DISASTER

MANAGEMENT

INDEX
1.Introduction
2.Rare phenomenon
3.Cautions approach
4. Government approach
5.Rescue and relief in latur
 Aspects of rescue
6. First aid, transportation of the injured and hospitalization
7.Health care and epidemic control
8.Aspects of relief
 Clothing
 Dry ration
 Cooked food
 Shelter
9.Conclusion
10. References
INTRODUCTION
Simply speaking, Earthquake means the shaking of the Earth’s surface. It is a sudden
trembling of the surface of the Earth. Earthquakes certainly are a terrible natural disaster.
Furthermore, Earthquakes can cause huge damage to life and property. Some Earthquakes are
weak in nature and probably go unnoticed. In contrast, some Earthquakes are major and
violent. The major Earthquakes are almost always devastating in nature. Most noteworthy,
the occurrence of an Earthquake is quite unpredictable. This is what makes them so
dangerous.
One of nature's most disturbing and destructive phenomenon is a major earthquake and its
devastating aftereffects. Plate tectonic movements have dominated the Earth for hundreds of
millions of years as the massive plates that make up the Earth's crust slowly shift over, under,
and past each other. The movement can be slow at times. At other times, the plates are sealed
together, preventing the accumulating energy from being released. The plates break free
when the accumulated energy becomes heavy enough. If the earthquake strikes in a populated
area, it could result in a large number of deaths and injuries, as well as significant property
damage.
Today, we're discussing whether earthquakes must be an uncontrollable and unpredictable
threat to life and property. Scientists have started to predict the positions and probabilities of
potential destructive earthquakes. The most dangerous areas are being recognised, and
significant progress is being made in constructing structures that can withstand earthquakes.

LATUR EARTHQUAKE 1993

Exactly 26 years ago, more than 10,000 people did not and would never again wake up from
their sleep in the Latur region of Maharashtra, as a massive 6.4 magnitude earthquake shook
the ground under them. The villagers were fast asleep after celebrating Ganesh Chaturthi. The
September 30, 1993, Killari-Latur earthquake that struck around 3.56 am, is now considered
a ‘Watershed’ in Indian seismological studies. It has permanently led to the upgradation of
seismological observatories from analogue charts to digital. This earthquake has been
described as “death at dawn”.
Latur earthquake was one of the deadliest earthquakes Maharashtra has seen till date. In the
intraplate earthquake about 52 villages were destroyed, over 30,000 were injured and
approximately 10,000 were killed. The earthquake left a huge hollow at Killari, which was
also the epicentre, remains in place till date. In short, the 10,000 lives lost in one of the worst
earthquakes of the 20th century in India permanently changed the outlook of earth scientists,
administrators and policy makers towards saving lives.
The earthquake in Maharashtra mainly affected the districts of Latur and Osmanabad districts
of Gulbarga and bijapur of Karnataka. fifty villages within an area of 70 sq km were razed to
the ground; close to the epicentral area almost the entire livestock perished. The area of Latur
was densely populated so, the toll of those who were killed and injured was very high Since
the earthquake's focus was 12-kilometre-deep, the shock waves caused more damage. The
epicentre of the quake was Killari. The large crater can be seen at the place even today. Every
year, residents of Killari village in Maharashtra’s Latur district observe a ‘black day’ on
September 30.

RARE PHENOMENON
Early morning news bulletins on All India Radio placed the death toll at 200-300. This rose
dramatically during the day, reaching 500 by 10 a.m., 2,000 by 1 p.m., 4,000 by 5 p.m., and
10,000 by 9 p.m. IMD, the Department of Science and Technology (DST), and the
Geological Survey of India (GSI) officials, on the other hand, were silent”. Nothing can be
said now," IMD's seismology division director S N Chatterjee said when asked about the
disaster later that evening. Meanwhile, the GSI issued a standard response: "This is an
unusual occurrence. And as the death toll climbed to over 30,000 over the next three days,
DST scientists tried to find an answer to the question: "How could such a catastrophic
earthquake occur in the Deccan, which is supposed to be seismically stable?. Latur district
and most of the Deccan Plateau area around it are listed as Zone-I seismicity maps, indicating
the least vulnerability to earthquakes. The Deccan plateau was dubbed the "shield" by
scientists and the general public because it was made up of extremely old and tectonically
stable rock formations. "We're completely taken aback," a DST official said.

