114 Thomas Cl" 1st1,msen

6. What arc thc st, engths and weaknesses of multilcvcl eovcrnance ,n analys,ng the process of [uropean ,ntegrat,on!

7. How s dcc.,s,or 1'1ak,.,g by unclected techrocrats Icg1t -n,zcd •n the European regulatory statel

8 What are the ma,n cntc,sms on '1ormat,ve g,ounds thdt can bc Jdvarced ag.i,nst llCW govemance?

• GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

[is,ng. R. and Kohler-Koch, B. (eds) ( 1999) The lransforma!IO/l ofGovcrnance m the [uropean Union (London. Rou, edge)
Presenting thc r,nd,ng, of a large-sca e re,earc.h pro.ec- m,s volume ,ncludes chapters on govemarce ,n a rarge o' d f'er-
ent sectors and membe, states.

l looghe. 1 and Marks. G (200 1a) Mul!,-Level Goverricmce ond Europeon lmcgrac,on (London Rowman & l.Jttlefeld) Th,s ,s
the defin t,ve stateMent of the key elemcnts a11d find,ngs of the multdevel govemance approach by ts founders

Mapne. G (ed) ( l 996J Regu/01,ng Europe (London. Routledge) A collect,on of contnbuuons from the founder of the
[uropean regulatory state app, oact, and others.

Marks, G . Scharpf. F W Scnm,tter. P C and Streeck, W ( 1996) Governance 1n ehe [uropean Union (Lordon: Sage
Pubhcat,ons) A c.ollcct,on of essays by senior scholars explor,.,g a,fferent d1mens1ons of the gover"lance approach.

Scharp' ~ W ( 1999) Govern,ng ,n Europc· E(Tecc,ve and Democrat1C? (Oxford Oxford Un,vers1ty Press) A collect,on of
~says explor,ng both tl'le emp,ncal and '10nTiat ve d,mens,ons of govemance ,n thc EU

WEBLINKS

http://ec.europa.eu/tr,rnsparency/regcomitologyhndcx.cfm1do=implemencing.home The F.uropean Cor-im,ss,on's

vvebs,te dealmg w1th all aspects related to the Corr,tology procedure.

http://euro pcangovcmance.l,vingrevicws.org/ Lwmg Re,1ews ,n Europeon Governonce ,s an e JOumal, pubhsh,ng sohc-

1ted art,cles ,n the field of [ uropean ,ntegra· /0'1 a'1d govemancc rcscarch.

http://garymar ks.web.unc.edu/ Gary Marks' home page. wh,ch ,nch.1des dC.cess to pubhshcd a"ld forthcom,ng papers.

http://hooghcweb.unc.edu/ Liesbet Hooghe's horre page wi),ct, ,cludes access lo publ,sl>ed and forthcom,ngpapers.

http://ec.europa eu/reg,onal policy/indcx en.dm f he vvebs,te of the 1:U's Reg onal Policy wh,ch ,ncludes current
1nformat10'1 about ~s governanc.e and pro,ecis
8
Europeanization
Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke

Chapter C ontents
lntroduction 116
Why does Europeanization matter ? 117
Explaining top down Europeanization 1 19
• Explaining bottom-up Europeanization 122
Towards a sequential perspective on Europeanization? 124
Conclusion 125

Reade r's Guide

The first sect ion of the chapter explains what Europeanizacion means and outlines the main ap-
proaches to studying ehis phenomenon. The second section describes why this concepe has become
so prominent in research o n ehe Euro pean Union (EU) and its member seates. In the third section,
the chapter reviews ehe staee of the art with particular reference to how the EU affects scaees ('top
dow n' Europeanization). lt illustrates t he eheoretical arguments w ich empirical examples. Similarly,
the fourth section examines how states can influence ehe EU ('bottom-up' Europeanization) and
provides some theoretical explanations for ehe empirical patterns observed. This is followed by a
section ehat presems an overview of research that looks at linkages between bottom-up and top-
dow n Europeanizaeion. and considers ehe fueure of Europeanization research with regard to EU's
r ecent and current crises and challenges. This chapter argues that Europeanizaeion. despiee the
crises the EU has been facing, will remain an imporeant field of EU research for ehe foreseeable
fueure.
 lntroduction
Europeanization (see Box 8.1 ) has become a promi-
nent concept in rhe srudy of rhe European Union and
Europe,u1 integra tio n. Wh.ile Europeanization gener-
ally reters to interacrions berween the EU and its mem-
ber states or rhird counrries. the literature has defined
the rerm in differem ways. Broadly, onc can distinguish
berwcen rwo different notions of Europeanization:
'bottom-up' and 'top-down' Europeanization.
The bottom-up perspecrive analyses how member
states and other domestic accors shape EU policies,
EU politics, and ehe European polity. For bottom-up
Europeanization approaches, the phcnomenon eo
be explained is the EU itsclf. This research analyses
whether and how member states arc able eo upload
cheir domestic intercsts to EU instirucions and pobcies
by, for example, giving ehe European Parliament (EP)
more powers, increasing ehe areas in which the ordi-
n ary legisla tive procedurc (OLP) appbcs, o r exrend-
ing conrem and scope of EU policies (as is the case in
ehe liberalization of Services). European integ-ration
theories, such as li beral intcrgovern rn en ta lism , neo-
funclion alism, and suprana tio nal institutionalism,
complement bottom-up Europeanization approaches
since they also address such uploading efforts by
member state governments (see Chaprers 4, 5, and 6).
The top-down perspective reverses the phenom-
enon tobe explained and its plausible causes. Here, the
focus is on how ehe EU shapes institutions, processes,
and political ouccomes in both m ember srates and
third countries (Ladrech, 1994; Sanders and Bellucci,
2012). The phenomenon of interest is whether and
how states download EU policies and institutions that
subsequently give rise to domestic change. In ochcr
words, how does rhe EU impact on domestic instiru-
tions, policies, or political processes? To what extent,
for example, has rhe shift of policy competcnccs from
BOX 8.1 EUROPEANIZATION
Europeanizat,on captures the interact1ons between the
European Union and member stat es or third countries
(1ncluding candidat e councries and nelghbourhood
councnes). One strand of Europeanization research analyses
how member st ates shape EU pol1cies, politrcs. and po'1ty.
while t he other focuses on how the EU tnggers change in
member state polic,es, polrtics, and polrty.
the domestic to the EU levcl undermined ehe powers of
national parliaments by reducing their function to that
of merely rransposing EU dir('ctivcs into national law?
ls rhe EU responsible for a decline of public services by
forcing France or Gcrmany to liberalize telecommuni-
carions, poscal services, or their energy markets? And
to what extent has European integration empowered
populist parrics, such as the Fro nt ~ ational, Die A l-
tern atil't!.f,ir De11 tscl1lantl (Alterna tive for Germany),
the Uni1cd Kingdom lndc pcndcncc Party, or the
M<1vime11t <1 5 Stelle, which scek Lo mobilizc those who
feel that they have lost out because of the single Eu-
ro pcan markc t, particularly since the financial and the
migration crisis? With youth uncmployment reaching
more than 50%, dtizens in Spai.n and Greece feel that
EU policies and institutions are a major cause of their
socio-economic gricvances (see Box 8.2). The electoral
success of populist movements, such as Podemos in
Spain, and the Creek referendum of 2015 testify to the
increasing po li ticizatio n of EU powers.
Top-down Europeanization approaches search
for factors at the EU level that bring about domestic
change. They share the assumption that the EU can
(but does not always) cause adaptations of domestic
policies, institurions, and political processes if rhere
is a misfit berween Europea n and domestic ideas and
institutions (Börzel et al. , 2010). The incompatibility
of European and domestic norms faciliraces top-down
changes on.ly if it creates material costs or if it chal-
lenges col!ectively shared knowledge or beliefs abouc
how to address societal problcms. For example, it
raises the question of whcthcr it is more appropriate
to protect ehe environment by preventing pollution
(the German approach) or by fighting environmental
pollution where it becomes too damaging (ehe Brit-
ish approach). Thus, top-down Europeanization ap-
proaches complemcnt compliance theories which
explain domestic change in the EU multilevel system,
such as enforcement theory, management approaches,
or legalizati.on theories (Börzel et al., 2010), by com-
bining EU- and domcstic-level explanatory variables.
rn addition to analysing separately bottom-up and
top-down Europeanization, some scholars pur for-
ward a sequencial perspecrive by examining policy
cycles or long-term interactions between the EU and
its members (Kohler-Koch and Eising , 1999; RadaeUi,
2003). Member states are not merely passive takers of
EU demands for domestic change; they proacrively
shape European policies, insrirutions, and processes,
which they have eo download and to which rhey later

