What

is the essence of due process in The mo/on by the DENR to dismiss the case
administra2ve proceedings? for ABC’s failure to exhaust administra/ve
remedies should be set aside. The rule on
ANS: In administra/ve proceedings, due exhaus/on of administra/ve remedies
process simply means an opportunity to seek applies only to decisions of administra/ve
a reconsidera/on of the order complained of; agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-
it cannot be fully equated to due process in judicial powers [Associa/on of Philippine
its strict jurispruden/al sense. A respondent Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
in an administra/ve case is not en/tled to be Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1
informed of the preliminary findings and 9981. Thus, where what is assailed is the
recommenda/ons; he is en/tled only to a validity or cons/tu/onality of a rule or
reasonable opportunity to be heard, and to regula/on issued by the administra/ve
the administra/ve decision based on agency in the performance of its quasi-
substan/al evidence. (Velasquez v. CA, G.R. legisla/ve func/on, the regular courts have
No. 150732, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357). jurisdic/on to pass upon the same (Smart
Note that it is the administra/ve order, not c o m m u n i c a / o n s v . N a / o n a l
the preliminary report, which is the basis of telecommunica/ons commission, G.R. No.
any further remedies the losing party in an 151908, August 12, 2003).
administra/ve case may pursue. (Viva
Footwear Mfg. Corp. v. SEC, et al., G.R. No. Gandang Bai filed her cer2ficate of
163235, April 27, 2005). candidacy (COC) for municipal mayor sta2ng
that she is eligible to run for the said
The Secretary of the Department of posi2on. Pasyo Maagap, who also filed his
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) COC for the same posi2on, filed a pe22on to
issued Memorandum Circular No. 123-15 deny due course or cancel Bai's COC under
prescribing the administra2ve requirements Sec2on 78 of the Omnibus Elec2on Code for
for the conversion of a 2mber license material misrepresenta2on as before Bai
agreement (TLA) into an Integrated Forestry filed her COC, she had already been
Management Agreement (IFMA). ABC convicted of a crime involving moral
Corpora2on, a holder of a TLA which is turpitude. Hence, she is disqualified
about to expire, claims that the condi2ons perpetually from holding any public office or
for conversion imposed by the said circular from being elected to any public office.
are unreasonable and arbitrary and a patent Before the elec2on, the COMELEC cancelled
nullity because it violates the non- B a i ' s C O C b u t h e r m o 2 o n f o r
impairment clause under the Bill of Rights of reconsidera2on (MR) remained pending
the 1987 Cons2tu2on. even a`er the elec2on. Bai garnered the
highest number of votes followed by Pasyo
ABC Corpora2on goes to court seeking the Maagap, who took his oath as Ac2ng Mayor.
nullifica2on of the subject circular. The Therea`er, the COMELEC denied Bai's MR
DENR moves to dismiss the case on the and declared her disqualified for running for
ground that ABC Corpora2on has failed to Mayor. P. Maagap asked the Department of
exhaust administra2ve remedies which is Interior and Local Government Secretary to
fatal to its cause of ac2on. If you were the be allowed to take his oath as permanent
judge, will you grant the mo2on? Explain. municipal mayor. This request was opposed
(4%) by Vice Mayor Umaasa, invoking the rule on
succession to the permanent vacancy in the
Mayor's office. Who between Pasyo Maagap plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
and Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to candidate.64 Under this sole excep/on, the
occupy the posi2on of Mayor? Explain your electorate may be said to have waived the
answer. Explain. (4%) validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or
Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to occupy throwing away their votes, in which case the
the posi/on of Mayor. This was sealed in eligible candidate with the second highest
Talaga v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 196804 October number of votes may be deemed elected.65
9, 2012). where the court upheld that the The facts of the case at bar did not state the
disqualifica/on of Bai created a situa/on of a existence of such excep/on, thus it cannot
permanent vacancy in the office of the apply in favor of Maagap simply because the
Mayor. A permanent vacancy is filled second element was absent.
pursuant to the law on succession defined in
Sec/on 44 of the LGC which states the “If a How do you differen2ate the pe22on filed
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the under Sec2on 68 from the pe22on filed
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice- under Sec2on 78, both of the Omnibus
mayor concerned shall become the governor Elec2on Code? (3%)
or mayor. “
The two remedies available to prevent a
Pasyo Maagap who garnered only the second candidate from running in an electoral race
highest number of votes lost to Gandang Bai. are under Sec/on 68 and under Sec/on 78 of
Applying the Labo case cited in Talaga, the Omnibus Elec/on Code. The candidate
Maagap could not assume office for he was who is disqualified based on the grounds
o n l y s e c o n d p l a c e r d e s p i t e t h e under Sec/on 68 (i.e., prohibited acts of
disqualifica/on of the Gandang Bai because candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s
the second placer was "not the choice of the permanent residency in another country
sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court when that fact affects the residency
explained, a minority or defeated candidate requirement of a candidate) is merely
could not be deemed elected to the office.61 prohibited to con/nue as a candidate. On the
There was to be no ques/on that the second other hand, a candidate whose cer/ficate is
placer lost in the elec/on, was repudiated by cancelled or denied due course based on a
the electorate, and could not assume the statement of a material representa/on in the
vacated posi/on.62 No law imposed upon said cer/ficate that is false under Sec/on 78,
and compelled the people of Lucena City to is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/
accept a loser to be their poli/cal leader or she never filed a Cer/ficate of Candidacy.
their representa/ve. (Talaga v. COMELEC)

