Legal Separation: Procedure in filing petitions for legal separation (Articles 55 to 67)

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ vs.

EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

REYES, J.B.L.,J
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife
continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.
They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with

Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the
trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present rebuttal
evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly
notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the
one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff, before the final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and it will also apply if the action involved
property rights.
RULING:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and
there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or
by the heirs of the appellant.

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo (plaintiff) and Serafina Florenciano (defendant) were

married on April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcales.
Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff
sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one
year. Again plaintiff discovered that while in Manila, defendant was going out with
several other men aside from Jose Arcales. Towards the end of June 1952 when
defendant had finished her vocational studies, she left plaintiff and since then they
had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with one Nelson Orzane. Plaintiff filed an action for legal
separation against his wife. Defendant put as defense that plaintiff condoned her
adulterous acts with Orzane since plaintiff never sought for her after having
discovered her adulterous acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff condone the acts of the defendant.

RULING:

No. The Court do not think plaintiff’s failure to actually search for defendant
wife and take her home, after the latter had left him in 1952, constituted
condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzane. It will be
remembered that Serafina “left” plaintiff after having sinned with Arcales and after
he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not plaintiff’s
duty to search for her and bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. The
Court, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband’s petition for legal separation
against his wife, reversed the appealed decision and decrees a legal separation
between De Ocampo and Florenciano with all the consequent effects.
TEODORO E. LERMA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CONCEPCION DIAZ
G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:

FACTS:

Husband Teodoro Lerma (Lerma) sued his wife and a certain Teddy Ramirez
for adultery. Sometime later, the wife sued Lerma for legal separation with an
urgent motion for support pendente lite. Lerma opposed the motion setting up the
wife’s alleged adultery as a defense.

ISSUES:

Whether or nor the adultery a valid defense

RULING:

Yes, the alleged adultery of the wife is a valid defense if there is a good
chance that this adultery can be proved. And this is true, whether what is asked is
support from the husband’s capital or from the conjugal partnership property,
because even in the latter case where conjugal partnership assets are involved, the
right to a separate maintenance is granted only if there is justifiable cause for it, not
when the person asking is, to all appearance, guilty of adultery.

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

FELIX, J.:
FACTS:

U.S Navy serviceman Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters informing

him of the alleged acts of infidelity of his wife, Leonila Ginez. He admitted that
she even informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. He sought for his
wife and when the two met, they both proceeded to a certain house where they
stayed and lived for two (2) nights and one (1) day. Then they repaired to
Bugayong’s house and again passed the night there as husband and wife. On the
following day, the petitioner tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery. But Ginez, instead of
answering the query, merely packed up and left, which the petitioner took as
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on his wife. Bugayong went to Ilocos
“to soothe his wounded feelings then filed for legal separation against his wife,
who in turn filed a motion to dismiss on ground of condonation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a finding that there was condonation on the part of
plaintiff-appellant.

RULING:

Yes. According to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to the alleged

adultery on the part of the husband. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that
legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition. It was ruled that a single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live
in the same house, it is presumed that they live in terms of matrimonial
cohabitation. Pursuant to foreign jurisprudence, a divorce suit will not be granted
for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known or there
is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single
night. Since the parties have stayed together as husband and wife for more than
two nights after the knowledge of wife’s infidelity, condonation is established.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA and

TERESITA S. GANDIONCO
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:

Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed

with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment
of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with
MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the
payment of support pendente lite.

Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on
the case of concubinage.
RULING:

No. Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on

concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for
concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability
arising from the offense.

Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”
even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.
 ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. NO. 153206 October 23, 2006

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong
(Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They
have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the
age of majority.

On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under
Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. RTC rendered
its Decision decreeing legal separation, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of abandonment thus the petition for legal
separation should be denied.

RULING:

No. The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted is without merit, following Art.
56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied
when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

Republic Act No. 9262- act defining violence against women and their
children and protective measures

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MELCHOR CABALQUINTO

G.R. No. 167693 September 19, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 147678-87]

TINGA, J.

FACTS:
 Cabalquinto was accused of raping his eight-year old daughter seven times.
He was found guilty of by the Regional Trial Court for rape on two counts and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The victim testified that her father had
raped her seven times since her mother left for abroad. A medical certificate and
the testimony of the mother further supported the charge. But the defense pointed
out some inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother on
certain circumstances of the alleged rape events. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and also ordered payment of damages.

ISSUE:
Is Cabalquinto guilty of rape?

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court meticulously and painstakingly examined the records
as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes and found no cause to overturn the
findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
mother’s testimony that she witnessed the act of rape corroborates the victim-
daughter’s account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her
mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the
question of whether rape was actually committed.

Thus, whether the victim cried out or not does not discount rape. It should be
emphasized that the victim was only eight years old when she was raped. A child
of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her
torment with exactitude.Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is
rape as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when
the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be
imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law. In this case, the qualifying
circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the accused as the
latter’s daughter were properly alleged in the Information, proven during trial and
not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.The accused is sentenced,
in each of the criminal cases reviewed, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for each count, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count.Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity, are automatically granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the
other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from
sexually abusing their daughters.