II BOX 8.2
~ ECONOMIC CRISIS
TOP- DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP EUROPEANIZATION: THE CASE OF THE
Prior to the econom1c cris1s, lreland, Portugal. Greece, and Spain
had benefrted from the surge of cheap credit and domestic
demand driven booms in real estate and construct,on after the
1ntroduction of the euro. However, this made them part,cularly
vulnerable to the cred,t cr,sis which started in 2007. The burst
of the United States housing bubble triggered chain reactions,
wh1ch threw EU deficit countries into a systemic cris,s that
threatened lhe very existence of the economic and monetary
union (EMU). The rescue measures taken by the EU and its
member states led to encroachment on a number of domestic
policies that have been a class1cal domain of the democratic
state: for example, pens,ons and wages, higher educat,on. and
nealthcare. as weil as other aspects of social policy.
The structural reforms the EU and its member states have
demanded as a condition for financial bailouts have substant,ally
reduced the econom,c well-being of the cit,zens ,n cns,s
countries, particularly among the middle class, young people,
and women. Rocketing unemployment rates (more than 50%
among young Greeks and Spaniards) and the virtual breakdown
of many soc,al services (health, social welfare, pensions)
transformed the financ,al crisis into a social crisis. which has
undermined the legitimacy of elected governments in Greece,
have to adapt. Moreover, the need to adapt domesci-
cally to European pressure may also have significam
effects ar thc European level, where member states
seek to reduce rhe misfit between European and do -
mcstic arrangements by shaping EU decisions. For
example, when Germany succeeded in rurning its
air pol.l urion regulatio ns imo the Large Combustion
Plant Directive adopted by rhe EU in 1988 (Directive
88 / 609 / EEC), it did not have eo introduce any major
]egal and administrative changes, and German indus-
cr-y had litLle difficulty in complying with EU air pol-
lurion Standards. The UK, by contrast, was forced eo
overhaul its entirc regulatory structure and British
industry had Lo buy new abatement technologies for
wh ich Cerman companies were rhe market leaders.
The sequential approach is not a ncw research av-
enu e, but rarher synrhesizes the top-down and bot-
tom-up Europeanization approaches. lt analyses how
member stares shape the EU (uploading), how the EU
feeds back into member srates (downloading), and
how the latter react in changing properties of ehe EU
(uploading) (see Börzel and Risse, 2007) .
Euro pean,z;it1on 1 17
Spa,n, ltaly, lreland, and France. The inab,lrty of these
governments to respond to the press,ng demands of their
electorate for a different course ,n the,r econom,c policy fuelled
the mobilizat,on of protest by the most affected social groups.
1 he EU has become the rescue of last resort for member states
in times of financial crisis. At lhe same time, Germany and some
other Northern European member states managed to upload
the,r austerity rules to the European level. The Stab,lity and
Growth Pacl turned the EU into an agent of a part,cular type of
e<onomic and social policy, which, although highly contested at
the domestic level, does not leave member state governments
much possib,lity of dev,ating f rom the course of liberalism and
fiscal restra,nt imposed by EU conditionality. Domest1c
opposit1on and political calculus led the Greek government to
call for a referendum on the condit,ons of the European
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund for bailout to resolve the debt crisis of June
2015. In early July 2015, the Greek c1tizens rejected the bailout
condit,ons by 6 1%. Yet. s,nce the vast majority of Greeks want
to stay ,n the euro, Prime Minister Ts,pras had to negot,ate a
third bailout in August 2015, which not only forced Greece to
implemenl reforms rejected ,n the referendum, but imposed
even stricter conditionality.
KEY POINTS
Europearnzation has become a key but disputed term 1n
research on European ,ntegration.
Top-down Europeanization seeks to expla,n how the
European UniOn ,nduces domestic change in member
states or th,rd countries.
ßottom-up Europearnzation analyses how member states
and other domestic actors shape EU policies, EU polit,cs,
and the European polity.
The sequenual approach to Europeanization synthesizes
the ments of top-down and bottom-up Europeanizat,on.
Why does Europeanization matter?
The European Union has become ever more im-
portant for the daily lives of its citizens. The EU has
gained more and more policy competences, which
now range from marker creation and trade liberali-
zation policies, health, environmental research, and
118 TanJa A Borze1ilnd Diana P,mkc
social policies, to cooperatio11 in the fight against
crime and foreign policy, to no cooperation in the
relocation of refugees and migrants. The economic
crisis has given rise to the esrablishrnent of a new ar-
chitecrure to regulate the banking sector better and
coordinate national fiscal policy and the budgeta ry
cycles of membe r staces-wiLhouL changing the EU
Treaty (see Chapter 26). Similar attempts at delegat-
ing more power to supranational institutions failed in
ehe case of the mig rarion crisis. The membcr states
ultimacely rejecred proposals for a semi-auromated
relocation of refugees. Nor did they approve pla ns for
European Return Intervention Teams to repaniate
illegally staying third-country nationals (see Chapter
22). How do we e.xplain this variation in Europeaniza-
tion? Which actors and which coalitions are active in
shaping the EU? Why is it that we observe a general
broadening and widcning of integration where the
member states have bcen willing to g ive ehe EU ever
more power on regulating rhe banking sector, while
resisting any significant sovereignty loss with regard
to migration and asylum? Are the 'big th ree' (the UK,
France, and Germany) in a better position to make
their incerests heard in the EU than Luxembourg,
Ireland, Greece, or Malta? lt .is also very irnportant to
exa mine how the EU affecrs the domestic scructures
of its m ember states, because Europe has hit virruaUy
all policy areas pe netrating the Jives of its citizens in
many respects. The EU not only regulates the quality
of their drinking water, the length of parental leave,
or roaming fees for mobile phones- Europeanization
has also fundamencally affected core institutions and
polirical processes of the member srates and accession
counrries by, for examplc, disempowering national
parliaments (Schmidt, 2006). What kind of domestic
change (of policies, institutions, or politica1 processes)
does the EU trigger? Do Greece, ehe UK, Poland, Lux-
embourg, Prance, and Denmark all download EU pol-
icies in a similar way, or do national and sub-regional
diflerences remain evcn after Europeanization? To
what extent has ehe EU's ciisis management ro save
the euro resulted in the dismantling of rhe European
welfare staLe, not only undermi ning rhe democratic
legitimacy of member state governments in Greece,
ltaly, Spain, and France, bur also fuelling Lhe politidza-
tion o f the EU polity and thc rise of nationalist, au-
thoritarian populism to ehe exLent that thc fu ture of
European integrarion may be endangered?
Anorher reason why research on Europeanization
has been thriving is that European integration does
not onJy affecr member states, but can also bave in-
tended or unintended sidc cffocts on third countries.
The EU is actively seeking LO change the domescic
scrucLures of its neighbours and other third coumries
by exporti ng its own governancc model. Examples of
what is often referred to as 'external Europeanization'
are ehe EU's enlargement policy with the famous Co-
pcnhagcn criteria, which prescribe liberal democracy
and markct economy forany country that seeks to join
rhe club (see Chapter J 8), a nd the EU's neighbour-
hood policy rhat stipulaces simila r requiremencs (see
Chapter 19). Both seck to induce third counnies to
implement parcs of the acq11is comnrnnautaire. Thus
the EU has not only talked France, Germany, Spain,
Greece, and the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
councries inco granting their citizens general access
to environmenta1 information, but has also asked
Ukrain e, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to make
data on the environmental impact of planned projects
accessible to the pu blic. Conditionality and capacity-
building provide a major incentive for candidate and
for neighbourhood counnies to adapt to Europe. Fi-
nally, Europeanization can have unintended effects on
member states and third counnies. Domescic actors
can use the EU for th eir own ends and can induce do-
mestic changes in the name of Europe (Lavenex, 200 l ).
For example, gay and lesbian gro ups in Poland have
used the EU to push for the rights o f sexual minorities
in the absence of any specific EU legislation. At the
sa me time, th e incumbent governmencs of rhe Euro-
pean neighbourhood countrics have instrumencal-
ized rh e EU's demands to fight corruption in return
for accession to ehe Single Ma rket and visa fadli tations
to undermine the power of political opposition. For-
mer Ukranian Prime Minister Julija Timoshenko was
convicted of embezzlement and abuse of power, and
sente nced to seven years in prison. Likewise, former
Presidcnt Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia faces crirni-
nal cha rges filed by the Georgian prosecutor's office
over alleged exceeding official powers.
Countties that are not current or would-be mem-
bers of the EU are subject ro the inclirect influen ce
of the EU, too (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Norway, for
example, became part of rhe Sehengen Agreement
because ir forms a passport union with the Scandina-
vian EU member states. Outside Europe, farmers i.n
developing countries i.n Lati.n America and Africa suf-
fer from consequences o f the Common Agricultura1
Policy (CAP), which effectively shuts their products
out of the Single :\.1arket (sec Chapter 17). Fi.nally, the

