1

G.R NO. 198908

Virginia Ocampo vs Deogracio Ocampo
Facts:
Virginia and deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16 1978. On September 10, 1990,
petitioner Virginia Ocampo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
on the ground of psychological incapacity on January 22, 1993. The trial court rendered a decision that
the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio is null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as for the properties their conjugal partnership gain shall necessarily be dissolved and
liquidated but the petitioner did not yet listed such property, therefore the court cannot act upon on the
liquidation aspect. The parties were given 30 days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for
the purpose of the liquidation. On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed order sating that
the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on 50-50 sharing. Virginia filed a notice
to appeal before the trial court on February 2, 2004. On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a motion to
dismiss the notice of appeal and for the immediate execution pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 2-1-10,
the trial court denied the aforesaid motion. Deogracio filed a motion for reconsideration but was also
denied by the trial court. In the disputed decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of appeals denied
Virginia’s appeal. Virginia filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnerhip of gains of bad faith
and psychological perversity

Held:
No, respondent is deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership. The Court held that in a void
marriage, as in those declared void under the Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 provides “when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shared and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership”. Article 147 applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses properties on the
basis of co-ownership under Article 147 the (1) must be capacitated to marry (2) live exclusively with
each other and (3) their union is without a benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. However the
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and the appellate court who correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on
her own effort.

2
Barrido vs. Nonato
Facts:
In the course of their marriage, respondent Leonardo Nonato and petitioner Marietta Barrido
acquired a property situated in Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot. On March 15,1996 ,
their married was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no
reason to maintain co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition but
Barrido refused. Thus Nonato filed a complaint of partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
cities (MTCC). Barrido claimed that she had already sold the property to their children namely
Raymund and Leo. The MTCC rendered a decision in favour of Barrido. Nonato appealed the
decision of the MTCC before the Regional trial court (RTC). The Regional trial court reversed
the decision of the MTCC ruling and ordered that partition of the property, hence Marrietta
appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The appellate
court denied the appeal of Marietta , ruling that since the assessed value of the property is inly
P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCc jurisdiction. Though the RTC applied Article 129
instead of Article 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 129 is applicable?
HELD:
No. The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During the marriage, however, the
conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations . Although Article 129 provides
for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147
provides When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other , live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage ,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership. In
absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry , shall be owned by them in equals
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and the household.

3
G.R. NO. 178044
Dino v. Dino
 FACTS
Alan Dino ( petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dino (respondent) were
childhood and sweetheart lovers. They started to live together in 1984 and separated in 1994. In
1996 they started to live together again. On January 14, 1998 they got married. On May 30,
2001, Alan (petitioner) filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent
on the ground that she failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to petitioner and
abandoned her responsibility in the family, instead she would go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends. Petitioner also alleged that she was not faithful and sometimes she
becomes violent towards him. Ma. Caridad L. Dino (respondent) who was at that time living in
the United States, did not file an answer to the petition in the reglementary period. Petitioner then
learned that respondent file a petition for divorce with petitioner thus was granted by the
Superior Court of California, and that respondent then married Manuel Alcantara. On October 18
, 2006 the decision of the trial court granted the petition of on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, thus a Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage shall be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community property and the ruling
that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued after the liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?

Held:
The Supreme Court agrees to petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Artilce 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no
basis because Section 19(1) of the Rules does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) states “If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule of Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of properties. Article 50
“The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall
also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45. It is clear from Articles 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code which
should be declaird void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Wherefore the Supreme Court affirm the decision of the trial court with modification that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon the finality of the trial court’s
decision without waiting for the partition and distribution of the parties properties under the
Article 147 of the Family Code.

