Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitatino

Jimenez v. Canizares
G.R. No. L-12790
August 31, 1960
Facts:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court
of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition
of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to
exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married.
Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the
lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon
the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or
aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the
wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,
because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may
do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.
 Legal Separation Grounds
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
G.R. No. 153206
October 23, 2006
Facts:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when
Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code. Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William
subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang
her head against the concrete wall. And been violent towards their three children. He
would scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel
wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her
and asked her to leave the house which she did. Lucita’s statements about William’s
abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom
Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her
injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
Ruling:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take
control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s
repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established.
He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her family at
the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and
children the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given
great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano
gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are
not tainted with bias. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct; such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said provision.
 Legal Separation Grounds
Gaudionco v. Penaranda
GR No. 72984
November 27, 1987
Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita
also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed
an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved
and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite,
in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus; all
proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the
conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil
action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil
and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof
including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children,
support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal
separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary. Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a
remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion
of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered
as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
 Legal Separation Grounds
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R No.82606
December 18, 1992
Facts:
Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The
latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to
an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of
conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial
court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of
action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the
Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to
visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even
returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
Issue:
Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separation of conjugal property.
Ruling:
For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo
did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima.
Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Wherefore, the petition was
granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of
the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be
implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the
persons.
 Condonation/Pardon
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 96602
November 19, 1991
Facts:
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby
(wife) and Arroyo (petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner
and the wife, based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex
with petitioner Arroyo. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife
later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been
extended by her husband. The husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal
of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable
doubts on his credibility.
Ruling:
Petitioner Neri also contends that Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the
compromise agreement operate as a pardon meriting a new trial. The Court notes that
the cases of People v. Camara (supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(supra) were the very same cases which petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602
which the Court has already held to be inapplicable in the present case. The rule on
pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: ART. 344. ...
— The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. While there is a conceptual difference
between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous
act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, 21 nevertheless, for either consent or
pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint.
22 In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November
1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after
the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated and
signed after issuance of our Resolution in G.R. No. 96602 on 24 April 1991.
 Condonation/Pardon
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033
December28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila
Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the
marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went
back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters
who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-
law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with
her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college. He admitted that
his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these
communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy
Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department. In August 1952,
Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the
defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff
where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept
together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information
he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as
a ground for dismissal of the action.
Ruling:
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree
with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband despite his belief that his
wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code. The only general rule in American
jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the
offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption
may be rebutted by evidence.
 Condonation/Pardon
People v. Zapata
G.R No. L-3047
May 16, 1951
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata,
his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated
sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the
filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his co-defendant to be a married
woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was
sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same
court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for
adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17
September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735).
On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of
the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second
complaint. From the other sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has
appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal to quash the second complaint for adultery be
granted.
Ruling:
The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted
would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married
woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should
pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour
from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted
because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
 Condonation/Pardon
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for
one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out
with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly,
plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the plaintiff constitute condonation.
Ruling:
The Court do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take
her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her
adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having
sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.
Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
 Forms
Matubis v. Praxedes
G.R No. L-11766
October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga,
Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the
couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status
remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered
into an agreement : (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal
husband and wife, (b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us
can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising
from our separation, (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my
husband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for
anything from my wife and (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from
the time we verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made
our verbal separation into writing. In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with
one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child
who was recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and
Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as
such in the community.
Issue:
Whether or not there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.
Ruling:
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of
paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only
implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or
consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs.
Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint
should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not
be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and
defendant have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital
bond having been affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code" (appellants
brief, pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to counsel's contention, because it is
contrary to the evidence.
 Forms
People v. Schneckenburger
G.R. No. 48183
November 10, 1941
Facts:
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the
Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District,
State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his
co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since
then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity
of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two actions
against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other
concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the
conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one
day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the
plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal,
this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former
procedure and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to
the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through
reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not there is consent on the part of both parties to commit an illicit
acts.
Ruling:
As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission,
"consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the
offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between
prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to
compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his
wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring
knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore,
hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended
party from prosecuting the offense.
 Forms
People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720
March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had
one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the
Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or
sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. On the return of the
husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery
and both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. After
completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to
this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she
might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she
begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife it he would take care her back. He
refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished,
abandoned her for the second time. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with
her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his
rights as husband.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano impliedly gave consent Ursula to commit adultery.
Ruling:
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the
conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he
consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is
not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
 Rationale
Agueda Benedicto De La Rama v. Esteban De La Rama
G.R. No.1056
December 8, 1903
FACTS:
On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a
final judgment in this case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the
husband's adultery, as well as the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid
share of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200
pesos as an allowance for their support since the date on which the action was
instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of First Instance
in its entirely.
