ADOPTION (SEQUITIN)

JURISPRUDENCIAssssss:

SECOND DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of

the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its
decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August
3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat
by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-
inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must
be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or
a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we
shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated
assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that
such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does

not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive
to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right
to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband
therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her
explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her
right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already
vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his
part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the
text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must
not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law
should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a
settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure
leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted
child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the
adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need
not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to
sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such
a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention
and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material
requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to
bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every
slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be
found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to
approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that
there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules
of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and
it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating
to the child and its parents, which may give information to those
interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading.
Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it
substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts
necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish
that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance
with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the
parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will
not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the
decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is
with the consent of his natural parents. 25 The representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial
court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons,
especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since
infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of
the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the
petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found
and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances
of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We
are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the
court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the
child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Oscar M. Herrera, with Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and
Asaali S. Isnani concurring, in CA-G.R. CV No. 17911.
2 Per Judge Angel M. Alegre in Sp. Proc. No. 1386.
3 Rollo, 15.
4 Original Record, 8.
5 Rollo, 18.
6 Ibid., 25-26.
7 Ibid., 6.
8 Sec. 11, Rule 3, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court.
9 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 15 (1964).
10 Ayog, et al., vs. Cusi, etc., et al., 118 SCRA 492, 499 (1982).
11 16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 651.
12 People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al., 71
SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc., et al., 145 SCRA 408
(1986); Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro, etc., et al., 149 SCRA 432 (1987).
13 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 998.
14 Cohen vs. Reckseit, 53 N.Y.S. 2d 365, 184 Misc. 107.
15 People ex rel. Central New England Ry. Co. vs. State Tax Commission, 26
N.Y.S. 2d 425, 261 App. Div. 416; Mich.-Clugston vs. Rogers, 169 N.W. 9, 10,
203 Mich. 339.
16 Republic vs. Pielago, G.R. No. 72218, Resolution, July 21, 1986.
17 Ramos, et al., vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565 (1971), and
cases therein cited.
18 Original Record, 4. This was executed on October 17, 1987 in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A. where he was then residing due to his employment in the Saint
Francis Hospital there, and was duly authenticated in the Philippine Consulate
General in that city.
19 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
20 Ibid., id., 900.
21 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 418.
22 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
23 Ibid., id., 907.
24 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 412.
25 Original Record, 3.
26 TSN, March 28, 1988, 7.
27 Rollo, 21-22.
28 Citing Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 159 SCRA
369 (1988).
29 Rollo, 29.
30 Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28195. June 10, 1971.]

RE ADOPTION OF THE MINORS FRANCIS, ALEX, MARIA TERESA,

JOSEPH, GREG and GERMAN, all surnamed MILLENDEZ,
SINFOROSA T. MILLENDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant.

Celso B. Jamora for Petitioner-Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, 1st Assistant Solicitor General

Esmeraldo Umali and Trial Attorney Diosdado Saavedra
for Oppositor-Appellee.

CIVIL LAW; ADOPTION; NATURE OF; DISQUALIFICATION TO ADOPT;

