Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

143286 April 14, 2004

Facts:
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.Eusebia
sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties),
claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legalwife
of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they
begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their  marriage, they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion,
Cebu.Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares
of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income
from coconuts leased to corporations.

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant,
PacitaVillanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the
only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she
could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son
is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties.
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia
Natuya.Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial
court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal.

Ruling:
Yes. They are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed. The Family Code provisions on
conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before the effectivity of Family Code. 

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is
on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that
the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting
in1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December
1996.Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date
of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since the
subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.120594, June 10, 1997

Facts:
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and
Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and
Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint that
the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with improvements thereon
situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of Article
494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of
one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the action for
accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963, the brothers together with other
siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was
engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are entitled to the
fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, so that, an accounting of the assets and
liabilities of the partnership, as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper
in the premises.
On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed their answer alleging that an accounting is not
feasible because the company had long been dissolved by the partners on September 30, 1982 on
account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each partner was already given him. It
was further alleged that Alfonso mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager
and, as a consequence thereof, incurred advances and indebtedness from the partnership in the
amount of P130,000.00. Finally, private respondents asserted that Alfonsos one-third (1/3) share
of the subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in order to secure a
loan he obtained from her.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss contending
that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim
whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned. He prayed that the
case be dismissed. The trial court, in its Order dated July 4, 1990, denied Alfonsos motion but
recognized his reluctance to prosecute.
Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living
separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on August 31, 1977; that during their marriage, they bought a residential lot
consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46249 and that the
funds used in the construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan she and her
husband secured, although it was her husband and mother-in-law who drew the loan.
Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses, on their part, tried to establish the following: (a)
that the family business, Bel Air Auto Supply Company, was dissolved on September 25, 1982
on account of mismanagement brought about by Alfonsos incompetence; (b) that Alfonso had no
more claim against the family business because he borrowed heavily on his equity in the family
business and from his brothers and sisters; (c) that the subject property was inherited by them
from their mother, Trinidad Uy; (d) that Alfonso borrowed money from their sister, Lolita, and
as a consequence thereof, mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her; (e) that Alfonso
failed to pay said loan; and (f) that the house on the lot in question was constructed using funds
from a loan contracted by their mother from the Social Security System (SSS). No documentary
evidence, however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation that the property
was inherited from their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of the lot in
question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because the Certificate of Title states that
the lot is registered in the name of Alfonso Tan, married to Eteria Teves; Celestino U. Tan
married to Rosario Dy Kushin and Maximo U. Tan is against well-settled jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.

Ruling:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. It is not necessary, to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the marriage, it is
considered as conjugal property. In fact, even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear, the presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
Said presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear, categorical, and convincing evidence
that the property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the
parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan
and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his
mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. The property is registered in the name
of Alfonso U. Tan, married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy Kuchin and
Maximo U. Tan, single, under TCT No. 46249. It is clear from TCT No. 46249 that the title was
entered on January 9, 1970 and a transfer from TCT No. 38759, when the latter covered the 906-
square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late Trinidad Uy to her children
when she died intestate and which property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the
Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties. While this document was not
admitted as evidence because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents' motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court, the source of the property can be reasonably
and materially inferred from TCT No. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is
subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for a period of two
(2) years, from January 9, 1979 against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy." Such imposition
on property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived of their lawful
participation of the estate of the decedent. The presence of the imposition in TCT No. 46249,
which was carried over from its predecessor TCT No. 38759 presupposes the existence of
summary settlement of an estate from where the property was derived, that of private
respondents' deceased mother. There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during
Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as
Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code which
provides that: Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (2) That
which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004

Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of
all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the
properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching,
wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment alleging inter alia that
the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband
during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in
the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the
presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that such presumption subsists
even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner
Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the surety ship obligation was not contracted in the
pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.

Issue:
Whether or not the 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the
loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching.

