Ottoman Tolerance or Pragmatism?

Ottoman Tolerance or Pragmatism?
Inquiry into tolerance towards Christians in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of ´kanuni´
Sultan Sϋleyman (r. 1520-1566)
Kenny A. J. Macco
University of Amsterdam
7.722 words December 2016
Abstract
Were the Ottomans tolerant towards other faiths (especially towards the so called ‘Peoples
of the Book’) during the reign of Sultan Sϋleyman the Lawgiver (r. 1520-1566)? This is a
claim that many historians make and is based on formal and informal characteristics of the
Ottoman Empire and the personality of the Sultan. In this paper I analyzed where these
historians base this claim on, and whether this is a plausible statement. I did this by carrying
out a secondary literature research. This paper will give the reader insights in the doubts
that surround this claim. During Sϋleyman’s reign the Empire was indeed formally tolerant,
in line with the religious views of the Sultan who thought of himself as expander of the
Ottoman Islamic realm and emperor of a revived Roman Empire. However, de facto this
tolerance was very limited. Tolerance only followed after the ‘Peoples of the Book’, mainly
Christians from the Balkan, were massacred, persecuted, and exploited after a region was
conquered. Resistance would not even have been possible, even if these subjected peoples
wanted to. Christians held an inferior position in the Empire after the conquests, and many
of them kept being exploited and enslaved systematically. Limited tolerance seemed a
pragmatic and religiously permissible way to expand power and influence of the Islamic
Ottoman Empire. The Dutch adage ‘rather Turkish than Papist’ seemed a powerful way to
show how intolerant the Spanish were, if the Dutch even preferred Turks who were
intolerant and hostile towards Christians.
Introduction
Sultan Othman (r. 1299-1326)1 started to build the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) from his
base in Anatolia and expanded rapidly since 1299. He did this at the expense of the
Byzantine Empire (330-1453).2 Othman was a Selcuk, a Turkish tribe descending from an
Asiatic race on the edge of Mongolia. When the Abbasids slowly dissolved, the Selcuks
became an independent region on its frontier with Christian Byzantium.3 The Byzantine
frontier in the east became the scene of clashes between Byzantines and Selcuks since the
Battle of Manzikert (1071).4 The Selcuk attacks were part of the ghazi, which was the
justifying practice of waging war against non-Islamic regions.5 Ghazi was of great
importance for the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Orhan (r. 1324-1364)
conquered most of contemporary Turkey, which became the core region of the Ottoman
Empire.6 This ghazi-mentality led to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by Sultan
Mehmet II (r. 1444-1446/ 1451-1481).7 When Sultan Sϋleyman (r. 1520-1566) took over, the
Ottoman Empire really lived up to its name, and had become a vast Empire containing the
Holy Land, Egypt, Syria, and the Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina.8 In the West,
Greece and large parts of the Balkan were conquered.9
1
This is a westernized version of the name Osman, which is why the Osman Empire was named the
Ottoman Empire in the West.
2
Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power (New York 2002), 4, 9.
3
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 9; Douglas E. Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires. Ottomans,
Safavids, and Mughals (Philadelphia 2011), 21-22.
4
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 4.
5
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 120-121; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 35; Marc David Baer,
Honored by the Glory of Islam. Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe (Oxford 2008), 11, 239.
6
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 10; Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge 2004), 69.
7
Michael Angold, The Fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (New York 2012), 165; Charles A.
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans. The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923 (Cambridge 2006), 9;
Andrew Phillips, War, Religion and Empire. The Transformation of International Orders (Cambridge
2011), 84-85.
8
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 64; Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 35.
9
Mark L. Stein, Guarding the Frontier. Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe (New York
2007), 1, 89; Angold, The Fall of Constantinople, 53; Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 28, 41, 312;
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 17, 76; Halil Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’. In Studia
Islamica 2 (1954), 103-129, there 105-106, 114.
1
From the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, from Othman to Sϋleyman, the
Ottomans always strived to turkification, islamization and assimilation of conquered peoples
within the empire.10 Even though assimilation was the goal, the Ottoman Empire stayed
ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse.11 The empire was a hotchpotch of Roman,
Greek-Byzantine, Indo-Persian, Selcuk-Turkic, and Arab-Islamic cultural elements.12 The
Ottoman Empire is seen as tolerant towards non-Islamic peoples during the Early Modern
era by contemporary historians and researchers.13 In this paper I investigate whether there
was indeed tolerance towards Christians (‘Peoples of the Book’) in the Ottoman Empire by
enquiring contemporary secondary literature. I also investigate how tolerance was formed
and whether tolerance was a goal or rather a consequence of political and religious
pragmatism. However, tolerance and pragmatism do not necessarily exclude each other.
Therefore, I do not a priori treat tolerance and pragmatism as a dichotomy.
I limit myself in this paper to the ruling period of Sultan Sϋleyman the Lawgiver (r.
1520-1566) and his Christian subjects within the realm. I have a number of reasons for these
limitations. The ruling period of Sϋleyman is mainly known for her developments in writing
and documentation. During Sϋleymans reign the amount of written primary sources became
way more elaborate, so that the secondary sources I use for my literature research are also
based on more firsthand documents. This makes the secondary resources concerning
Sϋleyman more trustworthy.14 During Sϋleymans reign the empire reached its peak in size.15
During the reign of Sϋleyman the empire flourished, so that intolerance towards minorities
would not have been necessary from an economic point of view. Therefore, I use the
Ottoman Empire during Sϋleymans reign as a critical case concerning the theory of
10
Kate Fleet, The Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge 2009), 1; Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of
Conquest’, 116.
11
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 8; Osman Sezgin en Ramazan Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance in
Turkish Culture‘. In The European Legacy 11: 4 (2006), 405-415, there 412; Cemal Kafadar en Halil
Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second and his Time (Istanbul 1993), 36.
12
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 5; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 40; Phillips, War, Religion and
Empire), 100; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 64, 67.
13
Kate Fleet en Suraiya N. Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey. Volume 2: The Ottoman Empire
as a World Power, 1453-1603 (Cambridge 2013), 47.
14
Fleet en Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 3.
15
Ibidem, 52.
2
tolerance. If tolerance was truly important within the Ottoman Empire, Sϋleymans reign
must have been a prime example of that.16 If tolerance (towards Christians) was lacking
during Sϋleymans reign, than the theory of tolerance concerning the Ottoman Empire might
be based on insufficient evidence. During my investigation, I limited myself to Christians,
because these ‘Peoples of the Book’ had a special status within the Ottoman Empire. If
Christians were not tolerated, tolerance towards other religious dissidents or cults was even
less likely.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First I shall discuss the theoretical
background of the term tolerance in the sixteenth century. Then I analyze the amount of
tolerance in the Ottoman Empire in three steps. The first step concerns the amount of
formal tolerance within the Ottoman system of government. I do this by asking the question
whether the Ottoman system was designed to accomodate Christians? The second step
concerns an inquiry into the way Sultan Sϋleyman treated his Christian subjects. I think it is
important to treat the Sultan seperately, because the formal Ottoman system of
government was very vertical. This power of Sϋleyman made his personal characteristics
very important. I conclude with an analysis of the amount of de facto tolerance. Revolts by
Christians were relatively scarce in the Ottoman Empire. I will try to find out whether this
was the consequence of a tolerant Ottoman treatment of its Christian subjects.
‘Rather Turkish than Papist’