The only /me that a second placer is allowed TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
to take the place of a disqualified winning (Necessity for No2ce and Hearing)

candidate is when two requisites concur,
namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General
highest number of votes is disqualified; and Manager issued an administra2ve order to
(b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and t h e f a c t t h a t a l l e x i s 2 n g r e g u l a r
in law of that candidate’s disqualifica/on as appointments to harbor pilot posi2ons shall
to bring such awareness within the realm of remain valid only up to December 31 of the
notoriety but the electorate s/ll cast the current year and that henceforth all
appointments to harbor pilot posi2ons shall of Appeals, 261 SCRA 237 (199 when a
be only for a term of one year from date of regula/on is being issued

effec2vity, subject to yearly renewal or under the quasi-legisla/ve authority of an
cancella2on by the PPA a`er conduct of a administra/ve agency, the requirements of
rigid evalua2on of performance. Pilotage as
 no/ce, hearing and publica/on must be
a profession may be prac2ced only by duly observed.
licensed individuals, who have to pass five 

government professional examina2ons. TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW


 Give the two (2) requisites for the judicial
The Harbor Pilot Associa2on challenged the review of administra2ve decision/ac2ons,
validity of said administra2ve order arguing that is, when is an administra2ve ac2on ripe
that it violated the harbor pilots' right to for judicial review?

exercise their profession and their right to
due process of law and that the said 1. The administra/ve ac/on has already been
administra2ve order was issued without fully completed and, therefore, is a final
prior no2ce and hearing. The PPA countered agency ac/on; and

that the administra2ve order was valid as it 2. All administra/ve remedies have been
w a s i s s u e d i n t h e exe rc i s e o f i t s exhausted. (Gonzales, Administra/ve Law,
administra2ve control and supervision over Rex Bookstore: Manila, p. 136 (1979).

harbor pilots under PPA's legisla2ve

charter; and that in issuing the order as a TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
rule or regula2on, it was performing its (Necessity for No2ce and Hearing)

execu2ve or legisla2ve, and not a quasi- The Mari2me Industry Authority (MARINA)
judicial func2on. Due process of law is issued new rules and regula2ons governing
classified into two kinds, namely, procedural pilotage services and fees and the conduct
due process and substan2ve due process of of pilots in Philippine ports. This it did
law. Was there, or, was there no viola2on of without no2ce, hearing nor consulta2on
the harbor pilots' right to exercise their
 with harbor pilots or their associa2ons
profession and their right to due process of whose rights and ac2vi2es are to be
law? substan2ally affected. The harbor pilots
then filed suit to have the new MARINA
The right of the pilots to due process was r u l e s a n d r e g u l a 2 o n s d e c l a r e d
violated. As held, in Corona vs. United Harbor uncons2tu2onal for having been issued
Pilots Associa/on of the Philippines, 283 without due process.
SCRA 31 (1997), pilotage as a profession is a 

property right protected by the guarantee of The issuance of the new rules and
due process. The pre evalua/on cancella/on regula/ons violated due process.

of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year
is unreasonable and violated their right to Under Sec/on 9, Chapter II, Book VII of the
substan/ve due process. The renewal is Administra/ve Code of 1987, as far as
dependent on the evalua/on ajer the prac/cable, before adop/ng proposed rules,
licenses have been cancelled. The issuance of an administra/ve agency should publish or
the administra/ve order also violated circulate no/ces of the proposed rules and
procedural due process, since no prior public afford interested par/es the opportunity to
hearing was conducted. As held in submit their views; and in the fixing of rates,
Commissioner r of Internal Revenue vs. Court no rule shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a 4. There is an urgent need for judicial
newspaper of general circula/on at least two interven/on;

weeks before the first hearing on them. In 5. The claim involved is small;

a c c o rd a n c e w i t h t h i s p ro v i s i o n , i n 6. Grave and irreparable injury will be
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court suffered;

of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996), it was held 7. There is no other plain, speedy and
t h a t w h e n a n a d m i n i s t r a / v e r u l e adequate remedy;

substan/ally increases the burden of those 8. Strong public interest is involved;

directly affected, they should be accorded 9. The subject of the controversy is private
the chance to be heard before its issuance.
 law;

10. The case involves a quo warranto
Alterna/ve Answer:
 proceeding (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs.
Submission of the rule to the University of Abad, 206 SCRA 482 (1992);

the Philippines Law Center for publica/on is 11. The party was denied due process
mandatory. Unless this requirement is
 (Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. vs.
complied with, the rule cannot be enforced.
 Court Appeals, 305 SCRA 147 (1999);

12. The decision is that of a Department
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW (Doctrine of Secretary (Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G.
Exhaus2on of Administra2ve
 R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000);

Remedies) 13. Resort to administra/ve remedies would

 be fu/le (University of the Philippines Board
A) Explain the doctrine of exhaus2on of of Regents vs. Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991)

administra2ve remedies. 14. There is unreasonable delay (Republic vs.

 Sandiganbayan, 301 SCRA 237 (1999)

B) Give at least three excep2ons to its 15. The ac/on involves recovery of physical
applica2on. possession of public land (Gabrito vs. Court
of Appeals, 167 SCRA 771 (198 ;

SuggestedAnswer:
 16. The party is poor (Sabello vs. Department
A ) T h e d o c t r i n e o f e x h a u s / o n o f of Educa/on,

administra/ve remedies means that when an Culture and Sports, 180 SCRA 623 (1989); and

adequate remedy is available within the 17. The law provides for immediate resort to
Execu/ve Department, a li/gant must first the court (Rullan vs. Valdez, 12 SCRA 501
exhaust this remedy before he can resort to (1964).

the courts. The purpose of the doctrine is to 

enable the administra/ve agencies to correct TOPIC: RIGHT TO HEARING AND NOTICE

themselves if they have commiaed an error.
(Rosales vs. Court Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 A. Give examples of acts of the state which
(198) . infringe the due process clause:

 

B) The following are the excep/ons to the 1. In its substan2ve aspect; and

applica/on of the doctrine of exhaus/on of 2. In its procedural aspect
administra/ve remedies. 


