Essais Science 01 Max Weber EN

Page 1
Max WEBER (1864-1920)
Theory tests
science
First try :
“The objectivity of knowledge in the sciences
and social policy ”(1904)
Translation from German and introduced

by Julien Freund
A document produced in digital version by Gemma Paquet, volunteer,

Retired professor from Cégep de Chicoutimi
E-mail: mgpaquet@videotron.ca
As part of the collection: "The Classics of Social Sciences"

Website: http://classiques.uqac.ca/
A library founded and managed by Jean-Marie Tremblay, sociologist
A collection developed in collaboration with the Library

Paul-Émile-Boulet from the University of Quebec in Chicoutimi
Website: http://bibliotheque.uqac.ca/
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Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 2
This electronic edition was produced by Gemma Paquet, volunteer, professor at

retirement from Cégep de Chicoutimi from:
Max WEBER
Essays on the theory of science

[A collection of articles published between 1904 and 1917]
First try :
and social policy ”(1904)
A digital edition based on the book Essays on the theory of science .

Translated from German and introduced by Julien Freund. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1965, 539
pages. Collection: Research in human sciences, no 19.
A collection of essays published between 1904 and 1917.
Fonts used:
For the text: Times, 12 points.

For quotes: Times 10 points.
For footnotes: Times, 10 points.
Electronic edition made with Microsoft word processor

Word 2004 for Macintosh.
Layout on paper format: LETTER (US letter), 8.5 '' x 11 '')
Editing completed on 1 st August 2006 in Chicoutimi, Ville de Saguenay, Quebec.

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Contents
Author's works
Translator's Note
Index of names
Contents index
Introduction by the translator , Julien Freund
First try : “The objectivity of knowledge in science and politics

social tick ”(1904)
I.
II.
Second essay: “Critical studies to serve the logic of science

culture ”(1906)
1. Elements for a discussion of the ideas of Édouard Meyer

2. Objective possibility and adequate causality in history
Third essay: “Essay on some categories of sociology comprehen-

sive ”(1913)
1. Meaning of a "comprehensive" sociology.

2. Relationship between comprehensive sociology and psychology.
3. Relationship between comprehensive sociology and legal dogmatic
than
4. Community activity
5. Socialization and corporate activity
6. The agreement
7. Institution and group
Fourth essay: “Essay on the meaning of“ axiological neutrality ”in

sociological and economic sciences ”(1917)
Page 4

MAX WEBER
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE
TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND INTRODUCED BY JULIEN FREUND
Paris, Librairie Plon, 1965, 539 pp. Collection: Research in human sciences
maines, no 19.
The essays published here are taken from

Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
2. Aufl. (Tübingen, Mohr, 1951).
Return to the table of contents
Page 5

WORK OF THE AUTHOR
Max Weber's published work is considerable. We are content with

mention here the volumes in which his main studies have been collected, in de-
however, carving out their summary. The reader will be able to find a complete list of
writings of Max Weber, established by Johannes Winckelmann, in Max WEBER,
Soziologie - Weltgeschichtliche Analyzen - Politik 2 (Stuttgart, Kröner, 1960).
490-505, where references to its many accounts are gathered
reports, conferences, and press articles.
We made a point of including the translations, no doubt to render hom-

mage to this desperate fraternity of Weber's translators, but above all for
practical and scientific reasons. Weber's texts are very readable.
difficult, the French reader will often benefit greatly from the translations carried out
in other languages, although we find the worst as well as the best. Inter-
claims of the author's thought have been proposed on the occasion of the work of
duction, some of which stand out in the history of sociology. Some
introductions and translations finally, especially the Russians - the first of all,
ignored by the West as so many works of this brilliant intelligentsia of the
beginning of the century - or the English, had a historical significance which is not
negligible.
Hans H. Gerth and Hedwig Ide Gerth have published a "Bibliography on Max
Weber ”in Social Research, XVI (1949), 70-89, to which we will add some-
ques titles cited on page 505 of the above-mentioned collection - É. D.
*
**
Page 6
Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats

und Privatrecht.
Stuttgart, 1891.
Trad. Italian: La storia agraria romana (Milano, Societa editrice libra-

ria, 1907) in Pareto's “Biblioteca di storia economica”, vol. 11, 2nd
part, pp. 509-705.
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie .
Tübingen, Mohr.
SUMMARY :
TOME 1er (1st ed. 1920; 2nd and 3rd ed. 1922; 4th ed. 1947)
Vorbemerkungen [General introduction].
English, Spanish, Italian and French translation, in the works

ages mentioned above below.
Die Protestantische Ethik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus, 1905.
Trad. English: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

(New York, Scribner; London, Allen & Unwin, 1930; reprint 1948 and
1950) by Talcott Parsons.
Trad. Italian: L'etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalismo (Roma,

Leonardo, 1945) by P. Burresi.
Trad. Spanish -. Protestant etica y el espiritu del capitalismo

(Madrid, Ed. Revista del Derecho Privado, 1955).
Trad. French: Protestant ethics and the spirit of the capitalist (Paris,
Plon, 1964) by Jacques Chavy.
Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920.
Trad. English ap. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York,
Oxford UP, 1946; London, Kegan Paul, 1947) by HH Gerth and
CW Mills.
Page 7
Trad. French: Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism , in

the work mentioned above.
Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen.
Einleitung. - I. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. - Zwischenibetrach-

tung: Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religiöser Weltablehnung.
1916.
Trad. English introduction and excursus ap. From Max Weber .

The main study has been translated as The Religion of China
(Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951) by HH Gerth.
VOLUME II (1st ed. 1921; 2nd ed. 1923)
Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. - It. Hinduismus und Bud dhis-

mus, 1916-19I7.
Trad. English of fragments (Brahmans and castes) ap. From Max We-
ber ; partial translation under the title The Religion of India: Sociology
of Hinduism and Buddhism; (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958) by HH
Gerth and D. Martindale.
VOLUME III (1st ed. 1921; 2nd ed. 1923).
Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. - 111. Das antike Judentum -

Nachtrag: Die Pharisäer. 1917-19.
Trad. English under the title Ancient Judaism (Glencoe, The Free Press,
1952) by HH Gerth and D. Martindale.
Gesammelte Politische Schriften.
1st ed. München, Drei Masken Verlag, 1921. 2nd ed. Tübingen, Mohr, 1958.
SUMMARY :
Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, 1895.

Zur Gründung einer national-sozialen Partei, 1896.
Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland, 1906.
Rußland Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus; 1906.
Bismarcks Außenpolitik und die Gegenwart, 1915.
Zur Frage des Friedensschließens, 1915.
Zwischen zwei Gesetzen, 1916.
Page 8
Der verschärfte U-Boot-Krieg, 1916.

Deutschland unter den europäischen Weltmächten, 1916.
Deutschlands äußere und Preußens innere Politik, 1917.
Ein Wahlrechtsnotgesetz of the Reichs, 1917.
Rußland Übergang zur Scheindemokratie, 1917.
Die Lehren der deutschen Kanzlerkrisis, 1917.
Vaterland und Vaterlandspartei, 1917.
Bayern und die Parlamentarisierung im Reich, 1917.
“Bismarcks Erbe in der Reichsverfassung” 1917.
WahIrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland, 1917.
Innere Lage und Außenpolitik. I-II, 1918.
Parlarnent und Regierung ini neugeordneten Deutschland, 1918.
Trad. Italian: P arlameto e governo, nel nuovo ordinamento della

Germania (Bari, Laterza, 1919) by E. Ruta
Die nächste innerpolitische Aufgabe, 1918. Waffenstillstand und Frieden,

1918. Deutschlands künftige Staatsform, 1918. Das neue Deutschland, 1918.
Zum Thema der “Kriegsschuld” 1919. Der Reichspräsident, 1919.
Zur Untersuchung der Schuldfrage, 1919. Politik als Beruf, 1919 ..
Trad. English ap. From Max Weber .
Trad. Italian ap. Il lavoro intellettuale come professione (Torino, Ei-

naudi, 1948) by A. Giolitti.
Trad. French ap. The scientist and the politician (Paris, Plon, 1959) by Ju-
Freund link.
Bemerkungen zum Bericht der Kommission der allierten und assoziierten Re-
gierungen über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges, 1919.
Politische Briefe, 1906-1919. [Deleted in the 1958 edition .]
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, III.

Abteilung].
Tübingen, Mohr, 1st ed. Marianne Weber 1922; 2nd ed. increase. 1925; 3rd ed.
1947; 4th ed. increase. J. Winckelmann 1956.
Trad. full Spanish: Economia y Sociedad (México Fondo de

cultura economica, 1944), 4 vol. : I. " Teoria de organizacion social "
by JM Echavarria. IL “ Tipos de comunidad y sociedad ” by JR
Page 9
Parella. III. "Tipos de comunidad y sociedad: Sociologia del dere-

cho ”by EG Maynez; “La ciudad” by B. Imaz. IV. "Tipos de
dominacion ”by JF Mora.
Trad. full Italian: Economia e società (Milano, Edizioni di

Comunità, 1962) edited by Pietro Rossi.
Full French translation in preparation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
First part: Soziologische Kategorienlehre.
Trad. English version of the first part, under the title The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization (London, Hodge, 1947; New York, Oxford UP,
947, repr. 1950) by AM Henderson and Talcott Parsons.
1. Soziologische Grundbegriffe.
Trad. English of fragments of sections 1 to 8 AD. Max Weber on Law

in Economy and Society (cf. infra, 11, vit) by BA Shils. - Translated
full English version of the whole chapter under the title Basic Concepts
in Sociology (New York, Philosophical Library, 1962 by HP Se-
Dear.
Trad. Japanese by Yoshie Atoji and Kanji Naitô (Tokyo, Radokawa

Shoten, 1953).
II. Soziologische Grundkategorien des Wirtschaftens.
III. Die. Typen der Herrschaft.
Trad. Italian under the title Carismatica ei tipi del potere by VF

Accolti ap. Roberto Michels, Politica ed economia Torino Unione
tipografico-editor torinese 1934), “Nuova collana di economisti
stranieri e italiani “vol. XII pp. 179-262.
IV. Stände und Klassen.
Part two: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen

und Mächte.
1. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen in ihrer prinzipiel-

len Beziebung.
Page 10
II. Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen der Gemeinschaiften im, allgemeinen.

III. Typen der Vergemeinschaftung und Vergesellschaftung in ihrer Be-
ziehung zur Wirtschaft.
Fragments of this chapter have been translated into English by Ferdinand Ro-
legar under the title "The Household Community" in Talcott PARSONS
et al., Theories of Society (New York, The Free Press, 1961), 1, pp. 296-
305.
IV. Ethnische Gemeinschaftsbeziehungen.
Fragments of this chapter have been translated into English by Ferdinand Ko-
legar under the title “Ethnic Groups” in PARSONS, i bid . I, pp. 305-309.
V. Typen religiöser Vergemeinschaftung.
Trad. English under the title The Sociology of Religion (Boston, Beacon
Press, 1963) by Ephraïm Fischoff. - Other English translation of § 7. 4
Stände, Klassen und Religion ”by Christine Kayser under the title“ Reli-
gion and social status ”in PARSONS, ibid, Il, pp. 1138-l161.
VI. Die Marktgemeinschaft.
VII. Wirtschaft und Recht. [This chapter has been the subject of a German edition
separate order, but this time based on the author's manuscript by
J. WINCKELMANN: Rechtssoziologie (Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1960).]
Trad. English under the title Max Weber on Law in Economy and Socie-
ty (Cambridge [Mass.], Harvard University Press, 1954) by EA
Shils and M. Rheinstein. This volume also contains the translation of
chap. I and VI as well as fragments of chapters VI I (first half)
and IX (sect. 1 and 3 partially) and fragments of chap. 1 of the first
first part.
VIII. Politische Gemeinschaften.
Trad. English language of the second half of this chapter (nations, classes,
parties) ap. From Max Weber .
IX. Soziologie der Herrschaft.
Trad. Russian section of the eighth section (with the exception of § 5 on democracy
ancient and medieval tie) under the title Gorod (Petrograd, "Nauka i
Skola, ”1923) by BB Popov edited by N. 1. Kareev.
Page 11
Trad. English of fragments (bureaucracy, charismatic authority, dis-

cipline) ap. From Max Weber. - The second section, “Die drei reinen
Typen der legitimen Herrschaft ”, has been translated under the title The Three
Types and Legitimate Rule (Berkeley Publications in Society and Institu-
tions, IV [1958], 1-11) by HH Gerth. - The eighth section, "Die
nichtlegitime Herrschaft ”, has been translated under the title The City (Glen-
coe, The Free Press, 1958) by D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth.
Trad. Italian fragments (charismatic authority) ap. Carismatica

ei tipi del potere. - The eighth section has been translated under the title La
città (Milano, Bompiani, 1950) by 0. Padoa.
Appendix: Die rationaIen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Mu-

sik, 1921.
Trad. English: The Rational and Social Foundations of Music Sou-

thern Illinois University Press, 1958) by D. Martindale, J. Riedel and G.
Neuwirth.
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre .
Tübingen, Mohr, 1st ed. Marianne Weber, 1922; 2nd ed. J. Winckelmann,
1951.
SUMMARY :
Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalöko-
nomie, 1903-1906.
Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,

1904.
Trad. English ap. The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe,
The Free Press, 1949) by EA Shils and HA Finch.
Trad. Italian ap. I l metodo delle scienze storico-sociali (Torino, Ei-
naudi, 1958) by Pietro Remi.
Trad. French, ap. Essays on the theory of science (Paris, Pion,
1965) by J. Freund.
Trad. Japanese, Tokyo.
Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik, 1906.
Trad. English ap. The Methodology.

Trad. Italian ap. It method.
Trad. French, ap. Essays on the theory of science .
Page 12
R. Stammlers “Überwindung” der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung,

1907. - Nachtrag.
Die Grensnutzlehre und das "psychophysische Grundgesetz", 1988. Energe-

tische Kulturtheorien, 1909.
Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie, 1913.
Trad. French, ap. Essays on the theory of science.

Trad. Italian ap. It method .
Der Sinn der "Wertfreiheit" der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissens-

chaften, 1917-18.
Trad. English ap. The Methodology .

Trad. Italian ap. It method .
Trad. French, ap. Essays on the theory of science.
Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 1921.
See Wirtschaft und Gesellschatt, I, 1, supra.
Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1919.
Trad. English ap. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology (New York,
Oxford UP, 1946; London, Kegan Paul, 1947) by HH Gerth and C.
W. Mills.
Trad. French ap. The scientist and the politician (Paris, Pion, 1958) by J.
Freund.
Trad. Italian ap. Il lavoro intellettuale come professione (Torino, Ei-
naudi, 1948) by A. Giolitti.
Trad. Japanese (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1936) by Kunio Okaka.
Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Shelter der universalen Sozial- und Wirt-

schaftsgeschichte. - Ed. S. HELLMANN and M. PALYI.
Berlin, Duncker and Humblot. 1st ed. 1923; 2nd ed. 1924; 3rd ed. increase. Winc-
kelmann 1958.
Trad. russian; Istorija hozjajstva (Petrograd, “Nauka i Skola”, 1923)

edited and with a preface by IM Grevs.
Trad. English: General Economic History (New York and London,

1927; reprint Glencoe, The Free Press, 1950) by FH Knight.
Page 13
Trad. Spanish: Historia economica general (México, Fondo de

cultura economica, 1942 and 1956) by MS Sarto.
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte.
Tübingen, Mohr, 1924.
SUMMARY :
Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum, 1897, rev- 1909.
Trad. Russian: Agrarnaja istorija drevnego mira (Moskva, M. and S. Sa-

basnikov [1925]), by ES Petrusevskaja under the direction and with a
preface by DM Petrusevskij.
Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur, 1896.
Trad. Russian: "Social'n'ija priein'i padenija antienoj kult'ury", Nauc-

noe Slovo [Moskva], VII 1904), 108-124, by ES Petrusevskaja under
the management of DM Petrusevskii.
Trad. Spanish: "La decadencia de la cultura antigua", Revista do

Occidente, XIII (1926), 23-59.
Trad. English: "The Social Causes of the Decay of Ancien Civiliza-

tion ”, The Journal of General Education, V (1950), 75-88, by C.
Mackauer.
Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter, 1899.
Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung, 1893.
Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter, 1894
Der Streit um den Charakter der altgermanischen Sozialverfassung in der

deutschen Literatur des letzten Jahrzehnts, 1904.
This collection does not include the lecture given on the occasion of the exhibition.
universal tion of Saint-Louis, the German text of which seems to be lost:
Deutsche Agrarprobleme in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, 1904.
Trad. English revised ap. From Max Weber under the title "Capitalism
and Rural Society in Germany ”.
Page 14
Retrad. German in the Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissens-

chaft, CVIII (1952), 431-452, by HH Gerth.
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik.
Tübingen, Mohr, 1924
SUMMARY :
Methodologische Einleitung für die Erhebungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik

über Auslese und Anpassung der Arbeiterschaft der geschlossenen Großindus-
trie, 1908.
Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit, 1908-1909.
WORK OF THE AUTHOR 511
Die Börse, 1894-1896.
Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommißfrage in

Preußen, 1904
Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik.
Trad. English language of one of these interventions ("No matter how frightening the thought
sure that the world may one day be populated by teachers - we
would withdraw on a desert island - the idea that it could not be
that small gears is even scarier at ...) ap. JP
MAYER. Max Weber and German Politics (London, Faber, 1954).
125-131.
Geschäftsbericht und Diskussionsreden auf den deutschen soziologischen Ta-

gungen, 1910 und 1912.
Der Sozialismus, 1918.

Page 15
INDEX OF NAMES
ADRIAN (H.) VS
ANTONI (C.) F
ARISTOTLE CALVIN
ARON (Raymond) CAESAR FECHNER (G.)
CHAMBERLAIN (H. SHEET
B St.) FICK (L.)
COHEN (H.) FISCHER (K.)
BABEUF (FE), COUNT (A.) FLUG (O.)
BACON (F.) CONRADIN FRÉDÉRIC THE
BARTH (P.) CONSTANT (B.) BIG
BASHKIRTSEFF (M.) COPERNIC FRÉDÉRIC-
BAUMGARTEN (E.) CROCE (B.) WILLIAM IV
BECKER (H.), CUPROV (A.) FREUD (S.)
BELOW (G. VON)
BERNOULLI (J.) D G
BENEFIT (W.)
BINDING DARWIN GENGIS-KHAN
BISMARCK DEFOE (D.) GNEIST (VON)
BOECK (A.) DEUTSCH GOETHE
BOESE (F.) DILTHEY (W.) GOLDSCHMITT
BORTKIEWITSCH DIOCLETIAN GOMPERZ (H.)
(THE.) DROYSSEM GOSSEN (H.)
BRAUN (H.) DÜNTZER (H.) GOTHEIN
BRENTANO (L.) DURKHEIM (E.) GOTTL-
BREYSIG (K.) OTTLILIENFELD
BRINKMANN E GRAB (H.)
BROCKHAUS GRAPPLE
BUNSEN (R.) EISNER (K.) WILLIAM II,
BUSCH (W.) ESCHYLE GUMPLOWICZ
EULENBURG (F.) GUSTAVE-ADOLPHE
Page 16
LEDERER PAUL 1st

H Lenin PFISTER (B.)
LEVY-BRUHL PLATO
HAMPE (H.) LIEFMANN (R-) PLENGE (J.)
HANNIBAL LIEPMANN (M.) PLOETZ (A.)
HARTMANN (LM) LIPPS (Th.) PRANTL (K.)
HAUSHOFER LITERATED PTOLEMY
HEGEL LOEWITH (K.)
HELFERICH (K.) LUTHER Q
HELMHOLT (H.)
HONIGSHEIM (P.) M QUÉTELET
HUSSERL (E.)
CHEWED UP.) R
1 MALTHUS
MARROU (I) RABELAIS
IVAN THE TERRIBLE MARX (K.) RADBRUCH (G.)
MENGER (K.) RANKE
J MERKEL (A.) RAPHAIL
METTLER (A.) RICKERT (H.)
JAFFÉ (F.) MEYER (E.) RICŒUR (P.)
JAMES (W.) MICHALIOWSKI (N.) ROBESPIERRE
JASPERS MICHELS (R.) ROLLAND (Ms.)
JELLINEK (G.), MILL (Stuart) ROMULUS
JUNG (C.) BETS (L.) ROENTGEN
JUSTINIAN MOLIERE ROSCHER
MOMMSEN (Th.) ROUSSEAU (J.-J.)
K MOMMSEN (W.) RÜMELIN (MV)
MULLER (VON)
KANT MUNSTERBERG S
KARJEJEW
KAULLA NOT SAVIGNY
KAUTSKY SCHAAF (J.-J.)
KISTIAKOWSKI (B.) NAPOLEON 1st SCHELTING (A. von)
KJELLEN (R.) NAPOLEON III SCHLEIERMACHER
KNAPP NAUMANN (F.) SCHLOSSER (FC)
KNIES (K.) NIETZSCHE SCHMEIDLER (B.)
KRIES (VON) SCHMITT (C.)
KROYER (Th.) O SCHMOLLER (G.)
SCHOPENHAUFR
THE ONKEN SCHULZE-
OPPENHEIMER (F.) GÄVERNITZ
FOUNTAIN OSTWALD (W.) SCHUMPETER
LAMPRECHT (K.) SIMMEL (G.)
LANGE (FA) p SMITH (A.)
LASK (E.) SOLVAY (E.)
Page 17

SOMBART (W.) TSCHUPROW (A.). WEIPPERT (G.)
SPANN See Cuprov. WELLHAUSEN (J.)
SPENGLER (0.) WENCK (M.)
SPRANGER (E.) U WIESE (A. von)
STAMMLER (R.) W1LAMOWITZ-
STEIN (Mrs. de) USENER (H.) MOELLENDORF
STERN (W.) (U. von)
SWAMMERDAM V WILDE (0.)
WILLBRANDT
T VIERKANDT (A.) WINCKELMANN (J.)
VISCHER (F. Th.) WINCKELMANN (J--
THEMISTOCLE, V013LER (K.) J.)
THERESE D'AVILA WINDELBAND
THOMAS D'AQUIN W WÖLFFLIN
TOLSTOÏ WOLTMANN (L.)
TÖNNIFS WEBER (Alfred) WUNDT (W.)
TREITSCHKE WEBER (Max)
TROXLTSCII (E.) WEBER (W.)
Page 18

CONTENTS INDEX
Abandonment News
Absolutist Adaptation
Abstraction; - generalizing; - insulating. Adaptability
Accident, accidental Administration, administrative
OK Affection
Act Affinity; - elective.
Action; - rational; man of-; - Age
reciprocal. Altruism
Activity; - human; - rational by Soul
purpose; - rational by accuracy; Friendship
- judiciously oriented; - Amorphous
community; - community Love
silence conditioned by the mass; - Analogy.
community conditioned by To analyse; - causal; - axiological; -
the agreement; - member; - member interpretative; - reflexive; - means
complies with regulations; - so- ficative.
currency contrary to regulations; Anarchy of choices
- abnormal member; - member Anarchist
that relates to the company; so- Anatomy
cialized; - similar; - similar Ancestor
of a mass; - conditioned by Elders
socialization; - regulated by Animal
the society; - socialization; - by to cancel
similarity; mass; conditioned Anomism
by the mass; imitative; - in in- Unnatural
attempted; conditioned by the agreement; Antagonism; see Value.
- in accordance with the agreement; - in in-Anthropocentrism
tent conditioned by social Anthropology
station; - grouping; settled Anthropomorphism
by the group; who is reminiscent of Antiquity; ancient studies
door to grouping; - institution- Apogee
tional. Appreciation, appreciable
Page 19
Approximation, approximate
A priori VS
Arbitrary
Architecture, Calculation, calculate
Silver Cameralistic
Argumentation Election campaign; military campaign
Aristocracy to hush up.
Art; - convenient; - technical. Capital
Arts and crafts Capitalism
Asceticism, asceticism Character; - intelligible.
Suction Characterize
Astronomy Characteristic
Atom. Characteristic
Attractiveness; aesthetic,. Cartel
Authentic Case; - limit; - typical.
Autocephaly Caste; - military.
Autonomy; - Sciences. Casuistry
Others Category
Others; behavior of -. Catonism
To come up Causality; - adequate; - history; - and
Lawyer legality; - accidental.
Axiom; - ultimate. Cause; - history; - sufficient; - and
effect; dedication to a.
B Certainty
Real causal link
Bank Luck
Battle of Marathon Chemistry
Beauty Choice
Need Thing
Well Christianity
Biography Chronic
Biology Circumstances
Happiness Civilization; - modern and contemporary
Common sense raine; -dead.
Goodness Civilized
Mess Clear, clear
Buddhism Clan
Bourgeoisie Class; - social; - proletarian.
stock Exchange Classification; - Sciences.
Brigand Classicism, Classic.
Bureaucrat, bureaucratism Clinical
Goal; - economy; - science; - Closed
pedagogy; - know her- Consistency
session; - science Community
culture; - from the Association. Trade, trader
Page 20
Commander in chief Connoisseur

Commandment Connection; - causal.
As if Connivance
Communalization; - in agreement. Consciousness; - moral; good - scientist
Community; - linguistics; - racial; fique; making -.
- Politics; - mercantile; - do- Result; - adequate; - Wanted; -
household; family; - religious; predictable; - unwanted.
of understanding. Consumption
Agrarian Communism Finding, note.
Comparison, compare Constellation
Skill Constitution
Competition Theoretical or conceptual construction
Behviour;
you;--rational
orientedbyaccording
final- to expectation; - Contemplation, contemplative
Keep everyone happy
value oriented; condi- Contents
ted by the mass. Contradiction
Understandable Constraint; device of -.
Comprehension ; - causal; - and explain Control
cation. Convention, conventional
Understand Conviction; ethics of -; value -.
Compromise Cooperation
Accounting Copy
Concept; - general; - individual; - ge- Correct
neric; - genetics; - limit; - Courage
historical; - Collective; - and reality; Custom
construction or training of Creation
concepts. Criminology, criminal lawyer
Design; - of the world. Critical; - scientist; - technical;
Conceptualization spirit.
Concrete Belief
Competetion Crusca
Condition; - prior; - of life; - of Guilt
possibility. Culture [Kultur]
Conduct Curiousity; - causal; - historical.
Coexistence
Confidence D
Conflict
Comply, compliance Decadence
Confucianism Decision
Confusion Declaration
Awareness; - history; - causal; - Decomposition
scientist; - reflexive; - astro- Deduction, deduct
nomic; - discursive; - absolute Definition
and unconditional; - nomologi- Degree
than. Deliberation
Page 21
Delimitation Right; - commercial; - natural; - canoe

Democratic picnic - public; - people.
Demography Duel
Devil Sustainable
Demonstration
Common denominator E
Teleological dependence
Spent Difference
Unpleasant Exchange
Disenchantment Eclecticism
Disapproval Economy; - common; - urban; -
Description private; - financial; - human; -
Drawing, drawing of peace and war; - and politi-
Destiny than; economic and social.
Detail Writing
Determinism Education
To be in front Effect; - adequate; - contrary.
Development Efficiency, efficient
To become ; - history; - causal; in - Equality; - causal.
To have to Church
Devil National egoism
Dialectic Election
God; - of the moment. Elimination in thought
Differentiation; - social; - psychic. Eloquence
Dignity Emanatism
Dilettantism Embryo
Speech Emotion
Discussion Empirical
scientist Digital print
Arrangement Chaining; - understandable; -
Concealment causal.
Distance Energy; principle of conservation of
Diversity; - intensive and extensive. the' -.
Work division Energetics
Doctrine Child
Dogmatism Investigation
Dogmatic of meaning; - legal; - of Internal enrichment
Science. Together
Dogma Entelechy
Dominant Agreement; - domination.
Domination Enthusiasm
Don Entity
Given Desire
Doubt Epigenesis
Epigone
Page 22
Epiphenomenon Extension
Epistemology Exterior, exterior
Era Extreme
Balance
Equity F
Fault
Eroticism, erotic Facticity
Slave Do; - primary and secondary.
Space; - pseudo-spherical. Familiar
Species; - human. Family
Spirit Fanaticism
Gasoline Fatality
Essential; - and secondary. Fault; -of reflection; - of calculation.
Aesthetic False, falsehood
Being To favor
Stage Congratulated
State; - original; - final; - psychic. Feudalism, feudal
State (political) theory of -. Fiat
Eternity Fiction
Ethics; - Kantian; -economic; - End; - last or ultimate; - and medium.
of conviction and responsibility Finished
you. Fetus
Ethnography Faith
To be; - lived and - reasoned. Official
Narrow-minded Foundation
Student Strength; - of soul.
Eudemonist Formans
Evaluation Form; - legal; - and background.
Event; - Politics. Formal
Evidence Formula, formulate
Evolution, evolutionism. Crazy
Excitation. Frequency
Copy
Example G
Fraternal exhortation
Existence Genie
Expectation General; - and particular.
Experience; - general; - scientist; - Generalization
lived ,. Generation
Experimentation Generic; see Concept.
Explanation; - causal; - understand Kind
sive. Slap
To explain Taste
Exposed Group; - from Manchester.
Ecstasy Group
Page 23
War Importance, important.

Unpredictability, unpredictable
H Impulse
Imputation; - causal; - history; -
Habit legal; - sociological.
Hatred Inaction
Chance Unacknowledged
Heredity Incomprehensible
Hermeneutics Unconscious
Hero Indeterminism
Heterocephaly Phrenological index
Heteronomy Indifferent
Hierarch Individual
Hierarchy of needs; - Sciences; Individualism
- values. Individuality; - historical.
Story; - Politics; - universal; - of Individual
Literature; - religions; of Induction
art; - philosophy; - and Mo- Industry
rale; - and psychology; philoso- Inequality; - causal.
phia of -. Infinite, infinity; - extensive and intensive.
Historicism Affecting
Historiography Injunction
Historical; school -. Injustice
Male; -economic; -; - exception- Insignificant
nel. Instinct; - sexual; - acquisition.
Social honor Institution
Intellectual horizon Intellectualization
Humanity Professional intellectual
Hypothesis Intention
Forbidden
1 Interest; - scientist; - history; -
axiological; - aesthetic; - of
Ideal class; - group of-; - of the
Idealist [philosophy] peasantry; - of the class or-
Idealtype, idealtypical vrière.
Ideals Interior, interior
Idea Interpretation; - rational; - noetic;
Drawing - rewarding; - axiological; -
Picture causal; - understanding; - histo-
Imagination risk; -literal; - significant.
Imitation Intervention
Immigrant Respondent
Imperative; - categorical. intropathy
Imperialism Intuition
Imperfection Irrational, irrationality; - by purpose.
Page 24
Unreal, unreal Linguistic

Isolation Literature
Logic
J Law; - economical165; - empirical; -
social; - psychological; - mo-
jealousy rale.
Game; - by chance. Loyalism
youth Loyalty
I want Lucidity
Joy Lights (the).
enjoyment Struggle
Judaism
judge M
judgement; - valuable; - existential; -
critical; - aesthetic; - necessary Machine
site; - probability; - of percep- Magic, magic
tion; - possibility; - historical. Master
junker Majority
Case law Manner
Correct; - environment. Lack
correctness; - technical; - normative; - Marlet
type of justice; - social. Marginalism
Justification Marxism
Mass
K Materialism, law; - dialectic; - histo-
rique.
Kathedersozialisten Mathematical
Matter,
THE Maturity
Maxim
Layman Mechanical
Let the facts speak Mechanism
Speech Doctor, medicine
Tongue Mediatize
University lesson Meditation
Legality, legal Mercantilism
Lege ferenda Deserved
Legislation Measure, measure
Legitimacy, legitimate Metaphysical
Liberalism Meteorology
Freedom; - of thought. Method; - philosophical; - history;
Free exchange - universal; - comparative; -
Limitation theoretical and abstract; - nomolo-
Limit; - Knowledge; - science; - of gic.
the knowledge. Methodemstreit
Page 25
Methodism Personal note

Methodology Infant
Murder
Environment O
Minority
Mir Obedience
Miracle Objectivation
Miserability Objectivity
Fashion Object; - Of the history; - sociology.
Model Obligation, obligatory
Modification Darkness
Manners Observation
Me Obstacle
World; - surrounding; - contemporary; Occultism
-outside; - interior. Grant, grant
Globalization Work; - art; - literary.
Monism, monist Birds
Cash Omission
Monopoly Ontological
Moral; see Ethics. Arithmetic operation
Pattern; search for -; conflict of -. Opinion
Motivation Opportunity
Way; - of knowledge or - heuris- Optimism, optimist
tick; see End. Oracle
Medium; in -. Order; -legal; - reasoned.
Music Order
Mystery Organ
Mystical Organization
Mythology Pride
Meaningful guidance; - rational.
NOT Originality
Open
Birth
Nation P
Nationalism
Naturalism Pacification
Nature; - particular Pacifism
Necessity, necessary Peace; - economic.
Neutrality; - axiological. Pan-Germanist
Nomological Panic
Nomothetic Panlogism
Non-art Paradigm
Non-contradiction Parallelism; - psychophysics.
Standard; - ethics; - legal. To speak
Notables Parish
Page 26
Partner Possible
Left Power
Particularity, particular Pragmatism, pragmatism
Pass Convenient
Passion Precision
Pathology Predestination
Pathos Prejudice
Patrimony Here
Patrimonial Presentation
Patriot Hurry
Pedagogy Presupposition; without -.
Pedantic Pretension
Thought Evidence
Perception Forecast
Perfection Foresight
Painting Primitive
Permanence Prince
Permit Principle; - director; - economic.
Persist Privilege
Personalism Price
Personality Probability, probable; calculation of.
Perspective Intellectual probity
Disturbance Problem
People; - civilized. Problem
Fear Trial
Phenomenology Production; - literary.
Philology Product
Philosophy; - social; - values; To profess, profession of faith
see History. Professor
Photography Progress; - in art; - technical; -
Physiology economic.
Physical Progression
Complaint Project
Pleasure Sexual promiscuity
Point; - starting; - application; - Propaganda
preliminary; - Archimedean. Prophet, prophecy
Controversy Property
Police Prostitution
Politics; - social; - economic; Psychoanalysis
organization; - and moral. Psychiatrist
Polytheism Psychic; - and physical.
Scope Psychology, psychological; - social;
Position; making. - masses; - understanding.
Positivism Psychologism
Possibility; - objective. Psychopathic
Page 27
Psychophysics Regulations
Public Regiment
Publicity Causal regression
Powerful Regularity
Purity; - conceptual. Relationship; - causal; - singular; - the-
scabies; - legal; - timeless; -
Q significant; -; - social.
Relativism
Qualification Religion
Quality, qualitative Religiosity
Quantification Yield
Quantity, quantitative Profitability,
Question; - factory Girl; - social. Land rent
Day-to-day Reply
Representation
R Reproduction
Residue
Race Resignation
Raison; - to be; - state; - sufficient; - Resistance
to be and - to know (ratio es- Resolution
sendi and cognoscendi ratio). Responsibility; ethics of -.
Reasonable Resentment
Reasoning Results
Report; - significant; - to values Back to nature
Rationalization Revolutionary
Rationalism Rigor, rigorous; - conceptual.
Rationality; - teleological or by purpose Rivalry
ity; - barely. King
Rational Historical novel
Ray; - X. Romanticism
Reaction, reactionary
Naive realism S
Realistic; - science; - Politics.
Reality,; -single or lived; - empi- Wisdom; - nations.
risk; - history; - cultural; - Holiness
social. Salvation
Recipe Satisfaction
Research; - profit. Savage
Reciprocity, reciprocal To know; - nomological; - empirical; -
Story, ontological; - experimental; -
Reflection specialized.
Refractory Plan
Refute Science; - social; - reality; - of
Rule; - by right; - experience. nature; - of the culture; empiri-
Rules. that; - ethics; - subjectifying; -
Page 28
objectifying; - nomothetic and - Spiritualism

idiographic; - human. Stadium; see Step.
Scientism Static
Scholastic Statistical
Sculpture Stimulation
Sect History structuring
Social segregation Structure; - logic.
Selection Chinese stupor
Seminar Lifestyle.
Meaning; - targeted; - from the body; -literal; - sub-
Subjectivity, subjective
jective; - historical. Sublimation
Sensation Subsumption
Sensitivity Substance
Feeling Success; value -.
Feel Succession
Series; - causal. Suggestion, suggest
Sermon on the Mount Topic
Service Safety
Servitude Syllogism
Skat Symbol
Sigisbée Sympathy
Sign Symptom
Meaning; -cultural; - axiologi- Synchretism
than; - history; - causal. Union, unionism
Silence Synthesis; - designer; - abstractive.
Similarity Systematic
Sincere Systematization
Singularity, singular System; - values; - concepts.
Situation.
Social T
Socialization
Socialism, socialist Painting; - of thought; - imagination.
society Task
Sociology; - understanding; -and psy- Tact
ecology; - and law; - art. Tailor
Solidarity Talent
Solitude Technical
Solution Technology
Wizard Teleology, teleological
Sources Temperament
Memory Time
Specialization Tendency; - development.
Specialist Voltage
Specificity, specific Theocratic
Speculation Theorem
Page 29
Theory; - knowledge; - abs-

treaty; - and practical. V
Therapeutic
Shard Valid
Third
Totality; meaning of -. Value; - of use; - economic; -
Tradition cultural; - vital; - intrinsic
Traffic or clean; - subjective; idea of -;
Work; - theoretical; - scientist; - antagonism of -; standard of -;
historical philosophy of -; see Philoso-
Tribe phia.
Cheat, cheater Validity; - empirical; - general; -
Barter objective; - universal; - scientist
Type; - way. fique; - axiological.
Typical Lived; - and know.
Check, check
U Truth
Virtue
Unanimity Life; - social; - affective, 454; - culture
Unilateral, unilateral real; - daily.
Unity; - economic. Aging
Universalization. Violation, violate
Universality, universal; - and particular. Violence
University Vocation
Univocal, univocal Thief
Emergency Volksgeist
Factory Will
Utilitarianism Want to
Usefulness Probable
Utopia, utopia
Page 30

Translator's Note
During the drafting of these notes we have avoided as much as possible

guide the reader by bringing a personal interpretation of the thought of
Max Weber. We have confined ourselves to providing purely historical information.
for those who are unfamiliar with German literature, to establish
correspondences between the various passages of Weber's works dealing with the
same question and, if necessary, to compare them with the works of other authors,
when these shed light on the texts translated here.
We have used the following editions of Weber's works:
1) Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenchaftslehre , 2nd edition, Mohr, Tübingen,

1951.
2) Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie , Mohr, Tübingen, t. I, 4th

1947 edition, t. II, 2nd edition 1923, t. III, 3rd edition 1963.
3) Gesammelte politische Schriften , 2nd edition, Mohr, Tübingen 1958, except

for letters where we used the 1st edition, München 1921.
4) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 3rd edition, Mohr, Tübingen 1947.
5) Wirtschatfsgeschichte , 3rd edition, Duncker-Humblot, Berlin 1958.
6) Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik , Mohr, Tübingen

1924.
7) Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte , Mohr, Tü-

bingen 1924.
The quotes refer in each case to the various German editions, even
for this translation. For this purpose, we have indicated the pagination of the 2nd
edition of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenchaftslehre . It is only for
two conferences Wissenschaft als Beruf and Politik als Beruf that we refer
Page 31
the pagination of the French translation under the title Le savant et le politique,
Paris, Plon, 1959 and for The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Paris.,
Plon, 1964.
Footnotes with lower case letters (a, b, c) refer to the footnotes of
Weber, which are placed below the text of the translation; arabic numerals
to the translator's notes.
Max Weber was fond of italics. Every time they add nothing
in the sense, we allowed ourselves to suppress them.
Page 32
INTRODUCTION
by Julien Freund
It is difficult to define the intellectual activity of Max Weber. It just happens

title for one of the greatest sociologists of all time. However, the work
properly sociological published during his lifetime is very thin. His main work
cipal Economy and Society appeared after his death. The book remained unfinished, until
plan which was not definitively decided. The work brought together under the title of Ge-
sammelte Aulsätze zur Religionssoziologie were first published under the
form of a contribution to an economic ethics of world religions
(Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen). As for the volume entitled Gesammelte Aul-
sätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, the share of sociology is minimal and
reduced to a few reports and interventions at the two congresses of 1910 and 1912
of the German Sociological Association. He had been the promoter of this institution
tion, but, the day after the 1912 Congress in Frankfurt, he left the management committee.
owing to divergences on the question of axiological neutrality 1 . Certainly,
he held a chair of sociology at the University of Munich, but only
during the last months of his life. If he came to this science, it is rather
by late vocation. It seems more accurate to qualify your activity more
general using a name that he used himself: that of
social science and policy. It gives a clearer picture of the career of
Weber who successively held a chair of law, political economy and
sociology at the same time as it allows to specify the unity of its thought, badly
thanks to the diversity in the orientation of its work, which has been of a sociological nature
as well as legal, economic, philosophical, epistemological, etc. Neither
for example, that Economy and Society, which we consider to be its
1 See Marianne WEBER , Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild (Tübingen 1926), pp. 427-430.
Page 33
his sociological work was only part of a collective treatise, Grundriß der
Sozialökonomik which he directed at Mohr / Siebeck publishing house in Tübingen.
Weber's interest in methodological problems can be explained in part

by the intellectual climate which reigned at that time in German universities
des, in part by the nature of its own work. At the end of the 19th century the uni-
German versity was dominated by the conflict of methods (Methodenstreit). It
had arisen in the circles of economists following the criticism made
by Schmoller of recent works by Knies and Menger. During the same
year 1883 it extended to all the human sciences with the publication of
Dilthey's Introduction to the Sciences of the Mind . The question asked was extremely
complex: is there a difference. between natural sciences and
human sciences and what is it? Both categories of science work
on a different object, on the one hand the physical reality which can be deter-
quantitatively undermine and subsume under strict laws and reality on the other
psychic, of a qualitative and singular character? Or would the object be the same
in both cases, but considered from other points of view, so that the dis-
Is the distinction between the two kinds of sciences purely methodological? At
case where we admit a distinction between them, what is the method specific to
human sciences, it being understood that in the eyes of most
At that time the method of the natural sciences escaped discussion, its
processes being more or less definitively fixed and determined in a few details
near ? It was therefore generally a question of giving the same rigor to the procedures of
social science. Some believed to find in psychology a discipline
capable of playing the same role as mechanics in the natural sciences.
Others insisted on the impossibility of eliminating ethics and in general the judges-
elements of value. Still others were looking for an original means of investigation
specific to the human sciences on the basis of the distinction between "explaining" and
"Understand", first established by the historian Droysen in his
Grundriß der Historik (185I) .- In turn the notion of comprehension gave rise to
to controversies: is it of a purely intuitive nature or, on the contrary, does it require
it to be valid to be checked by the ordinary channels of the imputation cause
dirty? All these questions gave rise to others: what are the disciplines that
belong to the sciences of the mind? Is psychology a science of
nature or human science? What about political economy? Or the various as-
pects of these disciplines allow themselves to be grasped by naturalistic processes?
what, the others by those of the human sciences?
Many representatives of the various disciplines took turns intervening.

in the debate, physicists, chemists and physiologists like Mach,
Ostwald and von Kries, specialists in political economy, psychology,
aesthetics, history, law, sociology or philology as
L. Brentano, Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Wundt, Lipps, Jaspers, Lamprecht, Breysig, E.
Meyer, Voißler, etc., as well as the philosophers Münsterberg, Windelband, Rickert
and Simmel. The latter were Weber's friends: It was through their contact that he
Page 34
familiarized with the problems and difficulties of logic and epistemology

and that he tried to dominate them by taking a less narrow point of view than
that of the methodology specific to a particular science, sociology, economics
crumb or another. For having risen above any specialization, he was at
even to grasp the scope and limits of epistemological research. They are
on the one hand the sign of a crisis in a determined discipline and as such it
them can become the condition of progress, but on the other hand they give very
often a critical and dogmatic intemperance which diverts the scientist from
its real purpose. This is how he writes in the Report for a discussion
on values: “For the moment, there is a kind of
methodological pestilence. We hardly write any more studies, however empirical-
them, without the author feeling the need to add to them, so to speak because of
its reputation, methodological remarks ” 2 .
Weber was a lawyer by training. However, already as a student he was interested in

knows philosophy, history and political economy under the authority of the great
masters
doctoralthat were Kuno
dissertation, Fischer,
focused on Knies, von Gneist,
the history Treitschke
of commercial lawand
(ZurMommsen.
Ges- Her
chichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter, 1889) 3 and his thesis with a view to
to hold the habilitation concerned the relationship between the law and the agrarian problem (Die
römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht,
18qi). As Privatdozent at the University of Berlin (1892-1894) he taught over-
all commercial law and for a few months there. replaced the holder of this
chair, Professor Goldschmitt, who as a result of illness had been forced to
momentarily give up taking lessons.
Very quickly however there. turned to questions of economics and

social policy. From 1888 he became a member of the circle known as Verein für Sozialpolitik
who grouped around those who were called the Kathedersozialisten of the
silences of all stripes and all disciplines, enamored of social advancement. At
during a military period in Posen he was introduced to the problem of the politics of im-
migration to the borders of eastern Germany. In 1890 the Verein für Sozial-
politik instructed him to investigate the situation of agricultural workers (German
mands and Polish) in this region, which he recorded in a report entitled Die
Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Gebiet and published in 1892 in the
Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, t. LV. This work attracted the attention of eco-
2 Gutachten zur Werturteilsdiskussion, published by B. Baumgarten in Max Weber; Werk und

Person (Tübingen 1964), P. 139.
3 Max Weber's current specialist in Germany, J. Winckelmann, has just discovered that
reality this book is a development of the real dissertation whose title was: Entwic-
klung des Solidarhaftprinzips und des Sondervermögens der offenen Handelsgesellschaft aus
den Haushalts- und Gewerbegemeinschaften in den Italienischen Städten (Kröner, Stuttgart
1889). See in this regard J. WINCKELMANN, Max Webers Dissertation, in Max Weber
zum Gedächtnis, Sonderheft n • 7 of the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsy cholo-
gie, XV (1963), pp. 10-12.
Page 35
nomists, as evidenced by the declaration of one of the most eminent

of the agrarian economy of this period, Professor Knapp:
arrives at Dr. Max Weber's monograph on the situation of workers in the east
of the Elbe, a work which surprised its readers by the richness of thought and the
insight into the design. This work awakens in me above all the feeling
that the time of our knowledge has passed and that everything must be started from the start.
share ” 4 . While taking an interest in a stock market investigation, Weber is exploiting his
early work by publishing various articles in journals 5 . Despite the opposition
sition of the Prussian Minister of Public Instruction, Weber was called in 1894 to
the chair of political economy at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, which he left
in 1897 for an identical chair at the University of Heidelberg.
From that time on he tried to translate the results of his theoretical research
ques in political acts. He has often been criticized for the ambiguity of his belonging.
these, since it adhered to the Pan-German League - for which he made a
number of conferences on the Polish question - and that he participated in the various
congress of the evangelical and social movement, led by his friend Pastor F.
Naumann, who was then the leader of what one might call "progress
earthquake ”of this time. In truth one could just as easily interpret these attitudes
like those of an independent academic, anxious to find the means
more adequate to realize his views outside of any ideological profession. This
However, this is not the place to analyze Weber's political development. Remember
simply that despite his seemingly contradictory affiliations, his
concrete positions are beyond any doubt. Friendship did not prevent it
not to criticize, sometimes harshly, Naunann's positions. - Let us take to
for example Weber's intervention in Erfurt in 1896 when Naumann proposed
its to transform the evangelical and social movement into a political party. We-
ber opposed the project with all his ardor. He pointed out to those present that they
will only be the party of commiseration for the proletariat, of miserabilism
sentimental and utopian pacifism, especially since the leaders and activists of the
evangelical and social movement are oriented towards ethical concerns
religious which they will not be able to get rid of, due to a lack of
real economic game and the instinct of power. "A party that thinks only of
recruiting the weakest will never achieve political power ” 6 . More
still chimerical appeared to him the hope of Naumann who believed he could
dear to a portion of the working class of the Social Democratic Party, although We-
4 Quoted by Marianne Weber, op. eyelash. p. 136.