What was notable in this case was the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, in
relation to Republic Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and Republic Act 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), on the confidential
nature a rape trial. According to the Court, these laws uniformly seek to respect the
dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. The Court thus
withheld the real name of the victim, and used fictitious initials instead to represent
her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEXANDER MANGITNGIT

G.R. No. 171270 September 20, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 153250-52]
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

That on or about the 29th day of January, 1999, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
morning, the said accused with lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter, 12 years of age, against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice. At his arraignment on 17 May 1999, appellant, duly
assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to all three counts of
rape. In Criminal Case No. 14971, however, private complainant AAA repeatedly
failed to appear despite due notice. Appellant thus moved for the dismissal of said
case invoking the right of appellant to speedy trial which the trial court granted in
its Order dated 15 May 2000. The trial court favored BBB and CCC's version of
the events and convicted appellant of the crimes charged. When the case was
brought to CA, the Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to deviate from
the findings of the trial court. It held that BBB and CCC's testimonies which were
direct, straightforward, free from inconsistencies and unshaken by rigid cross-
examination, duly corroborated by medical evidence on record, are sufficient to
support a conviction for rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of the minor victim should be given weight.

RULING:

Yes. We reiterate that a rape victim's testimony against her parent is entitled to
great weight since Filipino children have a natural reverence and respect for their
elders. These values are so deeply ingrained in Filipino families and it is
unthinkable for a daughter, or daughters in this case, to brazenly concoct a story of
rape against their/her father, if such were not true.
 Moreover, courts give full weight and credence to testimonies of child-victims
of rape. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that 12-year old and 15-year old girl like CCC and BBB would impute
a crime as serious as rape to their own father, undergo the humiliation of a public
trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing their own
degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender
apprehended and punished. More especially in BBB's case, already in her teen and
self-conscious years, the embarrassment and stigma of allowing an examination of
her private parts and testifying in open court on the painfully intimate details of her
ravishment by her father effectively rule out the possibility of false accusations of
rape.

Rights and obligations between husband and wife (Article 68-73)

MARIANO B. ARROYO vs.DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014             August 11, 1921

STREET, J.:

FACTS:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the

bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few
short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of
Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with
the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had
been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations,
this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home
and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of
marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she
averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed
for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in
favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her
alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to
the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial
of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by
appeal to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is within the province of the courts of this country to attempt
to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other.

RULING:

The Court are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair
are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these
countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.

JULIETA B. NARAG vs.ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

PER CURIAM:
FACTS:

Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against

her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated
Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 

Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his
paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint
of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion
to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as
the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy.
The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as
again the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories.
After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed
abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In
addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated
and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.

RULING:
Yes. The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set
for the members of the law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
 CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

Property relations between husband and wife (Articles 74-148)

MARGARITA QUINTOS DE ANSALDO and ANGEL A. ANSALDO vs.

THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FIDELITY & SURETY
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and LUZON SURETY
COMPANY
G.R. No. L-43257 February 19, 1937

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:

Romarico Agcaoili obtained a loan from Phil Trust Co. upon the express
guaranty of Fidelity and Surety and Co and Angel Ansaldo agreed to indemnify
Fidelity. Agcaoili defaulted and so Fidelity paid Phil Trust. Fidelity then sued
Ansaldo for the recovery of P19,065 and after obtaining a judgment in its favor,
caused the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account of Angel and Margarita in
BPI amounting to P165.
 Margarita and Angel filed a third-party claim averring that the money is part
of the conjugal property of the spouses and not liable for the payment of Angel’s
personal obligations. An action against respondents were also filed to in order to
declare void the execution levy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a joint account of a husband and wife is liable for the payment of
the obligation of the husband.

RULING:
No. It is clear that the amount of P636 is derived the paraphernal property of
Margarita. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said spouses.

The provision of art.1408 must be understood as subject to the qualifications,

established by Art.1386, to the effect that the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband,
provides, “ The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment
of personal obligations of the husband, unless it proved that such obligation were
productive of some benefit to the family”. In construing the article together, it is
clear that the fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the assets of
the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of
the husband, unless it is proven that such obligations produce some benefit to the
family.
 TOMASITA BUCOY vs. REYNALDO PAULINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-25775 April 26, 1968

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiff TomasitaBucoy and defendant Reynaldo Paulino were married on

October 29, 1956. The husband occupied himself with the business of buying and
selling PX goods, second hand cars and household appliances with the help of his
wife. With their savings, they acquired seven parcels of land in Angeles, Pampanga
In the latter part of 1957, defendant Reynaldo Paulino was following up his father's
loan with the GSIS in Malacañang. There, he met defendant Eufemia Bernardo,
relations between Reynaldo and Eufemia became intimate. As early as 1958,
Eufemia knew that Reynaldo was a married man. She did not mind playing second
fiddle to the legitimate wife.