Researcher and historian Karen Barkey states in Islam and Toleration that tolerance must be
historically contextualized in order to make the concept applicable for scientific research.
Barkey adds that tolerance was nothing more than the absence of persecution of ethnic-
linguistic minorities and religious dissidents.17 Contemporary definitions of tolerance
16
Eckstein, H. ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science.’ In Handbook of Political Science (7),
Strategies of Inquiry (Reading 1975): 118.
17
Karen Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model’. In International
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 19 (2005), 5-19, there 15; Murat Dagli, ‘The Limits of Ottoman
Pragmatism’. In History and Theory 52 (mei 2013), 194-213, there 203.
3
however, are more inclusive. Tolerance is no longer seen as merely a physical limitation on
dissident behavior or beliefs. Contemporary definitions of tolerance are more extensive,
making it possible for dissident lifestyles to live peacefully next to the dominant lifestyle.
According to this more inclusive definition of tolerance, dissident lifestyles are de facto
possible to maintain. Within the inclusive definition, psycho-social pressure to discourage
dissident lifestyles is also seen as intolerant.18 Within this paper I use both the inclusive and
the limited definition of tolerance, in order to precisely describe what went on in the
Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520-1566). I use the definition of
pragmatism as a possible but not necessary contradiction towards tolerance. Pragmatism is
a form of secular policy in the Ottoman context. It is policy that might be inconsistent since
this kind of policy is not grounded in comprehensive ideologies nor dogmatic religious
principles.19 A pragmatic approach offers a Sultan and local rulers the possibility to adapt
their policy to specific situations. The pragmatic approach makes governing more fluid.
Dutch people like to portray themselves as tolerant, pointing towards a tradition
that first became manifest when the Dutch revolted against the Spanish Habsburg Empire
(1568-1648). The Dutch see the Union of Utrecht (1579) as proof of this rudimentary
tolerance towards Protestants and religious dissidents in general.20 Also the Calvino-Turkist
adage ‘Rather Turkish than Papist’ resembles how the Dutch felt towards the intolerance of
the Spanish Inquisition and its allied forces. However, this adage does not say much about
the knowledge of Dutch people concerning tolerance in the Ottoman Empire.21 The
Ottoman Empire was seen as incarnated evil by the vast majority of Europeans, so that this
18
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge 2004), 20; ‘Toleration is the social
virtue and the political principle that allows for the peaceful coexistence of individuals and groups
who hold different views and practice different ways of life within the same society.’
19
Dagli, ‘The Limits of Ottoman Pragmatism’, 202.
20
Luc Panhuysen, ‘De Unie van Utrecht’. In Historisch Nieuwsblad 7 (2012). Retrieved from:
https://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/nl/artikel/29185/de-unie-van-utrecht.html
Smeekschrift der Edelen (5 april 1566). Retrieved from:
http://www.dutchrevolt.leiden.edu/dutch/bronnen/Pages/1566-04-05-ned.aspx
Union of Utrecht (20 januari 1579). Retrieved from:
http://www.dutchrevolt.leiden.edu/dutch/bronnen/Pages/1579%2001%2020%20ned.aspx
21
‘Rather Turkish than Papist’. Retrieved from:
https://vre.leidenuniv.nl/vre/dutchrevolt/dutch/spreuken/Pages/liever%20turks.aspx
4
typically Dutch adage was merely used to stress how intolerant and cruel the Spanish were
towards religious dissidents in the Low Countries towards those fellow countrymen who
were not yet convinced that a revolt was a lesser evil than to obey.22
The last decades there seems to be a growing consensus among historians that the
Ottoman Empire was tolerant. Halil Inalcik, a leading historian concerning the Ottoman
Empire and cited by almost all the other historians I included in my secondary literature
research, never used the term in his descriptions of the Ottoman Empire in 1954. However,
in later works Inalcik uses tolerance more and more as a central element of the Ottoman
Empire.23 Tolerance seems to fit in a wider discourse in which historians take on what they
call a more non-Eurocentric approach of the oriental other. A postcolonial approach
initiated by, among many others, Edward Said and his influential Orientalism.24 The term
pragmatic went through the same kind of development as tolerance. Historian Murat Dagli
stated that Karen Fleet described the Ottoman Empire as pragmatic in 1999, but she only
used this term explicitly years later, just like many of her colleagues.25 Contemporary
discourse, in which tolerance seems to be a central term with which to describe the
Ottoman Empire, is part of a wider essentialist discourse where the Ottoman Empire is seen
as predictable, honorable, trustworthy, and cosmopolitan.
I tend to be very critical on this new postcolonial discourse. Some historians go even
further, creating outright myths about the Ottoman past. The Turkish academic historians
Osman Sezgin and Ramazan Bicer shamelessly trivialize intolerant elements in the Ottoman
Empire. Bicer and Sezgin state that the jizyah-tax for non-Muslims was ‘very moderate’.
Furthermore, Bicer and Sezgin state that some dhimmi’s had ‘the privilege’ to become a
protected minority. The moment they speak of the growth of the Ottoman Empire Bicer and
Sezgin never use the term ‘conquering’. Finally, these seemingly untrustworthy historians
22
Margaret Meserve, Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge 2008), 4, 67.
23
Cemal Kafadar en Halil Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second and his Time (Istanbul 1993); Halil Inalcik,
‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’. In Studia Islamica 2 (1954), 103-129; Halil Inalcik en Donald
Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume 1: 1300-1600 (Cambridge
1997).
24
Edward Said, Orientalism (Londen 2003).
25
Dagli, ‘The Limits of Ottoman Pragmatism’, there 198.
5
explain the millet-system26 very unnuanced as an expression of tolerance, while the millet-
system was essentially a formalization of segregation and exclusion.27 I shall describe these
elements in the next three chapters, making the ridiculousness of the descriptions by Bicer
and Sezgin clear. With the recent Ottoman revival under president Erdogan, historians must
become more aware who they cite, since it is not unthinkable that these historians are at
the very least influenced by the current nationalist Turkish discourse, catalyzed by the AKP
and its supporters.
In short, in this paper warn that our current postcolonial, combined with a Turkish
nationalist discourse, helps to construct new myths concerning Ottoman history and the
place and role of Christian Europe. This suspicion about the postcolonial discourse and
Turkish nationalism was a personal incentive for me to execute this secondary literature
research. In this paper I shall explain where nuances are necessary and on which so-called
‘tolerant elements’ in the Ottoman Empire of Sϋleyman there is still a lot of doubt and
(implicit) discussion. On some elements there seems to be no discussion, while in fact the
evidence is too scarce for consensus. In the further chapters in this paper it will become
clear that the current mainstream depiction of the Ottoman Empire as essentially tolerant
lacks nuance and is a new myth, ready to be deconstructed.
Judicial and Administrative Tolerance

