Robert B. Sklaroff, M.D., F.A.C.P.

Medical Oncology/Hematology  Telephone: (215) 333-4900

Smylie Times Building - Suite #500-C  Facsimile: (215) 333-2023
8001 Roosevelt Boulevard  rsklaroff@gmail.com
Philadelphia, PA 19152-3041 August 27, 2021 – a.m.

To: Distribution [Politicians, Media, Potentially-Interested Persons]

Re: Pennsylvania “Forensic Audit” of 2020 POTUS Election [PART LXXV] – Draft Testimony (C)
{}

Continuing efforts to distill what should be included in subpoenae to be issued by the PA Senate
first entails recalling the impact of prior under-oath testimony regarding deficient oversight at the
PA Convention Center; this constituted the most extraordinary testimony evinced during the
entire set of legislative hearings, notwithstanding the countermanding of a lower-court ruling by
the Democrat-controlled Supreme Court. If the observer can’t observe, there is no observing.
[LXXIII - https://tinyurl.com/e7cpa9nh] and input of the Auditor General corroborated [LXXIV -
https://tinyurl.com/4hxx858p].

These recommendations have been gleaned from Memo IV [https://tinyurl.com/49w85hvk] and

Memo XXXI {https://tinyurl.com/vf2smw8k], both resulting from my grunt-work based upon
review of 9/10 hearing transcripts/attachments; they have been placed within the context of the
Navarro Decalogue (https://tinyurl.com/p99xs68, page 79), as per this crosswalk:

10,000 {a} Absentee ballots cast that arrived after Election Day
14,328 {b} Absentee ballots cast from addresses other than where voters
legally reside
58,221 {c} Absentee ballots cast that were returned on or before the
postmark date
9,005 {d} Absentee ballots cast without a postmark (violating state law)
8,021 {e} Dead voters
742 {f} Double voters: in-state
7,426 {g} Out-of-state voters who voted in-state
202,377 {h} Over-votes (per State Representative Frank Ryan, et al.)
680,774 {i} Poll watcher & poll observer abuse (defying SCOTUS orders)*
1,573 {j} Voters age 100+ (suspect, per state records and obituaries)

Drawing upon all of the available information, in particular that in Memo IV:

(a) We know that Absentee ballots were received up to three days after Election Day.
(b) We know the SURE System was unable to track address changes reliably.
(c) We know “confusion” led to aberrations that may have been exacerbated by the U.S.P.S.
(d) We know the 3 a.m. tabulation spike could have been caused by ballot-stuffing.
(e) We know J. Christian Adams had to sue the Commonwealth to expunge deceased voters.
(f) We know voters who received multiple ballots may have returned them.
(g) We know the Address-Change and EPIC Systems were not consistently employed.
(h) We know, c/o a State Rep. harboring extensive experience, over-votes occurred.
(i) We know observers were denied meaningful oversight in fraudulent-Philadelphia.
(j) We know that the absence of purged voter rolls allows for voting by centarians.
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 Philly and Auditor General Recap

The lack of oversight during the tabulation process was as gross as has been demonstrated
occurred in Detroit; instead of physically blocking sightlines with plywood, observers were only
allowed to view from afar. Indeed, I’m told that compliance with a judicial order that they were
to be moved six feet closer to the tabulators prompted the organizers to move the tabulators
another six feet distant. When I was at the PA Leadership Conference post-event seminar,
multiple attendees corroborated what I’d recalled from news reports and, assuredly, those who
filed affidavits with Rudy could be invited to testify regarding their individual/group experiences.
Regarding the Auditor General, he could be invited to detail how he could facilitate this effort.

