R E V IE W A ND C O M M E N T AR I E S
The Science and Folklore of Traumatic
Amnesia
Richard J. McNally, Harvard University
Some clinical theorists believe that certain experiences
are so overwhelmingly traumatic that many victims
dissociate their memory for the experience (Gleaves,
Smith, Butler, & Spiegel, this issue). Unfortunately,
clinicians who endorse this hypothesis often exhibit
confusion about the very studies they cite in support of
it. For example, they often misinterpret everyday forget-
fulness that develops after a trauma with an inability to
remember the trauma itself; they confuse organic amne-
sia with traumatic amnesia; they confuse psychogenic
amnesia (massive non-organic retrograde amnesia cou-
pled with loss of personal identity) with (alleged) inability
to remember a traumatic event; and they confuse not
thinking about something (e.g., sexual abuse) for a long
period of time with an inability to remember it (i.e.,
amnesia). The purpose of this commentary is to dispel
some of this confusion.
Key words: amnesia, dissociation, repression, sexual
abuse, trauma, posttraumatic stress disorder. [Clin Psy-
chol Sci Prac 11: 29–33, 2004]
Address correspondence to Richard J. McNally, Department
of Psychology, Harvard University, 1230 William James
Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail:
rjm@wjh.harvard.edu.
DOI: 10.1093/clipsy/bph056
Ó 2004 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION D12
Some clinicians believe that the more traumatic an
experience is, the more likely some victims will be
unable to remember it. As Brown, Scheflin, and
Hammond (1998) asserted,
when emotional material reaches the point of being
traumatic in intensity—something that cannot be
replicated in artificial laboratories—in a certain sub-
population of individuals, material that is too intense
may not be able to be consciously processed and so
may become unconscious and amnesic. (p. 97)
That is, some victims are unable—not merely un-
willing—to remember their traumatic experience, pre-
cisely because it was so emotionally overwhelming.
Moreover, these clinicians believe that dissociated
trauma must be remembered for healing to occur
(e.g., Olio, 1989), and that special techniques are
sometimes needed to help patients recover the traumatic
memories they are otherwise unable to recall:
Because some victims of sexual abuse will repress their
memories by dissociating them from consciousness,
hypnosis can be very valuable in retrieving these
memories. Indeed, for some victims, hypnosis may
provide the only avenue to the repressed memories.
(Brown et al., 1998, p. 647)
Citing Brown, Scheflin, and Whitfield’s (1999)
review article, Gleaves, Smith, Butler, and Spiegel (this
issue) appear to endorse this traumatic-amnesia hypoth-
esis. Unfortunately, clinicians often exhibit confusion
about the studies they cite in support of this notion. The
purpose of my commentary is to dispel some of this
confusion. (For extensive critiques, see McNally, 2003b,
pp. 186–228; Piper, Pope, & Borowiecki, 2000.)
29
CO N FU S IN G E V ER YD AY F O R G ET FU L NE S S W IT H
T R A U MAT I C AM NE S I A
After having been exposed to trauma, some people
report difficulty concentrating and remembering things
in everyday life (e.g., Wilkinson, 1983). Unfortunately,
some theorists misconstrue these reports as evidence for
traumatic amnesia (e.g., Brown et al., 1999). In reality,
this form of memory impairment refers to ordinary
absentmindedness that develops following the trauma; it
does not refer to difficulty remembering the trauma
itself. Everyday forgetfulness that develops after a trauma
must not be confused with amnesia for the trauma.
CO N FU S IN G O R G A NI C AM NES I A W IT H
T R A U MAT I C AM NE S I A
Some clinicians mistakenly cite cases of organic amnesia
as relevant to traumatic amnesia. For example, accord-
ing to Brown et al. (1998), ‘‘Dollinger (1985) found that
two of the 38 children studied after watching lightning
strike and kill a playmate had no memory of the event’’
(pp. 609–610). Brown et al., however, forgot to
mention that both amnesic children had themselves
been hit by side flashes from the main lightning bolt,
knocked unconscious, and nearly killed. Amnesia
resulting from direct physical insult to the brain must
not be confused with amnesia arising from psychic
causes.