In this chapter I explain some of the rights and duties minorities in the Ottoman Empire of
Sϋleyman had. These examples of rights and duties, varying from political, judicial, militarily,
and religious subjects, are a selection from a vast and complex system of government. Via
this selection I will try to show how tolerance in the Ottoman Empire was shaped formally.
This chapter is somewhat more general since many of these formal elements were also
present before and after Sϋleyman ruled the empire. Using Barkeys limited definition of
26
Every group of people had their own rights and obligations in the Ottoman Empire. In the
nineteenth century scholars named this the millet-system.
27
Osman Sezgin en Ramazan Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance in Turkish Culture‘. In The European
Legacy 11: 4 (2006), 405-415, there 408-410; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 112.
6
tolerance, the non-arbitrarily chosen examples show that there are many elements of
tolerance in the formal Ottoman system of government. The Ottoman system of
government gave no formal justification for the persecution of Christians. However, these
religious dissidents were subjected to certain limitations. Using the contemporary, more
inclusive definition of tolerance, makes the Ottoman Empire looks way less impressive.
The Ottoman system of government had become complex and multilayered in
Sϋleymans time, which I am unable to describe in its totality in this paper. In theory, the
Sultan was the absolute ruler in a vertical hierarchy. The military successes of the Sultan
gave him glory. Glory and fame were fundamental for any Sultan. The Catholic historian
Charles Frazee shows the importance of the military by pointing towards the priority that
the Sultan gave to it.28 The ghazi-theory is used by many European historians as an
explanation for the successes of the Ottoman Empire. The ghazi is an Islamic militant
fighting a holy war against non-Muslims with the sword in the dar al-harb.29 In the Ottoman
case this often meant looting and raiding. The dar al-islam30 was the area that could not be
looted or raided, since this land was Islamic.31 Ghazi meant something different than jihad.32
Jihad is a holy struggle by one group of Muslims against those Muslims (or non-Muslims)
who were seen as apostates, and were thereby threatening the unity of the dar al-Islam.33
Jihad was a top-down undertaking, and during Sϋleymans reign Jihad was not applied on
Christians or other religious dissidents like it is today among Islamist fighters.34 The ghazi-
theory as part of the Sultans glory seems to make Christians the eternal outcasts.
This unambiguous interpretation of the ghazi-theory has been criticized by many
contemporary historians, because this intepretation would make religion more important
than it actually was during Sϋleymans reign. The Sultans, from Othman to Sϋleyman,
developed all kinds of practical solutions to assimilate the conquered peoples within the
28
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 25.
29
House of war: the part of the world that was not yet subjugated to the laws of Islam.
30
House of peace: the part of the world that was subjugated to the laws of Islam.
31
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 26; Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 11.
32
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 31.
33
34
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 26; Fleet en Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 55.
7
Ottoman Empire. The Sultans had to overlook sharia-law to make place for urf (customary
law)35 and the laws of the Sultan (kanun).36 The devshirme clarifies this tension between
diverse judicial sources. Christian boys were taken away from their parents by the
Ottomans, before they were in their teens, to be trained as Janissary37 or to become part of
the Ottoman administration.38 The devshirme was a hard practice, but also gave these
Christian boys the chance to flee from their poor and miserable conditions.39 However,
devshirme was not part of the Hanafi-school of interpretation. The Hanafi-school was/ is a
school of interpretation of Islamic law and principles applying on most Muslims within the
Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century.40 Already then, the sharia was no monolithic
judicial system, because sharia was interpreted differently by four different schools of
interpretation.41 The Hanafi-interpretation of sharia did not contain rules for the treatment
of foreigners.42 Therefore, devshirme did not come from Islam, but was in line with the
kanun, or the laws of the Sultan.43 It was the task of a mufti to interpret Islamic law, but in
the case of the devshirme, the kadi was responsible for the jurisprudence, because this
administrator had knowledge of the kanun and customary laws (urf).44 These practices,
combined with a lack of knowledge of sharia, were part of a complex and unique Ottoman
system of law. Sharia was definitely part an important (but surely not the only) part of it.
From the very moment non-Islamic peoples were conquered and integrated within
the Ottoman Empire, the ‘People of the Book’ paid special taxes. These so-called dhimmis
paid jizya for a judicial status in which they were formally protected. To make use of Islamic
35
Kafadar en Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second, 43; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 76.
36
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 244; Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History (Cambridge
2004), 34; Kafadar en Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second, 43.
37
Yeni ceri, or new troops in Turkish.
38
39
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 134; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 82, 92-93.
40
Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam, 30; Burak, The Second Formation, 3, 6, 9.
41
Four schools of law intepret sharia differently, so that there is much debate over the interpretation
and there exists no coherent, universal sharia system of law.
42
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 7; Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam. Ottoman Law in
Comparative Perspective (New York 1994), 30; Guy Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law. The
Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (New York 2015), 3, 6, 9.
43
Kafadar en Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second, 43-45.
44
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 72.
8
lands the religious dissidents had to pay kharaj, since the Ottomans expropriated the land
after they conquered it.45 According to Sezgin and Bicer, the jizya was not a form of
intolerance, since the demanded amount was relatively low (in their perspective) and also
because the amount changed when the income of the dhimmi changed. Another reason
why Sezgin and Bicer do not agree with the jizya as a form of intolerance, is because the
dhimmis got certain cultural and religious freedom in exchange for their payments.46 Even
the most critical, Catholic historian Charles Frazee confirms these cultural and religious
freedoms:
‘By the end of Sϋleyman's reign, the Catholics inside Ottoman