Ruling:
No. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in
the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed
to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account
of PBMCI. Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. In this
case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership.
 Matthews v. Taylor, G. R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Facts:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old
Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M.
Martin a lot (Boracay property). The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow
Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of
Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn
ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with
third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay
property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. Petitioner thereafter took
possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the
Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamin’s consent,
Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages
against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition
and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife
without the consent of her British husband is valid. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner
of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same

Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation
of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands
of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of
the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely
not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more
and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale
of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s
claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing
that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

In re Muller v. Muller, G. R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By
this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller. Due to incompatibilities
and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
reimburse the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the
amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Elena
Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. There is an express prohibition
against foreigners owning land in the Philippines. Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law
bars him to do directly. With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

Navarro v. Escobido, G. R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009

Facts: 
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because
no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before
the complaints for replevin were filed. Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in
the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the
actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the
complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to
state a cause of action.

Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include
Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint
which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a
mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court created a cause of action
for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even worse, according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed
the theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro claims that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion when it assumed that the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of
Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles
subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTC gravely erred when it
ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal

Ruling:
The Court holds that it is conjugal property. Article 124 of the Family Code, on the
administration of the conjugal property, provides that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act with authority in
managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No need exists, therefore, for one to
obtain the consent of the other before performing an act of administration or any act that does not
dispose of or encumber their conjugal property.
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of
the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement
between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.

Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G. R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010
Facts:
Imani signed a Continuing Surety ship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-
sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs, but not exceeding 6 Million php. CPDTI incurred an indebtedness around Php 164,000 to
which it defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by
Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its name. Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her
conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani, reasoning that the loan proceeds never
redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank
appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme
Court.

Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

Ruling:
No. Civil Law: Conjugal Property - All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal.
However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua nonto the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-
Imani married to Sina Imaniis no proof that the property was acquired during the spouse’s
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner
utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
Remedial Law: Appeals - The argument regarding the road right of way must be rejected
because it was raised for the first time in this petition. In the trial court and the CA, petitioners
arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well settled that issues
raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred
by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.

Dela Peña v. Avila, G. R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012

Facts:
Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum
of P250, 000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory note and a
notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land,
together with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in
the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña”
(Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal. To secure the payment of the loan obligation.

Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma
Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600, 000.00. As such Gemma
caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a
credit limit of P1, 200,000.00.

Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she

was the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma
utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.

FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the
property due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the
public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the
realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina
registry.

Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint
for annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono
who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied the material allegations,
maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her
husband was still alive.

RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the
property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same was
acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are
upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT
No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.

Ruling:
No, Petition Is Denied. CA Decision Affirmed In Toto. Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove
that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who
invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when
there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing
evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peña’s did not even come close
to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased
when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.

In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still
single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner
constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be
presumed conjugal in nature. “Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as
paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.”
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the
realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof
as security for the payment of the P250, 000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.

Titan Construction Corporation v. David, G. R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010

Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957.
In 1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City,
which was registered in the name of “MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Manuel A. David” and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer
communicated with each other. Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had
previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1, 500,000.00
through a Deed of Sale dated April 24, 1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the name of Titan. Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of
Quezon City.  Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No.
130129 be invalidated, that the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be
issued in their names. In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good
faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995
signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses.
Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In his unverified Reply, Manuel claimed
that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a forgery; hence,
Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint which was granted by the trial court.  Thus, on October
15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint impleading Martha as a co-defendant in the
proceedings.  However, despite personal service of summons upon Martha, she failed to file an
Answer. Thus, she was declared in default. Trial then ensued.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals patently erred by not ruling that assuming the sale was void,
on grounds of equity Martha s. David should reimburse petitioner of his payment with legal
interest.

Ruling:
The petition is without merit. The property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership. The Civil
Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage between
Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides: Article 160.  All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides: Article 153.  The following are
conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses; these provisions were carried over to the Family Code.  In particular, Article 117
thereof provides: Art. 117.  The following are conjugal partnership properties: Those acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses.

