case W04C79

February 19, 2016

Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market

Expansion and Reception
Alexander Cooper,i head of Asia expansion for Uber Technologies, Inc., was sitting in a Tesla that he did
not own. The Tesla showed up for his Uber ride to the meeting he was about to have with Travis Kalanick,
Uber’s CEO, and Ryan Graves, head of Global Operations. It was morning in San Francisco, California, but the
sun was setting in China where the action had occurred. Cooper checked for updates on the new petition
they had launched to keep Uber running in Hong Kong, where days before five Uber drivers and three
office staffers had been arrested in a police raid.1 Hong Kong was a new market for Uber, and its success
or failure there could define the company’s next move, not only in Asia, but globally. Uber had posted bail
to release the drivers and employees, but the situation was still developing. The drivers would be due in
court in several months on charges of operating without car permits. For Cooper, this represented another
challenge to Uber’s growth. As he mentally prepared for his meeting, he knew that Kalanick and Graves, while
concerned about the situation in Hong Kong, would have broader and more significant questions related to
Uber’s quest for global expansion and leadership role in growing the sharing economy. What should be Uber’s
next move? How would the company handle the challenges presented by their competitors around the world?
What strategies should Uber implement? Should it leave its challenging global markets and simply focus on
the U.S. market?

The Sharing Economy

Evolution and History

Broadly speaking, the sharing economy, also referred to as collaborative consumption, can be defined as
an economic model that allows individuals to borrow or rent assets owned by other individuals.2 The concept
of the sharing economy had existed for thousands of years, but the development of the Internet allowed the
peer-to-peer rental market to expand hugely,3 and in 2011 collaborative consumption was identified by Time
Magazine on its list of “10 Ideas That Will Change the World.”4 By 2015, the sharing economy had emerged
as a serious economic model; five key sectors using this model were travel, car sharing, finance, staffing, and
music and video streaming. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report projected that these five key sharing sectors
would likely increase global revenues from $15 billion in 2015 to $335 billion by 2025.5
i Alexander Cooper is a pseudonym and a fictional character created for class discussion purposes and is not meant to depict a specific
person within the Uber organization.
Published by WDI Publishing, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.
©2016 Qingxu Jin (Bill), Carl Spevacek, Nasreddine El-Dehaibi, and Whitney Johnson. This case was written under the supervision
of Andrew Hoffman (Holcim Professor of Sustainable Enterprise) at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business by graduate
students Qingxu Jin (Bill), Carl Spevacek, Nasreddine El-Dehaibi, and Whitney Johnson. This case was designed for academic purposes
to simulate a scenario that could occur in the business world. While secondary research was performed to accurately portray information
about the featured organization, this is a hypothetical scenario, and company representatives were not involved in the creation of
this case.

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

The sharing economy was considered an alternative to conventional business models because it
prioritized access to goods, resources, and services, rather than ownership of them.6 This new collaborative
consumption model offered economic advantages over traditional business models. Providers generated
revenue by utilizing underused assets, and users had increased access to goods and services at lower prices
than with traditional providers.7 Sharing economies maximize a good’s capacity, saving time and money for
both the producer and consumer.8

Driving Forces
The development of information technology significantly expanded the sharing economy. Smartphones
and social media created increased and continuous access to information for consumers, allowing new users
to discover and quickly adapt products and services within the sharing economy.9 Sharing in the economy
had existed long before and could be thought of as a collaborative economy, but the Internet created a new
platform on which the sharing economy could operate. The Internet transformed the sharing economy and
enabled it to grow significantly in a short period of time within multiple sectors (see Exhibit 1).10

Exhibit 1
The Sharing Economy in Almost Every Sector

Source: Owyang, Jeremiah. “Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2 – Watch It Grow.” Web-strategist.com. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.web-strategist.com/
blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/>.

Another driver of the sharing economy was the financial crisis of 2008. The sharing economy emerged
as a response to the economic downturn and instability that followed the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in
networking and pooling of resources.11

Cultural shifts also helped nurture the development of the sharing economy. In the U.S., car ownership
had long been a sign of independence and many people could not imagine their world without owning a car.
This was not true for younger generations, however. A survey conducted by the technology and research firm
Gartner found that 46% of adults between ages 18 and 24 would prefer to have Internet over a car, while
only 15% of baby boomers answered the same.12
2

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Sustainability and Sharing Economy

There is also a sustainability case to be made for sharing economies. Using goods to their maximum
capacity can reduce waste.13 Additionally, proponents of the sharing economy argued that increased utilization
of underused resources could reduce the carbon footprint of a good.14 For example, a Fast Company business
editorial focusing on innovation claimed that “when measuring carbon emissions, home sharing is 66% more
effective than hotels” and “car sharing participants reduce their individual emissions by 40%.”15 Peers, a
community that helps individuals find independent work opportunities and benefits, stated that car sharing
could potentially reduce up to 72% of U.S. CO2 emissions.16 By enabling more sustainable consumption, the
sharing economy was compatible with economic growth, while simultaneously diminishing environmental
impacts through reduced waste and efficient use of existing resources at the level of an individual consumer.17
At a broader societal level, the sharing economy had the potential to push whole communities toward
shrinking their carbon footprints.