5 Die Erhebung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik über die Lage der Landarbeiter, in the review
Das Land, 1 (1893); Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter, in
the Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung, VII (1894) and in Preußische Jahrbücher, LXXXVII
(1894 ); Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur in Die Wahrheit VI
(1896); Agrarverlältnisse im Altertum in Handwörierbuch der Staatswissenschaften
(1897).
6 Zur Gründung einer national-sozialen Partei, in Gesammlte politische Schriften, 2nd ed.
(Tübingen 1958), p. 27.
Page 36
ber hardly had any illusions about his political capacities. Asset
take, Weber did not deny the possibility of engaging in politics from a
"Miserable point of view", on condition, however, that it is translated in terms of
power and not in those of an ethical and humanistic religiosity which is only
compromise between the vague and inconsistent views of pastors and priests, of
teachers and a few workers. These are not political points of view.
ques. “Naumann,” said Weber, “seeks the collaboration of intellectuals. Despite
all he offers from the national point of view, his party will be the organization of
reux and overwhelmed [...] This party of the weak will never achieve anything. Point
of a miserable view will turn the National Socialists into political puppets,
men who, depending on whether the sight of economic distress hits them
nerves, will react with inarticulate movements to go sometimes to the right, sometimes to
left, in order to fight here the agrarians and there the purse and the great
industry ” 7 . Politics is not about pity. "Whoever takes the res-
responsibility for inserting one's fingers into the spokes of the development wheel
politician of his homeland must have strong nerves and not be too sentimental
to do time politics. And whoever goes down the path of
temporal policy must above all remain without illusions and recognize [...] the fact
fundamental to the existence of the ineluctable and eternal struggle of men against
men on this earth ” 8 .
In a sense, we already find in these texts the prefiguration of the famous dis-
distinction between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility. There is a ma-
very often abstract and theoretical denial of doing politics which consists of
judge in the name of non-political, moral, religious or scientific reasons, and
another which immediately places itself at the heart of the struggle and draws the consequences, if
harsh and unpleasant they may be. Among these consequences, some are also of
methodological character, in so far as they condition a clear conception and
lucid of theory and practice, explanation and evaluation. If he is
possible to enter the political arena for ethical, religious, scientific
fic or economic, however, we condemn ourselves to impotence if we
deliberately and systematically renounces by means of this activity,
know the force with its procession of violence and compromises or defilements
ethical. If this is so in practice, then political science must explain the political
as it is and not to hide the reality of the struggle in the name of former ideals
trapolitical or make believe (which is not at all its role as a science)
that it would be possible to conduct a policy that is finally innocent, pure and strictly
consistent with ethical and religious values. We play politics with the means
of politics and not with those of science or morality, just as there
pursues a political goal and not a moral or scientific one. The nuns of the ac-
7 M. WENCK, Die Geschichte der National-sozialen, 1905, quoted by Marianne Weber, op. cit.
pp. 234-235.
8 Protokoll über die Vertreter-Versammlung Aller National-sozialen (Erfurt 1896), quoted by W.
MOMMSEN, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik (Tübingen 1959), p. 46.
Page 37
political dimension are to be found within it and not outside it. Of course we can think
that politics should be an activity other than what it is, but it is
It would be scientifically aberrant to explain empirical being or reality on the basis of the
must be purely evaluative. It is to unmask this common confusion that is
largely devoted to the methodological work of Weber.
Like it or not, as long as the globe is divided into a plurality

States, concrete political action necessarily consists of placing oneself in the
conditions of a determined community, namely that of which one is a citizen, in order to
to promote its internal development as well as its power. Only the activity
thus understood is objectively adequate to the essence of politics. As a result
therefore there is no other correct and consistent political attitude for a German
and especially for a German statesman to judge affairs from the point of
view of a German, given the nature of the domestic regime and the context
international relations. The same for a French or for an English. A
thing is to fight a government that fails in its task - Weber was the
first to fiercely oppose the adventures of Kaiser Wilhelm II -
something else is to cultivate the utopia of a supposedly ideal policy, devoid of
every manifestation of power and struggle. Some have taken the pretext of this
Weber's attitude to accuse him of being a fierce nationalist. Such an in-
interpretation is only possible if certain sentences are isolated from the whole
and ignore its methodological studies.
Weber has set out the position which we have just analyzed most clearly.
in the most important writing of this first period of his life, namely the
inaugural course on The National State and Economic Policy which he delivered in
May 1895 at the University of Friborg 9 . Some commentators have interpreted it
as the most perfect expression of its nationalism, whereas one could
just as well to find there the reasons which led him to resign some
Pan-German League time later. However, there is no question of where
to see a controversy here. If Weber later changed his attitude towards the
Poland, he never denied the spirit of this conference, except to acknowledge that he
had felt obliged at that moment to recall with a certain brutality some
obvious. What is the theme of this university lesson? After summing up a
again the results and conclusions of the investigation into the situation
agricultural workers east of the Elbe, he wonders about the meaning of the political economy.
tick, which leads him to develop the premises of a philosophy and a
temology which will find their adequate form in later writings, because with
the time it will come to insist ever more on the irreducible antagonism
values and on the distinction between theory and practice, science and action. The
only difference is that the romanticism of his youth will be replaced by a reflection
more serene, however, that from that time lucidity in the analysis of the reports
9 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, in Gesammelte politische Schriften ,

pp. 1 to 25.
Page 38
ports between economy and politics is in no way inferior to that of the study on
Axiological neutrality or of the two conferences on the profession and the vocation of
scholar and politician 10 , in which he examines the relationship between science and
politics, between politics and morality, etc.
There are two distinctions, according to Max Weber. The first is inter-
greater than the notion of economy taken in general, in the sense that it is important not to
confuse economic science and economic policy . Considered as
science, economics aims to explain and analyze economic reality and,
as such, it is "international", that is to say, universal, just as
any other kind of science. Understood in this way, it is at the service of
only truth, either that it studies the objective conditions of the economic situation
that of a given country or period, either that it deepens the phenomenon
economic leads for itself or its historical development. As such she
can, no more than any other science, become a prophecy and announce the epiphany
of some last end. Say for example that it is by itself the
condition of peace or social justice, it is to make a value judgment
which no longer has anything in common with a scientific statement 11 . Whatever our
desires and our ultimate beliefs, the phenomenology of economics can only
to note, as far as we go back in history, the permanence of the struggle
and economic rivalry (open or latent). "There is no Peace either
in the economic struggle for existence; only the one who takes the appearance of peace
for the truth can believe that the future will bring peace and enjoyment of life to
our descendants. We are well aware that in the eyes of vulgar conception the eco
nomie passes for a reflection on the recipes likely to make the happiness of the
world - improving the "balance of pleasures" would be the only understandable goal
of our work. In truth, just the obscure gravity of the demographic problem
prevents us from being eudemonists, from imagining or believing that peace and
human happiness would be buried in the depths of the future ” 12 . It is therefore to be mistaken
dre on the meaning of the economy than to see in it a peaceful activity or more
conducive than another to the establishment of peace. As long as it is based
needs, therefore interests, it cannot be spared from conflicts of interest.
rets which, depending on the circumstances, can turn into power conflicts.
"It is not the peace and happiness of mankind that we have to provide
to future generations, but the eternal struggle for conservation and
of our national character. We do not have the right to abandon ourselves to the es-
optimistic hope that our task would be accomplished with the fulfillment
the greatest possible of economic civilization, while the selection,
10 See our translation of these last two conferences under the title Le savant et le politique
(Paris 1959).
11 Der Natiolsstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2e
edits. Tübingen 1959), p. 13.
12 Ibid. p.12.
Page 39
thanks to the play of free "peaceful" economic competition, would contribute

even with the advent of the most developed type ” 13 .
Of course, there can be no "economic work other than on a

altruistic base ”(which means that, by its very movement, any political
present economic trend tends to improve the living conditions of generations to
come), but we cannot derive from this fact any reason to give in the opti-
mism of a future happiness established by an alleged economic peace 14 . Indeed,
it is by dint of struggle that evolution takes place. The mistake is to identify the pro
sandstone in the production of goods (pure technical question) and social justice
(pure ethical question). Between these two series of problems there is no relation
logically necessary 15 .
Although no one can be forbidden to base hopes on

eudemonistic capacities of the economy, any lucid mind will recognize that
their hopes belong to the sphere of must-being, of which there is no
science. In any case, insofar as it is an empirical science, the economy
mie would not know how to pronounce on the must-being nor to make judgments of value.
On the other hand, this is the role of the economy understood as a practical or political art.
economic. However, as soon as we engage in economic policy and wear
value judgments, a new question immediately arises: what
is the yardstick by which we measure or assess economic development
that desirable? Although this is a purely doctrinal or par-
times subjective, there is only possible economic efficiency on the condition of keeping
account of the given historical situation. What is it ? It is the division of
globe in a plurality of states or nations. Consequently, as long as the
men live within national structures, there are no other possibilities
to achieve the specific goal of the economy only with the means and resources
available sources and within their institutional framework. Hence the affirmation
tion of Weber which caused a sensation at the time: "The economic policy of a
German state of value as the standard of value of the German economic theorist
mie can only be Germans ” 16 . To which it is permissible to retort: such
nationalistic value judgment is a prejudice. Weber does not dispute it
not. Is not belief in a eudemonist or peaceful economy also
also a prejudice which, moreover, has the disadvantage of not corresponding to any
real situation or to respond to any data of scientific investigation or
historical? And Weber took a position not without brutality:
things have changed since economic development began to
13 De Nationalstaat und die Wolkswirt sckatfspolitik, in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2e
edits. (Tübingen 1959), p. 14.
14 Ibid. p. 12.
15 Ibid. p. 13.
16 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirt schaftspolitik, in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2 nd
edits. (Tübingen 1959) p. 13.
Page 40
to build a vast economic community of nations beyond national borders

national? Should we throw away the “nationalist” standard of judgments
as well as “national egoism”? Or again, the struggle for economic self-defense.
that, for the woman and the child, would it be outdated since the family lost
its former function of production community and has been included in a
larger economic community? We know that this is not the case: the struggle has
only adopted other forms - of which it is questionable whether they should be considered.
rer as an attenuation or on the contrary as a reinforcement or an aggravation
vation. In the same sense, the economic community is another form of
rivalry between nations, of the kind that did not soften the struggle for
defense of one's own civilization, but which have aggravated it ” 17 .
Weber had too much of a sense of history to be purely and simply a na

tionalist. The economy can take other forms tomorrow as it did
others in the past. For the moment it is national and it is in this context
that it is necessary to achieve the specific goal of the economy. That's all he wants to say: In
Indeed, the economy “is linked to the particular imprint of humanity that we find
come into our own being. It is most strongly felt when we believe in
vantage that we got rid of our old skin. And - for em-
bend a somewhat fantastic image - if we could get out of our grave
within a few millennia, it would be the distant traces of our own being that
we would try to peer into the figure of the future species. Our supreme and ul-
Earthly ideals are also changing and fragile. We can not
hope to impose them on future generations. But we can make it so
that they recognize in our way of being that of their own ancestors.
As for us, we want to become through our work and our being the ancestors of
the future human species ” 18 . In other words, it makes no sense to think of the economy
abstractly outside of the resources and structures given or to be modified.
No one can know if nations with all the ideals attached to them at-
will disappear within a hundred years, it is therefore unreasonable to seek to upset
economics in the name of this ignorance. In this way we do no service to the
alive nor to our descendants. On the contrary, whatever the variations in
structures and ideals, it is unlikely that the economy itself
transforms into something quite different from what it is and has been. It is therefore little pro-
bable that in the future it will suddenly become essentially peaceful while
it has always developed in the course of struggles, competition and
Conflicts. We wrongly imagine that in the event of globalization of the problems the
goal of the economy could become other than economic and that will cease
conflicts, antagonisms and rivalry of interests.
17 Ibid. pp. 13-14.

18 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirt-schaftspolitik, in Gesampnelte politische Schriten, 2 nd
Page 41
If this is so, it is futile to want to give the economy goals that are for it.
foreigners, for example political (establishing a final peace), ethical (making the
happiness of mankind) or others. A fortiori do we delude ourselves if we
believes that she could draw ideals and final ends from her own background. " In
truth, it does not of itself generate ideals that would be particular to it, in the
on the contrary, it is the old general types of human ideals that we have introduced
sounds in the matter of our science ” 19 . In other words, the ultimate ends and values
what we are trying to achieve through economic activity are the same as
those that we pursue during our other activities, of a political nature,
legal, religious, artistic or scientific. In any case, however, the strict
economic science is not in a position to justify - unless it denies itself - the
elements of value in favor of the domination of a specific social class. All
However, it should not be concluded from this that an economist would be prohibited from proposing
solutions or do evaluations. It is even quite common that those who
claim to refrain from any value judgment are the first to be unfaithful
to their resolution, or they become the victims of instincts, sympathies and
uncontrolled antipathies, or they regard as economic truth the doctrine
who triumphs or who is on the way to winning, as if objectivity allowed itself
decide by the ratio of the strongest to the weakest. The great difficulty is therefore to
know when a proposition comes under economics and when to policy
economic tick.
This embarrassment becomes all the greater as we are now witnessing a sort of
imperialism of economism. In most disciplines (history, law,
politics, art and philosophy) economics is supposed to provide a principle of explanation
universal tion. It would be wrong to think that this method would be scientifically
more valid than the others. While it is true that legal concepts and institutions
dicies were established for economic reasons and therefore involve
of economic aspects, we cannot, however, privilege them, because
by reducing all the right to a manifestation of the forces of production we fall
in a system which is directly in contradiction with the postulates of the
scientific cation. This position is as false as the one which concludes from the fact that
physicists, physiologists or psychologists are interested in philosophical
the problem of knowledge and sometimes occupy chairs of philosophy
sophie, the old metaphysical questioning of being would have ceased to be the
fundamental problem of philosophy. The explanation of cultural phenomena by
economics is often an extremely useful and fruitful point of view, nevertheless
it does not cease to be a point of view, however vast its field becomes
investigation.
The second distinction concerns the establishment of a clear differentiation

between economics and politics in order to determine their relationship. For Weber
19 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, in Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2e

Page 42
each of these two activities has its specific purpose and means: they
are therefore autonomous. However, the independence of the economy is only real
level of economic enterprises; as far as the whole is concerned, its orienta-
tion depends on political will. Weber therefore opposes all those who
see in the economy, in one form or another, the element that would be
decisive analysis of politics, in the sense that the latter would only be
the expression or a superstructure of the phenomena of production. even though
economic considerations play a role in determining policy
generally they do not have any exclusivity, since other factors inter-
also come in the establishment of internal and external security. Yes
political economy as a science can claim universality, political
that economic, on the contrary, remains particular due to the fact that it is linked, like us
we have already said, to the available resources of a given country and that it depends
of the institutions and regime of each nation. Whether it is a city, a place
worse, of a state or another structure to come, it is the policy which often decides
as a last resort, because it has the supreme authority in
finance, that it concludes commercial treaties and that it can prohibit or
promote exchanges with other countries. "The development processes
economic are ultimately struggles for power; the interests of Can-
ciency of the nation are, whenever they are questioned, interest
ultimate and decisive in the service of which economic policy must be placed; the
science of economic policy is political science . She is a ser-
boasts (Dienerin) of politics, not of the politics of the day of such and such a potentate and
such class who hold power, but permanent political interests
what power of the nation. The national state is not something uncertain-
undermined that we believe to enhance the more the more we veil our nature in
a mystical darkness; if is the temporal organization of power. For us
the reason of state is the ultimate standard of value, even in the sphere of considerable
economic rations. This does not mean, as a strange misunderstanding goes,
that "state aid" should take the place of "personal effort" or else regulation
state mentation of economic life in the free play of economic forces,
but we would like to insist by this formula on the fact that with regard to
questions of German economic policy - among other things to decide whether and
to what extent the state should intervene or whether and to what extent it should
leave free the economic forces of the nation or on the contrary dismantle their
fortress - the decisive and ultimate voice must remain in the particular case with the interests
economic and political power of the nation and its representatives, in short to
the German national state ” 20 .
Normally all economic strength and class have always sought to take hold.
to ward off power and most of the time it is desirable that the economic class
the most powerful and the most dynamic holds the reins of the state. All-
20 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftpolitik, in Gesammelte politischeSchriften 2e

edits. (Tübingen 1959), pp. 14-15.
Page 43

times, "we must not forget that the economic power and the vocation to direct
politics do not always coincide ” 21 . In other words, there is no rap-
logically necessary port between economic power and political competence
tick, not only because, as history shows, it often happens
that the economically weaker class comes to power and sometimes even the
declining class - which in the long run risks endangering the interests of
nation - but also ready that the economically most powerful class cannot
not always have sufficient maturity to assume political leadership - this
which can constitute an even greater danger than the previous one. Is that the
political competence requires specific qualities "that no environmental conditions
nomic cannot replace ” 22 . Max Weber judges here without prejudice. The capacity
political city can reside in an exceptional man the disadvantage being in this
case, as the example of Bismarck shows, that the domination of a great
man is not always a means of politically educating the nation) or in
a "workers' aristocracy" possessing political sense and instinct. " It's not
not - as those who look, hypnotized, with a haggard eye in the
depths of society - in the mass that is danger. The real bottom of the
social policy issue is not a situation issue
of the governed, but the political qualification of the dominant classes
and rising ” 23 .
Breaking with the principle of professorial neutrality 24 , Weber evaluates in

conclusion the chances of Germany. He finds the situation tragic.
While recognizing himself as a member of the bourgeois class, he denies him the ability
political, lack of political intelligence and education. It is dominated by a
"non-historical and non-political" spirit; also she aspires to find a protection
tion in a "new Caesar". As for the Junker class who forged the nation
German she has accomplished her work and is no longer up to the new tasks.
the. Why ? Weber explains it in another text from the same year:
that a state can permanently rely politically on a social layer
who herself needs the protection of the state to survive ” 25 ? Remain the
socialists and the proletarian class. It's about economic and social strength
rising, but it is dispersed in the purely economic struggle without cons-
clear awareness of the political problem, both because it lacks maturity
political and possesses neither the instinct for power nor the capable leaders,
21 Ibid. p. 18.
22 Ibid p. 22.
23 Ibid. p. 23.
24 In the preliminary remark Weber considers that he can take the liberty here to wear
value judgments because it is an inaugural course whose aim is not to arouse
approval but contradiction.
25 Verhandlungen des evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses 1894, p..92 , cited by W. Mommsen, op.
cit- p. 36 .
Page 44
born that they are by the petty-bourgeois spirit (Spießbürgertum) 26 . Without assigning a
any prophetic gift to Weber, it should be noted that on this point his lucidity
has not been denied by history.
*
**
Called in 1897 to the chair of political economy at the University of Heidelberg

where he succeeded his master K. Knies, Weber was forced the following year by
a nervous disease restricting the number of its courses and repeatedly
to interrupt them for a few months. He sought to rebuild his health on
shores of Lake Geneva, Corsica, Italy, and finally he gave up teaching
birth in 1903. In the absence of active life. as a teacher he took refuge in life
contemplative to "think thought", to use the expression of Marianne We-
ber 27 . In 1903 he published his first purely methodological study the first
rst section of Roscher und Knies und-die logischen Probleme der historischen
Nationalökonomie in the Schmoller Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und
Volkswirtschaft. The second section will appear in 1905 and the third in 1906.
This study will remain unfinished like a certain number of other of his writings.
thodological. In 1904, at the same time as the Protestant Ethics and the spirit of
capitalism, he wrote for the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaift und Sozialpolitik which he
had just taken in hand, in collaboration with Jaffé and Sombart, the long article
Die “i Objektivitât” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis.
In the same review appeared in 1906 Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der
kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik, in 1907 Rudolf Stammlers "Uberwindung" der
materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, in 1908 Die Grenznutzlehre und das,
“P sychophysische Grundgesetz”, in 1909 Energetische Kulturtheorien. In the
Logos magazine in 1913 Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie, in
1917 Der Sinn der "Wertfreiheit" der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wis-
senschaften and in 1919 in the form of a booklet his Wissenschaft conference
als Beruf. All these writings with in addition Soziologische Grundbegriffe have been brought together
after his death in a volume entitled Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftsle-
hre (1st edition 1922, 2nd edition 1951).
This last work does not, however, include all of the publications of ca-
Weber's methodological character; he leaves aside the very brief published notices
in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik as well as the numerous
reports. In addition, we also find scattered in its main
works and in his interventions during the assemblies of the Association for
26 It is perhaps appropriate to compare these ideas with those expressed by Lenin more or less in the
same period in What to do? Weber only read Lenin later, but one may wonder
so Lenin, who was a great consumer of German literature, did not read Weber. For
To find out, we have to wait for the opening of the archives concerning Lenin.
27 Marianne Weber, op. cit. p . 319 .
Page 45
social policy and the German Sociological Society all kinds of remarks
epistemological issues. It would be tedious to make a review of it here.
plete. Let us confine ourselves to a few general considerations. As noted
Marianne Weber 28 , Weber's methodological writings are the works of
circumstances and most of them even have a distinctly controversial character. He de-
lop his own points of view by analyzing and combating the errors he
believed
that onceto find in
partial thefragmentary
and works of other scholars.
glimpses Asphilosophy
of his a result, heof
does not give us each
sance, without ever having systematically elaborated in a general work
own theory of knowledge.
The present translation contains only four of the ten writings collected in the
Gesamnmelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre; it is first of all the three studies
which have generally been translated abroad, namely the objectivity of
sance, the Critical Studies and the Essay on Axiological Neutrality. We have it
added the Essay on some categories of comprehensive sociology which has not been
translated so far into Italian (probably because of the many difficulties
presented in the text). If we present it here, it is because it seems to us illus-
particularly typically the method of analysis of Weber at the same
time it provides valuable information on some key concepts of
Weberian sociology, such as those of type of correctness, agreement, etc. The conference
reference to Wissenschaft als Beruf has been translated by us, with Politik als Be-
ruf, under the title Le savant et le politique. As for the study on Soziologische
Grundbegriffe, it belongs to Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft of which it constitutes the
first six sections of the first chapter. Of the ten writings contained in the
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre there are therefore only four left who
found no place and it is precisely those that have not been translated in
no foreign language. Apart from the long study on Roscher and Knies, whose tra-
duction alone would form a 200-page book, they do not have the same
importance than others. Nevertheless to give the French reader an idea
as complete as possible on Weberian epistemology we will give in
the lines which follow an analysis as clear as possible of these last four
writings 29 .
In Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Natio-
nalökonomie Weber studies the question of the validity of both general and
intuitivism in the human sciences, but already it announces, in a form
sometimes insufficiently developed, most of the problems that will be the subject of
writings translated below. He tackles the problem of law in the human sciences.
nes through the classification of sciences which, at that time, was the subject of
numerous works and discussions in Germany. Roscher distinguished two ma-
28 Marianne WEBER, op.cit .- p. 321.

29 Weber's theory of knowledge was the subject of an important study by A. von Schel-
ting, Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen 1934).
Page 46
denies of scientifically treating reality; the first "which he called" philoso-

phique ”consists in grasping the real by way of generalizing abstraction which
undermines contingency, the second he called "historical" tries to repro-
read by way of description. This distinction is reminiscent of that
established by modern logic (difference between the natural sciences and
Dilthey's spiritual sciences, between the nomothetic sciences and the
idiographies of Windelband, between the natural sciences and the
Rickert culture). Broadly speaking, it comes down to this:
The first series of sciences attempts to order the extensive and intensive diversity
sive by the construction of a system of concepts or laws of general validity
rale as large as possible. His logical ideal obliges him to always strip
more the reality of its contingency thanks to a reduction in differentiation
qualitative to precisely measurable quantities. It therefore moves away from the
concrete and singular reality owing to the fact that its specific logical means consists of
concepts whose content shrinks while their extension increases. The re-
The result is the establishment of concepts of relations having general validity,
that is, laws. In this case, the generic elements become essential
phenomenons. The second series deals precisely with the aspect of reality
that, because of its logical ideal, the generalizing method necessarily neglects,
know the knowledge of events in their singularity and in their future
unique. Its specific logical means also consist of concepts of relations
on the contrary, the content of which increases while the extension narrows. The result
is the construction of individual concepts (insofar as this expression has a
meaning) having a universal meaning, that is to say historical. Become es-
sential in this case the characteristic elements of the phenomena.
Weber agrees with this classification and its justification ("The difference between
these two ways of constructing concepts is fundamental in itself ”) 30 , but
he adds two very important remarks:
1) Due to the fact that the sensible world is infinite extensively and above all intensive-
ment, it is impossible to fully reproduce even the most limited portion.
of reality by neither of these two series of sciences. Because each of them
each time retains other aspects of the phenomena as essential, the general
ity as well as singularity operate a selection in infinity and neglect
certain aspects. Consequently, it cannot be said that the results of the sciences
of nature are more valid, more true and closer to reality than those of
cultural sciences.
2) This distinction has a purely methodological value, i.e. it does not

does not divide the whole of the sciences into two opposite spheres, but it is
found in any science (with the possible exception of mechanics and
30 Max WEBER, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 6-7.
Page 47
certain branches of historical science). For example, it is wrong to say that

astronomy and biology belong only to the natural sciences and
sociology and psychology to cultural sciences. On the contrary the astrono-
or biology, sociology or psychology use, depending on the circumstances.
these and the necessities of knowledge sometimes the generalizing method sometimes the
individualizing method. Psychology can establish laws just like bio-
logy can deal with singularities.
By the way, Weber finds here the deeper truth, generally misunderstood.
known by polemical bias, by progressive routine or simply by irreconcilable
inflection, of the scholastic proposition on the advancement of knowledge:
g enus proximum et differentia specifica, which he himself never ceased to fight.
even, like the vast majority of epistemologists and logicians
modern. If one examines things more closely it cannot escape that the
double movement of generalization and singularization amounts to saying that
all knowledge and all science proceed by establishing differences,
alterities or oppositions on the one hand and resemblances, analogies and cor-
on the other hand. This means that the relations are either distinct
tion or identification and that it is not possible to establish the first
for seconds and vice versa. In short, the general method of science
is neither unilaterally nor definitively generalizing or individualizing.
In the light of this classification theory and general methodology

rale of the sciences it is possible to detect, by taking the example of the thought of
Roscher, all kinds of confusions that an economic doctrine can convey
and social. Roscher claims to follow the historical method because he claims to
the legal school of Savigny, while on the other hand he sees in Adam Smith and
Malthus of the precursors. Hence a contradiction that is difficult to overcome. In
Indeed, Savigny fought the legalistic rationalism of the Enlightenment and emphasized
on the irrational and singular character of the law by asserting that it proceeds as
the language and other cultural phenomena of the "spirit of the people" ( Volksgeist)
and that it cannot be inferred from laws or general norms. The classical school
English, imbued with the spirit of enlightenment, seeks on the contrary to discover the
natural laws of the economy and its development. Roscher thinks he can
reconcile the two opposing points of view by taking it into account, without however
subject it to criticism, the notion of people and by interpreting it as a total
individuality in the sense of a biological organism. As well as the diversity of
individuals does not prevent the anatomist and the physiologist from establishing laws
general, the historian has no difficulty, despite the diversity of peoples, in finding
between them analogies and parallelisms that it would be possible to raise to the rank
of natural laws as our knowledge progresses. At the end
of the account, we could develop a generic concept of. people under which he
it would be possible to subsume the development of particular historical peoples,
apart from their accessory singularities. Like the theories organized
cistus from the beginning of the 19th century in Germany, Roscher conceived the laws of development
Page 48
historical development on the model of the succession of ages of individual life

dual: youth, maturity and old age The phenomena of economic life,
which in fact only drill a part of the cultural life of a people, would be left
therefore study according to the type of physiological methods, that is to say it would be
possible to determine various stages in the economic life of peoples,
same as in their political, artistic and other life. This method purely
ultimately a naturalist would allow predictions to be made as long as,
despite their individuality, the historical development of all peoples would be
always the same. Roscher therefore ignores surprises and irrationality.
tionality of history of which he was nevertheless aware. He pushes infidelity to the
historical method to the point of placing such great confidence in the abs-
tractive that he hopes that science will one day succeed in building a system of
sufficiently complete and rich concepts from which it will be possible to deduce reality.
This thesis of the deductibility of reality is obviously in contrast to

complete with the Weberian idea of the inexhaustible infinity of the sensitive and phenomenal world.
nomenal both from the point of view of the individualizing method and that of
the generalizing method. Hence the criticism of Roscher's doctrine for which
concepts would be a reproduction of reality or even science, when
that it is in front of a causal relation between several objects, should see
in what appears to him to be essential the cause of what seems less important
so much. However, there is no need to dwell on it at length, since it is a
criticism common to all Kantian and neokantian philosophies and no
ment peculiar to Weber's thought. We will not find any in all of them either.
details of Roscher's doctrine, which Weber analyzes with critical perseverance
most often very insightful, but sometimes also giving the impression of
request texts. Let us rather focus on the fundamental question that he poses in relation to
pos of Roscher's general methodology: what are the relationships between reason
and history, between concept and reality? Three solutions are possible.
The first uses analogies and parallelisms to establish laws.

Weber does not dispute its heuristic importance, even in the sciences.
human beings, on condition that this is not seen as the ultimate goal of science in general nor
not one of the particular categories of sciences, that is to say those of nature,
either those of the mind or of history. Indeed, the process of establishing laws
is endless. Suppose we succeed in establishing a multitude of empirical laws
ques of historical becoming. By virtue of their internal movement, abstraction and
generalizations tend to subordinate these laws to other laws that are still more general
until it forms, at the limit, a system of concepts of absolutely general validity.
neral capable of abstractly representing the whole of historical development.
Such a process inevitably departs from sensible reality by the fact that it eliminates
progressively undermines all the singularities of becoming. It is therefore vain to hope
that he can identify this becoming; all the more reason cannot we deduce the reality
of a system of concepts, however perfect it may be.
Page 49
The second is to use analogies and parallelisms in order to

understand reality in its future and its singular relationships and to identify
thus the characteristic significance of cultural phenomena. In this case also
they are purely heuristic means likely to develop at all times
more individual concepts with universal meaning, not to grasp
all reality, because this process is also endless. Ignoring this, the ana-
logies and parallelisms deflect research, as has often happened
towards pernicious confusions.
The third solution provides Weber with one of the few opportunities to explain himself.
quer on Hegel. The latter's dialectical philosophy tries to overcome the
irrationalized hiatus between concept and reality thanks to the construction of general concepts
nerals conceived as metaphysical entities that would contain the becoming and
singular events, in the sense that their actualization would only be a
festation of the concept, In this case all the rational is real, that is to say the generalization
ty of the concept is coextensive with its content. "Between understanding and extension
of a concept the relation is no longer the reverse, but of coincidence, because the indi-
viduality is no longer the exemplary of a genre, but a part of the whole represented by
the concept. The most general concept from which everything can be deduced is the same
richest time in terms of content ” 31 . Such a conception,
remarks Weber, takes a model from mathematical knowledge, without being
identical, and it presupposes the presence of metaphysical entities behind the reality
from where this would emanate from the way in which the mathematical propositions follow
wind. It is therefore an "emanatist" philosophy.
that Although Roscher washethe
it is "philosophical", opponent of
nevertheless Hegel's method
conceives under theway
in an analogous pretext
the relation
between reality and concept, with the difference that historical reality does not emanate
more of a general concept, but of the natural laws of becoming which are themselves
even the expression of the "thought of God". In other words, just like the sys-
teme of Hegel, that of Roscher is more theological than truly scientific.
Weber accompanies his critique with epistemological considerations of more
general. Basically Roscher admits only one type of scientific method,
namely the deduction. So the distinction between the sciences has for him its
foundation in the nature of the objects they deal with (matter, spirit, history, etc.)
and not in the way each of them forms its concepts and uses the various
logical processes. For Weber, on the contrary, scientific methods are
its because of the complexity of the problems they set out to solve. Of
From this point of view, any effective method is good, regardless of its har-
or not with any methodological ideal of the theorist. As a result
quence Weber rejects the almost unanimously recognized prejudice of the primacy of
the mathematical method and quantification, in the sense that it would be the model
of all methods, towards which the sciences should tend under penalty of
31 Max Weber, op. cit . p. 15.
Page 50
to remain an inferior and, so to speak, illegitimate knowledge. As long as the

method is a technique, its role is to advance knowledge and not to
move towards a so-called ideal of knowledge. The mathematical method
is only a particular and therefore limited form of knowledge, it is not effective
cace only under specific conditions and in virtue of certain postulates. She does not
therefore enjoys no superiority. On the contrary, mathematical work, like
any other scientific work is endless; it would therefore be presumptuous
to think of it as finished, which all those who see
in the mathematical process the methodological ideal. If it is true on the one hand that
the mathematical method or deduction is only a specific vision of the
world, therefore a point of view, and that on the other hand it goes no foreseeable term, it
is unreasonable to believe in the possibility of inferring historical reality or
being of a concept or of supposed general and ultimate laws of becoming.
The conceptions which give themselves a methodological ideal are also those which
generally claim to know the ultimate stage of human development.
By a kind of natural slope they are led to look at the becoming as
taking place by stages, ages, therefore following the pattern of growth and decline,
since the birth of a new age supposes the decadence of the previous one. We
sees, as other texts show, that Weber does not aim only at Hegel,
but also Marx and Comte. However, he does not deny the heuristic value of
concept of stage, but it disputes the possibility for the scientist to pass these
divisions, which are only of value from the point of view of a more
clear, for real stages which would be inscribed in the very becoming. It exists
therefore an affinity between the theories which propose to establish the laws of development.
from which one could deduce reality and those who believe
cover ages of humanity; they are all "emanatists", because they
conceive of concrete reality as the manifestation of an arbitrary posited idea
definitely as the last step. There is no question of denying the usefulness of these philosophical
phies, because they can help man to better understand certain aspects of
reality. What Weber denies them is their validity as a scientific vision of the
world, because, being indefinite research, no science can allow itself to be limited
by this kind of fences.
We now better understand the distinction indicated above between the validity
generality of a concept and its universal meaning, which nevertheless remains unique.
For Weber, science is one of the means, besides economics, 'of politics,
of religion and art, to become aware of reality. This distinction takes
all its meaning if we refer to the Weberian philosophy of the irreducational antagonism
tible of values. Despite all its success, science is not in a position to
substitute for other human activities, such as politics or the economy, because our
intelligence of reality depends as much on action as on knowledge. So there is
point of privilege of knowledge, in spite of the rationalization and the intellect.
tualization that characterize modern civilization. Certainly science is undefined.
denies; there is therefore no term for it in the field of mathematics as well.
Page 51
matics than in physics or chemistry, it also increases

ceaselessly its field of investigation following the constitution of a history
scientist of art, philosophy, religions, etc. In this sense, its significance
tion is universal, for there is no aspect of reality from which one could ex-
clure. Nevertheless, this meaning remains singular because it is only one
point of view, specific certainly, but which could not replace those of the economy,
morality or politics. In other words there will always be about
any question the point of view of the scientist, but also that of the man
state, economist and artist, without the possibility of reducing them to a denomination
common nator. However, it is to this unilaterality that the general validity of a
concept, because it considers itself capable of deducing all reality from a standard law.
blamed by knowledge alone, as if political, economic and other
were only ways of knowing it. The infinite diversity of reality is expressed
in all these activities, but none can fully understand it. The hia-
tus between concept and reality remains insurmountable, that is to say we are not
not close to solving the following riddle: while it is not possible for us to
know the world other than by constantly building new ones
concepts, why no concept, nor their sum either, are they able to
fully grasp all the real, that is to say why the increasing rationalization,
under the preponderant influence of science and scientific technique,
does it force each time in another way, as it progresses, the
power of the irrational 32 ?
Karl Knies on the other hand had a very keen sense of weight and permanence.
of the irrational. Weber, who in principle devotes the following two sections of
study, does not linger much in the examination of its doctrine and quickly takes precedence.
text of the problems it raises to discuss a number of concepts
tions of more recent theorists of the human sciences, those of Wundt, of
Simmel, Gottl, Lipps, etc. However, as the conclusion of the
third section, he thought he would return in the course of a fourth section, which was not
unfortunately never written, to the doctrine of Knies to submit it to a
more in-depth critical analysis. Despite this incompleteness, Weber's design
appears with sufficient clarity: if it is impossible to build on
purely scientific bases a rational system from which one could deduce the
reality, should we bow to the perpetual irruptions of the irrational and
trust only intuitionist methodologies and the like?
32 It would be wrong to classify Weber among the modern scorners of science. On the contrary,
he had a deep respect for all that mankind has accomplished in this area, but he
also kept from all exaltation. In his opinion, scientifically educated judgment should apply
also to the objective interpretation of its significance for culture by evaluating how
the scope and limits of knowledge without falling into the exaggerations of
scientism or the pitfalls of irrationalism. Too often scientists, even eminent ones,
come from their authority proposals which are in no way scientific and consequently arouse
quence of the confusions which risk discrediting the true scientific work.
Page 52
The first edition in 1853 of Knies' main methodological work,

Die politische Oekonomie vom Standpunkt der geschichtlichen Methode passa
unnoticed. Under the influence of the Kathedersozialist movement we rediscovered
so to speak this work and Knies published in 1883 a second- edition rema-
denied that was at the origin of the Methodenstreit of which we have already spoken. Like the
Most of his contemporaries, he initially gave himself a classification of scientists
these, based not on the method but on the object, because he considers that the
nature of the object determines the type of method to be employed by a science. To his
opinion there would be three categories: the natural sciences, the
took and the sciences of history. Political economy would belong to this last
denial, except that the human action that it studies is conditioned at the same time by
nature and through history. It follows that it comes up against the fundamental problem of
relation between the necessity of nature and the freedom of the will. He designs the inter-
vention of the elements of nature from the purely naturalistic angle of a development
development conforms to laws and opposes it to that of human activity which, because
that it is free, would be singular and irrational. In principle the influence of the na-
ture on economic phenomena should produce obedient development.
sant to laws. If this is not so, and if economics remains a historical science,
it is because the natural laws which operate within the economy remain
laws of nature and are not laws of economics itself, for good reason
that the will of man introduces a certain irrationality into it.
One can first of all dispute the identification that, following Roscher, Knies
establishes between causality and legality. It is not true that causality would make sense
that in the context of the investigation intended to discover laws, since a
singular event may be the cause of another singular event, apart from
of any generalization. Therefore, nothing prevents us from speaking of a cause.
singular dirtiness. The main difficulty, however, lies in the opposition that
Knies believes he finds between the mechanical causality which characterizes the phenomena
nes of nature and the "creative" action attributable to the intervention of people
in the economy. What should we understand by this expression of "creative action"?
If we place ourselves solely on the level of irrationality there is no need to do so,
time Weber, a principle distinction between the action of an isolated individual and that
of several or of the mass. On the contrary, it is high time that sociologists and
economists are once again ridding themselves of the ridiculous prejudice of the dilettantes of the
scientism according to which mass phenomena, considered as causes or
historical effects, would be more objective and therefore less singular than
the action of a hero or an individual. A historical event (for example a
war or revolution) remains singular despite the number or quantity of
ticipants. What deserves particular attention is the qualifier
of "creator" by which Knies defines the action of the person. And since Wundt
made it a fundamental notion of the methodology of the human sciences under
the name of "creative synthesis" ( schöferische Synthese), it is appropriate to
refer to its design.
Page 53
For Weber, it is a mistake to see in this notion something other than the deposit
evaluations. By calling human action "creative" one does not confer on it any
higher objectivity, but above all one cannot say that the creative action of a
concrete personality would be different from that of an impersonal causal element of
nature. “This is by no means an empirical concept, because it relates to
valuable ideas under which we consider qualitative changes
in reality. Physical and chemical phenomena, for example, which have
contributed to the formation of a layer of coal or a diamond are formal-
ment of "creative syntheses" in the same sense as the chains of
motives which help to form a new religion on the basis of intuitions
of a prophet - except that the meaning can be determined otherwise as to the content
because of the diversity of the guiding ideas of value ” 33 . This text may sur-
take it at first reading. For Weber, however, it is not a question of assimilating the
formation of a layer of coal to that of a religion, but to distinguish clear-
between ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. The analogy only concerns the
logical process that establishes a creative synthesis in the order of changes
qualitative. When we are in the presence of modifications of this kind we do not
let us never take into account all the causative elements which have intervened
indeed - the causal regression is infinite as well in the order of the course of
nature than in that of history - but we attribute more importance
great to some of them, that is, we make a choice. Even when
we explain the formation of the cosmological system from a nebula
primitive, we formulate a hypothesis which eliminates a certain number of causes
as negligible to attribute to others a determining efficiency. That
means that the selection which divides the causes into negligible and important is
the work of our knowledge and not of the real course of things or even the ine-
equality in the causal action of the elements depends on the inequality of the ideas of value
to which we report them. In short, the concept of creative synthesis
expresses the difficulty experienced by the scientist in applying the proposition purely
deterministic: causa œquat effectum. "What we call" creator "in
these cases is simply that our "conception" of historical reality
attributes a variable meaning to real causal becoming ” 34 . Indeed, in themselves the
course of nature and that of history are foreign to any significance. This is
the human spirit which is the creator of meaning by virtue of the relation to values and it is he
which is decisive both for the interest we attach to certain phenomena
leads and for the causal inequality that we attribute to the various elements of
nir.
When Wundt considers that a phenomenon of nature is nothing other than the
sum of its molecules with their reciprocal action, while the variations of
psychic or historical events would introduce new properties not
contained in their causes or elements (what he calls creative synthesis), he
33 Max Weber , op.cit., Pp. 49-50.