DISQUALIFICATION SHALL BE ENFORCED EVEN IF A SUSPENSION OR
WAIVER THEREOF WOULD OTHERWISE BENEFIT THE CHILD PROPOSED
TO BE ADOPTED OR THE FATHER OF THE CHILD, WHO IS ALSO THE SON
OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTER, HAS BECOME WAYWARD AND CONSENTED
TO THE ADOPTION. — Adoption, as a privilege granted by law, can be
exercised by any person of age and in full possession of his civil rights. It
is, however, withdrawn from certain persons enumerated in Article 335 of
the Civil Code, among whom are those who have children of their own,
whether the children are legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate. And the
provision, being clear and explicit, had to be enforced although its
suspension or waiver would have worked to the benefit or well-being of
the child proposed to be adopted. Thus, in one case, where after the child
was taken from his natural parents the adopting couple begot children of
their own, a petition subsequently filed to make formal the adoption of the
child was denied, on the ground that the adopters were already
disqualified because of the presence of their own children. It is for the
same reason that the petition of a step-father to adopt his wife’s child had
by a previous marriage was refused, because there were already children
of that second marriage. For, while it is true that the intendment of
adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of the children, such that
the modern trend is to encourage adoption by persons who can provide
them with proper care and education, adoption may be allowed only
where it is possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute. It
is of no significance in this case that appellant’s child has consented to the
adoption, or that such child has become wayward and led a dishonorable
life. Article 335 of the Civil Code creates a disqualification on the adopter
himself, not on the child, that there is nothing about the behaviour of the
latter short of his losing the status of a child (if there is any such means in
the law) that would remove the disqualification prescribed in the article.

2. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 335

(1) OF THE CIVIL CODE. — The reason for the prohibition to adopt under
Article 335 (1) of the Civil Code is not difficult to find. Not only would the
adoption introduce a foreign conflicting element into the family unit, but it
would, in the present case, result in the reduction of the legitimate of the
son to the benefit of the prospective adoptees, who are not forced heirs of
the would-be adopter, thereby producing an indirect disinheritance in a
manner not authorized by law, i.e., by a testament expressly stating the
legal cause for the disinheritance. Not only this, but the adoption would
make the disinheritance of the son permanent and irrevocable, contrary to
the policy of the law that "a subsequent reconciliation between the
offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been
made." This same policy inspires Article 1033, that permits an unworthy
heir to succeed if the de cujus should condone the unworthiness in
writing. The consent of the son to the adoption of his own children by his
mother is likewise ineffective to circumvent the statutory bar, as by Article
905, of the Civil Code, every renunciation of a future legitimate is void,
and of no effect.

3. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF "CHILDREN" AS USED UNDER ARTICLE 335,

CIVIL CODE. — Appellant’s claim that no disqualification attaches to her
having one legitimate child because Article 335 speaks of "children," is
equally devoid of merit. The use of the word "children" in the law does not
mean that an adopter must have more than one legitimate, legitimated or
illegitimate child before the disqualification to adopt shall attach. No such
intention can be discerned from the provision. The use of the word
"children," instead of "child," appears more to have been called for by
grammatical correctness than anything else, to complement the plural
subject "those."

It was ruled that while the adoption would benefit the minors, the
same cannot be granted on account of the express prohibition of Article
335 of the new Civil Code. Petitioner, having a child — Bobby Millendez,
the father of the minors — she is disqualified under the law to adopt
anybody. At any rate, the court pointed out, the purpose of the minors’
mother and grandmother can still be achieved by the latter’s executing a
will, or having Bobby Millendez declared a spendthrift.

Footnotes:
1. The disinheritance was based on the son’s attempts on the life of
the father.

2. Article 334, Civil Code of the Philippines.

3. In re-Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.

4. McGee v. Republic, L-5387, 29 April 1954.

5. Prasnik v. Republic, L-8639, 23 March 1956, 93 Phil. 666.

6. Santos, Jr. v. Republic, L-22523, 29 September 1967, 21 SCRA

379.

7. Santos v. Aranzanso, L-23828, 28 February 1966, 16 SCRA 344.

8. Civil Code, Article 916.

9. Civil Code, Article 922.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
RULE ON ADOPTION
A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION

SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. – This Rule covers the domestic

adoption of Filipino children.
SEC. 2. Objectives. – (a) The best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and
adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and
Internationally, and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children
and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.

(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through
foster care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall:

(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his
parents and is provided with love, care, understanding and security for the
full and harmonious development of his personality. Only when such
efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within
the child’s extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated
person be considered.

(ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in

relinquishing their parental authority over their child;

(iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological

parents;

(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a

positive environment for adoption;

(v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity
to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications and
offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent
preparation and post-adoption education and counseling;

(vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child’s identity and

culture in his native land, and only when this is not available shall inter-
country adoption be considered as a last resort; and

(vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental

authority and custody over their adopted child.

Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall

be administratively or judicially declared so as to establish the status of
the child as “legally available for adoption” and his custody transferred to
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly
licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity
shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule:

(a) “Child” is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
filing of the petition for adoption.

(b) “A child legally available for adoption” refers to a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly
licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the
parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of
adoption, his guardian or adopter(s).

(c) “Voluntarily committed child” is one whose parents knowingly and

willingly relinquish parental authority over him in favor of the Department.

(d) “Involuntarily committed child” is one whose parents, known or

unknown, have been permanently and judicially deprived of parental
authority over him due to abandonment; substantial, continuous or
repeated neglect and abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.

(e) “Foundling” refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose

parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an
orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth
and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a “foundling.”

(f)”Abandoned child” refers to one who has no proper parental care or

guardianship or whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least
six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.

(g) “Dependent child” refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or

custodian or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good
cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent
upon the public for support.

(h) “Neglected child” is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not
attended to or inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by
his parents or guardian.

(i) “Physical neglect” occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and

without proper shelter.

(j) “Emotional neglect” exists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated,

exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to
good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in
moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and
other vices.

(k) “Child-placement agency” refers to an agency duly licensed and

accredited by the Department to provide comprehensive child welfare
services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption,
evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption
home study report.

(1) “Child-caring agency” refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited

by the Department that provides 24-hour residential care services for
abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed children.

(m) “Department” refers to the Department of Social Welfare and

Development.

(n) “Deed of Voluntary Commitment” refers to the written and notarized

instrument relinquishing parental authority and committing the child to the
care and custody of the Department executed by the child’s biological
parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the child’s legal
guardian, to be witnessed by an authorized representative of the
Department after counseling and other services have been made available
to encourage the biological parents to keep the child.

(o) “Child Study Report” refers to a study made by the court social worker
of the child’s legal status, placement history, psychological, social,
spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural background and that of his biological
family needed in determining the most appropriate placement for him.

(p) “Home Study Report” refers to a study made by the court social worker
of the motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to
provide a home that meets the needs of a child.

(q) “Supervised trial custody” refers to the period of time during which a
social worker oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both
adopters and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.

(r) “Licensed Social Worker” refers to one who possesses a degree in

bachelor of science in social work as a minimum educational requirement
and who has passed the government licensure examination for social
workers as required by Republic Act No. 4373.

(s) “Simulation of birth” is the tampering of the civil registry to make it

appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is
not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his true identity
and status.

(t) “Biological Parents” refer to the child’s mother and father by nature.

(u) “Pre-Adoption Services” refer to psycho-social services provided by

professionally-trained social workers of the Department, the social
services units of local governments, private and government health
facilities, Family Courts, licensed and accredited child-caring and child-
placement agencies and other individuals or entities involved in adoption
as authorized by the Department.

(v) “Residence” means a person’s actual stay in the Philippines for three
(3) continuous years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for
adoption and which is maintained until the adoption decree is entered.
Temporary absences for professional, business, health, or emergency
reasons not exceeding sixty (60) days in one (1) year does not break the
continuity requirement.

(w) “Alien” refers to any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and
remains in the Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or travel
documents and visa.

SEC. 4. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil

capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is emotionally
and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen
(16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of a 16-year difference between the age of the adopter
and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent
of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines, that he. has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition’ for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in
his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his
country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his
country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino

spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his spouse a relative within the fourth (4 th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse.

(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate chili of one spouse by

the other spouse; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided,

however, That the other spouse has signified his consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
the spouses.

Adoption under Philippine Law – Divina Law

Published 10 December 2018, The Daily Tribune
Many Filipino children are in dire need of permanent home and
sense of belonging. At the same time, many couples had long been
wanting to grow further their families and have a child. Good thing, our
laws allow adoption.