boundaries enjoyed relative freedom and stability in the practice
of their religion. Although the Ottoman Sultans, from Mehmet II
to Sϋleyman, could have closed the capital's churches and
expelled the Catholic population at a moment's notice, they did
not. Toleration continued even in the face of difficult and
prolonged conflicts with Western Catholic powers and almost
constant papal calls for a crusade.’47
Devshirme was a tax. Protagonists of the theory of tolerance concerning the Ottoman
Empire interpret the devshirme as a form of tolerance, because those subjected to it could
climb the Ottoman ladder of administration. These slaves (mainly young Christian boys from
the Balkan) received an intense physical and intellectual (religious) training and education,
so that most of the Ottoman askeri during Sϋleymans reign consisted of converted Christian
boys.48 The non-Islamic, Turkish counterpart of the devshirme is the ghulam.49 What the
similarities of the devshirme and ghulam betrays, is that Colin Imbers view on slavery is not
right. Imber stated that Anatolia deliverd almost no slaves, because the majority was
Turkish. But a closer look, reveals that there was one common denominator between the
45
Sezgin en Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance in Turkish Culture‘, 408, 410-411; Frazee, Catholics and
Sultans, 6.
46
Sezgin en Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance in Turkish Culture‘, 408.
47
48
49
Ibidem, 67.
9
ghulam and devshirme, namely the ‘Peoples of the Book’. Anatolia simply had a low number
of Christians, so that the number of slaves taken from there was also lower.50
The Ottoman Empire kept society segregated in cultural and religious groups, which
were often synonymous. Christians had their own special place in the Ottoman judicial and
administrative system, so that one can speak of some minor integration.51 This Ottoman
integration was relatively progressive for the sixteenth century. It is highly probable that
Mehmet II (r. 1451-1481) already initiated this system, and that Süleyman simply developed
it further.52 Nationalist Turks labeled this system in the nineteenth century the millet-
system.53 According to Karen Barkey, this system was inspired on sharia, because the Islamic
doctrine justified the existence of ‘Peoples of the Book’ within the dar al-Islam.54 The millet-
system offered space for Greek-Orthodox, Jewish, and Armenian/ Catholics believers.55
Every millet had her own leadership, education system, and jurisdiction over people within a
given territory.56 It should not surprise the reader, that many contemporary historians view
the millet-system as a rudimentary form of tolerance. According to these historians, the
different groups within the millets, were theoretically able to climb up to higher positions in
administration. Those contemporary historians suggest that the Ottoman Empire was
organized as follows:
50
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 137; ‘The areas where the sultans made the Collection were the
Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia, with the former providing most recruits, presumably because it was
an area with a majority Christian population. In Anatolia, the majority population was Turkish, and so
not eligible.’
51
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 9.
52
Sezgin en Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance‘, 410.
53
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 13-16.
54
Ibidem, 16.
55
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 31-32.
56
Ibidem, 31.
10
Picture 1: Romantic depiction of the Ottoman millet-system
After the Ottomans conquered a region, the local aristocracy was sent into exile, and the
conquered area became part of the timar-system. This meant the region now came under
direct Ottoman administration. Timar was a feudal system whereby the Sultan gave the
authority over certain conquered regions to sipahi’s, the Ottoman cavallery.57 Information
of the regions and their inhabitants were noted in the defter, containing information about
the number of civilians; patriarchs; ethnicity of the civilians; religion of the civilians.58 The
defter also contained information about the economic exploitation of the land.59 Halil Inalcik
described the timar-system as follows: ‘It was in fact a conservative reconciliation of local
conditions and classes with Ottoman institutions which aimed at gradual assimilation.’60 The
information in the defter was used for the military, for taxation, and for Islamization. The
timar-system was a useful tool to find solutions for practical problems that arose after
people were conquered with a dissident religious or cultural background. Not tolerance
57
Halil Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’. In Studia Islamica 2 (1954), 103-129, there, 107.
58
Defter: Official Ottoman registration system; Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 103; Or
matriarchs when a widow was the head of a family.
59
Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 103.
60
Ibidem, 103.
11
seemed to be the goal of the Ottoman rulers, but long-term turkification, assimilation, and
Islamization.61 To counteract revolts, the Ottomans chose a wise strategy whereby policy
was Burkean, which is to say conservative but open for change in a slow and incremental
manner. This policy was tolerant, because tolerance seemed the best option from a
pragmatic perspective. The Sultan (Süleyman) took the political and religious sensitivities
into account, so that he did not impose his ideology top-down to his new subjects.
The information in the defter was also used for military purposes. For their salary,
Ottoman soldiers were given the right to collect taxes in the timari they were assigned to.62
The sipahis (governors) increasingly saw the land as their possession so that they grew in
power and reputation. The absolute power of the Sultan was threatened by this. Therefore,
the janissaries were created by Mehmet II (r. 1451-1481) as counterweight against the
sipahis. The janissaries were slaves who were unable to claim land.63 Christians could
initially own a timar, as long as they were either soldier and had proven their loyalty to the
Sultan.64 During Sϋleymans reign Christian timari were nowhere to be found and were more
and more seen as a shocking and peculiar irregularity.65 Converts (from Christianity to Islam)
were still to be found in the higher ranks.66 Many Christian armies gave up quite easily
according to Halil Inalcik. Inalcik explains this strategically and elitist, stating that leaders of
some Christian armies recognized the chances to gain power by climbing the career ladder
within the Ottoman askeri (shepherds), the Ottoman upper-class that governed the raya
(the herd).67 According to Inalcik, these opportunistic Christian leaders saw the Ottoman
Empire as a safe-haven of tolerance. A situation one would not find in the Roman-Catholic
world. De facto however, the askeri became almost unpenetrable for Christians during
Sϋleymans reign..
61
Kate Fleet, The Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge 2009), 1; Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of
Conquest’, 116.
62
63
Halil Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’.
64
Ibidem, 114.
65
Ibidem, 116.
66
Ibidem, 115.
67
Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 115; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 112.
12
68
Picture 2: Ottoman military organization
In short, the Ottoman Empire grew in size by conquering Christian regions. The ghazi-
tradition (a tradition in which Sϋleyman liked to position himself) inspired Muslim rulers to
mainly conquer and plunder regions in the dar al-harb, following from the Islamic conviction
that Muslims should not fight among each other, especially not within the dar al-islam.69
The only justification for an internal war among Muslims was if a group of Muslims would
behave un-Islamic. That group of Muslims, behaving like kuffars, would then be labeled as
apostates. It was this justification Selim I (r. 1512-1520) gave when he decided to conquer
Egypt, Syria, the Holy Land, Mecca, and Medina from the Mamluks.70 The Ottoman upper-
class (askeri) was almost completely Islamic. The Islamic millet had all kinds of privileges in
relation to the other millets.71 The big exception was the Christian Pargali Ibrahim Pasha,
who was the governor (beylerbey) of Rumeli under Sϋleyman. Ibrahim was a youth friend of
Sϋleyman who would later become the advisor of Sϋleyman.72
68
69
Angold, The Fall of Constantinople, 165.
70
Fleet en Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 113.
71
72
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 89-90.
13
Especially during Sϋleymans rule the emphasis on Islamic Hanafi-laws (sharia)

increased.73 Muslims were not allowed to make slaves of other Muslims. For this reason, the
devshirme referred mainly to non-Islamic subjects. This usage went on under the reign of
Sϋleyman, because the devshirme was not seen as haram.74 The jizya-tax was a special tax
for Christians, necessary to protect themselves from persecution.75 In other words: the jizya
was a mandatory and necessary payment for ‘Peoples of the Book’ to take away their status
as an outlaw. Christians had to pay for Barkeys limited tolerance, so that the Ottoman
system of government was hierarchical and formally limited tolerant. Religion was
important, but it was not necessary to be Muslim to climb the ladder of the Ottoman
political hierarchy. The social status of an individual was important, and religion was an
important component in this.76 Tolerance however, was never a goal in itself. Nuance is
necessary when it comes to the theory of tolerance in the formal sketch of the Ottoman
Empire during the reign of Süleyman (r. 1520-1566).
‘Kanuni’ Sultan Sϋleyman (r. 1520-1566)

