Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, Illegal DAVID Record Searches Lawsuit

Case 4:14-cv-00361-RH-CAS Document 15 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 23
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
ROBERT BRAYSHAW
and STEPHANIE BRAYSHAW, CASE NO. 4:14-cv-00361-RH-CAS
Plaintiffs,
v.
LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity

as SHERIFF, LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA;
LARRY R. ASHLEY, in his official capacity
as SHERIFF, OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA;
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA;
ELLAINA PINKERTON, individually;
DAVID EMMONS, individually; RYAN
PENDER, individually; RYAN DUNPHY,
individually; and JAMIE KNOX, individually,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, ROBERT BRAYSHAW and STEPHANIE BRAYSHAW, hereby sue
Defendants, LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, LEON COUNTY,
FLORIDA; LARRY R. ASHLEY, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, OKALOOSA
COUNTY, FLORIDA; CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA; ELLAINA PINKERTON,
individually, DAVID EMMONS, individually; RYAN PENDER, individually; RYAN
DUNPHY, individually; and JAMIE KNOX, individually, and allege:
JURISDICTION
1. This is an action for injunctive relief and money damages under the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§2721, et seq. (“DPPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and
1988, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the common
law of Florida, to recover damages for Defendants’ disregard and invasion of Plaintiff’s
constitutional, statutory, and common law rights to privacy. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked
pursuant 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. §1343 (civil rights claim
jurisdiction).
2. All conditions precedent to the maintenance of this action have been performed or
waived.
THE PARTIES
3. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff, ROBERT BRAYSHAW (“R. Brayshaw”),
has been a resident of Leon County, Florida.
4. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff, STEPHANIE BRAYSHAW (“S.
Brayshaw”), has been a resident of Leon County, Florida.
5. Defendant, LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, LEON
COUNTY, FLORIDA (“Leon County Sheriff”), was at all times pertinent to this action the top
constitutional law enforcement officer of Leon County, Florida, and was the employer of
Defendants PINKERTON and EMMONS.
6. Defendant, LARRY R. ASHLEY, in his official capacity as SHERIFF,
OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA (“Okaloosa County Sheriff”), was at all times pertinent to
this action the top constitutional law enforcement officer of Okaloosa County, Florida, and was
the employer of Defendant KNOX.
2
7. Defendant, CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA (“the City”; collectively with
the Leon County Sheriff and the Okaloosa County Sheriff, “the Entity Defendants”), is a
municipality duly organized and existing under the laws of Florida.
8. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, ELLAINA PINKERTON, was a resident
of Florida and was employed by Defendant Leon County Sheriff. She is sued in her individual
capacity.
9. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, DAVID EMMONS, was a resident of
Florida and was employed by Defendant Leon County Sheriff. He is sued in his individual
capacity.
10. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, RYAN PENDER, was a resident of
Florida and was employed by Defendant City. He is sued in his individual capacity.
11. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, RYAN DUNPHY, was a resident of
Florida and was employed by Defendant City. He is sued in his individual capacity.
12. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, JAMIE KNOX (collectively with
PINKERTON, EMMONS, PENDER, and DUNPHY, “the Individual Defendants”), was a
resident of Florida and was employed by Defendant Okaloosa County Sheriff. He is sued in his
individual capacity.
GENERAL FACTS
13. Plaintiff R. Brayshaw promotes education and legal action, and performs
research, publishing, and advocacy in support of civil and constitutional liberties.
14. In order to provide information and political commentary, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw
has utilized popular websites such as Wikipedia.
3
15. More specifically, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw has posted numerous entries on
Wikipedia addressing Annette Garrett, a former officer with the Tallahassee Police Department
(“TPD”). In various posts, he has been critical both of the TPD and of Garrett.
16. On or about March 4 2011, Garrett deleted from Wikipedia Plaintiff R.
Brayshaw’s comments and posts discussing Defendant City, the TPD, and herself.
17. In December 2011, after his posts were deleted, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw obtained
TPD emails pursuant to a public records request. These emails revealed that his posts were
removed by Garrett. Upon information and belief, Garrett used her TPD computer to delete
Plaintiff R. Brayshaw’s posts.
18. Throughout late 2010 and continuing into early 2011, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw
posted various documents critical of the TPD and Garrett on various public file sharing sites,
including scribd.com, slideshare.com, and calameo.com. Upon information and belief, Garrett
requested that these sites delete Plaintiff R. Brayshaw’s shared files, and caused scribd.com and
calameo.com to terminate his account.
19. Plaintiff R. Brayshaw’s posts have never been obscene, sexually explicit, racially
derogatory, or defamatory. Nor has he ever encouraged or suggested illegal activities. Plaintiff R.
Brayshaw has also not engaged in criminal or suspected criminal activity for which law
enforcement agencies would have a legitimate reason to be investigating him.
20. Notwithstanding, law enforcement personnel in Florida have illegally viewed
Plaintiff R. Brayshaw’s and Plaintiff S. Brayshaw’s private, personal, and confidential driver’s
license information without a legitimate purpose.
4
21. These law enforcement personnel viewed their private information from the
period of May 2010 to May 2012. On information and belief, more such private information of
Plaintiffs has been viewed during and after this time; however, Plaintiffs do not yet know the
full extent of the violations to date.
22. Each unauthorized access of both Plaintiffs’ private information, made while
acting under the color of state law, violated Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights and constituted
behavior prohibited by federal statutes, Florida law, and agency and departmental regulations
prohibiting some or all of the conduct engaged in by Defendants in this case.
23. As early as May 2010, or even earlier, law enforcement officers began looking up
Plaintiffs’ private information stored in a database maintained by the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”), known as the Driver and Vehicle Information
Database, or “DAVID.”
24. The officers viewed Plaintiffs’ private and highly-restricted personal information
via DAVID, including their home address, color photographs or images, social security numbers,
dates of birth, states of birth, detailed vehicle registration information and descriptions, prior and
current home and mailing addresses, emergency contacts, and those contacts’ private and highly-
restricted personal information.
25. Plaintiffs have retained the undersigned to represent their interests in this cause
and is obligated to pay her a fee for her services. Defendants should be made to pay said fee
under applicable law.
5
COUNT I-VIOLATION OF DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