 B. On April 6, 1963. Police Officer Mario
1. The ques/on involved is purely legal;
 Gatdula was charged by the Mayor with
2. The administra/ve body is in estoppel;
 Grave Misconduct and Viola2on of Law
3. The act complained of is patently illegal;
 before the Municipal Board. The Board
inves2gated Gatdula but before the case IX-D of the Cons/tu/on, the Commission on

could be decided, the City charter was Audit has the authority to seale all accounts
approved. The City Fiscal, ci2ng Sec2on 30 pertaining to expenditure of public funds.
of the city charter, asserted that he was Raintree Corpora/on cannot file a case in
authorized thereunder to inves2gate city court. The Republic of the Philippines did not
officers and employees. The case against waive its immunity from suit when it entered
Gatdula was then forwarded to him, and into the contract with Raintree Corpora/on
are-inves2ga2on was conducted. The office for the supply of ponchos for the use of the
of the Fiscal subsequently recommended Armed Forces of the Philippines. The contract
dismissal. On January 11, 1966, the City involves the defense of the Philippines and
Mayor returned the records of the case to therefore relates to a sovereign func/on.

the City Fiscal for the submission of an
appropriate resolu2on but no resolu2on In-United States vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487,492,
was submiled. On March 3, 1968, the City the Supreme Court held:

Fiscal transmiled the records to the City "The restric/ve applica/on of State immunity
Mayor recommending that final ac2on is proper only when the proceedings arise
thereon be made by the City Board of out of commercial transac/ons of the foreign

Inves2gators (CBI). Although the CBI did not sovereign, its commercial ac/vi/es or
conduct an inves2ga2on, the records show economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
that both the Municipal Board and the may be said to have descended to the level of
Fiscal's Office exhaus2vely heard the case an individual and can thus be deemed to
w i t h b o t h p a r 2 e s a ff o r d e d a m p l e have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
opportunity to adduce their evidence and when it enters into business contracts. It
argue their cause. The Police Commission does not apply where the contract relates to
found Gatdula guilty on the basis of the the exercise of its sovereign func/ons. In this
records forwarded by the CBl. Gatdula case the project are an integral part of the
challenged the adverse decision of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
Police Commission theorizing that he was both the United States and the Philippines,
deprived of due process. indisputably a func/on of the government of

 the highest order: they are not u/lized for
TOPIC: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE nor dedicated to commerce or business
REMEDIES purposes"



The Department of Na2onal Defense The provision for venue in the contract does
entered into contract with Raintree not cons/tute a waiver of the State immunity
Corpora2on for the supply of ponchos to the from suit, because the express waiver of this

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), immunity can only be made by a statute.
s2pula2ng that, in the event of breach, 

ac2on may be filed in the proper court in In Republic vs. Purisima. 78 SCRA 470 474,
Manila. Suppose the AFP fails to pay for the Supreme Court ruled:

delivered ponchos where must Raintree "Apparently respondent Judge was misled by
Corpora2on file its claim? Why?
 the terms of the contract between the

 private respondent, plain/ff in his sala, and
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 defendant Rice and Com Administra/on
Raintree Corpora/on must file its claim with which, according to him, an/cipated the case
the Commission on Audit. Under Sec/on 2(1) of a breach of contract between the par/es
and the suits that may thereajer arise. The that he should have availed of all the means
consent, to be effec/ve though, must come of administra/ve processes afforded him.
from the State ac/ng through a duly enacted Hence, if a remedy within the administra/ve
statute as pointed out by Jus/ce Bengzon in machinery can s/ll be resorted to by giving
Mobil."
 the administra/ve officer concerned every

 opportunity to decide on a maaer that
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
 comes within his jurisdic/on then such
In accordance with the doctrine of remedy should be exhausted first before the
exhaus/on of administra/ve remedies, court’s judicial power can be sought. The
Raintree Corpora/on should first file a claim premature invoca/on of court’s jurisdic/on is
with the Commission on Audit. If the claim is fatal to one’s cause of ac/on.
denied, it should file a pe//on for cer/orari
with the Supreme Court.
 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is suscep/ble of dismissal
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
 for lack of cause of ac/on. This doctrine of
Are the government-owned or controlled exhaus/on of administra/ve remedies was
corpora2ons within the scope and meaning not without its prac/cal and legal reasons,
of the "Government of the Philippines”? for one thing, availment of administra/ve
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
Suggested Answer:
 for a speedier disposi/on of controversies.
Sec/on 2 of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administra/ve Code of 1987 defines the It is no less true to state that the courts of
government of the Philippines as the jus/ce for reasons of comity and convenience
corporate governmental en/ty through will shy away from a dispute un/l the system
which the func/ons of government are of administra/ve redress has been completed
exercised throughout the Philippines, and complied with so as to give the
including, save as the contrary appears from administra/ve agency concerned every
the context, the various arms through which opportunity to correct its error and to
poli/cal authority is made effec/ve in the dispose of the case.
Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, This doctrine is disregarded: when there is a
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other viola/on of due process; when the issue
forms of local government. involved is purely a legal ques/on; when the