Under Sϋleymans reign the Ottoman Empire reached its peak in size.77 In this chapter I
analyze whether tolerance was indeed part of Süleymans way character and style of
government. I do this by analyzing the formal aspects of the Sultanate, while also
investigating the personal characteristics of Sultan Sϋleyman. I first analyze the formal
components of Sϋleymans rule. Douglas Streusand distinguishes two forms of rule in the
Middle East. The first is godly kingship, whereby the king is seen as a God on earth. The
other is holy kingship, whereby the king is mortal but has a mandate from heaven so that he
73
74
Haram: when an act or deed is not legitimate according to a specific interpretation of sharia-law,
and is therefore seen as un-Islamic; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 130; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder
Empires, 15-17; Géza Dávid en Pál Fodor, Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Leiden 2007),
xi; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 67; ‘The roots of this slave culture lay in the Islamic creed, and
especially in the stricture against enslaving fellow believers.’
75
76
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 114-115.
77
Ibidem, 87.
14
can serve as a shepherd for his people.78 The Ottoman Sultan serves as an example,
whereby he serves his raya (the herd) with a heavenly mandate.79 The Sultan had to care for
a just society, the farmers took care of enough tax income and food to pay for expenses
(military) and to have sufficient nutrition. The army served as a means whereby the Sultan
could consolidate his power and his sovereignty over the herd. Later historians explained
this justification of power in this circular manner.80
Picture 3: Circle of Justice/ Legitimation
The Ottoman state protected religion, since the state (monarchy) and religion were
complementary.81 Sultan Sϋleyman saw himself, just like his predecessors, as Islamic. They
saw themselves as proponents of Islam (ghazi) and every innovation or policy was in
principle not allowed to be contradictory to Islamic law (sharia).82 The Sultan saw himself
not only as ruler of an empire, but also as Caliph, the leader of the Sunni-Islamic world.83 It
was mainly Sϋleyman that gave the religious Ottoman system of government a boost, since
78
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 13-14.
79
Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 115; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 112.
80
81
82
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 8, 72; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 120-121.
83
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 10; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 125.
15
it was he who educated kadis (bureaucrats trained in madrassas84) and sent them to every
corner of the Ottoman Empire. Religion became more and more part of the Ottoman state,
whereby religion became a source of power.85
It is not without reason that Sϋleyman is named ‘the Lawgiver’ (kanuni) in history
books.86 Since Süleymans predecessors conquered parts of the Balkan, all kinds of specific
practices of customary law came into being. Sϋleyman systematized this fragmented judicial
order to improve the predictability for individuals to know what their rights and duties
were.87 The Ottoman judicial system started to contain a lot of contradictions over time.88
As I stated in last paragraph, Sϋleyman tried to streamline the judicial system by taking
these contradictions away. Mufti Ebussuud Efendi was responsible for part of the judicial
standardization and streamlining between religious Hanafi-laws and Sultanic law.89
Süleyman initiated the study of jurisprudence in order to systematize and canonize them.90
Sϋleyman was a pious organizer and innovator who made the Ottoman system of
government sophisticated and efficient.
Sϋleyman demanded respect and sought eternal fame and glory, which benefited
his beloved status.91 Already in his first year after his peaceful inauguration92 he invaded
Hungary.93 In 1522 this ghazi conquered Rhodos, a Greek Christian island, so that Ottoman
ships were relieved from Christian pirates on the route from Venice to the Holy Land and
Egypt.94 Sϋleyman got what he and his predecessors always wanted: a claim on the title
84
Islamic schools.
85
86
87
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 76; Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 25.
88
89
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 76-77; ‘First, he shaped the diverse corpus of laws dealing with
land and taxes into a form that Ottoman society came to accept as sanctified. Second, by routinely
adding the caliphal title to the long list of Süleyman’s honorifics, he affirmed that the sovereign was
not only the head of the Ottoman state, but also the guide for the community of all Muslims, an
invented tradition that helped validate sultanic law. Third, and most controversially, he justified, in
accordance with Hanafi law, the use of endowments (evkaf) in the lending of money.’
90
Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, 124.
91
Fleet en Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 154; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 76.
92
Sometimes a fight broke out between multiple heirs, but Sϋleyman was the only one.
93
94
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 49; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 88.
16
‘Emperor of Rome’, since Ottoman Sultans proudly pictured themselves as Islamic substitute
of that glorious empire of the past.95 Sϋleyman also reigned Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina,
because these regions were conquered by Selim I (r. 1512-1520) in the war against the
‘apostate’ Mamluk Sultanate in 1517.96 Sϋleyman proudly wore his title Caliph, especially
because he was a devout Muslim. After conquering Buda in Hungary in 1541, a number of
churches were Islamized by transforming them into mosques. The Sultan had a heavenly
mandate, so that Islamizing a church was simply done by praying in it.97 Sϋleyman gladly
took the lead in wars of conquest against Christian regions, but because the Ottoman
Empire was so spacious, his participation was often impossible.98 At all his conquests and
wars Sϋleyman prevented wars on two sides to prevent a costly and diluted endeavour
which could bring his glory in danger.99
Sϋleymans personality characterizes Colin Imber as authoritarian and dominant.100
Stanford Shaw characterizes Sϋleyman as just. According to Shaw, taxes were adapted to
the income of each household. The damaged infrastructure of the conquered region was
often recovered very quickly by the Ottomans. According to Shaw, this top-down policy
from Sϋleyman was important, because a devastated region was not profitable.101 Sϋleyman
also seemed trustworthy, sensitive, and loyal. Sϋleyman showed his trustworthiness when
he promised Christian knights on Rhodos a safe conduct if they would give up. Süleyman did
not break this oath.102 Ibrahim Pasha was a youth friend of Sϋleyman. Sϋleyman stayed loyal
to his Christian confidant, even making him Grand Vizier at the beginning of his reign.103
Sϋleyman was also sensitive. The Ottoman system was based on slavery. The personal
guards of Sϋleyman were taken from janissaries, an army of slave boys from the devshirme I
95
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 54, 125.
96
Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 35; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 64; Fleet and
Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 45, 113.
97
Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 177.
98
99
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 88.
100
101
102
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 38-39.
103
17
explained in an earlier paragraph.104 Even the offspring was arranged with slaves
(concubines), who were part of his harem. These concubines were in theory merely vehicles
for Sultanic reproduction. Even Süleymans own mother was a slave.105 However, Sϋleyman