EU's policies and institurions can also diffuse inco
other regional organizations, such as the Andean
Co mmunicy, the Southern African Developmem
Commu nity, the Association of South Bast Asian
Natio ns. o r the Eurasian Cuscom Union.
KEY POINTS
Europeanization has become a key concept in the study
of European integrat ion.
Europeanization research examines how lhe EU has
obta1ned a broad array of policy competences over the
course of more than 50 years of integration and also how
this triggers changes 1n member states affecting vanous
aspects of the daily lives of EU citizens.
Students of Europeanization also 1nvestigatc how lhe EU
affects third countnes, which may or may not want to
become members, by pushing for market liberalizat1on,
democracy. human right s, and good governance.
• Europeanization research shows that European
1ntegration has had unintended effects on states both
within and outside the EU.
Explaining top-down
Eur opeanization
Top-down Europeanization seek.s co uncover the con-
ditions and causal mechanisms through which the Eu-
ropcan Union t riggers domestic change in its member
sta res a nd in third coumries. lt starts from rhe empiri-
cal p uzzle that European policies, instirutions, and po-
Litical proccsses facilitate domestic change, but do not
provoke the convergence of n ational poliries, politics,
or policies. lt also posits that EU policies and insticu-
tio ns arc a constant imperus of domestic change for
alJ st ates (Cowles et al., 2001; Sanders and Bellucci,
2012). To solve the puzzle, the literamre has drawn
o n two different strands of neo-institutionalism (see
Cha pter 6). While both assu me that institutions medi-
a te or filter the domestic impact of Europe, ration-
alist and constructivist approaches to top-down
Eu ropeanization differ in th eir assumptions about
exactly how institutions matter. Rational clw ice ü i -
stitutionalism argues that the eu facilitates domestic
adaptation by changing oppor mnity structurcs for
do mcstic actors. ln a first scep, a misfit between the
EU and domestic norm s creates demands for domcs-
tic adaptation. ln a second step, the downloading of'
Et..rope;in11;i l 10n 1 19
eu policies and insrirutions by the member states is
shapcd by cost- benefit calculacions of the Stra tegie ac-
rors whose interests are at stake. lnstiturions constrain
or enable certain actions by strategic rational actors
by rendering some options more cosdy than others
(Tsebelis, 1990; Scharp( 1997). Prom this pcrspective.
Europeanization is largely conceived of' as an emerg-
ing political opportunity structurc that offers some
actors additional resources wid1 which co exert inOu-
ence, while severely constraining the ability of others
to pursue their goals. Domestic change is facilitated
where the instirutions of the member states empower
domesric actors to block change at veco points or to fa-
cilitate it through supporting formal instimtions (Bör-
zel and Risse, 2007). For cxample, ehe liberalizarion of
the European transport sector (Regulations 96 / 1191
and 1893 / 91) empowercd internationally Operating
road hauliers and liberal parties in highly regulated
member states, such as Germany or the Netherlands,
which had been unsuccessfully pushing for pl'ivatiza-
tion and de regulation at home. But while the German
reform coalition was able to exploit European policies
to overcome domestic opposition to liberalization,
Italian trade unions and sectoral associations suc-
cessfully vetoed any reform attempt (Hel'itier et al..
2001). Likewise, public agencies in the UK supported
t he appeal of women's organizations in support of the
Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Directives (Directivcs
75 1 11 7 / EEC and 76 / 10 7 / EEC, respectively) to fu r-
ther gender equality by providing ehern wich legal ex-
pertise and funding to take employers to court. In the
absence of such formal institutions, French women
were not able to overcome domestic resistance by em-
ployers and trade unions to implement EU equal pay
and equal tream1 ent policies (Caporaso and JupilJe,
2001 ; Cowles et al., 2001).
Other research in the Europeanization literamre
draws on sociological institutionalism . This specifies
change m cchanisms based on the ideational and nor-
mative processes involved in top-down Europeaniza-
rion. Sociological institutionalism is based on thc 'logic
of approptiateness' (March and Olsen, 1989), which
argues that acrors are guided by collectively shared un-
derstandings of what constirutes proper, socially ac-
cepted behaviour. These norms influence rhe way in
which actors define rheir goals and what they perceive
as rational action. Rather than maximizing egoistic
self-interest, actors seek to meer social expectations.
From this perspective, Europeanization is understood
as the em ergence of new rules, norms. pract ices, and
120 1mJa A. Börzcl and D1ana Parke
scructures of meaning to whid1 member states are ex-
posed and which thcy havc to incorpo rate into their
domestic scructures. For example, consider a norma-
tive or cognitive misfit becween whac rhe B1itish be-
lieve or know about procecting the environment best
and what EU policies prescribe is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for domestic change in response
to top-down EuropeanizaLion. If there is such a misfit,
norm entrepreneurs, sum as epistemic communi-
ties or advocacy nctworks, socialize domestic actors
imo new norms and rules of appropriateness rhrough
persuasion and social learning. Oomestic accors then
redefine their interests and identities acco rdingly (Bör-
zel and Risse, 2007). The more active norm entrepre-
neurs are and the more they succeed in making EU
policies resonate wich domestic norms and beliefs, ehe
more successful they wiU be in bringing abou t domes-
tic change.
Moreover, collective understandings of appropri-
ate behaviour strongly influence the ways in which
domestic actors download EU requiremems (see
Box 8.3). First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative
decision-making culture helps co overcome multiple
veco points by rendering the.ir use for accors inappro-
priate. Cooperative fedcralism prevemed the German
Länder from vecoing any of thc Treaty revisions that
deprived them of core decision-makin g powers. Ob-
structing the dccpening and widening of European
integration would not have been acceptable co the po-
litical dass (Börze1, 2002). Likewise, the litigious Ger-
man culture encouraged German citizens to appeal to
national courts against the deficient application of EU
law, while sum a culture was absent in France, where
lirigation is Iess common (Conant, 2002).
Second, a consensus-orientated political culrure
allows fo r a shating of adaptation costs, which facili-
tate the accommodation of pressure for adaptation.
BOX 8 .3 EX PLAINING
'DOWNLOADING' AND 'TAKING'
The top-down Europeanizat1on literature uses the concepts
of 'downloading' and 'tak1ng' as synonyms. Both terms
capture the response of member states and third countries
to the European Union. States are good at taking or
downloading pohaes if they are able to respond sw1ftly to
impetuses for change com1ng. for example, from the EU in
the form of EU law, EU neighbourhood policy, or EU
development policy.
Rarher than shifting adaptation costs onto a social or
political minority, thc 'wirmers' of domestic mange
compensate the 'losers'. For example, the German
government shared ics deösion powers in European
policy-making wich th e Länder to make up for their
EU-induced power lasses. Likewise, the consensual
corporatist decision-making culture in ehe Nether-
lands and Germany facilitated the liberalization of
ehe cransport scctor by offe ring compensation to em-
ployees as the potential losers of domesric m anges
(Heritier et al., 2001). In short, ehe stronger informal
cooperative institutions are in a member state, the
more likely domestic change will be.
Whilc Europeanization has affected the policies,
politics, and polity, of all member states, the degree
of change diffe rs significantly. If we consider the ex-
ample of environmental policy, ehe EU has promoted
mange towards a m ore precautionary problem-solv-
ing approach, partic.ularly in the area of air and water
pollution control. lt also introduced procedural policy
instrumems sum as the Access to Envi.ronn1enta1 In-
formation and the Environmental Impact Oirective
(Oirective 90/313 / EEC). Equally, EU policies have led
to tighter standards in virtualiy all areas of environ-
mental policy. While the EU has affected rhe policy
content of all member states, the environmental late-
comers (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, the UK, and
more recemly the CEE countries) have been much
more Europeanized than ehe envirorunemally pro-
gressive 'leader' seates (Denma rk, Sweden, Finland,
the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria).
The Europeanization of administrative structures
paints a similar picture, although domestic change has
been more modest. In old and new member seates, ehe
domestic impact of Europe has fostered ehe centrali-
zation of environmental policy-making competences
in the hands of central government departments
and agencies at the expense of subordinate levels of
government. Whi]e regional governmenes in highly
decemralized states have, to some extent, been com-
pensated by co-decision righes in the formulation and
implementaeion o f EU environmenta1 policies, the
main losers of Europeanization are the national and
region al parliamencs. Thus, the Europeanization of
environmenta! policy-making has created new politi-
cal opporrunities, parricularly for citizens and environ-
mental groups, and has reinforced existing consensua1
and adversatial sryles rather than changed them. The
only exceprions are Lhe three Northern coumries that
joined the EU in 1995. In Austria, Sweden. and to a