 administra/ve ac/on is patently illegal
G o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d amoun/ng to lack or excess of jurisdic/on;
corpora/ons are within the scope and when there is estoppel on the part of the
meaning of the Government of the administra/ve agency concerned; when
P h i l i p p i n e s i f t h e y a re p e r fo r m i n g there is irreparable injury; when the
governmental or poli/cal func/ons.
 respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaus2on of implied and assumed approval of the laaer;
Administra2ve Remedies. What are the when to require exhaus/on of administra/ve
excep2ons thereto? remedies would be unreasonable; when it
would amount to a nullifica/on of a claim;
1. Before a party is allowed to seek the when the subject maaer is a private land in
interven/on of the court, it is a pre-condi/on land case proceeding; when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate conduct of elec/on. However, the resolu/on
remedy, and when there are circumstances of the adverse claims of private respondent
i n d i c a / n g t h e u r g e n c y o f j u d i c i a l and pe//oner as regards the existence of a
interven/on. (Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 manifest error in the ques/oned cer/ficate of
[1997]) canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an
arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear
2. Non-exhaus/on of administra/ve remedies both par/es to determine the veracity of
is not jurisdic/onal. It only renders the ac/on their allega/ons and to decide whether the
premature, i.e., claimed cause of ac/on is not alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the
ripe for judicial determina/on and for that resolu/on of this issue calls for the exercise
reason a party has no cause of ac/on to by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It
ven/late in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 has been said that where a power rests in
SCRA 132, March 3, 1997, 3rd Div. [Davide]) judgment or discre/on, so that it is of judicial
nature or character, but does not involve the
Does the pe22on for annulment of exercise of func/ons of a judge, or is
proclama2on of a candidate merely involve conferred upon an officer other than a
the exercise by the COMELEC of its judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
administra2ve power to review, revise and The COMELEC therefore, ac/ng as quasi-
reverse the ac2ons of the board of judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
canvassers and, therefore, jus2fies non- requirements of procedural due process in
observance of procedural due process, or resolving the pe//ons filed by private
does it involve the exercise of the respondent. (Federico S. Sandoval v.
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial func2on? COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000
[Puno])
H e l d : Ta k i n g co g n i za n c e o f p r i vate
respondent’s pe//ons for annulment of Q — Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his cer2ficate
pe//oner’s proclama/on, COMELEC was not of candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
merely performing an administra/ve for the May 2004 elec2ons. Thomas
func/on. The administra/ve powers of the Palileng, another candidate for Mayor filed a
COMELEC include the power to determine pe22on to annul/nullify his cer2ficate of
the number and loca/on of polling places, candidacy and/or to disqualify on the
appoint elec/on officials and inspectors, ground that Cayat has been convicted of a
conduct registra/on of voters, depu/ze law crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty
enforcement agencies and governmental three days before the elec2on, Cayat’s
instrumentali/es to ensure free, orderly, disqualifica2on became final and executory.
honest, peaceful and credible elec/ons, He, however won and was proclaimed and
register poli/cal par/es, organiza/ons or assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral
coali/on, accredit ci/zen’s arms of the protest contending that Cayat was ineligible
Commission, prosecute elec/on offenses, to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor intervened
and recommend to the President the removal and contended that he should succeed Cayat
of or imposi/on of any other disciplinary in case he is disqualified because Palileng
ac/on upon any officer or employee it has was only a second placer, hence, he cannot
depu/zed for viola/on or disregard of its be declared as the winner. Is the conten2on
direc/ve, order or decision. In addi/on, the of the Vice-Mayor correct? Why?
Commission also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the
ANS: No, because there was no second ANS: No. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which
placer, hence, Palileng should be proclaimed enunciates the doctrine on the rejec/on of
as the winner on the following grounds: First, the second placer, does not apply because in
the COMELEC’s Resolu/on of 12 April 2004 Labo there was no final judgment of
cancelling Cayat’s cer/ficate of candidacy due disqualifica/on before the elec/ons. The
to disqualifica/on became final and doctrine on the rejec/on of the second
executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed placer was applied in Labo and a host of
to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng other cases because the judgment declaring
was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, the candidate’s disqualifica/on in Labo and
Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elec/ons. the other cases had not become final before
Twenty-three days before the elec/on day, the elec/ons. Labo and other cases applying
Cayat was already disqualified by final the doctrine on the rejec/on of the second
judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May placer have one common essen/al condi/on
2004 elec/ons. As the only candidate, – the disqualifica/on of the candidate had
Palileng was not a second placer. not become final before the elec/ons. This
essen/al condi/on does not exist in the
On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and present case. (Cayat v. COMELEC). Reason in
only placer, second to none. The doctrine on Labo. In Labo, Labo’s disqualifica/on became
the rejec/on of the second placer, which final only on 14 May 1992, three days ajer
triggers the rule on succession, does not the 11 May 1992 elec/ons. On elec/on day
apply in the present case because Palileng is itself, Labo was s/ll legally a candidate. In the
not a second-placer but the only placer. case of Cayat he was disqualified by final
Consequently, Palileng’s proclama/on as judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004
Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond lec/ons. On elec/on day, Cayat was no longer
ques/on. Second, there are specific legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s
requirements for the applica/on of the candidacy for Mayor was legally non-existent
doctrine on the rejec/on of the second in the 10 May 2004 elec/ons.
placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s
favor, regardless of his interven/on in the Q — What is the effect if a candidate is
present case, if two condi/ons concur: disqualified by final judgment? Explain.