fell in love with Roxelana, one of his concubines from Russian origin. Sϋleyman broke the
tradition whereby concubines were limited to reproduction. After Roxelana got pregnant,
the Sultan would normally no longer have sexual contact with that concubine. In the case of
Roxelana however, Sϋleyman kept visiting her and sending her letters, which betrayed his
deep love and affection for her. After her death, Roxelana was even added to the Sultanic
grave in Istanbul, reserved for Sϋleyman.106 Roxelana initiated a new tradition, whereby
women of the Sultan in the Topkapi Palace were no longer mere vehicles for reproduction,
but actually gained sufficient political influence.107
The literature does not necessarily portray Sϋleyman as tolerant. Indirectly one can
interpret Süleymans supposed tolerance. Because religion was so important for Sϋleyman I
can subtract his predisposition towards religious dissidents.108 Christian are, just like
Muslims, ‘Peoples of the Book’. In the Quran, Christians are seen as potential Muslims in the
future, when they would convert. These ‘Peoples of the Book’ are tolerated in a position of
inferiority within the dar al-islam. Therefore, Muslims were not allowed to persecute
Christians individually, or treat them as outlaws in any other way.109 Because the Ottoman
state and religion were complementary, and Sϋleyman considered himself the embodiment
of that state, I can conclude that his attitude towards the ‘Peoples of the Book’ was tolerant
in Karen Barkey’s limited definition.110 That is not to say there was a lot of tolerance in
practice. I also do not pose the Ottoman state as a monolithic institution. I limit myself by
stating that Sultan Sϋleyman, who was the absolute ruler in theory, had significant influence
104
105
106
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 90; Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 50; Henk Boom,
‘Sϋleyman, de Grote Turk’. In Historisch Nieuwsblad 7 (2010). Retrieved from:
https://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/nl/artikel/26820/suleyman-de-grote-turk.html
107
108
109
110
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 8, 16.
18
on the way the Ottoman Empire was governed.111 Barkey recognizes that religion was seen
as the embodiment of the Ottoman state, but that secular law was often more applied, or
even necessary when Islamic jurisprudence could not provide a solution in specific cases.112
Also Sϋleyman sometimes departed from Islamic law. I showed this before when I wrote
about the contradictions between different sources of law. These contradictions were the
consequence of pragmatic decisions by Ottoman Sultans. I shall explain this more
thoroughly in the next chapter.
In short, Sϋleyman characterizes himself as authoritarian and dominant. In
combination with a deep religiosity, Sϋleyman was also a fighter. His big strategic insight
and organizational capabilities added up to an Ottoman Empire that was culturally,
religiously, and politically at its peak. His honour was dear to him, so that meddling with it
would be a life threatening deed. Süleyman was loyal to his Christian youth friend Ibrahim
Pasha, making him Grand Vizier, but when Pasha became a danger for Süleymans power
and honour he was executed. Süleymans love for Roxelana shows not only his sensitive side,
but also his progressiveness when it benefited him. To say something about Süleymans
tolerance I sketched his religiosity. Sϋleyman was probably tolerant in Barkeys definition,
but tolerance was not a goal in itself. Sϋleymans limited tolerance sprang from political
pragmatism and religious beliefs.
Tolerance in Practice
The limited version of tolerance defined by Karen Barkey is a good description of the
Ottoman Empire in theory, as well as the personal characteristics of Süleyman. However,
those formal elements are of less importance than how it actually went on in the Ottoman
Empire. In this chapter I analyze the Ottoman system of government in practice. In this
chapter I explain that the theory of tolerance in the Ottoman Empire is de facto barely
111
Dagli, ‘The Limits of Ottoman Pragmatism’, 202.
112
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 11; ‘Thus, although Islam was understood as the religion of the
state, it was subordinated to the raison d’etat. Religion functioned as an institution of the state and
its practitioners emerged only as state officials.‘
19
supported by the secondary literature. I tried to evade selection bias by posing examples
that are representative for the overall tendency in the secondary literature. Tolerance in
Barkeys limited definition was often visible in the way the Ottomans dealt with their
Christian subjects, but only after any form of resistance was first reduced. After conquering
a Christian region, the local Christian population was subjected to turkification and
islamization from day one, for example by slaughtering men capable of fighting, forced
migrations, forced taxes (jizya), making mosques from churches, slavery, and different forms
of psycho-social pressure which made it harder for Christians to maintan their Christian
traditions. Christians on the Balkan could barely make a fist against the new Ottoman ruler,
let alone to exert their Christian faith.
Historian Daniel Goffman states that the repressive Catholic and Greek-Orthodox
administrative elements were replaced by Asiatic egalitarianism and Islamic tolerance, and
that Christian subjects accepted this new rule because they saw the tolerant Ottoman
system of government as a great improvement.113 Furthermore, Douglas Streusand states
that Christians accepted the Ottoman rule because it brought predictability, justice, and
order.114 In this chapter, I will argument that these depictions are caricatures of Ottoman
rule after they conquered Balkan regions. It is evidently more probable that the acceptance
of Ottoman rule by Christian subjects did not follow from a recognition of Ottoman
tolerance, but rather a consequence of pragmatic considerations and lack of means to resist
the Ottomans. The Catholic historian Charles Frazee, who is quite nuanced in his depictions
of the Ottoman Empire, sketches what happened when the Ottomans won a war with
Hungary, a region that was part of the dar al-harb in the conception of the Ottomans: ‘The
civilian population of central Hungary had been practically exterminated (...) Slaves were
still being exported chained together in long lines like horses being taken to the fair.’115
Those Christians who survived the massacres were no longer persecuted, according to
Douglas Streusand. After the massacres by the Ottomans, and when the Ottomans imposed
113
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 46-47.
114
115
20
their ingenious system of government that was directed to turkification, islamization, and
assimilation, the question arises whether resistance was even possible at all.116
The Ottoman system of government was imperialist and discriminatory towards
religious dissidents, whereby religious dissidents had to pay special taxes and laws. The jizya
was adjusted to the individual capacity to pay them, but the tax was compulsory and
discriminatory, since the ‘Peoples of the Book’ would otherwise be outlawed and in
constant danger that Muslims would plunder and persecute them.117 Slavery also continued
after Christian regions were conquered in the form of an un-Islamic devshirme system, that
was still being used by Sϋleyman, even though he was a devout Muslim.118 Streusand plays
down the devshirme by stating that many Christian families voluntarily gave their sons to
the Ottomans so that they could grow within the Ottoman ranks of the army and politics.119
How miserable were the conditions of these Christians in occupied territories on the Balkan,
when parents even decided to give their children voluntarily to a hostile occupier. An enemy
that had killed many of their ancestors, so that families that stayed behind often had to ‘live
in shame’.120 Research from Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert show that cities like
Dubrovnik, Ragusa and Sarajevo were flourishing under Sϋleymans rule in terms of trade.121