4
G.R NO. L- 45870
MARGARET MAXEY v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
Melbourne Maxey who was a member of the American occupation forces
in 1899 married Regina Morales in 1903 in a “military fashion” and had six children and are all
herein in plaintiffs, namely John, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George. During their
cohabitation in 1911 and 1912, Melbourne acquired parcels of land. On 1919 Melbourne and
Regina Morales got married in a Church Marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. In 1953 Melbourne remarried his second wife Julia
Pamatlaun Maxey, Melbourne through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold the
properties defendant-spouses Mr and Mrs Beato C. Macayra, since then the defendants-spouses
have taken immediate possession of the properties up to the present. On January 26, 1962
plaintiffs instituted the present case before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the
annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover
possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging that the realties
were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through
joint effort and capital ; and that the sales of the said property in favour of the defendants-
spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales was executed by their father
without their knowledge and consent. The defendants-spouses said that they are true and lawful
owners and possessors of the properties, having purchased the land with good faith.

ISSUE:
Should Article 144 of the civil code applied in the case?
HELD:
Yes. Article 144 of the New Civil Code that the property governed by the rules of
co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if
it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship
belongs to a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them. The “real contribution” to the acquisition of
property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. Torresmust does not only include the earnings of a woman
from a profession, occupation or business but also her contribution in the family’s material and
spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household tasks and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Melbourne cannot be said to be the exclusive
right over the properties in question when the present Civil Code became effective for standing
against it was the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a share of the properties.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales
Maxey when they were sold. Wherefore the private respondents are ordered to return one-half of
said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales.
 5
GR. NO. 132529
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO VS SUSAN YEE CARINO

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. On June 20, 1969 he
first marriage petitioner Susan Nicdao with whom they had two offsprings namely Sahlee and
Sandee. While the second marriage was on November 10, 1992 with respondent Susan Yee with
whom he had no children for almost 10 years of cohabitation. In 1988 SPO4 became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. On November 23,1992 SPO4
passed away under the case of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from
various government agencies. Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI,PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pagibig, while respondent Susan Yee received
a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial ( GSIS), Burial (SSS). On December 14, 1993,
respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one half of the
P146,000.00 collectively denominated as “death benefits” which Susan Nicdao received from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pagibig.

ISSUE:
Who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased?
HELD:
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. Considering
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage Article 148 would be applied. The
disputed P146,000.00 from Benefit Associations are renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased, unless if Susan Yee present a proof that she
contributed money, property or industry in acquisition of these monetarily benefits. Hence they
are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
the respondent has no right to claim the P146,000.00. As to the petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriages
are nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of marriage license. Even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
create a co-ownership entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. Thus, one-half of the
“death benefits” under the scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass the intestate succession to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
6
GR. NO 122749
ANTONIO VALDES V RTC AND VALDES

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. On June 1992,
petitioner Valdes sought the declaration of of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. The court hereby declared the marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes null and void under the Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations and the petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code , and to comply with
the provisions of Article 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. Consuelo Gomez sought a
clarification of that part of the decision directing compliance with Article 50, 51, and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions for the liquidation of
common property in “unions without marriage”. The trial court clarified that Article 147of
Family code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their
“family home” and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-
ownership found in the civil code shall apply.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the “family home” and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them?
HELD:
The court did not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the “family home” and all their common property in equal shares, including the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them. The provision that is be
applied on co-ownership are Articles 147 or 148. The petitioner argues that Articles 50, 51 and
52 in relationto Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses but Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to
Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code will not apply to the liquidation and partition because
the rule set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
Wherefore the questioned orders of the trial courts are affirmed.
7
GR. NO. 127358
BUENAVENTURA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner , Noel Buenaventura file a petition for the Declaration of nullity of
maariage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Sighn
Buenaventura herein respondent. Thus the Regional trial court rendered a decision on July
31, 1995 declaring the marriage of Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Sighn
Buenaventura is null and void on the gorund that both of them are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and ordering the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property, particulary the plaintiffs
separation/ retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust company by
ceding, giving and paying to her 50%of the net amount of p3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with the 12%interest per annum from the date of this decision and ½ of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and provident Group of
Companies. Petitioner appealed the aboive decision, while the case was pending respondent
Isabel filed a motion to increase the P15,000.00 mothly support of their son, Javy .
Petitioner filed an opposition, praying to denied. On September 2 , 1996 the Court of
appeals issued a resolution increasing the support pendent lite of P20,000.00.
 ISSUE:
Is the trial correct in giving respondent one-half of petitioners shares of stock
In Manila Memorial Park and in the provident Group of Companies ?