CON FU S IN G P SY CHOGEN IC AMN ESIA WI T H
T R A U MAT I C AM NE S I A
Psychogenic amnesia is a rare syndrome characterized by
sudden, massive retrograde memory loss that cannot be
attributed to physical insult to the brain (Kihlstrom &
Schacter, 2000). The syndrome sometimes occurs
following exposure to a stressful event, but these events
are often quite ordinary and nontraumatic (e.g.,
romantic disappointment).
Psychogenic amnesia must not be confused with
traumatic amnesia (McNally, 2003b, pp. 186–189).
Classic psychogenic amnesia begins suddenly, often
after a nontraumatic stressor; involves massive retro-
grade memory loss, including loss of personal identity;
seldom lasts for more than a few weeks; and usually
remits suddenly. Alleged traumatic amnesia has an
uncertain mode of onset; involves selective forgetting of
specific traumatic events; does not involve loss of
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE
personal identity; and supposedly remits gradually,
often during ‘‘recovered memory therapy.’’
C O NF USIN G IN COMP L ET E E NC ODIN G WI T H
T R A U MA T I C AM NE S I A
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th ed.; DSM-IV) lists ‘‘inability to recall an important
aspect of the trauma’’ (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1994, p. 428) as a symptom of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Unfortunately, the meaning of this
symptom is ambiguous. Because the mind does not
operate like a video recorder, not every aspect of
a traumatic experience will get encoded into memory in
the first place. Incomplete encoding must not be
confused with an inability (amnesia) to remember (cf.
Gleaves et al., this issue). For example, people robbed at
gunpoint sometimes fail to encode the face of their
assailant, often because their attention is captured by the
assailant’s weapon. A later inability to recall what the
assailant looked like would not constitute amnesia
because the person failed to attend and encode every
aspect of the experience (e.g., the assailant’s face).
C O N F U S I N G NO N D I S CL O S U R E W I T H
T R A U MA T I C AM NE S I A
When queried by survey interviewers, some known
abuse victims fail to mention their abuse (e.g., Widom &
Morris, 1997). But a failure to disclose must not be
equated with an inability to remember (amnesia). For
example, one research team recontacted nondisclosing
respondents and learned that all of them had re-
membered their abuse, but had been previously un-
willing to discuss it with the survey interviewer
(Femina, Yeager, & Lewis, 1990). Therefore, one cannot
assume that failure to disclose means inability to
remember.
C O NF USIN G NOT THIN KI N G A B O U T S O M E T H I N G
F O R A L ON G T I ME W I T H T R A U MAT I C AM NE S I A
Some researchers have reported that nearly 60% of adult
patients who report having been sexually abused as
children answer affirmatively when asked whether there
had ever been ‘‘a time when you could not remember’’
the abuse (Briere & Conte, 1993, p. 24). Such findings
have been interpreted as evidence for ‘‘sexual abuse-
related repression’’ (Briere & Conte, 1993, p. 26). An
 V11 N1, SPRING 2004 30
affirmative reply to this question implies that the
respondent had spent a period of time unsuccessfully
trying to recall his or her childhood sexual abuse. But if
a person has dissociated all memories of abuse, on what
basis would he or she attempt to recall them in the first
place? Most probably, respondents interpret such
questions as meaning, ‘‘Has there ever been a time when
you did not think about your abuse?’’ But not thinking
about one’s trauma is not the same thing as being unable
to remember it. And inability to remember is what
defines amnesia. Assuming Briere and Conte’s respon-
dents had been abused, it is likely that the memories
would have come immediately to mind had someone
posed this question during the period of alleged
‘‘amnesia.’’ Moreover, as Schooler, Bendiksen, and
Ambadar (1997) discovered, some individuals, who
believe that they had not thought about such experiences
in many years, are surprised when others tell them that
they had, in fact, remembered and discussed the
experiences during the period of alleged amnesia. That
is, some people forget having previously recalled these
experiences.