lesscr extem Finland, the need to implement EU en -
vironrnental policies in a timely fashion has reduced
the scope for extensive consultation with affected in-
te rcstS, chus undermining the traditionally conscnsual
parterns of interest intermediation. Moreover, ehe
legalistic approach of the Commission in the moni-
toring o f compliance with EU law has constrained the
discretion public authorities used to exercise in the im-
p le m entation of cnvironmemal regulations in the U K.
lreland, and France.
Excernal Europcanization also corroboraees the dif-
Je rcntial impact of Europe. [luropeanization has had a
m ore similar effect on candidate and neighbourhood
co untries than it has on member staces when it comes
eo the stre ngthening of core cxccutivcs and increasing
their auconomy from domestic, polirical, and societal
prcssures. lt has also led to ehe development of a less
politicized civil service and t0 a degree of decencrali-
zation and regionalization, at least when compared
wich the Communist lcgacy (Schirnmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 2005). At ehe same time, however, Euro-
pcanization effects on institutions and politics vary
co nsiderably. EU political conditionalicy was success-
ful o nly in case s of unstable democracy, in which it
screngthened liberal polirics (as in Slovakia o r Serbia),
while being irrelevant in those countries that already
had strong democratic constituencies (mosL of ehe
CEE countries) or in aurncratically ruled states such as
Belarus or Azerbaijan (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). In
genc ral , rhere has been lictle institutional convergence
aro und a single European model of governance.
Finally, some of the new member states show ten-
de ncies of dcmocratic back-sliding. Attempts by
the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, and by
Poland's Law andjustice Party (PiS) to undo some o f
the institutional changes introduced as a condition
for EU membership indicace chat Europeanization is
no t necessarily irreversible. The multiple crises ehe
EU has been faci ng since 2008 including ßrexit have
reinforced concerns of de-Europeanizatio n and disin-
tegra rio n (see Schimmelfonnig, 2018). Europeaniza-
rion ca n analytically caprure the reversing of domescic
changes induccd by EU policies and institutions. lt is
less c quipped to account for such de-Europeanizarion.
T he opposite of Europeanizarion rends eo be concep-
t ua lized as no Europeanization in terrns of resistance
a nd rejection. Domestic veeo players and ehe absence
of a cooperative institutional culture explain why t:he
do mestic Status quo is not changed. They have less to
say why change is undone (see Chapter 27).
European1za llon 12 1
In sum, ehe top-down impact of Europeanization is
diffe rential and reversible. EU policies and institutions
are not downloaded in a uniform manner. Nor is eheir
adoption and implementation equally (un)controver-
sial. Denmark, the UK, and Sweden are better tak-
ers than France, Italy, and Greece, because they have
more efficient administrations (Börzel et al., 2010). At
ehe same time, EU policies and institutions are politi-
cally more comested in Greece ehan in Spain, as the
2015 bailoue debate and the subsequent refcrendum in
Greck illuscrates. Thus we should not be too surprised
eo find hardly any evidence of convergence towards an
EU policy or institucional model: convergence is not
synonymous with Europeanization. Mcmber states
can undergo significant domestic change wichout nec-
essarily becoming similar.
By focusing on 'goodness of fit' and mediating fac-
tors, such as vcto playcrs, facilitating formal institu-
tions, or norm entrepreneurs, we can accow1t for the
diflerential impact of Europe. These factors increas-
ingly poinr to complementary rather chan competing
explanations of Europeanization. As such, scudents of
Europeanization primarily seek to identify scope con-
ditions under which specific facrnrs are more likely
to influence ehe downloading of EU policies and in-
stitutions by ehe member states. Rather than Jack of
convergence, the challenges are recenc Lendeneies of
de-Europeanization wich regard to ehe rule of law and
the abolition of border concrols.
KEY POINTS
Top-down Europeanization explains how the EU tnggers
dornestlC change. A central concept 1n this regard is
'm1sfit'. Only if domestic polic1es. proc:esses, or institutions
are not already in line w ith what the EU requires can the
latter causally induce domestic change.
lf misfit 1s present. the 1mpact of the European Union can
be explained through different theoretical approaches-
namely, soc:iolog1cal or rational choice 1nst1tutionalism.
A frequent question of top-down Europeanization
research is whether the polioes, polit1cs. and polit y of
st ates converge over time as an effect of membership, or
whether states maintain distinct features.
Academic research and empirical evidence show that
convergence is not synonymous w 1th Europeanizat1on.
• The challenge for Europeanilclt1on is to explain the
reversal of EU -1nduced domestic change.
122 T.1nja A. Börzel and Dian;i Pankc