34 Ibid. p. 50.
Page 54
confuses reality and concept. There is no reason to refuse to talk about synthesis
creative about the economic value of a diamond and a grain and
apply it on the other hand to the epistemological value or to the accuracy of the proposition.
tion 2 X 2 = 4- In no case does the meaning derive from causality, no matter what
the nature of the phenomena. Does the meaning that the diamond and the grain
possess relatively to certain human axiological feelings would be found
prefigure to a higher degree or in another sense in the physical conditions
of their formation than would be - in case of strict application -
the principle of causality in the psychic sphere - the representations and
the judgments in the elements from which they derive? Or, to take
historical examples, the significance of the Black Death for social history or
from the irruption of Dollart to that of colonization would it be prefigured
in the first case in bacteria and other causes of infection, in the second
in geological or meteorological causes? It is exactly the same
of the invasion of Germany by the troops of Gustavus Adolf and that of
Europe through the years of Genghis Khan. All these events had consequences
important historically, that is to say in relation to our cultural values.
real. All were also causally determined, if we take seriously,
as Wundt wants it, the universal domination of the principle of causality. All
are also at the origin of a "psychic" and "physical" development. However, we do not
can derive from their causal conditionality, the historical "meaning" that
we attribute to them. In particular, it does not follow at all that they contain
nent of "psychic becoming". On the contrary, the meaning we attribute to
all these events, that is to say the relation to the values that we operate, is
the absolutely heterogeneous and disparate moment which breaks the possibility of
make a deduction from their component parts 35 .
Basically, Weber means this: it is possible to analyze causally the deve-

psychic end in the same way as physical becoming and, from this point of view, nothing
does not allow us to declare that one would be more rational or more irrational than
the other; conversely, the psychic becoming is not more significant in itself
than physical becoming, because in both cases the meaning is imposed from the former
development, by reference to the valuable ideas of the wearer
judgment on evolution. It is therefore wrong to believe that the changes
psychic or historical considerations (whether of a political, economic,
artistic or cultural) contain in themselves a creativity absent from
physical changes or that they impart a determined meaning to the development
development. In itself, history is no more significant than nature. the
physical becoming is as creative as psychic becoming and what is called
creative synthesis is only one way of designating the values that we add
to causality to give it direction. As a result, it is to sin against
scientific lucidity than to believe that the creative synthesis would be a principle
immanent in the psychic or historical becoming, to the exclusion of the
35 Max Weber , op. cit., p. 54.

Page 55
ture. Like adaptation, progress and the like, it is not

that a means of surreptitiously introducing axiology into pure scientific analysis
fique. We must therefore be wary of the alleged opponents of teleology, because their
positivism is very often only a roundabout path that finality takes to
disturb the work of the scholar. Take the example of adaptation. She confuses will-
their theoretical and practical value, because it tends to pass off utility for
truth, that is to say that, under the appearances of an objective observation, it opens
the door to axiological points of view. As the proposition 2 X 2 = 4
is true in itself for purely logical reasons and not by virtue of
practical considerations of a psychic, historical, or sociological nature, the truth
scientific in general does not allow itself to be determined by any external criterion such as
economic utility, political efficiency, etc.
All in all, no value, including that of science, "is understandable

empirically of itself ” 36 . The goal of science is indefinite research and
the progress of knowledge for itself; its results are only true
by virtue of the logical standards of our thinking. We can, of course, put it at the service
vice of economic, political, medical, technical and other interests, but the
value of each of these ends is imposed on it from the outside: it does not allow itself to be
can only be justified by science itself. There is more. From a strictly em-
pirical, the value of pure science understood as research for itself
remains problematic and questionable. We can fight it for religious reasons
or policies - frequently adopted positions - but in addition, the individual who
gives primacy to the value of life over that of knowledge may
deny the adversary in so far as he considers that it risks endangering the existence
tence of man on earth. Conversely, the denier of life can oppose the
science either that he sees in it an ever richer manifestation of life or
on the contrary, it becomes a possibility of annihilating life on earth. None of these
attitudes is not logically contradictory, provided we do not ignore that the
glorification and depreciation of science both presuppose adherence to
other values that we prefer. It is clear that under these conditions the significance
tion of science for culture as well as that of culture itself considered
as an increase in value (Wertsteigerung) do not allow themselves
more scientifically based. On the contrary, they are never only points of
axiological and teleological view, therefore debatable. Indeed, our judgments on
science and culture are those of civilized beings and who as such are familiar
with a scale of values that other men can reject without becoming
for that degraded or inferior beings. All of these positions are metaphysical
ques and express the intrusion of intelligibility into empirical reality by
through ethical standards.
Weber thus outlines his conception of the philosophy of history that he develops.
loppera later. As long as the future of nature as well as that of 1
36 Ibid . p. 60 .
Page 56
history are in themselves foreign to any meaning, no philosophy of

history cannot claim to speak in the name of science. They can never
than to rely on fragmentary scientific knowledge without the possibility
to prejudge future discoveries, because no one is able to predict them
as long as science remains an indefinite search. In other words, each philoso-
phy of history values certain elements of infinite becoming by attributing to them a
causal power greater than that of others. In fact this is a pure view of
the mind which confuses ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi insofar as the developments
lopements that she believes she sees in the real course of things, foreign to the
gnification, are only the developments of our ideas of value. But to their
in turn the developments of ideas of value are infinite because it does not exist and
that there can be no single, definitive and absolute system of values. For the
same reasons Weber rejects psychologism, historicism or naturalism
when they claim to pass for conceptions of the world. Neither science in general
neral nor a fortiori a particular science are not in a position to grasp
in their concepts infinite empirical reality. When they claim to be able
to do so, they cease to be sciences to become vague metaphysics
as prejudicial to properly metaphysical reflection as to research
scientist. In addition, they do not represent any positive contribution because they
do nothing but solicit the facts to justify the alleged universality of an idea of
value.
Besides creativity, irrationality would be another characteristic of action

and therefore (the human sciences. In the manner of many economists and
scientists we can understand this concept in the vulgar sense of the impossibility of predicting
(Unberechenbarkeit). Is this new characteristic more valid than the
former ? “First of all, observes Weber, if we stick to the 'lived' reality
we do not see this specific unpredictability of human action.
Any military command, any penal law and even any externalization to the
in our contacts with others rely on the intervention of certain consequences.
quences in the psyche of those to whom they are addressed - not unequivocally
in all respects, but sufficient for the purpose of the command,
of the law and of externalization in general. From a logical point of view these acts
rely on these consequences in a way that is no different from evaluations
"Static" of a bridge builder, forecasts in the order of chemistry
of the farmer and the physiological assumptions of a herder and their
these calculations are no different in meaning from economic evaluations.
ques of a broker ” 37 . In short, between the possibility of predicting the phenomena of
nature and expectation of the consequences of human action there is no difference
in principle. Moreover, certain phenomena of the first category, of-
meteorological dre, for example, are more unpredictable than those of the second
and it will always be so whenever we consider the singularity of a
phenomenon of nature. All the improvement of our monological knowledge
37 Max Weber, op. cit. , - p. 64.
Page 57
will not change anything. There can therefore be no question of attributing to human action
an irrationality greater than in the singular phenomena of nature.
Suppose an avalanche tears a block of rock from a wall and that-

it fragments into multiple pieces of debris. On the basis of the laws of mechanics we
could give a causal explanation for the fall and approximately its
direction, of the debris bursting and the degree of this bursting and, in the cases
favorable, from the direction of both breaks. Yet about the name-
of debris, their form and an infinity of other aspects of this kind, our
causal curiosity is reduced to recognizing that all this is not incomprehensible
in principle, that is to say, is not in contradiction with our nomo-
logic. On the other hand, not only would it be impossible as a result of the disappearance
the trace of concrete determinations to operate a real causal regression,
in case one would like to explain these aspects, but such a task would be unnecessary.
Only in the event that one or the other singular process is at first glance in
contradiction with the laws of nature that we know, that our curiosity
causal would be awakened. This example is typical of how we use
let's read the category of causality in all kinds of things like weather-
rology, geography or biology. Just think of the way we use
in biology of the concept of adaptation: rarely it is the object of a causal imputation.
dirty precise and almost never it is based on real necessary judgments of
causality. In general we are satisfied to admit that it is about process
that we could understand, that is, they do not form exceptions
of our nomological knowledge. Hence a first conclusion to be drawn: “When
the explanation of concrete events, the possibility of making strict judgments
necessary causality is far from constituting the general rule, but the exception,
and these judgments never relate to anything but isolated elements which we
take into consideration leaving aside the others who can and should be
considered negligible ” 38 . We do not do otherwise in the
sphere of human action, be it the behavior of an individual or
that of a community. The difference between natural sciences and sciences
human rights is of a different order: it essentially concerns the notion of
tation (Deutung) to which Weber devotes long pages. He hears this
concept not in the sense of the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Boeckh, but in the
purely epistemological meaning that he took from Dilthey and subsequently from
Münsterberg, Simmel and others.
Weber begins by drawing our attention to two points:
(1) We can satisfy our causal curiosity other than

by the nomological method alone and this new way makes it possible to give a
new meaning to the notion of irrational. Indeed, we can make the
intelligible human behavior by trying to understand it (verstehen), this
38 Max Weber, Op.cit. , p. 66,
Page 58
which means by releasing by reviviscence (nacherleben) the motif or the com-

complex of motives which he obeyed. In this case it can be interpreted as significant-
ment and, from this point of view, it is less irrational than a singular phenomenon of
nature which is absolutely foreign to any motivation. It is still necessary to recognize
be that all human behavior is not accessible to interpretation, for
example that of the madman. So it is only where the understanding of the motives ceases
that interpretation also ceases and that we then have no other solution than
explanation by the nomological method. "Wherever historical knowledge
encounters irrational behavior in the sense that it escapes interpretation,
causal curiosity must as a rule be satisfied with understanding it by
see nomological (for example that of psychopathology or other sciences
of this sort) analogous to that which we would possibly use in connection with the
grouping of debris from a boulder - but it should not be content
less ” 39 . At the level of an interpretation of the reasons we are dealing no
no longer to a nomological but teleological rationality, that is to say it cannot be expressed
prime more by a necessary judgment of causality, but in the form of the causal
adequate dirt. This is what Weber would later call racial behavior.
tional by purpose 40 . There is therefore no doubt that motivated behavior is
more accessible to rational evaluation and calculation than the sin-
gulier of nature: we better understand the attitude of Frederick the Great by
1756 as weather variations. As a result, it is wrong to identify
freedom of will and irrationality; on the contrary, free behavior, unlike
of that of the madman or that of nature, is more accessible to the inter-
interpretation, because it obeys the teleological rationality determined by the relation
from medium to end.
(2) Causal curiosity further requires that we understand the meaning (Sinn) of
the action. Indeed, we do not achieve an intelligence of human behavior
by simply relating it to the rules of becoming, however strict they may be. "Phe-
nomenologically, interpretation is not a simple case of subsumption under
rules ” 41 . Not only can knowledge of the laws not replace the inter-
interpretation of meaning, but it even means absolutely nothing in this respect. Suppo-
sounds that one succeeds in establishing by means of empirical and statistical proof that
everywhere and always men have reacted in a manner absolutely identical to
a specific situation, so that it would be possible to "predict" their reactions.
future tions, it is nonetheless true that this knowledge does not strictly
ment nothing to the interpretation. Indeed, these manifestations remain incomprehensible.
siblings until we know why men react this way and all
39 Ibid . pp . 67-68.
40 On these categories of adequate causality and rationality by finality, see the explanations of
Weber in the two pamphlets translated below: Critical Studies and Essay on some
tegories of comprehensive sociology.
41 Max Weber, op.cit.,, P. 70 note 1.
Page 59
days in the same way, that is, as long as the meaning of their behavior
stay hidden.
Unfortunately we have sometimes misinterpreted the role that interpretation plays

in the sciences. Some authors, and in the first place. Münsterberg 42 , deducted
of the heterogeneity between interpretative research and nomological work,
possibility of using these two methods at the same time in the same science
different. There would be two kinds of sciences, one called subjectivating
(subjektivierende), such as history and related sciences such as political economy
tick, which would proceed exclusively by interpretation, the others called
objectifying
ecology, (objektivierende),
which such
construct general as physics,
concepts chemistry,
or laws biology
solely on andofpsychology
the basis
induction, establishment and testing of hypotheses. Everything happens
as if each of these kinds of sciences had for its object another being, no
more in the sense of the classic distinction between the physical being and the psychic being,
but to that of the opposition between being lived and being reasoned. According to Münsterberg,
the real and current 'me' that we experience all the time as well as
the surrounding world that it animates cannot become the object of an explanation
causal operating with concepts and laws: they escape any description.
It is that the ego is not only intuition, but it is always and at all times.
ment a being who wants, takes a stand, values and judges. So he only leaves himself
to interpret. The surrounding world is not likely to become the object of an explanation.
causal cation only on the condition of conceiving it as a thing perceived, under-
deals with ego action. As a result there would be no action or behavior
rational and causally explicable only if we think of them as detached from the ego
and subject only to the general laws of becoming, which object perception
boasts is the only one in a position to establish. Of course, Münsterberg would easily recognize
that the objectification of the human world by causal knowledge supposes that it
is first given as lived, but he denies that it can ever become as such
object of knowledge. In other words, a current and lived will is in his eyes
something quite different from the desired objects studied by objectifying science. It's about
therefore of something more than the distinction between the existent and the judgment
existential, since the actual and existing will constitutes a being other than the will.
lu which is the object of knowledge. So there would be two wills, one will
real of a current subject and the one who becomes the object of science by abstraction of the
me who animates it. As a result, current affairs are only accessible to a general understanding.
immediate effect, the ego being abandoned to pure intuition, so that the
ordinary processes of science such as causation or analysis are not only
useless, but also inapplicable. However, history being a knowledge of
acts of people in the past, of their concrete desire and of their im-
mediated, it necessarily falls into the category of the subjectifying sciences.
42 Münsterberg had been Weber's colleague at the University of Freiburg before emigrating to
America. It was at his invitation that Weber made his trip to the USA in 1904. The book
referred to here appeared in 1900 in Leipzig under the title Grundzüge der Psychologie.
Page 60
Even more, as long as there is no passage allowing to pass from the

subjectivity to objectivity, from noetic or comprehensive interpretation to
causal cation, there is no longer any other way out for the scientist who has embarked on the
path of causal imputation than to persevere in it, even if it encounters during
the analysis of the aspects of an immediate will, accessible to the Noetian interpretation
than. On the contrary, he must even try to reduce these aspects to processes.
elementary psycho-physical for example and, in case of failure, leave them
simply in the shadows:
Obviously Weber first rejects this thesis because it is in contradiction-

tion with its own philosophy; on the one hand it ignores the negative presupposition
tive of all empirical science, namely the infinite intensive of all sensible reality,
on the other hand, it admits the possibility of subsuming a singular, objective phenomenon.
vé under a law and even to establish a law for a singular case. Very quickly
however the criticism is more general. Suppose we want to do an ana-
historical analysis
of the times of the of the relationship
Reformation. between
Research firstreligious
comes upprinciples
against a and upheavals
difficulty
so to speak internal concerning the complexity of states of consciousness and faith
men of that time. It would be missing out on the real problem to
reduce these inner states to pure sensations or other psychophysical factors.
elementary ques. Moreover, this is not the goal of historical knowledge which
n / A. what to do with these artifices. But above all we do not see how to go about it
to submit all these questions to exact observation in a laboratory of
psychology. On the other hand, the story is also interested in the outside world, either
that the events that take place there become pretexts to act, or that the action
tion changes the course of events and has repercussions on
beliefs and feelings. There's no reason enough to refuse history
the value of an objective science because it cannot reduce human actions.
mains to elementary factors. As such, it should also be refused to the
biology, since it has not yet succeeded in reducing the cell to com-
simpler poses.
Münsterberg, however, makes an exception for pedagogy. He notices that he

would be unreasonable to transform the pedagogue responsible for instructing and
to educate children or students in an experienced psychologist
mental, because:
a) the role of the teacher is not to be a man of science or even a

subjectifying science, but to achieve a human work whose value or
non-value escape the competence of analytical and experimental knowledge;
b) in this matter common sense and ordinary experience are very often worth
better than any theoretical knowledge. This exception is instructive. the
aim of the pedagogy is not to treat the child or the pupil as a special case
or a copy of a general concept, but to provide the individual with all
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chances of full personal development in a given context. It's about

therefore of a work that can only be achieved by direct contact and not by
experimental analysis inside a laboratory or institute. It is obvious
that all the information concerning the experiments carried out on memory, at-
attention or fatigue are useful to the educator, but all of these
these do not yet make him a teacher. Indeed no law can dictate this
that it is good to undertake in practice and on the other hand the application of knowledge
Theoretical sessions vary with each individual. There is therefore a problem of op-
portunity that nomological knowledge is not able to resolve.
Now, Weber remarks, the same can be said of historical disciplines and
economic. History can and should take into account the information provided to it.
not only psychophysics and psychopathology, but also physics, bio-
logy or meteorology. However, the most extensive knowledge in these areas
nes do not yet make a historian. This takes into account the above information.
dentes according to the needs and the expediency of the research, but it does not have to be
transform himself into a specialist in psychology or biology.
When he makes the historical study of the scale and consequences of an epidemic
in the Middle Ages, it is clear that the medical literature on the disease in question
tion may be useful to him, but it is equally clear that his role is that of a histo-
nothing and not of a biologist aiming to establish new bacteriological laws. It
The same is true of the relations between history and psychology. "As long as the
concepts, rules, statistical calculations resist interpretation, they do not
constitute only truths which history accepts as simple data, but
they cannot satisfy by themselves the specific curiosity of the historian ” 43 .
Is therefore untenable the conception which makes psychology in general or a
of its branches, for example collective psychology, fundamental science
history and economics, on the pretext that historical events and
economic have psychic aspects. On this account physics and
meteorology could claim to play the same role and, as long as the activity
modern statesmen are increasingly expressed through speeches and
written, one could just as easily attribute this role to the acoustics or chemistry of
dyes. More generally still, the current opinion which believes that it is enough to
separate the various factors that go into the cultural chain to elevate
each of them has the dignity of a new science, of a new ... logic, forget
that a science only makes sense if there really are problems specific to the
research. We do not see, moreover, why psychology should maintain
closer links with history than with other sciences and vice versa.
Finally, these remarks have a more general scope and concern all of
methodology. The role of the method is not to artificially reduce a
science to another, but to deepen and broaden research in all directions
possible, if necessary by a comparison of the results of the various
43 Max Weber, op. cit ., p. 84.
Page 62
those. When Münsterberg wants to reduce social psychology to a "psycho-

physics of society ”, he limits arbitrarily, in the name of a methodological prejudice.
geology, the chances of research, especially since it bases this limitation on
the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism which remains perfectly indifferent to
possibilities of social psychology. All this is only methodological dogmatism.
logical, harmful to scientific work. The scientist with a problem
decides for itself the direction of research on the basis of the knowledge acquired and
his flair, he does not have to obey the injunctions of the logician, guardian of the purity of a
theory. To suppress the freedom of the mind of the scientist is to deal a bad blow to the
research. Whatever method is used, the main thing is to advance the
knowledge, even if it means finding a more elegant demonstration after the fact. If I have-
but the interpretation was found to be useful for the mathematician, too bad for the
prescriptions of the methodologist. The scientist is the judge of his work and it is he who
remains the master of "the degree of precision of the concepts, according to the needs of the goal
of his research ” 44 . In short, it is at the service of science and not of the need to be
methodological. For the efficiency of the research, it is open to him to make the dis-
tinctions, analogies and classifications he wants, provided he does not transpose
not in the name of dogmatism these divisions in being. Reality is infinite and this
is not the office of science to pass purely methodological divisions
giques for divisions in being itself.
Weber addresses further criticisms of Münsterberg; he criticizes her for certain-

certain obscurities, unhappy formulations and confusion between the various
finality levels. We stick to the basics: interpretation is not
a method specific only to certain categories of science, but it is
one of the usual means of knowledge that the scientist uses according to the
you; it is not in opposition to other methods such as those of the explanation
by induction or by statistical calculation, but the researcher can sometimes use one
of these methods, sometimes the other or even combine them if he hopes to obtain by doing so a
scientifically valid result. In particular the opposition between interpretation and
causality is fictitious. It should be said rather that interpretation is one of the aspects
of causal research if we admit the possibility of a teleological rationality
based on the study of the motives and on the relation of means to end. Also Weber in-
does it exist on the double face of interpretation: on the one hand it is evaluation
when it is suggested to promote an event or a work of art
and on the other hand it is "causal knowledge" when it tries to "understand
dre ”a relation between phenomena before which our nomological knowledge
that is helpless.
44 lbid. p. 79 note 1.
Page 63
Simmel, for his part, also tried to develop a theory of interpretation.

and understanding 45 . In addition to the difference he establishes between seizure by
conceptual path (Begreifen, which must be compared to Begriff) of external reality
and the understanding (Verstehen) of a psychic experience, he distinguishes the
so-called objective understanding and so-called subjective interpretation. The first aims
understanding the meaning of an expression, for example what is said or written, the second
counts the motives of the speaker (opposition between das Gesprochene and der
Sprechende). According to Simmel, the interpretation of the motives is still uncertain and
equivocal because it is difficult to distinguish between spontaneity and
construction and that on the other hand any motive is ambivalent and can also lead to
as well to love as to hatred for example. -Only the objective understanding of
meaning would have a place, it is true limited, in scientific investigation, in the
as meaning is defined as a logically coherent unit.
While admiring the finesse of Simmel's analyzes, Weber is wary of the

genius of a purely psychological description of logical processes: it
can shed light on certain aspects of the path of thought, but not go
at the bottom of things. In particular the distinction made by Simmel between the objectivi-
t of understanding and the subjectivity of interpretation is artificial. It is not
not true that understanding would intervene only in the case of a
theoretical and objective knowledge; it is also about feelings and
immediate practical actions, for example when it comes to understanding
immediately the meaning of an order or that of a question asked or even a di-
rect to, awareness and sense of dignity. Conversely, it is not true
nor would interpretation be a pure subjective process. On the contrary we are there
have recourse as soon as a content is not understood immediately, because the
meaning of a command, for example, remains obscure or the question posed equivo-
than. We then appeal to a theoretical interpretation precisely in order to
objectively understand the intended meaning.
One can address similar criticisms to the thesis presented by Gottl in Die
Herrschaft des Wortes 46 , insofar as he too confuses the psychological path
ecology of a thought process and the logical essence of the concepts it uses.
Furthermore, reading this book teaches us what interpretation is not.
According to Gottl, historical knowledge would be, unlike experience pro-
pre in the natural sciences, an exploration of what is to be known. He hears
hence that there is historical knowledge as soon as we propose to penetrate
by a virtually unique act of interpretation of human action, including
constantly granting, through other interpretations, the various elements of reality
history to form a set of ever-expanding relationships that are
45 Weber refers here to the second edition (Leipzig 1905) of Probleme der Geschichits
Simmel's philosophy . The study that the latter published later, Vom Wesen des historis-
chen Verstehen (Berlin 1918), is therefore irrelevant.
46 Iena 1901.
Page 64
hold reciprocally. This knowledge, which would be specific to human action

maine, is transparent to us from within, and it is opposed to natural knowledge.
realistic, capable only of achieving a maximum of probability, thanks to
hypothetical laws based on analogies to be constantly verified. Independent
Regardless of the confusion between goal and method of knowledge, this thesis is
inaccurate when it asserts that there is historical knowledge only on the basis
of an interpretation. Indeed the intuition that it requires is in no way different from
that which is necessary to formulate hypotheses in the natural sciences
ture or mathematics. Ranke guessed the historical relations of the same
way Bunsen guessed physical relationships during his experiments.
tions. Psychologically these two scientists may have proceeded differently, but
from a logical point of view the role of intuition is the same in both cases.
In the second place Gottl affirms that history retains in the becoming that it describes
only those elements likely to be captured by the logical laws of thought
sée, while the rest, for example historically important phenomena
nature, such as the irruption of the Zuydersee or the Dollart, is only a simple displacement.
building of the "conditions" of human action. Apart from the distinction
equivocation that he establishes in this regard between the notion of "cause" and that of "condi-
tion ”, he too confuses ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi, taking the
ticks the rationality of becoming and the comprehensive interpretation of action. A
action is not necessarily rational because we understand it, that is to say
nothing authorizes us to establish an equivalence between what is understood by inter-
interpretation and what we logically infer. The presupposition of rationality, when
it is not simply an a priori of value judgments, it is never only a
possible hypothesis that must be verified empirically and controlled as
what other hypothesis of the natural sciences. Moreover, the feelings
irrational elements can be understood in the same way as ra-
tional and exceptional as well as the normal, provided that the interpretation
is adequate. As Simmel rightly remarked, there is no need
to be Caesar to understand Caesar.
In a sense it is correct that we understand better what we have ourselves-

same experiences as the psyche of others or the phenomena of nature, provided
tion, however, to remain at the level of pure immediate experience without claiming that the
knowledge of ourselves would be easier than that of others. Indeed, from
logical point of view there is no difference in principle between the methods of
historical or psychological sciences and those of the natural sciences, because
in both cases it is essential to conceptually transform the data
born to make reality intelligible. It is therefore wrong to assert that we
are better equipped to grasp the inside than the outside, the experience than the fact of
nature. There are not two absolutely opposite types of objectivity, for there is no
there could be two contradictory essences of science. Also, whatever
the object studied and whatever the science, the logical structure of pre-
tending to the truth remains the same for those who want the truth. Contrary to
Page 65
what Gottl asserts, exploration is not unique to the historical sciences.

nor analogy by approximations to the natural sciences, but our
taken proceeds by analogies, approximations, hypotheses and corrections
successive in both cases. Interpretation is only possible on condition
to break the undifferentiated experience, otherwise we will remain frozen in a wave
understanding of ourselves which cannot pass for a knowledge of
ourselves.
There remain the conceptions of Lipps and Benedetto Croce, although they are
more oriented towards the methodology of aesthetics. Let us first take the theo-
laughs at the interpretation that the first named expounded in his Grundlegung der
AEsthetik 47 . In his opinion, the understanding of an act or expression of another
is something more than just intellectual knowledge it involves
intropathy (Einfühlung). This last category which Lipps considers to be
absolutely fundamental would be an aspect of imitation, understood exclusively
as an inner imitation of the behavior of others that the observer does
his. One understands for example the acrobatics of the acrobat not point by ana-
thoughtful lysis, but through personal experience that identifies with the act of the acrobat in
imagining oneself on the rope, not fictitiously but actually. The intro
pathie would therefore be a kind of introjection of the own ego into the behavior
other, so that the ego becomes double: it is both the ego represented in
the other and a self becoming a lived action. This duplicity clears the way for interpretation.
causation, because intropathy is only possible on the basis of an experience that is
dirty previous: a child, for example, could not "experience" the behavior of
the acrobat. However, this experience is by no means an objectified product of a
nomological science; it is experienced and acted intuitively as a force acting
health. Intropathy is not unique to the psychological sciences
since we can also "live" through it the phenomena of
nature: we can identify with the outside world if we "live"
some of its aspects as expressions of certain "forces" or aims of
determined laws. This singular and anthropomorphic causality would be between au-
very the source of natural beauty. Unlike the objectified nature which is
allows to decompose into concepts of relations, nature thus experienced becomes a
thing (Ding) in the same way as the ego is a thing. The only difference between
nature and the ego comes from the fact that the lived ego is the only real and original thing.
which confers on the phenomena of nature the thing and the unity susceptible
to be experienced intuitively.
Apart from the value of this theory for a taste analysis, there is no
there is no doubt, according to Weber, that from a logical point of view, one cannot assimilate
intropathy to what the acrobat lives or should live on the rope. The fictitious character
intropathy forbids us to see it as knowledge. Admittedly, this one can im-
47 Hamburg / Leipzig 1903. See also by the same author, Einheiten und Relationen (Leipzig
1902 ).
Page 66
cause intropathy but that does not mean that we can identify them, because
all knowledge necessarily selects, by reason of its purpose, certain aspects
pects of lived experience. A fortiori, is there no reason to attribute to intropathy a
superiority over intellectual knowledge: it is and never is anything but experience
which remains below the threshold of objectification. As for the other point of the thesis
of Lipps, according to which the ego is the source of all true thing, he
raises the oft-debated problem of the logical nature of the concept of thing. Without
ceasingly the possibility of such concepts has been denied. Croce's theory is the most recent version
most recent of this negation 48 .
According to Croce, things are intuitions, while concepts express

only the relationships between things. In other words, no concept is
an intuition, since in essence it is general and abstract, although it includes many
intuitive insofar as it is an elaboration of the relations between things and
that because of this it is in contact with them. As a result things are
necessarily individual, that they do not allow themselves to be reduced to concepts
but to grasp only by intuition: we cannot know them other than
by aesthetics. The notion of concept of the singular would therefore be a contradictio in
adjecto. History, the role of which is knowledge of the singular, is therefore necessarily
of art, that is to say a succession of intuitions. Indeed, no analysis conceived
what can not tell us if a fact of our life has been "real" - and that alone matters
to history - on the other hand, the reproduction of intuitions is able to bring it to us.
to take. “History is memory” and its judgments contain no com-
conceptual position: they are expressions of intuition. This is why the history
roof is not the object of a logical evaluation as long as the latter does not
deals only with general concepts and their definition.
For Weber, such conceptions are the consequences of natural prejudices.

realistic, the first of which consists in asserting that there would be no other concepts than
relationships. However, all in all, even physics uses concepts other than those
of absolute causal equality. Second, it is not true that things are
would be pure intuitions and, as such, refractory to conceptualization. This
prejudice is based on a confusion of the different meanings of the concept of intuition. Of
even that intuitive evidence of a mathematical proposition is something
other than the intuition of the diverse which is given to us immediately in the
lived experience - in the sense that Husserl distinguishes categorial intuition from intuition
empirical - Croce's thing and Lipps' self-thing are different in the
context of an empirical science of what they were in lived experience.
Whenever an empirical science treats the given diversity as a thing
or a unit, for example the personality of a concrete historical being, it does not see
that an object determined relatively, that is to say, it forms a table of thought
48 Weber is probably referring to Croce's work: E stetica comme scienza dell 'espressione
e linguistica generale (Milano 1902), translated into German under the title A Esthelik als Wis-
senschaft des Ausdrucks und allgemeine Linguistik (Leipzig 1905).
Page 67
which for this reason is artificial, owing to the fact that unity only has meaning through the selection
tion of what seems essential in relation to the purpose of the research. Finally the theo-
ries of pure intuition give vulgar prejudice the possibility of grasping
the whole, as if the story were a reproduction of empirical intuitions or the
reflection of past experiences (his own or those of others). However, as soon as we are
let's say to grasp our own experience through our thoughts, it is impossible to reproduce it
fully or imitate it; such a design gives rise to another and new
lived experience with its own originality. A fortiori cannot
relive us or reproduce the experiences of others.
Unfortunately professional historians are often the first to illu-

and believe in discovering in the alleged intuitiveness a specific privilege
of their science. Logically, however, the role of intuition in the historical sciences
toric is no different from that which it plays in other sciences; all at
more can we speak of a difference of degree, depending on whether it is possible to operate
a more or less precise conceptualization. Still, an acquaintance
is scientifically valid only if it can be controlled, verified, that is to say
it requires proof or demonstration, otherwise we should admit the possibility
of a science without problems and without research. However, as soon as the proof or the
demonstration is required, we can no longer be satisfied with the vagueness of intuition or
lived, because the clarity and the validity of the propositions depend on the precision of the
concepts used. Interpretation of human action or behavior
is no exception to this rule. In short, the justification procedure is the same in
all sciences. Intuition is exploratory, it opens up new avenues for
as it gives rise to new hypotheses and analogies, but this
vail cannot be said to be scientific as long as the proof of the validity of
new ideas have not been conceptually educated. Without this condition,
there is no science. Once we recognize this necessity, we find ourselves
more comfortable discussing ancillary matters such as those of the experiment.
common knowledge and quantification. The first is not sufficient, the second
conde is not necessary.
It would be unreasonable to disdain current experience, either in the form

of lived experience, or under that of the wisdom of the nations. It is rich in lessons,
but, for want of conceptual rigor, the generalization or individuation that
implicitly behaves do not satisfy the need for correctness of a
scientific proposal. Of course, it can be useful to the historian if necessary.
one or the other stage of the research and even sometimes be an anticipation of the
adequate causality to be established, on condition, however, that it is subjected to criticism
methodical. No one has better demonstrated the confusions of the
rante that the comedian W. Busch. He got his funniest effects by translating
the sentences of this experience in scientific language. Take all this-
meanwhile, vulgar psychology is often more profitable for interpretation than
the pedantry of the specialist in psychology who claims to found the objectivity of
history and economics on so-called psychic laws of a quantitative character.
Page 68
tif. There is every reason to believe that the validity of historical interpretation is generally
neral all the greater in that it renounces the quantitative formulas specific to
natural sciences. What is the use of imposing the postulate of parallelism on history?
psychophysical, for example, as long as the results in history and even in
social psychology do not depend in any way on this premise? The quantification is
an aspect of scientific objectivity, alongside others such as criticism, interpretation
rationalization, etc. History is a science of reality not because it is
would reproduce in full - something absolutely impossible - nor because
that it uses mathematical formulas, but because it operates with
concepts as precise as necessary with regard to the determination of events
ments and relationships between the events it studies.
Under these conditions, we can ask ourselves whether it is judicious to oppose so radically
the concepts of "lived" and "experience" are more curious than Gottl does. In
admitting that they are opposites, it would be a mistake to reserve the exclusive one
to the historical sciences and the other to the natural sciences, because, if there is
opposition, it is the same in internal phenomena and in
externalities, at the level of action and that of nature. Psychologically this-
during these two categories are not contradictory, since all understanding
sion presupposes experience; logically either, since the evidence of the
the first is based on the second. Only the quality of the evidence is not the same
in both cases. (In a note Weber specifies that he means the obvious in the sense
of an "internal intuition of what is going on in consciousness", although the logi-
ciens use this term to designate the intelligence of the foundations of a judge-
is lying. But this is to avoid the ambiguities of the notion of intuition.) It is clear
for example that human passions are experienced qualitatively in another
meaning that aspects of nature grasped by concepts (begriffene). The real pro-
problem is elsewhere: it is a question of not confusing evidence and validity, in this sense
that not everything that we have intuitively grasped as obvious is not necessarily valid
ble in the eyes of science. The validity of a proposition depends on the logic of
truth, while a relationship may seem obvious to us hypothetically or
ideal-typical. We find the dualism between evidence and validity in all
sciences, including mathematics where pseudo-spherical space is logical-
contradictory, although it is "obviously" possible to construct it. The
only difference is the following: mathematical or quantitative evidence has a
categorial character, while the psychological evidence is of a phenomenological order.
gic.
Despite these explanations, some "historical methodology specialists

continue to assert that there is at least one case where interpretation by reviviscence
immediately takes on the significance of scientific validity: when the history
nothing analyzes an unarticulated sensibility and tries to suggest it to its readers.
Although it is sometimes necessary for the historian or the philologist to identify with the
character, author or period he is studying, nothing allows us to see in
this process the surest canon of scientific accuracy or a method
Page 69
independent of any conceptual articulation? Without a doubt, the simple ma-

denial of concepts does not yet make anybody a scientist, nor does it produce
of himself a knowledge worthy of the name. There is no great scientist without
unexpected intuitions and so to speak without a sense of totality. However at-
no serious historian will be satisfied with intropathy alone, for the results
which it leads to have no value if they are not expressed in judges-
articulated and demonstrable elements, that is to say if they do not follow the path of
controllable explanation. Certainly, a feeling and a sensitivity do not leave
define as a right triangle or any other quantifiable object,
but that is not a reason to oppose history and nature, because the qualitative aspects
of nature cannot be better defined than the qualitative aspects of the psy-
classy. From this point of view, no quality of any kind whatsoever can be
lets determine rigorously by concepts. As a result, when the his-
torien addresses our own sensitivity to suggest an experience to us, this can
mean two things: either it is a kind of shorthand of fragments
of reality, the conceptual determination of which can be neglected without damage
for the purpose of research; this is only a consequence of the impossibility
to exhaust the wealth and the totality of the various. Or in a way intended for us
to better understand the original character of a style, a work or an era. It
is not prohibited for a historian to proceed by suggestion, provided that in addition
he does not claim for his description the validity of science. Intuitions have
an indisputable heuristic value, but there is a risk of damaging the
objective knowledge if the narrative is based exclusively on them. Indeed, nothing
gives us the guarantee that the feeling of totality that we suggest corresponds
indeed to what the men of a given epoch have experienced; he can
just as well to be a question of the subjective feeling which the historian experiences personal-
is lying. Causal analysis and aesthetic appeal may go hand in hand, but neither
could replace the other. Very often the alleged meaning of the whole is only one
label that we stick on an era.
Interpretation by reviviscence is therefore neither historical knowledge and

empirical evidence of the real causal chain or even an interpretation proceeding by
a relation to values. What does this new form of interpretation mean? She
is one of the fundamental principles of any historical analysis, for a triple
raison :
1) it guides the selection within the infinite diversity of reality to make the
division between what, for our curiosity, seems essential and secondary;
2) it confers meaning on the object studied as
3) it is a constituent of the historical object or individuality (Formung des

historischen Individuum). As soon as we interpret a literary or artistic work
tick like Goethe's Faust or Raphael's Virgin or even a doctrine
like Puritanism or a personality like Bismarck we find there ex-
Page 70
awarded certain values which were those of creators, activists or

singular sounds. The first work therefore consists in clarifying what these
men have tried to understand or do (obviously the validity of these
values is not to be confused with the validity of the empirical fact), to compare
their values with ours. Thanks to this relationship to values and this confrontation
tion the past remains alive, it remains ours. Which means it is constantly changing
with the story itself. The past is not something definitively stopped,
but history constantly incorporates new interpretations which in turn
make history. For this reason, history is always permeated with the philosophy of
history, due to the fact that according to our relationship to values or, which is the same
thing, according to our curiosity, we discover in the works of the past other
important aspects, different from those which previous historians believed in
cover and also of those who were considered essential in the eyes of the creators of a
work or activists of a doctrine at a specific time. The intervention of
the historian is an integral part of history.
We may wonder if this type of interpretation is not ultimately so sub-

jective than the revival of lived experience. No, Weber replies. Certainly the selection
that the relation to values operates depends on the historian's decision, it is not
therefore does not pose with the necessity of a law and in this sense it is subjective. However
However, unlike interpretation by reviviscence, it can be verified then
that it is expressed in articulated judgments and any reader can control the
well-founded. "Indeed," says Weber, "as opposed to simple feeling experienced, we
by value we mean this and only what can become the content of a take
of position, therefore becoming the object of an articulated and conscious judgment, of
positive or negative ” 49 . The initial subjectivity of choice or curiosity ceases
to be arbitrary in so far as it submits its points of view to ordinary resources.
of scientific criticism and thereby the meanings that the report
to values gives to the object of the sphere of pure lived experience. "There is no way
to establish unambiguously whether someone else sees the red of a tapestry of the
the same way I see him or if he has the same feelings; at this level
communicability of intuition inevitably remains undetermined. The claim of
sharing an ethical or aesthetic judgment on a fact would make no sense
if - due to the intervention of all the incommunicable factors of the sensitivity
- it was not possible to understand in the same way the presumed content of this
judgment, at least as regards the important points. The ratio of the singular
to link to values therefore always indicates that one discards - to an obvious extent -
relatively - which is only felt intuitively ” 50 .
Weber does not hide the difficulties and dangers of this interpretation, of the
fact that it can take a double form: either it is directly valued
health and takes on a metaphysical character to the extent that, as in the
49 Max Weber, op. cit. , p. 123.