HELD:
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
maariage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family
Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership
gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather as a general rule applies, which is that in
case a marriages is declared null and void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to
be liquidated, partition and distributed is that of co-equal ownership.In Valdes v. RTC the
trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage regardless of the cause thereof the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 and 148. Article 147 provides that “when a man and a woman
who are capaciatated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of a marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules of co ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both
by the trial court and court of appeals , to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein is ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not the regime of property.
8 GR.NO 127358
GONZALES VS GONZALES

FACTS:
In March 1977 , Francisco Gonzales petitioner and Erminda Gonzales respondent started
living as husband and wife . After two years on February 4, 1979, they got married. On October
29, 1992. Erminda respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for the annulment of marriage
with prayer for support pendent lite. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no reason justiciable
reason, humiliates and embarrass her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During
the time of they lived together, they acquired properties, she managed their pizza business. He
adenied that she was the one who managed the pizza business. The trial court found that the
evidence by plaintiff overwhelming to prove that the defendant by his infliction of injuries on the
injuries on the plaintiff, his wife and excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, a personality
disorder called satyriasis, was at the time of the celebration of marriage, psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage although such incapacity
became manifest only after its solemnization. The defendants evidence, on the other hand on the
psychological incapacity of plaintiff did not have any evidentiary weight, the same being
doubtful, unreliable, unclear and unconvincing. Wherefore the trial court rendered its decision
on February 12, 1997 (a.) Declaring the marriage contracted by between Francisco Gonzalez and
Erminda Florention Null and Voidab intio with all legal effects as provided for under applicable
laws and (b.) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing the
conjugal properties between share of real and personal properties. Petitioner was not satisfied in
the manner the court divided the properties, petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court of
appeals. The petition was denied. Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be
divided equally between the parties?

HELD:
Their property relation shall be governed by the provisons of Article 147 of
the Family Code. Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired through their
joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. It is true
that all properties were brought from the proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself
testified that respondent was not plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the
business. In petitions for review on certiorari under the Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
general rules is that only questions of law may be raised by the parites. The instant petition
is denied , factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on , especially this
court, when complete in accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not
the Supreme Court’s function to analyse or weigh the evidence all over again.
9
GR NO 152716
ELNA MERCADO- FEHR vs Bruno FEHR

FACTS:
On March 1997 Elna Mercadi – Fehr filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity against respondent Bruno
Fehr. After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved in lieu
thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouse is established
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the
rights previously acquired by creditors. On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an order
resolving the various motions filed by respondent, thus the court finds (a.) Bacolod
property and (b.) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium purchased by respondent’s exclusive
funds, both excluded from the conjugal properties while the conjugal properties of both of
the parties were distributed. For Elna Mercado- Fehr (a.) LCG Condominum , Ground
floor with an area of 671.84 sq. m (b.) Tamaraw FX, while for Bruno Fehr (a.) The upper
basement of LCG Condominuim with an area of 113.54 sq.m (b.) Nissan Sentra.
Respondent Bruno Fehr declared Suite 204 , LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54
sq.m as an exclusive property , thus petitioner is directed to transfer the ownership of Suite
24 in the name of respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order
with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204 LCG Condominium, she alleged that suite 204
was purchased at the time when petitioner and respondent exclusively living with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Resolving the said
motion , the trial court held that in an order dated October 5, 2000 that since the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership
should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common
pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code . The court however , noted the partied have
already agreed in the principle to divide the properties from the sale theref proportionately
among them and their children as (a.) 1/3 for petitioner (b.) 1/3 for respondent (c.) 1/3 for
the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that suite 204 of LCG Condomininum was
acquired prior to couple’s cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent.