Boockvar’s Department of State

Rep. Grove, the Chair, cited the legislature’s oversight responsibility, but recognition of error
must yield commensurate intervention if “due diligence” reveals failure to “provide our residents
with the best election process which conforms to our constitutional requirements, is transparent,
has integrity, and is accessible.” Also, the Chair noted that the state constitution expressly
mandates uniformity in our election laws [Article VII, Section 6], apparently perceived as a
fungible concept by (then) Secretary of State Kathy Boockvar; she defined “Election Guidance” as
“a mix of what’s uniform and what’s discretionary.” In contrast with diversity, state rules that are
uniform include “deadlines for voter registration [and for] absentee mail-in ballots.” Yet, even
this wasn’t automatically “directory” because there is no “process to evaluate Guidance.” {1}

Boockvar said {1} one Directive advised providing “information to party and candidate
representatives during the pre-canvass and canvass periods that identifies voters whose ballots
have been rejected” to ensure counties manifest transparency; authorized representatives,
people in attendance would have the opportunity to know why a ballot is being set aside {6}. Yet,
the Department did not provide any specific guidance on curing ballots; this “new information”
was shocking personally, for I had never previously heard of public notice of such a forum:

Boockvar said, “Third-party notification [is now] authorized under Pennsylvania’s Election Code”
because “it’s the duty of the County Board of Elections in an open meeting to provide information
about decisions that it’s making on the validity of individual voter ballots [because this also would
be] within the discretion of the County Board of Elections.” She felt that “the Election Code
[hadn’t] anticipated that decisions about individual ballots during an open meeting would be kept
a secret”; further, the Election Code may lack a specific citation to justify third-party involvement,
but there is no provision that prohibits “giving the county a duty to be open and transparent
about the decisions that it’s making on individual ballots.” After she said, “ballots must be signed,
dated, and something else,” she admitted that this hadn’t become “Guidance” and that there
was no “specific regulatory authority in most of the election realm.” She concluded “I don’t think
there can be flexibility” {1}, probably because she desires less variation among counties in terms
of how they handle voters who haven’t done everything needed to have their ballot count {1}.

When confronted with the observation that “The way counties dealt with mail-in ballots differed
substantially because only some voters in the county are notified prior to election day or only
some counties in Pennsylvania provide this notice,” she denied this created a 14th Amendment
concern as well as uniformity concern under Article 7, Section 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution
because she claimed federal/state courts had ruled otherwise, honoring local authority {6}.

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Also, Equal Protection issues were also raised by Rep. Keefer because constituents couldn’t fix
ballots. Thus, counties are to exercise “discretion” is subject to critique beyond whether there is
to be compliance with the “equal protection” mandate.

Periodically, when challenged, reference was made to supportive decisions by the Democrat-
controlled PA Supreme Court, to wit: “ballots could be counted” after November 3rd through
November 6th,” and “We saw very, very few election contests or petitions for recount” despite
multiple challenges because “unfounded allegations [were] thrown out [because t]here was no
evidence.” Ignored was the fact that there hadn’t been an opportunity to present evidence in a
judicial/legislative setting. Also, unexplained were discrepancies between “the official numbers
that they said that they certified versus what the Department of State had on the website.” {1}

{I was unable to review all e-mails that had provided Guidance, documents on election machine
certification, and a list of all complaints filed with the Department of State; data satisfying pledges
honored to provide follow-up information were not uploaded to the WWW. These omissions are
manifest in testimony/supplements, for they are homologous; they also should be subpoenaed.}

SURE [“Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors”] Nightmares

The SURE system stores data provided inter alia by counties after confirmation of qualifications.
Cited was “ID PA OVR specification version 1.5, the Web API specification 3/5/3000 document”
that stated {2} “posted entries would be granted access and authority not only to create voter
registrations but also to submit mail-in ballot applications and permanent mailing list selection.”
There were minimal if any audits of employees entering data. {2} It is this type of laxity that was
condemned by Lt. Col. Shaffer as a potential cybersecurity vulnerability {10}.