Adoption is the legal process of according legitimate status to a

child. It is a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that of legitimate paternity and filiation. Adoption can take place
only by judicial decree. A mere agreement between the adopter and the
biological parents of the child without judicial approval is not valid.
 Traditionally, the purpose of adoption was to afford persons who
have no children the consolation of having one. The modern trend,
however, is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status. This was indeed confirmed in 1989, when
the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption
is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent is geared to favor the adopted child.

The Philippines has two laws on adoption, namely: (1) Republic Act
8552 otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; and (2)
Republic Act 8043 otherwise known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995. Domestic adoption governs the adoption of Filipino children by
Filipinos and/or aliens residing in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years, while inter-country adoption pertains to the process of
adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad.

As between the two, domestic adoption is encouraged by the State

to preserve the child’s identity and culture. It is only when domestic
adoption is not available that inter-country adoption may be pursued as a
last resort. In fact, before a child is placed for inter-country adoption, the
law requires that all possibilities for domestic adoption of the child have
been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in the child’s best
interest. When it comes to domestic adoption, on the other hand, the
policy of the law is to have the child adopted by his or her relatives. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or
adoption within the child’s extended family is available shall adoption by
an unrelated person be considered.

After undergoing the proceedings required by adoption laws and

once adoption is decreed by the court, all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee shall cease and be vested upon the adopter. The
adoptee will then be considered the legitimate child of the adopters for all
intents and purposes and will be entitled to all the rights and obligations of
a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of the father and mother. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.

The adopter and the adoptee also have reciprocal rights of

succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. The adoptee can
inherit from their adopting parents and they can represent them in the
estate of the latter’s ascendants. However, while the adopter and the child
acquire reciprocal rights and obligations, adoption does not confer on the
adopted the nationality of the adopter. Citizenship is a privilege, not a
right. Adoption is not recognized by law as a way of acquiring citizenship.

The foregoing laws on adoption are liberally construed to carry out

the beneficent purposes of adoption. Every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate
objectives of the law — that is, to promote the interests and welfare of the
adopted child. The next articles will tackle the procedure for domestic and
inter-country adoption. Meanwhile, those who are minded to adopt should
carefully consider its consequences before adopting a decision.

Guidelines for Child Adoptee[edit]

The alien or Filipino permanently residing abroad must be at least
27 years of age and 16 years older than the child. A joint adoption must be
done in the case of marriage. He/she/they must be eligible to adopt under
Philippine, UN and their foreign national laws from a country wherein the
Philippines must have diplomatic relations. From the Domestic Adoption
Act, he/she has to have been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the petition and stays until the
adoption decree is entered.

According to the ICAB, marital requirements also apply[26]

 Minimum length of marriage requirement for ICA applicants is 3
years;
 Applicants who have lived together in a common law
relationship for several years culminating in a legal marriage
must be married for at least one (1) year and the stability of the
relationship prior to marriage ios taken into consideration;
https://www.icab.gov.ph/faq/ - retrieved
Jan 25, 2021

 Single applicants are not prohibited from applying but effective July
2007 the Board has set a moratorium on the acceptance of single
applicants unless the child preference is a child with special needs
(older or sibling group);
 PAPs with history of divorce: since stability of marriage will ensure
the permanency of the placement, a maximum of two (2) divorce
histories will be accepted.