ISSUE:
Is the court right to order dividing the common properties of petitioner and
respondent into 3 , 1/3 to petitioner , respondent and the children, and affirming its
previous ruling that suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property of
respondent/

HELD:
The disputed property , Suite 204 of LCG Condominiumwas purchased on
instalment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together.
Hence , it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. Article
147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, this provision
creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
As regards to the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, the
Supreme Court ruled that the civil provision on co-ownership should apply. There is
nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties
have agreed to divide the properties into 3 one third share to each petitioner and the
respondent and their children. In sum, The Supreme Court is in favour of the petitioner,
that suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of the petitioner and the
respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the
law on co-ownership.
10
GR. NO. 202370
SALAS Jr. vs. Eden Villena Aguil

FACTS:
On Sepmteber 7, 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and respondent Eden
Villena Aguila were married. On June 7, 1986 , Aguila gave birth to their first baby girl named
Joan. Five months later Juan Sevilla Salas left their conjugal dwelling, since then he no longer
communicated with his wife Eden Aguila or his daughter. On October 7, 2003 , Aguila filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against his husband petitoner on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On May 7, 2007 the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila. The RTC decision
further provides for the “ dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. On September 10,
2007, Aguila filed a manifestation of motion stating that she discovered (a) two 200 square meter
parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome (b) a 108- square-meter parcel of
land located in tondo. The owner of the said parcels of land is Juan Salas, married to Rubina
Salas. During the hearing, Aguila was asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina was Salas
common-law wife. On February 8, 2008, Salas filed an opposition to the manifestation alleging
that there is no conjugal property to patitioned of, Salas also claimed that Aguilla waived her
right to discovered properties. Salas then enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favour of
Aguila (1) Parcels of land in Batangas City (2) P2000,000.00 and (3) Motor Vehicles, thus Salas
contended that the conjugal properties were deemed patitioned.

ISSUE:
 Did the court considered the discovered lands to be partitioned to the legitime of
their legitimate?
HELD:
Yes. The RTC ruled in favour of Aguila, wherefore , foregoing premises being
considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to partition between themselves
by proper instruments of conveyance (1) 2 parcels of land in the name Juan Salasmarried to
Rubina C. Salas of located in Quezon City and (2)Parcel of land registered in the name of Juan
Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas located in Tondo. The court shall confirm the partitions
agree upon by the parties with the order of the court confirming the same, and shall record it in
the Registry of Deeds of the place where the property is located.
11 GR. NO . 204494
DIAZ – SALGADO V. SALGADO

FACTS
Luis Anson , the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis. They were married in a
civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave
birth Maria Luisa , while Jo-ann was Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. During
the marital union with Severina, they acquired six real properties located in Metro Manila.
According to Luis there was no marriage settlement between them, thus the six properties
pertains to their conjugal partnership. However without Luis’s consent and knowledge, Severina
had already executed three separated Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring three properties in
favour of Jo-ann, while Maria Luisa secured herself 3 properties when Severina died on October
25, 2002. The proceeding acts divested Luis of his lawful share in the conjugal properties of his
inheritance as compulsory heir of Severina. In Jo-ann and Maria luisa answers the were unaware
of any marriage contaracted by her mother, she however knew that Severina and Luis had a
common law relationship, thus they had executed a partition agreement in November 1980 and
another in April 1981, thus Luis had aready received properties apportioned to him by the
agreement , while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired
exclusively by Severina and that the TCT’s were only under Severina’s name therein described
as single. On February 16, 2006 The trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the
sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature.