Explaining bottom-up very important for rhem and if ehey manage eo form
winning coalitio ns through con cessions (package
European ization
d eals or side payments) or t hrough chreacs, such as rhe
Bottom-up Europeanization research analyses how disruption of furrher cooperation , scopping support
states upload their domestic preferences to the EU level. on ocher issucs, or reducing side payments. Hence the
These preferen ces may involve EU policies, such as en - higher ehe bargaining power of a state and ehe higher
vironmcnral standards; chey m ay relace eo European the issue salien ce for thac state, the more likely it is
political processes, su ch as h ow far day-co-day decision- that this stace will sh ape ehe content of the European
makingshould involve ehe European Parliament; orchey policy (su ccessful boccom-up Europeanizarion).
can touch on issues of instin,tional design regarding, for Quantitative scudies of EU decision-making at-
example, whether the European Commission should tribute different causal weight eo formal rnles, rang-
get additional compecences in the EU's Coopcration in ing from rraditionally power-based scudies eo more
the Area of Preedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) m at- ins titutionalist approaches (Pank.e, 2012a). T he for-
ters (see Box 8.4). Bottom -up Europeanization studies mer assum e that p olitical and material power is the
can be divided into those that analyse intcrgovernmcn - crucial explanatory factor governing EU negotiations
tal confcrcnces (IGCs) (Moravcsik, 1998) and ehose (Widgren, 1994), wh ereas ehe latter put more em-
ehat examine ehe daily decision-m aking process (Panke. phasis on formal rules su ch as decision-making pro-
2010, 2012a; Thomson et al., 2006; Thomson, 2011). Jn cedures or ehe shar e o f voces (Tsebelis and Garren,
order eo conceptualize how bottom-up Eumpeanization 1997). The collaborative research project 'The Euro-
works and how states are able eo upload cheir p refer- pean Union Decides· showed that 'powerful accors
ences, studencs of the European Union have drawn 0 11 who accach most salience co ehe issues receive ehe
rationalist and constructivisc approaches. Rationalist ap- largest con cessions from oth er n egotiacors' (Schnei-
proaches assume chac actors have fi xed and predefined der et al.. 2006: 3 05; see also Thomson er al., 2006).
interests, and pursue ehern chrough recourse eo their Hence, ehe vocing weighc rh at a m cmber state has in
power resources (often economic scrength or voces in ehe EU Council is an important negotiation resource.
ehe EU Council) strategicaUy calculating ehe costs and buc does not decermine o uccom es. This is ehe res ult
benefits of different options. Construcrivist approaches of an informally institutionalized consensus norm,
assume ehat actors are open to p ersuasion and change according to which 'powerful and inrense actors are
their 0exible interescs in the wake of good argumen ts. conciliates, even wh en ehey might be legally ignored'
One of th e mosc prominent ration alisc decision- (Ach en, 2006: 297). Moreover, in o rder co influence
making approach es is intergovernmentalism (H off- policies successfully, staces have to create coalition s.
mann, 1966, 1989) and its newer version , liberal While the re is evidence of ehe rationalisc accounc of
incergove rnmem alism (Moravcsik, 1998; see also bottom-up Europeanization, a con siderable am o unt
Ch apter 5). Imergovernmencalism assumes chae seates of empirical va riation is left unexplained.
wich many votes in the EU Council and high bargain- Qualitative sn,dies also dcmonstrate ehac bargaining
ingpower are in a beccer position eo shape ourcomes in and voting weighc are very important for bottorn-up
EU negotiations than states with fewer votes. Moreo- Europ eanization, because power iruluences the oppor-
ver, powcrful staces are m ore likely to inOuence suc- cunities ehac states have eo upload national preferences
cessfully the contenc of EU law if ehe policy at stake is to ehe EU level (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Panke,
2012b). A srudy by Eugenia da Con cei~iio-J-leldt (2004)
on ehe Common Pisheties Policy (CFP) highlights rhar
BOX 8.4 EX PLAINING 'UPLOAD ING' power, preferences, and preference incensiry inOuence
AND 'SHAPING ' ehe outcomes of complex, iteraced negotiations under
conditions of uncertainty (see Box 8.5). A.noeher ex-
The bottom-up EuropeanizatJon literature uses two concepts ample of ehe irnportance of bargaining power in ehe
interchangeably in order to describe how states ,nfluence sh adowof votes is ehe WorkingTim e Dircctivc (Direc-
policies, politics, or institutions of the European Union:
Live 2003 / 88 / EC). Duringehe cwoyears of negotiations
·uploading' and 'shaping'. An EU member state ,s a successful
in ehe Committee o f Perm an en t Represcntativcs
shaper (or uploader) 1f ,t manages to make its preferences
heard, so that an EU policy, political process, or institution (C oreper) prior to an agreernent, a potential compro-
reflects its interests, mise shiftcd the outcome cowards the UK as a strong
veto player. A majo1ity of Slates favoured ehe Directive.
 Fu mpean1zat1on 123