(1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualifica/on ANS: The law expressly declares that a
remained pending on elec/on day, 10 May candidate disqualified by final judgment
2004, resul/ng in the presence of two before an elec/on cannot be voted for, and
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in votes cast for him shall not be counted. This
the elec/ons; and is a mandatory provision of law. Sec/on 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms
(2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualifica/on Law of 1987, states: Any candidate who has
became final only ajer the elec/ons. (Cayat been declared by final judgment to be
v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007). disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
Q — It was contended that the doctrine of any reason a candidate is not declared by
rejec2on of the second placer laid down in final judgment before an elec/on to be
Labo v. COMELEC should apply. Is the disqualified and he is voted for and receives
conten2on correct? Why? the winning number of votes in such elec/on,
the Court or Commission shall con/nue with
the trial and hearing of the ac/on, inquiry, or Q — Is the interven2on of the Vice-Mayor
protest and, upon mo/on of the complainant proper? Why?
or any intervenor, may during the pendency ANS: No. The pe//on-in-interven/on should
thereof order the suspension of the be rejected because the doctrine on the
proclama/on of such candidate whenever rejec/on of the second placer does not apply
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Sec/on 6 to this case. The doctrine applies only if the
of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers winning candidate’s disqualifica/on has not
two situa/ons. The first is when the yet become final and executory before the
disqualifica/on becomes final before the elec/on. In this case, the disqualifica/on was
elec/ons, which is the situa/on covered in final and executory before the elec/on,
the first sentence of Sec/on 6. The second is hence, there was no second placer. (Cayat v.
when the disqualifica/on becomes final ajer COMELEC). Three-term limit; even if “as
the elec/ons, which is the situa/on covered caretaker”.
in the second sentence of Sec/on 6. The
present case falls under the first situa/on. Q — Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth
term despite having served for three (3)
Sec/on 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law consecu2ve terms as Mayor of Mabalacat,
governing the first situa/on is categorical: a Pampanga. In answer to a pe22on to cancel
candidate disqualified by final judgment his cer2ficate of candidacy, he alleged that
before an elec/on cannot be voted for, and while he served his second term, he did it as
votes cast for him shall not be counted. The a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto
Resolu/on disqualifying Cayat became final officer” because he was suspended by the
on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May Ombudsman from January 16, 1999 to July
2004 elec/ons. Therefore, all the 8, 164 votes 15, 1999 and that his proclama2on was
cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was declared void and which became final and
never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 executory on August 6, 2001. The COMELEC
elec/ons. Palileng’s proclama/on is proper declared him disqualified. Before the
because he was the sole and only candidate, Supreme Court, he contended that his
second to none. (Cayat v. COMELEC). second term from July 1, 1999 to June 30,
2001 may not be counted since his
Q — Why is the proclama2on of Cayat void? proclama2on was void. Is the conten2on
Explain. ANS: Cayat’s proclama/on is void correct? Why?
because the decision disqualifying him had
already become final on 17 April 2004. There ANS: No, because his service from July 1,
is no longer any need to ascertain whether 1999 to June 30, 2001 was for a full term,
there was actual knowledge by the voters of hence, the three-term limit rule applies to
his disqualifica/on when they casted their him. This is especially so that he assumed
votes on elec/on day because the law office. He served as mayor up to June 30,
mandates that Cayat’s votes “shall not be 2001. He was mayor for the en/re period
counted”. There is no disenfranchisement of notwithstanding the decision in the electoral
the voters. Rather, the voters are deemed by protest case ous/ng him as mayor. As held in
law to have deliberately voted for a non- Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 162395 and 163354,
candidate, and thus their votes are stray and January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473, such
“shall not be counted”. (Cayat. v. COMELEC). circumstance does not cons/tute an
interrup/on in serving the full term. In Ong,
he served the full term even as there was a
declara/on of failure of elec/on. Sec/on 8, Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified,
Ar/cle X of the Cons/tu/on provides that the followed by an order for him to vacate the
terms of the office of elected local officials x x office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida
x, shall be three years and no such official did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
shall serve for more than three consecu/ve term, there being an involuntary severance
terms. x x x Sec/on 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 from office as a result of legal processes. In
(the Local Government Code) clearly provides fine, there was an effec/ve interrup/on of
that no local official shall serve for more than the con/nuity of service. On the other hand,
three consecu/ve terms in the same posi/on. the failure-of-elec/on factor does not obtain
Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat in the present case. But more importantly,
con/nuously without any break since July 1, here, there was actually no interrup/on or
1995, hence, he is disqualified. (Rivera III, et break in the con/nuity of Francis’ service
al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591 and Dee v. respec/ng the 1998-2001 term.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 170577, May 6,
2007). Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated
during the term in ques/on; he never ceased
Q — Explain the reason for the maximum discharging his du/es and responsibili/es as
term limit. ANS: The framers of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
Cons2tu2on wanted to establish some the en/re period covering the 1998-2001
s a f e g u a r d s a g a i n s t t h e e x c e s s i v e term. Instead, Ong v. Alegre applies to
accumula2on of power as a result of Morales. Francis Ong was elected and
consecu2ve terms. As held in Latasa v. assumed the du/es of the mayor of San
COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
2003, 417 SCRA 601, the three-term limit is consecu/ve terms. But his proclama/on as
an excep2on to the people’s freedom to mayor in the May 1998 elec/on was declared
choose those who will govern them in order void. As ruled, his service for the term 1998
to avoid the evil of a single person to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-
accumula2ng excessive power over a term limit rule applies to him. There is no
par2cular territorial jurisdic2on as a result reason why this ruling should not also apply
of a prolonged stay in the same office. to Morales who is similarly situated. (Rivera
(Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., May 9, 2007).
167591 and companion case, May 9, 2007).
Q — Is not the case of Morales similar to the Q — Morales cited Borja v. COMELEC to
case of Lonzanida v COMELEC? Explain. apply to him. Is this case applicable? Why?