However, this says very little about the situation of the vast majority of farmers who
produced the wine and grains for the flourishing trade at the those ports.122 Charles Frazee
states that ‘the gains made by the Turks at their expense [of the Orthodox Church] were
devastating.’123
Christians did not have complete freedom to practice their religion, not even when
their region accepted Islam as new official religion, even though this is suggested by the
claim the Ottoman Empire was tolerant towards ‘Peoples of the Book’. ‘No bells were to be
rung nor clocks strike the hour nor would the construction of new churches be permitted.
116
117
118
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 134 Kafadar en Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second, 43.
119
Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 83, 95.
120
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 67-68.
121
Inalcik en Quataert, An Economic and Social History, 259.
122
Ibidem, 266.
123
21
All such stipulations were consonant with Islamic practice in dealing with a city which
voluntarily submitted to Muslim rule.’124 However, Christians were allowed to move
throughout the Empire, exemplified by pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land (the vast majority
of pilgrims preferred to travel from Venice to Jaffa by sea).125 Catholic missionaries however,
could count on agression and violence within the Empire.126 Boys that were made slave
(devshirme) were educated in Islamic doctrine and became Muslim, had to learn Turkish,
had to accept the Sultan as their pater familias, and were seperated from their country of
birth and family (which on some occasions they could visit later on).127 Also in the higher
layers of government Christians were under pressure to convert to Islam, even though being
Muslims was in theory not necessary to climb the Ottoman ranks.128 This pressure was
psycho-social, according to Halil Inalcik.129 Christians in the Ottoman armies were being
distrusted since there was doubt if they would stay loyal to the Sultan.130 Being Muslim also
influenced ones status, which was a very important element of Ottoman culture. However,
once status was not only dependent on religious denomination.131 According to Marc David
Baer there were direct stimuli to convert Christians, like Christians awaiting all kinds of gifts
once they would convert.132
The Christian world saw this loss of Christian territory as a threat. Especially because
Muslims islamized Christian holy sites. Constantinople and its Hagia Sophia cathedral,
conquered by Mehmet II the Conquerer, changed its name to Istanbul and the Hagia Sophia
became a mosque.133 This islamization of a Christian symbol did not just spring from
religion, but also fused with the Ottoman dream to revive the Roman Empire under the
124
125
Ibidem, 60.
126
Ibidem, 29.
127
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 55, 67-68; Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 21.
128
129
Inalcik, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 116-117.
130
Angold, The Fall of Constantinople, 6.
131
132
Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 15.
133
22
banner of Islam.134 Islamizing churches was a practice Sϋleyman repeated many times,
making it hard or impossible for Christians to enter and/ or use their places of worship.135
Because the Ottomans were proud of their conquests they built many mosques in the new
regions.136 The presence of Islam quickly increased, especially since Ottomans liked the
practice of remigration and stimulated mixed marriages.137 On the longer term Christian
regions on the Balkan were turkified, islamized, and thereby assimilated.138
Sultan Sϋleyman saw himself as an absolute ruler, but de facto his power was
limited. Besides the many formal limitations on his power, there were even more informal
limitations. This made Süleymans official practice, namely not to persecute minorities, de
facto impossible to impose.139 Suppression and persecution of religious dissidents, as well as
psycho-social pressure, could often not be prevented. This is how the Christian population
in Buda (Hungary) got decimated to hundred families. The remaining Catholic and Orthodox
Christians started to share their church.140 The limited power of the Sultan was also manifest
in the way civil servants were allocated. Some families escaped the control of the Sultan,
making some administrative jobs heredetary.141 Furthermore, slaves had to be treated well
according to the kanuni, but de facto their situation was miserable.142 All this together
added up to a situation where revolts in regions with Christians as a majority were a
constant threat.143
134
Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 54; Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 21-22; Michael Angold,
The Fall of Constantinople, 18; Phillips, War, Religion and Empire, 100.
135
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 38-39; Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 177.
136
137
Fleet and Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 49.
138
Fleet, The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1-2; Angold, The Fall of Constantinople, 53; Inalcik,
‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest’, 103.
139
140
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 43; ‘Inside Buda Sϋleyman installed a vezir with greater authority
than any other governor of Ottoman provinces. Although Sϋleyman promised the inhabitants of the
region that no harm would come to them, there were few Hungarian survivors. In Buda the Christians
comprised only 238 families, so few that both Catholics and Protestants shared the single church left
open, St Mary Magdalen’.
141
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 320-321.
142
143
Ibidem, 139.
23
Splitting society into subcommunities (millets) pacified Christians who were unable
to accept Ottoman occupation. The millet was de facto not just an example of tolerance, like
Sezgin and Bicer want the reader to believe.144 The millet consisted of elements with which
persecutions could be prevented, since the millet-system somewhat pacified Christians in
occupied territories.145 However, the millet consolidated a segregated society as long as the
religious dissidents did not convert to Islam.146 This sketch of the Ottoman system of
government contradicts with the postcolonial idealization of Ottoman tolerance. I tried to
visualize this postcolonial idealization of Ottoman tolerance in their policy below. Political
and religious considerations were the basis for tolerance towards Christians. The threat of
revolt was still substantial in areas where the majority of the population was Christian.147
The Ottomans realized that peaceful intercultural contacts would benefit their empire.148
This was the reason Orthodox Christians had a better life than religious dissidents in the
Papist hemisphere.149 Finally, splitting Ottoman society in millets should not be exaggerated.
In many villages and cities the millet-system was not physically manifest. Many Ottoman
cities were home to Christians, Muslims, Jews, and many ethnicities and other religious
denominations.150
144
Sezgin and Bicer, ‘Foundations of Tolerance‘, 410.
145
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 16-18; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 137.
146
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 16-18; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 83.
147
Barkey, ‘Islam and Toleration’, 16-18; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire, 45, 47.
148
149
Kafadar and Inalcik, Sϋleyman the Second, 210.
150
24
Picture 4: Ottoman system of government in practice
Benjamin Kaplans description of the Ottoman system of government and its practical
consequences in Divided by Faith resembles exactly the my argumentation in this paper. In
it, Kaplan describes how the Ottoman practice of government and her formal governmental
structure were in a tense relation with eachother.
‘Famous for their toleration of Jews and Christians, those two