Tan v. Andrade, G. R. No. 171904, August 7, 2013

Facts
 Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of land situated in Cebu City,
which she mortgaged to and were subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. When the
redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed
to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son,
Proceso Andrade, Jr., evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Proceso, Jr. executed a
Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties
inconsideration of P50, 000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry
Andrade, one of Rosario's sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned
Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of
Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for
the sum of P310, 000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership
over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name. On October 7, 1997,
Rosario's children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph,
Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. Santiago, filed a complaint for reconveyanceand annulment of
deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between Rosario and Bobby was
not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosario's
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by
them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr., the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and
thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued
that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the
issuance of the TCTs in his name. Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely
owned by Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name and that he had validly acquired the same
upon Proceso, Jr.'s failure to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties. The RTC
ruled for Bobby. The CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether the properties were exclusive properties of Rosario

Ruling:
Pertinent to the resolution of this issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove
dthat it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the
party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
acquired during the marriage as held in Go v. Yamane.
Onstott v. Upper Tagpes Neighborhood Association, Inc, G. R. No. 221047, September 14,
2016
Facts:
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 18,589 square meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645- ) M-556 situated in the Province of
Rizal (subject property). Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal
sold the subject property at public auction to one Amelita A. De Serra (De Serra), the highest
bidder, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004.Respondent UTNAI, an
association representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed 8 the
same from De Sena. Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint 10 for
cancellation of OCT No. (-2645- ) M-556 and for the issuance of a new title in its name before
the RTC against Albert and Federico M. Cas (Cas), the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal.11 It alleged, among others, that it became the owner of the subject property upon
redemption thereof from De Sena and that, consequently, it must be issued a new title. Moreover,
Albert was an American citizen who, under Philippine law, is not allowed to own a parcel of
land in the Philippines.12 Efforts to serve summons upon Albert proved futile as he was not a
resident of the Philippines. Thus, summons was served through publication. 13 Nonetheless,
Albert still failed to file his answer. Hence, upon the motion of UTNAI, Albert was declared in
default and UTNAI was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI
notwithstanding (a) the lack of jurisdiction over the person of Albert, the registered owner of the
subject property who has been dead prior to the institution of UTNAI'S complaint; (b) the failure
to implead his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party, since the subject property was
allegedly conjugal in nature; and (c) the lack of legal interest on the part of UTNAI to redeem the
subject property.

Ruling:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. However, the p who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As Michael invokes the presumption of conjugality, he must first establish that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Indeed, records are bereft of any evidence from which the actual date
of acquisition of the subject property can be ascertained. Considering that the presumption of
conjugality does not operate if there is no showing when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired, the subject property is therefore considered to be Albert's exclusive property.
Consequently, Michael's insistence that Josephine who, the Court notes, has never personally
appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge the disposition of the subject property sans
her participation is a co-owner thereof and necessarily, an indispensable party to the instant case,
must therefore fail. With respect, however, to the question of whether UTNAI has legal interest
to redeem the subject property from the highest bidder at the tax delinquency public auction sale,
the Court finds that the CA erred in its disquisition.

Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 118305 February
12, 1998
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence
filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal
of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of
their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners
on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given
to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation
of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin-off
of the loan itself.

Dewara v. Lamela, G. R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011

Facts:
On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision  acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the
heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50, 000.00 as civil indemnity, P50, 000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.

On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also
affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of P15,
000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50, 000.00
exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them.  The decision became final and
executory on October 1, 2001.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ,  resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.

Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 the CA
dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
in issuing its assailed orders. It also denied Efren’s motion for reconsideration,  prompting him to
file the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal
properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
Ruling:
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did
not execute any prenuptial agreement.14Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute
that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it
was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia. The
reasoning goes:

Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact
does not prevent the application of Art. 94, last paragraph, of the Family Code because their
property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute community. This finds support in
Art. 256 of the Family Code which states: if the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties. None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired
by each over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-
spouse may properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed. 15 Art. 121. The
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children,
and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be
governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major
or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere
preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses
to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for
self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of
their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of
litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the conjugal
partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio, G. R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011

Facts:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B.
Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he,
who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She
was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr.
and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold apportion of the property
(5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the
return of the property, but Servacio refused to heedtheir demand. They sued Servacio and Rito
for the annulment of the sale of the property. Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he
had purchased it with his own money.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation
 
Ruling:
No. Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.  If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-
judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. 
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoi
ngrequirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern
the property relations of the subsequent marriage.