50 Max Weber . o p. cit ., pp. 123-124.
Page 71
philosophy of history proper, it privileges a particular value by

an act of faith or a conviction, or it remains purely analytical (wertana-
lytisch) in the sense defined at the moment. It is clear that only the latter finds its
place in the methodology of history. Indeed, unlike the other, it does not
is not based on a system of values, but it respects the infinity of evaluations
possible possibilities
vels perspectives to try to confront
to knowledge. "In thisthem
sensewith
andafor
view
thistoreason
opening
it isnew
correct
than the strong personality of the historian, which means rigorous evaluations
specific aspects of its own, can play an eminently effective role
birth attendant of causal knowledge, while it is true that on the other side it
is capable, by virtue of the weight of its influence, of putting the validation of
the partial results as long as they claim to be empirical truths.
ques' 51 .
In any case, there is no need to compromise on the following points: the qualities
practices of the object no more than the ontological differences of being, nor
the psychological path leading to the establishment of knowledge
are decisive for the logical meaning and the presuppositions of validity of the
historical method. Moreover, whether it is an empirical knowledge in the
domain of things of the mind or in that of nature, of phenomena which
unfold in us or outside us, there is no other objective path than that of
conceptualization, it being understood that the essence of the concept remains the same in the
two domains, that is to say, it remains foreign to any division of reality into
"Psyche" and "physical" or in the sphere of personnel and action
opposed to that of mechanics and inert nature. Above all, avoid
confuse the evidence obtained by interpretation with the empirical validity of the result
got. "Because and insofar as a phenomenon takes on a meaning, the
psychic reality and physical reality, or both at the same time, constitute an indi-
historical individuality; because a phenomenon can be determined by evaluations
and meanings, our causal curiosity specifically apprehends a
significantly interpretable human behavior (or activity) during
the historical explanation of this individuality; finally, insofar as the human action
maine is guided by significant evaluations or is confronted with
they are clearly understood in a specific way. As it concerns
the role of what is understandable by interpretation in history, it is therefore
always differences that bear
1) or our causal curiosity,
2) or on the quality of the evidence of the singular causal chains,

and no differences concerning causality or meaning, nor
the way of forming the concepts ” 52 .
51 Ibid. p. 125.
52 Ibid. p. 126.
Page 72
In the forms examined so far, interpretation by reviviscence and interpretation

axiological tation, Weber adds a third which he calls a rational interpretation.
nelle (rationale Deutung). It concerns the relation of means to end. All the
once we understand that human activity has been conditioned by ends
consciously wanted in full knowledge of the means, our understanding
unquestionably reaches a specifically high degree of evidence. If we
look for the reason we find that it consists of the rational relation of
means to end which happens to be very close to generalizing causality in the sense
nomological. There is no rational action without a causal rationalization of
the portion of reality considered as object and means of action, that is to say
without the possibility of integrating this portion into a complex of shipping rules.
experience that tell us what the outcome we can expect from a
determined behavior. Of course, it cannot be said that the teleological conception
that of a development is always a simple inversion of the causal relation,
nevertheless it is certain that without confidence in the rules of experience he
it is not possible to evaluate the means in order to obtain a specific goal. Corrected
lately, in the event that the end is given univocally, neither can it be
to have a choice of at least relatively adequate means. The ra- interpretation
tional is therefore likely to adopt the form of a judgment of necessity, depending on
the following diagram: in the case of a given end x , the agent must according to the rules
known to become choose the means y or respectively the means y, y 'and y ".
It can also take the aspect of a teleological evaluation of the activity
empirically observable according to the following diagram: the choice of the means offers
according to the rules known from experience, a greater chance of arriving at the re-
sultat x that means y ' and y "or at least he obtains this result at the least
fresh or finally it is the most suitable or the most opportune.
This kind of evaluation is of a purely technical nature, i.e. they

observe the adequacy of the means at the end according to the general rules of the experiment
rience and for this reason, although they are evaluations, they do not give up
not the field of the analysis of what is given empirically. Also, with regard to
knowledge, do they have the value of hypotheses or of idealtypical constructions?
ques. This means that we can confront the activity that took place real-
also with the activity which, considered from the teleological point of view, is rational,
either to discover the rational motive which guided the agent and thus to see if the
means were adapted to the end, either to understand why a known pattern of
finally led us, following the choice of means, to a different result
of what the agent was expecting subjectively. In either case he
it is not necessary to make a psychological study of the agent's personality,
since it is the analysis of a given situation objectively on the basis of
our nomological knowledge. Because of the central significance of the action
cient of its purpose in empirical reality, one can use tele-rationalization
logic as a constructive way to create thought boards
having extraordinary heuristic value for the causal analysis of relationships
Page 73
historical. And this for two reasons. Or these thought boards play the
particular role of hypotheses in the service of interpretations of singular relations
in order to determine the extent to which political activity by
example was rational and therefore in order to indirectly make up the factors
irrational and unforeseen. In this case it is possible to assess at least -
relatively the causal importance of a man's personal intervention in
the course of events. Or - more importantly - they play the general role
ral of idealtypical constructions, in the sense of economic laws for example, which
are capable of ideally constructing the consequences of certain situations.
economic conditions, if one presupposes that the activity takes place in a strict
rationally. These teleologico-rational constructions do not have the same
relation to the reality that the laws of the natural sciences or the sin-
gular; they are only ideal types intended to facilitate interpretation
valid empirically, in the sense that they allow us to measure the difference between the
reality and teleological rationality. They are, if you will, diagrams of the inter-
interpretation and, as such, they play a role analogous to that of interpretation
teleological in biology.
However, it should be noted that one cannot deduce from this interpretation
rational real activity, but only objectively possible relations.
Likewise, teleological evidence does not in any way claim empirical validity.
of a fact: an "obvious" rational construction, when it has been established
rectly, only allows to detect non-rational teleological factors
real economic activity and make its development more intelligible
effective. These interpretive schemes are also something other than hypo-
theses within the meaning of the hypothetical laws of nature, although on occasion they may
play this role during the interpretation of concrete events. Besides that We-
ber uses here the notion of schema to characterize the ideal type, he is led to
give a precision concerning the very notion of idealype that it. will not resume
more in this form in later writings. “Unlike the assumptions
of the natural sciences, the fact that these interpretative diagrams do not give
in certain special cases for a valid interpretation, has no effect
as to their value for knowledge, as for example the non-validity
empirical analysis of pseudospheric space has no consequence for the correctness of
its construction. In these cases the interpretation by means of the rational scheme
turns out to be quite simply impossible - since the ends combined in the
ma did not exist as grounds - which in no way excludes the possibility of them being
use in other cases. A hypothetical law of nature that is flawed
in one case, on the other hand, definitively loses its hypothesis quality. Is that the
idealtypical constructions of political economy do not claim - if
we understand them correctly - to a general validity, while the law of
nature must have this claim on pain of losing its meaning. Finally, the
so-called empirical law is an empirically valid rule and has only one
problematic causal interpretation; a teleological scheme of ration-
It is an interpretation with problematic empirical validity. From
Page 74
logical point of view they are two opposites. - These diagrams are constructs
ideal types. It is only because and only because the categories
end and means condition, as soon as they are used, the rationalization of the
empirical bedridden, that it is necessary to construct them ” 53 . The supreme misunderstanding would be
to see in these constructions of the abstract theory - for example in the case of the
marginalism - the product of psychological interpretations or even the foundation -
psychological aspect of economic value. Their particularity as well as their
heuristic utility and the limit of their empirical validity do not make sense precisely
only because they do not contain a grain of psychology.
After this long detour, Weber returns to the problem of irrationality under the
form of the relationship between freedom and indeterminism. The more free a decision is, that is
that is, taken because of her own evaluations, without being disturbed by a
external constraint or irresistible passions, plus also the motivation
adapts to categories of end and means; at the same time it becomes easier to
analyze it rationally and integrate it into a scheme of rational action;
consequently, the greater is also the role that nomological knowledge plays
on the side of the agent and on the side of the researcher, because the agent is more
determined in relation to means. In addition, the more the activity is free in the sense that
we have justofindicated
personality the beingand deviates
capable from the
of taking becoming
a stand of nature,
with regard thevalues
to the more aalso
nd intervenes the
ultimate gnifications of life to turn them into ends during activity and
transpose them into a teleologico-rational action. In this context the concept
naturalistic and romantic aspect of the personality loses its credit, for it is she who
imagine finding the staff sanctuary in the so-called deep depths
differentiated, deaf and vegetative of life, that is to say in the disorder of irra-
tional. It is also this which makes of the personality an enigma and sometimes ne-
site not to extend the freedom of the will to the regions of pure nature. By
against, “for the historian's interpretation, personality is not an enigma;
on the contrary, it is the only thing that it is really possible to understand by
interpretation ” 54 . Even where all rational interpretation is excluded, the activity
human behavior and behavior are no more irrational than any
another singular phenomenon, and where it is possible the human is less irrational
than pure natural.
The historian has the impression of a specific irrationality of the personality

because it measures the activity of the heroes and the constellations which result from it uni-
cally to the ideal of teleologico-rational action, instead of also confronting it
also with the singular events of inert nature. Anyway, there
53 Max Weber, op.cit . p. 131.

54 Max Weber, op. cit ., p. 133. This text is one of those which allow us to better understand
why Weber became an adversary of nascent psychoanalysis, although he was
among his contemporaries, one of the few to immediately recognize its importance, since
put it on the same level as Marxism and Nietzsche's philosophy.
Page 75
there is no reason to attribute any particular irrationality to freedom of the will.

Indeed, it is precisely the being acting with all his freedom, that is to say
tion of its own evaluations, which is teleologically linked to the means
necessary to reach its end. The manufacturer struggling with competitors and
the stockbroker has nothing to do with the belief in the freedom of the will. They
have to choose between their elimination from economic life and obedience to
precise maxims of economical driving. In case, to their great detriment,
they contravene these maxims, it is necessary to take into consideration, alongside others
possible hypotheses, the fact that their freedom of will made them
should. This means that the laws of economic theory like any interpretation
rationalization of a singular historical event make the freedom of the will
their assumption. Whatever forms this freedom adopts, they remain
are all outside the historical enterprise and have no meaning
for it, except in the case where it takes on the meaning of teleological activity.
rational.
It is that in the eyes of Weber "the interpretative research of the motives of the part
of the historian is nothing other than a causal imputation in the same logical sense.
that the causal interpretation of any singular phenomenon of the na
ture; in fact its aim is to establish a sufficient reason (at least as a
hypothesis), like the naturalistic investigation when it proposes
to establish the singular characteristics of a complex of natural phenomena. Unless
to become the victim of Hegelian emanantism or any other va-
of modern anthropological occultism, it cannot set itself the goal of
knowledge of what to do (within the meaning of the laws of nature), because the
concrete human as well as the concrete extrahuman (living or inert), when we
considers it as a fragment of the totality of cosmic becoming, does not allow
never fully integrate into nomological knowledge, for the good reason
that everywhere and always (and not only in the sphere of the personnel) it is
an aspect of infinite intensive diversity. Now, from a logical point of view, all
singular thinkable elements, provided that they are given to the scientific
tific, may be taken into account as causally im-
bearing a causal historical chain ” 55 . Also, because of the diversity
infinity of reality, all facts, whether of a physical or psychic nature, can
wind to become historical and none is definitely negligible; following the orientation
tation of curiosity, they can find a place in research.
Each discipline uses in its own way the category of causality and in a certain way
some sense the content of the category may vary. According to its original and full meaning,
causality involves two fundamental ideas; on the one hand that of an action
(Wirken) conceived so to speak as a dynamic link between phenomena
qualitatively different and on the other hand that of a subordination to rules.
Depending on the disciplines, or the notion of action understood as content of the
55 Ibid. p. 134.
Page 76
category of causality and therefore also the concept of cause lose their
meaning and disappear wherever we can establish by means of quanti-
tative a mathematical equality expressing a causal relation of single order
spatial ment: This means that if we identify causality and equality, the notion of
causality retains only the meaning of the rule of a temporal succession of
movements and even this is only possible on condition of seeing in them the expression of
metamorphosis into an equality which, in essence, would be eternal. (This is a
important points of Weber's theory of causality: this theory is never
but as such a pure equality, except when it adopts the mathematical form
than; in the other cases it expresses an inequality.) Or, the idea of rule is
face if the causality relates to the qualitative uniqueness of global becoming or to the sin-
qualitative regularity of one of its fragments. If we want to keep meaning
notion of causality when we try to know the infinity of diversity
concrete, we just have to stick to the notion of production (Bewirk-
twerden), in the sense that the new one that appears at a certain time is a
product of the past which was to manifest itself under the aspect it took and not under a
other. This means that basically an event occurs in the present as it
had to occur with its characteristic singularities and not otherwise, while
inscribed in the continuity of becoming.
Empirical disciplines which attempt to elaborate the qualitative aspects of

reality - among them we must understand history, political economy and in general
ral les sciences sociales - use the category of causality in its fullest sense.
They regard states and changes in reality as pro-
picks which in turn exert an action (bewirkt und wirkend): they seek
sometimes by the abstraction to be discovered in, the causal relations of the rules of
causality, sometimes to explain concrete causal relations by referring to
rules. As to what role the formulation of rules plays, what
is the logical form they adopt and even if one can formulate such
gles, all this depends each time on the specific goal of the knowledge. Whatever
in itself, the exclusive aim of the human sciences does not in any way consist in expressing
these rules in the form of necessary judgments of causality, being understood
that they are not alone in not providing propositions of an apodicti-
than. In addition, the causal explanation obeys in history the postulate of the interpretation
understanding. Of course, it can and must operate with concepts as precise as
possible and, depending on the state of the sources, give the maximum univocity to the imputation
causal tion; nevertheless the historical interpretation is in no way addressed to our
ability to subsume facts as copies in formulas and
generic concepts, but only to our confidence able to understand the mo-
tives of singular human activity, on condition that the interpretations
hypotheses constructed by understanding by intropathy to the control of
experience. Strict causal necessity is therefore not the goal of history, which-
does not mean that one could draw from the irrationality of a singular fragment which
conch of cosmic becoming the idea of a freedom conceived as indeterminacy
nism, no matter how one understands this last notion. In view of the history
Page 77
the freedom of the will is something transcendent: it cannot

pass for the basis of his research. All in all, the idea of necessity
absolute as well as that of freedom understood as indeterminism is
kill in an area that cannot be justified by experience; therefore-
that neither should influence or orient the work of the historian
as long as it deals with an empirical science.
"So when we meet quite frequently during discussions

methodological the following proposition: man would also be subordinate
objectively during its activity to an always identical causal connection
(legal) - this assertion remains outside the sphere of practice of
the historian; it is even a questionable protestatio fidei in favor of a deter-
metaphysical minism from which the historian could not derive any kind of
for his practical work. For the same reason, the historian's refusal to believe in
metaphysical determinism - it does not matter in what sense it is understood - for mo-
religious or other things which go beyond experience has in principle and empirical-
of no importance as long as during his practice he sticks to the
rule of interpretation of human activity on the basis of understandable motives and
subordinate in principle and without exception to verification by experience. Of
the other side, the belief that deterministic postulates include in
all areas of knowledge as the exclusive goal of knowledge the postulate
methodological of the necessary construction of generic concepts and laws
is no greater error than to suppose that the metaphysical belief in
freedom of human will would exclude recourse to generic concepts and to
rules to explain human behavior or even that the freedom of
will would be correlative of a specific unpredictability and in general of a
any kind of objective irrationality of human activity. Like us
As we have seen, the opposite is true ” 56 .
Following these explanations, Weber resumed discussing the general philosophy

rale which serves as the basis for Knies' doctrine, and above all for his conception of
methodology. Regarding the first point it is certain that Knies did not
understood freedom as an absence of cause, but as an emanation of
individual substance which is personality, so that the irrationality of activity
té would be reduced, in his opinion, to the rational. Indeed, he sees the personality
as a unit, but a unit of a naturalistic and organicist character. Also is-
it is impossible to break down the individual into a plurality of tendencies, in the same way
flawed from classical theory of economics. Furthermore, just like Roscher, he
applies this theory of the essence of the individual to the people, without bothering
to clarify this notion, except that on occasion he identifies it with the organized community.
sée in a State. Individual and people therefore represent totalities which constitute
the ontological foundation from which the various cultural manifestations proceed.
We therefore find in Knies the very principle of romantic philosophy,
56 Max Weber, op.cit. . , p. 137.
Page 78
although he admits that the organisms that are singular peoples are
undermined by a higher organic whole: humanity. regardless of
mystical aspects camouflaged in anthropology, Knies' doctrine is also
heir to Hegel's panlogism. Like Roscher's, we can qualify it
emanatism. We can follow the trace of it in its methodology, because it prevented
ché Knies to grasp the relationship between concept and reality. So it only ended up
negative and even destructive results. Consideration of this question should
be the subject of a fourth section which unfortunately was not written.
The long study entitled R. Stammlers "Überwindung" der materialistischen

Geschichtsauffassung, published in 1907 in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik is certainly the one that offers the least interest in knowing it.
session of Weberian epistemology. In general the discussion revolves around
legal concepts, although Weber claims to examine the theory of
sance of Stammler, and more often still the tone is more polemical than truthful.
critically critical 57 . It is therefore particularly difficult to read this article.
ble: or Weber peels one by one the pages of Stammler's book devoted to
to the methodology to identify sophisms, confusions, apparent truths
and scholastic propositions, or it attaches itself to a concept, for example
that of legality, to note the sentences in which the term is used and
detect contradictions. for lack of a precise definition of the meaning of the concept. For
all these reasons we will make a rather rapid analysis of this writing and we do not
we will stop only in passages which provide some details on the epistemo-
Weber's logic.
He simply denies Stammler's book the value of scientific work.

than. First, because the interpretation of Marx's philosophy is extreme there.
flat, because it takes up the most hackneyed comments of Marxism.
Indeed, it is caricaturing this last doctrine to believe that it does not reduce
history to nothing other than the development of economic positions and struggles
or that it does without more of the other aspects of the culture of simple reflections
of material production. Stammler ascribes to Marx such a philosophical naivety.
that one may wonder what is the real mystifier. In any case, this
it is not in the name of spiritualism that we will succeed in refuting dialect materialism.
electic. Weber quickly passes over the question of whether the Marxist doctrine
was correctly exposed by Stammler and whether he was able to pass it. It is more
early to subject to criticism the concepts which were used to criticize Marxism.
The first
to discuss condition
questions of to be required
logic of an author
and methodology with
is the a philosophical claim
rigor
57 The work by Rudolf Stammlers that Weber is referring to here is the second edition (Leipzig 1906, the
1st edition is from 1896) from Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauf-
fassung- Eine socialphilosophische Untersuchung. Weber's article is 68 pages long and
even if we add the appendix found in the papers after his death and the editors
des Gesammelte Aufzätze zur Wissenschaftslehre have collected in this volume.
Page 79
tuelle. The univocity of a term does not imply the reduction of its various meanings
usual to only one, but certainly the refusal to jump in the course of the same reason-
from one direction to the other, because it is far from always speaking of the
same thing using the same concept. In other words, terminological univocity
that is by far not comparable to univocity as to meaning '. The first grievance that
Weber's address to Stammler is that he did not avoid this confusion. So when he
uses the notion of legality or legal conformity (Gesetmäßigkeit), it does not
not the distinction between nomothetic-type research which proposes to de-
cover general laws on the basis of an abstraction from sin-
studies or experiments and research of a historical character which uses
concepts or general laws during the causal interpretation of relations
singular. Under these conditions, Stammler necessarily comes to identify
causality and legality, against all critical thinking. Then he confuses the
legality in the sense of becoming to be known and that of knowing thought, that is
say the laws that govern the relations between objects of nature or events
aspects of social life and those which determine the objective validity of the results
obtained; in short, he confuses the laws of nature and the norms of thought. It's not
not all. Stammler also speaks of legality to denote a so-called point
of uniform and unconditional view that would govern all knowledge
session. However, not only every science, including mathematics and physics
that, is in itself a point of view on the real (the division of knowledge
in specialized disciplines is based precisely on the multiplicity of points of view
possible), but the very notion of point of view excludes by definition the unconditional
tionality and universality that Stammler attributes to legality. Finally, when he
gives the task to the human sciences to discover laws in social life
analogous to those of nature, it gives the notion of legality the sense of a duty-
to be, that is to say it asks them to identify the imperatives to be imposed on the conduct
social. In this case, he confuses theory and practice, observation and evaluation.
With the same critical acuity, Weber tirelessly hunts for others
confusions. Here he discovers that Stammler hears the notion of category sometimes
as an axiom sometimes as an empirical proposition, which he uses here
without examining the expression "to generalize observations in a teleological sense.
that ”, since it can mean either a deduction of natural ends from
of natural laws or the use of teleological concepts as means
heuristic or the empirical relation between a determined end and the means
appropriate or finally the expression of value judgments of a practical, ethical,
political or other. Stammler juggles concepts without realizing that
even the definitions may contain methodological problems which put-
try to defeat their apparent precision. Weber has no difficulty in finding
ambiguity in the way in which the relationship of content to form is used, the
concepts of matter, social, causality, nature, etc. Finally, as it comes
in this writing of a criticism that a jurist specializing in economics makes of an or-
The work of another jurist, also a specialist in economics, it is not surprising
if the notion of rule is placed in the foreground and if more than half of
Page 80
the article is devoted to this, concept., Stammler sees in social life a life in
community subject to external rules that vary over time. Weber
uses this definition as a pretext to deepen the notion of rule and, as
this review is by far the most interesting, it seems good to pay attention to it
both to understand this concept in itself and to illustrate how
Weber analyzes a notion.
The notion of rule has two fundamental meanings. First

place it designates general statements bearing on relativistic causal connections.
ves to be: these are the laws of nature. However, if we take the
concept of law in its strictest and most rigorous sense, in so far as it excludes any
exception, we will sometimes call rule the formula of experience which is not capable
of this rigor - for example we know from experience that a slap provokes certain-
adequate reactions from a student affiliated with a corporation - sometimes the law
called empirical which, although it is rigorous and does not suffer from exceptions, does not
however, does not lend itself to a sufficient theoretical inspection of conditionality
causal - "all men die" is such a rule. Secondly
it designates a standard according to which one measures in the name of a judgment of
their past, present and future events. The rule expresses in this case a
general statement on a logical, aesthetic, ethical duty to be,
religious or other.
There are, however, other senses which cannot be reduced without more to one
of the two preceding ones, for example the rules which one calls the maxims of the
activity. Take the example of Robinson, whose Stammler and other economists
serve to illustrate their analyzes, although it is a fictional character who
did not exist historically. The hero of Defoe's novel led despite everything
in his solitude a rational economic life, taking into account the conditions of
its existence, since it subjugated the consumption of goods and the profit that
hoped to get out of his work (didn't he stock up on seeds and walk
what about the trees to be felled during the following winter?) to rules, and
to economic rules. Without opening a discussion about the possibility
of an economy outside of any society, it seems that, as shown in the
ethical standard unlike the legal standard, there may be non-ethical rules
depending on social life. Let us admit, however, with Stammler that the re-
conceptually constitutive of social life and that the economy supposes
conceptually would be social regulation. Now, Robinson lived outside
of society and yet its economic behavior proceeded according to
rules. Stammler pulls himself out of trouble by saying Robinson's life is letting go
despite everything, explain causally because he had previously lived in society.
tee and was pulled out of it by accident. On the other hand he recognizes that the origin
causal is not essential to the conceptual essence of the rule. Why
Does he then feel the need to explain all the same by causality the rules of
Robinson's life, to add that, failing to be able to become the object of a
social science they can be explained by the means of the natural sciences.
Page 81
ture? It is that in his eyes this absolute loneliness, apart from any contact with
the other is a behavior that is purely technical.
This correlation that Stammler finds between nature and technique is a good
opportunity to reflect on the notion of rule, because the technique is precisely
a process that develops according to the rules of utility. What is the opposition worth
that Stammler establishes between the rules of technique and those of social life?
For Weber, “the coordinated action of the parts of a machine takes place,
logical sense, according to rules established by man just like coordinated work
given, but forced, of draft horses and slaves or that of "free" workers
in a factory ” 58 . The fact that in the first case the rule is based on a ne-
cessity arising from the laws of nature and in the second a physical constraint
or psychic remains unimportant for the concept of rule. An industrialist holds
takes into account in the same technical sense the needs of workers obliged to work
ler to feed their family only with their physiological and muscular capacities
or the possibilities offered by machines. Although these three orders of magnitude
are different in nature, they are also causal conditions of the intended goal. In
more, the manufacturer takes into account representations and reactions
of the worker in the same sense that the hunter calculates with the reactions of his
dog, when he kills a partridge. From the point of view of the use of the rule there is
no logical difference between all these examples and the fact that in the case of
the worker the conscience intervenes, does not modify in any way the fundamental state of things.
Consequently, when Stammler establishes an opposition between technique and
social life it does not provide any decisive element for the knowledge of the essence of
Rule. From this point of view, Robinson's economic behavior in the
loneliness on one's island is no different from handling currency within
of a social group. The modern individual no longer needs to know why
money has all the virtues that we know when it uses it than to know
be the anatomy to take a step. Habit or experience is enough for him, just like
he knows that a lit stove is heating up or that the month of July is hotter than
the month of March. The complexity of the conditions of existence of the holder of a
great fortune may be as great as possible compared to Robinson's,
logically there is no difference.
What is the relationship of the notion of maxim with the two types of defined rules?
nished previously? When I say: my digestion is settled - it can mean
two things. On the one hand, this affirmation expresses the simple fact that it is accompanied by
fold in a determined time. The rule is in this case "an abstraction of the course of
nature ". On the other hand it can mean that I found myself obliged to settle it
to eliminate certain gastric disturbances. So although the sentence is
grammatically the same and perhaps also the outward appearance, the meaning of
rule is different: in the first case it is an observed regularity, in the
second of a regularity that I have tried to reestablish. The fact that these two
58 Gesammelte Aufzätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 325.
Page 82
regularities can coincide de facto , to the great satisfaction of the subject,

not that logically and conceptually it is necessary to distinguish them. Of a
on the side it is an empirical fact, on the other an ideal to be achieved, from a standard to
which we measure the facts by evaluation. In turn, the ideal rule takes a
double meaning, if I ask myself: what is the factual regularity that corresponds
respond? or: to what extent has it had a causal action in the recovery
de facto regularity? In the first case it theoretically defines
the normal function and it makes it possible to determine whether the de facto movement is
link or not, in the second it intervenes as a causal element in the form of
drug for example, intended to really restore regularity. She acts in
this case as a real agent. It is the same in the case of behavior
economic with regard to goods or social conduct with regard to others. The
standard may on the one hand indicate how Robinson or the possessor of money should
wind behave if their behavior claims to be regular. The ideal rule has here
a theoretical meaning as it defines how they should act in the
cases where they would like to orient themselves according to the ideal of rational and appropriate activity
at its end. It is a teleological evaluation that the activity presupposes
as ideal. On the other hand it plays the role of heuristic means intended to make
better understand the empirical activity of Robinson or another recluse with
existed historically. It is then an idealtypical construction that we use
as a hypothesis, the relevance of which must be verified according to the facts, but which
makes it possible to investigate the real causality of the activity and to determine in what
sure this one approaches the ideal type.
The rule of the activity appropriate to its end is therefore taken into account for
empirical knowledge of Robinson's behavior in both directions quite
distinct fact. In the first place as part of Robinson's maxim which
forms the object of the research, i.e. as a factor having had an action
causal effect on its empirical activity. Second as one of the elements
the provision of knowledge and concepts that the researcher makes use of
that the intelligence of the possible ideal meaning of the activity helps him to know it empirically.
cally. These are two things to be strictly distinguished. There is no
doubts that at the level of empirical reality the norm is a determinant of the de-
come just as the drug absorbed is from the regularity of digestion,
but it is only one determinant among others. As such it conditions
activity with varying degrees of awareness. Just as the child learns to walk
expensive, to respect hygienic regulations and to avoid certain harmful foods.
bad to his health, he also accepts the rules that govern the lives of others and
conforms, without elaborating the norm itself by thought, or by basing itself
consciously on experiences he has had, or because the rule
appears in itself as a compulsory standard, first received through education
and later recognized as valid by personal reflection, so that it
helps guide activity. However, when we say of a moral standard,
conventional or teleological, whether it is the "cause" of a specific activity,
we express ourselves badly if we do not specify that it is not a question of its ideal validity of
Page 83

norm, but from the empirical representation of the agent who recognizes it as
"Valid" for his behavior. The same is also true of standards
ethics, purely conventional rules or the wisdom of nations.
When I greet a famous person in the street, it is not the convention rule.
who discovers my boss, but my hand, and I make this gesture, either by simple
habit, or because I know that rudeness can have disastrous consequences.
pleasant, either because I consider that it is not appropriate to miss, without y
be forced, to a conventional and harmless rule, observed by everyone.
This last example already belongs to the sphere of social regulation,

that is, to that of the behavior of one another. The discussion of this
new aspect of the question will allow us to further specify the
rule concept. Let us take to. as an illustration the elementary example of barter.
Suppose that two beings who have absolutely no social relation between them
meet, for example a European and a negro from the bush, and they make
a barter involving any two objects. We can rightly insist on the
fact that the simple representation of the double external behavior which allows
perceive, that is to say the gestures and possibly the sounds exchanged on this occasion.
Zion, constitutes, so to speak, the physis of barter, the essence of which cannot be apprehended.
sence. Indeed the latter consists in the "meaning" that the partners give
to their behavior, and in turn the meaning of their current behavior prepares the
regulation of their future contacts. So it is said that in the absence of this meaning it
would not be possible to actually perform the exchange nor to build it
conceptually. All this is correct, because the fact that external signs serve
of symbols is a constitutive presupposition of any social relationship. Nevertheless
less this feature alone is not sufficient, as shown by a
another example. When we bookmark a book, we also have
it is a matter of a symbol and yet this does not in any way establish a social relation.
The externally perceptible course of things does not therefore constitute the
total course. It is the meaning that gives the meaning to the gesture of the bookmark although it
not be a social relationship. It is therefore wrong to say that the meaning is specific to the
only social life. On the contrary, whatever the object, as soon as we abstract
tion of its meaning to consider only the externally perceptible elements,
our observation will be called naturalistic. Hence the definition of nature: it
is what does not make sense or more exactly: "The course of things becomes natural
ture when we do not wonder about its meaning ” 59 . In these conditions
the term logically opposed to nature is not that of social, but that of
signifier, it does not matter, whether it is about a meaning to be conferred or to be discovered.
If we come back to the example of barter, its meaning appears to us in two forms
logically different. In the first case the meaning is taken as an idea,
that is to say, we ask the question: what are the ideal consequences of meaning
that the scientist gives to a concrete event or how this meaning can be
59 Gesammelte Aufzätze zur Wissenschaftslehre , p .. 333.
Page 84
fit into a larger meaningful system of thoughts? Based on

"Point of view" thus obtained, it is possible to assess the consequences of the course
things. For example, we can ask ourselves how the two partners of the
barter should behave subsequently, after making the exchange, so that
their actions correspond to the idea of exchange, that is to say so that they are
consistent with the consequences of the meaning that the scientist found in their activity. We
therefore arises from the empirical fact of the affair concluded between the two partners who
may not have had a clear awareness of the significance of their act at the
theoretical construction of the meaning of the act according to a table of thoughts
not contradictory. In this case we are doing “the dogmatics of meaning” 60 . In the
second case one wonders if the meaning that the scientist has attributed dogmatically to
barter is the one that the actual actors have consciously put into it or
it is another and which one or if they did not make any sense of it. In turn this
second case can be considered in two ways. Or the actors have accepted
voluntarily a mandatory standard and in this case we are dealing with a maxim
normative or both were simply looking for a certain result,
so that barter was only a means to achieve the goal. The question is
is then the following :.
1) to what extent were the two actors aware of the need to

regulate their relations so that there is equivalence between the objects exchanged and
gation to respect the new property status (normative maxim) and 2)
how aware were they of the appropriateness of their act at the end
they were aiming for?
This means: 1) to what extent has the representation of meaning been

finishing in the decision to barter? and 2) to what extent condition-
will it be their future conduct after the conclusion of the exchange? For all these
questions the dogmatics of meaning can be extremely useful as a principle.
ristic in establishing the hypotheses, on condition that it does not
will be possible to give a definitive answer on the basis of this dogma.
Too often, in fact, researchers make the error of decreeing that the ac-
real people acted effectively according to this ideal dogmatic sense, the role of which is
yet that of an ideal-type intended to better explain an event or a
act.
Admittedly, the normative maxims which attribute to this ideal sense of exchange a
mandatory nature may, if necessary, become one of the determining factors
the empirical act, but only one determinant among others. At the end of all
these explanations we find with regard to the notion of meaning the double meaning of
notion of regularity that we have encountered with regard to the example of diges-
tion. Just as one cannot use, under penalty of confusion, the concept of
rule understood as the ideal standard of rationality to designate the maxim of
60 Ibid . p. 334.
Page 85
empirical behavior, it is also necessary to distinguish between the ideal sense

of the dogmatics of meaning and the concrete meaning that the actors actually give
to their behavior.
To illustrate the different ways in which we can consider the rule, Weber
take the example of a card game: the skat 61 . To play means to submit to certain-
certain rules or norms which define on the one hand the correct game and on the other hand the
winner. These rules can become the object of all kinds of considerations:
1) Of a purely ideal nature. In this case they can be the object
a) a practical evaluation, in the sense that the “skat congresses” of yesteryear
discussed whether, from the point of view of the interest of the game, the great
should take precedence over the open draw. This is a question of skat politics;
b) dogmatic reflections, when we ask ourselves, for example, whether the

player who has the wrong card must be penalized or if it is simply necessary-
ment cancel the game;
2) Purely empirical. In this case they can become the object
a) a rather historical research when one asks oneself

why a player did not play correctly in concreto: intention-
nally or inadvertently?
b) an empirical evaluation when after the game one wonders whether a

player played well or badly and if it was not possible to make a number
points higher, given the possibilities offered to him by the cards he
had in hand. This is a matter of experience and practice,
sometimes also of calculation, insofar as one expects certain reactions
probable effects of the adversary;
c) we can finally speak of an ethics of skat, depending on whether

in the game a weak player that we hope to "pluck".
We further say that the rule is the presupposition of the game. What does this mean?
from the point of view of only empirical knowledge? First of all the
rule is a causal factor - not as an ideal standard of case law.
61 It is a game very widespread in northern Europe and little known in France, except in
the departments of the Rhine and the Moselle. Like bridge, it involves auctions (gra-
from the color to the open draw through the draw and the big one) and also three players, the
fourth, the one who in turn distributes the cards, not participating in the game.
in bridge, it is played with 32 cards, two of which are put out of play by the one who made the most
high bid. In color and in large the jacks are the highest trumps and they determine
also undermine auctions.
Page 86
dence of the skat, but by virtue of the representation that the players have of its
content and its binding nature. It is therefore one of the determining elements.
of the game, next to the distribution of cards, the knowledge of each player, etc.
In the second place it is the presupposition of the empirical knowledge of the skat
as such, that is to say, it defines it in a characteristic way in relation to
other games. This is the conceptual determination that makes the skat the
skat and which defines it as a generic concept. Explaining skat is self-explanatory
quer the rule in this sense. Thirdly, it is a heuristic means
allowing us to know why a player plays in such a way or even
evaluate his chances of winning given the cards he has in hand, in the same way.
ness whose aesthetic standards are used by the art historian to know the
tendencies of the artist when he explains the originality of his works. Independently
of the various points of view examined above, that of politics, justice,
prudence or the ethics of skating, we see that with regard to knowledge
rique there are at least three logically distinct functions of the understood rule
as a presupposition. On the one hand, it plays the role of one of the causal factors
end of the game, on the other hand that of constitutive reason of the concept as
that it delimits the object of the skat and finally that of heuristic means. More than ever
but it seems necessary to define each time with precision in which sense we
takes the concept of a rule, otherwise one flounders in confusion if one is
poses to analyze any phenomenon, whether historical, social,
economic, psychological or otherwise. Without conceptual rigor, there is no
valid scientific study.
More than any other, the legal field deserves attention, because
that law is essentially a complex of rules. If we do not consider
not law from the point of view of legal dogma or the history of law,
but of its significance for culture, it is important to recognize that a
a purely legal phenomenon is likely to interest us also under
aspects other than that of law, for example under its economic appearances,
political, and others. On the other hand, other sciences use legal concepts.
dies for their own purposes and sometimes give them a different meaning from
that which the lawyer attributes to them. This can result in confusions which, not to be
that terminology may confuse conceptual analysis or interpretation.
These possible confusions should therefore be kept in mind so as not to
fall when studying the concept of rule of law.
Let us take a specific paragraph of the Civil Code. It can become the object of a
analysis on several counts, apart from that of legal dogmatics. All
first it can be discussed for reasons of legal policy, either
challenges validity for ethical reasons, or denies its value for reasons of
reasons of social policy or power politics, or finally that we
rejects any utility in the name of class or other interests. These are evaluations
encountered many times during this study, and, since they do not present
nothing new, there is no need to dwell on it any longer. Can also
Page 87
ask about this paragraph the following two questions: what does it mean
conceptually? and: what is its empirical action? Independently of
the usefulness of the answer to these questions for a paragraph value analysis
from a political or ethical point of view, it is necessary to examine their logical essence.
In the first case the paragraph is a complex of thoughts liable to de-
come the purely ideal object of an analysis that the lawyer undertakes to grasp it
all the implications. In the second case it plays the role of an empirical reality
and as such it can mean various things. In the first place, for the one who reads the
civil code, the representation of the consequences that a behavior may entail
outside determined. Second, that people, called judges,
may possibly trigger the device of physical or mental restraint.
than to force an individual to obey the rule. Thirdly, that everything above
toyen can hope with a fairly high probability that others will respect her-
ront, so that he is right to conform his own behavior to them. In all
these and other cases that need not be mentioned, this is a series of
complex causal connections that actually determine behavior
in relation to each other. '
These two kinds of questions are absolutely different from the local point of view.
gic. The ideal meaning of the rule of the first question is a problem of truth
legal, i.e. it is for the legal conscience of the researcher to establish
the real relationships between the concepts by which the rule is expressed. This validity
ideal which all those who seek to establish the legal truth propose to establish.
that is not, however, devoid of empirical consequences such as the
proves the existence of a case law. In addition, judges and other officials
who have the capacity to exercise physical and psychological restraint have in principle
they too care about this truth. The second question asserts that social life
is ruled, that there is empirically a legal order from which men hold
actually account or are obliged to take into account in the course of their activities.
There is no doubt that this empirical existence of rules and more simply
of a right has nothing in common with legal truth understood as what
should ideally be worth. A bad or false legal rule is worth empirical
cally and obliges in the same way as the good or true rule. So we can say
that in the first case the rule of law is an ideal norm which can be
found by thought, in the second an empirically ascertainable maxim of the
behavior of concrete beings who conform to it with more or less rigor
and frequency. What is called legal order consists in the first case
in a system of thoughts and concepts elaborated so to speak scientifically
by legal dogma and serving as an ideal standard of reference for the judge,
the lawyer or the citizen, in the second in a complex of maxims which determine
nent or guide men by the representation they form of them during their
concrete behavior.
It is all relatively straightforward. The problem becomes more complicated as soon as we

proposes to relate a legal concept, that of the United States by
Page 88
example, and an empirical and historical structure of the same name. So let's take the
case of the concept of the United States. We are in the presence of the same term which
designates both a legal reality and a historical, economic, political
tick, etc. This terminological identity is a source of confusion and risks
distort the jurist's judgment as long as he does not distinguish the various meanings of
term, either that he calls legal what is not, or that he only attributes
legal importance to what is essentially political, economic or
social. Let us take the following six sentences: "The United States alone is competent
to conclude commercial treaties, unlike the various States of the Union
- "In accordance with this provision the United States concludes with Mexico
a content trade treaty a ” -“ The interest of commercial policy
of the United States would rather require a content- b treaty "-" Indeed, the United States
export to Mexico the product c in quantity d ”-“ The payroll balance-
States of the United States is therefore in situation x "-" This will have the
consequence y on the exchange rate of the United States ”. In these six sentences the
concept of the United States is taken each time in different senses which all may
wind of interest to the law, but which are not all purely legal, but also
political, economic, etc. Here we are faced with a problem which we do not find
We have no analogy with what we said previously about the rules of
skat. Indeed the concept of a concrete and determined game is identical to what we
know of the game in general thanks to the rules which delimit it. Due to the scope
culture of skat, it is moreover difficult to use this term for
other uses. Talking about skat is therefore talking about a very precise game. It is all
otherwise from the term "the United States" which designates a legal reality, but also
other realities of an economic, social or political nature. To fully understand the
new problem which is posed to us, it is important to specify a certain number of
points, in particular what is meant by shape.
After all these explanations, Stamrnler's thesis, which makes law a form
and conceives the relationship between the rule of law and social reality in the sense that the law
would be there. form or one of the forms of social life, becomes absurd unless we
means form in the sense of the classical opposition to content. Indeed, if we take
the rule of law in the sense of an idea, it never designates an empirical reality,
social or other, because being an ideal norm determining a duty to be, it does not
could be a form of being; she is only a standard of value to which the
jurist who wants legal truth measures empirical reality. If, on the contrary, we
understands it as an empirical fact, nor can it be a form, which
whatever the meaning we give to this term, because it is then one of the components
positive values of empirical reality and social order, that is to say a more
or less pure which contributes to causally determine the behavior of
men in a more or less conscious way, just as it can be more or
less followed. That the judges conform to such a maxim to decide a
conflict of interest, which other people called bailiffs or police officers have
as a maxim to abide by their decision and that in the end most
part of men think legally, all these facts are extremely
Page 89
important from the point of view of the constitution of social reality and not
shapes. What is called the legal order is also a set of rules.
empirical rules which help to determine the activity of men,
that they act rationally by finality. Like any other rule of
experience, the law can serve as a means to achieve a specific goal or
play the role of brake or obstacle. This in no way prevents an individual from
seek to modify the rule of law for its own benefit or to use it for its interests,
just as it acts in the same direction on nature through technique. Suppose
that he has to complain about the too strong smoke which comes out of the chimney of a neighbor; he
consult a lawyer to find out about their rights may possibly engage various
proceedings and perhaps sue his opponent, which he can win or
to lose. To the extent therefore that the rule of law is capable of modifying a
situation it is one of the determining elements of relations between individuals.
The trial is undoubtedly the legal institution which offers the most analo-
gies with the game, since it can be lost or won. Likewise the legal order
is like the rule of the game, the presupposition of the empirical course of the trial,
that is to say, it serves as a maxim for the judge and a means for the parties involved. In addition
the knowledge of its ideal meaning plays the role of heuristic means for the explanation
causal aspect of the development of a concrete process, just like the ideal meaning of
rule for the "historical" explanation of a particular game of skat. Finally, in
two cases, the rule is the building block of individuality. the object, that is to say
it delimits it conceptually. It would be wrong, however, to draw from these analogues
between the trial and the game that the rule of law is generally assimilated to the
rule of the game. In other words, however important the process may be in the economy of
legal procedure, it is far from exhausting all the applications and meanings of the
right. Indeed, as soon as we find ourselves in the presence of a complex situation,
example that of workers in a specific sector of industry, the problem
changes appearance.
of textiles in Saxony What interests
far exceeds us may
what for example in theinsituation
be important the eyesofofworkers
the
Lawyer. It is, of course, undeniable that the rule of law has a causal influence
extraordinary about this situation and that whatever the point of view
square; nevertheless other political and economic elements intervene
also which in no way allow themselves to be reduced to pure legal matters. Whereas in
the game of skat and in the process all the essential elements of the performance
tif derive from the rule, it is not the same for the development of a situation
social. Its complexity can even confuse the lawyer when he only considers it
from the limited point of view of his specialty.
Apart from pure dogmatics, the jurist is on the wrong track if he reduces a situation
only to its legal aspects or if it considers exclusively these
only aspects, seeing in the human being only the subject of law or a complainant
potential. The need to explain the reality or the behavior of a being towards
others and with regard to nature can precisely find the greatest interest in
elements which pass for secondary and insignificant from the point of view of the rule
Page 90
by right. Conversely, as has been said previously, political science and

economic can use legal terminology. Much more, their right
often offers material that is so to speak preformed. It comes from development
growth of legal thought in the direction of a rationalization of the social order.
However, one cannot blame the specialist in politics or economics.
to use this preformed material in its own way and in a different direction from that of the
lawyer, if by this means he is able to obtain satisfactory results in
the order of its research. Legal purity is to be demanded from the point of view of dogmatics
legal, not to that of other disciplines whose subject matter is too complex to
be reduced to a pure legal definition. No one will dispute the influence
decisive wind of the legal order on the development of a behavior
individual or social situation; however, in the eyes of specialists in
human sciences, he does not enjoy any privilege, and as an empirical fact he can
have no meaning in relation to all the causal conditions other than that
that we give, for example, to the influence of solar heat. The fact that the rule is
a causal determinant of social life in no way prevents man, in
as a reasonable being, also thinks his activity according to ideal standards. All
the question is not to forget during the analysis to distinguish the two or-
dres. As long as the lawyer has a clear awareness of this logical opposition
that, it can call without inconvenience and without risk of confusion the dogmatic
a formal study of law and contrast it with the causal and naturalistic study which
considers the rule of law as one empirical determinant among others of
the social life.
Obviously, concludes Weber, this article is not intended to exhaust all

possible meanings of the rule, as a more complete study would have to deal with
in addition to the difference between law and convention, between rule of law and modern rule
rale, etc. However, it is unnecessary to go into detail, because from the point of view of
logical distinction between ideal norm and empirical fact, analysis would not provide
nothing substantially new.
*
**
The short article entitled Die Grenznutzlehre und das “P sychophysische Grund-
gesetz ”(16 pages) aims at the critical study of a particular theme of an or-
vrage of Lujo Brentano 62 . While recognizing the merits of this book, in particular
to discuss the relationship between utility and use value, Weber criticizes the
psychologist position of marginalism of which Brentano was one of the main
representatives in Germany. Already, Fechner had the idea to apply his law to
62 L. BRENTANO, Die Entwicklung der Wertlehre notebook of the Academy of Sciences of Ba-
vière, section of philosophy, philology and history (München 1908). This notebook is part of the
series of studies devoted to the development of value since Aristotle. This work undertaken
by L. Fick was completed by R. KAULLA, Die geschichtliche Entwkickeluing der modernen
Wertlehre (Tübingen 1906).
Page 91
economy, similarly FA Lange in the second edition of his Arbeiter-

frage 63 . The latter also refers to Bernoulli's thesis on the relation
between the relative (subjective) evaluation of a sum of money and the absolute value
of the fortune of the owner in question. There would be a lot to say about the attempts
to found political economy on psychology, if only because of the
multiplicity of meanings of psychology concept. Weber, however, confines himself to
contest Brentano's more precise assertion that Weber's law
Fechner is said to be the basis of marginalism. Indeed, it is a mistake to make this
last doctrine a simple particular application of the psycho-physical law.
Although this law has so far been interpreted very differently, we can
summarize it with Brentano as follows: wherever sensa-
tion it is possible to verify the validity of the proposition asserting the
dance of sensation in relation to excitement, in the sense that Bernoulli had established
a relationship of dependence between the feeling of happiness that arises from the increase in
ment of a sum of money and the overall value of the fortune. We can first
ask if it is possible to transpose the problems and solutions as they are
specific to one science in another which is heterogeneous. Certainly Darwin has
inspired by the doctrine of Malthus, but we could not, however, identify sim-
plement the two theories or make them two special cases of the same law more
general. Moreover, happiness is not a univocal qualitative concept like the affair.
affirms moral utilitarianism; it is not even a purely psychological concept
and any serious psychologist will be careful not to confuse it with joy. Abstrac-
made of all these observations, it remains nonetheless true that it is hardly
possible to use the parallel between happiness and sensation even as a wave
analogy, except perhaps for what concerns outward appearances. Let's place-
we therefore from the latter point of view. In this case, we can find a corresponding
dance between the excitement which is in Fechner's purely external stimulation and
bodily, at least quantifiable in principle if not in reality, and the increase
of the amount of money at Bernoulli's, which is also an external phenomenon.
It remains to determine what in the Weber-Fechner law corresponds to the concept of
fortune at Bernoulli. Suppose for this purpose that we can establish an analogy
between fortune and differentiation in sensitivity as a result of the increase
ment of weight. We know that according to Weber-Fechner the intensity of the sensation increases
in arithmetic reason when that of the excitation increases in geometric reason. Yes
we admit the Brentano equation between the increase in wealth and
the increase in excitation it should be admitted that if an individual possessing
1000 marks experienced a certain intensity of happiness when his fortune increased
of 100 marks, he will have to experience the same intensity if, possessing a fortune of one
million marks, he increases it by 100,000, on condition of course that we
can apply the experiences of touch to other forms of feeling.
sibility. Suppose that this does not present any difficulty and that it is even possible
63 We were unable to obtain the second edition, but only the third, dated
Winterthur 1875. Lange is best known as a historian of materialism.
Page 92
ble to apply the concept of threshold of sensation and the curve of Fechner's law
to the phenomenon of happiness resulting from the acquisition of a good, will we have
due to the essential question: in what way does all this provide an answer
to the questions posed by economic theory? Did by any chance the validity
of the logarithmic law of the psychophysicist would be the foundation and the reason without
which the proposals of political economy would remain incomprehensible.
wounds?
It would be worth paying attention to the various human needs as well.

hands so important from the point of view of the economy and to examine in
to what extent and in what way they allow themselves to be saturated. What contribution is in
this case the psychophysical law, since all these questions, in particular that of
the way to saturate the needs, are foreign to him? If in addition we analyze the
reinforcement and relaxation of each of these singular needs (concerning the
food, housing, sexuality or aesthetics) depending on the means
likely to saturate them, the curve of the Weber-Fechner law will discover without
doubts here and there some analogies, but sometimes it will stop, sometimes it will
will come negative, sometimes it will be proportional to saturation, sometimes it de-
will come asymptotic, in short it will be different in each particular case. Nevertheless
less suppose that one can establish analogies, even vague and accidental
such, concerning how to vary the saturation of needs. They will be ill-
grateful for a feeble interest, since no theory of economic value
could neglect subjectivity. Indeed, contrary to what the law presupposes
de Fechner applied to economics, the need is not oriented according to an excita-
exterior but expresses a lack which is itself a complex of sensa-
feelings, feelings, tensions, aversions and hopes combined with
coming, anticipations and possibly contradictory motives. While
the psychophysical law sets out to teach us how a stimulant ex-
dull causes sensations in us, the economy is mainly concerned with understanding
the meaning and importance of internal impulses and their influence on the behavior
externally, which in turn reacts to the need that has conditioned it by trying
to saturate it . So here is a complex course of events, to say the least, and no
unequivocal that can only exceptionally be assimilated to a simple feeling.
sation. So the real problem would be one of reaction rather than one of
the stimulation. All this shows that the psychophysical law has only distant
relation to the central problem of the economy. In fact, she is only one of the ele-
among many others, which the economist takes into account depending on the circumstances.
these and research necessities. It is difficult to see how she could play the
fundamental role of the economy, since it is in no way one of the conditions of its
possibility.
The task of this last discipline is to grasp how it is formed and

feel human activity as a result
a) competition between the multiple needs requiring to be satisfied,
Page 93
b) the limitation of our capacity to experience needs and especially of that

goods and forces capable of appeasing them and
c) the coexistence of a multitude of men torn by the same needs

and having unequal means to saturate them, so that they end up
compete with each other. “However, all these problems cannot be conceived of.
see as particular cases or complications of the psychophysical law,
neither does the method of solving them fall within the competence of psychophysics or
applied psychology; there is no relation between these two orders. No
only, as the simplest reflection shows, the proposals of the
nalism are absolutely independent of the sphere or even of any
sphere of validity of Weber's law, but even of the possibility of establishing in general
neral a law of general validity concerning -the relationship between stimulation and
sensation ” 64 . It suffices to make the theory of marginalism possible
1) that everyday experience be interpreted correctly in the sense that

men's activity is solicited, among other things, by needs which cannot be
be appeased only by the use of available goods and forces, but given in
limited quantity,
2) that most of these primary needs and especially the most urgent to the point
of subjective view are saturated, so that others take on a character of ur-
gence and that
3) most men, no matter how many, are able to act quickly.

tally under the. reports of experience and forecast. We must hear
hence that they are able to distribute the goods relative to their importance.
and the forces available or likely to be acquired, depending on the needs
present and immediately future. How do these questions matter
in common with a sensation caused by a physical stimulant? Even in
admitting that the saturation of needs can be accomplished according to a progression
analogous to that of Weber and Fechner's law, there is no doubt that if we
conceives this progression at the level of toilet paper, cervelas, editions
classic authors, prostitutes or consolations from a mis-
decin or a priest, the analogy with the logarithmic curve of the psychophy-
sique remains problematic to say the least. And if ever an individual calms his
intellectual need at the expense of his food by buying books, no ana-
psychophysical logic is not able to give us this attitude. smarter
corn.
Just to hear that everyday experience could be the foundation

from a scientific theory the professional of psychology will make a face. Corn
64 Max Webe r, Gesammelte Aufzätze zur Wissenschaftslehre , pp. 389-390.