Social Benefit
Sharing economies also create social benefits. The growth of sharing economies can be described by
the “Sharing S-Curve” (see Exhibit 2).18 Generally, sharing economies develop at a local scale, and start-
up companies fulfill a niche role. Therefore, sharing economies promote interactions among individuals
at this local level, which strengthens communities.19 Although seemingly insignificant, peer-to-peer
interactions create meaningful connections between people, and some research even showed psychological
and neurological benefits from participating in sharing transactions.20

Exhibit 2
The S-Curve of the Sharing Economy

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/
sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html>.

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Trust and Transparency

Sharing economies depend heavily on trust and transparency. Companies within a sharing economy
emphasize the importance of creating a reputation and building a relationship with their consumers.21
Consumers must trust that providers will provide a worthy product or service, and providers need to trust that
consumers will pay and respect the product, as someone else will use the product again in the future.22 Thus,
trust is required by both providers and consumers to make sharing economies successful.

Technology Innovation
The development of the sharing economy was also driven by value shifts among both service providers
and consumers. Rachel Botsman, a professor at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School and widely considered
a global leader providing insights into the collaborative economy, argued that technological innovations
increased the connectivity of societies, which led to changing views on ownership and sharing.23

Challenges
Despite all the benefits accompanying the sharing economy and the presence of significant driving
forces, there were significant obstacles to this system. Sharing economies worked well on local scales
and sometimes across municipalities. However, it remained unclear if the benefits could be maintained in
worldwide sharing economies.24

Regulatory barriers present perhaps the biggest obstacle and threat to success for the sharing economy.
The innovative business models and practices of sharing economy companies such as Airbnb and Uber
generated uneasiness among regulators, specifically related to the issues of market competition, consumer
protection, and legality of operations.25 Citing negative consequences for citizens and governmental units,
regulators feared that the ability of these and similar companies to generate a competitive advantage
by offering lower prices to a consumer than traditional service providers, such as hotels or taxis, could
ultimately displace these established industries. Uber, for example, was not subject to the same safety and
tax regulations as traditional taxis or car services.26 Furthermore, these companies operated in a legally
gray area. For example, Uber defined itself not as a taxi or transportation company, but as a technology
platform.27 This definition pushed forward by lawyers at Uber had effectively protected Uber from complying
with the Americans with Disabilities Act.28 Uber was sued several times, prompting it to provide more
handicap-accessible vehicles. Governmental regulation or self-regulation by the company could therefore
positively or negatively affect the potential market share of sharing economy companies.

Lack of trust was another setback to the sharing economy. A study by Carbonview Research showed that
trust contributed 67% to the reason why individuals were hesitant to participate in the sharing economy
(see Exhibit 3).29

The other factors that held people back, including effort and quality, related to the price point of the
goods and sharing prices.

Transportation Sharing Economy

Within the automobile transportation sector several services fell under the umbrella of the sharing economy.
These services ranged from traditional public transportation providers, such as taxis and buses, to the relatively
new car- and ride-sharing providers, which included companies such as Uber, Lyft, and Zipcar. New peer-to-
peer ride-sharing platforms were providing an alternative for traditional public transportation options.30 Uber
specifically set out to offer an alternative to poor cab infrastructure and low service standards (i.e. dirty cabs,

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

late cars, and the lack of credit card acceptance).31 Therefore, Uber and other transportation sharing platforms
came to thrive on the fact that traditional service providers were falling short of consumer needs.

In 2015 only 8% of all adults had participated in some form of automotive sharing,32 indicating
significant room for growth within this sector. Even more encouraging for the innovators, studies showed
that consumers wanted the sharing economy to succeed in the automotive sector over all other sectors, and
were prepared to accept a culture shift away from car ownership and toward increased ride-sharing.33

Exhibit 3
Why People Hesitate to Participate in the Sharing Economy

Source: Olson, Kristine. “National Study Quantifies Reality of the ‘Sharing Economy’ Movement.” 8 Feb. 2012. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://www.campbell-mithun.
com/678_national-study-quantifies-reality-of-the-sharing-economy-movement>.