Ros v. Philippine National Bank, G. R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011

Facts:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI
of Ilocos Norte. The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000
from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof.
Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. 
Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she
consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul
the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse
of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by
the appellate court upon appeal.

Issue: 
Whether or not the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Held:
Yes. Petition denied. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract
is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not
give her consent. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and
rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ros’ loan
from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership. 

Siochi v. Gozon, G. R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010

Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a
30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of
the couple is conjugal partnership of gains. Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis
pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took
possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter,
Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property.
Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC
issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and
Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA,
Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional
Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with
Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to
Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld
original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by
Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done
without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be
perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that
Elvira’s conduct showed her acquiescence to the sale.
However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it
was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided
share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo is valid

Ruling:
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art
124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement
is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that
the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred.
As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected
by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property
as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation)
in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
“Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred.
Aggabao v. Parulan, G. R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010
Facts:
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed
of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr.
On July 2, 2004, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69044, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari, seeking to reverse
the decision of the CA. They present as the main issue whether the sale of conjugal property
made by respondent wife by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly
executed by respondent husband in her favor was validly made to the vendees, who allegedly
acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his
signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence
from the country. We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CAs finding that
the vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not exercise the necessary prudence
to inquire into the wifes authority to sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the
consent of the husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the sale between Mrs. Elena and
the petitioners had been a nullity under Article 124 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil
Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents
because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the
administration over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the
country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution
of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family
Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulans counter-offer during
the March 25, 1991 meeting. Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under
Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or
the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified. On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from
the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the
offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence
of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Fuentes v. Roca, G. R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11,
1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. [1] But
Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. Six years later
in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to
prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared
[2]
 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for
the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca
(Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses
were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 or P160,000.00,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano
was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions,
Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the
additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the
spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano
passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. Eight years later in
1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R.
Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo,
represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the
spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on
the affidavit of consent had been forged. The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her
residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the
document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989. All the same, the Fuentes
spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke
it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had
already lapsed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
Ruling:
(1) The CA found that Rosarios signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked
difference between her signature on the affidavit of consent and her specimen signatures. The
CA gave no weight to Atty. Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila
on September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the
affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R and s were written is also
remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
(2) Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family
Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the
conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership
of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership, Article 166, prohibited him from selling commonly owned real
property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale
is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled
during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs
may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value
of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
(3) As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the
right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and
disposal.

Mertopolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Pascual, G. R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008
Facts:
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married onJ anuary 19, 1985.During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door
apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. On April 30, 1997,
Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a Php 58 million loan
from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank).To secure the obligation,
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their
properties, including one involving a lot.

Florencia secured a waiver from Nicholson. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, initiated a
foreclosure proceedings over the properties. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings,
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the
nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the property, which is
still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the properties in contest form part of the conjugal properties of Nicholson and
Florencia.

Ruling:
The property is deemed conjugal. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

Domingo v. Molina, G. R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016

Facts:
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land.
The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the
subject property.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora’s death, Anastacio sold
his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses
Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property. In 1986, Anastacio died.

In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 272967 and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the
spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the
spouses Molina on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the
spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could
not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was
already dead at the time of the sale. The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the
title to the subject property to answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already
own half of the land. The spouses Molina have been in possession of the subject property before
the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the property’s real estate
taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is
valid and legal; and whether fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses
Molina.