ISSUE :
Can Severina dispose the properties by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale without
the consent of Luis?
HELD:
 No, The trial court declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral
Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed of by Severina without
the consent of Luis, her husband. Wherefore the judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
Luis, annulling, Voiding, Setting aside and declaring of no force and effect of the three
Unilateral Deeds of Sale in favour of Jo-ann. On November 17, 2008 , the RTC rendered
another decision which ordered the annulment, voiding, setting aside and declaring of no
force and effect the Deed of Extra- Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina
De Asis by Maria Luisa.

12
GR. NO. 132529
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO VS SUSAN YEE CARINO

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. On June 20, 1969 he
first marriage petitioner Susan Nicdao with whom they had two offsprings namely Sahlee and
Sandee. While the second marriage was on November 10, 1992 with respondent Susan Yee with
whom he had no children for almost 10 years of cohabitation. In 1988 SPO4 became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. On November 23,1992 SPO4
passed away under the case of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from
various government agencies. Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI,PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pagibig, while respondent Susan Yee received
a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial ( GSIS), Burial (SSS). On December 14, 1993,
respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one half of the
P146,000.00 collectively denominated as “death benefits” which Susan Nicdao received from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pagibig.

ISSUE:
Does the second wife have a right to received one-half of the retirement of the
deceased?
HELD:
 In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. Considering
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage Article 148 would be applied. The trial
court ruled in favour of Susan Yee holding that defendant, Susan Nicdao ordered to pay Susan
Yee the sum of P73,000.00. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court appeals relied
on the case of Vda. De Consuegra v. Governement Service Insurance System, where the court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased on the first wife and the other half, to
the second wife holding that with respect to the right of the second wife , this court observed that
the only just and equitable solution in this case would be recognize the right of the second wife
to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. Wherefore the Supreme Court
granting the petition affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court ordering petitioner to pay
respondent , Susan Nicdao the sum P73,000.00 to petitioner Susan Yee.
13 GR. NO. 137650
Tumlos vs. Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez

FACTS:
Respondents Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez filed an action for ejectment
against petitioner Guillerma, Toto and Gina Tumlos. Spouses Fenandez alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building located at Valuenza, Metro Manila. The respondents
allowed defendants- private respondents to occupy the apartment building without the payment
of any rent. After a few months defendant will pay P1,600.OO a month while the other
defendants promised to pay P1,000.00a month but both rental was not complied with the
defendants, the spouses then demanded several times for the defendants to vacate the premises
and also demanded the payment of P4,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tulmos representing rentals
for 7 years and payment of P143,600.00 FROM Guillerma Tumilos as unpaid rentals for 7 years.
Spouses Fernandez now prays for the defendants be ordered to vacate the propertyand to pay the
stated unpaid rentals. Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos the only one who filed an answer stating that
she was a co-owner of the subject premise and that she is co-vendee of the property in question.
Upon the appeal to the RTC petitioner and two other defendants alleged in their memorandum
that respondent Mario Fernandez and petitioner Guillerma had an amorous relationship, they
acquired the property in question, the apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III. It
further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment with their two children for 10 years.
Guillerma administered to collect rentals from lessees until she discovered that respondent Mario
accused her of being unfaithful and baseless jealousy. Toto Tumlos was then accommodated to
one of the rooms, while Gina was a nanny of the children , they were only transients and not
tenants.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property?
HELD:
 The Supreme Court reject the claim of respondent claim that she was a co-owner
of the disputed property. Under Article 148 of the Family Code which provides that In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
contrary, their respective contributions to contrary, their contribtutions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credits. It is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner
because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also cleared that petitioner admitted
by petitioner that she cohabited with Mario. The relationship of petitioner and and respondent
Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Petitioner then failed to show
any vested right over the property in question. Her claim of administering the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated, it does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the
Family Code provides that administration tof property amounts to a contribution In its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. The property in
question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were
correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises.
14
GR. NO. 151967
Francisco vs Master Iron Works

FACTS:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August
31, 1984, Josefina purchased two parcels of land. The Registry of Deeds issued transfer
certificate of title in the name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo Francisco. On
January 13, 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears the Eduardo
affixed his marital conformity to the deed. On June 11, 1990 Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of
cement from Master Iron Works and Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the
same. The court issued writ of execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to
MIWCC. On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an affidavit of third party claim over the parcel of
land which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit. Before she could commence presenting her evidence against
MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Paranaque, on
the ground that when they were married , Eduardo was already married to Carmella Carpio. On
September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraneque rendered judgment declaring the marriage between
Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and
cannot be held liable for Eduardo’s personal obligations?