ANS: No. In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, while he ANS: No, because with the death of Mayor
assumed office, he voluntarily vacated when Cruz, Capco assumed office as mayor by
there was a declara/on of failure of elec/on. virtue of the principle of succession, he being
He did not fully serve the term, hence, he the vice-mayor. He was not therefore, elected
was qualified to run for a third term. The even if he served the rest of the term of the
difference between the case at bench and mayor, hence, his assump/on of the office of
Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in the mayor upon the death of the incumbent
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty mayor may not be regarded as a term.
elec/ons was declared a nullity for the stated Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
reason of “failure of elec/on”, and, as a 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90, it
consequence thereof, the proclama/on of was held that assump/on of the office of
mayor in a recall elec/on for the remaining ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
term is not the “term” contemplated under contested office has occurred. This should
Sec/on 8, Ar/cle X of the Cons/tu/on and now be filled by the vice-mayor in
Sec/on 43(b) of R.A. 7160 (the Local accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code). There was a “break” in Government Code. (Rivera III, et al. v.
the service of the mayor. He was a “private COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591, May 9,
ci/zen” for a /me before running for mayor 2007 ci/ng Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
in the recall elec/ons. (Rivera III, e al. v. 105111, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297).
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591, May 9,
2007). Q — What are the requirements which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply?
Q — What is the effect if the cer2ficate of ANS: For the three-term limit to apply, the
candidacy of a candidate is cancelled? following two condi/ons must concur: 1) that
Explain. the official concerned has been elected for
three consecu/ve terms in the same local
ANS: Any candidate who has been declared government post; and 2) that he has fully
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not served three consecu/ve terms. (Lonzanida v.
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, September 3,
not be counted. (Secs. 6 and 7, RA 6646). Any 1998, 295 SCRA 157; Ong v. Alegre, 479 SCRA
vote in favor of a person who has not filed a 473; Adormeo v. COMELEC, 376 SCRA 90;
cer/ficate of candidacy or in favor of a Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
candidate for an office for which he did not 167591, May 9, 2007). Effect if there is a /e.
present himself shall be considered as a stray
vote but it shall not invalidate the whole Q — What is the proper procedure to be
ballot. (Sec. 211, Omnibus Elec/on Code). resorted to in case of a 2e? Explain.
Morales can not be considered a candidate in ANS: To resolve the /e, there shall be
the May 2004 elec/ons. Not being a drawing of lots. Whenever it shall appear
candidate, the votes cast for him should not from the canvass that two or more
be counted and must be considered stray candidates have received an equal and
votes. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. highest number of votes, or in cases where
167591, May 9, 2007). two or more candidates are to be elected for
the same posi/on and two or more
Q — It was contended that since Morales candidates received the same number of
was disqualified, the second placer should votes for the last place in the number to be
be proclaimed as the winner. Is the elected, the board of canvassers, ajer
conten2on correct? Why? recording this fact in its minutes, shall by
resolu/on, upon five days no/ce to all the
ANS: In Labo v. COMELEC, the Court has ruled /ed candidates, hold a special public mee/ng
that a second place candidate cannot be at which the board of canvassers shall
proclaimed as a subs/tute winner. The rule is proceed to the drawing of lots of the
that, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving candidates who have /ed and shall proclaim
majority votes does not en/tle the eligible as elected the candidates who may favored
candidate receiving the next highest number by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed
of votes to be declared elected. A minority or shall have the right to assume office in the
defeated candidate cannot be deemed same manner as if he had been elected by
elected to the office. As a consequence of plurality of votes. The board of canvassers
shall forthwith make a cer/ficate sta/ng the candidacy and, thus, was not a valid
name of the candidate who had been favored candidate in the pe//on to deny due course
by luck and his proclama/on on the basis to or cancel Luna’s cer/ficate of candidacy. In
thereof. Nothing in this sec/on shall be effect, the COMELEC, without the proper
construed as depriving a candidate of his proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger ’s
right to contest the elec/on. (Sec. 240, BP cer/ficate of candidacy and declared the
881; Tugade v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. subs/tu/on of Luna invalid. (Luna v.
171063, March 2, 2007). Withdrawal of COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 165983, April 24,
cer/ficate of candidacy. 2007). Pre-proclama/on controversy; extent
of power of COMELEC.
Q — Hans Roger filed his cer2ficate of
candidacy but withdrew the same. He was Q — What is the extent of the power of the
subs2tuted by Joy Luna but the COMELEC COMELEC in pre-proclama2on controversy?
denied due course to her cer2ficate on the Explain.
ground that Hans being under age, he could
not have filed a valid cer2ficate of ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-
candidacy. There was, however, no pe22on proclama/on cases that the Board of
to deny Hans cer2ficate of candidacy. Did Canvassers is without jurisdic/on to go
the COMELEC act correctly? Why? beyond what appears on the face of the
elec/on return. The ra/onale is that a full
ANS: No. The COMELEC acted with grave recep/on of evidence aliunde and the
abuse of discre/on amoun/ng to lack or me/culous examina/on of voluminous
excess of jurisdic/on in declaring that Hans elec/on documents would run counter to the
Roger, being under age, could not be summary nature of a pre-proclama/on
considered to have filed a valid cer/ficate of controversy. However, this rule is not without
candidacy and, thus, could not be validly any excep/on. In Lee v. Commission on
subs/tuted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, Elec/ons, it was held that if there is a prima
by itself, without the proper proceedings, facie showing that the return is not genuine,
deny due course to or cancel a cer/ficate of several entries having been omiaed in the
candidacy filed in due form. (Cipriano v. ques/oned elec/on return, the doctrine does
COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, not apply. The COMELEC is thus not
436 SCRA 45). In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the powerless to determine if there is basis for
Court ruled that the ques/on of eligibility or the exclusion of the ques/oned returns. (G.R.
ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is No. 157004, July 4, 2003, 405 SCRA 303;
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of Ewoc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
the COMELEC. If Hans Roger made a material 171882, April 3, 2007). Handwri/ngs have
misrepresenta/on as to his date of birth or only one general appearance.
age in his cer/ficate of candidacy, his
eligibility may only be impugned through a Q — May the COMELEC invalidate certain
verified pe//on to deny due course to or ballots merely on a finding that the wri2ngs
cancel such cer/ficate of candidacy under have the same general appearance and
Sec/on 78 of the Elec/on Code. In this case, pictorial effect? Explain.
there was no pe//on to deny due court to or
cancel the cer/ficate of candidacy of Hans ANS: No. General resemblance is not enough
Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans to warrant the conclusion that two wri/ngs
Roger did not file a valid cer/ficate of are by the same hand. (Silverio v. Clamor, 125
Phil. 917 (1967)). In order to reach the which provides that in preparing the ballot,