CAUTIOUS APPROACH
Senior Indian seismologists such as Vinod Gaur, the former director general of the National
Geophysical Research Institute, and Harsh Gupta, the current director general of the NGRI,
disagreed with the Kurudwadi interpretation. "It's important to escape the pit of instantaneous
explanations," Gaur said. Any attempt to link the Latur earthquake to the Kurudwadi rift, he
stressed, must be followed by evidence that the rift was seismically active.
Gaur denied any knowledge of seismicity, claiming that only extensive monitoring prior to
the earthquake could have revealed it. Both he and Gupta emphasised the importance of
understanding the Latur earthquake in the context of the Indian subcontinent's overall seismic
activity.
According to this viewpoint, India is colliding with Asia's underbelly at a pace of about 5 cm
per year. The huge Himalaya mountain range and similarly major earthquakes north of the
Ganga are the most visible effects of this activity. The fact that the collision affects the entire
country of India is less apparent. The entire Indian plate is under stress and compression,
which is periodically relieved by earthquakes.

GOVERNMENT APPROACH
Recognizing the validity of these claims, the Union government declared four days after the
earthquake that it will conduct seismological mapping of southern India. However, there was
little indication that this decision would resolve the roadblocks that had previously hindered
seismological research in India.
The earthquake in Latur also illustrated India's lack of seismological instrumentation.
Initially, different IMD monitoring stations recorded widely disparate estimates of the
quake's strength, which ranged from 5.5 to 6.5 on the Richter scale. According to
seismologists, this was due to a lack of equipment standardisation and inter-calibration. "Not
only does this make us the laughingstock of the planet," Gaur says, "but it also means that
data classification and review from various IMD centres is unnecessarily delayed and
difficult."
Gaur is a self-professed crusader for the rapid adoption of ultra-high monitoring technology
in the 300 to 3,000 megahertz frequency range. Gupta, on the other hand, favours expanded
monitoring facility implementation at current technical stages. "Our first priority is to make
sure we reach the whole country as soon as possible."
Both Gaur and Gupta acknowledge, however, that seismological research would have to go
beyond the problem of technology to provide technical rigour. A team of IMD and GSI
scientists was dispatched to Killari last October after a tremor measuring 4.3 on the Richter
scale was felt there. "We were unable to recognise these tremors," says R N Pali, deputy
director general of GSI's central zone office in Nagpur. Pali also mentioned that there were
no surface manifestations of faults in the area that triggered tremors. Ironically, there have
been no signs of the Latur earthquake.
The aspirations of the country's decision-makers would also have an effect on seismological
planning. Politicians despise being chastised in the wake of disasters. Regarding the
earthquake, Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao said, "The Deccan Plateau was thought to be
earthquake-resistant. This confidence has been broken to a significant extent." He went on to
say that "from a seismological point of view, southern India has been poorly studied."
Seismologists should expect more robust debunking from policymakers in the future.
Seismologists would have to try earthquake prediction as one of their goals. The success of
Chinese seismologists in predicting the Haicheng earthquake in 1975 has sparked much
debate. Despite the fact that the quake had a magnitude of more than 7, the death toll was less
than a thousand because most people had been evacuated. The seismologists were less
accurate the following year, when a stronger quake struck Tangshan, killing nearly 242,000
people.
Despite using the most sophisticated monitoring devices, US seismologists were unable to
predict the magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck California in 1989. As a result, it's not just
Indian seismologists like Gaur who claim that earthquake prediction is still inexact.
"Earthquake predictions are rather like weather forecasts — they can sometimes be wide of
the mark," Alice Walker of the British Geological Survey told Down to Earth.
"Seismologists' main contribution should be to show the general trend of seismological
activity over the decades to come," Gaur says. Proper civic planning will allow "adequate
anticipation of these risks, effective settlement planning and enforcement of building codes,
emergency and relief procedures" in light of such awareness. The unpreparedness of
humans, on the other hand, gives every earthquake a lethal edge. The California earthquake
killed only one person, but 30,000 people died in Latur.
Seismologists in India argue that their area of study should be fitted to allow for safe siting
and housing ahead of time. Though earthquakes may be postponed for up to 100 years, the
impact will be determined by how effectively the interregnum is used. Scientists, in contrast
to officials, were able to offer seemingly detailed explanations for the Latur earthquake.
J G Negi, a former director-grade scientist at NGRI who is now the director general of the
Madhya Pradesh Council of Science and Technology, provided the most tension between two
sides of the Kurudwadi rift, a fault that stretches hundreds of kilometres from Pune to
Sholapur.
The Kuruwadi rift, according to Negi, passed through the epicentre of the Latur earthquake.
T Chandrasekhar of the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay agreed with Negi's theory.