Uber: The Company

History
Uber Technologies, Inc., was founded in 2009 in San Francisco by Garrett Camp and Travis Kalanick with
$200,000 of seed funding.34 During a discussion in Paris at Loic and Geraldine LeMeur’s LeWeb conference,
Kalanick and Camp came up with the idea of a limo timeshare service in San Francisco, Kalanick’s and Camp’s
place of residence, that would allow the two founders private access to a personal driver that could be
accessed through an iPhone application. Camp developed the application prototype, while Kalanick’s original
role was chief incubator, which involved temporarily running the company, developing the company through
the prototype stage, which officially launched in 2010, and finding a general manager. In 2010, Ryan Graves,
a former GE employee, was hired.35 Graves ultimately became head of Global Operations, while Kalanick
served as CEO36 and Camp was appointed chairman.37

In addition to seed funding, between 2009 and 2015 Uber received 12 rounds of funding from 52
investors to raise a total of $6.61 billion.38 Investors included Lowercase Capital, First Round, Menlo,
Benchmark, Goldman Sachs, and Google Ventures.39 The most recent investment, totaling $1.2 billion led
by the Chinese search engine Baidu, was raised specifically to pursue the Asian market.40 In 2015, Uber

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

made Business Insider’s 50 Most Powerful Companies list,41 and was valued at almost $51 billion.42 However,
despite all the investments and high valuation, leaked documents showed the company was actually losing
money, with losses totaling $56 million in 2013 and over $160 million by the second quarter of 2014.43

Business Model
Uber provided a technology platform to allow customers to receive easy and reliable access to a ride
using the tap of a button. An Uber board member described Uber as a marketplace through which customers
connected with drivers who were considered “independent agents.”44 Uber also boasted clear pricing, direct
charges to a credit card for convenient pay, and the opportunity to split a fare with other riders. Furthermore,
on the application riders could see the estimated time of arrival for pickup, as well as the route and estimated
time to their destination. Following the ride, both the rider and the driver had the opportunity to rate each
other and provide feedback on their experience.45 For Uber, creating a value proposition for consumers
was all about offering a premium experience. Kalanick told an audience at an early Uber event: “You get
that experience of like…‘I pushed a button, and a car showed up, and now I’m a pimp.’”46 In addition to a
technology and a transportation company, Uber was seen as a lifestyle company.47

Uber offered a variety of car types to cater to different demands as well as surge pricing,48 a demand-
response pricing model through which rates increased at times of peak demand, such as rush hour. These
aspects made Uber’s business model unique compared to competitors.

Additionally, Uber sought to distinguish itself from competitors by diversifying its service offerings. For
example, Uber offered specialized services, such as UberHealth,49 through which individuals could order a
nurse to administer a flu shot; UberAssist,50 designed for senior citizens or people with disabilities requiring
special assistance; and UberRush,51 a delivery service. Uber also experimented with providing alternative
modes of transportation, including boats, helicopters, and motorcycles. Importantly, these distinguishing
features were available only in select geographic locations.52

Uber’s pricing comprised an important component of its business model. Early in its history, Uber
provided rides at a cost roughly 50% higher than traditional taxis.53 However, by 2015 Uber claimed to offer
rides using the UberX option, the least expensive of available cars, at rates up to 40% cheaper than a taxi.54
Although operating at lower margins, Uber was able to lead the market at different price points (i.e. for
different car service options), with the ultimate goal of enhancing customer experience across a broad range
of consumers.55 Furthermore, Uber’s surge pricing technology was so important that Uber applied for a U.S.
patent on it.56

Uber’s primary appeal to potential drivers was that they could earn extra money as an independent
contractor using their own vehicle, create a flexible personalized work schedule, and receive weekly
payments. An Uber board member stated that over 80% of gross fares went to the drivers.57 In addition,
Uber offered advantages over other driving opportunities, such as taxis, chauffeuring, limos, buses, heavy
trucks, and delivery or courier vehicles. Uber claimed to offer higher hourly payments than all these other
sectors, while having fewer licensing requirements. Only a standard driver’s license, background check, and
insurance (provided by the driver or offered through an Uber plan) were required.58

Expansion Strategy
Uber’s expansion strategy centered on raising money for expansion projects and then implementing
city-by-city launches in target areas. Upon launching in a given city Uber would offer free rides in an effort
to generate a strong impression. Uber then relied on its service to market itself, and for its initial customers
to spread its use to new consumers by word of mouth.59 Therefore, little marketing investment was needed.
6

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Benchmark partner Bill Gurley, an investor in Uber, explained that “the product is so good, there is no one
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on marketing.”60

Uber faced varying expansion challenges at local scales. Although Uber’s business model and expansion
strategy had success in the U.S., results on foreign soil were mixed and the end results remained to be seen.

Competitors

Domestic
At its inception in 2009, Uber was the first company of its kind and essentially created the ridesharing
market. Since then several companies have entered the ridesharing business, with Lyft representing the
biggest competitor in the United States.61 Uber faced competition from other markets as well, including car
rental companies, car-sharing companies like Zipcar, and the taxi industry. As Uber continued to grow it
took market share from taxis while car rental companies appeared to be mostly unaffected (see Exhibit 4). 62

Exhibit 4
2014/2015 Uber, Taxi, and Car Rental U.S. Market Share

Source: Certify, Inc. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-sharing-the-road.aspx>.