RULING:
The action of this court upon those four assignment of error relating to adultery
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the decision of that
court there were definitely disposed of. The other assignment of error relate to that part
of the decision of the Court of First Instance with treats of the division of the conjugal
property, the allowance of alimony, and the order of the court below that the case be
referred to the fiscal for criminal proceedings against the defendant. As has been said,
these assignments of error were not considered by this court in view of the result which
it reached upon the other assignments. Nor were they discussed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
 How commited
Jose De Ocampo v. Serafina Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for
one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out
with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly,
plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a collusion in the case at bar.
RULING:
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it
appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the
parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds
therefor. The offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her
story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute.
She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it
has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party
confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs.
Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).
 Prescription
William Brown v. Juanita Yambao
G.R.No. L-10699
October 18, 1957
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under
oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University
of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one
Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived
separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the
marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for
their remedy as might be just and equitable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
RULING:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was
already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten
years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from
internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation
can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant
of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal
separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our
law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.
 Prescription
Jose De Ocampo v. Serafina Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553
February 23, 1960
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for
one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out
with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly,
plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confession of judgment merely prohibits a decree of
separation.
RULING:
Even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of
such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on
her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats
the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately
confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. The mere circumstance that defendants told
the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to
the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint,
she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal.
Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which
implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
 Prescription
Elena Contreras v. Cesar Macaraig
G.R. No. L-29138
May 29, 1970
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of
Quiapo. In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that
defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following
October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report
from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in
April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on
the family way on Dasmariñas St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the
family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with
him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while,
defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or
three days but would be gone for a period of about a month. On December 14, 1963,
plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant did not
interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code.
After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Peñaranda that he believed
that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence.
Defendant has never appeared in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
should be counted.
RULING:
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the
law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her
husband was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed
decision, the following happened — In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff,
accompanied by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio
went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon
Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded
with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring
him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family. The Court conclude
that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her
husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to
return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the
legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
 Procedure
Banez v. Banez
G.R. No. 132592
January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided
Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between
petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net
conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets
in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of
P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets; and the
surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the
smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner
and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision. The petitioner filed
an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify
the decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated
December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of
the total value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as
advance attorneys fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%. In another motion to
modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well
as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two
motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. On
November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for moral and exemplary
damages and litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
Ruling:
 There is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which
respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. Petitioner did not refute
respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two
(2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had
none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for
execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
than the exception. Similarly, The Court was not persuaded that the P100,000 advance
payment to petitioners counsel was properly granted. The Court sees no justification to
pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at
the time that the trial courts judgment was already on appeal.
 Procedure
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. L-30977
January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until
1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss
the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was
filed beyond the one year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of
Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
 Rationale
Araneta v. Concepion
G.R. No. L-9667
July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of the
Respondent herein, for legal separation on the ground of adultery. After the issues were
joined Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor
children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her
passport, to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her,
and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The petition is
supported by her affidavit. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct
imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had abandoned the children; alleging that
conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by
Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting
her right to attorney’s fees. Plaintiff prayed that as the petition for custody and support
cannot be determined without evidence, the parties be required to submit their
respective evidence. He also contended that Defendant is not entitled to the custody of
the children as she had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her
conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions
and unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true mother and without
means to educate them. As to the claim for support, Plaintiff claims that there are no
conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support because of her infidelity and that she
was able to support herself. Affidavits and documents were submitted both in support
and against the omnibus petition. The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition,
granting the custody of the children to Defendant and a monthly allowance of P2,300 for
support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Upon
refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to
require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.
Issue:
 Is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code mandatory for the
refusal of the Plaintiff`s evidence?
Ruling:
This provision of the code is mandatory. This case cannot be tried within the
period of six months from the filing of the complaint. The court understands that the
introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident, is
prohibited. The law, up to the last minute, exerts efforts at preserving the family and the
home from utter ruin. Interpreting the intent of said article, the court understands that
every step it should take within the period of six months above stated should be taken
toward reconciling the parties. Admitting evidence now will make reconciliation difficult if
not impossible. In this case the court should act as if nothing yet had happened. The
children must be given for custody to him or her who by family custom and tradition is
the custodian of the children. The court should ignore that Defendant had committed
any act of adultery or the Plaintiff, any act of cruelty to his wife. The status quo of the
family must be restored as much as possible. In this country, unlike perhaps in any
other country of the globe, a family or a home is a petite corporation. The father is the
administrator who earns the family funds, dictates rules in the home for all to follow, and
protects all members of his family. The mother keeps home, keeps children in her
company and custody, and keeps the treasure of that family. In a typical Filipino family,
the wife prepares home budget and makes little investment without the knowledge of
her husband. A husband who holds the purse is un-Filipino. He is shunned in Filipino
community. The court therefore, in taking action on petition No. 1 should be guided by
the above considerations.