Ruling:
We deny  the petition. It is well settled that when the trial court’s factual findings have been
affirmed by the CA, the findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court and may
no longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions. While there are exceptions to this rule, the Court
finds no applicable exception with respect to the lower courts’ finding that the subject property
was Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal property. Records before the Court show that the parties did
not dispute the conjugal nature of the property. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora’s consent. We do not find Melecio’s
argument meritorious. Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the
subject property, is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held
in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-
owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in
a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Furthermore, Melecio's belief that Anastacio could not
have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to
invalidate the spouses Molina's registered title over the subject property.

Quiao v. Quiao, G. R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012

Facts:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody
of their three minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or
after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before
the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the
net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case.

2. Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the
conjugal partnership.

Ruling:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already
the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by
the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested
rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets
between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

 
Yao v. Perello, o G. R. No. 153828, October 24, 2003
Facts:
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the property was
scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition alleging that the
subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The
trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
intervention on the ground that the same was filed late.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said
provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On
the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to
intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefore. As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case petitioner filed his motion
way beyond the period set forth in the rules.

Ocampo v. Ocampo, G. R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015

Facts
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
(Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psycholog
ical incapacity. The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the
marriage. On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition
of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual
issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their
conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their
respective stand. On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the
properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains
by reason of bad faith andpsychological perversity.

Ruling:
No.The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code
provides In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and main
tenance of the family and of the household. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union
is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term
“capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of
either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held
that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
 
We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties
during the subsistence of their marriage. The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not
sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All
properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties
are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted
by the mere fact that the certificate f title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of
one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia
tore but this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of
the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the
appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

Barrido v. Nonato, G. R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

Facts:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a
house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no
more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for
partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold
to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the
complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that Article 129 of the Family Code has no
application in the present case.

Ruling:
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

Diño v. Diño, G. R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011

Facts:
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation
to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent
and hurt him. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of
the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of
the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel
V. Alcantara. On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents
disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial
court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically in capacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

 Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The petition has merit. Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1)
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon  City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

Maxey v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only married in a
“military fashion.” However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in dispute were
acquired in 1911 and 1912.In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second
wife Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the properties to private respondents spouses
Macayra. Julia is of the belief that said properties were exclusive to Melbourne.Petitioners are
children of Melbourne and Regina. They seek the annulment of the above sale and recovery of
possession. They allege that such properties were conjugal properties of their parents marriage as
they were bought with their joint effort and capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners, while
the CA found otherwise.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Melbourne and Regina were married in 1903 in military fashion Act No. 3613
recognizing military marriages was only enacted in1929. The military wedding did not make a
valid marriage. 

2. Whether or not the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne.

Ruling:
The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the Civil Code because it could not be applied
retroactively in prejudice of vested rights. But even if Art. 144 did apply, the CA is of the view
that the property could not have been acquired by the spouses’ joint efforts because this pertains
to monetary contributions and Regina was a mere housewife.SC rules otherwise. It applies Art.
144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired because there exists
a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in question. The disputed
properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the estate of his late wife Regina when
they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be unjust to require a woman who is a wife in
all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her home
and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in
business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she made
no monetary contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include
not only the earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual
goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources,
freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.
But given that the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julia’s sale over
Melbourne’s share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to
private respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half
of the properties.

Cariño v. Cariño, G. R. No. 132529, February 2, 2002, 351 SCRA 127

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in
their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. He passed away on November 23
1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao
collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000. Yee filed an instant case for
collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits."
Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She
however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

Ruling:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships. Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer
as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties
acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same.  By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs.  And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them. As regards to the first marriage, the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license.
Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto.
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the
benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the
disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
succession. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before
he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity
is necessary.

Valdes v. RTC and Valdes, G. R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.  Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
“unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing desire to stay with their father. 

Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.  Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.  A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. 

Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

Facts:
Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that
her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to
go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to
her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her
children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under
the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order
for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final
and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of
the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under
Art 41 of the Family Code were duly established.