Lyft
Lyft, a ride-sharing company and smartphone application with a business model very similar to Uber’s,
was founded in 2012 and by 2015 operated in 65 cities with no international presence.63 The key difference
between Uber and Lyft was the company culture; Uber was more of an upscale professional service, while
Lyft focused on providing casual and friendly service. For example, Lyft riders were encouraged to sit in the
front seat and greet their drivers with a “fist bump.”64

Uber grew six to seven times faster than Lyft in terms of ride numbers and 10 to 11 times faster in terms
of revenue (see Exhibits 5 and 6).65

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Exhibit 5
Uber vs. Lyft in Revenue Growth Rate

Source: Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue with 12x Lead in U.S.” 11 Sep. 2014. Future Advisor. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in-u-s/>.

Exhibit 6
Uber vs. Lyft in Rides Growth Rate

Source: Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue with 12x Lead in U.S.” 11 Sep. 2014. Future Advisor. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in-u-s/>.

Zipcar
Zipcar, a car-sharing company, was founded in 2000 and acquired in 2013 by Avis for $500 million. Its
business model was fundamentally different from that of Uber in that the customer was the driver rather
than a passenger. Cars were parked in designated spots and users gained access from a card reader on the
windshield. The car had to be reserved ahead of time in order for it to unlock and the user was then billed by
the hour or day for the allotted reservation time. Customers paid an annual subscription fee for the service
while the company covered insurance and gas.66
8

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

As a move to better compete with ride-sharing services like Uber, Zipcar introduced “One>Way” service
in late 2014, which allowed users to pick up a car from one location and return it at another. The company
operated across the nation and more than doubled its customer base in the span of 3.5 years (see Exhibit
7).67 Zipcar also operated in Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.68

Exhibit 7
Zipcar Membership Size
Zipcar customers: Number of people using Zipcar as car rental company
within the last 12 months in the United States (USA) from spring 2008 to
spring 2015 (in millions)
1

0.8
0.8
0.72
Number of people in millions

0.6
0.54 0.54
0.47
0.42
0.4
0.4 0.37

0.2

0
Aut umn Spring Aut umn Spring Aut umn Spring Aut umn Spring
2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015

Source: Additional Information:

© Statista 2015 United States; approx. 204,000; 18 years and older

Source: Statista. “Customers of Zipcar in the USA, 2015.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.statista.com/statistics/295919/zipcar-customers-usa/>.

Taxis
Since its introduction, Uber had become the largest competitor to the taxi industry.69 A study on
the share of total paid car rides shows that business people are increasingly shifting toward Uber as an
alternative to taxis (see Exhibit 8).70 A major Uber advantage was its lower cost compared to taxis (see
Exhibit 9)71 although the taxi industry still maintained a leading market share.72

One advantage for taxis was that they were perceived to be safer than Uber.73 It was reported that an
Uber driver ran over and killed a 6-year-old girl in San Francisco.74 Royale Simms, a business agent for the
Washington, D.C., Taxi Drivers Association, was quoted by US News & World Report as saying “People with
criminal histories have been approved as drivers for these companies. You can’t do that as a taxi in the
city.”75 Taxi drivers had to go through a rigorous licensing process that Uber drivers could bypass.

International
Europe
Due to heavily regulated markets in Europe and the strong presence of trade unions, Uber did not grow
there as quickly as it did in the U.S.76 Taxi drivers, seeing lost business, accused Uber of bypassing local
licensing and safety laws. Protests against the ridesharing service were staged across Europe and Uber’s
budget service, UberX, was banned in most of Western Europe as a result.77 Competing with Europe’s trade
unions therefore proved to be a daunting task for Uber and significantly hindered its growth on the continent.

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Competitors in Europe included GetTaxi and Hailo, both of which used a slightly different business model
than Uber’s. As opposed to connecting passengers with pre-approved drivers, the competitor apps connected
passengers specifically with taxi drivers.78 This allowed customers to request a ride with a click of a button
while still benefiting the local taxi drivers and avoiding challenges with local regulations.

Exhibit 8
Uber’s Market Growth in the U.S.

Source: Certify. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-sharing-the-road.aspx>.

Exhibit 9
Cost of Uber vs. Taxi Service

Source: Certify. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.”
Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/infograph-sharing-the-road.aspx>.

