Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Wassmer Vs Velez, 12 SCRA 648
Wassmer Vs Velez, 12 SCRA 648
Wassmer Vs Velez, 12 SCRA 648
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed
marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their
wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and
was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared
in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.
Issue:
Held:
Tanjanco vs CA
18 SCRA 994
December 17, 1996
Doctrine: seduction is more than a mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise of
marriage, it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, entrapment, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yield.
Seduction falls under art 21 of the new civil code.
Facts:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos both are of legal age. Tanjanco expressed
his undying love and affection for Santos who in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings. Santos consented and acceded to Tanjanco's pleas for carnal knowledge
because off his promise to marriage. Santos then conceived a child as a consequence
and to avoid embarrassment and humiliation she had to resign her job as a secretary
in IBM Inc.,. She was unable to support herself and the baby. She also suffered moral
shock and humiliation because Tanjanco refused to marry her. She prayed
that Tanjanco would be liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Santos can claim damages and if the acts of Tanjanco constitutes
seduction.
Held:
No she can’t claim for damages because for 1 whole year she maintained sexual
relations with Tanjanco. Such act is not compatible with seduction because there's
voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, Tanjanco is not liable for damages.
De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines
Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed
signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with
another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the
other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.
The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession
of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal
the father's resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on
this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.
In re Santiago, 70 PHIL 66
FACTS: Atty. Roque Santiago prepared for a married couple (who had been
separated for 9 years) a document wherein it was stipulatet that they
authorize each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever
right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if
there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer simplypointed to his diploma
which was hanging on the wall and said that he would tear off that document if
the contract turns out to be invalid. Pursuant to the contract, the husband
married again.
ISSUE: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice of law
HELD: Atty. Santiago was suspended from practice of law for a year on the
ground of ignorance of the law or being careless for giving legal advice by
trying to dissolve the marriage through a private contract. The document is
contrary to law, good morals and public order. Marriage is an inviolable social
institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.
Jones v. Hallahan
Annotate this Case
November 9, 1973.
*589 David Kaplan, Stuart L. Lyon, Louisville, for appellants.
VANCE, Commissioner.
Appellants contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the license deprived
them of three basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of
association; and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that
the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.
"The legal union of a man with a woman for life; the state or condition of being
married; the legal relation of spouses to each other; wedlock; the formal
declaration or contract by which a man and a woman join in wedlock."
"The civil status, condition or relation of one man and one woman united in
law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties
legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction
of sex."
Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage between persons of the
same sex[1] nor do they authorize the issuance of a marriage license to such
persons.
Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for
that purpose. For a time the records of marriage were kept by the church.
Some states even now recognize a common-law marriage which has neither
the benefit of license nor clergy. In all cases, however, marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been
presented with no authority to the contrary.
Baker v. State
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs are same sex couples denied marriage licenses
in their respective towns. Plaintiffs sued their respective towns and the state of
Vermont for declaratory relief.
Facts. Plaintiffs are three same sex couples that were denied marriage licenses
in their respective towns. Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory relief from the
refusal to issue the marriage licenses. The Defendants are the State of Vermont
and the respective towns. The trial court found for the Defendants on the basis
that the marriage statute furthers the state’s interest in promoting the link
between procreation and child rearing. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issue. May the State of Vermont exclude same-sex couples from the benefits
and protections afforded to opposite-sex married couples?
Dissent. The dissent focused on the court’s limited role is dictating public morals
and its view that this decision did just that. Also, the court disagreed with the
approach the court took which ordered the legislature to provide a remedy, but
failed to rule whether the state marriage laws were constitutional or not.
Note however, that the dissenting justice agrees that same-sex couples should
be given the right to marry.
Concurrence. The concurring justice focused on his disagreement with the
analytical framework the majority utilized to reach this decision. Specifically, the
concurring justice believed the majority now requires a much higher standard of
justification for state legislation and this would come into conflict with the narrow
role he perceived for the state courts.
Discussion. The court focused their discussion on the state constitutional
requirements. The prohibition against same-sex marriage was found in violation
of the common benefits clause. But, the court refused to rule the definition of
marriage and the statute unconstitutional. Rather, it put the burden on the state
legislature to craft an alternative solution that would give same-sex couples
equal rights as married cou
SYLLABUS
DECISION
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe
Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion
temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the
offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to recognize and
maintain, at P15 per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as a
consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to pay the costs.
The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18,
who was the injured girl in this case. She is therefore appellant’s niece by
marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of
Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the appellant
asked Felicita, who was then about 18 years of age, to accompany him across
the river on some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river
together into the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the
appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway
where tall grass and other growth hid them from public view. In this spot the
appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but she
refused to give her consent, and he finally, notwithstanding her resistance,
accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of
his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about
11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon
Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the
girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened, and
this prosecution for rape was started.
The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above
stated, and that the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the
appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. We
concur in this view of the case. The manner in which the appellant dealt with
the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide
intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of
essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the
wrongdoer.