HELD:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot
be held to answer the liabilities of Eduardo. Even though Eduardo and Josefina marriage is
bigamous , the properties cannot be held conjugal , Josefina failed to adduce preponderance or
evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject
property hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also the court doubted when she acquired the property
at 23 years old, she had enough funds to pay for it.

15
Milagros Joaquino a.k.a Milagros Reyes vs. Lourdes Reyes

FACTS:
Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in Manila.
At the time of his death, Rodolfo was living with his common-law wife, petitioner Milagros
Joaquino. Rodolfo Reyes, was the vice- president of Warner Barnes & Co. with a salary of
P15,000.00 and upon his retirement Rodolfo received P315,011.79 as his separation and
retirement benefits. During the common law relationship of Rodolfo and petitioner,
Milagros , while living together, they bought a house and lot situated at Metro Manila. A
deed of Absolute sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favour of petitioner, Milagros
and certificate of title No. S- 90293 covering the said property. To secure the finances to
pay the said property of P140,000.00, petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in
favour of Rodolfo Reyes to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. An
application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth
Insurance Company and a real estate contract which was executed as collateral to the
mortgage loan which was payable in 10 years. Respondents pray that the property be
declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes and Rodolfo Reyes and that petitioner
be ordered to reconvey the property in respondents favour.

ISSUE:
Whether the property is conjugal ( owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive
(owned by Milagros or co-owned by Rodolfo or Milagros

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals whereby
ordering the petitioner to surrender the possession of said subject property, pursuant to the
applicable law on succession , to the respective estates of the late Rodolfo and Lourdes.
Article 148 , In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article , only the
properties acquired by both of the parties throught their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them incommon in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit . Thus a common-law couple have
legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them, through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions.
16
JACINTO SAGUID VS COURT OFAPPEALS

FACTS:
On July 1987 , Gina S. Rey , 17 yrs old who was then separated then
married to Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque. 7After a brief courtship, they decided to
cohabit as husband and wife in a house built in on a lot of the father of Jacinto. On 1992-
1994 Gina went to Japan to work as an entertainer. Her periodic absence result for their
relationship to end on 1996. On January 9, 1997 , private respondent filed a complaint for
partition and recovery of personal property with receivership against the petitioner with
the Regional Trial Court. She alleged that she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the
unfinished house , also her earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to
acquire and accumulate appliances , furnitures and household effects, a total of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of of P70,000.00 representing her contribution will reimbursed to her.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction
of their house were defrayed solely from his income, he averred that private respondent
unable to contribute in the said construction. Petitioner further contended that Gina did
not work continuously in Japan , but only for 6 months duration each year, she also did not
share in the expenses for the improvement for their house.

On July 15, 1998 a decision was rendered in favour of private respondent Gina Rey against
Jaicnto Saguid ordering the partition of the house and directing defendant to return and
reimburse to the plaintiff, Gina the amount of P70,000.00 which was contributed to its
construction and completion.

ISSUE:
Is private respondent, Gina S. Rey co-owner of petitioner, Jacinto Saguid in
the controverted house?
HELD:
 Yes, The Supreme Court declared Gina as a co-owner of the controverted
house on the ground that their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationship in
a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under the regime only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions … Proof of actual contribution is required. In the case at bar, although the
adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987 before the effectivity of the
Family Code , Article 148 would still govern because this provision precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code , In the case of Agapay v. Palang and Tumlos v.
Fernandez the Supreme Court ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property is essential. On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to
purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account , there is
however no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their resoective shares therein ,
pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code , in the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution their share shall be presumed equal.
 17
Juaniza v Jose

FACTS:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident causing 7 death and 5 of its passengers for physical injuries. That
time Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramost but was cohabiting with
defendant- appellant, Rosalinda Arroyo for 16 years cohabiting akin to husband and wife.
The cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance rendered a decision ordering
defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalio Arroyo to pay for the damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be
held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same?