10

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

China
In China, Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache shared the same business concept and service model as Uber.
The two companies together controlled more than 99% of China’s ridesharing market in 2014.79 By the end
of that year, the market surged to 154 million users.80 The companies were both heavily funded, with $700
million of Didi Dache coming from Temasek and others and $600 million of Kuaidi Dache raised by SoftBank.81
They developed a series of strategies to prevent Uber from significantly slicing into their market. The two
companies tried to give large discounts to maintain the market share. In just the first half of 2014, they
spent more than $400 million offering discounts to users.82 In early 2014, people who used their apps could
get free rides.83

In 2015, Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache agreed to merge to deal with Uber, the cash-rich invader.84 After
the merger, the new company, Didi Kuaidi, received $2 billion in private equity investment from companies
including Capital International Private Equity Fund, Ping An Ventures, Alibaba, Tencent, Temasek, Coatue
Management and other existing shareholders.85 By collaborating with WeChat, the most popular messaging
app in China with almost 650 million monthly active users by the third quarter of 2015,86 Didi Kuaidi received
an average of 700,000 bookings per day via the service.87 Additionally, Didi Kuaidi heavily invested in Uber’s
competitors in other markets, including $680 million to Uber’s biggest rival in the U.S., Lyft, and $500
million to the India ridesharing company Ola.88 The Wall Street Journal reported that Lyft “discussed ways
to work with its Chinese investors to compete strategically with Uber, including sharing product plans.”89
Didi Kuaidi was the first company legally allowed to provide online private-booking ride-sharing service in
Shanghai, one of China’s biggest markets.90 Meanwhile, Uber’s operation in Hong Kong was facing charges
of providing illegal private rides. In 2015, Didi Kuaidi was providing 13 million rides per day in comparison
with 1 million rides per day from Uber China (see Exhibit 10).91

Exhibit 10
Uber’s Daily Rides Far Behind Didi Kuaidi’s in China

Daily completed rides (approximate), Uber China

vs. Didi Kuaidi
Daily completed rides
Didi Kuaidi (total) 7 million
Didi Kuaidi (taxi) 3
Didi Kuaidi (private cars) 3
Uber China 1

Source: Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion--and Could Soon Merge.” Quartz. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have-already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-merge/>.

India
In India, OlaCab, also known as Ola, was the most popular mobile app that provided a similar service
to Uber. With seven rounds of investments, Ola raised $1.18 billion from 19 investors, including Didi Kuaidi,
DST Global, Falcon Edge Capita, SoftBank, and Tiger Global Management.92

While Uber poured resources into India’s market, Ola was building strategies to defend its turf in India.
Ola did not plan to expand globally.93 With 33,000 cabs in 19 cities, Ola’s main focus was to recruit more
drivers.94 Ola, together with leading financial institutions, provided financial support to prospective drivers
11

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

to purchase their cars, and training to ensure drivers were able to deliver a quality and safe experience for
passengers.95 Culturally, Ola addressed the various needs of the Indian population by providing three tiers
of car services to suit different budgets — luxury sedans, mid-range, and Ola Mini, which was priced on the
same level as the humble auto rickshaw.96 Ola also extended its service into delivering goods such as sweets
during the Diwali holiday.97 Besides offering price flexibility, Ola addressed the issue of payment service by
allowing cash payments, and encouraged use of its standalone in-app payment service, Ola Money.98 The
company also provided carpooling services, mobile wallets, and more.99 With all the strategies implemented,
Ola sold 750,000 rides per day while Uber sold only 280,000 (see Exhibit 11).100

Exhibit 11
Uber’s Daily Rides Trailed Ola’s in India

Daily completed rides in India (approximate),

Uber vs Ola
Daily completed rides
Uber 280,000
Ola (includes auto rickshaws) 750,000

Source: Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion — and Could Soon Merge.” Quartz. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have-already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-merge/>.

Conclusion

Cooper knew that Kalanick and Graves wanted answers and insights for the company’s next move. Cooper
knew Uber’s business model, core competencies, and objectives inside and out. He also understood the
benefits of and challenges to the expansion of the sharing economy. Ultimately, he wanted Uber to lead the
push for expanding that economy, but he had his doubts about whether he and his team could accomplish
this task with financial success. What should Cooper suggest? How could Cooper, Kalanick, and Graves ensure
that Uber is successful in Hong Kong? What did they need to do to ensure their success in China and India?
How would their Asian methods vary from Uber’s approach in Europe or in the U.S.? Should Uber work with
governments or work around them as it expands? What are the pros and cons of each approach? How should
Uber protect its business model? Will patents be enough? How should it handle competitors and imitators
in international markets?