Held:
Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law,
sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided
in an expedition’s manner without regards technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

Gonzales v. Gonzales, G. R. No. 159521, December 16, 2005

Facts:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children
were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties, and
Erlinda managed their pizza business. In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of
their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties.   She
managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. Mario denied she was the
one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
"existing during their marriage." In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its
judgment and ordered the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal
properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

Ruling:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later
affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article
147 of the Family Code. These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property
relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.   These are: (1) when
a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a
void marriage.   Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. Article 147
creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been
acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares.   It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.   

Mercado-Fehr v, Fehr, G. R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003

Facts:
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived
with him. During the time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium
on installment. They got married in 1985. In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between
Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal properties. The properties were divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and
1/3 for the children. The custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse.
Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it
was declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of
the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded
Elna of the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna
filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit. 

Issue:
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

Ruling:
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of Elna and Bruno and
the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the
Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 147 applies
in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All these
elements are present in the case at bar.  The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the
settlement of the common properties of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to
voidable marriages and to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code. 

Salas, Jr. v. Eden Villena Aguil, G. R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
Facts:           
On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave
birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On October 7, 2003, Aguila
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties
whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of
their conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion
stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by
proper instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue: 
Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila,
thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

Ruling: 
Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of
their marriage. The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property
acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s
joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus, the Discovered Properties should
be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

Diaz-Salgado v. Salgado, G. R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016

Facts:
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along
with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8chanrobleslaw

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s
(TCT/s):ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),
2. TCT No. 60069/T-301 (now TCT No. 11106-R),
3. TCT No. 5109/T-26 (now TCT No. 11107),
4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),
5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and
6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the
above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and
consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died on September 21,
2002, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina
de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs
over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the
Answer of her husband, Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage
contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-
law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition
Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned
to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were
under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage
license based on the Marriage Contract 61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its
absence.

Ruling:
The entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract me prima facie proof that at the time
of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that
their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying
a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties
are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the
subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records.
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time
of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a
valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household.

Cariño v. Cariño, G. R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127

Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee
Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago
passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,
000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage
does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable
to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been
sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well
for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Tumlos v. Fernandez, G. R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000

Facts:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the Tumlos. Said spouses alleged that
they are the absolute owners of an apartment building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment of
any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay P1, 600/mo while the other defendants
promised to pay P1, 000/mo for the rental, which was not fulfilled by the Tumlos. When the
Fernandez demanded the payment from the Tumlos of P84, 000 from Toto and Gina Tumlos as
unpaid rentals for 7 years and P143, 600.00 from Guillerma as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but
said demand were unheeded. Then they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to vacate the property
in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30, 000 in attorney's
fees. Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-
vendee of the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a Contract
to Sell. MTC promulgated its decision in January 1997. Upon appeal to the RTC Guillerma et al
alleged that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they bought
the property as their love nest; that they lived together in the property with their two children and
that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. RTC affirmed with the judgment of the MTC.
CA reversed the RTC Decision.

Issue:
Whether or not that petitioner is the co-owner of the apartment.

Ruling:
No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were the co-owners of the disputed property.
Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must be presented to be deemed as co-owner of
the property acquired during the cohabitation. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any
evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the apartment building. She
merely anchors her claim of co-ownership on her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. No other
evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. Her
claim of having administered the property during their cohabitation is unsubstantiated, for there
is nothing in the Article 148 of the FC provides that the administration of the property amounts
to the contribution in its acquisition.