BOX 8.5 BOTTOM-UP EUROPEANIZATION: THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY

The Common Fisheries Policy case 1s a good illustration of how
states make use of their voting power and the threat of a
negative vote 1n order to obtain better deals for themselves.
Back 1n 1976. the European Commission proposed rules on
fishing quotas and member states' access to fishing areas. This
po11cy required unanimity among the member states. All
member states agreed to the proposal, with lreland and t he UK
opt1ng for higher quotas and l1m1tat1ons of the equal access
princ1ple. lreland and the UK had high barga,ning power because
their agreement was required to pass the policy. In the course of
sever al years of bargaining, the lnsh government accepted lhe
Commission·s modified proposal because it achieved
concessions in the for m of quota increases. The UK, however,
ma1nta1ned rts oppositJon and was brought back 'on board · only
later. when the CFP was linked to the UK's budget contr ibution
in a comprehens!Ve package deal. At that point. however.
0 enmark turned into a veto player because it became
dissatisfied with the quota system. Denmark demanded higher
and more flexible fishing quotas, and created a stalemate by
evoking the Luxembourg Compromise. To the threat of
cont1nued blockade, the Community responded with higher
offers. Only af ter Denmark received higher quotas as side
payments could the CFP finally come into existence 1n 1983.
So11,re dJ Concc1~-hcldt (7006)