Additional requirements set by the ICAB include:

Educational requirements: must have at least a high school diploma
Income requirements: must have a minimum annual income of
US$40,000.00
Single applicants: Resources for older children between 9–15 years old.
[24]

Inter-country adoption procedure[edit]

As of Section 10, 11 and 14, the prospective adoptive parent (PAP)
must apply to the ICAB, or the Philippine Regional Trial Court through an
intermediate foreign agency. Requirements such as the applicant's birth
certificate, home study, written consent of biological or adopted children if
above 10 years of age, medical and psychological evaluations, income tax
returns and police clearance are needed for the application process. The
waiting period for the Board to approve the application is 3 months to 1
year.
Once the application is approved, matching a suitable child to the family is
done depending on the preferences PAP. The availability of a child for
adoption is determined by the DSWD, determining if it will be in the child's
best interests. Matching is done by the Board which includes the head or
social worker of the agency, a child psychologist, a medical doctor, a
lawyer, and a representative of an NGO engaged in child welfare. The
waiting time usually takes 2 to 4 years after the approval of the PAP.
Acceptance of a special needs child or older (73 months and above)
generally shortens the waiting period. Upon approval of the PAPs of the
matching, the Philippine law compels adopters to personally fetch the child
from the Philippines not later than thirty (30) working days after issuance
of visa of the child.
The Philippine Inter-country Adoption Law requires a six (6) months
post placement period or trial custody period where three (3) Post
Placement Supervisory Reports along with pictures of the child and the
PAPs (or extended family) must be submitted to the ICAB. If successful, a
Consent to Adoption between the parents and the ICAB within fifteen (15)
days of last post placement report. The final step is a petition for adoption
with the court in the country the parent resides. [27]

Commonly cited reasons for adoption[edit]

According to Social Welfare Officers in the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, the four most noticeably common reasons for
adoption cited are the following:
- Mother is not yet of legal age.
- Relationships are illicit.
- Pregnancy is the product of abuses, such as rape.
- Pregnancy is the product of incest.
It has also been noted that while poverty may be assumed by the
general public to be a leading reason for adoption, this has actually not
been the case. The DSWD makes efforts to provide funding and services
to families that attempt to put children up for adoption due to poverty.[61]

FAMILY CODE (ADOPTION)

ART 183.
(par. 1) A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and care for his
children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family.
xxx
(par. 3) In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older
than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature
of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to
be adopted.
Under article 184 of the Family Code provides the persons who are not
allowed to adopt. Common law partners are not included thereunder, thus,
they are allowed. This is in accordance with the principle that: “What is not
expressly included is not deemed included”… “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius”
- Means the express mention of one thing excludes all others – when
items are listed anything not explicitly stated is assumed not to be
included.

HOWEVER, Applicants who have lived together in a

common law relationship for several years culminating in a legal
marriage must be married for at least one (1) year and the stability of
the relationship prior to marriage is taken into consideration;
https://www.icab.gov.ph/faq/ - retrieved Jan
25, 2021

EN BANC
G.R. No. 146943           October 4, 2002
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO
TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express

mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a

number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations
are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of
logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated
upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned."23
 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, (1990), pp. 160-161, citing the cases of
23

Canlas vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139
(1958); People vs. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245
(1978); People vs. Lantin, 30 SCRA 81 (1969); Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of
Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 (1976); Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 (1980);
Lerum vs. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950); Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540 (1982).

EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894               April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D.
ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO
BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

 x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A

man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires
that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil
Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to
'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law
spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of
the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied]

Common Law Marriage

Marriage vs. Common Law Marriage: What's
the Difference?
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0210/marriage-vs.-
common-law-what-it-means-financially.aspx - Jan 26, 2021.

A common law marriage, on the other hand, will recognize a

couple as equivalent to legally married even if the pair never said
their vows in a civil or religious ceremony and don’t have a marriage
license. While states don’t have official rules on the books regarding
common law marriage, there are certain conditions that have to be
met for a couple to be considered married by common law. They
must:

1. Be a heterosexual couple living together in a state that

recognizes common law marriages.
2. Live together for a significant period of time. Although many
people believe seven or 10 years is the requisite timespan, no
state provides a specific timeframe for cohabitation.
3. Introduce themselves to friends, neighbors, and coworkers as
a married couple, calling each other “my husband” or “my
wife” and even using the same last name. Also, they must file
a joint tax return and have joint bank accounts and credit
cards.
4. Be of sound mind.
5. Not be married to someone else.