Back to the spouses TomasitaBucoy and Reynaldo Paulino. Following their

marriage, they took up residence in Cavite City. Apparently by reason of their buy-
and-sell business, Reynaldo frequented Angeles City, while Tomasita remained in
Cavite City. Through remarks made by friends of Reynaldo, Tomasita became
aware of the extra-legal relationship between her husband and Eufemia Bernardo

In 1961, the spouses commenced the construction of Pauline's Motel on the six
lots. This motel was opened for business in July of 1962. TomasitaBucoy took part
in the management of Pauline's Motel. She kept tab of the daily receipt since the
motel opened for business in July, 1962 until February, 1963.

It was in this month — February, 1963 — that TomasitaBucoy saw Eufemia

Bernardo inside Pauline's Motel1 and learned that she was occupying a room
therein with the consent of her husband, Reynaldo Paulino. Tomasita left for
Cavite City and resided with her parents. On June 18, 1963, two deeds of absolute
sale were executed by Reynaldo Paulino in favor of Eufemia Bernardo:
Tomasita Bucoy made a trip in August to Angeles City. There, Tomasita learned of
the sale of the properties.

All these events culminated in the filing by TomasitaBucoy of a complaint

with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga4 on September 19, 1963 seeking
annulment of the deed of sale. and the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of
Eufemia Bernardo.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Eufemia Bernardo be
declared as invalid as it was without consent of Tomasita Bucoy.

RULING:

The deed of sale is null and void. According to article 173:

“The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property.”

The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may
be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far
as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife.
EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA vs.PONCIANO
S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983

xxxxxxx

JULIA R. DE REYES vs.PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes-to be herein referred to as Ponciano and

Julia alone for brevity-were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting
of Lots 5 and 6, Block No. 132, situated at Retiro Street, Quezon City-plus the
buildings erected thereon, were bought from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to be herein mentioned as "Araneta"-February, 1947 on
installment basis.

On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Arayat,
Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question, together with their
improvements to appellees Mendozas for the sum of P80,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living
separately and were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were subsequently issued in the name
of the Mendozas.
Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of
himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and
without his knowledge or consent.
Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their
answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and
that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In a
separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas'
contentions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed properties are conjugal properties.

RULING:

The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which
provides the following conjugal partnership property:

“(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses;”

There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage. The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by
the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the
Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact
that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not
destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was
registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature,
neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land
registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal
nature.

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA vs.COURT OF

APPEALS SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO
VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO,
MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR
GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR.
G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997

FRANCISCO,J.:
FACTS:

A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named
Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners,
the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain
an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their
1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina
were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was
sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan
however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming
that they own 9/10 of the land. The RTC said that the land was presumed to be
conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in
the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of
the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties
appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10
or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parcel of land is a conjugal property of Santiago Garcia and
Consuelo Garcia.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that it is an exclusive property of Santiago Garcia. The
said parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother
Eugenia Clemente and that it used to be part of a big tract of land which was
divided among Santiago and his sisters. It has been repeatedly held by this Court
that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the
marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that
the property was acquired during the marriage.
 JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZ vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. His wife,
Gilda, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contends that such illness of
the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities.

The RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to
Art 124 of the Family Code and that the proceedings therein are governed by the
rules on summary proceedings. The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that the petition made by his mother was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such, it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings;
instead, it should follow the rules on special proceedings in the Revised Rules of
Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the Family code
comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife”
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. He, he argued
that this should not be applied in this case. During the pendency of the motion,
Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son-in law (Glenda and Jose Uy).
Upon the appeal of Teodoro, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gilda, as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, as

cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

RULING:

No. The SC ruled in favour of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings

does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that subject spouse
was incompetent being in a comatose condition and diagnosed to have brain
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers
of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian.

SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,

JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
 Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6,
1964 but had been most of the time living separately. In Hongkong sometime in
June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong
dollars or P321,830.95. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within
the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court of First Instance.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the ground
that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was
committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. In
view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against
Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of
money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court.

The lower court rendered a decision holding that Romarico was indeed not
given his day in court as he was not represented by counsel nor was he notified of
the hearings therein although he was never declared in default. The court, finding
that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the
jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership property
being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the same may not be sold or
disposed of for value until after the liquidation and settlement of the community
assets. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum

of money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and
sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed.

RULING:
 No. The Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they
are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and
Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned
by Romarico.

Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family
if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the
conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and
when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.

Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the

Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation
to them. The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires no higher
or better right than what the execution debtor has in the property levied upon.
 AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO
MAGSAJO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO &
ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) was granted a P50,300,000 loan from

petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent
Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon
PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.

After trial, the court gave decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and
Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan
with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution
and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

RULING:
 Petition is denied. The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. PBM
has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their being
stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt
and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stocks. If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit
of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

GERTRUDO FLORES, ET AL. vs. ARSENIO ESCUDERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-5302 March 11, 1953

MONTEMAYOR, J.