Francisco v. Master Iron Works, G. R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005

Facts:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January
1983.  The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation.  Josefina
acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo.  An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he
declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own
savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property.  When Josefina mortgaged
the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.  In 1990, Eduardo
who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the
same.  The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against
Eduardo.  The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on
execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due
under the decision of the trial court.  Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land
in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

Issue: 
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal
funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner.  The Deed of
Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage.  Their case fall under Article
148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can
be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.  Petitioner likewise failed that she
had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied.  In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired
during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise. The petition was denied for
lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

Joaquino V. Reyes, G. R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004

Facts:
Lourdes Reyes was the widow of Rodolfo Reyes, having been married in 1947 in Manila.
Rodolfo, however, in the course of their marriage, had illicit relations with one Milagros
Joaquino, to whom he allegedly "put into custody" some of the couple's conjugal properties. Said
properties specifically include his earnings and retirement benefits from working as the Vice
President and Comptroller of Warne r Barns and two cars; and that the amount herein stated was
used to pay off the loan and monthly mortgage of a house in Paranaque, registered under
Joaquino's name. Lourdes then prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that Milagros
surrenders the possession thereof, and that damages be awarded. Milagros, on the other hand,
contends that she purchased the mentioned properties in her exclusive capacity, that she had no
knowledge of the Rodolfo's first marriage, that she had was never a beneficiary of the latter's
earnings, and that her living together with Rodolfo for nineteen (19) years, along with the fact
that she had children with him, be considered by the court in rendering judgment.

Lourdes, however, died and was later represented by her children with Rodolfo. Subsequently,
the trial court granted Lourdes' complaint. Upon appeal to the CA, however, Milagros reiterated
her stand and questioned the findings of the trial court. But to no avail, the CA likewise held that
the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes, because the funds
used to pay the house off was sourced from Rodolfo's earnings as part of the conjugal
partnership.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the properties in question were conjugal

2. Whether or not the petitioner's common-law relationship with Rodolfo validates her claim of
ownership
Ruling:
Yes. The property regime applicable is the CPG, having been the default property regime during
the time of Lourdes' marriage. Such properties include the following, as enumerated by Article
153:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either
of them;

(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. Subject properties fall squarely
within the said categories.

Article 160 then prescribes that all properties of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal and
covered by the CPG unless rebutted and proven otherwise. Joaquin o, having failed to prove that
she was financially capable and that she purchase d said properties in her exclusive capacity,
could not make a valid claim of ownership.
As to Joaquino's claim of having the benefit of co-ownership conferred by the common-law
relationship under Article 144 of the Civil Code (in connection with Article 148 of the Family
Code), the Court reiterated that the said provision is inapplicable to common-law relations
amounting to adultery or concubinage. Jurisprudence holds that for Article 144 to apply, the
couple must not have any legal impediment to contract a marriage. And since Rodolfo and
Joaquino were incapacitated to marry due to Rodolfo's marriage with Lourdes, she cannot validly
invoke the right conferred. Thus, only the property acquired by them-through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry-shall be owned by them in common and in
proportion to their respective contribution.
Milagros likewise failed to prove that she was indeed financially capable of pur chasing the
house and lot, that she actually contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time
after 1961 when the property was purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she
borrowed money from her siblings and h ad earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed
to have no probative value as they were not cross-examined by the respondents. The petition is
therefore denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed.

Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003

Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she
met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end
up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

Issue:
Whether there are actual contributions from the parties

Ruling:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is
required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property. In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she
specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

Juaniza v. Jose, G. R. No. L-50127-28, March 30, 1979

Facts:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident
of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7
deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers.  That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but
had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. 
Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the
deceased, Victor Juaniza.  A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be
reconsidered.

Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.
Ruling:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to
marry.  Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The
common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused
by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death
of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers.