RESCUE AND RELIEF WORK IN LATUR

Natural disasters may strike with or without warning. A tragedy that is expected is met with
preparedness because forewarned is forearmed. When a catastrophe is on the horizon,
recovery efforts are more effective. But what happens when tragedy hits when you least
expect it?

ASPECTS OF RESCUE
Immediate Rescue Work
A survivor made the first step that started the rescue and relief activity at the disaster site.
While being one of the few survivors, (he) demonstrated foresight by fleeing the village and
running to a local police station to inform them of the major disaster he had experienced first-
hand.
The superintendent of police, who had been told of the villager's storey by the police station,
acted quickly and alerted senior officials at the state police headquarters.
Despite initial uncertainty, the government and non-government organisations' rescue and
recovery efforts have been widely praised. The involvement of the Chief Minister near to the
disaster site supervising rescue and relief work, the coordination work done by the Chief
Secretary from Mantralaya, the communication network formed by a team of ham operators,
and the key role played by the army are all notable features of the Latur and Osmanabad
rescue and relief efforts.
Several citizens rushed to the scene shortly after the earthquake. Panic and chaos reigned
supreme. Students, government officials, volunteers from various organisations, and residents
from the same and neighbouring villages were among the first to offer assistance.
Since all government officials were preoccupied with the final day of Ganesh Chaturthi on
September 29, 1993, much of the government machinery remained operational. The first
news of the earthquake came over the police radio, and the initial death toll was estimated to
be about 500 people. To deal with the crisis, government officials were dispatched. As word
of the number of villages affected and the number of people killed spread, rescue and relief
teams began to arrive. Many people came to Killari to help with relief and rescue efforts
because the village had been experiencing tremors for a year prior to the disaster. The teams
that arrived came from all over the world and the province. The villagers themselves were
among the first to assist in the evacuation of those caught in the rubble.`
On the first day, students from schools and colleges in Latur, Solapur, Osmanabad, and other
nearby areas arrived at the site. The majority of the college students were National Cadet
Corps (NCC) and National Social Service (NSS) members (NSS). Furthermore, many of the
volunteers lacked the tools necessary to move the rubble in order to reach the wounded
people trapped underneath it. Finally, despite their best efforts, they lacked the stamina to
devote long periods of time to the arduous task of rescue.
In the chaotic post-disaster situation, the appearance of NCC staff in uniform seemed to
reflect order, which had a positive impact on the people's psyche. The students were thought
to be among the few agents active in the rescue and relief efforts who worked diligently.
Furthermore, they were thought to be orderly and able to adapt to the situation as a group.
When it came to determining if any of the more stressful disaster rescue tasks had a negative
effect on the students, particularly those who were only 15 or 16 years old, it was determined
that, although shocked at first, they handled the situation admirably.
Around 5,000 students were expected to participate in 15-day rotations. After the army
arrived, the NCC students eventually withdrew. Following that, students were involved in
some way in cordoning off the field. In addition to the teachers, there were other boys
employed in the area's garages, who not only provided manpower but also provided vehicles
for the wounded to be transported. Local government officials assisted in forming teams of
volunteers and dispatching them to various villages to conduct rescue operations.
The processing of the dead bodies lasted until 7 p.m. on September 30, 1993, or until there
was no more natural light. Those volunteers who had access to some kind of lighting
continued to operate late into the night. From the second day on, heavy rams made rescue
work challenging. In a rescue mission of this nature, there were insufficient implements. The
wounded were buried three to four feet under loose debris, and only high-powered machine-
operated tools would have been able to extract them. The army, which arrived at the site near
the end of the second day, brought such implements.
The army was tasked with organising rescue missions. In a five-day operation, the army
rescued over 6,000 wounded people in Latur and over 3,000 in Osmanabad and transported
them to hospitals and medical facilities. Furthermore, over 6,000 people were exhumed and
cremated. By October 5, 1993, the rescue operations had been completed to a large extent.
The troops' loyalty and devotion to their jobs is commendable.
In examining the role of the army, one of the questions people asked was whether the
immediate arrival of an organised force by air used to dealing with emergencies could have
resulted in the rescue of more lives. Some of the arguments that are put forward in favour of
this are that all deaths did not occur because of injuries resulting from collapse of large pieces
of stone but also because of the suffocation due to the loose rubble that had fallen on the
injured people. There is clear indication that speedy arrival of efficient rescue machinery
would have saved many more lives. Despite the fact that the devastation in Latur district was
much greater than in Osmanabad district, the latter had 21% more deaths. Many hours (on
average 6 hours) after the Latur villages, the majority of the Osmanabad villages received
first aid and organised rescue machinery (TISS, 1994). On the first day, one of the major
challenges in organising the rescue operation was an incorrect estimation of the villages
affected and the severity of the disaster. The authorities were unable to mobilise the army
earlier in such a situation. The distance from which the army had to be requisitioned, as well
as the obstruction of roads in the villages by collapsed buildings, were also logistical
difficulties in mobilising the army at short notice.