12

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Endnotes
1
Shu, Catherine. “Hong Kong Police Raid Uber Offices, Arrest Drivers.” Tech Crunch. 11 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://
techcrunch.com/2015/08/11/hong-kong-uber-raid/>.
2
Investopedia. “Definition of ‘Sharing Economy’.” 11 July 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
sharing-economy.asp>.
3
Investopedia.
4
Walsh, Bryan. “10 Ideas That Will Change the World.” Time Magazine. 17 Mar. 2011. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://content.time.
com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717_2059710,00.html>.
5
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.” 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/
entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf>.
6
Entrepreneurial Insights. “An Introduction to Sharing Economy.” 5 Mar. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.
entrepreneurial-insights.com/introduction-to-sharing-economy/>.
7
The Economist. “The rise of the sharing economy.” 9 Mar. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy>.
8
Rudenko, Anna. “The Collaborative Consumption on the Rise: Why Shared Economy Is Winning Over the ‘Capitalism of Me.’”
POPSOP. 16 Aug. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://popsop.com/2013/08/the-collaborative-consumption-sharing-wins-over-ownership/>.
9
Entrepreneurial Insights.
10
Owyang, Jeremiah. “Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2 – Watch it Grow.” Web-strategist.com. Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://
www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/>.
11
Castells, Marcaell. “Aftermath: The Cultures of the Economic Crisis.” Journal of Global Academic Institute, Business & Economics,
1(2). Barcelona, 2012. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <www.globalacademicinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/jgaibe_vol_1_no_2.
pdf#page=48>.
12
Kaiser, Tiffany. “U.S. ‘Driving Age’ Teenagers/Young Adults Prefer Internet Over Cars.” Daily Tech. 29 Nov. 2011. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016. <http://www.dailytech.com/US+Driving+Age+TeenagersYoung+Adults+Prefer+Internet+Over+Cars/article23391.htm>.
13
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
14
Brady, Diane. “The Environmental Case for the Sharing Economy.” Bloomberg. 24 Sep. 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-09-24/the-environmental-case-for-the-sharing-economy>.
15
Scorpio, Jessica. “What’s the Future of the Sharing Economy?” Fast Company. 4 June 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.
fastcoexist.com/1679964/whats-the-future-of-the-sharing-economy>.
16
Rudenko.
17
Brady.
18
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue Opportunity.” Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.pwc.
co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html>.
19
Rudenko.
20
Walsh.
21
Entrepreneurial Insights.
22
Green, Charles. “Trusting and Being Trusted in the Sharing Economy.” Forbes. 2 May 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.
forbes.com/sites/trustedadvisor/2012/05/02/trusting-and-being-trusted-in-the-sharing-economy/2/>.
23
Botsman, Rachel. “The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition.” Rachelbotsman.com. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://
rachelbotsman.com/work/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition-fastco-exist/>.
24
Parsons, Adam. “The Sharing Economy: A Short Introduction to Its Political Evolution.” Open Democracy. 5 Mar. 2014. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/adam-parsons/sharing-economy-short-introduction-to-its-political-
evolution>.
25
Zrenner, Alexandra. “The Ethics of Regulating the Sharing Economy.” The Keenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Accessed
7 Dec. 2015. <http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Sharing-Economy-2015.pdf>.
26
Zrenner.
27
Uber. “Legal.” 8 Apr. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms>.
28
Lapowsky, I. “Uber’s Business Isn’t Built to Help Disabled People.” Wired.com. 14 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://
www.wired.com/2015/08/uber-disability/>.

13

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

29
Deucher, Gioia. “Forget Owning, Let’s Share.” Nextrends. 14 Aug. 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://nextrends.
swissnexsanfrancisco.org/forget-owning-lets-share/>.
30
Khazanah Research Institute. “The Sharing Economy: An Alternative Mode of Transport? – Part 2.” 5 Oct. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan.
2016. <http://www.krinstitute.org/kris_publication_Urban_Transportation.aspx>.
31
Khabra, Dee. “How Does Uber Market Itself?” Quora. 23 Mar. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.quora.com/How-does-
Uber-market-itself>.
32
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
33
PricewaterhouseCoopers. “The Sharing Economy.”
34
Crunchbase. “Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber#/entity>.
35
Kalanick, Travis. “Uber’s Founding.” Uber Newsroom. 22 Dec. 2010. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://newsroom.uber.
com/2010/12/ubers-founding/>.
36
Uber. “The Company.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/about>.
37
Forbes. “America’s Richest Entrepreneurs Under 40.” Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/profile/garrett-camp/>.
38
Crunchbase.
39
Uber. “The Company.”
40
Rao, Leena. “Uber Closes on $1.2 Billion in Funding for China.” 7 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://fortune.
com/2015/09/07/uber-china/>.
41
Loudenback, Tanza. “The 50 Most Powerful Companies in America.” Yahoo! Finance. 28 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/50-most-powerful-companies-america-150200135.html>.
42
Macmillan, Douglas, and Telis Demos. “Uber Valued at More Than $50 Billion.” The Wall Street Journal. 31 July 2015. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-1438367457>.
43
Biddle, Sam. “Here Are the Internal Documents that Prove Uber is a Money Loser.” Gawker. 5 Aug. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://gawker.com/here-are-the-internal-documents-that-prove-uber-is-a-mo-1704234157>.
44
Gurley, Bill. “A Deeper Look at Uber’s Dynamic Pricing Model.” Above the Crowd. 11 Mar. 2014. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://
abovethecrowd.com/2014/03/11/a-deeper-look-at-ubers-dynamic-pricing-model/>.
45
Adhika, Gia. “Your Safety, Our Priority.” Newsroom.uber.com. 19 Oct. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan. 2015. <https://newsroom.uber.com/
indonesia/en/your-safety-our-priority/>.
46
Weise, Karen. “This Is How Uber Takes Over a City.” Bloomberg. 23 June 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city>.
47
Mangalindan, J.P. “The Trials of Uber.” Fortune. 2 Feb. 2012. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://fortune.com/2012/02/02/the-trials-
of-uber/>.
48
Uber Help. “What Is Surge Pricing?” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://help.uber.com/h/6c8065cf-5535-4a8b-9940-d292ffdce119>.
49
Verena, Meghan. “Outsmart the Flu with UberHEALTH.” Uber Newsroom. 17 Nov. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://newsroom.
uber.com/2015/11/uberhealth/>.
50
Uber Newsroom. “Introducing UberASSIST.” Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <https://newsroom.uber.com/la/2015/07/introducing-
uberassist-la/>.
51
Uber Rush. “Meet Your On-Demand Delivery Fleet.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://rush.uber.com/how-it-works>.
52
Deep, Ajay. “How Uber Works: Insights into Business & Revenue Model.” Next Juggernaut. 24 Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://nextjuggernaut.com/blog/how-uber-works-business-model-revenue-uber-insights/#!prettyPhoto>.
53
Kessler, Andy. “Travis Kalanick: The Transportation Trustbuster.” The Wall Street Journal. 24 Jan. 2013. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324235104578244231122376480>.
54
Uber. “Uber for Business.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/business>.
55
Gurley.
56
Deep.
57
Gurley.
58
Uber. “Driving Jobs vs. Driving with Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs>.
59
Khabra.
60
Dillet, Romain. “Benchmark’s Bill Gurley: ‘Uber Is Growing Faster Than eBay Did.’” 29 Apr. 2013. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://
techcrunch.com/2013/04/29/benchmarks-bill-gurley-uber-is-growing-faster-than-ebay-did/>.
61
Rogowsky, Mark. “Uber Is Winning.” 10 June 2014. Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/06/10/
whos-winning-right-now-in-the-competition-between-lyft-and-uber/>.
14