Page 94
here is the economy using in addition the vulgar notion of "need", whereas it
is a real nest of difficulties and physiological and psychological problems.
ques! In addition, we ask the economist not to worry about these jobs.
barras and to be right in the name of good scientific conscience! For
Finally, the point of vulgarity is given as a basis for the economy of concepts
like those of rational activity by finality, utility, experience and
tion which pass for extremely complex in the eyes of the psychologist, even
incomprehensible, in any case among the most difficult to analyze! What becomes
under these conditions the sublimation that is experimentation with all its devices
laboratory? Well, the economy doesn't care about materialism, vitalism,
psychophysical parallelism and all theories of interaction.
She doesn't care whether Lipps' unconscious or Freud's or any other
is a usable base for psychological disciplines. These are there for everything
say, questions that are indifferent to him. And yet she claims to find
mathematical formulas to show the theoretical course of the eco-activity
nomic. The strongest thing is that she succeeds. It doesn't even matter that we dispute our
results in the name of reasons drawn from its own methodology, it does not prevent
their accuracy remains independent of the greatest upheavals at the level of
fundamental assumptions of biology or psychology. She does not want to
whether Ptolemy or Copernicus is right, any more than he is interested in hypotheses.
its theological or the perspectives offered to physics by the second principle
cipe of thermodynamics. None of the upheavals taking place in
other sciences is not in a position to settle the question of the correctness of a proposition.
economic position concerning the theory of rent or prices. No other
science cannot replace it, for it is its own master. She is a
autonomous discipline, since its results claim to be economically correct
and not psychological, biological or physical. Why then make the
validity of its propositions of those of other sciences?
It should obviously not be concluded that at the level of the empirical analysis of
economic life there are no points or results obtained by others
sciences which cannot be of great help to economic research, nor
nor the way of constructing the concepts which has proved to be effective in
other disciplines cannot serve as a model on occasion. In what
concerns the first point Weber proposes precisely to show one day in
what meaning can experimental research in the field of psychophysics be
useful 65 . Regarding the second, economics has long been inspired by
forms of thought peculiar to mathematics or biology and at any rate
field, it borrows concepts from other disciplines when it finds them effective.
caces for his research. However, "it absolutely depends on the problem
economy to determine how and in what direction it should use them, because
65 This is what he did in a long study of 1908-1909 entitled Zur Psychophysik der indus-
triellen Arbeit and published in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, pp.
61-255.
Page 95
any attempt to decide a priori which are the theories of other sciences which
should be fundamental for its research is as idle as the hierarchy
of sciences according to Auguste Comte ” 66 . Of course, the current experience from which
economics is also the starting point for all other empirical sciences.
ques, and each of them tries to overcome it and even must, since it is
foundation of its right to exist as a science. However each one overcomes it
and sublimates it in its own way, according to its own perspective and direction. On this point the
psychology has nothing to prescribe to the economy, that is to say, the latter does not have to receive
see directives neither from Fechner's law, nor from psychology in general.
ral. As a result, marginalism has no psychological basis as
Brentano believes; its basis is pragmatic, since it cannot do without
middle-to-end relationship.
To which must be added that the proposals and theories of economics are
means intended for the analysis of causal relations of empirical reality. El-
the are therefore not copies, but idealtypes that Weber defines here from the
as follows: "They present a series of events constructed by thought
that we very rarely find with their ideal purity in empirical reality and
often not at all, but who on the other hand, because their elements are taken from
experience and only accentuated by thought to the rational, also serve
many heuristic means for analysis than constructive means for the presentation of
empirical diversity ” 67 .
*
**
The study entitled Energetische Kulturtheorien (1909) is an analysis

review of the work of the chemist Ostwald, Energetische Grundlagen der Kultur-
wissenschaft (Leipzig 1909). However, before approaching the article itself, it is worth
worth examining the very long note at the beginning devoted to the theses presented
by E. Solvay in his work Formules for an introduction to physio and
psychosociological (Brussels 1906). This note is interesting to a double
point of view. On the one hand, it teaches us what Weber thought of the trend
immoderate - still more common today than in its time - of sociology
to quantify results that understand themselves and on the other hand what they
think of the thesis of certain American sociologists who interpret Weber
as the promoter of quantification in sociology (to such an extent that during the
Max Weber Congress of April 1964 in Heidelberg the sociologist Deutsch tried to
show his audience that the originality of Weber's political thought lay
for example in the quantification of the notion of power).
Take the Solvay formula:
66 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre p. 393.

67 Ibid. pp. 396-397.
Page 96

R= E 1 = E - (E + E
vs f r
)
E vs E vs
where R denotes the yield, E the energy consumed (breathing, nutrition, etc.),
vs
E the fixed energy (morphologically),

f E the rejected energy and E energy
r 1
released by the body's oxidative processes. The value of the report E, 1
E vs
decisive for yield, varies with age, since E has been increasing since
1
childhood to middle age and E conversely, from middle age to old age
r
lesse. From the point of view of sociology, however, only a fraction of the total
free energy is taken into account in the evaluation of the energy yield
tick of the organism, in particular in the singular individual: it is the quanti-
tee needed for work, unlike the quantity E 1transformed into heat
which remains invariable as in any other machine. All the energy
useful energy of the individual does not therefore become useful social energy (E = socioener-
gie), because of the body's needs for physio-energy. If we call U the
variable coefficient of social utility we can calculate the social return of
all individuals at a given time based on the formula:
[
EU - E (+
E + E )]R T
R=
E vs
Objects which do not have a physioenergetic character and which are therefore
not at the service of the organization, but which still influence performance is
therefore allow integration into the formula insofar as they signify an increase
ment or a weakening of E vs. The same is true of needs of a pure order.
imaginative and moral ment.
If one objected that all this construction is worth nothing because this strength
mule does not take sufficient account of the complexity of the phenomena, Solvay
might rightly answer that by introducing new variables, to be determined
undermine during research, we could in principle integrate the constellations
the most complicated. Likewise the fact that many of these coefficients are not
not exact or even measurable does not constitute an objection either, since
political economy also rightly uses the fiction of measured needs.
bles. Therefore Weber is not hostile to quantification in sociology,
but he protests against procedures which, under the pretext of clarifying the problems,
introduce new confusions. Indeed the futility of the construction of Sol-
vay comes from what it involves in an apparently rigorous formula
and exact value judgments absolutely, subjective. The notion of "point of
Page 97
social view ”or that of“ socio-usability ”can only be determined on the basis of
tion of purely subjective ideals, in the name of which each individual judges what the
company should be. Countless nuances among all valuable standards
possible and an even greater host of compromises between these opposing stallions
therefore come into play, each of which can also be justified
for good reasons, as long as one of the theological beliefs
that or metaphysics that positivism believed it could banish, does not
ticingly through the back door. Indeed, in the name of what criteria is it possible
to answer the following questions: Why are individuals with ex-energetic
cessive, such as Ivan the Terrible, Robespierre, Napoleon, Goethe or Oscar Wilde have
were they "profitable" from a socio-energy point of view? More generally in-
core: to what extent can we say they were profitable or unprofitable?
"It is playing a childish game to embed these value judgments in
mathematical symbols which, if ever these artifices had any meaning, should
be assigned for each subject carrying a value judgment of total coefficients
quite different, including Solvay itself and me too. It is simply
foolish to believe that when we thresh a straw so empty of all grain, we
accomplishes a scientific work ” 68 .
In short, this construction is absolutely useless (keinen Schuß Pulver wert),

as evidenced by the embarrassed explanations of Solvay about the applica-
tion of its formula to intellectual phenomena. Considered in them-
even one cannot detect there the development of a specific energy, because
that they essentially constitute an expenditure of neuromuscular energy. Useless
to discuss this surrogate of psychophysical parallelism, because the expressions used
The results of Solvay already contain enough confusion in themselves. The
same expenditure of energy, he says, can give rise to works of "value" (!)
different. And yet these phenomena must (by order of whom? Asks We-
ber) be measurable and fit into formulas, because they play a role
important in sociology and that this is a special case of the manifestations
energetic. Obviously one cannot measure them themselves nor the energy either.
concomitantly, but their effects. What are all these explanations worth? Nothing
other than amusing leprechaun games. How, indeed, to measure the effect of
adorned with the Madonna of the Sistine Chapel and a work in the style of Saint
Sulpice? What Solvay calls effect, isn't that another term for value?
The normal end of cerebral effort, he says again, consists in a normal individual
and therefore also (!) in a normal community in self-preservation,
that is to say in protection against certain physical and moral harmfulness (!). In
consequence (!) the normal effect of cerebral effort is always (!) an improvement
improvement of energy efficiency, both in a genius and in an illiterate.
There is no need to note all the value judgments that are presented in this way.
in an apparently scientific form. Fortunately, Solvay refrains from speaking
of the method suitable for measuring all these physio-energetic, psycho-energetic values
68 Max Weber, op. cit. . p. 404.
Page 98
energetic and socio-energetic, under the pretext that this question is not
its spring. Without going into the other details concerning the economy, let us retain the
conclusion of Weber: to what order of ideas belong all these notions of
"Evaluation", "productivism", "accounting", etc. ? To that of
value judgments or that of empirically ascertainable facts? Under pre-
text to build a positive sociology, Solvay opens the doors to normativism and
to confusion, quite in line with classical utopian thought in France.
So much for the long note.
In turn Ostwald felt the need to discuss the human sciences,
it is true with a little more common sense than Solvay. However, he commits like
Mach the fault
1) to absolute from the logical point of view of the forms of abstractions specific to
naturalistic method to make it the criterion of scientific thought in general
ral,
2) to tax heterogeneous forms of thought, specific to other disciplines,

imperfections and backward ideas, because they do not serve
that because of their end they cannot return,
3) to artificially make almost all of becoming a set of

special cases of energy relations and
4) to push the passion to master objects intellectually thanks to its

personal conceptual means up to including the sphere of duty-being, which
leads him to deduce, in the name of parochial patriotism, the standards of value of
only made from his own specialty. It is true, the current climate is in the direction of the
distortion of the image of the universe proper to a science into a general conception
rale of the world. We can see this with regard to Darwinism, but also anti-Darwinism.
nism which goes so far as to divert science in the direction of pacifism. Here we believe
to be able to deduce individualistic imperatives from science, there imperatives al-
Truists of a more or less socialist character. Due to the enormous importance
of chemistry both from a scientific and technical point of view, the work
of Ostwald offers in the spirit of scientism sovereignty to technological ideals
gic.
We have no difficulty in detecting in Ostwald's work the influence of Quételet

and Auguste Comte, insofar as he hopes to be able to develop like them a
"exact" method of sociology, in a direction quite close to that of
the Institut de sociologie de Bruxelles, founded by Solvay, to which the work is also
their dedicated. In particular Ostwald admits at least implicitly the hierarchy
of the sciences of Auguste Comte that Weber qualifies as "a schema foreign to life,
built by a grandiose pedant who did not understand that the sciences pursue
extremely diverse aims, each based on specific aspects
Page 99
born from immediate current experience to sublimate and elaborate the content of this
unscientific knowledge from totally different points of view and entirely
autonomous ” 69 . It goes without saying that the autonomy of the various sciences does not prevent them
not to cross at one or the other point, to support each other for
separate on other principles, each retaining its independence as well as
level of the method than that of the problems it has to solve. There is no
subordination from one science to another, i.e. psychology does not depend on
more of biology than the political economy of psychology or any other
science. Each of these disciplines is adult and the results it obtains are worth
by virtue of the presuppositions which are specific to each of them and not by virtue of
others that are foreign to him. Belief in a hierarchy of sciences is
than a dogmatism of science in general. So we should not be surprised when
one reads from Ostwald a sentence as confused as the following: "It is
possible
apart to time
from conceive of thought
and energy, as remaining
while spatial, although it cannot
subjective. " be
We will content ourselves here with very roughly summarizing Ostwald's thesis.
that Weber analyzes in detail, taking one by one the different chapters of the
vrage. It boils down to this: everything we know about the world can be expressed
in terms of energy, up to changes in civilization and phenomena
of culture which would only be consequences of the discovery of new
energy reports or the new exploitation of known reports. In short,
the development of the world and of human life would also be subject roughly
to the second principle of energetics. One after another the various chapters of
the work of Ostwald expose the action of energy in the various fields,
from zoology to politics, including economics, law, peda-
gogy and art. Weber follows step by step all these developments, either to deny them
any value for sociology, for example that which Ostwald devotes to the different
presence between instrument and machine, either to underline exaggerations or to
on the contrary, simplifications, either to discover a lack of information and the in-
competence of the author who casually settles questions relating to
disciplines which are foreign to it. It is enough here for us to identify the main lines
of the criticism made by Weber, when it gives us some indications on its
own methodological doctrine.
When Ostwald identifies progress with the development of energy alone

tick it should be noted that such a general proposition has absolutely nothing
scientist. It is not worth more than others who equate progress with de-
development of materialism, Darwinism, moral irenism, etc. More the
propositions of this kind are general, the less scientific they are. Indeed,
they are based not only on hasty generalizations, but also in
controllable, for example when Ostwald sees a parallel between the expenditure
energy costs and costs or expenses of an economic nature. There are certainly many-
69 Max Weber , op.cit. pp. 412-413.
Page 100
suddenly more scientificity in a precise and documented description of an event.

historically isolated, made on the basis of critical research, than in the general
achievements of energetics. We can only nod when a chemist,
yet accustomed by his work as a specialist to the handling of precise concepts and
rigorous, is satisfied with the most vague notions and the most insecure formulas.
consistent in the discussion of problems of other sciences.
More specious still is the intellectual intemperance which claims to derive from
scientific propositions of value judgments, while it only insinuates
the personal convictions of the scholar. This is so when Ostwald studies the
energetic development of weapons to assert, following reasoning
sophistry, that energetics and pacifism go hand in hand. The passages devoted to
art borders on the ridiculous, because, if we pushed to their extreme consequences
the aesthetic conceptions of Ostwald, it would be necessary to admit that the most beautiful
bleau would be the one that represents an explosion or a naval battle. That he's
failed to distinguish between art and technique. The sculpture of a table requires
a mass of energies of kinetic, chemical, etc. order that the completed table is
incapable of restoring, and if we measure it on an energetic scale, it does not represent
no more calories than a heap of wood of the same size. Any man of
secular prit (which does not mean the same as scientific mind) can ac-
cite Ostwald's developments on pedagogy, conceived as an educator
freedom of thought and belief. But still it is necessary to draw the consequences
from the assimilation of "character formation" to "development of qualities
social "which is in turn assimilated to" technical energy qualities.
only useful ”, because every apostle of the order founded on technological ideals
should know that this doctrine ultimately preaches submission and adaptation
to the social relations of the established power. In any case, the freedom to think
sée is not a technological ideal that could be founded energetically.
Finally, is it true that the criterion of scientific thought is practical domination?

tick from the outside world? “It is not entirely by chance that the real foundations
date of the scientific spirit of modern sciences were not Bacon, this
ancestor of the technological conception of science, but thinkers of a damn
other edge. What we call nowadays: “Search for scientific truth
for itself ”, Swammerdam expressed it in the language of his time:
“Providing proof of divine wisdom through the anatomy of a louse”. And finally,
the good Lord did not function so badly at that time as a heuristic principle.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that these were and still are ecological interests.
nomiques which gave and give the impetus to sciences like chemistry
(and many other natural sciences). Does it follow, however, that we should see
nowadays in this technical agent which is indeed important for chemistry, the
“Meaning” of scientific work as it once was with God and his glory?
In this case, I would like the latter even better ” 70 .
70 Max Weber, op.cit. p. 423.
Page 101
Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First try (1904) 101
Of course, we can only approve of Ostwald when he asks for the loan of the
greater attention to the application of the law of energy to soil phenomena
cials, but not when he makes energetics the exclusive foundation of sociolo-
gie or another discipline. Only the concrete results of chemistry and bio-
logic can become, where it seems useful, of very great interest for
specialists in the human sciences, but not uncontrolled generalizations
bles of energetics and other doctrines of this kind. It is not because the eco
nomie or sociology use here and there concepts borrowed from physics or
to chemistry that we are entitled to draw the conclusion that it is possible to base
such or such human science on a principle of the natural sciences. One can
admit that with this work Ostwald has only made a mistake. There is none left
less true than the haughtiness with which certain theorists of the sciences of
nature deal with the work done in historical or other disciplines is
deeply ridiculous. But above all, we cannot accept that because of the
indisputable causal cause of energy we raise energetics to the rank of method
universal scientist. No more than a specialist in economics, history or
of sociology need not prescribe to the physicist or chemist the method to be followed or
the points of view from which he must examine the problems of his discipline, the
natural scientists need not impose their conception of
science, elevated to the rank of conception of the world, to economists or socio-
logues. Collaboration does not mean subordination. The common good of all
scholars is science, but without freedom in research it cannot develop
nor does it bear fruit.
*
**
This introduction having no other goal than to be useful, that is to say to do better
know Weber's untranslated texts so that the reader can get a
as complete an idea as possible of its methodology, we refrained from
to recognize the strength and weakness of these various studies. A work of
this kind would require beforehand that we establish the correspondences between the main
cipal Weberian themes: the ideal type, adequate causality, the relation to
theirs, objective possibility, comprehension, axiological neutrality, etc. TO
in turn, commentators consider one of these pre-
ference to others, because he would control the whole system. Perhaps
none of them really exercise a primacy, because as long as we put the
Weber's methodology in correspondence with his philosophy of antagonism
values and possible points of view, we would see that methodologically we
cannot favor any direction. In the second place, it would be necessary to confront the
theory and practice with a view to testing the effectiveness of this conception of
method in the light of the results obtained by Weber and possibly discover
the scholar's infidelities towards the philosopher and vice versa. It would finally be necessary
situate this methodology in the intellectual context of the time, bring to light
Page 102
concordances with the philosophy of Windelband, Simmel and others, but

also the refusals, make the necessary comparisons with that of Rickert. Those
influences are known, although they have so far not been the subject of a
overall analysis. Perhaps it would also be appropriate to confront the thought
of Weber and that of Husserl, the former having himself pointed out certain similar
gies with phenomenology, unlike Husserl who hardly ever cited
contemporaries from whom he borrowed. This comparison would also be
Least interesting from another, more general point of view. Indeed, Husserl and We-
ber were the main adversaries of naturalism, psychologism and history.
toricism that reigned at that time in the humanities in Germany.
Without going into all these details it is nevertheless possible to mark the
less summarily, the originality of Weberian methodology: its theory of
knowledge (as far as this expression fits) is a refusal of any
systematization, not only at the level of affirmation and confession as
among many other theorists, but especially that of the actual practice of
learned. From reading his works we of course get the impression of richness
extraordinary information and a penetrating density of reflection, but
also that of a scattering, of a dispersion that has never felt the need,
if only once, to give oneself a center or a home. The problems
and the themes are juxtaposed like the articles and the works, without any
a kind of subordination, so was Weber convinced of the uselessness of such a
vail (for himself), since in his opinion nothing allows us to hope that
man could one day exhaust all possible points of view and connections.
bles. Nothing is more significant in this respect than his conception of the idealype. It
there is no such construction that could claim to be definitive,
that is to say, there is no model ideal type of craftsmanship, nor a type of economy
determined, neither of Protestantism, nor of power, but the scientist can build
as much as he wants, according to the needs of the research. This means that there is
not just as many idealypes as there are historical situations, movements
ideas or particular human activities, but again each of these situations
tions and activities can be understood by a multiplicity of constructions of this
genre, all of which are valid if they help the scholar better explain the
pects of a phenomenon. At the level of historiography, history is nothing
other than an infinite dissemination of shards of thoughts.
It is clear that from this point of view Weber occupies a special place as well
in the development of sociology than in that of the theory of science
in general. In sociology he was the opponent of the systematic conception of
Count whose influence was decisive on sociologists of all countries,
even on those who did not expressly claim to him, insofar as they
all try or try to develop a system, coordinate and subordinate
ner social concepts and phenomena within dualities such as that of
community and society or a solidarist vision of the world, or
an explanation of phenomena from a religious principle; economic,
Page 103
military, etc., or more generally finally within a conception of the world. In

epistemology he remains the protagonist of a theory that is, so to speak, non-philosophical.
than science and knowledge, if we understand by philosophy a reflection
coherent on the world or on a particular aspect of human life from
from an original intuition. For Weber, the scientist's freedom of choice is in his
order as complete as that of the politician, without there being more chances
to be able to subordinate it to an alleged ultimate end of knowledge that
the other side to a supposed ultimate end of society. Despite all the difference
that he establishes between knowledge and action, fact and value, his vision of science is
like the one he has of politics. At all levels we meet this
that Raymond Aron calls the “anarchy” of choices 71 .
'This is to say that his epistemology is inseparable from his theory of action. Of a
on the other hand, the duality of will and knowledge is insurmountable; these are two
spheres of human life, none of which is superior to the other; in the same way one does not
could fix the rule of conduct to the other. On the other hand, they offer despite
their radical distinction the same representation of the world characterized by the di-
infinite versity. None is completed and in all likelihood will never be completed.
corn. Each also contributes to our destiny. So nothing would be more
false to believe that the progress of science could transform nature
of action. Certainly, scientific technique is the leaven of rationalization
growing that we are witnessing, it has disenchanted our world, but
in no way to the detriment of the irrational. It is not true that the multiplication of
scientific, legal, political and other laws has diminished in any way
the irrationality of evaluative positions and decisions, previously attached to
to tradition. It retains its empire in a legal system. The problems have
only been moved, not resolved. Science and action can collaborate on
many points, but at any time conflict can arise. All that we
can ask man, it is to be able to grant lucidity and courage,
and even this agreement remains purely individual and personal, in spite of the
most formidable percussions of politics and science, for example under
the form of the alliance of progress and the mass, on the collectivity.
Under these conditions, can Weber's philosophy be defined as relati-
see? Although either of his statements can give credit to this
interpretation, he generally refused this label, insofar as he felt that
the free choice of the will was able to pick up the shards of history or
at least a certain number of them in a conscious action of a precise goal
in the service of a more or less general purpose. Of course, the antinomies remain
antinomies, but they become the strength of man when he succeeds in
join in the same movement of thought and action, with respect for
their distinction and not in confusion. If there is relativism, it is not that of
eclecticism, because Weber, while recognizing the need for compromises in certain
71 Raymond ARON, The critical philosophy of history, 2nd ed., Paris 1950, p.272.
Page 104
certain circumstances, refused to amalgamate into a dilettante vision of the

of diverse and heterogeneous origins. If there is relativism, it is not either
that of pluralist personalism, this philosophy of a crossroads awaiting
problems coming from all directions of thought. He did not have the
a taste for the mind torn apart by singular cases of conscience. On the contrary, some
time before his death he had predicted the degeneration of intellectual circles
Germans who, under the Weimar Republic, will undermine in the name of pluralism the
political will of the country and will throw Germany into the adventure. Not only
he was perfectly aware of the futility of a philosophy of values which
nuncio of your choice (since a philosophy which welcomes everything as equal-
valid for action is no longer a philosophy of values: it is
elegant difference), but also of the inevitable decline of such a thought, of the
means that others will impose on her the choices she refuses to make, since with the
decision violence enters the world. As much Weber wanted the pen-
sée always remains open at the level of knowledge, as much he demanded that it be closed
in action through responsibility and resolve. This means that the arbitrariness of
choice reigns at the level of the ends and not at that of the means, because of them alone and
for their consequences we can be responsible. If there is no reason
it is rational to prefer one end to another, there is to prefer one means to other
very. It is also at this stage that the will is able to break the rationality of the
determinism and science to curb irrational movements.
If the notion of relativism comes from the pen of the commentator of the Wis-
senschaftslehre, it is because Weber, who insisted so much on the consciousness of
consequences, disdained to draw the consequences from his own position. However, from
that one wonders about the logical consequences of a practical attitude or a
theoretical assertion, one inevitably puts the foot in a system. The fact is
that Weber neither considered the consequences of a method proceeding by ideal-
types nor that of an evaluative position on the basis of the immediacy of the decision.
To the extent that he has scattered idealtypes in the field of knowledge
sance, he dispersed values in that of action. Hence a philosophy that
we could call perspective, which we recognize in particular by the fact that without
ceased he used the notions of Siandpunkt, Gesichtspunkt, Ansatzpunkt, An-
griffspunkt, Blickpunkt, WertPunkt, etc., which are only substitutes for its
rejection of metaphysics 72 . More exactly Weber believed he could substitute for
72 This aspect of his thinking has been brought to light in a very suggestive way by C. Schmitt, Die
Tyrannei der Werte, May hors commerce, 1960. It should be noted that Weber had his life
having a lot more friends than students. Indeed, while many German academics are
make it an honor to have taken Weber's classes, there was no school strictly speaking
Weberian as there is a positivist, Marxist, phenomenological school, etc. Same as
nowadays, whatever may be said, there are no "real" Weberians. This certainly holds
the unsystematic nature of his thought which is much more a pretext for questioning
and on reflection that a doctrine can give rise to a struggle between Orthodox and heterodox.
The influence he continues to exert more than ever is not that of a master, but of a hero.
of thought legend.
Page 105
the metaphysical questioning of the personal heroism of man determined to endure without
ceases the ordeal of the unfinished.
Allow me at the end of this introduction to thank Mr. Henri

Adrian for all his valuable advice and suggestions when translating certain
some difficult or equivocal passages.
Page 106
First try 73
The objectivity of knowledge

in science
and social policy
By Max Weber
[1904]
73 The notes with lowercase letters (a, b, c…) are those of Max Weber, the
others, in Arabic numerals, in parentheses, with hyperlinks (1, 2, 3), are those of the translation.
tor. We have grouped the translator's notes at the end of each of the JMT essays.
Page 107
The first question * by which we usually welcome home the

publication of a social science and above all social policy journal [147], or
change in its editorial board, is as follows: what is its "ten-
dance ”( 2)? We cannot avoid this question either. Aus-
if, following the remarks set out in the Presentation (3 ), should it be opened
here a debate on the problem of principles. We will thus have the opportunity to put
in light, in multiple directions, which, in our opinion, constitutes the originality
"scientific" work in general in the social sciences. This may be
useful, if not to the specialist, at least to many readers unfamiliar with the practice.
than scientific work, although it is or, rather, precisely because it
these are "obvious things".
In addition to increasing our knowledge in the order of "conditions

of all countries ”, therefore facts of social life, the Archive, since it
exists, has explicitly set itself the goal of educating also the judgment to be made on
the practical problems of social life, and therefore - as far indeed
very modest where one can demand such a goal of scientists insofar as they are
private men - to criticize practical politico-social work, up to and including
including that of legislative bodies. However, from the outset, the Archive kept
be an exclusively scientific journal, to work only with the means of
Scientific Research. The first problem that arises is therefore the following:
* In the first section of this study where we speak expressly on behalf of the editorial staff and
where the tasks of the Archive are fixed, it is obviously not the private opinions of the author
of this article, but on the contrary of statements which have been explicitly approved by the
drafting committee. Regarding the second section, responsibility for the form
and the substance rests solely with the author of those pages.
The Archiv will never slip into the rut of the opinions of a particular school. We
will find the guarantee in the fact that the points of view not only of the collaborators, but
also members of the editorial board are in no way identical, even in this
which concerns questions of method. On the other hand, however, the agreement on certain
fundamental conceptions was the common assumption of the editorial staff who
took charge of the review. This agreement relates specifically to the appreciation of the value of the
theoretical knowledge under certain "unilateral" points of view as well as on the requirement
a construction of rigorous concepts and a strict separation between empirical knowledge and
value judgment, as it is advocated here - naturally without any claim of
wear anything "new".
The considerable extent of the discussion ( sub II) and the frequent repetition of the same
idea are exclusively at the service of the same goal: to obtain by these explanations the maximum
possible common understanding. For this purpose, we have rather neglected - not
too much, hopefully - the precision of the expression and for the same reason we have complete-
ment abandoned the idea of systematic research in favor of a succession of a few
methodological points of view. Otherwise we would have had to raise a multitude of
epistemological problems which are, in part, much deeper than those we
have evoked. It is not a question here of making logic, but of using certain
results of modern logic, nor is it a question of solving problems, but of ex-
clearly state their meaning to the layman. Anyone who knows the work of logicians
modern - I cite only those of Windelband, Simmel, and, for our own purpose, special-
not those of Heinrich Rickert - will immediately notice that for everything that is essential
we followed suit (1).
Page 108
how can this goal be reconciled in principle with this limitation to

purely scientific means? When the Archive allows its collaborators to
judge in its columns legislative and administrative measures or proposals
practical positions in favor of such measures, what does this mean? What are the
norms of these judgments? What is the validity of the value judgments that
formulates the one who thus poses himself as a judge or that the writer alleges who makes it the
dement of the practical proposals it recommends? In what sense is it maintained
are they still in the field of scientific discussion, since it is necessary to seek
the characteristic of scientific knowledge in the "objective" validity of
its results considered to be truths? In the first part we explain-
let us take our point of view on this question in order to be able to answer in the second
to another, broader - in what sense are there "objectively valid truths"
in the field of cultural life in general - a question that cannot be
der, in view of the constant change and the ardent struggle [148] over the problems
apparently the most elementary of our discipline, its working method, its
way of forming its concepts and the validity of these (4 ). We do not offer
it is not here to provide solutions, but to present the problems - especially
those to which our journal must pay attention in order to meet the
demands of his past and future work.
We all know that the science of ours, as well as - except

perhaps political history - all the sciences which have institutions as their object -
human cultural events and events, have historically arisen from
Practical rations . Develop value judgments on certain policy measures
Economic tick, such was the immediate goal and, at the beginning, only one of our discipline.
It has been a "technique" roughly in the sense that the clinical disciplines of
medical sciences are. However, we know how this situation changed little
little by little, without however succeeding in establishing a separation in principle between
knowledge of l. "Being" [Seeinde] and that of the " before-being " [Seinsol-
late] . A double opinion thwarted this distinction. First of all the one who
understands that immutably identical laws would govern economic phenomena
and then that which believes that a univocal principle of development regulates them.
and that, consequently, in the first case, - the to-being would merge
with immutable being , - in the second case - with becoming [Werdende] ineluc-
table. With the awakening of historical sense, a combination of
of ethical evolutionism and historical relativism which tried to strip the
ethical standards of their formal character, to determine the content of the sphere
of "ethics" by introducing all cultural values and raising
thus political economy has the dignity of an "ethical science" based on
empirical basis (5 ). By marking all the various cultural ideals possible
Page 109
sealed with the seal of 'ethics', we only succeed in letting the special dignity vanish.
cific ethical imperatives without gaining anything for the “ob-
jective ”of these ideals. In spite of everything, we can and we must avoid here a
discussion of principles: we simply stick [149] to the fact that, at-
Even today, the confused idea that political economy develops and must elaborate
value judgments based on an economic "conception of the world" is
not yet abandoned and, it is easy to understand, remains particularly
familiar to practitioners.
We would like to state at the outset that our journal, representing a

empirical science, must reject in principle this point of view. Indeed, we do not think
not know that the role of a science of experience can ever consist of a
discovery of imperative norms and ideals from which one could deduce
recipes for practice.
What is the consequence of this position? It does not follow at all that
in general, value judgments must be removed from scientific discussion,
fact that in the last analysis they are based on certain ideals and thus have
even a "subjective" origin. The practice and the aim of our review do not
would only constantly disavow such an attitude. The criticism does not stop-
before value judgments. The question is rather this: what does and what does
aims at a scientific critique of ideals and value judgments? It requires
closer examination.
Any reflexive analysis [denkende Besinnung] concerning the ultimate elements

of reasonable human activity is first of all linked to the categories of
"End" and "means". We want something in concreto either by virtue of
its "own value" is as a means at the service of what we want from it.
deny spring. What is above all immediately accessible to scientific examination
that, it is the question of the conformity [ Geeignetheit ] of the means when the goal is
given. Since we are able to validly establish (each time
within the limits of our knowledge) what are the proper means or not to drive
to the goal that we represent to ourselves, we can also by this way weigh the
chances that we have in general attaining a given goal by means of
specific means that are at our disposal. Therefore, based on the situation
history, we can each time indirectly criticize the intention as
practically reasonable or unreasonable depending on the conditions given. Of
more, when it seems that it is possible to achieve the goal that we represent, well
heard always within the limits of our knowledge, we can determine, besides
the possible achievement of the intended goal, the consequences that the em-
use of essential means, since [150] everything is in the process of becoming. We
let us thus give to the one who acts the possibility of balancing [abwägen] the
intended consequences and the unintended consequences of its activity and
at the same time to answer the question: what costs [was kostet] the realization of the
desired goal in relation to foreseeable sacrifices of other values? Since in
Page 110
the vast majority of cases any goal that one pursues "costs" or at least
can cost something in this sense, nobody can avoid putting in bas-
launches the goal and the consequences of his activity, as long as he acts with the
awareness of their responsibilities. One of the essential functions of criticism
technique that we have considered so far therefore consists in making pos-
sible this confrontation. However, incline this confrontation until the decision
Zion, this is no longer a possible task of science, but of man endowed with
will: it is he alone who. deliberates and who chooses between the values in question, in
conscience and according to his own conception of the world. Science can help him
realize that any activity and, of course also, depending on the circumstances,
inaction, signify by their consequences a position in favor of
certain values and therefore as a general rule - although it is readily forgotten
nowadays - against other values. Making the choice is therefore his business ( 6).
We can still bring her something else for her decision: know her
know the importance of what he wants. We can teach him what are
the chain and the scope of the ends he proposes to achieve and between which
he chooses, starting by indicating and developing logically
correct what are the "ideas" that are or can be the basis of its goal
concrete. For it goes without saying that one of the most essential tasks of all science
of human cultural life is to open up intellectual understanding to
"Ideas" for which men have fought and continue to fight either in reality
tee either in appearance. This does not go beyond the limits of a science which aspires to a
"Reasoned order of empirical reality", no more than the means which serve to
the interpretation of spiritual values are "inductions" in the current sense of
term. In any case, this task is, at least in part, outside the framework
of properly economic science insofar as it obeys the specialization
usual which results from the division of labor; they are rather [151] tasks of the
Social philosophy. Nevertheless, the historical force of ideas has been and remains in
core so important for the development of social life that our review is not
will never shirk from this problem, but will include his study among his
most important tasks.
However, the scientific method of dealing with value judgments cannot

not only to be confined to understanding, [verstehen] and to revive [nacherle-
ben] the desired goals and the ideals which serve as their foundations, she proposes
also to teach us to pass a “critical” judgment on them. This cry
tick can only have a dialectical character, which means that it
can only be a logical-formal judgment on the matter contained in the judgments.
elements of value and ideas given historically; she can only be one
control of ideals according to the postulate of the internal non-contradiction of the willed
( 7). By setting this goal, she can help the man of will to realize
itself both of the ultimate axioms which form the basis of the content of its
wanting and standards of value [Wertmaßstäbe] from which he starts unconsciously or
well which he would have to leave to be consistent. Help the individual to consider
Page 111
knowledge of these ultimate standards that manifest in value judgment

concrete, this is ultimately the last thing that criticism can accomplish without
get lost in the sphere of speculation. As to whether the subject should accept
these ultimate standards, that is his own business, it is a matter of the res-
comes out of his will and his consciousness, not that of empirical knowledge.
An empirical science cannot teach anyone what to do,

but only what he can and - if necessary - what he wants to do. It is correct that
in the field of our discipline the personal conceptions of the inter-
usually come constantly in scientific argumentation and that they
constantly disturb, that they lead to variously assess the weight of this
argumentation, including in the sphere of the discovery of causal relationships
simple, depending on whether the result increases or decreases the chances of per-
personal, which means the possibility of wanting a specific thing. Under this
report the editors and contributors of this journal will not consider themselves certain-
not lying "strangers to what is human." However, it is a long way from this admission of
human weakness in the belief in an "ethical" science of political economy
that who would have to derive from his material ideals or even [152] concrete norms
through the application of general ethical imperatives. It is also true that the
most intimate elements of the "personality", the supreme and ultimate judge
elements of value that determine our action and give meaning and importance
tance to our life, we feel them precisely as something that is
“Objectively” of a great price [Wertvolles]. Indeed, we do not succeed in
make us the defenders only if they appear to us to be valid because
that they derive from our supreme vital values and that they develop in the
fight against the resistance that we encounter during our existence. Without
undoubtedly, the dignity of the "personality" resides in the fact that there are
to which it relates its own existence and, if ever in the particular case
link these values were located exclusively within, of the sphere of the individual
personal duality, the fact of "spending oneself" [Sichausleben] in favor of
rets to which it assigns the authority of values then becomes the idea to which it
refers to. In any case, the attempt to advocate outside judgments of
value can only really be meaningful if you believe in values.
However: to pass judgment on the validity of these kinds of values is a
a matter of faith [Glauben] and perhaps also a task of speculative thought and
the interpretation of the meaning of life and of the world, but this is certainly not the object
of an empirical science in the sense in which we mean to practice it here.
Contrary to what is often believed, this is not the fact that can be observed by
experience of historical variability and contentiousness of ultimate ends which
is decisive for the separation between science and faith. Indeed, knowledge of
most certain propositions of our theoretical knowledge - for example those of
exact sciences, mathematics or physics - as well as acuity and subtlety
of our conscience are first and foremost the products of culture. And, if we think
especially to the practical problems of economic and social policy (in the
Page 112
common sense of the term), we see that there are many and even innumerable
particular practical problems about which the discussion starts from certain
purposes unanimously recognized as obvious - consider, for example, credits
for emergencies, concrete tasks of public hygiene, assistance to
underprivileged, to measures such as labor inspection in factories, to
industrial tribunal, labor control and a large part of the law
worker slation - to ask oneself only, at least apparently, what
are the means making it possible to achieve [153] these ends (8). Even if in these cases
we wanted to take the appearance of evidence for the truth - what science
can never do with impunity - and if we wanted to hold on to the conflicts that sur-
lie at the time of any attempt at practical execution for pure questions
techniques of opportunity - which would often be a mistake - it cannot
escape that this appearance of evidence of the axiological regulatory standards
vanishes as soon as we pass from the concrete problems of economic assistance
social and charity, under the auspices of charity and the police, to those of politics
social and economic. The hallmark of a social policy problem
consists precisely in the impossibility of solving it on the basis of simple
technical considerations based on established purposes; on the contrary we can and
one must fight for these axiological regulatory standards, since the problem becomes
rushes into the region of general questions of civilization. If there is a struggle, she
does not relate only - as we readily believe nowadays - to the "in-
class interests ”, but also on conceptions of the world, although everything remains
is quite true of course that, whatever the conception of the World, one of which
dividu acts as an advocate, usually intervenes decisively among other things, and
sure in a very. to a large extent, a degree of elective affinity. which binds the
conception of the world to the "class interest" - as far as one can employ
here this last expression which is univocal only in appearance. Anyway,
one thing is certain: the more the problem in question is "general", which
say in this case the more important its significance for the culture, the less it
is susceptible of an unequivocal solution from the materials provided by knowledge
empirical, because the ultimate axioms also come into play, eminently personal
nels, faith and axiological ideas. He is simply naive of
some specialists still believe, on occasion, that it would be for science
social practice of establishing above all a "principle" whose validity would be consolidated.
science, to then deduce unambiguously the standards intended to
solve the specific problems of the practice.
However necessary discussions of principle may be in the social sciences