DIRECT ACTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §2724 (against the Individual Defendants)
26. Plaintiffs here re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1-25 above.
27. This count sets forth claims by Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants for
violation of the DPPA, which claims are brought directly under 18 U.S.C. §2724, and not
through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
28. Plaintiffs provided information to DHSMV, including their home address,
photographs or images, social security numbers, dates of birth, states of birth, vehicle registration
information and descriptions, prior and current home and mailing addresses, emergency contacts,
and those contacts’ personal information, for the purposes of acquiring and using a Florida
driver’s license and/or of owning and registering vehicles.
29. The DHSMV maintains Plaintiffs’ driving records, and that information is made
available on the system described above, known as DAVID.
30. At no time did Plaintiffs provide their consent for any of the Individual
Defendants to obtain, disclose or use their private information for any purpose other than official
law enforcement business.
31. Intentionally obtaining, disclosing or using a driver’s license information without
an authorized purpose is a violation of DPPA. The statute provides for criminal fines and civil
penalties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724.
32. More specifically, a private right of action is available to Plaintiffs against the
Individual Defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724, which action, under the law of this circuit,
may be brought directly, without reliance on 42 U.S.C. §1983.
6
33. The DPPA provides relief for violations of a person’s protected interest in the
privacy of her motor vehicle records and the identifying information therein.
34. Each of the Individual Defendants have invaded Plaintiffs’ legally protected
interests under the DPPA.
35. The Individually Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID, disclosed
and/or used Plaintiffs’ personal information for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA. 18
U.S.C. § 2724(a).
36. None of the Individual Defendants’ activities fell within the DPPA’s permitted
exceptions for procurement of Plaintiffs’ private information.
37. The Individual Defendants knew that their actions related to Plaintiffs’ personal
information were in violation of the DPPA.
38. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the Individual
Defendants, set forth in part above, Plaintiffs have suffered harm because their private
information has been obtained unlawfully. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer harm by
virtue of the increased risk that their protected information is in the possession of law
enforcement personnel who obtained it without legitimate purpose. This is precisely the harm
that Congress sought to prevent by enacting the DPPA and its statutory remedies.
39. The Individual Defendants each willfully and recklessly disregarded the law,
entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages under the DPPA, see 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2). Plaintiffs
are entitled to actual and punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs
reasonably incurred, and such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be
appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b).
7
40. In addition, under the DPPA, Plaintiffs are entitled to a baseline liquidated
damages award of no less than $2,500 for each violation of the DPPA. 18 U.S.C. §
2721(b)(1). Plaintiffs need not prove actual damages in order to receive liquidated damages.
COUNT II-VIOLATION OF DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