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

62
Certify, Inc. “Sharing the Road: Business Travelers Increasingly Choose Uber.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://www.certify.com/
infograph-sharing-the-road.aspx>.
63
Kosoff, Maya. “We Talked to Lyft’s Investors – Here’s How It Will Compete with Uber’s Crazy Fundraising Efforts.” 26 Feb. 2015.
Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-lyft-can-take-on-uber-2015-2>.
64
Stokes, Natasha. “Uber vs. Via, Lyft & Sidecar: Who’s the Best Car Service?” 5 Aug. 2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2015. <http://www.
techlicious.com/tip/uber-via-lyft-sidecar-best-car-service/>.
65
Nicholson, Chris. “Study: Uber Pulls Ahead of Lyft in Riders and Revenue With 12x Lead in U.S.” Future Advisor. 11 Sep. 2014.
Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://blog.futureadvisor.com/study-uber-pulls-ahead-of-lyft-in-riders-and-revenue-with-12x-lead-in-
u-s/>.
66
The Economist. “The Connected Car.” 4 June 2009. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.economist.com/node/13725743>.
67
Statista. “Customers of Zipcar in the USA, 2015.” Accessed 8 Dec. 2015. <http://www.statista.com/statistics/295919/zipcar-
customers-usa/>.
68
Zipcar. “Zipcar Overview.” Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.zipcar.com/press/overview>.
69
Collaco, Conrad. “Uber vs. Taxi: Why the Taxi Industry Will Never Be the Same.” 18 Aug. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/uber-vs-taxi-why-the-taxi-industry-will-never-be-the-same-1.3194893>.
70
Certify.
71
Certify.
72
Certify.
73
Lafrance, Adrienne and Rose Eveleth. “Are Taxis Safer Than Uber?” The Atlantic. 3 Mar. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207>.
74
Constine, Josh. “Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girl’s Death Raises Accident Accountability Questions.” Tech Crunch. 2 Jan. 2014.
Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurance-whenever-their-driver-app-is-
open/>.
75
Longardner, Tara. “Report: Uber, Lyft as Safe as Taxis.” U.S. News & World Report. 11 Feb. 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/11/report-uber-lyft-as-safe-as-taxis>.
76
Campbell, Harry. “Will Uber Ever Dominate the International Rideshare Market?” Forbes. 13 May 2015. Accessed 7 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrycampbell/2015/05/13/will-uber-ever-dominate-the-international-rideshare-market/>.
77
Reuters. “Legal Troubles – Including 173 Lawsuits in the U.S. – Threaten Uber’s Global Push.” Business Insider. 5 Oct. 2015.
Accessed 7 Dec. 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-legal-troubles-market-realities-threaten-ubers-global-push-2015-10>.
78
Carey, Scott. “The Taxi App War: As Lyft, Gett and Hailo Try to Take on Uber, Can Any of Them Actually Win?” Tech World. 18 Nov.
2015. Accessed 7 Jan. 2016. <http://www.techworld.com/startups/taxi-app-war-who-will-win-3629784/>.
79
Custer, C. “China’s Taxi App Market Breaks 150 Million Users, and It’s Totally Dominated by Two Apps.” Tech in Asia. 5 Nov. 2014.
Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.techinasia.com/chinas-taxi-app-market-breaks-150-million-users-totally-dominated-apps/>.
80
Custer.
81
Gannes, Liz. ”China’s Two Leading Uber Competitors, Kuaidi Dache and Didi Dache, Agree to Merge.” Recode. 13 Feb. 2015.
Accessed 6 Jan. 2016. <http://recode.net/2015/02/13/chinas-two-leading-uber-competitors-kuaidi-dache-and-didi-dache-agree-
to-merge/>.
82
Cendrowski, Scott. “China Has a New Taxi App Monopolist – and It Isn’t Uber.” Fortune. 16 Feb. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016.
<http://fortune.com/2015/02/16/china-has-a-new-taxi-app-monopolist-and-it-isnt-uber/>.
83
Cendrowski.
84
Chen, Liyan. “Meet Uber’s Mortal Enemy: How Didi Kuaidi Defends China’s Home Turf.” Forbes. 23 Sep. 2015. Accessed 6 Jan.
2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/09/23/meet-ubers-mortal-enemy-how-didi-kuaidi-defends-chinas-home-
turf/>.
85
Wang Yue. “Chinese Taxi-Hailing App Didi Kuaidi Readies New Funds As It Battles With Uber.” Forbes. 8 July 2015. Accessed 4
Jan. 2016. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2015/07/08/chinese-taxi-hailing-app-didi-kuaidi-readies-new-funds-as-it-
battles-with-uber/>.
86
Millward, Steven. “WeChat’s Growth Continues, Hits 650 Million Users.” Tech in Asia. 10 Nov. 2015. Accessed 8 Jan. 2016.
<https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-650-million-monthly-active-users/>.
87
Millward.
88
Crunchbase. “Didi Kuaidi.”
89
The Wall Street Journal. “China’s Didi Kuaidi Gets License to Ride in Shanghai.” 8 Oct. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2015. <http://www.
wsj.com/articles/chinas-didi-kuaidi-gets-license-to-ride-in-shanghai-1444288510>.