on practical problems, that is to say if it is necessary to bring back to their
ideal content the value judgments that are imposed on us without reflection, and well
that our review [1541 proposes to devote itself especially to this kind of
questions, it remains nonetheless true that the discovery of a common denominator
mun [ Generalnenner ] practice for our problems as a set
universally valid supreme ideals cannot be a task or a
for this review nor for empirical science in general: such a task would be
Page 113
not only insoluble in practice, but also contradictory in itself. What

whatever the way. whose basis and nature of the obligation are interpreted
ethical imperatives, it is certain that one cannot unequivocally deduce from
their character as norms for the concrete and determined action of the individual,
obligatory cultural contents [Kulturinhalte] ; the thing is all the less possible-
ble that the contents in question are broader. Only positive religions -
or more exactly sects linked by dogmas - are capable of conferring on
content of cultural values the dignity of valid ethical imperatives
tally. Apart from these religions, the cultural ideals that the individual holds
proposes to update and the ethical duties that it must fulfill have, in principle, a
variable dignity. It is the fate of an epoch of culture which tasted the tree of the
knowledge of knowing that we cannot read the meaning of global becoming
in the result, however perfect, of the exploration that we make of it, but that
we must be able to create it ourselves, that the "conceptions of the
world 'can never be the product of an advance in empirical knowledge and
that, therefore, the supreme ideals which act most strongly on us
only actualize themselves at all times in the struggle with other ideals which are also
sacred to others than ours are sacred to us.
Only an optimistic synchretism such as it sometimes results from historical relativism
that and evolutionist can be deluded in theory about the extreme gravity of this
state of affairs or in practice evade the consequences. Of course, in
a particular case, on the objective level, it can be just as consistent with the
duty of the practical politician to reconcile two opposing opinions rather than
take sides in favor of one or the other. However, this has absolutely nothing to
to do with scientific "objectivity". The “happy medium” is not the least of the
world a more scientific truth than the most extreme ideals of the parties of
right or left. Nowhere is the interest of science more
denied that where one refuses to see the unpleasant facts and the reality of life [155]
in its hardness. Arcniv will mercilessly fight this dangerous illusion
who thinks that it is possible to arrive at practical standards that have a valid
scientificity thanks to a synthesis or an average of several points
of view supporters (9 ). In fact, such an illusion, because it likes me
to find one's own standards of value under the guise of relativism is a
more harmful to the impartiality of research than the old naive belief of the par-
tis in the possibility of scientifically "demonstrating" their dogmas. Become ca-
pables to distinguish between knowing [erkennen] and making a judgment
[beurteilen] and fulfill our duty as a scholar which consists in seeing the truth of
done as well as defending our own ideals, that is all we want to do.
We will get used to it again with more firmness.
There has been and always will be - this is what matters to us - an important difference.
surmountable between the argumentation which addresses our feeling and our capacity
city of enthusiasm for practical and concrete goals or for forms and
cultural content and that which is addressed to our conscience, when the validity of
Page 114
ethical standards is in question, and finally that which appeals to our faculty and our
need to rationally order empirical reality, with the pretension of establishing
the validity of a truth of experience. And this statement remains true even if,
as we will see again, the supreme values of the practical interest are and
will always be of decisive importance for the orientation that the activity
trice of thought adopted each time in the field of cultural sciences.
Because it is and it remains true that in the sphere of the social sciences a demons-
scientific tration, methodically correct, which claims to have achieved its goal,
must be able to be recognized as correct also by a Chinese or more precise
cally must have this, although it is perhaps not possible to réali-
be fully, owing to a material insufficiency. Likewise it remains true
that the logical analysis of an ideal intended to reveal its content and axioms
ultimate as well as the explanation of the consequences that logically and
practically in the event that the prosecution is to be considered to have been crowned with
success, must also be valid for a Chinese - although there may be nothing
to understand our ethical imperatives and even to reject (which, for sure, he will
wind) the ideal itself and the concrete evaluations that flow from it, without contesting
in any way the scientific value of the theoretical analysis [156]. Certainly, no-
be reviewed will never ignore the inevitable and constantly renewing attempts
in order to clearly determine the meaning of cultural life. On the contrary,
they are among the most important products of cultural life, and possibly
one of the most powerful driving forces. This is why we
will at all
“Social times closely
philosophy” monitor the
understood development
in this sense. Muchof discussions
more, we areonvery
the far away
the prejudice according to which reflections on cultural life are unsuitable for
to serve knowledge, on the pretext that they would go beyond the reasonable order
sounded by empirical data and would attempt to interpret the world from the point of view
metaphysical. It is however to the theory of knowledge that it belongs to
determine the sphere of these themes; also, in view of our goal, can we and
even we must refrain from giving a solution to these questions. There is no
that a point we hold firmly to is that a social science journal
as we understand it must be, in so far as it is concerned with science, a
place where we seek the truth which - to remain in the example that we have
chosen - claims the validity of a reasoned ordering of empirical reality
even in the eyes of a Chinese.
Undoubtedly, the editors of this review could not once and for all forbid
all neither to themselves nor to their collaborators to express in the form of a judge-
values the ideals that drive them. Only two obliga-
important issues. The first: to wear scrupulously, at every moment, at their
conscience and that of the readers what are the standards of value that serve
wind to measure reality and those from which they derive the value judgment, instead
to cultivate, as happens all too frequently, illusions around
conflicts of ideals through an imprecise combination of values of a very diverse nature
and wanting to "please everyone". If we scrupulously respect this
Page 115
command, taking a position of a practical nature not only cannot

harm the pure scientific spirit, but it could be of direct use to it and even
to impose. During the scientific criticism of legislative proposals or
very practical arrangements it frequently happens that it is not possible to
clear and understandable the scope of the reasons of the legislature and the
ideals of the author criticized other than by confronting [157] the standards of value
which serve as a basis for them with other stallions and, of course, as their preferred
rence with its own. Any sensible appreciation of a foreign will does not
can be criticized only from a personal "conception of the world" and any
polemic against an ideal different from his can only be done in the name of an ideal
staff. If, therefore, in the particular case, one endeavors not only to define
and to analyze scientifically the axiom of ultimate value which founds a practical will.
tick, but also to highlight its relationship with other axioms of
value, then a "positive" criticism by an overall comparison of its reports.
ports with other axioms becomes inevitable.
So we will inevitably have to give in the columns of our

journal - in particular concerning the commentary on laws - the floor to politics
social science which is concerned with presenting the ideals, alongside the social science which
cup of the rational order of facts. However, it would not occur to us to
to pass off as "science" discussions of this kind and, of all our
forces, we will be careful not to give in such confusion or mis-
socket. Indeed, in this case, it is no longer science that speaks. Also the second
fundamental commandment of scientific impartiality is this: it
at all times to make it clear to readers in these cases (and, let us repeat-
the, above all to oneself) where and when the scholar's reflective research ceases and where
and when the man of will begins to speak, in short, to indicate when the
arguments are addressed to understanding and when to feeling. Confusion per-
maneuver between Scientific discussion of facts and axiological reasoning is
one of the most frequent and most harmful peculiarities in the work of
our speciality. It is only against this confusion that our
previous remarks and not against the commitment to a personal ideal.
Lack of doctrine [Gesinnungslosigkeit] and scientific "objectivity" have
between them no kind of internal affinity. The Archive has never been, at least by
intention, a place of controversy against certain political or social parties and it
will refrain from becoming so in the future; it will be just as little a place of recruitment
for or against political and social ideals. There are other organs for
that. On the contrary, the originality of the review, since its existence, has precisely
consisted in the fact that it brought together ardent political opponents with a view to
common scientific work and, insofar as it depends on its directors, it
will remain [158] faithful to this formula. Until now it has not been a “so-
cialist ”, it will not henceforth become a“ bourgeois ”body. She will not exclude
from the circle of his collaborators, none of those who will want to be in the field
of scientific discussion. It cannot be an arena for "refutations",
replicas and duplicates, but neither will it protect anyone, nor its di-
Page 116
rectors than his collaborators, against an objective and scientific criticism, if

severe be it, even in its own columns. Anyone who doesn't feel there
force to endure this or who thinks they cannot collaborate, even for the
cause of scientific knowledge, with people defending others
ideals than his own, just have to stay away from the publication.
Alas! this last sentence - we do not want to delude ourselves - says

today, in fact, much more than it seems at first glance. All
first of all, as we have already indicated, the possibility of freely meeting
political adversaries on neutral ground - that of learned societies or
discussion of ideas - unfortunately comes up everywhere, and mainly in
Germany, to psychological obstacles, as experience shows. This
trait, a sign of a partisan and narrow-minded fanaticism as well as of a little
evolved, deserves to be fought without reservations. He takes in a magazine like the
our importance given that, in the field of social sciences,
the impetus for the study of scientific problems generally arises from
practical matters , as experience shows, so that the simple fact of
finding the existence of a scientific problem already contains a personal union
nelle [Personal-union] with a determined orientation of the will to live beings.
vants. In the columns of a journal which made its entry into life under the
fluency of the general interest for a specific concrete problem, we will encounter
regularly signing employees who are personally interested in this
problem because certain concrete situations seem to them to be in contradiction
with the ideal values in which they believe or even that they seem to put them-
be in peril. The elective affinity between related ideals will then create the coherence
of this circle of collaborators and will make it possible to make new recruits. All
this will give the journal, at least when we deal [159] with the problems of po-
practical social litics, a certain "character" which inevitably accompanies
any joint action by living and sentient beings, whose valuing positions
risking about problems never allow themselves to be completely stifled, even
at the level of purely theoretical research: they can be expressed from the
most legitimate way in criticizing proposals and practical measures
taking into account the presuppositions discussed above.
The Archive came into being at a time when certain practical problems concerning
the "workers question", in the current sense of the term, were in the foreground
research in the social sciences. Personalities who believed that
problems the journal set out to address were related to valuable ideas
supreme and determining and which for this reason, became collaborators
regular tutors, were therefore also the representatives of a conception of
culture having an identical or at least similar color. Also, everyone
knows that, if the magazine firmly refused to obey a ". trend ”, by limiting
expressly for scientific studies and expressly using
"Partisans of all political horizons," she nevertheless possessed a
character in the sense indicated above: This was the work of his regular collaborators.
Page 117
bind. They were generally men who, on the one hand, despite their differences
from other points of view, had the same goal, namely: to protect the health of
masses of workers and give them the possibility of greater participation in
material and spiritual goods of our civilization, - which on the other hand considered
that the means to achieve this goal consisted of a combination of intervention
state in the sphere of material interests and a liberal evolution of the order
existing political and legal system, - and who finally, whatever their opinion on the
structure of the future social order, accepted for the present the capitalist form,
not that it seemed to them the best compared to the old forms, but
because it seemed to them practically inevitable and that attempts to fight
systematically against it did not appear to them as a progress
but as an obstacle to the access of the working class to the light of culture.
In the situation of modern Germany - need not be specified here
more - this attitude was [160] inevitable and could still be so of our
days. The indisputable success which crowned this general participation in the discussion
scientific mission was of real benefit to the journal and rather constituted one of the
elements of its influence, perhaps even, under the given conditions, one
titles justifying its existence.
It is undeniable that the development of a "character" in this sense can, in

in the case of a scientific journal, constitute a danger for the impartiality of the work
scientific and it should indeed be so if the choice of collaborators
was done. systematically one-way: in this case the fact of cultivating such a
"Character" would mean practically the same thing as the existence of a "tendency".
dance ”. The editors of this periodical are fully aware of the res-
responsibility which this state of affairs imposes on them. They do not intend to modify
systematically the character of the Archive nor to preserve it artificial-
ment by a deliberate limitation of the circle of collaborators to scientists having
strong political ideas. They accept this character as it is and get over it.
attempt to its future “development”. The way this one will form and maybe
will be transformed, given the inevitable enlargement of the circle of collaborators,
first of all the originality of the personalities who will enter there to achieve a
scientific work and which will thus become and remain familiar with the journal.
Finally, this new character will also depend on the enlargement of the sphere of
problems, the development of which will be one of the objectives of the review.
These last. remarks lead us to ask the question that we do not have
not yet raised, that of the material delimitation of our field of work.
vail. We cannot give him an answer without at the same time raising the question.
tion of the nature of the goal of knowledge in the social sciences in general.
By making a distinction in principle between "value judgment" and "knowledge
empirical. ”We have so far assumed that there is indeed a
unconditionally valid knowledge, that is to say a reasoned order of the
empirical reality in the social sciences. This assumption becomes
now a problem as we have to discuss what can mean
Page 118
proud, in our disciplines, the objective "validity" of the truth that we seek.
No one can ignore that this problem arises and that it is not raised by.
simple subtlety. To be convinced of this, it suffices to observe the quarrel around
methods, "fundamental concepts [161]" and presuppositions, the con-
so much change of points of view and the continual renewal of the "defini-
of the concepts used, or to consider the abyss that appears to be intangible.
crossable between the forms of theoretical research and those of historical
riques, in the manner of this Viennese candidate who one day complained bitterly about
note that there were "two kinds of political economy". This is the problem
that we would like to devote the following section.
II
From its inception, this journal has treated the objects it deals with as
phenomena of an economic and social nature . Although the determination of
concepts and the delimitation of the sciences make little sense here, it is nevertheless important
less to elucidate summarily what this means.
Expressed as imprecisely as possible, the fundamental state of affairs

on which depend all the phenomena that, in the broadest sense of the term,
we call "economic-social" consists in the fact that our existence
physical as well as the satisfaction of our most ideal needs collide by-
everything to the quantitative limitation and the qualitative insufficiency of external resources.
laughter who are indispensable to them, at the same time as their satisfaction demands
organized foresight, work, the fight against nature and socialization
[Vergesellschaftung] with other men. The quality of an event that
considering it as a "social and economic" phenomenon is not a
attribute which, as such, is "objectively" inherent in it. Rather she lets herself be
determine by the direction of the interest of our knowledge, such as it results
of the specific cultural importance that we give to the event in question
tion in the particular case. Whenever an event in cultural life,
considered in the elements! of its singularity [Eigenart] which contain to our
eyes its specific meaning, is related directly or even in the most
more indirect possible in the fundamental state of things defined above, it contains
or at least it may contain, as far as it is so, a problem of
social science. This means that it becomes the object of a science which gives itself
task of elucidating the scope of this fundamental state of affairs.
[162] Among the problems of an economic and social order we can distinguish
guer several kinds. In the first place, the events, the complexes of standards,
institutions, etc., the economic aspect of which is in our view essential from the point of
Page 119
view of their importance for culture, for example events specific to the
life of the stock market or banks, which interests us first and foremost under
this aspect. This is generally (perhaps not exclusively) so with institutions.
tions which have been created consciously or which are used for purely
economic. We will say that these objects of our knowledge are events.
ments or even "economic" institutions in the narrow sense [ im engeren Sinn
wirtschaftliche ] . There is a second category of phenomena - for example
those of religious life - which do not interest us from the point of view of their importance
economic or because of it, or which certainly do not interest us in the
chief in this aspect, but which, under certain conditions, acquire under
this angle has economic significance, because they produce effects that
interesting from an economic point of view. We will call them phenomena
“Economically important” [ ökonomisch relevante E rscheinungen]. There are
finally a third category of phenomena whose economic effects do not
have no interest or at least no considerable interest and which are therefore not
economic in the sense we mean here - for example taste orientation
period - but of which some important aspects of their
particularity are in this case more or less strongly influenced by
economic tifs: in our example by nature, from the social environment of the public
who is interested in art. We will call them phenomena conditioned by
the economy [ ökonomisch bedingte Erscheinungen ] . The complex of human relations
norms, norms and normatively determined ratios that we designate
by the term of "State" constitutes for example an "economic" phenomenon in
as regards the management of public finances; as it intervenes in the
economic life by legislative measures or in any other way (even there
where points of view absolutely other than those of economics determine
explicitly: its behavior), it is “economically important”; finally,
as, in the context of relations other than "economic" relations,
his behavior and particular status are in part determined by
economic factors, it is "conditioned by the economic." ". All that we
just said allows us to easily understand on the one hand that the sphere of
economic events are floating and difficult to delineate with precision,
on the other hand that the "economic" aspects [163] of a phenomenon are not uniform.
not conditioned by economic factors nor a source of efficiency
purely economic, finally that a phenomenon does not generally keep a character
economic as and as long as our interest is exclusively
ment on the importance it can have in the material struggle for existence.
Following the example of economic and social science as it has developed

from Marx and Roscher ( 10), our Review will not only deal with the phenomena
properly "economic" nomenes, but also of those which are "economical"
mically important ”and those which are“ conditioned by the economy ”. It
is evident that the circle of this sort of object - which varies each time with the di-
rection of our interest - naturally extends through all the phenomena
cultural leaders. Specifically economic reasons - which means those
Page 120
which, by their peculiarities which are important for us, are linked to the state of
damental that we have just specified - exert their action wherever the satisfaction
tion of a need, however intangible, depends on the use of external resources
limits. As a result, they have a power which contributes to determining and transforming
sea everywhere, not only the form of satisfaction, but also the content of
cultural needs, even of the most intimate species. The indirect influence of rela
social relations, institutions and human groups, subject to the pressure of interests
"Material", extends (often unconsciously) to all areas of civilization.
sation without exception, down to the finest nuances of aesthetic feeling and
religious. They affect the circumstances of daily life just as much as they do
"historical" events of high politics, collective phenomena or
mass just as much as the "singular" actions of statesmen or
individual literary and artistic works: these are thus "conditioned by
the economy ”. On the other hand, the totality of the phenomena and conditions of a
a given historical civilization exerts an action on the configuration of needs
materials, on how to satisfy them, on the formation of interest groups
materials and the nature of their means of power and thereby on the nature of the course
of “economic development”: it thus becomes “economically important
aunt ”. As far as, thanks to causal regression, our science imputes [zu-
rechnet] certain economic phenomena of civilization with singular causes
liers - economic or not - it strives to be knowledge
"Historical". As long as it follows the trail of a specific element of the [164]
cultural phenomena - in this case the economic element - in the context of the
more diverse in cultural relations in order to grasp their cultural importance, it focuses on
force to be a historical interpretation from a specific point of view and it
presents a partial image, preliminary work, of historical knowledge
of the whole of civilization.
Although we are not dealing with an economic and social problem everywhere
where we see the intervention of economic elements in the form of causes
or consequences - this does not appear, in fact, except where the meaning of
these factors are problematic and can only be established with emergency assistance
of the methods of economic and social science - it remains, however, that the circle
problems of an economic and social nature is almost limitless.
So far our Review has been limited, after all, to certain questions
and it has generally given up on dealing with a whole series of special branches
extremely important, in particular that of the descriptive knowledge of
economics, the history of economics in the narrow sense and statistics. She has
also left it to other bodies to discuss technical matters
financial, technical problems of the market economy and those of prices
in the world of the modern exchange economy. She focused her research
ches on the current significance and on the historical development of certain
constellations of interests and conflicts that have arisen in the economy of civil
modernized thanks to the preponderant role that capital has played in research
Page 121
of investments. In doing so, however, she did not limit herself to the problems
practices of the historical development of the so-called social question in the
narrower of the term, that is to say to the relations between the modern class of employees
and the existing social order. No doubt the in-depth scientific study of the interest
growing that this special question had encountered in our country in the
for the 1880s and following was to be one of his most important tasks.
sentials. However, as the practical study of the condition or-
vrière also became with us the constant object of legislative activity and of
public discussion, the center of gravity of scientific work was obliged to
place more and more towards the determination of more universal relations of which these
problems constitute a compartment, to be used ultimately in a
analysis of all the modern problems of civilization arising from nature
particular of the economic foundations of our civilization and which are, in
[165] this measure, specific. As a result, the Review started very quickly-
also to be concerned with the most diverse living conditions specific to
to the other great classes of modern civilized nations, insofar as they are
partly "economically important" and partly "conditioned by the economy.
mie ”, and to examine from a historical, statistical and theoretical point of view the
relations that these classes maintain among themselves. So we are just pulling the
conclusions of this attitude when we now assign the Journal as
his own field of work that of scientifically exploring the meaning
general cultural cation of the economic and social structure of collective life
human and its historical forms of organization.
This is what we were thinking about and nothing else when we gave our-
be Revue the title of A rchiv für Sozialwissenschaft. It means we hear
embrace the historical and theoretical study of the same problems as those whose
practical solution is the object of "social policy" in the broadest sense.
of the term. In saying this, we take the right to use the notion of "social"
in its meaning determined by concrete current issues. If we
wants to call "cultural sciences" [Kulturwissen schaften ] the disciplines which
consider the events of human life in terms of their significance
for culture, social science [Sozialwissenschaft] as we understand it
here belongs to this category. We will see later what are the consequences.
logical sequences.
Highlighting the economic and social aspect of cultural life means

undoubtedly relies on a very perceptible limitation of our themes. We are objected-
ra that the economic point of view or, to use a less precise expression also
used, the "materialist" point of view which we start here to consider.
rer cultural life is "one-sided" [ einseitig ] . That's right, but this unilateral
ity is desired. The belief that this is the task of scientific work
that it is progressive to remedy this unilaterality of the economic perspective,
giving it the scope of a general science of the social, suffers from a fundamental
tal: this is because the so-called "social" point of view, that is to say that of the relationship between
Page 122
men, does not really have sufficient precision to delimit the pro-
scientific problems only on condition of being accompanied by a special predicate
any determining its content. Otherwise the social, considered as an object
of a science, could obviously [166] embrace both philology and
the history of the Church and in particular all the disciplines which deal with the ele-
most important constituent of cultural life, namely the State, as well as
the most important form of its normative regulation, namely the law. There are
there are also few reasons to consider the social economy as the indispensable precursor
thinkable of a "general science of the social", because it deals with
"Social", than to make it a branch of biology because it deals with
phenomena of life or a branch of a future astronomy reviewed and
augmented because it deals with events that take place on a planet.
It is not the "material" [sachliche] relations of "things" which constitute
kill the basis of the delimitation of fields of scientific work, but the rela-
conceptualizations of the problems: it is only where one deals with a problem
new with a new method and where we discover in this way truths
which open up important new horizons that are also born a new "science".
velle.
It is not by chance that the notion of "social", which seems to have a

quite general sense, covers each time we check its use a signi-
absolutely particular fication, of a specific coloring, although imprecise the
most of the time. In reality, what is "general" in it does not consist of anything.
other than its indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit]. Indeed, when we take it
in its general meaning, it does not provide us with any kind of point of view
that would elucidate the meaning of specific elements of the
the civilization.
Although we do not share the outdated prejudice that the

the totality of cultural manifestations can be deduced as a product or
as a function of constellations of "material" interests, we believe, however,
for our part that the analysis of social phenomena and cultural events
rels, under the special point of view of their conditionality [Bedingtheit] and their
range economic, was a scientific principle of creative fertility and
that it will undoubtedly remain so in the most distant future, on condition of the em-
bend with caution and rid it of any dogmatic prevention (11 ).
Admittedly, the so-called "materialist conception of history", considered as
a "conception of the world" or as the common denominator [ Generalnenner
] of the causal explanation of historical reality, must be [167] rejected in the way
the most categorical; nevertheless, the concern for an economic interpretation of the
toire is one of the essential aims of our Journal. This requires some explanation.
tions.
The so-called "materialist conception of history", in the old primary sense

mitive and brilliant Manifesto of the Communist Party, no doubt no longer exercises
Page 123
worse nowadays than on a few laymen and dilettantes. Indeed, it is in this

environment that is still widespread this curious idea that the need to explain
causal aspect of a historical phenomenon is not satisfied as long as one
has not found (or apparently found), somehow and at some time
whatever, the intervention of economic causes. If satisfaction is given to them,
they adapt to the most hackneyed hypothesis and the most general formulas.
them, because from now on their dogmatic need is appeased which wants
Economic 'forces of production' are the only 'character-
stical ”,“ true ”and“ everywhere in the final analysis ”. This phenomenon
nomène, however, is not one of a kind. Almost all sciences, from-
then philology to biology, have occasionally made the claim of pro-
not only specialized knowledge, but also "conceptions of
world ". Under the impetus of the enormous importance that the upsets have taken-
modern economic aspects and especially - of the immense scope of the "ques-
working class ”, the ineradicable monist tendency, which characterizes all
refractory to criticism of itself, naturally also slipped into this
rut. Nowadays, where nations lead with increasing vigor one
against the other a political and commercial struggle for the domination of the world,
this tendency takes refuge in anthropology. Indeed, an opinion currently
very widespread believes that in "final analysis" all historical future would be.
result of the rivalry of innate "racial qualities" ( 12). To the simple description
non-critical of the "characteristics of a people", an assembly has been substituted
even less critical of distinctive theories of society on the basis of science
of nature. In this Review, we will closely follow the development of
anthropological research, insofar as it is of importance to our
perspectives. It is to be hoped that methodically educated work will succeed little in
little [1681 to triumph over the position that we know nothing until
we will not have causally reduced cultural events to "race" - to
way in which they had also been reduced to the "middle" and even earlier
to "circumstances" [Zeitumstände]. so far nothing has been so damaging
to this kind of research that the claim of some zealous dilettantes who believe
that they could provide the knowledge of civilization with something
specifically other and much more considerable than simply developing
the possibility of more solidly attributing concrete and sin-
from historical reality to concrete, historically given causes ,
thanks to the acquisition of exact means of observation , considered under certain
specific points of view. It is only to the extent that anthropology is
able to provide us with knowledge so that its results at-
will be of interest to us and that "race biology" will be something
more than a product of the modern frenzy eager to create new sciences.
The same is true of the significance of the economic interpretation of the history
rique. If, after a period of unlimited overestimation, we see nowadays that its
scientific significance is almost in danger of being underestimated, it must be seen
consequence of the unprecedented lack of critical thinking in the interpretation
Page 124
economic reality, conceived as a "universal" method, in the sense of a

deduction of all cultural events, that is to say of all that
is essential to us - from conditions which in the final analysis would be
economic. The logical form in which this interpretation is presented is ac-
tally is not completely homogeneous. Where the purely economic explanation
that it encounters difficulties it has various subterfuges to maintain its
general validity of decisive causal factor. Or else she treats everything in the
historical reality cannot be deduced from economic elements such as the "accident
dentel ”, which for this reason would be without scientific significance, or else it
gives the concept of the economy such an extension that it makes it unrecognized
ble in order to include all human interests which, in one way or another,
are linked to external resources. If it is historically established that we have reacted
differently to two economically identical situations - due to
differences in political, religious, climatic or
many others that have nothing economic - we degrade [degradiert] all these
factors in historically accidental "conditions" behind which the movements
economic factors act as 'conditions', with the sole purpose of maintaining
the premise of economics [169]. It goes without saying that all these factors that pass
for "accidental" in the eyes of the economic interpretation follow their pro-
near laws exactly in the same direction as the economic factors, and that for
an interpretation which analyzes their specific meaning the “conditions” é co-
Conversely, nomics are just as “accidental historically”. It exists
finally a last attempt, in vogue, to try to save in spite of everything the
preponderant boost of the economy: it interprets the constant cooperation
and interactions of the various elements of cultural life as causal dependent .
either functionally or functionally on each other or rather as all dependent
of a single element namely the economic. When a particular institution of
non-economic character has also historically fulfilled a "function" in
service of the economic interests of a class, that is to say, has become the instru-
of this, for example when certain religious institutions were
left to use and are still used as "black font", we present this
institution either as having been created for this function or - in a sense
completely metaphysical - as having undergone the imprint of a tendency of development -
economic development.
There is no need to expose today to a specialist that this interpretation

of the purpose of the economic analysis of civilization was in part the effect of a certain
a historical constellation which directed scientific research towards certain
problems of culture conditioned by economics, partly the expression of a
exaggerated parochial patriotism of a particular science, and that currently it
has fallen into disuse to say the least. Whatever the field of demonstrations
human cultural relations, reduction to economic causes alone is not
haustive in any sense, not even in that of "properly eco-friendly" phenomena.
nomic ”. In principle, a history of the banks of any people, who do not
would involve in the explanation that the only economic reasons, is obviously
Page 125
as impossible as, for example, the “explanation” of Our Lady of the Cha-
Sixtine shovel from the social and economic foundations of cultural life to
the time when this painting was made, just as in principle it is no longer
exhaustive than that which would derive capitalism from certain transformations
of the contents of the religious conscience which contributed to the birth of the es-
capitalist or the one who would interpret any political structure from
shooting geographical conditions ( 13). In all these cases, nothing else is decisive
for the [170] determination of the degree of importance to be attributed to environmental conditions
that the series of causes to which the specific elements must be attributed
ques of the phenomenon in question insofar as these take on our eyes, in
each particular case, the meaning which alone matters to us. One- sided analysis
eral of the cultural reality in some "respect" specific - in the
present
proud incase undermethodological
a purely that of their economic
way thatconditionality
the education-of
is the
firsteye
of all
in justified
observation of the effect of categories of qualitatively similar causes as well
that the constant use of the same conceptual and methodological apparatus offers
all the advantages of the division of labor. There is nothing "arbitrary" about this analysis
[willkürlich] as long as the success speaks in her favor, which means as long as she
brings knowledge of relationships that are valuable for imputation
concrete historical events. Thus the unilaterality and unreality of the interpretation
purely economic principle are after all only a special case of a principle of
very general validity for scientific knowledge of cultural reality. The
The main purpose of the discussions which will follow is to elucidate the
logical elements and the general consequences at the level of the method.
There is absolutely no "objective" scientific analysis of cultural life.

real or - to use a narrower meaning, although, for
of course, it does not mean anything substantially different as to our purpose - "mani-
social celebrations ”, which would be independent from special points of view and unilateral
raux, thanks to which these manifestations are left explicitly or implicitly
mentally, consciously or unconsciously select to become the object of
research or analyze and organize for presentation. We must seek the reason
in the peculiarity of the purpose of knowledge of all research in the sciences
these social, in so far as they set out to go beyond the pure
of norms - legal or conventional - of social coexistence [so-
zialen Beieinandersein].
The social science that we propose to practice is a science of

reality [Wirklichkeitswissenschaft]. We seek to understand the originality of
the reality of the life that surrounds us and in which we are placed,
in order to identify on the one hand the current structure of the relationships and the meaning
culture of its various manifestations and on the other hand the reasons [171] which have
fact that historically it has developed in this form and not in another
[ ihres so-und-nicht-anders-Gewordenseins ] . However, as soon as we seek to take
be aware of how life immediately presents itself to us, we
Page 126
note that it manifests itself "in" us and "outside" us by a diversity

absolutely infinite of coexistences and successions of events that appear
smell and disappear. Even when we consider in isolation a sin-
gular - for example a concrete act of exchange - the absolute infinity of this diversity
do not decrease in intensity at all, as soon as we seriously try to
describe in an exhaustive way its uniqueness in all of its individual elements
and all the more so as soon as we want to grasp its causal conditionality.
dirty. All reflexive knowledge [ denkende Erkenntnis ] of infinite reality by
a finite human mind is therefore based on the implicit presupposition that
boasts: only a limited fragment of reality can each time constitute the object of
apprehension [Erfassung] scientific and alone it is "essential", in the sense that it
deserves to be known. According to what principles the selection of this fragment is operated.
We kept on believing that in the final analysis we could find the
decisive criterion, even in the cultural sciences, in legal repetition [ ge-
setzgemässige ] of certain causal connections. According to this conception the tale
nu of the "laws" that we can discern in the course of infinite diversity
phenomena should alone be regarded as "essential" from the point of view
scientist. Also, as soon as we have proven by the means of amplified induction
historical belief that the "legality" of a causal connection is valid without exception
or again as soon as one has established for intimate experience its immediate evidence-
intuitively, we admit that all similar cases, whatever their number,
are subordinate to the formula thus found. The portion of individual reality
which each time resists the selection of the legal becomes then either a residue which
has not yet been scientifically developed, but will need to be integrated into the system
laws as it is perfected, or else the "accidental"
which for this reason is negligible as having no importance of the point
from a scientific point of view, precisely because it remains "legally unintelligible" and
does not therefore enter into the "type" of the process, so that it cannot be
that the object of an "idle curiosity".
Constantly reappears as a result - even among school representatives

historical [172] - the opinion according to which the ideal towards which tends or could
extend all knowledge, including cultural sciences, even if
it would be in the distant future, would consist of a system of propositions
from which one could "deduce" reality. We know that one of the masters of
natural sciences even believed they could characterize the ideal goal (practically
impracticable) of such an elaboration of cultural reality as a knowledge
“astronomical” session of the phenomena of life. Although these questions have
already been the subject of much discussion, we will not spare ourselves the trouble of
to reconsider them in our turn. First of all it is obvious that knowledge
"Astronomical" which we think of in this case is by no means a knowledge.
passing of laws; on the contrary, it borrows from other disciplines, from mechanics by
example, the "laws" she uses as presuppositions of her own work.
As for astronomy, it is interested in the following question: what is the singular effect
link that the action of these laws produces on a singular constellation , because this
Page 127
are these singular constellations that are important to us? Each

of these singular constellations that she "explains" to us or that she foresees is not
obviously allows causal explanation that as a consequence of an additional
also a singular antecedent constellation. And, as far as we are
possible to go back into the gray haze of the most distant past, the reality in
which these laws apply remains also singular and just as refractory to
a deduction from laws. A cosmic "original state" [Urzustand] which does not
not of a singular character or which would be so to a lesser degree than the reality
cosmic world of the present world would obviously be a meaningless thought
[ sinnloser Gedanke ] . However, in our discipline, a remainder of analogous representations
Doesn't he haunt the assumptions concerning the "original states" of order?
economic and social, stripped of any historical "accident", which one infers
sometimes natural law, sometimes verified observations on "primitive peoples
tive "- for example the assumptions about" primitive agrarian communism
tif ”,“ sexual promiscuity ”, etc., from which the development
singular history by a sort of fall into the concrete [ Sündenfall ins Kon-
krete ]?
The starting point of our interest in the social sciences is undue.

bitingly the real, and therefore singular , configuration of cultural and social life
that surrounds us, when we want to grasp it in its universal texture,
which is nonetheless singularly shaped, and in its development through
other [173] social conditions of civilization which, of course, are also
element of a singular nature. It is clear that we too are in front
the situation we have just commented on about astronomy by taking it
as a borderline case (a process that logicians also choose to be regular)
for the same purpose), and even in a specifically more accentuated proportion.
killed. If for astronomy, celestial bodies are not taken into account for
our curiosity that by their only quantitative relations capable of being
to be sure, in social science on the contrary, it is the qualitative aspect of
events that matter to us. In addition, in the social sciences, we
we are dealing with the intervention of mental phenomena that must be "understood
dre ”by reviviscence [nacherlebend]. And this last stain is specifically
different from that which formulas of exact knowledge of nature can
or in general want to resolve. However, these differences are not also
so categorical that it seems at first glance. Natural sciences - abstraction
made of pure mechanics - nor can they do without the notion of
quality; in addition, we meet in our own special area an opinion
- it is true erroneous - depending on which at least the phenomenon, fundamental for
our civilization, financial trafficking would be quantifiable and would be left for this
reason to grasp in the form of "laws" ( 14); finally, it would depend on the definition
more or less broad of the very concept of "law", that it is also possible to include
regularities which. are not susceptible of a numerical expression, because
not quantifiable. As regards more particularly the intervention of mo-
of a "mental" nature, it would not in any case exclude the possibility of establishing
Page 128
rules of rational action. But above all we. meet an opinion not yet
completely disappeared nowadays which gives the task to psychology to play
in the sphere of the various "sciences of the mind" a role comparable to that of
mathematics in the natural sciences ( 15). She would have to break down the
complex phenomena of social life in their psychic conditions and effects
ques, to then reduce these as much as possible to psychic factors
simple, finally to classify these in their turn by genre and to examine their relationships
functional. In this way we could elaborate, if not a "mechanics", of the
less a "chemistry" of the psychic foundations of social life. He does not call us
the question of the possible value of this kind of
research and - what is different - that of the usefulness of their partial results for
cultural sciences. All this does not matter to the question
of the possibility of achieving the goal of social-economic science, such as we
mean it here, namely: knowledge of cultural significance and relationships
causal ports of concrete reality , through research on what
is repeated according to laws.
Suppose that by the channel of psychology or by any other means one can
get one day to analyze up to any simple and ultimate factors always
are the causal connections of human coexistence, as well as those that we have
already observed than those which it will be possible to establish again in the future.
nir, and that we manage to comprehensively apprehend them in a formidable
casuistry of concepts and rules having the rigorous validity of laws, - that if-
would generate such a result for the knowledge of the world of culture given historical
rically or even for that of any particular phenomenon, for
example of the development and cultural significance of capitalism?
As a means of knowledge it signifies neither more nor less than what
encyclopedia of combinations of organic chemistry means to know it-
biogenetic session of the world of flora and fauna. In a case as in
the other one will have accomplished a preparatory work which is certainly important and useful.
But no more in one case than in the other one could never deduce from these
"Laws" and "factors" the reality of life. Not because it would subsist in the
vital phenomena of possible higher and mysterious "forces" (such as
"Dominant", the "entelechia" and other forces of this kind) - moreover he
this is a question for itself - but quite simply because, in the
knowledge of reality, all that matters to us is the constellation in which these
"Factors" (hypothetical) are found grouped into a historical cultural phenomenon.
materially significant to us; then because, if we want to "explain
causally ”this singular grouping, we would be obliged to go back without
ceases to other equally singular groupings from which we
laugh to "explain" them, obviously using these (hypothetical) concepts
called "laws".
Establishing these (hypothetical) "laws" and "factors" would not constitute

never was the first of the many operations to which the
Page 129
knowledge that we are striving to achieve. The methodical analysis and presentation
that of the singular grouping of these "factors" given each time historically -
ment, as well as their concrete combination, significant in its own way, which
[175], and above all the effort to make Verständlichmachung intelligible ]
the basis and nature of this meaning would constitute the second opera-
tion, which, however, cannot be achieved without the help of the
previous preparatory work, although in relation to him it is a task
completely new and independent. The third operation would consist in re-
go as far into the past as possible to see how
weighs the various singular characteristics of the groups which are significant
tifs for the present world and to give a historical explanation from
these previous constellations also singular. Finally it is possible to
design a fourth operation that would focus on the assessment of constellations
possible in the future.
For all these purposes, the availability of clear concepts and the knowledge of
these (hypothetical) "laws" would obviously be of great advantage as
heuristic means , but only as such. For this purpose they are even everything
simply essential. However, even reduced to this function, we can
immediately see at a decisive point the limits of their scope, and this observation
tation leads us to examine the determining peculiarity of the method in
cultural sciences. We have called "cultural sciences" the disciplines
plines who strive to understand the cultural significance of the phenomena of
life. The meaning of the structure of a cultural phenomenon and the basis of
this meaning cannot be drawn from any system of laws, however perfect,
nor do they find their justification or their intelligibility in it, for they presuppose
posit the relation of cultural phenomena to ideas of value [ Beziehung auf
Wertideen ] . The concept of culture is a concept of value. The empirical reality
is culture in our eyes because and as long as we relate it to ideas of va-
their (16 ), it embraces the elements of reality andexclusivelythis sort
elements that acquire a meaning for us through this relation to values.
A tinyby
color part
ourofinterest
the singular realityby
determined that we examine
these each time
ideas of value, onlyisthis
leftpart ac-
that has a meaning for us and it has one because it reveals
tions which are important [wichtig] as a result of their connection with ideas of
value. So it is because and as long as it is so that it is worth being
known in its singularity [ individual Eigenart ] . We could never deduce
of a study without presuppositions [ voraussetzungslos ] of the empirical given which
takes on meaning in our eyes. On the contrary [176] the finding of this
meaning is the presupposition that something becomes an object of the
vestigation. Of course the significant as such does not coincide with any law
as such, and this all the less as the validity of the law in question is
general. Indeed, the meaning that a fragment of reality has for us is not
obviously not consist in the relations which are common to it as much as possible.
sible with many other elements. The relation of reality to ideas of va-
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which give it meaning as well as the process of

highlight and order the elements of reality colored by this relation under the an-
of their cultural significance are completely different points of view and
distinct from the analysis of reality made with a view to discovering laws and order
give under general concepts. These two kinds of thought methods
ordering the real have no logically necessary relations between them.
res. Where appropriate they may coincide in a particular case, but the
consequences will be most disastrous if this accidental coincidence
abuse of their heterogeneity in principle.
The cultural significance of a phenomenon, for example that of exchange

monetary, may consist in the fact that it is presented as a phenomenon of
mass, which is also one of the fundamental elements of civilization
modern. But then the historical fact that he plays this role becomes precisely what he
must understand from the point of view of its cultural significance and explain causa-
especially from the point of view of its historical formation. Research on the es-
general essence of trade and trade traffic technique is a work
Preliminary - extremely important and indispensable ( 17). However, all of this
does not yet give us an answer to the question: how is the exchange
historically achieved the fundamental meaning it has today? - neither
especially to this other which matters to us in the final analysis: what is the significance
tion of financial economics for culture? Because it's only because of her
that we are interested in the description of the technique of the exchange, in the same way
that it is because of it that there is today a science which deals with this
technical. In any case, it does not derive from any of these kinds of "laws". The ca-
generic characters of exchange, purchase, etc., are of interest to the lawyer, but what
important to us economists is the analysis of the cultural significance of
historical situation which means that exchange is nowadays a phenomenon of
mass. When we have to explain this fact, when we want to understand
[177] which for example differentiates our economic and social civilization from
that of Antiquity, where the exchange presented exactly the same general characteristics.
that today, in short, when we want to know what the si-
gnification of the "financial economy", then a research is introduced into a
number of logical principles of radically heterogeneous origin. Us-
the concepts that the search for the generic elements of the eco-phenomena
nomic mass brings us as a means of description, to further
as long as they contain significant elements for our civilization. However,
when we have identified even with all possible precision these concepts and
these laws, we will not only not yet have achieved the goal of our work,
but the question of what should be the object of the formation of concepts
generics is not devoid of presupposition, for it has been precisely resolved
read according to the meaning that certain elements of the infinite diversity that
we call "trafficking" present for civilization. What we are looking at
to achieve is precisely the knowledge of a historical phenomenon, that is
say significant in its singularity. The decisive point in all of this is that the idea
Page 131
of a knowledge of singular phenomena generally has a logical meaning only

if we admit the presupposition that only a finite part of the in-
finite phenomena has a meaning. Even if we had the
as complete knowledge as possible of the totality of the "laws" of becoming, we
would be at a loss when faced with the question: how can a causal explanation of a
singular fact possible in general? - since even the description
of the smallest fragment of reality can never be fully thought out.
tive. The number and nature of the causes which determined a singular event
are always infinite and in things themselves there is no species
of criteria which would make it possible to select a fraction of them as before
only enter into account.
The test of a knowledge of reality devoid of all presupposition

would lead to nothing but a chaos of "existential judgments" [ Existenzia-
lurteile ] dealing with countless particular perceptions. Even this result does not
would be possible that in appearance, because the reality of each particular perception
always presents, if we examine it more closely, an infinite multitude of elements
singulars which cannot be expressed exhaustively in the judgments
elements of perception. Put order in this chaos only [178] the sole fact that,
in each case only a portion of the singular reality is of interest
and significance to us, because only this portion relates to
the ideas of cultural value with which we approach concrete reality.
These are just some aspects of the ever-infinite diversity of phenomena
singular, to know those to whom we give a general meaning to
culture, which are therefore worth knowing [wis senswert ] ; alone also they
are the object of the causal explanation, The latter in turn manifests the same
character: not only is it practically impossible to do a regression
causal comprehensive from any phenomenon in concrete for the capture
its full reality, but this attempt is quite simply nonsense [ Un-
ding ] . We only bring out the causes to which we can attribute
in the particular case, the “essential” elements of a future. As soon as it comes to
the individuality of a phenomenon, the problem of causality does not concern
laws, but on concrete causal connections ; the question is not to know
in what form must subsume the phenomenon to as exemplary, but
which constellation to impute it as a result. This is a question
imputation [ Zurechnungsfrage ]] . Wherever it comes to causal explanation
of a "cultural phenomenon" - or even of a "historical individuality", according to
the expression already used on occasion in the methodology of our discipline
and which is currently becoming common in logic with a more precise formulation
- knowledge of the laws of causality cannot be the goal, but only the
means of research. It facilitates and makes possible the causal attribution of elements.
of phenomena, important for culture by their singularity, to their
concrete causes. It is to the extent and only to the extent that it makes
this service that it is invaluable for the knowledge of singular sets. More
the laws are "general", that is to say abstract, the less they can satisfy
Page 132
the requirements of causal attribution of singular phenomena and, indirectly