BROUGHT THROUGH 42 U.S.C. §1983 (against the Individual Defendants)
violation of the DPPA, which claims are brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
penalties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724.
8
privacy of her motor vehicle records and the identifying information therein.
48. Each of the Individual Defendants have invaded Plaintiffs’ legally protected
interests under the DPPA.
49. The Individual Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID, disclosed
and/or used Plaintiffs’ personal information for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA. 18
U.S.C. § 2724(a).
50. None of the Individual Defendants’ activities fell within the DPPA’s permitted
52. A private right of is available to Plaintiffs against the Individual Defendants
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724, which action, under the law of this circuit, in addition to being
available to be brought directly, may be brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
53. The Individual Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
54. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Individual Defendants was
acting under color of state law, and acted to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their clearly
established privacy rights under 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq.
55. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Individual Defendants knew
or should have known that his or her actions served to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their
clearly established privacy rights under 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq.
9
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ statutory rights to be free from unauthorized accessing of
their private information stored in DAVID.
enforcement personnel who obtained it without legitimate purpose. This is precisely the harm
that Congress sought to prevent by enacting the DPPA and its statutory remedies.
58. The Individual Defendants each willfully and recklessly disregarded the law,
entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages under the DPPA, see 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2). Plaintiffs
are entitled to actual and punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs
COUNT III-VIOLATION OF DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

