (2004): Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed
Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet
to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula,
Camarines Sur. Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999,
entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other
Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and
Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof.” When
this was submitted to respondent Mayor Juliet Decena, there were lacking
rules and regulations on the subject at hand and a separability clause. Hence,
it was reverted to the Sangguniang Bayan. Further, in Resolution No. 078,
Series of 1999, Sangguniang Bayan voted to withdraw, set aside and shelf
indefinitely Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999.
Meanwhile, petitioner Canet applied for a mayor’s permit for the operation
of his cockpit. Decena denied Canet’s application on the ground that under
the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the
regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in
the Sangguniang Bayan. Canet then filed a suit against the mayor invoking
the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local
municipal tax ordinances which generally provide for the issuance of a
mayor’s permit for the operation of businesses.
Held: It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 which provided for the collection of
application filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit fees, filing fees
for the institution of complaints, entrance fees and special derby assessments
for the operation of cockpits. This Ordinance, however, was withdrawn by
the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit,
Resolution No. 049, S. 1998 cannot be implemented. To compel respondent to
issue the mayor’s permit would not only be a violation of the explicit
provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would
also be an undue encroachment on respondent’s administrative prerogatives.
Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied upon by petitioner
objects which were neither specifically mentioned nor enumerated would be
to run afoul of the dictum that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters. In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim
expression unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte (2008): The municipality of Marcos was created pursuant to RA 3753.
In interpreting said statue, the municipality of Marcos claimed the middle
portion of Nueva Era (another municipality in Ilocos Norte), which adjoins
its eastern side, as part of its territory. Nueva Era contended that RA 3753
created Marcos out of the territory of Dingras (yet another municipality) only.
And since said statue specified the barrios of Dingras that shall become
Marcos, Marcos’ territory should not go beyond those lines. The Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, which was affirmed
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
by the RTC. The CA, however, declared that Marcos is to be allocated a portion
of Nueva Era’s property.
Held: No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creastion of Marcos
under RA 3753. Only the barrios of Dingras which are stated in RA 3753
constitute Marcos’ territory. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
mentioned. If a statute enumerated the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its
operation and effect.
Since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of
barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission
must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support
in the rule of Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.
6.12. Doctrine of Necessary Implication
The doctrine states that “what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed.”
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved
in its application. In accordance with the doctrine, every statute is
understood by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including
all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, imper
inest et minus.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President: A Deputy Ombudsman was dismissed
from service, and a disciplinary case was initiated against a Special
Prosecutor, by the Office of the President. The issue is W/N the Office of the
President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman. Affirmative. The power to
remove is implied from his power to appoint.
Case:
Atienza v. Villarosa (2005): Petitioner and respondent were the Vice-
Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioner received a memorandum from respondent, which stated that “all
purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies,
materials, and equipment including fuel, repairs, and maintenance x x x of
the Sangguninang Panlalawigan shall be approved by the undersigned in his
capacity as the local chief executive of the province”.
Petitioner Vice-Governor wrote the respondent Governor, saying “purchase
orders for supplies, materials and equipment are included under those
authorized for signature by the Vice-chief executive of the Sanggunian . . .
and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is no longer necessary”. With
this, petitioner filed with the CA the petition for prohibition, assailing the
Governor’s memorandum as being issued with GAOD. Petitioner claimed that
such memorandum excluded him from using/enjoying his office in
accordance with RA 7160 (Local Gov’t Code). CA dismissed said petition.
Held: The court holds that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.
Under RA 7160, local legislative power is exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer. Being vested with
legislative powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacts ordinances,
resolutions, and appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in
accourdance with the provisions of RA 7160. Also, Section 39 of the Manual
of the New Government Accounting System for Local Government Units
instructs that “Disbursement vouchers appropriated for the operation of the
Sanggunian shall be approved by the Provincial Vice Governor x x x”.
Since the authority granted to the Vice Governor is that to sign all warrants
drawn on the provincial treasury for expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto, necessarily includes the authority to
approve purchase orders, applying the doctrine of necessary implication.
Guidelines in the Interpretation of Some Specific Words and
Phrases
6.13. “Shall,” “Must,” “Ought,” and “May
17
Words of command are generally and ordinarily regarded as
mandatory. These words ordinarily connote an imperative, and
indicate the mandatory character of the provision of the law.
However, this is not an absolute rule in construction and
interpretation. The import of these words ultimately depend upon
a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object, and the
consequences that would follow form construing it one way or the
other.
The word “may” is generally regarded as permissive. It indicates
the directory character of the provision of the law.
6.14. “And,” “Or,” and “And/Or”
And  a conjunctive.
Or  a disjunctive article signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each other things enumerated.