FACTS:

Regino Beltran and Simeona de Mesa were married in Laguna in 1877—They

had three children, namely: Mariano, Eulalio and Romualda. Sometime in 1902,
Regino left Simeona and never returned to their conjugal home—He died in 1925
while living separately from Simeona.

In 1912, while living separately from Regino, Simeona purchased a parcel of

land which she sometimes managed alongside her son Mariano until it was sold to
couple Arsenio Escudero and Rosario Adap—Mariano signed the Deed of Sale and
conveyed whatever right and interest he had in said parcel to Arsenio and Rosario.
Meanwhile, Romualda was married to Ponciano Flores with whom she had nine
children out of wedlock--She died two years ahead of her mother Simeona in 1941.

Eight years later, Ponciano, on behalf of his nine children with Romualda
(hereinafter Gertrudo et al.), attempted to repurchase one-sixth (1/6) of said parcel
which is supposed to be the portion corresponding to Romualda as inheritance
from her father Regino (who is said to have owned one-half (1/2) of the parcel as
his share of the conjugal partnership property)--The attempt, however, failed,
thereby causing Gertrudo et al. to pray for the recovery of one-sixth (1/6) of said
parcel before the trial court.

In its decision, the trial court found the whole parcel, having been purchased
during the marriage of Simeona and Regino, was conjugal property and that upon
Regino's death, one-half (1/2) thereof which belonged to him was inherited by his
three children with Simeona, including Romualda; hence, Gertrudo et al. had a
right to one-sixth (1/6) of the parcel as their inheritance from their mother.

Therefore, the trial court declared the sale of the parcel corresponding to
Romualda null and void, and ordered Arsenio and Rosario to pay Gertrudo et al.
monthly rental until complete delivery of said corresponding parcel. Arsenio and
Rosario appealed the decision, contending that the land purchased by Simeona in
1912 is exclusive property because her husband Regino contributed nothing to its
acquisition given that he had abandoned her and was living separately from her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land purchased by Simeona in 1912 during the lifetime of
her husband Regino but while living separately from him was conjugal partnership
property

RULING:

YES. Under the law, all property acquired during the marriage regardless of
whether the spouses are living together or not is conjugal property. While the
purchase was made exclusively by Simeona, it was not shown that she made the
purchase with her own money.

In the absence of proof to that effect, the law equally presumes that the money
came from conjugal funds which may consist of any income from conjugal
properties or from the exclusive properties of the spouses or from services,
industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BALDOMERO J. LESACA.

CONSUELO F. LESACA AND JUANA F. LESACA vs. JUANA FELIX
VDA. DE LESACA
G.R. No. L-3605 April 21, 1952

REYES, J.
FACTS:

Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila onNovember 8, 1946. He was

survived by his second wife (JuanaFelix), two minor children by the latter, two
children by hismarriage, and three acknowledged natural children by a
thirdwoman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F.Lesaca, his
children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. Itappears that the deceased and his
widow, Juana Felix, hadlived together maritally since 1924 but were not married
untilDecember 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allowances for support granted by the court to legitimate
minor children of the deceased pending liquidation of his estate are subject to
collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance?

RULING :

Yes. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a
retrovendendo before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal
property or not. In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer. Whether a
standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and harvested after the death of
the one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article
1401 of the Civil Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the
surviving spouse. It should belong to the conjugal partnership
 TERESITA C. FRANCISCO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and
CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA;
ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA;
ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998

QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner is private respondent Eusebio Francisco’s legal wife by his 2 nd

marriage. The other private respondents are his children by his 1st marriage.
Allegedly, the Francisco’s have acquired several properties since their marriage in
February 1962. Eusebio administered these realties until he was invalidated by
various diseases, rendering him unfit to administer them.

Petitioner averred that his children convinced their father to sign a general
power of attorney which authorized one of his children, Conchita, to administer the
house and lot as well as the apartments. Consequently, petitioner filed a suit for
damages and for annulment of said General Power Attorney and thus, enjoining its
enforcement. She also sought to be declared as the administratrix of all the
properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pertinent provisions of the Family Code can be given a
retroactive effect in the case at bar.

RULING:

No. The party who invokes the presumption provided by A.160, NCC must
first prove that the property in question was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. The presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Further, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of
the spouses.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage to
Eusebio.
 MANOTOK REALTY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FELIPE MADLANGAWA
G.R. No. L-45038 April 30, 1987

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:

The private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying
a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949
upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the
subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the
lot.

On 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private
respondent were placed under custodia legis.

Private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00
which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. There, thus,
remained an unpaid balance of P5,700.00 but the private respondent did not pay or
was unable to pay this balance because after the death of the testatrix, Clara
Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could not settle their differences. Apart from the
initial deposit, no further payments were made from 1950.