FIRST AID, TRANSPORTATION OF THE

INJURED AND HOSPITALIZATION

The district health administration acted quickly to offer medical assistance to those who had
been wounded. The district-level health directorate began operations about 6 a.m. on October
1, 1993. Prior to that, on September 30, 1993, about 5.00 p.m., teams of medical personnel
from Solapur, Ambejogai, Latur, and other locations had been dispatched to various villages
in Latur and Osmanabad. As more villages were identified as being affected, more teams
were dispatched. In terms of first aid, most of the local health-care infrastructure had been
destroyed, and the required first-aid supplies were unavailable. Within the first twenty-four
hours of the tragedy, rescue and medical teams arrived and began working in all villages. At
least twelve hours after the disaster, villages in Latur's interior, especially in Osmanabad,
received first aid (TISS, 1994).
As a result, the decision to transport the injured to the major hospitals was taken. State
Transport buses, private jeeps, trucks, tempos, cars and other vehicles were placed at the
disposal of the medical and rescue teams for transporting the injured to various hospitals.
As a result, it was decided to transport the wounded to one of the major hospitals. Medical
and rescue teams were given access to state transportation buses, private jeeps, vans, tempos,
cars, and other vehicles to transport the wounded to various hospitals.
Patients who required major surgery were transferred to hospitals with the appropriate
equipment and staff. Both public and private hospitals were used. An Out Patient Department
(OPD) was set up in a makeshift tent in Osmanabad. At least 5,000 patients were treated at
this OPD. From the OPD, after examination, patients were sent to different hospitals
depending on the nature of the medical care required.
The Vivekananda hospital in Latur was instrumental in providing medical care to the
wounded. The wounded were given blankets, and first-aid supplies were kept on hand. The
blood bank's status was examined. Doctors and technicians were summoned and put on high
alert. The newcomers were given first aid, placed in an open area, and given tea and biscuits.
Those who suffered minor injuries were taken to Rajasthan High School, while those who
were more seriously injured were taken to the hospital. Food for the wounded was arranged
with the assistance of local relief organisations. Non-medical assistance was given to the
affected people by a large number of volunteers.
On the first day, the local services were mostly used for medical assistance. Meanwhile, local
pharmacist societies and other donors contributed additional supplies. Local pharmacies were
open, and medical supplies could be obtained for free from the stores. After the third day,
massive amounts of national and foreign assistance began to arrive, causing inventory,
storage, and distribution issues.