BROUGHT THROUGH 42 U.S.C. §1983 (against the Entity Defendants)
61. This count sets forth claims by Plaintiffs against the Entity Defendants for
violation of the DPPA, which claims are brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
10
64. At no time did Plaintiffs provide their consent for any of the Entity Defendants to
obtain, disclose or use their private information for any purpose other than official law
enforcement business.
penalties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724.
privacy of his or her motor vehicle records and the identifying information therein.
67. Each of the Entity Defendants have invaded Plaintiffs’ legally protected interests
under the DPPA.
68. The Entity Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID, disclosed and/or
used Plaintiffs’ personal information for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA. 18 U.S.C. §
2724(a).
69. None of the Entity Defendants’ activities fell within the DPPA’s permitted
11
70. The Entity Defendants knew that their actions related to Plaintiffs’ personal
71. Private rights of action are available to Plaintiffs against the Entity Defendants
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724, which action, under the law of this circuit, may be brought through
42 U.S.C. §1983.
72. The Entity Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
73. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants was acting
under color of state law.
74. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants knew or
should have known that its actions served to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their privacy rights
under 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq.
75. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ statutory rights to be free from unauthorized accessing of
their private information stored in DAVID.
76. The actions complained of herein were taken by or at the direction of
officials/agents, who were policymakers within the Entity Defendants. Additionally, the Entity
Defendants, through their agents and employees, have engaged in a custom and practice of
violating the DPPA in unlawfully obtaining, disclosing and/or using private citizens’ driver’s
license information for purposes other than law enforcement business without such citizens’
consent.
77. In addition, the Entity Defendants are liable for their failure to train, monitor,
supervise, and properly discipline the Individual Defendants and other officers and employees
12
who are improperly and unlawfully accessing the private driver’s license information of citizens,
including Plaintiffs, without a proper, lawful, permissible, justifiable purpose for doing so, in
violation of the DPPA. This pattern of failure to train, monitor, supervise, and discipline
demonstrates the state of mind of these Entity Defendants, and their deliberate indifference to the
rights of the citizens and others whose information has been so widely accessed, including
Plaintiffs.
78. The federal statutory rights of the citizens, including Plaintiffs, whose information
is improperly accessed, are held in light regard by the Entity Defendants.
79. The Entity Defendants’ lack of concern evidences a deliberate indifference to the
unauthorized access to the private information of citizens, including Plaintiffs and others
often unaware of such access, in violation of their federal statutory rights.
80. The manner in which investigations are handled by the Entity Defendants
provides little expectation that these and other law enforcement personnel will cease accessing
without a permissible basis Plaintiffs’ private information and the private information of other
persons similarly situated to Plaintiffs.
81. On information and belief, no system has been established by the Entity
Defendants to monitor the regular access of DAVID by law enforcement personnel.
82. On information and belief, no reviews have taken place of other accesses of
DAVID by the same law enforcement personnel, or by other officers and employees in the
Defendant Entities.
13
83. On information and belief, no attempts have been made by the Entity Defendants
to protect and safeguard the rights of Plaintiffs’ and other persons’ private and highly restricted
personal information that is in the possession of DHSMV.
84. On information and belief, no attempt has been made by the Entity Defendants to
provide redress and assurances to persons, including Plaintiffs, whose driver’s license private
and highly restricted personal information has been wrongfully accessed via DAVID or any
other law enforcement database by the Individual Defendants or by other officers and employees.
85. The actions of the Entity Defendants were taken under color of state law with the
intent to harm Plaintiffs.
86. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the Entity
Defendants, described in part above, Plaintiffs have suffered physical, mental and other harm
because their private information has been obtained unlawfully. Plaintiffs suffered and continue
to suffer harm by virtue of the increased risk that their protected information is in the possession
of law enforcement personnel who obtained it without legitimate purpose. This is precisely the
harm that Congress sought to prevent by enacting the DPPA and its statutory remedies.
87. The Entity Defendants each willfully and recklessly disregarded the law.
Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs
14
COUNT IV-VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY

BROUGHT THROUGH 42 U.S.C. §1983 (against the Individual Defendants)
violation of their rights to privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, which claims are brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
an authorized purpose is a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to privacy under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
95. Each of the Individual Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID,
disclosed and/or used Plaintiffs’ personal information for a purpose not permitted by law, in
15
violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
information were in violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to privacy.
97. Private rights of action are available to Plaintiffs against the Individual
Defendants for their violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,
which action may be brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
98. The Individual Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
acting under color of state law, and acted to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their clearly
established privacy rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
100. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Individual Defendants knew
or should have known that his or her actions served to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their
clearly established privacy rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to privacy, and specifically with their
constitutional rights to be free from unauthorized accessing of their private information stored in
DAVID.
16
enforcement personnel who obtained it without legitimate purpose.
103. The Individual Defendants each willfully and recklessly disregarded Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights to privacy, entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages.
COUNT V-VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY

BROUGHT THROUGH 42 U.S.C. §1983 (against the Entity Defendants)
105. This count sets forth claims by Plaintiffs against the Entity Defendants for
violation of the their rights to privacy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, which claims are brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
108. At no time did Plaintiffs provide their consent for any of the Entity Defendants to
obtain, disclose or use their private information for any purpose other than official law
enforcement business.
17
an authorized purpose is a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights of privacy under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
110. Each of the Entity Defendants have invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy interests protected
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
111. The Entity Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID, disclosed and/or
used Plaintiffs’ personal information for a purpose not permitted by law in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
112. The Entity Defendants knew that their actions related to Plaintiffs’ personal
information were in violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of privacy.
113. Private rights of action are available to Plaintiffs against the Entity Defendants for
violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which action may be brought
through 42 U.S.C. §1983.
114. The Entity Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
115. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants was acting
under color of state law.
116. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants knew or
should have known that its actions served to violate and deprive Plaintiffs of their privacy rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
117. In their actions, described in part above, each of the Entity Defendants was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to privacy.
18
118. The actions complained of herein were taken by or at the direction of
officials/agents, who were policymakers within the Entity Defendants. Additionally, the Entity
Defendants, through their agents and employees, have engaged in a custom and practice of
violating private citizens’ privacy rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution in unlawfully obtaining, disclosing and/or using such private citizens’
driver’s license information for purposes other than law enforcement business without such
citizens’ consent.
119. In addition, the Entity Defendants are liable for their failure to train, monitor,
supervise, and properly discipline the Individual Defendants and other officers and employees
who are improperly and unlawfully accessing the private driver’s license information of citizens,
including Plaintiffs, without a proper, lawful, permissible, justifiable purpose for doing so. This
pattern of failure to train, monitor, supervise, and discipline demonstrates the state of mind of
these Entity Defendants, and their deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the
citizens and others whose information has been so widely accessed, including Plaintiffs.
120. The constitutional rights of the citizens, including Plaintiffs, whose information is
improperly accessed, are held in light regard by the Entity Defendants.
121. The Entity Defendants’ lack of concern evidences a deliberate indifference to the
the unauthorized access to the private information of citizens, including Plaintiffs and others
often unaware of such access, in violation of their constitutional rights.
122. The manner in which investigations are handled by the Entity Defendants
provides little expectation that the Individual Defendants and other officers and employees will
19
cease accessing without a permissible basis Plaintiffs’ private information and the private
information of other persons similarly situated to Plaintiffs.
123. On information and belief, no system has been established by the Entity
Defendants to monitor the regular access of DAVID by law enforcement personnel.
124. On information and belief, no reviews have taken place of other accesses of
DAVID by the Individual Defendants or other officers and employees in the Entity Defendants.
125. On information and belief, no attempts have been made by the Entity Defendants
to protect and safeguard the rights of other persons’ private and highly restricted personal
information that is in the possession of DHSMV.
126. On information and belief, no attempt has been made by the Entity Defendants to
provide redress and assurances to persons, including Plaintiffs, whose driver’s license private
and highly restricted personal information has been wrongfully accessed via DAVID or any
other law enforcement database by the Individual Defendants or by other officers and employees.
127. The actions of the Entity Defendants were taken under color of state law with the
intent to harm Plaintiffs.
128. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the Entity
Defendants, described in part above, Plaintiffs have suffered physical, mental and other harm
because their private information has been obtained unlawfully. Plaintiffs suffered and continue
to suffer harm by virtue of the increased risk that their protected information is in the possession
of law enforcement personnel who obtained it without legitimate purpose.
20
129. The Entity Defendants each willfully and recklessly disregarded Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights to privacy. Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages, reasonable attorneys’
fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
COUNT VI-COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY

(against the Individual Defendants)
130. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 25.
131. This count sets forth claims on behalf of Plaintiffs against the Individual
Defendants for common violation of privacy.
132. By improperly obtaining Plaintiffs’ private personal information for
impermissible reasons, the Individual Defendants intentionally intruded upon the solitude or
seclusion of Plaintiffs’ private affairs and concerns.
133. The Individual Defendants’ intrusions would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
134. The Individual Defendants’ intrusions caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional
distress and physical harm.
135. The Individual Defendants’ intrusions were intended to cause Plaintiffs to suffer
severe emotional distress and physical harm, and were made with either actual or legal malice, or
with reckless disregard of their rights and of their privacy.
136. Plaintiffs are entitled to tort damages for the Individual Defendants’ invasion of
privacy including, without limitation, damages for emotional pain and suffering, which damages
have been experienced in the past, are being experienced at present, and will likely continue into
the future.
21
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
(a) that process issue and this court take jurisdiction over this cause;
(b) that this court grant equitable relief against Defendants, mandating
Defendant’s obedience to the laws enumerated herein;
(c) that this court enter judgment against Defendants, and for Plaintiffs
awarding compensatory and punitive damages (where appropriate against the Individual
Defendants only) to Plaintiffs for Defendants’ violations of law enumerated herein;
(d) that this court enter judgment against Defendants and for Plaintiffs
awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs; and
(e) that this court grant such other and further relief as is just and proper under
the circumstances.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues set forth herein which are so triable.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Marie A. Mattox

