Lesson 7: REASON AND IMPARTIALITY

Do people still make impartial decisions anymore? Could we ever? It appears that wherever we
turn, we are told that impartiality just isn’t possible. But we speculate, sometimes, whether this can be
the case. Are things so complex that impartiality isn’t always possible? If not, when can impartiality be
achievable, at least to some degree? This lesson intends at a critical study and re-evaluation of the
concept of impartiality. The goal here is to clarify this ideal through analysis of the arguments relating to
impartiality, and in doing so to put forward a confined but defensible notion of impartiality. The first
step towards this goal is an examination of the concept of impartiality.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

After studying this chapter, the students should be able to:

1. Discuss the concept of impartiality as it relates to morality;
2. Differentiate responses based on reason and those based on feelings; and
3. Write an evaluation paper from the articles/stories from the news paper regarding issues or crime
cases in the Philippines.

LECTURE NOTES

Autonomous Reason

The foundation of a sound ethics for Immanuel Kant can only be the authority of human reason.
The person who acts in accordance to drawn-up lists of what one should do complies through the use of
his/her reason that they are indeed an obligation for his/her. The reason, therefore, elects such and
such as morally binding and thus acts in accordance with what he/she thinks is so. Her reason,
therefore, functions as the very effort to think through moral principles and apply what he/she knows to
the right thing to do. In fact, this internal authority of human reason is operative and takes precedence
every time the human person confronts a particular moral situation. This is human rationality that is
discursive, i.e., humans reason "talking to themselves," according to one of the Philosopher-readers of
Kant named Hannah Arendt.

Impartiality

Impartiality is sometimes treated by philosophers as if it were equivalent to moral impartiality.

Or, at the very least, the former word is often used, without the qualifying adjective ‘moral’, even when
it is the particularly moral concept that is intended. This is misleading, since impartiality in its broadest
sense is best understood as a formal notion, while moral impartiality in particular is a substantive
concept – and one concerning which there is considerable dispute. This entry will be predominantly
concerned with moral impartiality – the sort of impartiality, that is, that commonly features in
normative moral and political theories. However, we will begin by addressing the broader, formal
concept, and we will end with a brief discussion of issues raised by epistemic, rather than moral,
impartiality.

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The Impartial point of view

It is characteristic of modern moral thought to see impartiality as a requirement of, if not a

fundamental component of, morality. However, the precise nature of this connection remains disputed.
As Brad Hooker has pointed out, there are at least three levels at which assessments of moral
impartiality may be made. First, one may ask whether moral rules are being impartially applied. Second,
impartial benevolence may be used as a direct guide to practical decisions. And third, the content of
first-order moral rules may be assessed from an impartial standpoint. (Hooker 2010).
Let’s begin with the idea that to act morally is to act from the standpoint of impartial benevolence.
Many writers have simply assumed that to assert the importance of impartiality in the context of
morality just is to accept the idea of acting from such a perspective. It is generally agreed that some sort
of close connection obtains between morality and impartiality. Indeed, the phrases ‘moral point of view’
and ‘impartial (or ‘impersonal’) point of view’ are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to the
imagined impersonal perspective from which, it is supposed, moral judgments are to be made (Baier
1958, chapter 8; Harsanyi 1982; Scheffler 1982, 1985; Smith 1976 [1759]; Wolf 1992; see also Blum
1980, Chapter 3). As noted above, however, the word ‘impartial’ is a general term with many particular
species; it follows that the phrase ‘impartial point of view’ is itself ambiguous. At most, it might be that
the moral point of view constitutes one sort of impartial point of view.
It is not clear, however, that the demands of impartial benevolence are sufficient to exhaust those of
morality. Treating a person appropriately and respectfully may well require certain sorts of emotional
and/or cognitive responses: sensitivity to her needs and values, empathy for her suffering, and the like.
But if these responses are pictured as the results of positive traits or attributes (and not simply as, say,
the result of a lack of bias or prejudice), then it is not clear that merely being impartial between persons
is sufficient to guarantee that one will possess and display the necessary sensitivities. Indeed,
characterizations of impartial agents which proceed in negative terms (that is, by defining various
preferences, emotions or bits of information that she does not possess or that do not move her) often
risk picturing the impartial agent as impersonal and even indifferent (Henberg 1978; Brandt 1954).
The ideal observer theory
Rather than being put in terms of an impartial point of view, the relation between morality and
impartiality is sometimes made out in terms of an impartial agent or observer – a person who makes
moral judgments without being influenced by the sort of contaminating biases or prejudices that tend to
arise from the occupation of some particular point of view. (Smith 1976 [1759]; Hume 1978 [1740]; Firth
1952; Brandt 1954; Hare 1989.) The observer may also be defined as ‘ideal’ in various other ways. It is
generally stipulated that she is in possession of all the nonmoral facts that are relevant to the judgments
she has to make (Firth 1952). It is also fairly common to assume that she is an ideal reasoner, and thus
immune to logical fallacy or mistaken inference, etc. (Indeed, Hare goes so far as to state that his
‘archangel’ possesses “superhuman powers of thought, superhuman knowledge and no human
weaknesses” (Hare 1989, p. 44).) The ‘ideal observer theory’ of morality, in its most straightforward
form, states that moral judgments simply are the judgments an ideal observer of this sort will make.
Any advantage it has over the conception of morality as an impartial point of view presumably arises
from the fact that the ideal observer is not completely defined in terms of impartiality. (If she were, the
two conceptions would simply coincide.) Yet many ideal observer theorists seem to accept a
characterization of the ideal observer which concentrates on her impartiality and impersonality.

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 REFERENCES

Baier, Kurt, 1958. The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Brandt, Richard, 1954. “The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ in Ethics,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 15: 407–13.
Broad, C.D., 1959. Five Types of Ethical Theory, Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co.
Henberg, M.C., 1978. “Impartiality,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8(4): 715–724.
Hooker, Brad, 2010. “When is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010, pp.
26–41.
Firth, Roderick, 1952. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 12(3): 317–345.
Mill, J.S., 1992 [1861]. Utilitarianism, In On Liberty and Utilitarianism, Knopf: Everyman’s Library, Volume
81.
The concept of impartiality. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impartiality/#IdeObsThe

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