Although mcmber states could have voced according While quantitative studies do not (yet) test the
co qu ali fied majority voti ng (QMV), they abstained power of ideas and good argumencs, qualitative stud-
fro m procceding i.n this way, seeking i.nstead co bring ies can trace ideational processes. They dcmonstrate
ehe UK on boa rd as well. As a result, the UK achieved that ehe power of argument is highly important 1or in-
kcy concessions before the Directive was passed (Lewis, fl uenci.ng the opportunity that a member state has co
2003: l l5- 19). In line wich the findings of the 'The Eu- influence the content of European laws, Europcan in-
ropean Union Decides' project, the bargaining power stituti.ons, or EU political processes. Concerning mar-
01 a big statc wich high preference intensity manered in ket crearing and regulaLing polici.es, fewer than 15%
the case of the Working Time Directive_ Even though of all Council positi.ons on a Commissi.on proposal
proceeding to vote could have securcd supporc for the are actually decided at ehe ministerial level of the EU
Directive against Brirish incerests, all !arge states' in- Council. Coreper and, especi.ally, the working groups
teresrs were accommodatcd. Therefore, it is d ear that of the Council are ehe forums in which thc vast major-
qualitaLive work lencls supporc to major quantitative ity of political decisions are taken (see Chapter 11). In
findings in showing that, when it comes to hard bar- both lower-level arenas, hard political bargai.ning, in
gaining in lhe shadow of votcs, the size of a mcmber which states resort eo the threar of hierarchi.cal dcl-
state maners in shapi.ng its influence (Panke, 2010)- egation and voting, i.s rare (Panke and Haubrich Seco,
Constructivist approaches assume that the prefer- 201 6). The usual way of doing business is based on ehe
ences of state and non-state actors are not completely exchange of arguments (Beyers and Dierickz, 1998; El-
fö,ed du ring inte racLions. but can change in the wake of gsn·öm andjönsson, 2000)- A comprehensive study of
good argumencs (Risse, 2000). Accors have an idea of negotiations within rhe EU Council shows, for exam-
whar they want when they start negotiaring in the EU, ple, that high-quality arguments can convince others
buc can change their prefercnces if another actor makes even if the poinc is put forward by a small state with
a convincing Statement, for example, should new scien- limited bargaining and voting power_ For e.xample,
Lific insights be made available (Panke, 2011 ). Accord- Luxembourg used its EU and issue-specific expe rtise
ing to this approach, policy outcomes and integration to negotiate effectively in rhe Corrunon Agricultural
dyn amics arc shaped by processes of arguing arnong PoLicy health check negotiations of 2007 (Panke,
member states, typical.ly i1wolving supranational insti- 2.01 l ). Back then, a major dcavage ran berween coun-
tutions such as ehe Comrnissi.on, or policy experts and tries that favoured EU suhsidies and countri.es thar
epistemic communities (Haas, 1970; Sandholtz and Zys- wanted to lirn.ited the EU budget spend on the CA P.
man, 1989). Cood arguments are the ones that resonate Luxembourg belonged to the latter group. lt had
wcll with all interests. lf an argumenc wins the compeli- strong interests regarding land parcel transfer rules,
Lion of ideas, it influences outcomes. States are more mi.nimum thresholds for direct paym ents, and in rhe
successfol in shaping policy ourcomes (successful bot- correction scheme on milk quoca. The l .uxembourg
w m-up Europeani.zation) thc better their argumems expert had been dealing with ehe CAP regulations for
resonate with the beli.efä and norms of other actors. much longer than mosl Commission stalf, and knew
124 TanJa A Börzel ;irid D 1na P;inkc
the hiscory of the files significancly weil. Thus, from
ehe very Start of the negoeiaeions, Luxembourg ac-
eively lobbied ehe Commission and thc Council Presi-
dency and cirrnlaeed lengchy constructive reform
proposals that reflected a high level of experrise. On
this basis, Luxembourg successfully influenced the
CAP. This and other cases illustrate that the possibility
of persuading others with a convincing argument and
norms of mutual responsiveness both work as great
equalizers in Coreper negoriacions. As a result- and in
line with the conseructivist hypothesis 011 bottom -up
Europeanizatio11- smaller member states ca11 some-
cimes punch above their weight (Panke, 2011 ).
The rwo theoretical accounts of ehe shaping of Eu-
ropean policies are comparible rather than mut ually
exdusive. We know empirically ehae, in EU institu-
tions, accors sometimes engage in bargaining (as ex-
peceed by ehe rationalise intergovernmencal approa ch)
and sometimes argue (as expccted by ehe conscructiv-
ise supranational approach). Therefore, both expla11a-
tions of bottom-up Europeanization can account for
different parts of social reality.
KEY POINTS
• Bottom-up Europeanizat1on explains how states can
trigger changes in the EU.
Misftt is a necessar y cond1tion for EU-1nduced changes. lf
states' preferences are not already 1n accordance w1th EU
policies, polit,cs, or pol1ty. states can induce European-
level changes.
• Different theories focus on different means available to
states to make the1r voices heard, such as economic and
voting power, or argumentative and moral power.
Two prominent questions of bottom-up Europeanization
research ask whether large states, such as German:,:
l
France, the UK or Poland, are more successful in
1nfiuencing European policies than smaller states, and under
what cond,t1ons small stat es can punch above their weight.
T owards a sequential perspective on
Europeanization?
As stated earlier, ehe sequential pe rspecrive 011 Europe-
a11izacio11 seeks co explain both ehe shaping and taking
of EU and state-level policies, procedures, and insei-
turions. Few studencs o f Europeanization have made
an attempt to bring ehe two approaches togeeher,
although some studies consider 'shaping' as the cause
o f \aking ' or vice versa (Andersen and Lieflerink,
1997; van Ke ule n, 1999). Member states that have the
power and capacity to upload their preferences suc-
cessfully, and to shape EU policies accordingly, have
tewer difficulties in taking and downloading them.
This explai.ns why south crn European member seates
are laggards in implemenring EU environmenta1 pol.i-
cies (Börzel, 2003). Porn1gal and Greece si.mply Jack
capacities and power to serongly shape EU policy,
and consequenrly face a higher 'misfit', i11curring sig-
nificanr implementation costs. Problems in taking EU
policics can provide member states with imporcant
incentives eo engage in (re-)shaping in orde r to reduce
the 'misfit'. France, for example, which had already
deregulaced its cranspore seccor when ie mee ehe EU
demands for liberalizarion, pushed for re-regularing
ehe i.mpact of liberalization in order eo safeguard pub-
lic interest goals (H eritier et al., 200 l ). The Greek ref-
erendum of 201 5, by contrast, was a failcd attempt of
the Greek government eo renegociace painful reforms
thae previous governments had accepted in recurn fo r
a bailo ut. Rarh er, Germany and other credito r coun-
tries have managed to upload rh eir austerity policy eo
the EU level and impose it on th e debtor Stares (see
Chapter 26).
The more successful member states arc in shaping
EU policies, the fewer problems they are likely to face
in ta king these policies. Por example, if a scate with
high regulacory standards in rhe environmcntal policy
field, such as Denrnark, manages eo upload its envi·
ro11menral policy preferences to the European level,
it has to invest fewer resources in implementing EU
policies late r on, which in turn reduces the risk of
Dcnmark violating EU environmental law (Börzel,
2003). ßut are successful shaping and tak.ing explained
by the same factors, or do the two stages of the policy
process require different explanatio11s? Some faccors
rnight be more imporcant co shapi.ng than co caking,
or vi ce versa; they could also have contradictory cf.
fects. However, so far only a small number o f Euro-
peanization studies havc systcmatically combined and
compared the causal influence of diffe rent factors
in the two Stages of the EU policy process. Bringing
the rwo cogether co uld help address the puzzle of dc-
Europeanization as in the case of Brexit (see Chapter
27) and differential outcomes. Reversing EU-induced
domestic change and avoiding EU reforms a re as ef~
tecrive ways to reduce or avoid m.isfit as adjusting EU
institutions and policies.
 EuropeJn1z;it1on 125

KEY POINTS

The bulk of Europeanization research focuses either on top- There 1s great potential for future research that seeks
down or on bottom-up processes. to integrate sequentially top-down and bottom-up
EuropeanizatJon approaches which may help expla,n
Sequent,al approaches analyse interactions between the
de-Europeanization processes such as Brexit.
shaping and the taking of European policies.
There is limited research that identifies the interaction
between unsuccessful uploading of preferences to the EU
level and implementat,on problems at the national level.