The post-election SURE audit (not of machines/tabulation) {2} found that weaknesses in the voter
registration application process and the maintenance of voter records had resulted in instances
of potentially inaccurate voter record information. Data analysis had identified tens of thousands
of potential duplicate and inaccurate voter records. It was advised that the Department of State
implement leading information technology security practices and information technology
controls to protect the SURE system and to ensure the reliability of voter registration records.
Finally, it was advised that edit checks and other improvements be incorporated into the design
of SURE’s replacement system to reduce data errors and improve accuracy. That this necessity
was concluded yields the inescapable conclusion that errors in the SURE system had poisoned the
2020 election, despite provision of missing information by voters; no speaker was able to
conclude that a definitive, accurate tabulation could be identified. {3}

Concerns arose also related inter alia to downtime, printing, alternate address, blank precinct
voters, disappearing batches, imported batches [“it’s not necessarily that the information is
incomplete, but it’s not completely accurate”], system reboots, and pending labels; he observed
“a lot of unnecessary work [emerged because] ‘Permanent’ records in the SURE system were not
generating labels for the voter even though we had their application from the Spring Primary and
the voter had selected ‘Annual Mail In Ballot Request.’ [As a result,] We went through pages of
records to try to make sure those who had selected this did indeed have labels and the mail in
ballot sent to them. It was random and unexplainable.” Statewide implications of these
anomalies were profound and also “unexplainable.” {2}

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Timothy Benyo said such aberrations occurred because “the SURE technology is a band-aid on
changes that needed to happen to the system because of legislation and changes in the
environment of the voting process.” Michael L. Anderson corroborated the prior sentiments by
noting “frustration with the SURE system” is based on its being slow and working incorrectly; also,
a living voter had been rejected as deceased probably due to “a user error [where] they probably
matched to the wrong record and they marked the wrong individual deceased.” This is why he
had “used a mail house for the first time for this past election, and so we were guesstimating
when we thought they were going to be able to print everything and fulfill it.” {2}

Witnesses and representatives noted confusion that could not be rectified with any consistency,
compounded by inconsistency within the system itself; voters Westmoreland County were listed
multiple times and then, during the mail-in ballot process, they were received as multiple votes
that “pinking” hadn’t been filtered out by, a critical step in ensuring voters hadn’t voted twice:

When you sign in at your polling place, the electronic or paper pollbooks have a
barcode next your name; it correlates with your name and your record. After an
election with a paper system, the SURE system mandates using a small handheld
scanner to go page-by-page through every pollbook, and bink. That person then
gets credit for having voted. Electronic systems obviate binking.

Notwithstanding U.S.P.S. delays, people getting text files of the amount of ballots requested day
by day were confused because they found that “one day it would be one number, and then the
next day it would actually come down in terms of the number of ballots requested.” In multiple
counties (Lancaster, Lebanon, Lehigh), “when an individual moved from one address to another
address within their county, the mailing label within the SURE system did not update.” {2}

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a security tip stating, “Voter
registration databases are rich targets and maybe an attractive target for computer intrusions.”
Claims that breaches are caught on the county-level were countered by citing just-delivered
testimony by County Commissioners that noted “significant confusion about voters who stated
they’ve moved in an area and how these batches go.” Problems with the helpdesk were
identified, sometimes ascribed to insufficient training. And these issues persisted despite the
ability to block multiple-state voting by invoking the National Change of Address program and the
Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC). {3} Inactive voters are supposedly identified
after a half-decade absence followed by two more general elections, but J. Christian Adams had
to sue PA because of its retention of deceased individuals on the voting rolls {10}.

Recall the Auditor General Report [vide supra] didn’t satisfy three audit objectives and that the
“Auditor General was not able to conclude that there was reasonable assurance that the SURE
system is secure and that the Pennsylvania voter registration records are complete, accurate, and
in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” Submitting affidavits didn’t supplant ability
“to review system settings ourselves or reviewing documents.” The bases for this report merit
probing, particularly because it doesn’t seem the 50 recommendations therein were honored.

And everyone involved in the SURE system—which is to be replaced—must be grilled as to why

awareness of the multitude of deficiencies therein hadn’t been addressed. Such probes must
include all communications, particularly e-mails, to determine the origin[s] of such intransigence.