On March 13 and 20, 1959, petitioner became the successful and vendee of
the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision in pursuant to the deeds of sale executed
in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company , as its administrator of the Testate of
Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot is dispute was one of those covered by the
sale. The Deed of Sale was provided for terms and conditions.

Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the
Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court
action with damages would follow. This include amongst others who refused to
vacate the lots.
However, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s action. CA ruled that the only
right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance because
accordingly it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor, Don Vicente Legarda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of paraphernal

property.

RULING:

No. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The record does not show that
Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Doña
Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the
sale which was entered into by the private respondent and DonVicente Legarda
had its inception before the death of Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the
Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after her
death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot
in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Doña
Clara Tambunting, under Art. 136 NCC which states “The wife retains the
ownership of the paraphernal property” and Art. 137 “The wife shall have the
administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the
husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.In this
case, the public instrument shall be recorded in theRegistry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give adequate security.”

The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the
private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor
administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the
subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as the administrator of the

estate of Doña Clara Tambunting, he should have applied to the probate court for
authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the
probate court to approve the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been
able to execute the valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. But Don Vicente
Legarda had no effort to comply with the above-quoted procedure Nor on that of
the respondent to protect his interest or to pay the balance of the installments to the
court appointed administrator.

ISAIAS F. FABRIGAS and MARCELINA R. FABRIGAS vs. SAN

FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, INC.
G.R. No. 152346 November 25, 2005

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Fabrigas(petitioner) and respondent San francisco Del Monte, Inc.(Del

Monte) entered into an agreement, denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2482-V,
whereby the latter agreed to sell to Spouses Fabrigas a parcel of residential land.
The said lot was worth P109,200.00 and it was registered in the name of
respondent Del Monte. The agreement stipulated that Spouses Fabrigas shall pay
P30,000.00 as downpayment and the balance within ten years in monthly
successive installments of P1,285.69.

After paying P30,000.00, Spouses Fabrigas took possession of the property but
failed to make any installment payments on the balance of the purchase price.
Despite the demand letter made by Del Monte and the grace period given still the
said Spouses did not comply with their obligations.

On January 21, 1985, petitioner Marcelina and Del Monte entered into another
agreement denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2941-V, covering the same
property but under restricted terms of payment. Under the second contract, the
parties agreed on a new purchase price of P131,642.58, the amount of P26,328.52
as downpayment and the balance to be paid in monthly installments of P2,984.60
each. After the said deal, the petitioner made some delinquent installments paying
less than the stated amount, to which Del Monte made a demand letter to the
petitioners. And this time they ordered the cancellation of the Contract to Sell No.
2941-V.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Contract to Sell No. 2941-V was valid.

RULING:

Yes. The Court quotes with approval the following factual observations of the
trial court, which cannot be disturbed in this case. The Court notes that defendant,
Marcelina Fabrigas, although she had to sign contract No. 2491-V, to avoid
forfeiture of her downpayment, and her other monthly amortizations, was entirely
free to refuse to accept the new contract. There was no clear case of intimidation or
threat on the part of plaintiff in offering the new contract to her.

At most, since she was of sufficient intelligence to discern the agreement she is
entering into, her signing of Contract No. 2491-V is taken to be valid and binding.
The fact that she has paid monthly amortizations subsequent to the execution of
Contract to Sell No. 2491-V, is an indication that she had recognized the validity
of such contract. In sum, Contract to Sell No. 2491-V is valid and binding. There is
nothing to prevent respondent Del Monte from enforcing its contractual
stipulations and pursuing the proper court action to hold petitioners liable for their
breach thereof.

CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS
G.R. No. 74577 December 4, 1990

NARVASA, J.
FACTS:

Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz.
After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated
the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. Modesto Aranas
obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto
was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of
Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro
borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their
father’s property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative
Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness. Dorothea and Teodoro
failed to pay their loan.

As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and

acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later,
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses
Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and
they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action upon
their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife
Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and
personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion
and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will,
on the other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his
conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by
him to his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses

Modesto and Victoria.

RULING:

No. Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the

lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his
“exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by
lucrative title”. Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from
his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The
property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs.COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 106858 September 5, 1997

FACTS:

In 1984, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed two (2)

collection suits against, among others, Joseph L.G. Chua, husband of herein private
respondent, who acted as one of the sureties for the financial obligations with the
petitioner. After the filing of the complaint, the co-defendants of Joseph L.G. Chua
had no more properties left to answer for their obligations to the bank. The bank
chose to run after Joseph L.G. Chua who was found to own a property situated in
Dasmarinas, Makati. Said property was, however, discovered to have been earlier
transferred to Jaleco Development Corporation by virtue of a Deed of Exchange
dated October 24, 1983 executed by Joseph L.G Chua with the conformity of
private respondent. The bank considered such transfer as in fraud of creditors and
thereby sought its annulment before the Regional Trial Court. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals favored PBCom.