HELD:
Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code , Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of
the jeepney , the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife.
There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death
of, and physical injuries suffered by, passengers of the jeepney which figured in the
collision. Rosalia Arroyo, which is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be be
liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the
registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation. Wherefore , Rosalia Arroyo is declared free from
any liability for damages.
18
ADRIANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado , sometime in
1942 Lucio and Gliceria separated . June 11, 1968, Gliceria then settled and died in Rizaal
Laguna. On November 22, 1968, after the death of Gliceria, Lucio then married Vicente
and lived with their children in Calenderaria until they separated in 1972. On October 10,
1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties and assigning
his second wife Vicenta and all his children in the first and second marriage as devises and
legatees. (1) Private respondent and Lucio’s children would receive 10,000 squre meters of
disputed property, warehouse, rice mills, while for (2) Vicente and petitioners, his children
from the second marriage would receive the remaining 35,000 square meters and for (3)
private respondents wuld receive the residential house within the same property. On
February 11, 1981 Lucio died, Celestina, private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted as executrix , file a petition for the probate of the will thus by the RTC allowed
the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-
executrix . On August 17, 1988 and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were
pending before the RTC , petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano’s
will. In the complaint plaintiff-petitioner’s alleged that before the marriage of Luciod and
their mother, Vicenta. On November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife
and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and
administration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage?
HELD:
Yes. The ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and a woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while
Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to conjugal unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the
trial court and respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their
allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal
fund of his first marriage.
 #19
Yasuo Iwasawa v. Gangan

FACTS:
Petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national visits the Philippines
in 2002, met private respondent. Felisa Gangan, private respondent introduced herself as
single. In November 28, 2002 petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa came back to the Philippines and
married private respondent Felisa. After the wedding they resided in Japan. In 2004,
Yasuo noticed that Felisa, his wife was depressed, he confronted her and to his shock,
Felisa confessed to him that her previous husband passed away. Petitioner discovered that
indeed that his wife Felisa was married to Raymon Maglonzo Arambulo, their marriage
took place on June 20, 1994. Petitioner then file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and Felisa Gangan null and
void?
HELD:
Yes, as the documents exhibits directly prove (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in Manila (2) that private respondent contracted a
second marriage, this time with petitioner on November 28,2002 in Pasay City (3) that
there was no judicial declaration of nullity of marriage of private respondent and
Arambulo at the time she married petitioner (4) that the second marriage of private
respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void since the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was contracted, which is void from the beginning as
provided by Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.

#20
Go-Bnagayan v Bangayan

FACTS:
In 1979, Respondent Benjamin Bangayan developed a romantic
relationship with Sally Go Bangayan. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as Husband and Wife. March 7, 1982, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan,
Paig City, where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing the marital
status of Benjamin (who was then married to Azucena), assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered. During their cohabitation, they acquired parcels of land
(1) TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses (2) TCT
Nos.61720 and 190860 in the names of Benjamin, married to Sally (3) CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 in the names of Sally married to Benjamin (4) TCT Nos. 193656 and 253681
registered in the name of Sally as single. Their relationship ended in 1994, Benjamin filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin asked the court
for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
the Family Code. Sally was given several opportunities to present her evidence but she
refuse. The Trial Court then ruled in favour of Benjamin. On the issue of partition, Sallu
could not claim the 37 properties. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married
to Benjamin. The phrase “married to Sally Go” was merely a descriptive of Benjamin’s
civil status in the title thus the court found that the properties were bought by Benjamin
using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court then ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 617220 and 190860 and CCT Nos 8782 and 8783 are conjugal partnership
of Benjamin and Azucena. The trial court also ruled that sally acted in bad faith , knowing
that Benjamin was married to Azucena, applying Article 148 the trial court forfeited
Sally’s share in favour of their children Bernice and Bentley. Sally appealed the trial
court’s decision before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s
allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action of declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court of appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled before Benjamin
contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed
no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.
HELD:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals .
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled tha the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the
benefit of marriage. Thus only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportions to their contribution. The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse
are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution form either or both spouses, there can
be no ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