Marie A. Mattox[ FBN 0739685]
MARIE A. MATTOX, P.A.
310 East Bradford Road
Tallahassee, FL 32303
(850) 383-4800 (telephone)
(850) 383-4801 (facsimile)
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to
all counsel of record by CM/ECF this 8th day of September, 2014.
/s/ Marie A Mattox

Marie A. Mattox
23

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Case 4:14-cv-00361-RH-CAS Document 15 Filed 09/08/14 Page 1 of 23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity

Plaintiffs, ROBERT BRAYSHAW and STEPHANIE BRAYSHAW, hereby sue

Defendants, LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, LEON COUNTY,

FLORIDA; LARRY R. ASHLEY, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, OKALOOSA

COUNTY, FLORIDA; CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA; ELLAINA PINKERTON,

individually, DAVID EMMONS, individually; RYAN PENDER, individually; RYAN

DUNPHY, individually; and JAMIE KNOX, individually, and allege:

3. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff, ROBERT BRAYSHAW (“R. Brayshaw”),

has been a resident of Leon County, Florida.

4. At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff, STEPHANIE BRAYSHAW (“S.

Brayshaw”), has been a resident of Leon County, Florida.

5. Defendant, LARRY CAMPBELL, in his official capacity as SHERIFF, LEON

Defendants PINKERTON and EMMONS.

6. Defendant, LARRY R. ASHLEY, in his official capacity as SHERIFF,

the employer of Defendant KNOX.

7. Defendant, CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA (“the City”; collectively with

municipality duly organized and existing under the laws of Florida.

8. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, ELLAINA PINKERTON, was a resident

9. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant, DAVID EMMONS, was a resident of

PINKERTON, EMMONS, PENDER, and DUNPHY, “the Individual Defendants”), was a

research, publishing, and advocacy in support of civil and constitutional liberties.

14. In order to provide information and political commentary, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw

has utilized popular websites such as Wikipedia.

15. More specifically, Plaintiff R. Brayshaw has posted numerous entries on

16. On or about March 4 2011, Garrett deleted from Wikipedia Plaintiff R.

Plaintiff R. Brayshaw’s posts.

calameo.com to terminate his account.

enforcement agencies would have a legitimate reason to be investigating him.

20. Notwithstanding, law enforcement personnel in Florida have illegally viewed

license information without a legitimate purpose.

full extent of the violations to date.

prohibiting some or all of the conduct engaged in by Defendants in this case.

Plaintiffs’ private information stored in a database maintained by the Department of Highway

restricted personal information.

under applicable law.

COUNT I-VIOLATION OF DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

26. Plaintiffs here re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1-25 above.

through 42 U.S.C. §1983.

28. Plaintiffs provided information to DHSMV, including their home address,

driver’s license and/or of owning and registering vehicles.

available on the system described above, known as DAVID.

law enforcement business.

31. Intentionally obtaining, disclosing or using a driver’s license information without

penalties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723, 2724.

may be brought directly, without reliance on 42 U.S.C. §1983.

interests under the DPPA.

35. The Individually Defendants knowingly obtained through DAVID, disclosed

exceptions for procurement of Plaintiffs’ private information.

information were in violation of the DPPA.

appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b).

COUNT II-VIOLATION OF DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

41. Plaintiffs here re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1-25 above.

43. Plaintiffs provided information to DHSMV, including their home address,

driver’s license and/or of owning and registering vehicles.

available on the system described above, known as DAVID.

law enforcement business.