other “peoples of the book,” the Ottomans developed what is
known as the “millet” system. Islam was their established religion,
and only those who practiced it enjoyed full citizenship. But in
exchange for paying a special tax, Jews and the two main Christian
groups, Greek and Armenian Orthodox, were treated as protected
subjects (dhimmis) and allowed to organize as communities. Each
protected group, or millet, had its own laws, courts, and officials
as well as places of worship. Religious leaders also functioned as
25
secular leaders, with the power to tax their followers and to

punish them for offenses. Every non-Muslim had to belong to one
of the millets and submit to its leaders. Members had no rights of
conscience—no right to deviate from their millet’s official
teachings or disobey its rules. Nor could they proselytize; convert,
except to Islam; or marry outside their faith (except that Muslim
men could marry dhimmi women). Jews and Christians endured a
host of humiliating restrictions. But each millet was largely self-
governing, and within its confines Jews and Christians enjoyed
legal protection for their worship and way of life (…) Muslims, to
be sure, were a diverse, multinational group, and so on a lesser
scale were the members of the Jewish and Christian millets. Still,
there was a clear sense in the Ottoman Empire that dhimmis
constituted distinct peoples, with their own ancestors, customs,
and sometimes languages, as well as beliefs. Moreover, only one
group, Muslims, were full citizens; the rest remained tolerated
subjects—outsiders in “the territory of Islam,”’151
151
Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith. Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early
Modern Europe (London 2007), 240, 244.
26
Conclusion
In this paper, I limited myself to the period in which Sultan Sϋleyman the Lawgiver (r. 1520-
1566) ruled the Ottoman Empire. I analyzed whether the Ottoman Empire was indeed
tolerant using a secondary literature research. I used two definitions of tolerance to execute
the analysis. Karen Barkey defined tolerance in a limited fashion, stating that tolerance is
merely the exemption of persecution of ‘the other’. The more inclusive definition of
tolerance, one that contemporary historians and academics prefer to use, includes indirect
pressure by which ‘the other’ feels it can no longer behave or live like he or she prefers. In
this paper I found no evidence for this inclusive tolerance in the Ottoman Empire during the
reign of Sϋleyman (r. 1520-1566). Last decades however, more and more historians started
to stress the limited tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. I analyzed whether Barkeys variant of
tolerance was indeed part of the Ottoman system of government in three steps.
The first step concerned the extent to which the formal Ottoman system of
government was tolerant in Barkeys definition. Religion was important, but the formal
Ottoman system of government was more diverse and complex. The ghazi-theory did make
a clear religious distinction between the dar al-harb and dar al-islam: the ‘Peoples of the
Book’ were not equal to their fellow, Muslim countrymen. However, religious aspects were
not always dominant in decision making or Ottoman policy. Sultanic law (kanun), which was
secular by nature, often contradicted with sharia law. A good example of a contradiction
between religious and secular law is the devshirme. Sezgin en Bicer described the devshirme
as a form of tolerance, but it actually was a form of persecution of Christians. The power
and future of the enemy was used by the Ottomans in their own advantage. The dhimmi’s,
an Islamic term for the ‘Peoples of the Book’, had to pay a jizya-tax in order to have some
basic rights instead of being an outlaw. The Ottoman system of government was clearly a
formalization of inequality between Muslims and the unbelievers within the empire.
Some historians point towards the millet-system to show there was no antagonism
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. These historians interpret the
millet-system as rudimentary tolerance. Karen Barkey stated that the millet-system was
27
inspired on and influenced by sharia-law, because Islamic law justifies a place for the
‘Peoples of the Book’ within the dar al-Islam. Those ‘Peoples of the Book’ consisted of the
Greek-Orthodox, Jewish, and Armenians (including Catholics). It is true that the different
millets came with specific judicial, political, and religious rights and duties for those affected
by it within the Ottoman Empire. However, to label the millet-system as tolerant shows a
lack of knowledge among those contemporary postcolonial historians. It also shows
prejudice among some historians. The millet-system consolidated a segregated and
hierarchical society. The millet-system was also supported by the timar-system. This system
contributed to effective tax-collection (like the jizya/ devshirme). The askeri (Ottoman
higher class) was in theory accessible for Christians. The prospect of being able to become
part of the raya drove many Christian armies on the Balkan to surrender relatively easily. As
shown in chapter three however, those benefits for Christians would disappear on the
longer term. The Ottoman system of government was designed for slow assimilation, so
that the complete askeri would islamize slowly but surely. Also Islamic regions were
threatened by the Ottomans, since the Ottomans could easily use the Islam-unbelievers
dichotomy on other Muslims, labeling them as kuffars who needed to be eradicated after a
struggle (jihad).
In theory, Sϋleyman was the absolute ruler with a mandate from heaven. He was
the absolute top of the askeri (shepherds) who led his raya (herd). Sϋleyman was pious and
in search for glory. This was part of the Ottoman ghazi-tradition. Sϋleyman was strategic
and tried to prevent wars on two fronts. This pragmatic attitude sometimes brought him
trouble when his policy was contradictory to Islamic law and custom. When the ‘Peoples of
the Book’ were part of Süleymans raya they were also protected by him. Sϋleyman
stimulated the intellectual and political class by training kadis on a large scale and by
bringing contradictory laws in harmony. Sϋleyman was loyal to his youth friend Ibrahim
Pasha, trustworthy because he held his promises (even to enemies), and sensitive when one
looks at his intimate love for Roxelana. Sϋleyman broke with the Ottoman tradition whereby
a concubine served mainly as child carrier by loving Roxelana, even giving her executive
powers at the Ottoman court.
28
Finally, I analyzed whether the Ottoman Empire was tolerant in practice. Minorities
(like the ‘Peoples of the Book’) were not accepting Ottoman power in their region because
they were particularly attracted by their tolerant features. It is more likely that the amount
of violence and devastation from Ottoman armies after a Christian region was conquered,
together with an ingenious Ottoman system of government with its taxes, slavery, and
societal segregation, led to a lack of means for the subjected Christians to fight the Ottoman
occupation. Furthermore, the Ottomans made religious practice for Christians in conquered
lands nearly impossible. Finally, Sultan Sϋleyman contributed to this lack of tolerance by
Islamizing churches en masse. The phrase ‘Rather Turkish than Papist’ was therefore merely
a metaphor to stress the amount of intolerance of the Church and the Spanish Catholic
administration in the Netherlands. Tolerance was not a goal in itself in the Ottoman Empire
of Süleyman. I join Karen Barkey when she states Ottoman tolerance was often merely a
result of pragmatic policy. Via trial and error the Ottomans developed an ingenious,
conservative, machavellistic tactic to expand their empire. The Ottomans wanted a revival
of the Roman Empire, pushing forward with the hope that one day the crescent of Islam
would wave over the rooftops in Rome. Limited tolerance was one of the means to reach
that longterm goal.
29
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Ottoman Tolerance or Pragmatism?

‘Rather Turkish than Papist’

Judicial and Administrative Tolerance

‘By the end of Sϋleyman's reign, the Catholics inside Ottoman

Picture 1: Romantic depiction of the Ottoman millet-system

Especially during Sϋleymans rule the emphasis on Islamic Hanafi-laws (sharia)

‘Kanuni’ Sultan Sϋleyman (r. 1520-1566)

Picture 3: Circle of Justice/ Legitimation

Picture 4: Ottoman system of government in practice

‘Famous for their toleration of Jews and Christians, those two

secular leaders, with the power to tax their followers and to

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