15

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

90
The Wall Street Journal. “China’s Didi Kuaidi Gets License to Ride in Shanghai.”
91
Horwitz, Josh. “Uber’s Biggest Asian Competitors Have Already Raised about $7 Billion — and Could Soon Merge.” Quartz. 28
Sep. 2015. Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <http://qz.com/509913/ubers-%E2%80%8Bbiggest%E2%80%8B-asian-competitors-have-
already-raised-about-7-billion-and-could-soon-merge/>.
92
Crunchbase. “Ola.” Accessed 4 Jan. 2016. <https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/ani-technologies#/entity>.
93
Gore, Dipti. “How Ola Cabs Is Competing with Global Giants by Using Localization Strategy!” Tech Story. 11 Nov. 2014. Accessed
4 Jan. 2016. <http://techstory.in/olacabs/>.
94
Gore.
95
Gore.
96
Gore.
97
Gore.
98
Russell, Jon. “Ola, the Company Beating Uber in India, Raises $500M at a $5B Valuation.” Tech Crunch. 17 Nov. 2016. Accessed
11 Jan. 2016. <http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/17/ola-the-company-beating-uber-in-india-lands-500m-in-fresh-investment/>.
99
Russell.
100
Horwitz.

16

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Notes

17

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Notes

18

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 Uber and the Sharing Economy: Global Market Expansion and Reception W04C79

Notes

19

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.
 The Erb Institute is committed to creating a socially and environmentally
sustainable society through the power of business. Building on nearly two
decades of research, teaching, and direct engagement, the Institute has become
one of the world’s leading sources of innovative knowledge on the culture,
technologies, operations and governance of business in a changing world.
http://erb.umich.edu

Established at the University of Michigan in 1992, the William Davidson Institute

(WDI) is an independent, non-profit research and educational organization focused on
providing private-sector solutions in emerging markets. Through a unique structure
that integrates research, field-based collaborations, education/training, publishing,
and University of Michigan student opportunities, WDI creates long-term value for
academic institutions, partner organizations, and donor agencies active in emerging
markets. WDI also provides a forum for academics, policy makers, business leaders, and
development experts to enhance their understanding of these economies. WDI is one
of the few institutions of higher learning in the United States that is fully dedicated to
understanding, testing, and implementing actionable, private-sector business models
addressing the challenges and opportunities in emerging markets.

This document is authorized for use only in Oscar Armando Pardo Aragon's UNIANDES MBA ESTRATEGIA (O) (2021-20) OAPA ng at Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia (UniAndes) from
Aug 2021 to Dec 2021.