When said decision became final, the subject property was immediately levied,
and the auction sale was set. Private respondent Gaw Le Ja Chua, wife of Joseph L.
G. Chua, filed a Third Party Claim. At the same time, she initiated two separate
reinvindicatory actions on the subject property in the lower court.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion to Direct the Sheriff to
Enforce the Writ of Execution/Auction Sale.

On August 15, 1991, the RTC denied petitioner's motion. The Motion for
Reconsideration with a motion to quash the third party claim was, likewise, denied.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is now estopped from filing a third-party

claim as well as an independent action involving the property in question.

RULING:

YES. For her part, private respondent gave her marital consent or conformity
to the Deed of Exchange and that by that act she became necessarily a party to the
instrument. She cannot, therefore, feign ignorance to the simulated transaction
where the intention was really to defraud her husband's creditors.

She changed task by claiming that the property is conjugal and, as an

afterthought, she filed a third party claim. Notably, she never intervened in said
case where the validity of the Deed of Exchange was being questioned to protect
her rights and interests if indeed she truly believed that the property belonged to
the conjugal partnership. At the very least, private respondent is now estopped
from claiming that property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership.

The principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in pais, are

made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is
estoppel by silence, which obtains here and as to which it has been held that:

. . . an estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words.

"Estoppel by silence" arises where a person, who by force of
circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains from doing
so and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a state of
facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may
 support an estoppel whether the failure to speak is intentional or
negligent.

Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a

misrepresentation and concealment of facts, so as to raise an equitable estoppel.
When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would
become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny
what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in
conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in
conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to
speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent.
Petition is granted.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALEJO M. VINLUAN
G.R. No. 102692 September 23, 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business
under the name of “Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89
for which she issued seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced
and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.  Partial
payments were made after several demands.  When no further payments were
made to settle the obligation, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) filed a complaint against
the spouses for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. 
RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no “privity of
contract between J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan (Alejo) regarding the
obligations incurred by the wife”.  Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise
after the obligation involved in this action has been incurred. 

The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute
judgment on the properties of the wife.  However, the 2 notices of levy on
execution covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the
properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses.  This led the husband to file a
third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties.  Trial
court denied the third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when he
did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wife’s
engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the
settlement of his wife’s account. 

Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal and
paraphernal property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final
judgment.  CA upheld private respondent.  Hence this petition by J&J.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his
wife without his consent and did not benefit from conjugal partnership.

RULING:

SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court couldn’t, in
the guise of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision.  Only the wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable.  And since the power of the
execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor
alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. 

In any event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to

bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by
either the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business.  The
respondent court already found that the husband did not give his consent neither
did the obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.

ROBERTO TING, and DOLORES TINGvs.HON. AUGUSTO E. VILLARIN,

FELICIANO GERVACIO, FERDINAND J. GUERRERO, and
CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. L-61754 August 17, 1989

SARMIENTO, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioners, Roberto Ting, a director, was impleaded with his wife Dolores Lim
Ting. The complaint recites that the wife was impleaded as a party defendant in
order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains which allegedly benefitted from
the transactions subject of the complaint.

Consolidated Bank actually sued on two (2) causes of action. The first was
targeted at recovering on several promissory notes the amount of P2,972,955.51,
allegedly obtained for the defendant corporation by its duly authorized officers Lu
Cheng Peng, Teng See, and Roberto Ting. The second cause of action dwells on
several violations of trust receipt agreements which the defendant corporation
executed in favor of Consolidated Bank.

The petitioners came to this Court via a petition for certiorari. They are
questioning the writ of preliminary attachment principally on the ground that the
application therefor hinges on "fraud in contracting" the trust receipt agreements
under the second cause of action. Finally, the petitioners ask that the writ of
preliminary attachment be struck down by this Court because it authorized an
attachment over the petitioners' conjugal partnership property.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment issued is valid because, in

effect, it pierced the veil of corporate fiction. And that the corporation alone should
be held liable for the violation of the trust receipt agreements.

RULING:

Yes. The writ of preliminary attachment issued was invalid because it did not
provide for a sufficient basis and is not enough for the complaint to ritualistically
cite, that the defendants are “guilty of fraud in contracting an obligation.”

The respondent judge thus failed in this duty to ensure that, before issuing the
writ of preliminary attachment, all the requisites of the law have been complied
with. He acted in excess of his jurisdiction and the writ he so issued is thus null
and void.
 TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, JR. vs. SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980

MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS:

Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with
the land. The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured.
Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of
Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include “restrain
defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave
Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. The court enjoined
Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property.

The case was then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary
injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan Sr.
sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which
was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran
because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command
a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI
Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal
property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which the Loring
property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal.
Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They
appealed but was denied on the ground that the order appealed from is merely
interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA
which affirmed the same, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did
not acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to
sell.

RULING:

CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended
complaint prayed among others to restrain defendant from encumbering or
disposing of the property. This in effect brings the Loring property under the
jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of the
legal separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the
order. The administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute.
It was subject to a condition. The CFI Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction
primarily acquired by CFI Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case
is finally terminated.

LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO,

MERCEDES SAN PEDRO, DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T.
AQUINO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division), GRACE
GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband GERMAN GALCOS; ESTER
GOSIENGFIAO, assisted by her husband AMADOR BITONA;
FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., NORMA GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY
ROSE GUENO
G.R. No. 101522 May 28, 1993

NOCON, J.

FACTS:

Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in

Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to
secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate
heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma,
Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto. The bank foreclosed on the
mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma,
Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption
in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano. Grace
Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a
complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses
Mariano. RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et.
al.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own
personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing
state of co-ownership?

RULING:

No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a

co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the
foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not
vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-
owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership.
Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written
notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to
run.

ESTELA COSTUNA vs. LAUREANA DOMONDON THE HON.

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVIII,
QUEZON CITY, THE HON. PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, 13TH DIVISION, MANILA
G.R. No. 82753 December 19, 1989

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:

During their marriage, the spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three
parcels of land located in San Francisco del Monte Quezon City and registered in
the name of Amadeo Costuna. Sometime in November 1977, Amadeo sustained
third degree burns on his legs which were treated at various hospitals on different
dates. At the request of his relatives and while already being ill, Amadeo went to
Samar where he stayed with his sister to sign documents that needed his signature
pertaining to his Samar properties and never returned to Estela.

A feud ensued among Amadeo’s relatives and Estela over his custody
prompting Estela to institute a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of First
Instance in Quezon City. Five days later, Amadeo filed an action for partition
before the Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. On July 10, 1978, after failing
to get Estela’s consent to the desired partition, Amadeo was constrained to execute
a deed of sale over the one-half undetermined portion of the conjugal property in
favor of the respondent without the consent of Estela.

Thereafter, Costuna instituted special proceedings claiming one half share over
the lots after Amadeo’s death. On the other hand, Domondon filed an action to
compel Estela to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by Amadeo,
which was granted by the trial court and ordered Estela to affix her signature on the
deed of sale. The sale of the 1/2 of the conjugal properties to Domondon was
allegedly for the payment of Amandeo’s hospital expenses, which Estela never
rebutted. Estela, however, avers that the sale was void because her consent was not
given and argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Articles 166 and 167
of the new Civil Code and related jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be validly
made without the consent of the wife.

RULING:
YES. As a general rule, the husband may not validly sell real estates belonging
to the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. However, the New Civil
Code provides certain exceptions. In this case, Amadeo sought the petitioner’s
consent but was adamantly withheld by the latter from her belief that the deed of
sale was executed in fraud of her. What was sold by Amadeo without the
petitioner’s consent was only an undetermined one-half share in the community
properties, but he left intact the other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong
to Estela Costuna. The Court concedes that the consent of the petitioner is essential
for the validity of the sale, however, the Court may relax the application of the law
and consider the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions if consent was
unreasonably withheld.
RAMON C. ONGvs.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-63025 November 29, 1991
PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own
logging business and to acquire or make some development for her business she
loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private respondent. Due to mismanagement,
she failed to pay her obligation. Boix filed a complaint, based on the promissory
notes issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix, he then moved
to execute the judgment.

The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and attached a

parcel of land. An auction sale was held and Boix was adjudged the highest bidder
and a writ of possession was issued. Ramon filed a motion with the CFI of Manila
to quash the writ of possession and was denied. He then brought the case to the CA
to annul the auction sale, alleging that the property is conjugal and thus could not
be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property was subject to the payment of the debts of the wife.

RULING:

YES. After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to
the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations
contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable not
only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the
spouse.

The party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs
to the conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal,
the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art.
117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may
object (but subject to certain conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife
was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently
without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his
implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

ESTELITA PADILLA
G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991

NARVASA, J.

FACTS:

Thomas and Criselda Cheesman married in December 1970. In June 1974, a

Deed of Sale covering a parcel of unregistered land and house thereon was
executed by Armando Altares in favor of Criselda. Aware of the deed, Thomas did
not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Also without objection from
his end, tax declarations for the property were issued in the name of Criselda only,
while she assumed exclusive management and administration thereon. However, in
February 1981, Thomas and Criselda separated. In July 1981, Criselda sold the
property to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge or consent of Thomas.

In July 1981, Thomas filed a complaint against Criselda before CFI Olongapo
for the annulment of the sale on the ground that it was executed without his
knowledge and consent. In her answer, Criselda alleged that property was
parapheral having purchased the same with Funds exclusively belonging to her;
that Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of
ownership in the land; and that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. The CFI
declared the sale void ab initio, and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas
as administrator of the conjugal partnership property. However, Estelita filed a
petition for relief on the ground of fraud, mistake or excusable negligence which
had seriously impared her right to present her case adequately. Thus, judgement
was set aside, petition for relief was given due course, and a new judge presided
over the case.