conclusion that two wri/ngs are by the same each voter must “fill his ballot by wri/ng in
hand there must not only be present class the proper place for each office the name of
c h a r a c t e r i s / c s b u t a l s o i n d i v i d u a l the individual candidate for whom he desires
characteris/cs or ‘dents and scratches’ in to vote.” Excepted from Sec/on 211(19) are
sufficient quan/ty to exclude the theory of ballots with (1) a general misplacement of an
accidental coincidence; to reach the en/re series of names intended to be voted
conclusion that wri/ngs are by different for the successive offices appearing in the
hands we may find numerous likeness in class ballot (Cordero v. Hon. Moscardon, 217 Phil.
characteris/cs but divergences in individual 392 (1984)); (2) a single (Farin v. Gonzales,
characteris/cs, or we may find divergences in 152 Phil. 598 (1973)) or double (Sarmiento v.
both, but the divergence must be something Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June 1962, 5
more than mere superficial differences. SCRA 438) misplacement of names where
(Osborn’s Ques/oned Documents, p. 244; such names were preceded or followed by
Delos Reyes v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. the /tle of the contested office or where the
170070, February 28, 2007). voter wrote ajer the candidate’s name a
direc/onal symbol indica/ng the correct
Neighborhood rule. The votes contested in office for which the misplaced name was
this appeal are all misplaced votes, i.e., votes intended (Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199
cast for a candidate for the wrong or (1939)); and (3) a single misplacement of a
inexistent office. In apprecia/ng such votes, name wriaen (a) off-center from the
t h e C O M E L E C m a y a p p l i e d t h e designated space (Mandac v. Samonte, 54
“neighborhood rule.” As used by the Court, Phil. 706 (1930)), (b) slightly underneath the
this nomenclature, loosely based on a rule of line for the contested office (Sarmiento v.
the same name devised by the House of Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June 1962, 5
Representa/ves Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in SCRA 438; Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199
Nograles v. Dureza, HRET Case No. 34, June (1939)), (c) immediately above the /tle for
16, 1989, 1 HRET Rep. 138), refers to an the contested office ((Villavert v. Fornier, 84
excep/on to the rule on apprecia/on of Phil. 756 (1949)), or (d) in the space for an
misplaced votes under Sec/on 211(19) of office immediately following that for which
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Elec/on the candidate presented himself. ((Abad v.
Code) which provides: Any vote in favor of a Co, G.R. No. 167438, 25 July 2006, 496 SCRA
person who has not filed a cer/ficate of 505 and Ferrer v. Commission on Elec/ons,
candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an 386 Phil. 431 (2000)). In these instances, the
office for which he did not present himself misplaced votes are nevertheless credited to
shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall the candidates for the office for which they
not invalidate the whole ballot. Sec/on presented themselves because the voters’
211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the inten/on to so vote is clear from the face of
minds of the elec/on officials as to the the ballots. This is in consonance with the
candidates actually voted for and to stave off sealed doctrine that ballots should be
any scheming design to iden/fy the vote of appreciated with liberality to give effect to
the elector, thus defea/ng the secrecy of the the voters’ will. (Velasco v. COMELEC, et al.,
ballot which is a cardinal feature of our G.R. No. 166931, February 22, 2007). Marked
elec/on laws. (Amurao v. Calangi, 10 Phil. ballot.
347 (1958)). Sec/on 211(19) also enforces
Sec/on 195 of the Omnibus Elec/on Code
Q — When is a ballot considered as marked? transmission of the elec/on returns give rise
Explain. to the consequent failure to elect; the third
instance is interpreted to mean that nobody
ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered emerged as a winner. (Mu/lan v. COMELEC,
marked, in the sense necessary to invalidate et al., G.R. No. 171248, April 2, 2007). Note:
it, it must appear that the voter designedly None of the three instances is present in this
place some superfluous sign or mark on the case. In this case, the elec/ons took place. In
ballot which might serve to iden/fy it fact, private respondent was proclaimed the
thereajer. No ballot should be discarded as a winner. Pe//oner contests the results of the
marked ballot unless its character as such is elec/ons on the grounds of massive
unmistakable. The dis/nguishing mark which disenfranchisement, subs/tute vo/ng, and
the law forbids to be placed on the ballot is farcical and sta/s/cally improbable results.
that which the elector may have placed with Pe//oner alleges that no actual elec/on was
the inten/on of facilita/ng the means of conducted because the voters did not
iden/fying said ballot, for the purpose of actually vote and the ballots were filled up by
defea/ng the secrecy of suffrage which the non-registered voters.
law establishes. Thus, marked ballots are
ballots containing dis/nguishing marks, the Q — May an interlocutory order of a
purpose of which is to iden/fy them. COMELEC Division be the subject of
(Perman v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 174010, cer2orari to the SC? Explain.
February 8, 2007, Tinga, J). Failure of
elec/on. ANS: As a rule, No. The excep/on is in an
unusual case where the pe//on for cer/orari
Q — When is there failure of elec2on? ques/oning the interlocutory order of a
COMELEC Division was pending before the
ANS: There are three instances where a SC, the main case which was meanwhile
failure of elec/ons may be declared, thus: (a) decided by the COMELEC En Banc was
the elec/on in any polling place has not been likewise elevated to the Court. Thus, there
held on the date fixed on account of force was a situa/on where the pe//on for
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other cer/orari ques/oning the interlocutory
analogous causes; (b) the elec/on in any orders of the COMELEC Division and the
polling place has been suspended before the pe//on for cer/orari and prohibi/on
hour fixed by law for the closing of the vo/ng assailing the Resolu/on of the COMELEC En
on account of force majeure, violence, Banc on the main case were consolidated.
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; The issues raised in the pe//on for cer/orari
or (c) ajer the vo/ng and during the were also raised in the main case and
prepara/on and transmission of the elec/on therefore there was actually no need to
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, r e s o l v e t h e p e / / o n a s s a i l i n g t h e
such elec/on results in a failure to elect on interlocutory orders. (Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R.
account of force majeure, violence, No. 168253 and 172741, March 16, 2007;
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Soriano, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
In all three instances, there is a resul/ng 164496-505, April 2, 2007).
failure to elect. In the first instance, the
elec/on has not been held. In the second Note: The general rule is that a decision or an
instance, the elec/on has been suspended. In order of a COMELEC Division cannot be
the third instance, the prepara/on and the elevated directly to the SupremeCourt
through a special civil ac/on for cer/orari. of the COMELEC First Division in this case are
Furthermore, a mo/on to reconsider a not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in
decision, resolu/on, order, or ruling of a this case involve the interpreta/on of the
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will
COMELEC En Banc. However, a mo/on to the Rosal case apply because in that case the
reconsider an interlocutory order of a pe//on for cer/orari ques/oning the
COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second
division which issued the interlocutory order, Division and the pe//on for cer/orari and
except when all the members of the division prohibi/on assailing the Resolu/on of the
decide to refer the maaer to the COMELEC COMELEC En Banc on the main case were
En Banc. 
 already consolidated.

Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a The Court also notes that the COMELEC First
COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor Division has already issued an Order dated 31
can they be proper subject of a pe//on for May 2005 dismissing the protests and
cer/orari. To rule otherwise would not only counter-protests in EPC Nos. 2004-36,
delay the disposi/on of cases but would also 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39, 2004-40,
unnecessarily clog the Court docket and 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44, and
unduly burden the Court. This does not mean 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and
that the aggrieved party is without recourse protestees to pay the required cash deposits.
if a COMELEC Division denies the mo/on for Thus, the Court have this peculiar situa/on
reconsidera/on. The aggrieved party can s/ll where the interlocutory order of the
assign as error the interlocutory order if in COMELEC First Division is pending before the
the course of the proceedings he decides to Court but the main case has already been
appeal the main case to the COMELEC En dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This
Banc. situa/on is precisely what the Court are
trying to avoid by insis/ng on strict
The excep/on enunciated in Kho and Repol is compliance of the rule that an interlocutory
when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC order cannot by itself be the subject of an
Division is a patent nullity because of a p p e a l o r a p e/ / o n fo r c e r / o ra r i .
absence of jurisdic/on to issue the Misrepresenta/on in a cer/ficate of
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC candidacy; effect.
Division issued a temporary restraining order
without a /me limit, which is the Repol case, Q — When is misrepresenta2on in a
or where a COMELEC Division admiaed an cer2ficate of candidacy material? Explain.
answer with counter-protest which was filed ANS: A misrepresenta/on in a cer/ficate of
beyond the reglementary period, which is the candidacy is material when it refers to a
Kho case. The Court has already ruled in qualifica/on for elec/ve office and affects the
Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, that “it is candidate’s eligibility. Second, when a
the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC c a n d i d a t e c o m m i t s a m a t e r i a l
En Banc that, in accordance with Sec/on 7, misrepresenta/on, he or she may be
Art. IX-A of the Cons/tu/on, may be brought proceeded against through a pe//on to deny
to the Supreme Court on cer/orari.” The due course to or cancel a cer/ficate of
excep/on provided in Kho and Repol is candidacy under Sec/on 78, or through
unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho criminal prosecu/on under Sec/on 262 for
and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders v i o l a / o n o f S e c / o n 7 4 . T h i r d , a
misrepresenta/on of a non-material fact, or a
non-material misrepresenta/on, is not a
ground to deny due course to or cancel a
cer/ficate of candidacy under Sec/on 78. In
other words, for a candidate’s cer/ficate of
candidacy to be denied due course or
cancelled by the COMELEC, the fact
m i s r e p r e s e n t e d m u s t p e r t a i n t o a
qualifica/on for the office sought by the
candidate. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007).

Q — If a candidate misrepresents his

profession, is he disqualified? Explain.

ANS: No. No elec/ve office, not even the

office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, requires a certain profession or
occupa/on as a qualifica/on. Profession or
occupa/on not being a qualifica/on for
elec/ve office, misrepresenta/on of such
d o e s n o t c o n s / t u t e a m a t e r i a l
misrepresenta/on. Certainly, in a situa/on
where a candidate misrepresents his or her
profession or occupa/on in the cer/ficate of
candidacy, the candidate may not be
disqualified from running for office under
Sec/on 78 as his or her cer/ficate of
candidacy cannot be denied due course or
canceled on such ground. (Nelson T. Lluz, et
al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 172840, June
7, 2007).