ment, to understanding the meaning of cultural events.
What are the consequences of all this? Not obviously that the
knowledge of the general, the formation of abstract generic concepts, the
knowledge of regularities [179] and the attempt to formulate order relations
"Legal" would not be scientifically legitimate in the sphere of science.
Culture. On the contrary ! If the historian's causal knowledge consists of a
attribution of concrete consequences to concrete causes, it is not, in general,
not possible to make a valid imputation of a singular consequence which
conch without the help of "nomological" knowledge, that is to say without
knowledge of regularities of causal connections. To know if in reality
it is necessary to attribute in concreto to an individual and singular element of a connection
causal importance concerning the result, the causal explanation of which is in
cause, the only way to determine it in case of doubt is the evaluation of the actions that
we are used to expecting in general from this element and all the others of the
same complex which are taken into account in the explanation; these actions
are then the “adequate” effects of the causative elements in question. As to know
to what extent the historian (in the broadest sense of the word) can perform with
certainty this imputation with the help of his imagination nourished by his experience
personal experience of life and methodically educated and to what extent it
is dependent on the help of certain special sciences which facilitate its work,
this is a question which varies with each particular case. Everywhere however, and
also in the sphere of the complex phenomena of the economy, the certainty of
putation is all the greater as our general knowledge is more assured
and complete. The fact that in these cases, all the "so-called economic laws" being there
understood without exception, it is never a question of "legal" relations in the narrow sense.
exact sciences of nature, but of causal connections suitable express
established in rules, therefore of the application of the category of "objective possibility
tive ”(which we do not have to analyze further here), does not diminish in any way
the value of our assertion (18 ). This is because the establishment of these regularities is
not the goal, but a means of knowledge. As to whether this makes sense of
to put into the form of a "law" a familiar regularity of causal connections ob-
served in everyday life, it is a question of expediency in each case
particular. For the exact sciences of nature the laws are all the more -
important and valuable that they have a more general validity, while for
knowledge of the concrete conditions of historical phenomena the most
more general are regularly those which have the least [180] value, because
that they are the most empty in content [inhaltleersten]. Indeed, the greater the validity,
that is to say the extension, of a generic concept is broad, the more it also distances us
of the richness of reality, since, in order to embrace what there is in common
as many phenomena as possible, it must be as abstract as possible,
therefore poor in content. In the cultural sciences, knowledge of the general
ral never has a price for itself.
Page 133
The conclusion arising from these explanations is as follows: an “objective” study

tive ”of cultural events, in the sense that the ideal goal of scientific work
should consist of a reduction of empirical reality to laws, has no
meaning. It does not have any, not for the reason, frequently invoked, that
cultural events or, if you will, mental phenomena take place-
would "objectively" to a lesser degree according to legality, but because
1) knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality

cial, but only one of the many means that thought uses for this purpose, and
than
2) it is not possible to conceive of knowledge of cultural events

real other than being based on the meaning that the reality of life, always
days structured in a singular way, has in our eyes in certain relations
singular.
No law tells us in what sense and under what conditions it is

if, since this is decided by virtue of the ideas of value under which we consider
each time we derive "culture" in particular cases. "Culture" is, from
human point of view , a finite segment invested by the. thought of a meaning
and of importance in the midst of an infinite global future that is foreign to any significant
tion. It remains even that for those who oppose an implacable enemy to a
concrete civilization and advocates the "return to nature". Indeed it is not him
possible to adopt such an attitude that by bringing back this concrete civilization
to his own ideas of value which make him find it "futile". It is this condition
purely logical and formal that we are aiming for, when we say that all
historical individualities are anchored in a way that is logically necessary to
"Ideas of value". The transcendental presupposition of any science of
culture does not consist in finding a price in a particular civilization or in the
in general, but in the fact that we are civilized, gifted
of the faculty and the will to take a conscious position in front of the world and
to give it a meaning. Whatever that meaning may be, it will cause us to wear
[181] during the life on this basis of the judgments on certain phenomena of
human coexistence, to take a significant position towards them (positive
or negative). Whatever the content of this position, these phenomena
have cultural significance in our eyes, and it is only on this significance
tion based on their scientific interest. When throughout these pages we speak
lons, with reference to the use of modern logicians, of the conditionality of
cultural knowledge through valuable ideas , it is to be hoped that these words will not
will not be exposed to misunderstandings as crass as those of public opinion which
believes that cultural significance should be given only to purely
honorable. Prostitution is a cultural phenomenon as well as religion
or money, and all three are for reason and only for reason and
only as their existence and the form they historically take
directly or indirectly affect our cultural interests , whether they arouse our
Page 134
be intellectual curiosity from points of view that proceed from ideas of va-
theirs, which give meaning to the segment of reality understood under
these concepts.
It follows that any knowledge of cultural reality is always a

knowledge from specifically particular points of view [ besonderen ] .
When we require the historian or social scientist to pre-
basic assumption that he knows how to distinguish between the essential and the second
and that he possesses the points of view necessary to make this distinction
tion, that simply means that he must understand himself to relate - consciously
mentally or not - the elements of reality to "universal values of civilization"
tion ”and choose accordingly the connections that are of significance to us.
tion. And if the opinion constantly resurfaces asserting that these points of view are left
would 'draw from the material itself', this only comes from the naive illusion of knowledge.
who does not realize that from the start, by virtue of the ideas of
them with which he unconsciously approached his subject, he cut a seg-
infinitely tiny in absolute infinity to make it the object of the examination which alone
imported. About the selection, which we operate everywhere and always consciously
or unconsciously, of certain special and particular "aspects" of becoming, he
Yet another conception reigns in the work of the cultural sciences which is
at the base of the often heard assertion, according to which the element "person-
nel ”[182] would be the only really precious thing in a scientific work,
that any work, alongside other merits, should also express a "personality
tee ”. Assuredly, without the valuable ideas of the scientist, there can be no
material selection principle or any judicious knowledge of the singular real.
bind, just as without the scholar's belief in the meaning of any
cultural content, work on knowledge of the singular reality will not
it just makes more sense. Thus, the orientation of his personal conviction
and the refraction of values in the mirror of his soul give direction
at his work. The values to which scientific genius relates the objects of
research will be able to determine the "conception" that one will have of a whole period of time.
that, that is to say, they will be able to be decisive not only for what in the
phenomena are considered to be "remarkable", but still significant or insignificant.
trusting, "important" and "secondary".
Knowledge in the order of the science of culture as we understand it

gifts is therefore linked to "subjective" presuppositions, in so far as it is
only covers elements of reality that have any connection - if
indirect be it - with the events to which we attribute a meaning
cultural. Of course it remains, in spite of everything, a purely causal knowledge.
dirty, exactly in the same sense as the knowledge of singular events
and significant of nature which have a qualitative character. Besides the various kinds
confusion that the interference of legal-formal thought has caused in the
sphere of cultural sciences, he has recently introduced, among others, a
attempt to refute the principle of the "materialist conception of history" by
Page 135
a series of ingenious fallacies. It is explained that, as long as eco-friendly life
nomic should take place in legally regulated and agreed forms.
tionally, any economic "development" should take the form of
aspirations tending to create new legal forms, that as a consequence
it can only be understood on the basis of moral maxims and would therefore be
a different reason in essence from any 'natural development' (19 ). Know her-
economic development would therefore have a "teleological" character.
Without wishing to discuss here the meaning of the equivocal concept of
pement ”in the social sciences nor the equally equivocal
logical point of view of "teleological", one can however show here [183] that
the economy is not necessarily "teleological" in the sense presupposed by this
way of seeing. Even in the case of total formal identity of legal norms
ques in use, the cultural significance of normativized legal relations
as well as that of the standards themselves can change fundamentally.
Let us say that we want to immerse ourselves utopically in dreams of the future; we for-
could conceive, for example, as theoretically completed the "socialization of
means of production ”without any of the“ aspirations ”aimed consciously at
this result never manifested itself and without removing any paragraph from
our legislation or add a new one. On the other hand, the statistical frequency of
various legally normativized relations would undoubtedly undergo
radicalities and in many cases it would even be reduced to zero a
a large part of legal norms losing practically all meaning and
their significance for the culture changing to become unrecognizable. The
'materialist' conception of history could therefore rightly eliminate the dis-
cussions de lege ferenda, since his central point of view rightly affirmed the
inevitable transformation of the meaning of legal institutions. The one to whom
the modest work of the causal understanding of historical reality appears
as a subordinate, only has to do without it, but it is impossible to substitute
no kind of "teleology". As for us, we call the represen-
tation of a result which becomes the cause of an action [ Handlung ] . And we take it
considered as any cause that contributes or may
contribute to a significant result. Its specific meaning is based on unique-
lies about the fact that we can and not only want to see the activity
[ Handeln ] human, but also understand it.
There is no doubt that ideas of value are "subjective" (20 ). Between the in-
"historical" interest that we find in a family chronicle and that which we
let us bring to the development of the greatest possible phenomena which were
during long periods common to a nation or to humanity. and are in-
core, there is an endless scale of "meanings" whose rungs will have
another order for each of us. This order varies historically with the character
era of civilization and of thought which dominates men. It does not follow obviously
do not deny that research in the field of sciences of the [184], culture
could only lead to results which would be "subjective", in the sense that they were
would apply to one and not to the other. What varies is rather the degree of in-
Page 136
interest they have for one and not for the other. In other words: what becomes
object of research as well as the limits of this research within the infinity of
causal connections,
that determine them.these arethe
As for thehow
ideas ofWie],
[im valuethat
dominating
is to say the scientist
as to and an epoch
the method
of research, it is the dominant "point of view" which - as we shall see
again - constitutes the determining element for the construction of auxiliary concepts.
liaires that we use; regarding how to use the concepts the scholar
is obviously here, as everywhere else, linked to the norms of our thought. In
effect, is scientific truth only that which claims to be valid for all those who
want the truth.
There is a conclusion to be drawn from all these explanations: it is absurd to believe,

following the conception that sometimes reigns even among historians of our specialist
lity, that the goal, however remote, of the cultural sciences could consist of
develop a closed system of concepts that somehow condenses
reality in a definitive articulation [Gliederung], from which we can-
would deduct it again after the fact. The stream of immeasurable becoming is flowing
without stopping towards eternity. Endlessly, cultural problems are always formed.
new and otherwise colorful which keep agitating humans so that,
remains floating the sphere of all that, in the unshakably infinite flow of
singular, acquires meaning and importance for us and becomes an "individual
historical duality ”. Also vary the intellectual relations under which
we consider them and we understand them scientifically. The starting points of science
culture will therefore remain variable in the indefinite future, also
long that a kind of Chinese stupor of the life of the spirit does not come to
bituate men to ask questions of life as inexhaustible as ever. One
system of cultural sciences which would even systematically fix,
definitively and in an objectively valid manner the questions and
what they would be called upon to deal with would be absurd in itself. Such a
attempt can never result in more than a juxtaposition of several points of
view, specifically particular, often heterogeneous among themselves and disparate in
many regards, in which reality [185] has been and always remains for us
of "culture", that is to say, significant in its singularity.
After these long discussions we are finally able to tackle the

question which interests us from a methodological point of view about the re-
flexion on the "objectivity" of knowledge in the cultural sciences:
what is the logical function and the structure of the concepts with which our dis-
cipline works like any other science? And more especially, if we hold
account of the decisive problem: what is the significance of the theory and the
Theoretical construction of concepts for the knowledge of cultural reality?
Political economy - as we have already seen - was originally, at least

according to the center of gravity of its discussions, a "technique", that is to say it
considered the phenomena of reality from a practical point of view of value
Page 137
[ Wertgesichtspunkt ] stable and at least apparently unambiguous [eindeutig]: this-

him of the increase in the "wealth" of the population of a state. On another side,
from the start, it was not only a "technique", because it was found
embodied in the powerful unity of eighteenth-century worldview,
rationalist and oriented according to natural law. However the special nature of
this view of the world, with its optimistic faith in the possibility of rationalizing
theoretically and practically the real, had an essential consequence: it
acted as an obstacle to the awareness of the problematic nature of the
view that it presupposed as obvious. And like the rational study of reality
social science arose in close connection with the modern development of
nature, she remained close to them with regard to the whole of her ma-
deny considering things. However, in the natural sciences the point of view
valuable practice concerning what is directly technically useful has been,
from the start, closely linked to the hope inherited from antiquity and developed since,
that it would be possible to achieve, by means of generalizing abstraction [ genera-
lisierende Abstraktion ] and the analysis of empirical relations oriented
legal, to a purely "objective" knowledge, which means here, detached
of any value, and at the same time absolutely rational, which means a
monistic knowledge of all reality and free of all "contingency"
singular, under the aspect of a system of concepts having a metaphysical validity.
that and a mathematical form .
Scientific disciplines linked to this kind of axiological point of view,

such as clinical medicine and even more so what is usually called [186]
“technology”, became pure practical “arts”. The values they
had to serve, the health of the patient, on the one hand, and technical improvement
one production process, for example, on the other, have become unwavering
for each of them. The means to which they had recourse consisted and did not
could consist only in the application of concepts of a legal character
green by theoretical disciplines. Any progress in principle in the establishment
of laws was or could therefore bring about an advance in practical discipline.
When the ends remain immutable, the progressive reduction of the various questions
practical considerations (a case of illness or a technical problem) to validating laws
general as special cases, therefore the extension of knowledge
theoretical, is directly related and identical to the expansion of technical possibilities
nics and practices. The day when modern biology succeeds in also putting away the
elements of reality that interest us historically (by the fact that they are
unfolded one way and not another) under the concept of a principle of development
development of general validity, making it possible to order, at least apparently -
but not in reality - all that was essential in these objects in a diagram of
laws of general validity, the twilight of the gods [G ötterdämmerung] of all
axiological points of view seemed to extend to all the sciences. Indeed, can-
that so-called historical becoming was also a compartment of total reality and
that the principle of causality, a condition of all scientific work, seemed to require
the reduction of all becoming to "laws" of general validity and since finally we
Page 138
was in the presence of the prodigious success of the natural sciences which made
this principle, it seemed that it would no longer be possible to give scientific work
tific another meaning than that of the discovery of the laws of becoming in general.
In short, only the "legal" aspect could constitute the essential scientific element of
not all phenomena and "individual events" could come into play.
only as "types", that is to say as illustrations of
laws. Focusing your curiosity on the elements that are unique for themselves, that's what
appeared to be of no "scientific interest".
It is impossible for us to follow here the considerable repercussions that this state
of spirit, full of confidence, naturalistic monism has had in the ecological disciplines
nomic. When socialist criticism and the work of historians began
by transforming the original axiological points of view into problems [187], the
prodigious development of biological research on the one hand, the influence of
Hegel's panlogism on the other hand prevented political economy from recognizing
with precision in all its extent the relationship between concept and reality. For
as much as it interests us here, the result is that, despite the powerful dam
that German idealist philosophy since Fichte, the work of the historical school
German Law and Labor of the Historical German School of Political Economy
ticks have opposed the intrusion of naturalist dogmas, the fact remains,
partly because of these efforts, that the views of naturalism are not
still overcome at a number of decisive points. Among them it is necessary
cite in particular that of the relationship between "theoretical" work and "historical" work.
torique ”which is still problematic in our specialty.
Even today, the theoretical and "abstract" method continues to oppose

with a surly stiffness and apparently insurmountable to empirical research
that and history (21 ). She recognizes as entirely correct the impossibility
methodological method of replacing historical knowledge of reality with
mulation of "laws" or vice versa to achieve the establishment of "laws", in the sense
narrow term, by a simple juxtaposition of historical observations. For arri-
to establish some - because she remains convinced that this is indeed the supreme goal of
science - it starts from the fact that, without stopping, we make directly ourselves
the experience [ erleben ] of relations of human activity in their reality, so
that, she thinks, we can make their unfolding immediately intelligible-
ment with axiomatic evidence and express reality through "laws". The uni
that exact form of knowledge, to. know the formulation of immediate laws-
mentally and intuitively obvious, would at the same time be the only one that allows us to
it is a matter of reasoning about events that are not immediately observable. Also the
construction of a system of abstract propositions and therefore purely formal
the, By analogy with those of the natural sciences, would it be, at least in this
which concerns the fundamental phenomena of economic life, the unique
means of intellectually dominating social diversity. Although the creator of
this theory was the first and the only one to establish a methodological distinction of
principle between legal knowledge and historical knowledge, he did not claim
Page 139
not less for the propositions of the abstract theory [188] an empirical validity
that in the sense of a possibility of deducing reality from these "laws" ( 22). Cer-
tes, he did not understand it in the sense of the empirical validity of the only propositions
abstracts of the economy for themselves, but to the one where, once we have
constructs the "exact" theories corresponding to each of the other elements that
come into play, the sum of all these theories should contain the
true reality of things - which means all that is worth knowing
in reality. The exact theory of economics would establish the influence of a pattern
psychological, while other theories would have the task of developing
in a similar way all the other patterns in a set of pro-
hypothetical validity positions. Regarding the result of the theoretical work, it is
that is to say about the abstract theories of prices, interest, rents, etc. , this
conception pretended here and there in a fanciful way that it would be possible,
following a supposed analogy with the propositions of physics, to use them
bend to deduce from real given premises the determined quanti-
tally - thus laws in the strictest sense of the term - which would have a valid
for the concrete reality of life, given that, if the ends are given, the eco-
human name would be determined unequivocally in relation to the means.
No attention was paid to the fact that, in order to achieve this result, even in the case of
the simplest, it would first be necessary to posit as "given" and presuppose
as known the totality of historical reality, including all connections
causal, and that, if ever the finite human mind was able to access this kind
of knowledge, we would no longer see what the epistemological value would still be
of an abstract theory.
The naturalistic prejudice according to which it would be necessary to elaborate within these
concepts something which would be close to the natural sciences has precisely
leads to a false understanding of the meaning of these theoretical thought charts
[ theoretische Gedankengebilde ] . It was believed that it was a question of psychologically isolating
only a specific tendency in man, that of the instinct of acquisition, or
to observe in isolation a specific maxim of human activity, that of
economic principle. The abstract theory believed that it could be based on axio-
my psychological; the consequence was that historians called for a
empirical psychology to prove the invalidity of these axioms and [189] refu-
to provide psychology with any action on the course of economic events. We
do not intend to make in this place a detailed criticism of the significance
tion of a systematic science of "social psychology" - which still remains to be
constitute - as a possible foundation of cultural and special sciences -
ment of the social economy. The sometimes brilliant essays of psycho-interpretations
logic of the economic phenomena of which we are aware until
present show in any case one thing, it is that one does not make progress by going
from the psychological analysis of human qualities to that of social institutions
them, but that on the contrary the clarification of the conditions and the psychological
ques of institutions presupposes the perfect knowledge of the latter and the analysis
scientific lysis of their relationships. Psychological analysis then means everything
Page 140
simply an extremely interesting deepening, in each case

concrete, knowledge of their historical conditionality and their significance
cultural tion . What interests us in the conduct of a man within the
social relations is specifically particularized in each case according to the si-
specific cultural gnification of the relationship in question. It is about mo-
extremely heterogeneous and very heterogeneous psychic influences and
extremely concrete position. Research in social psychology means
that the various particular kinds of elements of
culture, disparate between them in many respects, with a view to testing their
city of interpretation for the use of our understanding by reviviscence. Starting
knowledge of particular institutions, this research will help us to
intellectually understand to a greater extent their conditionality and
their cultural significance, but never to deduce these institutions from psycho-
logical or to explain them on the basis of elementary psychological phenomena.
This is why the controversy that has agitated many circles about the
question of the psychological legitimacy of theoretical and abstract constructions,
as well as the scope of the "acquisition instinct" and the "economic principle",
etc., was hardly fruitful.
It is only in appearance that it is a question in the constructions of the abs-

deals with "deductions" from basic psychological motives; in reality
ty we find ourselves rather in the presence of the special case of a form [190l of the
construction of concepts [Begriffsbildung] specific to the sciences of human culture.
maine, and which in a certain sense is inevitable. It is worth characterizing it here
with more details, since we will be able to take a closer look at the question
logic of the meaning of theory in the social sciences. We will leave
pending once and for all the question of whether the theoretical constructions
which we will use as examples or to which we will allude in response
tooth, as such, for the purpose for which they are intended, in short if they have been formed
practically appropriately. As to the question of how far
should extend the current 'abstract theory', it is ultimately also a question.
the economics of scientific labor, which includes many other
problems. The theory of marginal utility [ Grenznutztheorie ] is also subordinate to
given to the law of "marginalism".
The abstract theory of economics offers us just one example of these

synthesis which is usually designated by "ideas" [ Ideen ] of the phenomena.
historical nes. It presents us, in fact, an ideal table [ Idealbild ] of events.
events that take place in the goods market, in the case of an organized company
according to the principle of exchange, free competition and a strictly
rational. This thought board [ Gedankenbild ] brings together relationships and events
determinate events of historical life in a non-contradictory cosmos of rela-
tions thoughts. By its content, this construction has the character of a utopia that
one obtains by accentuating by the thought [ gedankliche Steigerung ] elements
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determined from reality ( 23). Its relation to empirically given facts

consists simply of this: where it is observed or suspected that relations,
of the kind that are presented abstractly in the aforementioned construction,
in this case those events which depend on the "market", have had to a degree
any action in reality, we can represent to ourselves pragmatic
cally, in an intuitive and understandable way, the particular nature of these
tions according to an idealtype [ Idealtypus ] . This possibility can be invaluable, even
indispensable, for research as well as for the presentation of the facts. In what
concerns research, the idealtypical concept proposes to form the judgment
imputation: it is not itself a "hypothesis", but it seeks to guide
development of hypotheses. On the other hand, it is not an exposition of reality, but
proposes to provide the presentation with unambiguous means of expression. So it is the "idea"
of the modern organization [191], historically given, of society in an eco-
name of the exchange, this idea being allowed to develop for us exactly according to
the same logical principles as those which were used for example to build
that of the “urban economy” in the Middle Ages in the form of a genetic concept.
that [ genetischen Begriff ] . In the latter case, the concept of "economy
urban ”not by averaging the economic principles that have
actually existed in all the cities examined, but precisely in accordance with
destroying an idealtype. We obtain an idealtype by unilaterally emphasizing a
or several points of view and by linking a multitude of given phenomena
isolated, diffuse and discreet, which we find sometimes in large numbers, sometimes in small
tit number and in places not at all, ordered according to the previous points
views chosen unilaterally, to form a homogeneous picture of thought [ein-
heitlich]. We will nowhere empirically find such a table in its purest form.
conceptual tee: it is a utopia. The task of historical work will be to determine
undermine in each particular case how much reality approaches or deviates from this
ideal table, to what extent it is necessary to attribute, for example, in the conceptual sense,
the quality of an “urban economy” under the economic conditions of a determined city
mined. Applied with caution, this concept makes the specific service that we
waits in favor of research and clarity.
To analyze another example, we can draw [ zeichnen ] exactly from the

in the same way in the form of utopia the "idea" of "craftsmanship" by assembling certain
certain traits that exist in a diffuse way in certain historical trades
countries and countries, unilaterally accentuating their consequences
in an ideal table that is not contradictory in itself and by relating it to a formula
of thought that expresses it. We can also try to draw a society in
which all branches of economic activity and even intellectual activity
are governed by maxims which appear to apply the same principle
than that which is characteristic of "craftsmanship" elevated to the rank of ideal type. We
can in addition oppose by antithesis this idealtype of craftsmanship to an idealtype cor-
responding to the capitalist conception of industry, the latter being built on
the basis of the abstraction of certain features of large modern industry, and under this
report trying to draw the utopia of a 'capitalist' civilization, that is to say
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of a civilization dominated [192] solely by the interests of investment

private capital. It would consist in accentuating certain features given in a different way.
fuse into modern civilized life, material and spiritual, to assemble them in
a table, non-contradictory ideal, to the effect of our investigation. This painting
would then constitute the drawing [Zeichnung] of an "idea" of capitalized civilization.
list, without our having to ask ourselves here if we can and how we can
develop it. It is possible, or rather we must take it for granted that it is possible.
ble to sketch several and certainly even a very large number of utopias of this
such that no only resemble each other and, more reason, which no will
would never allow observing in empirical reality in the form of a real order-
in force in a company, but each of which can claim to represent
the "idea" of capitalist civilization and of which each can even have the pretension
tion, insofar as it actually selected in reality certain
significant characteristics by their peculiarity of our civilization, of
unite in a homogeneous ideal table (24 ). Indeed, the phenomena that interest us
feels as cultural events generally derive their interest - their
cultural significance - ideas of extremely diverse value to which
we can relate them. Just as there is an extreme variety of "points
of view ”under which we can consider these phenomena as signifi-
catifs, the most varied principles can also be used for selection.
determine the relationships likely to enter into the ideal type of a given culture.
What now does the meaning of these idealtypical concepts consist of?
for an empirical science such as we propose to practice it?
In advance we would like to insist on the need to rigorously separate the
thought boards we're dealing with here, which are "ideal" in a sense
purely logical, from the notion of must-be or "model". It is not, in
effect, that of constructions of relations which are sufficiently justified with regard to
of our imagination, therefore "objectively possible", and which seem adequate
your to our nomological knowledge.
Anyone who is convinced that knowledge of historical reality should
or could be a copy [ Abbildung ] "without presupposition" of "objective" facts.
tifs ”, deny any value to these constructions. And even the one who recognized that
level of reality [193] nothing is devoid of presuppositions in the logical sense
and that the simplest extract of an act or document cannot scientifically have
meaning only in relation to "significations" and therefore in the final analysis by
a relation to ideas of value, will nevertheless be inclined to look at the construction
of any kind of historical "utopia" as a means of illustration
dangerous with regard to the objectivity of scientific work and more often still
like a simple game. In fact, we can never decide a priori if it is a
pure play of thought or a construction of concepts fruitful for science.
Here too there is no other criterion than that of efficiency for the knowledge of
relations between the concrete phenomena of culture, for that of their
causal tionality and their meaning. Therefore, the construction of ideal
Page 143
abstract types are not taken into account as a goal, but only
as a means of knowledge. Any careful examination of the elements
concepts of a historical exposition shows that the historian, as soon as he seeks to
rise above the mere observation of concrete relationships to determine
the cultural significance of a singular event, however simple it may be, therefore for the
"Characterize", works and must work with concepts which, in general, are not
let it be specified in a rigorous and unambiguous way only in the form of idealypes.
Indeed, how can the content of concepts such as those

of "individualism", of "imperialism", of "feudalism", of "mercantilism",
of "conventional" and other innumerable conceptual constructions of this
kind that we use to try to dominate reality through thought and
comprehension ? Is it by the description "without presupposition" of some-
conque concrete manifestation isolated or on the contrary by the abstrac-
tive [ abstrahierende Zusammenfassung ] of what is common to several phenomena
concrete names? The language of the historian contains hundreds of words com-
bearing similar tables of thought, but imprecise because chosen for
the needs of expression in the current vocabulary not developed by the re-
flexion, the significance of which is however concretely experienced, without their
be thought out clearly. In a very large number of cases, especially in history
narrative policy, the vagueness of the content of concepts in no way harms the
clarity of presentation. It suffices then that we feel in particular cases what
the historian thought he saw, or we can be satisfied with what a partial precision
culière conceptually important content on a particular case [194]
presents itself to the mind as having been thought. However, in case it is necessary to take
clearly aware in a more rigorous way of the significance of a phenomenon
cultural leads, the need to operate with clear concepts, specified not only
under one, but in all particular aspects, becomes more compelling. It is evident
absurdly to want to give these syntheses of historical thought a
"Definition according to the diagram: g enus proximum et differentia specifica (25 ) we have
than to test it. This last way of establishing the meaning of words
is only found in dogmatic disciplines which use the syllogism.
It never proceeds, or only illusorously, to the simple "decomposition
descriptive "[schildernde Auflösung ] of these concepts in their elements, because, this
what matters in this case is to know which of these elements are
should be
genetic considered
definition essential.
of the contentWhen we propose
of a concept, theretoremains
give a no other form than that
of the idealype, in the sense indicated above. The ideal type is a table of thought, it
is not the historical reality nor especially the "authentic" reality, it still serves
less of a schema in which one could order reality as an example.
It has no other meaning than a purely ideal limit concept [ Grenzbegriff ],
which we measure [messen] reality in order to clarify the empirical content of certain
some of its important elements, and with which it is compared. These concepts are
images [ Gebilde ] in which we build relationships, using
Page 144
the category of objective possibility, which our imaginations formed and oriented
according to reality judges as adequate.
In this function, the ideal type is in particular an attempt to grasp the indicators.
historical vidualities or their different elements in genetic concepts .
Take, for example, the notions of "Church" and "sect". They let themselves be ana-
lyse by means of pure classification into a complex of characteristics, by
what not only the border between the two concepts, but also their content,
will always remain indistinct. On the other hand, if I propose to capture genetically
the concept of "sect". that is, if I conceive it relatively to certain signi
important cultural fications that the "cult spirit" has manifested in
modern civilization, then certain precise characteristics of both
of these two concepts will become essential because they have a relation-
causal tion adequate in relation to their significant action. In this case the
concepts at the same time take the form of idealypes, which means that they do not
not manifest [195] or only sporadically in their conceptual purity.
tuelle. Here as elsewhere, any concept which is not purely classifier we
moves away from reality. The discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e. the
fact that we only apprehend reality through a chain of transformations
in the order of representation, postulates this sort of shorthand of concepts
[ Begriffsstenographie ] . Of course, our imagination can often do without their
explicit conceptual formulation in terms of means of investigation, but
with regard to the exposition [ Darstellung ] , insofar as it seeks to be univo-
that, their use is in many cases inevitable in the field of analysis
cultural. Whoever rejects them on principle is obliged to confine himself to the aspect
formal cultural phenomena, for example in their historical-legal aspect.
Obviously the universe of legal nuns can be clearly specified from the point
conceptually and it is valid for historical reality (in the strict sense
legal). On the other hand, it is with their practical significance that the research is concerned.
che in the social sciences, as we understand them. However, it is very frequent
However, one can only become clearly aware of this meaning
relating the empirical data to an ideal limit case. If the historian (in the most
broad of the term) rejects the attempt to formulate such idealtypes under the pretext
that they are "theoretical constructions", that is to say useless or superfluous for
the concrete ends of knowledge, it follows as a general rule or that
consciously or unconsciously applies other analogous constructions without
formulate them explicitly and without logical elaboration, or else it remains pressed
in the sphere of what is "vaguely felt".
Nothing is undoubtedly more dangerous than the confusion between theory and history,
whose source is found in naturalistic prejudices. It comes in various
its forms: sometimes we think we fix in these theoretical and conceptual tables the
"True" content or the "essence" of historical reality, sometimes they are used
like a sort of Procrustean bed into which we forcefully introduce history,
sometimes even the "ideas" are hypostasized to make them the "real" reality.
Page 145
behind the flow of events or the real "forces" that have come together
folds in history.
In particular, this last danger is all the more to be feared as we are

accustomed to hearing also and even in the first place, by "ideas" of an era, the
thoughts and ideals that have ruled the mass or fraction historically
important [196] of men of that time and who were thus elements so-
gnificant for the particular aspect of the culture in question. We can add to
that two other remarks. In the first place, there are generally certain
relations between the "idea" taken in the sense of tendency of practical and theoretical thought.
that of an epoch and the "idea" in the sense of an idealtype of that epoch, constructed
by us to serve as a conceptual aid. It happens that an ideal type of certain
social conditions that one obtains by abstraction of certain social manifestations
characteristic of an era has actually passed to the eyes of contemporary
porains of it for the ideal which they practically strove to achieve or of the
less for the maxim intended to regulate certain social relations - the examples
of this kind are even quite common. This is the case with the idea of "protection
subsistence goods ”( 26) and many other theories of canonists, speci
especially of Saint Thomas Aquinas, relative to the idealypical concept in use
currently of the “urban economy” of the Middle Ages of which we have spoken
upper. All the more so does the same apply to the "fundamental concept" so
decried in political economy of economic "value". Since scholasticism
] 198] that in Marx's theory two ideas became entangled in this notion,
on the one hand that of "objectively" valid, that is to say that of a duty to be, and
on the other hand that of an abstraction from the empirical process of formation
prices. Thus the idea that the "value" of goods should be regulated on certain
principles of "natural law" has been of incalculable importance for all the development.
development of our civilization - not just in the Middle Ages - and it continues to
have it nowadays. It has had a particularly intensive influence on the pro-
empirical cessation of price formation. However, it is only thanks to a
rigorous construction of concepts, that is to say thanks to the ideal, type, that we
can really unequivocally elucidate what one hears and can be heard
dre by the theoretical concept of value. Those who have nothing but contempt for
The "robinsonnades" of the abstract theory would do well to meditate on all this so much
that they are not in a position to substitute something better for it, which
say something clearer in this case .
The causal relationship between the historically ascertainable idea that governs
men and the elements of historical reality from which one can
to destroy by abstraction the corresponding ideal type , can naturally take
extremely variable shapes. There is only one point which in principle should not be
to part with it is that we are dealing here with two things fundamentally [197]
different. This brings us to our second point. The very ideas that
ruled the men of an era, that is to say those who acted in a way
diffuses in them, cannot, as soon as it is a question of a table of thought somewhat
Page 146
complicated, be grasped with conceptual rigor only in the form of an ideal-

type, for the simple reason that they empirically agitated a number of men
indeterminate and variable and that they took in each of them the most nuances
more varied in form and substance, in clarity and meaning. The elements
of the spiritual life of the various individuals of a specific period of the Middle Ages
for example that we can designate by the term of "Christianity" of the
dividus in question, would naturally form, if we were able to
fully expose a chaos of intellectual relations and feelings of
all kinds, infinitely diverse and at the highest point contradictory, although at
In the Middle Ages, the Church was undoubtedly in a position to assert to a very large extent
on the unity of faith and morals. If we now wonder what in this
chaos responds to the notion of "medieval Christianity", it being understood that we
are forced to operate constantly with this concept as if it were clear-
established, in short if one asks what consisted of the "Christian" element that
we find in medieval institutions, we immediately see that we use
let us read on all these occasions a pure picture of thought constructed by us. It
consists of a set of articles of faith, norms of canon law and of
ethics, maxims for the conduct of life and countless numbers of
particular relationships that we combine into an "idea" or a synthesis that,
undoubtedly, it would be impossible for us to establish without contradiction, without using
idealtypical concepts.
The logical structure of the concept systems in which we expose

this sort of "ideas" is obviously extremely variable, as is their
relation to what is immediately given in empirical reality. Things get
present in a still relatively simple way when it comes to cases where a
alone or a few rare theoretical guiding principles, easily translatable into
a formula - such as the belief in Calvin's predestination - or even
clearly formulated moral postulates have governed men and produced
historical effects, so that there is little difficulty in ordering the "idea" into
a hierarchy of thoughts arising logically from these direct principles [198]
teurs. However, even in these cases it is easy to forget that some powerful
what was the significance of the purely logical constraining force of the idea in
history - Marxism is a remarkable example of this - it is nevertheless necessary to
take in general the empirical-historical process that took place in the mind
men as a psychologically conditioned process and not logically.
cally. The idealtypical character of these syntheses of ideas which have had an
history becomes even more evident if the guiding principles and
fundamental postulates do not or no longer inhabit the mind, individuals,
even though these continue to be governed by thoughts which are the consequence of
logical consequence of these principles or which emerged from them by association, either that
the historically original "idea" which served as their foundation either dead or
that it has never had any influence in general except through its consequences. Finally,
the syntheses take even more categorically the character of an "idea"
that we are building, when these fundamental guiding principles have failed
Page 147
imposed, from the start, only imperfectly or not at all on the clear awareness of
men or at least did not take the form of a clear and coherent set of
thoughts. If now we engage in this procedure, like this
happens endlessly frequently and must happen, it's not about the "idea"
that we form ourselves - for example that of the "liberalism" of a period of de-
terminated, that of "Methodism" or that of any non-elaborate variety.
intellectually of "socialism" - nothing but a pure idealtype,
having exactly the same character as the summaries of the "principles" of a
economic era of which we spoke above. The more relationships it is
to exhibit are vast and the more varied their cultural significance, the more
their global and systematic presentation in a set of thoughts and
concepts will come closer to the ideal type and the less it will be possible to get out of the woods
with just one such concept. From which it emerges with more evidence and necessity
sity of making repeated attempts to construct new concepts idealtypi-
ques in order to become aware of ever new aspects of meaning
of relations, All the presentations which have for theme the "essence" of Christianity
are idealtypes which necessarily and constantly have only a relative validity.
tive and problematic, if they claim the quality of a historical account of the,
born empirical; on the other hand, they have a very great heuristic value [199] for the
research and very high systematic value for the presentation, if used
simply, as conceptual means to compare and measure the reali-
you. In this function they are even essential. But there is still another
element generally linked to this kind of ideal-typical presentations, which
further complicates their meaning. They are generally offered
to be (they can also be unconsciously) not only idealtypes
in the logical sense , but also in the practical sense , i.e. types
copies [vor bildliche Typen ] which - in our example - contain what
from the scholar's point of view, Christianity must be [ sein soll ] , that is to say that which,
in his opinion, is "essential" in this religion because it represents a value
permanent . If this is the case consciously or more often unconsciously,
these descriptions then contain the ideals to which the scientist relates the Christian
tianism by evaluating it [ wertend ]; that is, the tasks and purposes according to the-
which the scientist orients his own "idea" of Christianity. Of course these
ideals may be, and probably always will be, totally different from
values to which the contemporaries of the period studied, for example the first
first Christians, brought back Christianity for their part. In this case the "ideas"
are obviously no longer purely logical auxiliaries nor are they
concepts to which reality is measured by comparison, but ideals based on
from which we judge the reality by evaluating it. It is no longer a question of the pure process.
theoretical aspect of the relation of the empirical to values [ Beziehung auf Werte ] ,
but strictly judgments of value [Werturteile] that one is located in the
concept of christianity (27 ). Because in this case the ideal type claims a va-
empiricality, it sinks into the region of the valuative interpretation of the
Christianity: we leave the domain of empirical science and we find ourselves in
presence of a personal profession of faith and no longer of a construction
Page 148
conceptual properly idealtypical. As striking as this distinction is
as to the principles, we see that the confusion between these two meanings
fundamentally different from the notion of 'idea' too frequently invades the
conduct of historical work. It is particularly on the lookout for the historian as soon as
that he begins to exhibit his own "interpretation" of a personality or a
era. Unlike the stable ethical standards that Schlosser ( 28) used
in the spirit of rationalism, the modern historian of a relativistic spirit, who proclaims himself
poses on the one hand to "understand in itself" the epoch with which he is concerned and which
on the other hand, wishes to pass a "judgment", feels the need [200] to take
"In the very matter" of his study the standards of his judgments, which
to say that he lets the “idea” in the ideal sense emerge from the “idea” in the sense of
of "idealtype". In addition, the aesthetic appeal of this process constantly pushes him to
erase the line that separates the two orders - hence this half-measure which on the one hand
cannot deprive himself of making value judgments and who on the other hand does everything
so as not to take responsibility for these judgments. To this we must oppose the
elementary duty of scientific control of oneself which is also the only
way of preserving ourselves from confusion by inviting us to make a distinction
strict between the relation which compares reality to ideal types in the logical sense
and the gratifying appreciation of this reality on the basis of ideals. The ideal type
that we understand it is, I repeat, something entirely independent of
evaluative assessment; it has nothing in common with another "perfection",
[their report is] purely logical. There are ideal types of brothels as well as
of religions, and with regard to the former there are some which, from the point of view of
contemporary police ethics, might seem technically
"Opportune" on the contrary of others which would not be (29 ).
We are unfortunately obliged to leave aside the discussion of detail-

of the case which is by far the most complicated and the most interesting, that of the structure
logical structure of the concept of State. We will confine ourselves to a few remarks. Yes
we ask ourselves what in empirical reality corresponds to the notion,
of "State", we find there an infinity of actions and human servitudes, diffused
his and discreet, an infinity of real and legally regulated relationships, unique
like them or returning periodically, held together by an idea, by
belief in standards that are actually in effect or that should
being, as well as relations of domination of man over man. This
belief is partly a spiritual good that can be explained by thought, partly it
is felt confusedly, partly experienced passively and it presents itself in
various individuals with varying shades. In fact, if men conceived
clearly this "idea" as such, they could do without the "general theory".
neral of the State ”which proposes to unravel this notion. However, whatever the
formulated, the scientific concept of the state is obviously always
days a synthesis that we [201] elaborate with a view to determined ends of the
awareness. But on the other hand it is also constructed by abstraction from
confused syntheses that we find ready-made in the minds of historical men
toric. Despite everything, the concrete content that the historical notion of the "State"
Page 149
takes in the syntheses of contemporaries of an era does not allow itself to be clearly understood.
only if we orient ourselves according to ideal-typical concepts. In addition, there is
not the slightest doubt that the way in which contemporaries of an era
destroy these syntheses, in an always imperfect logical form, that is to say
their idea of the state - for example the 'organic' idea of the state of
German taphysics opposed to the commercial conception of the Americans - is
of eminent practical significance. In other words, we find here also
if the practical idea which should be valid or which is believed to be valid and the ideal
theoretical type built for research needs go side by side and
constantly tend to merge.
We have deliberately considered above the essential "ideal-type"

ment - although not exclusively - in the form of an intellectual construction.
a tool designed to systematically measure and characterize individual relationships
dual, that is to say significant by their singularity, such as Christianity,
capitalism, etc. We did this to sideline the current opinion that would like to
that the abstract typical was identical to the abstract generic in the sphere of phenomena
nomenes of culture. However, it is not. Without trying to analyze here logic-
the concept of "typical", often discussed and strongly discredited because of the
abuse that one makes of it, we can however already draw from our previous dis-
therefore the conclusion that the formation of type concepts in the sense of elimination
tion of the "accidental" also has, and even rightly so, its raison d'être in
the study of historical individualities. We can obviously also give the
form of the ideal type to the generic concepts that we constantly encounter
in the form of elements of historical narratives or historical concepts
concrete by proceeding by abstraction and by accentuating some of their elements.
conceptually essential. This is even one of the important ways
and above all practically frequent to apply idealtypical concepts, because
each individual ideal-type is made up of conceptual elements which have a character
generic term and that we have developed into idealtypes. In this case also [202] we enter
the specific logical function of ideal-typical concepts. The concept
of "exchange" for example is nothing more than a simple generic concept, at the
sense of a complex of characteristics that happen to be common to several
phenomena, as long as I disregard the meaning of the elements
conceptual elements, so as long as I simply analyze its use
common in language. But if I put this concept in relation to the "law of
marginal utility ”and that I form the concept of“ economic exchange ”under the
form of a rational economic process, it will contain, like any concept
fully developed from the point of view, from a logical point of view, a judgment on the conditions
"Typical. Of the exchange in itself. It then takes on a genetic character and becomes
thus at the same time an idealtypical concept in the logical sense, which means
that it moves away from the empirical reality which can only be compared and
ter to him. The same can be said of all the so-called “fundamental concepts”.
rate ”of political economy: they cannot be developed in a genetic form.
than by giving them the character of the ideal type. The difference between the simple
Page 150
generic concepts which simply combine only the common characteristics

common to several empirical phenomena and ideal types of generic structure
- like the ideal-typical concept of the "essence" of craftsmanship - is obviously
floating in detail. No generic concept, however, has as such a
typical character, and there is no such thing as a purely generic "medium" type. Each
when we speak of "typical" quantities - for example in statistics -
we are always in the presence of something more than just
medium. The more we are dealing with a classification of processes which
feast in reality in a massive form, plus we are also dealing with
generic concepts. On the contrary, the more we give a conceptual form to
elements which form the basis of the cultural significance, specific to
complex historical relationships, plus also the concept or system of concepts
takes on the character of the ideal type. Indeed, the purpose of constructing concepts
idealtypical consists everywhere and always in being rigorously aware of
not of that, which is generic, but on the contrary of the Particular nature of the phenomena.
cultural names.
The fact that we can and do use ideal types of ca-