HEALTH CARE AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL

The risk of epidemics spreading was one of the main concerns following the earthquake.
Heavy rains exacerbated the condition, hastening the decomposition of the corpses. The two
districts' District Health Officers (DHOs) took a range of measures to address the situation.
The first step was to help those who had been wounded. For this, the civil hospitals as well as
all of the local medical college hospitals were used. Furthermore, the remains of the deceased
were quickly cremated to prevent decay. Water purification was the focus of the second
measure.
The water quality was meticulously monitored. Water was pumped from various sources in
the region and delivered to the villages. The health department kept an eye on the water
quality at the source. The necessary amount of medichlore was added to the water supply.
When the tank arrived at its destination, the mobile teams checked the water for portability.
When any test resulted in a negative result or when the consistency of the product was in
question, disinfection was performed.
A health worker and an assistant were part of the team posted at the village level.
Surveillance, water quality control, and health care were allocated to them. As a result,
waterborne diseases such as dysentery, diarrhoea, and cholera were monitored. Members of
the village team went from house to house, tending to the sick. Voluntary medical staff
supplemented the government's medical team. By treating the sick on the ground, the
potential for disease transmission was reduced. The village level team relayed information
about the village's health situation to mobile teams, who then relayed the information to the
district headquarters' control room. District Health Officers provided input to state level
officers, and appropriate action was taken right away. At the collectorate, there were daily
meetings. A Class-1 Officer manned the health control centre, which was a different body.
The district health administration announced that gynaecological issues were given special
attention, with some independent teams of lady medical officers being created. They visited
two villages a day for fifteen days, covering the entire district. Specialized medical teams
were also formed to investigate particular issues.
The medical assistance operation lasted until November 30th. Later, the number of teams was
reduced, and the operations were transferred to local Primary Health Care Centres (PHCs).
The medical unit's operations were carried out in collaboration with non-governmental
organisations. They were given a few villages to intervene in directly, while others were
assigned to them to work with government teams. The government's health department and
the non-governmental organisations that provided medical assistance worked well together.
While there was some overlap in the medical services rendered by the government, NGOs,
and unattached volunteers in some villages at first, this was later ironed out. In terms of
cleanliness, the situation was dire.
Anywhere there was hard rock, temporary sheds were erected. As a result, most villages
lacked a well-planned drainage scheme. Following the earthquake, the Gram Panchayat was
informed about sanitation arrangements. Drainage and waste management is explained to
them. Garbage was collected in dustbins and hauled away by trucks. NSS and NCC students
have started a sanitation health education campaign. In fifteen villages, the students
performed slide shows and street plays with the help of a doctor. There was little risk of
epidemics as a result of the interventions designed and introduced by the government health
department and voluntary organisations, though many worried that they might occur at any
time.

ASPECTS OF RELIEF
Cooked Food
Several citizens hurried to offer assistance after hearing about the earthquake. The residents
were disturbed because their homes had collapsed. As a result, those who were affected were
unable to meet basic needs such as food and water. Government officials, volunteers,
religious groups, college students, and businesspeople visited the affected area and
distributed bread, rotis, and puris. In the meantime, several organisations in the villages had
developed their own kitchens. However, heavy rains made cooking food and storing of
provisions difficult.

Dry Ration
Dry rations were distributed to the affected villages on the third and fourth days. The dry
rations were delivered in trucks and tempos by NGOs and individuals. The products were
unloaded in government godowns after they approached the district administration. When
donors decided to deliver the supplies themselves, the trucks were redirected to villages
where there was a need for that specific thing. Some donors did not approach the government
with their provisions, just as they did with cooked food. Instead, they went straight to the
villages and handed out help. Frequently, such donors lacked knowledge about the villages in
need of assistance, and the choice of village was arbitrary.

