MALACAT vs CA

FACTS:

In response to reports of bomb threats, Rodolfo Yu, was on foot patrol with other police officers at Plaza Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his companions observed both groups for about thirty
minutes.

The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, a fragmentation grenade was
found tucked inside petitioners front waist line.

Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.

Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer, conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their
rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapio‘s advice,
petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer.
Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession, there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner
admitted possession of the grenade.

In its decision, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866.

In his appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the
conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. As such, the
search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.

RULING:

The Court convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner’s guilt with moral certainty.

First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from
petitioner’s possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized.

According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the
commander was not presented to corroborate this claim.

Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, the police officer who conducted the
examination, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the
law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as
these.

Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in
uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience
that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty
minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner’s eyes moving very fast.

Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by
police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and
Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was
invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.

Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were
invalid, as will be discussed below.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:

Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in
flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a “stop and frisk.”

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the
grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search.

In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee
and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a “stop-and-frisk” as a “limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons,” as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment ***

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.

Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

As to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
earlier, this claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer
who allegedly chased that group.

Also, there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast, an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.

Lastly, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front
waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the
trial court:

When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade
was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person.

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR was ACQUITTED.

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PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]

Facts:

The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one
of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation.
 An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A
witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was
licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was
convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of
a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held:

An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest
without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and
frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

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PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]

Facts: 
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving
from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus
terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic
bag marked “cash katutak”. 

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a
shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old
woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. 

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

Held: 
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8
and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search; 

6. Stop and Frisk; 

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted. 

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not
acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis
to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully
arrested. 

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized
marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. 

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — Anapplication for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. 

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. 

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been
made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants
who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

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People vs. Burgos

The State (P) vs. Suspect NPA Rebel (D)
 GR L-68955, September 4, 1986 (144 SCRA
[T]
1)

Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive group who forcibly recruited him
and based on this information, the police went to arrest the suspect. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was
merely plowing his field.

Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.

Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his
life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him
plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm.
At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered alleged
subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team
leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it
came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by
the wife of Burgos (D).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect
that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not
yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made,
generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.

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People v De La Cruz

PEOPLE vs. DORIA G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999 Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Warrantless Arrests,
Search and Seizure, Plain View Doctrine
OCTOBER 26, 2017

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI) that one
“Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities and decided to entrap
and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3
Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked “Jun”
but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his
associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao) “Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s” house.

The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the woman as his
associate. SPO1 Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over “Neneth’s” house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s
flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
“Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants.

Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked
her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a
piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.
She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.
 The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.
 
ISSUES:

(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;
(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and
the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
 
RULING:

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
x x x.”

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the
box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances:(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed,
however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there
was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. “Personal
knowledge” of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable
cause” which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
 
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to
appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,
with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no
showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating
the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

2.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
 
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led there by
appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant
Doria named her and led them to her. Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a
view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton
box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain
view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit
of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of accused-
appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale
took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus
delicti, as evidence in court.The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00
which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
 
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao is acquitted.

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UMIL v RAMOS

Facts:

On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or
on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-
two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Binan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the
true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to
 the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held:

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

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Go v CA

FACTS:

The incident happen along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila where the car of Rolito Go bumped the car of Eldon Maguan while the Go
was traversing a one-way “wrong direction” road.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene.
A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a
9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from.
The police were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.
The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop.
The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
7 days after the shooting incident, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could
avail himself of his right to a preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the information in court, Eldon Maguan died of gunshot wounds.
Accordingly, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, the prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC. No bail
was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging
that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information
was filed.
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no
objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
Petitioner was released when his cash bond was approved.
Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in
the court be suspended.
The prosecutor stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
recommend cash bail of P100,000.00.
The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991
until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
However, the respondent judge issued an order on July 17, 1991, recalling his bail, the leave to conduct P.I, and his omnibus for immediate
release. Likewise, the judge ordered the petitioner to surrender within 48 hours.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Petitioner contends that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in
violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the
Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly, none had
the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to a preliminary investigation, could not apply in
respect of petitioner.
 ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful

WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

HELD:

1. NO. The arrest was invalid.

First, the trial court’s reliance in the case of Umil v. Ramos is incorrect. Herein, appellant was charged with murder while in Umil, the
accused was charged with subversion, a continuing offense.
The petitioner’s appearance to the police station did not mean he was arrested at all. Petitioner neither expressed surrender nor any
statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime.
Second, the instant case did not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just
been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan.
The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."

2. NO. Petitioner did not waive his right to P.I.

Petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day
that the information for murder was filed with the RTC, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation.
Moreover, the Court does not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In  People v.
Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to a preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of a preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a
motion in court asking for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, he clearly implied to recognized that petitioner's claim to the
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

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