Conclusion
T his chapter has introduced the concepr of Europe-
anization and has reviewed existing research on this
copic. We have focused attention on the theoretical lit-
erature around rhe concepts of top-down and bo LLom-
up Europeanization by idemifying their explanatory
quality and by conrexrualizing them in rhe.wider po-
Ut ical science literature. The empiiical examples have
shown how the European Union has conrribured to
changing strucrures, processes, and behaviour in na-
t ional arenas. but also under whaL conditions member
states are able to incorporate their preferences imo
EU policies, politics, and processes. Moreover, the
chapter has addressed the external dimension o f Eu-
ropeanization as the EU is able to affecr third countries
by pushing for socio-economic and political reform.
The chapter has also presenred a sequemial under-
stan ding of Europeanization that brings together the
merits of top-down and bottom-up Europeanization
approaches, and has outlined possible avenues for fu-
rure research. Ultimately, the chaptcr concludes that
Europeanization research will conrinue to be an im-
portant field of EU research for the forcseeable fururc.

• QUESTIONS

1. W hat is Europeanizat,on, and what are Lhe differences between bottom-up and top-down Europeanizat,on?

2. Why is Europeanizat,on an important research field?

3. What is "misfö"?
4. How can we explain why member states respond d1fferently to European12ation?
5. How can we explain member states' ab1l1ty to shape EU pohc1es and ,nstrtutions successfully?

6. Are some states berter equ,pped to shape EU pohc,es than others?

7. W hat do the lerms 'uploading' and 'download,ng' meanl

8. Can states be sub;ect to Europeanizat,on without be,ng membcrs of the EU?

• GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

Cowles. M. G., Caporaso. J. A , and Risse. T (eds) (20 11) lrons(orm,ng F.urope: Europeanizorion ond Domesr,c Change
(lthaca NY. Cornell University Press) This edited volume gives a good overv,ew of empirical studies on top-down
EuropeaniLation ,n the pre-access,on EU 1.S.

Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (eds) (2003) The Poliucs o(Europeon,souon (Oxfo,·d: Oxford Un,vers,ty Press) Th,s
book gives a comprehens,ve overview of the various theoretical approaches and d1mcnsions of top down
European,zat,on.
126 Tanja A. Bör-zel and D1ana Pankc

Sanders, D and Bellucc,, P (eds) (20 12) The Europeanization o( Ncmonal Po/it1es? C1tizensh1p and Support ,n a fbst-
Enlargement Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press) This book offers 1nteresting insights into top-down
Europeanization.

Schimmelfennig, Fand Sedelmeie~ U. (eds) (2005a) The Europeanizavon o(Cenrrol ond Eostern Europe (lthaca, NY·
Cornell Un,ver sity Press) Th1s book prov1des an excellent account of top-down [uropean1zation in accessIon coun-
tnes and new member states.

Thomson, R. (201 1) Resolving Comroversy in the Europeon Union: Leg,s/or,ve Decision-Mokmg Be(ore oncl .After
Enlargemem (Cambr idge, Cambridge Urnvers1ty Press) Th,s book prov1des ins1ghts into bottom-up Europeanization
with and wrthout the new member states.

:~~: W EBLIN KS

https://ec.europa.eu/info/publicac1ons/a1111ual-reporcs-monicoring-applicacion-eu-law cn T h1s website conta ns

the Europcan Comm1ssion's Annual Reports on the application of European law ,n rts member states (top-down
Europeanizatior,).

http://ec.europa.eu/prelex The European Union hosts a webs,te on deos1on-mak1ng and the preparat,on of EU
policies. Th1s prov1des 1ns1ghts ,nto bottom-up Eurooean1zation.

http://www.sv.u10.no/arena/eng1Jsh/research/publ1ca Lions/arcna-work1ng-papers/ The Arena Wor k1ng Papers is

an online collect1on of work1ng papers that analyse and document new European ordersof governance andin wh1C"I
much 1nnovat1ve theoret1cal wo,-k is showcased for the first t,me.

http://europeangovcr11ance.l1vingreviews.org/ L,vmg Reviews m European Governonce is an e-journal. publ1shing

solicrted state-of-the-art articles ,n the field of European integrat1on and governance research. The ma,n focus of the
articles is on European 1ntegration and European governance, and 1t reflects the whole spectrum of Europeanizat1on
research.

https://ec.europa.eu/info/dcpartmencs/taskforce-art1cle-S0-negot1ations-un1ced-k1ngdom en The European

Comm1ss1on's Taskforce on Art,cle 50 negotiat1ons with the United Kingdom is In charge of preparing and conduct-
ing the negot1at1ons w,lh the UK, by tak1ng into account merrber states' preferences.
9
Democracy and
Legitimacy in the
European Union
Stijn Smismans

Chapter Contents
lntroduction 128
From 'permissive consensus' to 'democratic deficit' 128
Maastricht and the debate during ehe 1990s 130
EU democracy and the governance debate 132
The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon 135
• Crises, populism, and EU legitimacy 137
Conclusion 138

Reader's Guide
This chapter discusses the extent to which decision-making in the European Union can be considered
democratic and legitimate. The chapter clarifies the concepts 'democracy' and 'legitlmacy', and de-
scribes how, although initially the legitimacy of the European polity w as not perceived as a problem,
it became more problematic as t he EU gained more competences. The European democr atic deficit
became an important issue of debate only during ehe 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty had trans-
ferred considerable powers to the EU. The main solut ion to the democratic deficit has been inspired
by the parliamentary model of democracy and involves strengthening the European Parliament (EP),
while also paying attention to t he role of national parliamencs and regional and local authorities. The
chapter also shows how the governance debate at the start of the twenty-first century broadened
ehe conceptual understanding of democracy in ehe EU by addressing the complexity of European
governance (see also Chapter 7). By looking at different Stages of policy-making and different modes
of governance, while dealing with issues such as transparency and the role of civil socicty, the chapter
discusses a w ider range of issues associated with the democracy and legitimacy of the Union. lt as-
sesses the impact on EU democracy of the Constit ut iona l Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The chapter
concludes by w arning that three main crises, namely the economic, migration, and securi ty crises,
have revived nationalist and populist movements exacerbating the challenges to the EU's legitimacy.