 Rationale
Samosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-34132
July 29, 1972
Facts:
Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the
ground of concubinage on the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of her
paraphernal and exclusive property. The hearing on the motion was opposed by
respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for preliminary injunction were heard, the
prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent
judge Vamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the
hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action
for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would
likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit.
Ruling:
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain
passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the
suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary
motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were
otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such coda
provision. . That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for
judicial power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article.
It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be
entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the
administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be
allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders
of the court." There would appear to be then recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such
six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the
property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers
under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be
heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all
the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband
whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
 Rationale
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53388
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on
April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted
a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage
only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March
17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete
and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of
the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article
103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.
Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
 Necessity of Trial and Intervention of State
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53388
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on
April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted
a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage
only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March
17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete
and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of
the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article
103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.
Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
 Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Sabalones v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106169
February 14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his
successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein
respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal,
properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to
the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action
for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed
that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that
his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization
and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization
and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills
was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for their
support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park
which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her
husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with
Thelma Cumareng and their three children. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant
the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it
enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park
property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.\ After trial,
Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon
his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal
separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent
wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint administration of the conjugal properties by the husband
and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will
be violated.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified
in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into
account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering
with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal. The law does indeed
grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided
in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court
shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of
the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
 Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115640
March 15, 1995
Facts:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent
by his employer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They
begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines
for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child
named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second
chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with
his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of
the children.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
Ruling:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare
shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be
ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that
the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7
years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered.
It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt.
She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact
he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their
mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for
the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
 Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. L-30977
January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until
1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss
the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was
filed beyond the one year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of
Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
 Decree of Legal Separation
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L 18008
October 30, 1962
Facts:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique
R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on
issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their
marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted
to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was
claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.
Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her
husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It
must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958,
necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to
provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
 Decree of Legal Separation
Siochi v. Gozon
G.R. 169900
March 18, 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land. The property is situated in
Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of “Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo),
married to Elvira Gozon(Elvira).”On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of
Cavite City a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992,
Elvira filed a notice of lispendens, which was then annotated on TCT no. 5357.While the
legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
agreement to buy and sell (agreement) involving the property for the price of P18
million. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with
the stipulations provided in the agreement. After paying the P5 million earnest money as
partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property. On
September 6, 1993, the agreement was annotated on TCT no. 5357.Meanwhile, on 29
June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision in the legal separation case, which
granted the same. The RTC ordered among others that, the conjugal partnership of
gains of the spouses is hereby declared dissolved and liquidated. As regards the
property, it held that it is deemed conjugal property. Alfredo executed a deed of
donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. Later on, Alfredo
through an SPA executed by his daughter Winifred, sold the property to IDRI and the
latter paid the purchase price in full. A new TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in
favor of IDRI. Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for specific
performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.RTC: Malabon RTC upheld
original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void he sale
by Alfredo and Winifred to InterDimensional.CA: Court of Appeals said agreement
between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the consent
of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in
favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property, being the sole
administrator of the same without obtaining the consent of Elvira?
Ruling:
Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the consent of
Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elvira’s
conduct showed her acquiescence to the sale. SC says the CA was right in declaring
the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of
the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which
require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void
in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that
the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of
Winifred. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly
indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. The Court said the CA erred in saying
that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal
separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2)
(Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal
separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, “Clearly,
what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as
regards this point, the CA erred.
 Rights and Obligations of Spouses
Pelayo v. Lauron
G.R. No. L-4089
January 12, 1909
Facts:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child
delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of
services rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without
alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in
his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs. The defendants
denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law had died
in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her
husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she
was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical
assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.
Ruling:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are
created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not
presumed. Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only
demandable ones. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised
among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support
as provided by the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for
the medical assistance rendered to the defendant’s daughter-in-law must be couched
on the husband. In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in
the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is especially
established by the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.
 Rights and Obligations of Spouses
Go v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114791
May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter
to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding
video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding
video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go
can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has been erased. The
Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded.
The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among
others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they
erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are
supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the
spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after
two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their
claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses
advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for
two months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim
the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy
Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact
that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant
milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was
lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in
compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation
that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as
allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy
Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73
of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only
Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is
liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
 Rights and Obligations of Spouses
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo
G.R. No. 17014
August 11, 1921
Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo
City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately
from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel
treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a
liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution
of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or
absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction.
Ruling:
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at
best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other
countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is
entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient
cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.