Clothing
As a result of being buried under the debris, people had lost the majority of their clothing
stock. According to a survey conducted by Stree Adhar Kendra, many women declined to
come out of their tents to collect relief because they lacked proper clothing. As a result,
clothing was in short supply.
Clothes were brought in from all over the country as well as from abroad. The government
collected and distributed clothing obtained from abroad, state governments, and a few
industries through its relief outlets. Many volunteer organisations have distributed clothing
directly. Various organisations contributed both old and new clothing. People were hesitant
or outright declined to wear old clothes for fear of contracting an infection. Everything
rejected and unsold clothing was auctioned in cities, with the proceeds going to the Chief
Minister's Relief Fund. Some of the new clothes brought in from other countries caused
problems because they were unsuitable for the local climate. When it came to donors who
came to the region on their own, the delivery system was often ineffective. The clothes were
thrown from trucks towards people. As a result, there was unequal distribution of clothes
among the affected people.

Shelter
The majority of the houses in the 52 severely affected villages were totally demolished.
Surviving residents of these villages relocated to open areas. Despite the fact that most
houses in the "B" and "C" group villages did not collapse, residents in these villages relocated
to open spaces out of fear of another earthquake. As a result, there was a huge demand for
temporary housing. The rains aggravated the situation even more. The number of temporary
shelters needed was initially estimated to be 40,000, but this number continued to rise due to
the addition of several partially affected villages.

CONCLUSION
Many lives could have been saved if some of the lapses had been detected and corrected in
time, according to the report. Some of these include the lack of a rescue drill and a clearly
established chain of command, inadequate volunteer relief skills, a lack of suitable equipment
to dig through the debris, and the inability to cordon off disaster areas from tourists at Latur,
valuable time was lost due to the lack of a rescue drill that would immediately authorise a
crucially positioned person to order rescue and relief operations, removing all "red tape."
Both rescue and relief efforts were nearly thwarted by the inability to cordon off the affected
areas from curious on lookers. Twelve hours passed in some villages (for example, Omerga
taluka) before the villagers were able to recover from their shock and seek rescue and relief,
or even initiate some kind of self-help. According to one account, rumours of a dam collapse
prompted the survivors to abandon all rescue efforts and flee to safety, only to return to
discover that their family members and relatives had been trapped and died (Deccan Herald,
October 17, 1993).
The rescue and relief process was also marked by a series of quick responses from a variety
of agencies, according to this segment. The army and the government were also crucial. A
variety of non-governmental organisations aided them in their efforts. The interventions used
were characterised by a high degree of spontaneity, which often resulted in repetition and a
lack of coordination. It's worth noting that while flooding the region with unnecessary relief
supplies caused problems with disbursement and encouraged dependence, it also allowed for
comprehensive outreach. The form and scale of relief obtained varied significantly between
districts and villages within each district. The affected villages in Osmanabad district
received less and delayed relief, compared to villages in Latur district. The need for
coordination remains undisputed.
The aspect of acute human suffering naturally elicits a strong response during the rescue and
relief process. This reaction is translated into material assistance. As a result, this step is not
always governed by rational and effective procedures. This has resulted in the influx of
culturally insensitive help (canned milk, inappropriate clothing). It is neither possible nor
prudent to refuse assistance. Instead, this could be transformed into sufficient material
assistance, or donors may be asked to supply relevant materials. The situations in Latur and
Osmanabad clearly demonstrated the need for such a body.
A constant flow of information is required by the disaster management system in order to
promote scheduled, closely monitored, and effective rescue and relief efforts. It is expected
that fast rescue and relief operations would minimise the number of fatalities and injuries.
However, the lack of better facilities, such as highways, railways, and airstrips or helipads,
made it difficult for rescue and relief workers to reach the largest number of trapped and
dazed survivors in the shortest amount of time.
However, steps have been taken to address the crisis management crisis. At the district and
taluka levels, both divisional commissioners and collectors were advised to prepare
contingency plans. This was done to alleviate the near-chaotic situation that existed in Latur
and Osmanabad at the start. Other crisis management steps include compiling a list of
volunteer organisations, medical facilities, blood donors, and military members who can be
quickly reached. There are plans in the works to stage "mock catastrophe" drills.

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India, 1995, 322 p.)
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