Adriano v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000

Facts:
On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio
and Vicenta and their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses separated in 1972.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties,
and assigning, among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second
marriages as devisees and legatees therein. Among the properties bequeathed in the will were a
45,000 square meter lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and equipment situated
thereon located in Candelaria, Quezon and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT")
No. T-56553 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon, which was disposed of in the following
manner: (1) to private respondents, Lucio's children by his first wife, 10,000 square meters of the
disputed property, including the warehouse, rice mill, and equipment situated thereon; (2) to
Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his second marriage, the remaining 35,000 square
meters; and (3) to private respondents, the residential house also within the same property.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted
in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981
before the RTC of Lucena City. The probate case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4442. After
due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC allowed the probate of the will
and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-executrix Celestina Adriano in an
Order dated August 22, 1983. On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said Order to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will. Vicenta died on
July 2, 1985.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the
RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 88-115. In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage
of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband
and wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and
administration in Spec. Proc. No. 4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in
Lucio's will are undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and
Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective
insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or properties of Vicenta.
It is also not disputed that the contested properties in Civil Case No. 88-115 and Spec. Proc. No.
4442 were also the subject of a complaint filed sometime in 1980 by Vicenta against Lucio,
docketed with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Lucena City, Branch II as Civil Case
No. 7534, wherein Vicenta sought the provisional partition or separation of the properties
pendente lite. The case was dismissed on January 28, 1991 without prejudice, for lack of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not it was erroneous of the respondent court not to have upheld the co-ownership of
Vicenta to 1/2 of said property, and to have declared the entire property as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of Lucio and Gliceria.

Ruling:
Petitioners' insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed between Lucio and Vicenta
during their period of cohabitation before their marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis
considering that Lucio's marriage with Gliceria was then subsisting. The co-ownership in Article
144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that
the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such
property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. Thus, we ruled in Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar that the
prima facie presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal cannot prevail
over a court's specific finding reached in adversarial proceedings to the contrary.
As found by both the trial court and respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to
overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also
presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased
by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his first marriage. This factual finding, which is
clearly borne out by the evidence on record, is binding and conclusive upon us and will not be
disturbed.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity would
dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case
have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the
property in question.
We cannot agree with petitioners bare and expedient assertion that, because the title to the
property was registered in the name of both Lucio and Vicenta, she should thereby be deemed
owner to half of it. A certificate of title under the Torrens system is aimed to protect dominion,
and should certainly not be turned into an instrument for deprivation of ownership. Because a
just and complete resolution of this case could only be arrived at by determining the real
ownership of the contested property, evidence apart from or contrary to the certificate of title
bears considerable importance. This assumes peculiar force in the instant situation where the
heirs of a lawful pre-existing marriage stand to be deprived. Thus, in Belcodero vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during
the subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the
name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have been created
by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property which lawfully pertains to the
conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage.
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
In Vicentas case, it is clear that her designation as a co-owner of the property in TCT No. T-
56553 is a mistake which needs to be rectified by the application of the foregoing provisions of
article 1456 and the ruling in Belcodero. The principle that a trustee who takes a Torrens title in
his or her name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration, is a well-known
exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.

Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan, G. R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as “single” and “has never married
before.” Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to
the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the
wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become
depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his
wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her
previous husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession
and discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous
Ruling:
YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: ( 1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,
1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time
with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner;
(3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondent's marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the
second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. G. R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Facts:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. married Azucena Alegre in September 1979. While Alegre was out of
the country, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father, naturally,
was against this arrangement. In March 1982, to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to
sign a purported marriage contract.
The relationship between Sally and Benjamin eventually deteriorated. Sally filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin. Benjamin, in his defense, filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to
Sally as non-existent. As evidence, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to
Benjamin.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

Ruling:
No, because the elements of bigamy are: The offender has been legally married, no marriage
took place in this case. The marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. He
contracts a second or subsequent marriage. The second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The fourth element is not present. It can be said that the marriage
was made in jest, also the marriage license presented as evidence by Sally was inauthentic, in
fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged marriage.

Ventura, Jr. v. Abuda, G. R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013

Facts:
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married
to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin.
Esteban on the other hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the
death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline. Sometime in 1968,
Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was purchased
by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had
small business establishments located in Delpan St. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban
was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline. Esteban passed
away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother
discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming
that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. .
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim
any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents. RTC ruled in
favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal properties of
Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

Ruling:
No. CA decision sustained. Civil Law, in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the
subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply. This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which
the CA applied in the assailed decision: Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. Applying the
foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1)
these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence
that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry. Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the
parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title
to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres." The title
itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro
Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas
property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title. Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the
Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the
acquisition of the Delpan property. Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who
does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.