However, the generic character is only of methodological interest if it is put
in connection with another factor [203]. so far we have only learned to
know the idealtypes only in their essential aspect of abstract concepts of
relations that we represent to ourselves as stable realities in the flow of
to become, that is to say as historical individuals who give rise to developments
loppements. Another complication is added to it, that the naturalistic prejudice,
in whose eyes the aim of the social sciences would be to reduce reality to "laws",
introduced with extreme ease into our discipline using the concept of
"Typical". We can, in fact, also construct ideal types of development,
and these constructs can have a very considerable heuristic value. This-
while in this case we are more particularly exposed to the danger of
confusion between idealtype and reality. We can for example achieve this result
theoretical that, in a society rigorously organized according to the principle of
“crafts”, the sole source of capital accumulation would be land rent.
From there we can possibly build - we do not dwell on
the correctness of this construction - a pure ideal picture of the transformation of the
artisanal economic form in capitalist form based on a few factors
simple as the scarcity of land, the increase in population, the influx of
precious metals and the rationalization of the conduct of life. To find out if the
empirical course of development has been effectively the same as that which
constructed, it must be verified with the help of this construction taken as a mean er-
ristic, by making a comparison between the ideal type and the "facts". Yes
the ideal type has been constructed "correctly" and that the real course of events does not correspond
respond to the idealtypical course, we would provide proof that the
diévale was not strictly "artisanal" in certain respects. If the ideal
type was built in a heuristically 'ideal' way - we
for the moment we do not need to ask ourselves if and how this could have happened
Page 151
do in our example - it will put the search on the track to grab sharper-
ment the special nature and historical significance of the elements of society
medieval that do not meet the artisanal structure. If it leads to this result,
he will have fulfilled his logical role, precisely by showing his own ir-
real [ Un-Wirklichkeit ] . It will have been - in this case - only the test of a hypothesis.
This process does not raise any methodological objection [204] for so long
that we always keep in mind that the idealtypical construction of the development
development and history are two things that are rigorously distinct and that the construction
tion was the means of methodically making the valid attribution of a development.
historical importance to its real causes among all those that are possible for us
to establish in the state of our knowledge.
We know from experience that it is often extremely difficult to respect
rigorously apply this distinction, and for a specific reason. In order to donate
give more expressive clarity to the demonstration of the idealype or the development
idealtypical one seeks to illustrate it with the help of suggestive examples taken from
empirical and historical reality, This completely legitimate process in itself presents
however, there is a danger: historical knowledge appears there as the servant of
theory instead of the other way around. The temptation is great for the theorist to consider
rer this relationship as normal or, what is more serious, to entangle theory and
story and simply confuse them. This danger is even more threatening.
when we combine in a genetic classification the ideal construction of a
development and conceptual classification of idealypes of certain structures
cultural res (for example forms of industrial activity, starting from
the "closed domestic economy" or religious concepts starting from
"Gods of the moment") (30). The series of types resulting from the choice of characteristics
conceptual ques then risk being taken for the historical succession of types
obeying the need for a law. Logical order of concepts on the one hand and order
empirical nance of the conceptualized within the framework of space and time as well as
of the causal connection on the other hand, then appear to be linked at this point that
the temptation to do violence to reality to consolidate the effective validity of the,
construction in reality is almost irresistible.
We have voluntarily refrained from demonstrating our design to

About by far the most important example among idealtypi-
ques, that of Marx's theory. We didn't do it so as not to complicate
further our presentation by introducing Marxist interpretations and also
so as not to anticipate the discussions that our journal will open on this doc-
trine, given that she will regularly write literature on this great thinker
and that which is inspired by him the object of a critical analysis [205]. That is why
we limit ourselves to noting that all the "laws" and constructions of development
of history specifically Marxists have obviously - to the extent
where they are theoretically correct - an idealtypical character. Whoever has
applied once Marxist concepts know the eminent heuristic importance
nent , and even unique, of these idealtypes when used only for their
Page 152
compare reality, but also their danger as soon as they are presented as
constructions having empirical validity or as "driving forces"
real (which means in truth: metaphysical) or even as tendencies
these, etc.
Generic concepts - idealtypies - generic concepts of ideality structure -

pique - ideas heard in the sense of bundles of thoughts that influence em-
pirically historical men - ideal types of these ideas - ideals which govern
men - ideal types of these ideals - ideals to which the historian relates
carries history - theoretical constructions that use the empirical as an illustration
tion - historical research which makes use of theoretical concepts as cases
ideal limits - and finally all the various possible complications that we
could only point out, all this represents nothing other than constructions
ideals whose relation to the empirical reality of the immediately given remains
problematic in each particular case. This list sufficiently shows the in-
ceaseless tracing of methodological and conceptual problems.
which constantly animate the cultural sciences. And since there was no question here
than to indicate the problems, we had to give up on seriously deepening
practical questions of the methodology and to discuss in more detail the reports
between idealtypical knowledge and knowledge by "laws", between
typical ideal concepts and collective concepts, etc.
After all these discussions, the historian will no doubt persist in public opinion.
that the preponderance of the ideal-typical form in the construction and
tion of concepts is only a specific symptom of the youth of a discipline.
In a certain sense we must prove him right, it is true by drawing other conclusions from it.
quences than him. Let us take a few examples from other disciplines. For sure,
the embarrassed pupil of a Quarta class as well as the primitive philologist
represent a language above all in an "organic" way, that is to say as
[206] a supra-empirical whole ordered by norms, and attribute to the
science the role of determining what should be authoritative under the rules of
pledge. The first task that a "philology" proposes itself consists normally
in the logical elaboration of the "written language", as did for example the
Crusca (31 ), in order to reduce its content to rules. On the other hand, when of our
days one of the masters of philology ( 32) proclaims on the contrary that the "talk of
each individual » singular constitutes the object of philology, it does not seem possible
to set up such a program only on condition of having an ideal type
relatively strong written language, with which exploration can operate at
within the infinite diversity of speech (at least tacitly), otherwise it would not have
no more direction or border. This is the same role that constructions play
theories of the State on the basis of natural law or the organicist conception or
again - to mention an idealtype which responds well to the meaning we give it -
nons - the theory of the ancient state of Benjamin Constant: they are thus
say stopovers while waiting for us to find our way around the immense sea of
empirical facts ( 33). For science, coming to maturity therefore always means
Page 153
fact: to go beyond the ideal type in so far as it is attributed empirical validity or

the value of a generic concept. On the whole, not only the use of the
brilliant construction of Constant, for example, still remains quite legitimate to
nowadays to demonstrate certain historical aspects and particularities of
ancient political life, on condition of course that care is taken to stick
to its idealtypical character, but above all there are sciences to which it has been
given to remain eternally young. This is the case for all historical disciplines.
ques, of all those to whom the eternally moving flow of civilization
ceaselessly cure new problems. In essence, their task comes up against the fra-
gility of all idealtypical constructions, but they are inevitably
forced to continually develop new ones.
Constantly new attempts are being made to determine the meaning "authentic.
tick "and" true "of historical concepts, without any ever succeeding in
its end. It is therefore quite normal that the syntheses that history uses
constantly reads either relatively precise concepts, or, from
that research requires univocity in the content of the concept, of abs-
features. In the latter case, the concept reveals a theoretical point of view and therefore
"Unilateral" which sheds light [207] on reality and to which it can be related, but which
is obviously unsuitable for becoming a scheme in which we could
slide completely. Indeed, none of those thought systems that we do not
we know how to do without if we want to capture the significant elements each time
of reality cannot exhaust its infinite wealth. They are nothing but
attempts to bring order to the chaos of the facts that we have brought in
within the circle of our interest, on the basis each time of the state of our knowledge
sance and conceptual structures that are always available to us.
The intellectual apparatus that the past has developed through reflective elaboration, this
which means in truth by a reflexive transformation of the immediate reality-
given, and by its integration into the concepts that corresponded to the state
of knowledge and the direction of curiosity, is in perpetual process with this
that we can and want to acquire new knowledge of reality. the
Work progress in the cultural sciences is done through this debate. The result
is a continual process of transforming concepts by means of which
we are trying to capture reality. The history of the sciences of social life is and
there remains therefore a continual alternation between the attempt to order theo-
only the facts by a construction of the concepts - by breaking down the ta-
of thought thus obtained thanks to a widening and a displacement of
the horizon of science - and the construction of new concepts based on it
modified. What is expressed there is therefore in no way that it would be wrong to
construct systems of concepts in general - for all science, even the simple
descriptive history, operates with the supply of concepts of its time. At
on the contrary, it expresses the fact that in the sciences of human culture the
construction of concepts depends on the way of posing the problems, which varies
turn with the very content of civilization. The relationship between concept and
conceived leads to the fragility of all these syntheses in the cultural sciences.
Page 154
The value of the great attempts at conceptual constructions in our science

consisted in general in that they put in evidence the limits of the signifi-
cation of the point of view on which they were based [208]. The most progress
in the social sciences are positively related to the fact
that the practical problems of civilization shift and take the
form of a critique of the construction of concepts. One of the most
valuable of our Review will serve the purposes of this review and, with it,
research concerning the principles of syntheses in the field of science
social.
If we now draw the consequences of what has just been said, we

come to a point where our views will perhaps diverge here and there from those of many
representatives, however eminent, of the historical school to which we belong
U.S. too. These often persist expressly or tacitly in
the opinion that the ultimate goal, the end of all science, would be to order its ma-
in a system of concepts, in the sense that its content can be established
and improve progressively by observing empirical regularities, by
the construction of hypotheses and their verification, until the moment when it comes out
ultimately a "perfect" and consequently deductive science. In view of
To this end, the historical and inductive work currently in progress would only be
preliminary task due to the imperfection of our discipline. Nothing can evi-
can seem more suspect to this conception than the construction and application
tion of rigorous concepts that could prematurely anticipate this goal
ultimate which can only be achieved in the distant future. - Such a concept
tion would be unassailable in its principles on the ground of the theory of
ancient the
among andmass
scholastic knowledge
of specialists which
in the continues
historical to remain
school. deeply
It assigns aliveto
a priori
concepts of being representative copies of "objective" reality. : hence the allu-
incessantly repeated zion to the unreality of all rigorous concepts. On the other hand this-
he who by thought pushes to the end the fundamental idea of the modern theory
derns the knowledge since Kant that concepts are and are not
could only be intellectual means with a view to helping the mind to become master
empirical data, will certainly not be able to see in the fact that the concepts
rigorous genetics are ideal types a reason to oppose being
build. In his view, it will be necessary rather to reverse the meaning of the relationship between concept and
historical work: it will seem logically impossible to achieve the ultimate goal
cited above, because the concepts are not the end, but the means of
knowledge of significant relationships under singular points of view [209].
It is precisely because the content of historical concepts is necessary-
variable that it is essential to formulate them with precision each time. It
will only require one thing. the need to carefully maintain their character
idealtypical when using them and not to confuse idealtype with history.
Since due to the inevitable variation of the guiding value ideas he cannot
could there be really definitive historical concepts, capable of being
considered as an ultimate and general goal, he will admit that, precisely because
Page 155
will have built rigorous and unambiguous concepts for the singular point of view
which guides the work each time, he will be able to take clear
knowledge of the limits of their validity.
We will not fail to give to understand, and we have it besides us-

even admitted, that in particular cases it is possible to clearly relate the
development of a concrete historical relationship without continually putting it
in relation to the defined concepts. Consequently we can claim for
the historian of our discipline the right to "speak the language of life", at the ma-
denial of the historian of politics. Sure ! It should be added, however, that by adopting
so much this process, it often happens to a very large extent that it is a pure ha-
sard if the point of view which makes it possible to give a meaning to the studied event
lets itself be grasped with a clear conscience. As for us, we are not in
general in the favorable situation of the political historian for whom the
cultural contents to which it relates its description are commonly univo-
ques or appear such. Any description that is only intuitive is accompanied by the
particular phenomenon of the importance that takes the presentation aesthetic: " Everyone
sees what he carries in his heart. On the other hand, valid judgments presuppose
everywhere the logical elaboration of the intuitive, which means the use of concepts.
It is certainly possible and often aesthetically pleasing to keep it in petto,
however, at the risk of constantly compromising the safety of the orientation of the
reader and often also that of the writer in terms of the content and scope of his
judgments.
It can be especially dangerous to neglect the construction of

rigorous concepts during practical discussions in the order of eco- policy
nomic and social. A layman cannot imagine the confusion caused by
example the use of the term "value" - this child of pains [210] of the eco-
political nomy to which one cannot give any univocal meaning other than ideal
than. The same is true of expressions such as "productive" or
"Considered from an economic point of view", etc., which generally resist any
clear and conceptual analysis (34 ). Without a doubt, it is above all the concepts
collectives, taken from everyday language, which cause embarrassment. Take a
school example too. clear to the layman's eyes that the concept of agriculture
under the aspect which it takes in the expression "the interests of the peasantry" [Inte-
ressen der Landwirtschaft]. Let us first consider these "interests of
peasantry ”from the angle of empirically ascertainable representations, more
or less clear and subjective, that the different individuals of this profession
make their own interests and completely disregard the countless conflicts
interests that may arise between peasants depending on whether they are breeders, fertilizers
breeders of cattle, whether they cultivate wheat, whether they mesh the cattle with it or whether they
distill, etc. Every specialist, if not every layman, knows the formidable entanglement
of opposing and contradictory value relations that can be represented
feel confusedly by the expression in question. We will only list
a few: the interest of peasants who wish to sell their land and who, in order to
Page 156
this reason, want a rapid rise in the price of land; diametral interest
opposed to those who wish to buy land, round off their property or
take it to the farm; the interest of those who wish to retain a property due to
social benefits for the benefit of their descendants and who therefore have an interest in the
reliability of land ownership; the opposite interest of those who wish for their
own benefit or that of their children a displacement of land for the benefit
from the best operator - or what is not exactly the same - to the bene-
the most capital-solid buyer's office; the purely economic interest that
the "most capable operator" in the sense of private economy is found in the
economic freedom to change properties; the interest opposed to the precedent of
certain dominant social layers who are keen to maintain the social position
and traditional politics of their "class" as well as that of their descendants;
the social interest that the non-dominant social layers have in the fall of the layers
superiors who compress their condition; contradictory interest in some
circumstances with the previous of the lower layers to be found in the layer
superior of political leaders capable of protecting [211] their vested interests.
We could considerably lengthen the list without finding a term, in-
core that we have proceeded in the most summary and imprecise way
possible.
We will leave aside the fact that this sort of purely "selfish" interests
can mix and bind purely ideal values, of very diverse nature, or
if necessary, defeat them and dismiss them. We will just recall
above all that, when we speak of "the interests of the peasantry", we are talking about
as a rule not only to these material and ideal values
which the peasants themselves report their "interests", but in addition to
ideas of value, in part totally different, to which we, we
can bring back the peasantry: for example the interests of production which
arise both from the interest there is in providing the population with products
cheaper than the one, which does not always harmonize with the previous one, to him
provide good quality products; on this point the interests of the city and those
campaign can clash in all kinds of conflicts and even the interests of
the current generation might not be the same as the likely generations.
future tions. Then there are the demographic interests, mainly the interest
of a country to have a large rural population, which derives itself or
well of the "interest of the State", motivated by reasons of foreign policy and.
interior, or other very different ideal interests, for example
the one expected from the influence of a large rural population on the form
peculiar to the civilization of a country; this demographic interest may come into
conflict with the most diverse interests of the private economy of all parties
of the rural population of a country and, it is not impossible, with all the
present interests of the mass of the rural population. Or even the interest that we
found in a specific form of the social structure of the rural population of
country because of the nature of the resulting political and cultural influences.
Depending on its orientation, this interest may conflict with all the interests
Page 157
imaginable, even with those who seem most urgent in the present and
the future in the eyes of the various peasants as well as those of the state. And, how
additional plication, the "State" to whose interests we gladly report
these various special interests, as well as many other analogues, is not
wind for us, in these cases, that a word which covers an extremely entanglement
muddled up with ideas of value to which we relate it on its side
in special cases. These values may consist of pure military security.
external silence, in that of the leading position of a dynasty or of certain
classes [212] inside; or in the interest of preserving and strengthening the unity
formal state of the nation for itself or for the preservation of certain
objective values of culture, which in turn are extremely different from one another,
that we feel we have to defend as a united people within a state: or
finally in the interest to transform the social character of the State in the direction of ideals
determinants of culture which, in turn, are again extremely diverse. It
would. too long to indicate everything that covers this expression - collective
of “state interests” to which we can relate the “peasantry ” .
The example we have chosen and even more our summary analysis are
rude and simple. I now invite the layman to analyze on his side so
analogous (and with more depth) to the concept for example of "the interests of the
working class "; he will then be able to see what contradictory entanglement is
hides behind this expression which is partly composed of interests and ideals
peculiar to the workers themselves, in part from interests through which we
consider ourselves the workers. It is impossible to be right about slogans
aroused by the struggle for interests by empirically emphasizing their relationship
activity. The only way to overcome rhetorical obscurity is that of
clear, rigorous and conceptual determination of the different points of view
sibles. Admittedly, the argument of "free trade", taken in the sense of the conception of
world or of standard empirical validity, is simply ridiculous thing.
However, whatever the nature of the ideals that each individual sets out to
to defend, the fact of having underestimated the heuristic value of the old wisdom of
larger traders. of the earth, which we expressed in formulas
idealtypical, has caused great prejudice in our discussions on the
political commercial. Only through idealtypical formulas
that one can really clearly understand the peculiar nature of
view that come into play in the particular case, thanks to a comparison
tion between the empirical and the idealype. The use of indifferent collective concepts
ciés, used by everyday language, never covers anything but obscurities of
thought or will, too often it is the instrument of dangerous mirages, and
always a means that hinders the development of the correct way of laying the
problems.
We have reached the end of our discussions which had no other goal than
to bring out the almost imperceptible line that separates science and belief and
to facilitate the discovery of the meaning of the effort of knowledge in the eco-order
Page 158
nomic and social. The [213] objective validity of all empirical knowledge has for
foundation and has no other foundation than the following: the given reality is ordered
according to categories which are subjective in the specific sense that they constitute
the presupposition of our knowledge and that they are linked to the presupposition of
value of the truth that only empirical knowledge can provide us. We cannot
we offer nothing, with the means of our science, to those who consider that this
truth has no value, - for belief in the value of scientific truth is
a product of certain civilizations and is not a given of nature. As well
will he no doubt seek in vain for another truth capable of replacing science?
in what it alone can provide, namely concepts and judgments which cannot
do not constitute empirical reality, which do not copy it either, but which
put to order it by thought in a valid way. We saw that
in the sphere of the social and empirical sciences of culture, the possibility
of a judicious knowledge of what, in our eyes, is essential in the wealth
infinite of becoming is related to the continual use of a character's views
specifically particular which, in the final analysis, are all aligned with
valuable. These can be experienced and observed empirically as
that elements of all human life having a meaning, but the basis of their
this does not derive from empirical matter itself. The "objectivity" of knowledge
success in social science depends, on the contrary, on the fact that the empirical data
is constantly aligned with ideas of value which alone give it value
for knowledge and, although the significance of this objectivity cannot be understood
take that on the basis of these ideas of value, there can be no question of making
pedestal of empirically impossible proof of its validity. The belief,
alive in each of us in one form or another, in the supra-
empirical of ideas of ultimate and supreme value to which we anchor the meaning
of our existence does not exclude, but includes the incessant variability of the
concrete views under which empirical reality takes on meaning. Reality
irrationality of life and its capacity for Possible meanings remain inexhaustible.
wheat; also the concrete structure of the relation to values remains shifting,
subject that it is to possible variations in the obscure future of human culture.
Maine. The light shed by these ideas of supreme value falls every time
on a finite part [214], constantly changing, of the chaotic and prodigious course
of events that flow through time.
We should not misunderstand what has just been said and believe that the task
true of social science would be to be. perpetually on the lookout for new
views and new conceptual constructions. On the contrary! It
should be emphasized more than ever on the following idea: to serve knowledge of the
cultural significance of concrete and historical relationships constitutes the ul-
time, exclusive and unique as the work of the construction and criticism of
concepts helps promote alongside other means. To use the terms
by F. Th. Vischer ( 35), I would say that there are also in our discipline
scientists who "cultivate matter" [ Stoffhube r] and others who "cultivate
meaning ”[Sinnhuber]. The throat eager for facts of the first only lets itself be gorged
Page 159
shots of documents, folio of statistics and surveys, but it remains insensitive

ble to the finesse of the new idea. The gluttony of the second corrupts itself-
even the taste for facts by distilling only ever new thoughts. But the
genuine artistic genius, which Ranke, for example, possessed to a great degree
diose among historians, usually manifests itself in the power to create despite
all new by reporting known facts from equally well-known points of view.
At a time when specialization triumphs, all work in the sciences of

culture, once it is oriented towards a specific subject thanks to fa-
determined to pose the problems and that he has obtained his principles
thodological, will see in the elaboration of this matter an end for itself,
without always consciously controlling the cognitive value of isolated facts by
relating to ideas of supreme value and even without ever having in general
awareness of the linkage to these valuable ideas. It is good that it is so.
But it happens that one day the atmosphere changes. The meaning of the points of view
used without reflection then becomes uncertain, the path is lost in the twilight
cule. The light of the great problems of culture has shifted further. Then
science is also preparing to modify its usual landscape and its
concepts for looking down on the course of becoming. She follows the as-
those who alone can give meaning and direction to his work:
[...] The new impulse is awakening,

I run to drink from its eternal light.
Before me the day and behind me the night,
Above me the sky and below the waves (36 ).
Page 160
Notes from the translator, Julien Freund,

for the first try:

and social policy ” (1904)
( 1 ) It is not necessary to mention here, as they are known, the bonds of friendship which
existed between Weber, Windelband, Rickert and Simmel. Weber quotes very often
these various authors and sometimes borrows from them both themes of their design
epistemological, to rework them in its own way, as we will see in the course of
pages that we have translated. Because of this friendship we wanted to see in We-
ber, one of the representatives of the neo-Kantian school of Baden, led by Windel-
band and Rickert (different from the neo-Kantian school of Marburg, led by H.
Cohen and Natorp). Rickert was the first to do justice to such an assimilation,
suggested by another friend of Weber, E. Troeltsch. Indeed, he also notices
well in the preface to its 3rd and 4th editions of Grenzen der naturwissenschaftli-
chen Begriffsbildung (1921) than in that in the 5th edition (1929) that Weber was
a mind far too independent and universal to be classified in a
any school. The same is true of G. Simmel, whose very personal thought
nelle, full of finesse, with certain aesthetic tendencies, constitutes
a philosophy for itself, despite all the correspondences that the critics have
could find with other writers.
( 2 ) This study was published in 1904 in the first issue of the Archiv far So-
zialwissenschaft und Soszalpolitik. Under this title, this review was the new
series of an older organ, the Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik,
founded in 1888 by Henrich Braun. The latter practically spent his life (1854-
1927) to create journals. Indeed, he was in 1883 with Kautzky and others the co-
founder of the most important socialist and Marxist body of this time, Die
Neue Zeit . At the same time as the Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik
cited above, he was head of the Sozialpolitisches Zentralblatt from 1892 to 1895. In 1905 he
created Die neue Gesellschaft which he directed until 1907 and from 1911 to 1913 the An-
nalen für Sozialpolitik und Gesetzgebung.
Page 161
The editorial board of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik com-
At the start was Max Weber, Edgar Jaffé and Werner Sombart. From a letter from
Max Weber from 17- VII - 1903, quoted by Marianne Weber, Max Weber, ein Le-
bembild, p. 289, it appears that JAFFÉ was the real promoter of the review. This-
he had just completed his studies with A Dissertation on Die Arbeitstei-
lung im englischen Bankwesen (1902). He would later become a specialist in
financial questions with his works Volkswirtschaft und Krieg (Tübingen
1905), Kriegskostendeckung und Reichsfinanzreform (Tübingen 1917), Die Fi-
nanz und Situeraufgaben im neuere Deutschland , München 1919. He also wrote
LEMENT Das Bankwesen (Tübingen 1915), as a contribution to the important trai-
té Grundriß der Sozialökonomie including Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft by Max Weber
will be one of the other parts later. However Jaffé is better known
as a specialist journalist (he collaborated in particular at the Europäische Staats-
und Wirtschaftzeitung of Munich) and as a politician, since he was the
Minister of Finance of the Bavarian Revolutionary Government of 1918, headed
by Kurt Eisner. The name of W. SOMBART (1863-1941) is more famous, then
that he was one of the great German economic historians. When entering
in the editorial board of the Archiv , he had already published Der sozialismus und
soziale Bewegung (1897) and Modern Der Kapitalismus (1902). Trend mar-
xist in the beginning, he oriented himself towards the analysis of capitalist society and published by the
suite Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (1911), Luxus und Kapitalismus (1913),
Krieg und Kapitalismus (1913), Der Bourgeois (1913), Die drei Nationalökono-
mine (1930), Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus (1932), Deutscher Sozialismus (1934)
and Vom Menschen (1938).
( 3 ) This 7-page presentation that Marianne Weber seems to attribute to her ma-
ri, since it includes it in the chronological bibliography of the latter ( op.cit. p.
716), does not seem to be the work of Weber alone, at least if we consider the
style, although it expresses a number of the guiding ideas of
the study on the Objectivity of knowledge in science and social policy
the (in particular as regards the place which must occupy the "question or-
vrière ”, how to understand the concept of“ social ”and the need for
critical science based on clear concepts. and rigorous).
( 4 ) Allusion to the endless controversy, known as Methodenstreit,

which agitated at that time the German journals of economic science and by the
following that of the human sciences in general. The pretext was the reissue in 1883
from the book by Karl VON KNIES, Politische Ökonomie vom Standpunkt der ges-
chichtlichen Methode , the score from Karl MENGER's book, Untersuchungen
aber dit Methoden der Sozialwissenschaften , the reviews by G. Schmoller
in Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Menger's very lively reply,
precisely entitled Methodenstreit, and finally the publication in that same year of
the important work of W. DILTHEY, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. The
quarrel therefore opposed on the one hand the partisans of the old German historical school
Page 162
economy, the main representatives of which were Roscher and Knies,

on the other hand those of the new historical school of economics led by G.
Schmoller and by the Kathedersozialisten and finally those of the Austrian school of
marginalism.
( 5 ) Weber is aiming here at the Kathedersozialisten. G. Schmoller took umbrage at this

sentence and vigorously replied to Weber in the Handwörterbuch der Staads-
wissenschaften (3rd ed. 1911. We will examine this controversy at greater length
than in the study on Axiological Neutrality .
( 6 ) This paragraph and the following ones are the outline on the one hand of the action ra-
tional as Weber will analyze it more fully in the Essay on a few
categories of comprehensive sociology and especially in the first chapter of
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , on the other hand from his theory of the relations between science
and action, which he will take up again in the study on Axiological Neutrality and in the
two lectures on Wissenschaft als Beruf and Politik als Beruf.
( 7 ) Most commentators on Weber's epistemology hardly agree

attention to the meaning he attributed to the role of the logical principle of
contradiction. It is, however, a capital theme, because it commands a
from the theoretical point of view, his conception of the interpretation of Marxism
in the Critical Studies, p. 246, and on the other hand, from a practical point of view, his theo-
of the ideal type, the possibility of foreseeing the consequences and the attitude that
shovel konsequent. See among others his speech at the Congress of Verein tar
Sozialpolitik in 1090 in Vienna in Gesammelte Aufsätze für Sosiologie und
Sozialpolitik, pp. 417-418.
( 8 ) See also the essay on Axiological Neutrality , p. 486.
( 9 ) See ibid . p. 485.
( 10 ) W. ROSCHER (1817-1894) was one of the great German economists of the

19th century and the founder of the first historical school of political economy
than. Opposed in principle to the English classical school, he sees in the economy the historical
development of economic laws, these being however only one
aspect of social and cultural life alongside political and religious phenomena,
artistic, linguistic, legal and others. Hence the affirmation of an interaction
constant between these various categories of social phenomena. See about it
son Grundriß zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirtschaft nach geschichtlicher Me-
thode (1843), his Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft aus dem geschichitlichen Stand-
punkt (1861). He is also the author of an important treatise on economic science.
that in 5 volumes, System der Volkswirtschaftt (1854-1894) We understand without
hardly why Weber associates the names of Roscher and Marx, since the latter
deny, despite the privilege he grants to the economy, also insists on the
dialectical ports between all social phenomena.
Page 163
( 11 ) To get a more complete idea of Weber's position with regard to the

Marxism one can consult, in addition to pages 214-215 of this same study, the dis-
discussion of Sombart's report to the congress of German sociologists of 1910 and
the conference on socialism, these two texts being in the Gesammelte
Aufsätze on Soziologie und sozialpolitik , respectively pp. 450-451 and 492-518-
See also K. LÖWITH, Max Weber und Karl Marx in the Archiv für So-
zialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, t. LXVII (1932) as well as E. BAUMGAR-
TEN, Max Weber, Werk und Person (Tübingen 1964), pp. 571-577.
( 12 ) Weber is probably thinking here of the movement of ideas sparked by H. St. Cham-
berlain and the works of L. WOLTMANN, Politische Anthropologie (1903), de
P. BARTH, Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie , t. 1 (1897), and possibly
also in the work of GUMPLOWICZ, Der Rassenkampf (1883). He clarified his
own position on the issue of race during the discussion between him
at the congress of German sociologists of 1910 to A. Ploetz. We can read his inter-
vention in the Gesammelte Aufsätze on Soziologie und sozialpolitik pp. 456-
462.
( 13 ) Allusion to Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism (French translation, Paris
1964) written at the same time he was writing this study. We also find
this same idea in the conclusion to the Protestant Ethics, pp- 248-249, as well as
in Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft , t. 1, part 2, chap. 1, § 1, p. 183.
( 14 ) Probable allusion to the conceptions of certain partisans of marginalism.
( 15 ) The doctrines referred to here are undoubtedly those of W. WUNDT, Logik, t. III and
especially that of the historian Karl LAMPRECHT, Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft
(2nd edition, Berlin 1909), perhaps also that of Taine, because Max Weber refers
sometimes to his works.
( 16 ) This paragraph and the following ones are obviously inspired by the work of RIC-
KERT which had just appeared a few years earlier: Grenzen der naturwissens-
chaftlichen Begriffsbildung (1896-1902), particularly with regard to
notions of the "relation to values", of the infinite diversity of reality and of causality
singular. In a letter from this time, dated Florence Weber wrote:
“I have finished reading Rickert's book. It's excellent. I find in
much of what I think myself without having worked out it logically. I'll do
however reservations about the terminology. This letter is quoted in
Marianne WEBER, op. cit. p. 273.
( 17 ) For a more in-depth sociological and historical analysis of the exchange,

see Wirtschaft und Gesselschaft ,, t.1, part 1, chap. 11, § 4, pp. 36 - 37 and Wirt-
schaftsgeschichte (3rd ed., Berlin 1958, pp. 3-4), as well as the Essay on some
categories of comprehensive sociology , § 6.
Page 164
( 18 ) Weber analyzes at length the categories of objective possibility and causal

adequateity in the second section of his Critical Studies. See further the
translation of this pamphlet.
( 19 ) Weber aims here at the thesis presented by STAMMLER in Wirtschaft und Recht
nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (1st ed. 1896, 5th 1924). To see
Weber's severe criticism of this work in the article R. Stammlers
Überwindung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung in Gesammelte Auf-
sätze zur Wissenschaftslehre , pp. 291-383.
( 20 ) This thesis of the fundamental subjectivity of value that Weber defended by-
once bitterly, together with Sombart, in front of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (the as-
most important society of economists of this period) violently struck
his colleagues, as can be seen from the study by G. SCHMOLLER, Volkswirt-
schaft, Volkswirtschaftskhre und Methode in the Handwörterbuch für Staatswis-
senschaften (Jena 1911), pp. - 426-501 The latter appealed for an alleged
the unanimity of the philosophers of his time to affirm the progressive triumph of
objective values of an ethical and political nature, so that there would be no motive
to speak out against the intrusion of morality into the most critical economic science
guru. Weber stays logical with himself when he denies the possibility of elaborating
a univocal and closed system of values, since in his opinion, the world of values
remains delivered to an eternal antagonism. For this reason he condemned any attempt
tive to build a system of values, even an open one, within the meaning of the article of
RICKERT, “Vom System der Werte”, Logos , IV (1913) (on this subject see Rickert,
preface to the 3rd and 4th edition of the Grenzen der naturwissenschattlichen Begriffsbil-
dung) . Not that Weber was the opponent of all systematization (the mis-
method followed in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft provides the best demonstration
tion), but he only accepted a purely logical systematization of concepts,
sense of idealtypical rationalization, apart from any hierarchy.
( 21 ) The intended conception is that of marginalism.
( 22 ) This is the jurist H. Gossen (1810-1858) who wrote at the end of his life an or-
book of political economy, Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs
und der daraus fliessenden Regelm für menschliches Verhalten (1854) and new
published in 1927. The work went unnoticed for a long time until he found
credit, thanks to marginalism, under the leadership of K. Menger.
( 23 ) The ideal type commands Weber's strictly epistemological conception.

Some commentators have thought that he borrowed this notion from Goethe who used
commonly reads the notion of type in his various studies on anatomy (Einlei-
tung in die vergleickende Anatomie, Inselausgabe, t. XVI, p. 442) and particular-
ment in the letter to Chancellor von Muller of 24-V-1828. Watching things
a closer look, however, we see that the concept responds to Goethe more
Page 165
to a real type ( Reallypus ) than to an ideal type ( Idealtypus) . It seems more likely
that Weber took this term from one of his colleagues at Heidel Law School-
berg, Georg Jellinek, as suggested by Marianne Weber ( op. cit. p.
327). Indeed, the latter devotes a whole paragraph to this concept in the chapter
tre where he discusses the method of political science. Although his explanations
are more confused than those of Weber, he uses it in an analogous sense, i.e.
say he sees it as a heuristic means for the clarification of the Seiende and not of the
Seinsollende . See G. JELLINEX, Allgemeine Staatswissewchaft, 3rd ed. 1914,
liv. 1, chap. 11, pp. 30-37.
Without going into the details of the comments, discussions and controversies that
arouse this notion it may seem good to point out:
a) that reflection on the concept of type was at that time common to many
many German philosophers, sociologists and psychologists. Thus, W. DILTHEY,
Weltanschauungslehre
(1911); W. SOMBART,(19II); G. SIMMEL,
Der Bourgeois Hauptprobleme
(1913); O. SPENGLER, der Philosophie
Der Untergang
des Abendlandes (1917); W. STERN, Die dfferentielle Psychologie (1920);
VIERKANDT, Die Gesellschaftslehre (1923), who tries to find a compromise
put between phenomenology and the ideal type; E. SPRANGER, Die Lebensformen
(1924), and finally the studies of the psychoanalyst C. Jung, in particular his Psycholo-
gischen Typen (1921). It would not be without interest, even for a better
knowledge of Weber's ideal type, of knowing to what extent these various
conceptions have been influenced by his theory or deviate from it or discuss it.
b) that Weber's concept of idealype has given rise to an important literature

ture. Among the studies of which we were able to read, mention: A.
VON SCHELTING, "Die logische Theorie der historischen Kulturwissenschaft
von Max Weber und im besonderen sein Begriff des Idealtypus «, Archiv für So-
zialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XLIX (1922); of the same, Max Webers Wissens-
chafts1ehre (Tübingen 1934); GOTHEIN, “Typen und Stufen”, Köln. Viertel-
jahrhefte für Soziologie, 1922; 0. FLUG, Die soziologischen Typenbildung bei
Max Weber. jahrbuck der philo. Fakultät (Göttingen 1923); F. ORPENHEMFR,
Die Logik der soziologischen Begriffsbildung (Tübingen 1925); H. GRAB, Der
Begriff des Rationalen in der Soziologie Max Webers (Karlsruhe 1927); B. PFIS-
TER, Die Entwicklung zum Idealtypus (1928); L. MISES, “Soziologie und Ges-
chichte. Epilog zum Mlethodenstreit in der Nationalökonomie “, Archiv fûr So-
zialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LXI (1929); W. BIENFAIT, “Max Webers
Lehre vom geschichtlichen Erkennen “, in Historische Studien, notebook 194
(1930); A. METTLER, Max Weber und die philosophische Problematik unserer
Zeit (Leipzig 1934); K. HELFERICH, Die. Bedeutung des Typusbegriffes im
Denken der Geisteswissenschaften (Giessen 1938); G. WEIPPERT “Die idealty-
pische Sinn- und Wesenserfassung und die Denkgebilde der formalen Theorie ',
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft , X (1940); JJ SCHAAF, man-
chichte und Begriff (Tübingen 1946); E. BAUMGARTEN, Max Weber, Werk und
Page 166
Person (Tübingen 1954), pp. 596 and following. In other languages C. ANTONI, “La
logica del tipo ideal by Max Weber ”in Studi germanici (1930); H. BECKER,
"Culture case study and idealtypical method, with special reference to Max We-
ber ”, in Social Forces (1934); R. ARON, The critical philosophy of history
(2nd ed., Paris 1950), pp. 232-236 and Contemporary German Sociology (Pa-
ris 1936); H. MARROU, On historical knowledge (Paris 1954), pp. 159-
168.
There is one last question, this one of translation. After long

hesitating between ideal type and ideal type (but the two versions are open to ambiguity),
we finally chose to respect as much as possible the terminology we-
Berian, even if it means using a somewhat barbaric word in French by translating
the term by idealtype. If the ambiguity remains, it is that implied by the vocabulary
Even Weber's story. Above all, we found a practical advantage: the pos-
ability to translate idkaltypisch by idealtypical, without needing to use a
heavy and obscure periphrasis.
( 24 ) With regard to the elaboration of these various examples of idealypes, the

"Urban economy" in the Middle Ages, of crafts and capitalism, we can
refer to the chapter devoted to the city in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, t. II, 2nd
part, chap. VIII and Wirtschaftsgeschichte , chap. II § 2, pp. 1 23 et seq. as well as
chap. iv.
( 25 ) Cf. Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 47.
( 26 ) On this point see Wirtschaftsgeschichte , p. 129 and pp. 138 and following.
( 27 ) It is appropriate to insist on the logical analogy between the notions of relation to

values and ideal type. Both are pure methodological procedures intended to
facilitate the understanding or scientific explanation of a historical reality
given. No more than the ideal type values or idealizes the object it aims for, the
port to values does not appreciate positively or negatively the phenomenon that it is
saie to understand.
( 28 ) FC SCHLOSSER (1776-1861), German historian of moralizing tendency

in the sense of liberalism and the Enlightenment. Author of a huge Weltges-
chichte für das deutsche Volk, 19 volumes (1843-1857).
( 29 ) Compare with Plato's conception that there is an idea, a

type of mud. Admittedly, the Platonic idea has in general a normative character,
but, insofar as it sets out to grasp things in their characteristics
essential, we can make a connection with the idealype, especially as Weber,
as can be seen from the example of the State analyzed in the following paragraph,
in no way excludes the immanent and proper finality of the reality which he tries to elaborate
the ideal type. The real difference between Plato and Weber is of a philosophical order.
Page 167
than. According to the first, the true, the good and the beautiful are one, while for the
second, there is an irreducible antagonism between the values (cf. Max WEBER, Le
scholar and the Politician , p. 93).
( 30 ) The notion of Augenblicksgötter was forged by the great German specialist

of the comparative science of religions, H. USENER (1834-1905) in the work
Die Götternamen (Bonn 1896), pp. 279-301 [3rd ed. Frankfurt 1948].
( 31 ) Academia della Crusca, Italian learned society founded in 1582 in Florence

by Grazzini, in order to purify the Italian language, to fix its rules, etc. She
publishes the Vocabolario degli academici della Crusca.
( 32 ) This is the German philologist K. VOßLER (1872-1949) whom he will be fond of.
is a question in the Critical Studies. Author of Positivismus und Idealismus in
der Sprachwissenschaft (1904) and Die Sprache als Schöpfung und Entwicklung
(1905); he later devoted himself to Romanesque literature, especially French and Spanish
gnole.
( 33 ) In all likelihood Weber is referring to the ancient state chart

that Benjamin Constant presented in his speech at the Athénée royal in Paris in
1819 and that we find under the title De la Liberté des Anciens compared to that
des Modernes in the Cours de politique constitutionnelle , ed. Laboulaye (Paris
1872), t. II, pp. 539-560.
( 34 ) On this notion of “productivity” see Gesammelte Aufsätze für Soziologie

und Sozialpolitik, pp. 416-423. With regard to analyzes similar to
that of the concepts of "productivity" and "interests of the peasantry", see also
also his explanations about the concept of the "United States" ibid. pp. 478-479
and Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 348.
( 35 ) Th. VISHER, (1807-1887), One of the greatest German estheticians of

19th century, - Hegelian tendency. Author of the monumental Aesthetik oder
Wissenschaft des Schönen , 6 vol. (1846-1857).
( 36 ) These lines are taken from Goethe's Faust (act 1, scene II). The editor of the
second edition of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre strong remark
It should be noted that this conclusion is also inspired by the Materialen zur
Geschichte der Farbenlehre (sect. III) by Goethe: “There is no longer any doubt about our
days that it is necessary to rewrite the history of the world from time to time. This
need is not, however, imposed because new views have been discovered.
vels on the past, but because new views are given, due to the fact that the
contemporary of an era in progress finds itself placed in front of
from which it is possible to embrace and judge the past in a new way.
velle. It is the same in the sciences. Not only the discovery of rap-
harbors in nature and hitherto unknown objects, but also the convictions and
Page 168
the opinions which gradually follow one another modify many things and
deserve to be taken into consideration from time to time. "

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Max WEBER (1864-1920)

Translation from German and introduced

A document produced in digital version by Gemma Paquet, volunteer,

As part of the collection: "The Classics of Social Sciences"

A collection developed in collaboration with the Library

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 2

This electronic edition was produced by Gemma Paquet, volunteer, professor at

Essays on the theory of science

A digital edition based on the book Essays on the theory of science .

A collection of essays published between 1904 and 1917.

For the text: Times, 12 points.

Electronic edition made with Microsoft word processor

Layout on paper format: LETTER (US letter), 8.5 '' x 11 '')

Editing completed on 1 st August 2006 in Chicoutimi, Ville de Saguenay, Quebec.

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 3

Introduction by the translator , Julien Freund

First try : “The objectivity of knowledge in science and politics

Second essay: “Critical studies to serve the logic of science

1. Elements for a discussion of the ideas of Édouard Meyer

Third essay: “Essay on some categories of sociology comprehen-

1. Meaning of a "comprehensive" sociology.

Fourth essay: “Essay on the meaning of“ axiological neutrality ”in

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 4

ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE

TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND INTRODUCED BY JULIEN FREUND

The essays published here are taken from

Return to the table of contents

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 5

Return to the table of contents

Max Weber's published work is considerable. We are content with

We made a point of including the translations, no doubt to render hom-

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 6

Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats

Trad. Italian: La storia agraria romana (Milano, Societa editrice libra-

Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie .

Vorbemerkungen [General introduction].

English, Spanish, Italian and French translation, in the works

Die Protestantische Ethik und der "Geist" des Kapitalismus, 1905.

Trad. English: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

Trad. Italian: L'etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalismo (Roma,

Trad. Spanish -. Protestant etica y el espiritu del capitalismo

Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920.

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 7

Trad. French: Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism , in

Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen.

Einleitung. - I. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. - Zwischenibetrach-

Trad. English introduction and excursus ap. From Max Weber .

Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. - It. Hinduismus und Bud dhis-

VOLUME III (1st ed. 1921; 2nd ed. 1923).

Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. - 111. Das antike Judentum -

Gesammelte Politische Schriften.

Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, 1895.

Max Weber, Essays on the Theory of Science. First attempt (1904) 8

Der verschärfte U-Boot-Krieg, 1916.

Trad. Italian: P arlameto e governo, nel nuovo ordinamento della

Die nächste innerpolitische Aufgabe, 1918. Waffenstillstand und Frieden,

Zur Untersuchung der Schuldfrage, 1919. Politik als Beruf, 1919 ..

Trad. English ap. From Max Weber .

Trad. Italian ap. Il lavoro intellettuale come professione (Torino, Ei-

Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, III.

Trad. full Spanish: Economia y Sociedad (México Fondo de