Thereafter, a Summary Judgement declared the sale to be valid having

satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the marriage
belong to the conjugal property, and that the property was Criselda’s paraphernal
property; and said presumption cannot apply to Thomas being an American citizen,
thus disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties.
Thomas appealed before the IAC but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the property in dispute form part of the conjugal property of
Thomas and Criselda.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled against Thomas. The Court is settled with the facts as
determined the lower and appellate courts that the funds used by Criselda to
purchase the property was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage
to Thomas, and that Estelita did believe in good faith that Criselda was the sole
owner of the property. Consequently, these determinations of facts will not be here
disturbed since the Court is not a trier of facts and has not reason to disturb them.

In this regard, the Constituiton prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Thomas was charged with the knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it
was his intention that the property be purchased by him and Criselda, he acquired
no right whatever over the property by virtue of the purchase; and in attempting to
acquire right or interest in land, vicariously or clandestinely, he knowingly violated
the Constitution; the sale as to him is void. In any event, Thomas had no capacity
or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on
the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property.

To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the Constitution. If

the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would have a decisive vote as to
its transfer or disposition. This is a right which the Constitution does not permit
Thomas to have. As already observed, the finding that that his wife had used her
own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife
had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the
property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may
recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her
with unauthorized disposition of conjugal funds is not now inquired into, for the
same is purely academic. The Decision of IAC is then affirmed.

JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993

VITUG, J.

FACTS:

Alayo D. Bosing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had
three children namely: Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal
home, and started to lived instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot a
child named Josephine Bosing now Josephine Belcodero.
 On August 23, 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on instalment basis from
the Magdalena Estate Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as “married to
Josefa R. Bosing”, the common-law wife. In a letter dated October 6, 1959, which
he addressed to Magdalena Estates Inc. (MEI), he authorized the latter MEI to
transfer the lot in th4 name of his wife “Josefa R. Bosing”. The final deed of sale
was executed by MEI on October 24, 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790
was issued in the name of “Josefa R. Bosing.....married to Alayo Bosing…” Alayo
died on March 11, 1967.

About three years later, on September 17, 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed
the document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was
then described as “conjugal property” of Josefa and deceased Alayo. On October
30, 1980 Juliana Oday and her three legitimate children filed with the Court a quo,
an action for reconveyance of the property. Trial court ruled in their favour and the
CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in question belongs exclusively to Juliana Oday and
her three legitimate children.

RULING:

Yes. The property in question was still part of the conjugal property of Alayo
and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the New Civil Code (Art 160) and the
Old Civil Code (Art 1407), “the property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife”. Josefa is not the owner of the property simply because the
title is in her name. She recognized Alayo’s ownership of the property when three
years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial
partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half interest in the property in what
may be described as her share in the “conjugal partnership” with Alayo.
 TEODORO L. JARDELEZA vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L.
JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L.
JARDELEZA
G.R. No. 112014 December 5, 2000

PARDO, J.

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03
August 1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children,
namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed L.
Jardeleza. On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered
a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. Thereafter, petitioner commenced
with the Regional Trial Court a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over
the person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters
of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of
letters of guardianship to him, rather than to his mother. This was opposed by
respondents. On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
petition for guardianship. The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the
petition is superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife
under the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
 Whether Article 124 of the Family Code renders ―superfluous the appointment
of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.

RULING:

Very recently, in a related case Uy vs. Jardeleza, it was ruled that Article 124 of
the Family Code was not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial
guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

In Uy vs. Jardeleza where the court ruled: ―ART. 124. xxx In the event that
one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. ― The situation contemplated under Art. 124 is one where the
spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule
93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Wherefore, the Court grants the petition,
reverses and sets aside the resolutions of the Regional Trial Court.
VICTOR JUANIZA, et al.  vs.EUGENIO JOSE, et al.
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National
Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to
seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the
accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
decision was rendered, ordering Eugenio and Rosalia to pay for damages.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with
her co-defendant but was denied.

The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil
Code which reads:
When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Rosalia then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which certified the
same to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case

where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated
to marry.

2. Whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can
be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered
owner of the same.

RULING:

1. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership

contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and
the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro
 Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia
Arroyo.

Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Rosario cannot be a

co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership
of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of
Rosario for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries
suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be
liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our
jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its
operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

Rosalia is declared free from any liability for damages.

FACTS:

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or

paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree
with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets
of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties
unto the marriage. Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of
P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-
Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. The latter declared that her mother was
the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names
of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the
document for the purpose of assisting his wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court
against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or
in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered,
Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property
and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for
annulment by the Laperals.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the property in question is the paraphernal property of Evelina

RULING:

Yes. All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is
however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property
belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land
is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of
substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded
to buy considering the singular source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of
the wife.

CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971

FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of

lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and
Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was
executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter,
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of
Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time
when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil
Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies
to a common-law relationship.

RULING:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation

between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy

of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together
as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister
to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.