Moreover, as we have learned in our research (for
a review, see McNally, 2003a), the typical participant
who reports having remembered a long-forgotten
episode of early sexual abuse did not experience the
abuse as traumatic when it occurred (McNally, Clancy,
Barrett, & Parker, in press). These individuals usually
remember it as being confusing, upsetting, or disgusting,
but not terrifying. Often failing to understand it as
sexual abuse, they simply did not think about it until
reminded of it many years later. Obviously, these cases
do not count as traumatic amnesia. If something was not
experienced as traumatic when it occurred, there is no
reason to believe that putative dissociative mechanisms
would come into play to render the experience
inaccessible to awareness.
The distinction between not thinking about some-
thing for a long time versus being unable to remember it
is not a semantic quibble. In fact, it has enormous clinical
implications. For example, if patients have merely not
thought about their abuse in many years (but the
memories are not blocked by active inhibitory forces),
then a simple question or two during an assessment
interview will prompt recollection of the long-forgotten
memories. On the other hand, if patients have genuine
COMMENTARIES ON GLEAVES ET AL.
amnesia for their abuse, thanks to postulated inhibitory
mechanisms (e.g., repression, dissociative encoding),
then therapists who believe recollecting such memories
is vital to healing will likely engage in ‘‘recovered
memory’’ procedures to help patients overcome these
inhibitory barriers. Indeed, the entire recovered mem-
ory enterprise is based on the assumption that patients
are unable to recall their traumatic memories—not that
patients have simply failed to think about these early
experiences in many years.
D EB UN KI NG FR E UDI AN F O L KL O R E
Alluding briefly to Freud’s (1896/1962) abandonment
of his seduction theory of hysteria, Gleaves et al. do
not mention the fascinating historical scholarship
concerning this topic (for a review, see McNally,
2003b, pp. 159–171). Scholars have debunked three
urban legends about this episode (e.g., Cioffi, 1998;
Esterson, 2001, 2002). Contrary to folklore, (a) Freud’s
hysteria patients did not tell him that they had been
sexually molested by their fathers; (b) Freud’s medical
colleagues were not shocked by Freud’s apparent
discovery of widespread incest among the respectable
Viennese bourgeoisie; and (c) Freud did not retract his
‘‘scandalous’’ seduction theory to restore his reputation
among his colleagues.
E XPERI MEN T AL COGN ITIV E R E S EARC H
Given their commendable interest in applying cognitive
psychology methods to the study of traumatized people
(not merely college students), I was surprised that
Gleaves et al. (this issue) scarcely mentioned the large
literature on this topic. Ever since the 1980s, clinical
researchers have used laboratory methods to test
hypotheses about cognitive abnormalities in patients
with PTSD (e.g., McNally et al., 1987; McNally,
Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman, 1998; for reviews,
see Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; McNally, 1998).
My colleagues and I have extended this line of research
to people reporting ‘‘repressed and recovered’’ memo-
ries of childhood sexual abuse (e.g., Clancy, McNally, &
Schacter, 1999; McNally, Clancy, Schacter, & Pitman,
2000; McNally, Clancy, & Schacter, 2001) and of
abduction by space aliens (Clancy, McNally, Schacter,
Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002). For example, contrary
to the traumatic (dissociative) amnesia hypothesis, adults
31
whose posttraumatic stress disorder is linked to early
childhood sexual abuse actually experience impairments
in forgetting trauma-relevant cues in the laboratory
(McNally et al., 1998)—findings directly contrary to the
notion that these individuals ought to exhibit a superior
ability to forget material related to abuse.
AC KN OWLEDGM ENT
The author’s research is supported by NIMH grant
#MH61268. I thank John F. Kihlstrom for his comments on
an earlier draft of this article.
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Received June 3, 2003; accepted June 23, 2003.
33