6.15. “Year,” “Month,” “Day,” and “Night”
Art. 13, NCC - When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months,
of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.
Radaza v. Court of Appeals: 6 months is equal to 180 days. A
preventive suspension which begins on 4 April 2007, shall end on 1
October 2007.
6.16. “Week”
Interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven
consecutive days. Where the word is used simply as a measure of
duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a
period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins.
6.17. Proviso
It is an added phrase, clause or sentence that provides a limitation,
condition, qualification or an exception to the main provision of a
law. It is to limit the application of the law, to provide requisites or
conditions for its enforcement, to qualify its generality, and to
except something therefrom. *Usually begins with “provided”.
1G STATCON notes | 4 August 2018 | Atty. Lara
ASSIGNED CASES
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
Section 25.
1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget
shall be prescribed by law.
2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein.
5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Section 26.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Section 27.
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large
in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Section 28.
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 29.
18
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary
as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds
of the Government.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
BICAMERALISM
1. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338,
December 23, 2008: In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a
wiretapped conversation (Hello Garci tapes) between President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano
regarding the President’s instructions to rig the elections in her
favor surfaced. The aforementioned recordings then became the
subject of legislative hearings conducted separately by the Houses.
On 8 June 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech (“Tale of Two Tapes”) and set
in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by several
committees of the Houses. After obtaining several alleged “original”
tape recordings from the NBI, the recordings were eventually
played in the chambers of the House. As a result, petitioner Virgilio
O. Garcillano filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and prayed that the House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings in their
committee reports. The House discussion and debates on the said
issue abruptly stopped. (Moot & academic; already played)
After more than two years, Senator Panfilo Lacson’s
privilege speech, “The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness” sought
an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities. The
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security. Senators Richard Gordon and Miriam Defensor-
Santiago aired their concerns about the body holding a legislative
inquiry on the matter. Petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili (retired justices of the CA) sought to bar the Senate from
conducting the legislative inquiry since it violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication
by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web
page.
ISSUE: W/N the Senate may be allowed to continue.
HELD: No, the Senate cannot be allowed.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process. R.A. 8792 considers
an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.
The Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue
into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of
the term of twelve Senators. On the nature of the Senate as a
"continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it.
2. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994): R.A.
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. House Bill No. 11197 was approved by the House of
Representative and was sent to the Senate. Senate submitted Senate
Bill No. 1630 in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 and taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and House Bill No. 11197.
Senate conducted its second and third reading on March
24, 1994 and was approved by the affirmative votes of 13 of its
members, with one abstention. H. No. 11197 and its Senate version
were then referred to a conference committee which, after meeting
four times, recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance
with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees”. Approved by the HoR and by the Senate, signed by the
President, it became RA No. 7716. It would have been enforced on
July 1, 1994 but was stopped because the Court granted a TRO on
June 30,1994. Petitioners contend that to be considered as having
originated exclusively in the House, as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24
of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7716 must retain the essence of House
Bill No. 11197.
ISSUES:
1. W/N R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional because it did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives and
is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills, House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630; and
2. W/N the Conference Committee violated the Constitution
when it included provisions not found in either the House
bill or the Senate bill.
HELD:
1. No, R.A. 7716 is not unconstitutional.
It is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required
by the Constitution to originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives. The bill from the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that may result to the rewriting of
the whole.
To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only
to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments and it
would violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
chambers.
The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate
of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the house bill.
19
2. No, the Conference Committee did not violate the
Constitution.
The report (third version) by the Committee is considered
an amendment in the nature of a substitute”. Only requirement is
that the third version must be germane to the subject of the House
and the Senate bill. It is within the power of a conference committee
to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the House or Senate bill.
EXTENT OF AND LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
3. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 19671, October 18,
2011: On 30 June 2011, Republic Act No. 10153, entitled “An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National
and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted. The law
reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The
law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional
Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of the power to appoint OICs is
constitutional.
HELD: The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general
and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power
for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution prohibits it. The constitutional
limitations of legislative power either express or implied. The
constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21
of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on
legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its
parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of
Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.
During the oral arguments, the Court identified options
available to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should
sit as ARMM officials interim: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity
until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; and
(2) authorize the President to appoint OICs. [There are more options
but not really connected with the issue; see case nalang]
(1) holdover capacity
This option violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitutions.
Elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution;
they cannot extend their term through a holdover. Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the
position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment
by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President.
(2) Grant is valid.
Section 16, Article VII: The President....He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
LAW V. STATUTES
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
4. Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976: On
September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand Marcos issued a
Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizen’s Assemblies to resolve issues of
martial law.
20 days after, the President issued PD No. 1031 which
amends PD No. 991 by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting by canvass of votes in barangay
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16,
1976.
President Marcos also issued PD No. 1033, stating the
question to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
asking if they want martial law to continue, and if they want to
approve the following amendments of the constitution.
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablo V. Sanidad, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the ComElec from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite; to declare without force PDs 991 and 1033
because they propose amendments in the Constitution and PD 1031
because it directs the ComElec to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite.
SG filed the comment for the respondent. SG maintains
that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue; the question
raised is political; at the state of the transition period only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step toward normalization.
Vicente Guzman filed another action for Prohibition for
Preliminary Injunction asserting that the power to propose
amendments or revise Constitution is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Sec 16, Art XVII of the
Constitution.
Raul Gonzales and others filed PPI to restrain the
implementation of PDs relative to the Referendum Plebiscite.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Presidential Decrees promulgated by the
president insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct referendum-plebiscite is within
his powers; and
2. W/N the PDs 991 and 1033 of Pres Marcos proposing
amendments to the Constitution are valid.
HELD: The vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions were
dismissed. The decision is immediately executory.
1. During the pendency of the case, the country was in a
state of martial law. In this period, the interim Prime Minister may
call the members of the Interim National Assembly to propose
amendments. The PM is vested with the discretion to convene the
interim National Assembly. In the current state, there is no interim
National Assembly. Hence, the President is allowed to exercise
legislative powers because of the existence of martial law, as
provided for in the constitution.
2. No. The amending process as laid out in the new
Constitution. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments
ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National
Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of
all its Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such
20
amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with
that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly,
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to
this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period
of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be
initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon
a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the
National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted
upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by
a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister.
In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body
is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for
the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval
of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only
to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to
do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution.
PARTS OF STATUTES – TITLE OF BILLS
Short discussion: the purpose of the requirement that the subject
of an Act should be expressed in its title are (1) to prevent hodge-
podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the
people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered,
in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
5. PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (PHILCONSA), a non-profit
civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine laws assails
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 383 or “An Act Amending
Subsection [c], Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Eighty-Six, As Amended By Republic Act Numbered Thirty
Hundred Ninety-Six.” It is argued that the above-mentioned
Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement
of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is
unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of
the law is centered on the proposition that the provision for the
retirement of the members and certain of officers of Congress is not
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 21

expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Section 21(1) of The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any
Article VI of the Constitution. public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
ISSUE: W/N the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the
subject matter expressed in the act. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of
Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal
HELD: It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, the
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the
Service Insurance System who have rendered at least twenty years
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete
of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane
index of its content.
to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic
Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who
Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers
run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other
thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance
provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the
System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these
ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate
officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to
the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act
Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
amendment (re:retirement benefits for Members of Congress and
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and
subject.
insurance benefits to its members.

7. Cawaling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001: On

6. Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention
assail the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of
Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No.
9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in
the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution. He avers that these provisions are unrelated to the
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad
ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for
substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed,
while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates
holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law
concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately
after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office
other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent
capacity.
ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election
Act violates the “one subject-one title” rule?
HELD: The petition must fail. Constitutional provisions relating to
the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law
provides not only the declaration of principles but also the
objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. — The State shall, during
the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of media of communication or information to guarantee
or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including
access to media time and space, and the equitable right to
reply, for public information campaigns and for among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
16 August 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806 or an “Act Creating The City of Sorsogon By Merging
The Municipalities Of Bacon and Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.” Pursuant to Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, the COMELEC conducted a
plebiscite in the aforementioned municipalities and submitted the
matter for ratification. The Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers
(PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Petitioner Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed a petition for
prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementations of R.A.
No. 8806 for being unconstitutional on the ground that said act
contains two (2) subjects, namely the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule. Petitioner
claims that no such information has been proved on the abolition of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
ISSUE: W/N R.A. No. 8806 violates the one subject-one bill rule.
HELD: Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a
subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City.
Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means
by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the
law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the
incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be
considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence.
8. Lidasan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967: On
18 June 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law R.A. 4790 or “An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sur”. It came into light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum
are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Coldan and Kabamawakan are parts and parcel
of another municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur. As a result, twelve barrios located in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. Petitioner Bara Lidasan, a resident and
taxpayer of detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, assails the
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
constitutionality of R.A. 4790 for not complying with the
constitutional requirement enshrined in Article 26. Respondent's
stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces
resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of
Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the
definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that,
therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken
away "need not be expressed in the title of the law."
ISSUE: W/N R.A. 4790 is constitutional
HELD: Unconstitutional. The test of the sufficiency of a title is (1)
W/N it is misleading; and (2) a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns
of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.
STEPS IN THE PASSAGE OF BILL INTO LAW
9. PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993: Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 9228 withdrew the franking
privileges from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. Petitioners
(members of the lower courts and National Land Registration
Authority) assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the
ground that it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage.
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec.
35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners
and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included
in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of
both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph
could not have been validly added as an amendment.
ISSUE: W/N R.A. No. 7354 is constitutional.
HELD: Arguments are untenable. While it is true that a conference
committee16 is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction
to this question.
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
16
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
22
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the
bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali
A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
10. Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, June 30,
1964, 11 SCRA 486: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-
owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and
own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines.
They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, for operating even after their permit
has expired. [Renewal of radio station licenses was supposed to be
two months before expiration; Secs. 12 and 14 of Dept. Order No.
11] Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation
without license and their continuing operation had caused damages
to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is entitled to damages for CBN’s
refusal to give up operations thereof.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that
any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease
operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of
the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV
stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And
even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of
the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto
a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to
veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill. However,
when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items
of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the
same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates.
(Art. VI, Sec. 20)
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever, 4 and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the
intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a
television station in Manila, where there are already television
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee. (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition
for the release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and
void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its
right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been
entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.
11. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August
14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC.
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund), which will be sourced from the excess of their revenue
targets collection, and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335 to be approved by a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
Respondents claim that the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates,
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative
policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on
the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: W/N Sec 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is constitutional.
HELD: It is unconstitutional.
[Relevant provisions: Article VI, Secs. 1 and 27 (1)]
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There
is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives.
The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators representing
the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at
least two members representing the minority. After the
Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall
thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to
exist.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be
subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity
violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and
the rule on presentment.
Legislative power is vested in Congress which consists of
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corollary, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus,
assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber
legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are
invalid.
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the
President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the
23
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this
sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a
valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect
without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law.
First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress. Second, it
must be presented to and approved by the President. The the
following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
1. A bill is introduced by any member of the House
of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures that
must originate only in the former chamber.
2. The first reading involves only a reading of the
number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
3. The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it
may be recommended for approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are
other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a
committee bill.
4. Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared
for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its
entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The
second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
5. The bill as approved on second reading is
printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the
members merely register their votes and explain them if they are
allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
6. Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to
the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If
there are differences between the versions approved by the two
chambers, a conference committee representing both Houses will
draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.
7. The bill is enrolled when printed as finally
approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries
of their respective chambers…
8. The President’s role in law-making – The final
step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it
takes effect as law after the required publication.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members
to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a
provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any
directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.
12. Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February
28 1963, 7 SCRA 347: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco)
was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used
primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of
the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid
the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde.
Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and
formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed
and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted
to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax
refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two
separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is
tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT
combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of
Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant
to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde”
appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the
terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately
as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be
construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea
formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently
distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as
“urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the
deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the
Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be
conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the
SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
13. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277
SCRA 268: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code
was introduced to the House of Representatives involving taxations
on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later
passed accordingly and brought to the Senate. Upon the
interpellation on the second reading, herein petitioner Rep. Joker
Arroyo moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is
constitutionally needed to conduct business. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared a presence of quorum. The interpellation then
proceeded.
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval of the
conference committee report. The Chair asked if there was any
objection to the motion. Without requesting to be recognized, Rep.
Joker Arroyo asked “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” The Chair allegedly
ignored Rep. Arroyo and then declared the report approved. The bill
was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza,
24
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount
to a violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the validity of the R.A. No. 8240 is affected by the
violation of the rules of the House.
HELD: Petition denied. It is not true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored.
He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained
recognition from the Chair. A member of the House cannot simply
stand up and talk without being recognized by the Chair. The
practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee
report is for the Chair simply to ask if there are objections to the
motion for approval of the report.
This practice is well-established and is as much a part of
parliamentary law as the formal rules of the House. The disregard
of the rules would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240 because
the rules allegedly violated are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of law. Legislative act will not be declared invalid for
non-compliance with internal rules.
14. Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA
714: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of
Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under
authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas.
He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et. al. and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed
with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065
(An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have
never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading
in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate
which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the
Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently
approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower
house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent
to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later
found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President,
sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for
signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had
no amendments thereto. It was recommendations raised by Senator
Roxas, not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and
the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the
withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the
statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While
it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked
 Construction and Interpretation of the Laws by Cyrus Victor T. Sualog | MALTBxJRT 25

upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however
that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of
the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their
signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be
as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that
error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.