#21
Gr. No. 202932
VENTURA Jr. vs. ABUDA

FACTS:

Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on June 9, 1980. Esteban had a
daughter named Evangeline Abuda herein respondent while Socorro had a son, who was
the father of Edilberto Ventura herein petitioner. Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage
to Crispin Roxas when she married Esteban. Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a
portion of a lot situated in Tondo Manila. Starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban
operated small business establishments (Delpan Property). On Spetember 1997, Esteban
sold the Vitas and Delpan Properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda.
Sometime in 1993 Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the
amortizations in the 2 properties with the amount of P200,000.00 for the Delpan property
and Evangeline likewise gave her P50,000.00 for the purchase of Vitas property.
Respondent argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim in
any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondent. According
to the RTC-Manila , the Vitas and Delpan roperties are not conjugal, and are governed by
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 144 When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not married or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co- ownership. Article 485
The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional
to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The RTC-mania concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition
of the properties. Hence she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim
any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.

ISSUE
Whether or not Vita property is a conjugal property of Esteban and
Socorro?

HELD
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas
property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because (1) that
the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued several months after the parties were married
and (2) title to the land was issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres. The Supreme Court disagree in this allegation. The title itself shows that Vitas
property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase “ Married to Socorro Torres” is merely
descriptive of his civil status and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The
evidence on record shows also that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate iof title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Thus it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father.
Thus Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro’s alleged monetary
contributions.

#22

GUERRERO vs. RTC

FACTS:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respectives wives being sisters. Filed by
petitioner as an action publican against private respondent , this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being
brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise

ISSUE:
Whether or not brother by affinity are considered members of the same family?
HELD:
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and
sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sister-inlaw.
Under Article 151 starts with the negative word no, the requirement is mandatory for that
the complaint or petition , which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that if it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

#23
GR. NO 174727
Ining vs Vega

FACTS:
 Leon Roldan married to Rafaela Menez, owner of a 3,120 square meters,
parcel of lands in Aklan. Leon and Rafael died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining. Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion
Vega and grandson of Leonardo Vega. Leonardo survived by hiss wife, Lourdes and children
Restonillo Vega, Crispulo Vega, Milbuena Vega- Restituto and Lenard Vega, substituted
respondents. Gregoria, survived by her six children, petitioners Natividad, Dolores. Natividad
survived by Ediberto Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and
Pastor Ruiz. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-
Francisco, Camilo Francisco Jr, Adolfo Francsico , Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo Francisco. In
short herein petitioners, except Ramon Tresvalles and Robrto Tajonera are Gregoria’s
grandchildren or spouses of Gregoria’s heir. In 1997, Leonardo filed for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession with the RTC claiming that one-half of the subject property belonged
to him as Romana’s surviving heir , but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands. The
Gregoria heirs claimed sole ownership of the property, and that portions of the property was sold
to Tresvalles and Tajonera. In 1979 Lucimo Sr., husband of petitioner, Teodora, illegally claimed
absolute ownership of the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the
property. On 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived Leonardo of the fruits of the property
estimated P1,000.00 per year; as a result, he incurred expenses by way of attorney’s fees and
litigation costs. Thus Leonardo prayed that he be declared the owner of the one-half of the
subject property. In their counterclaim , Teodoro, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo
claimed that Leonardo has no cause of action against them, that they re the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr, acquire the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez,
who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

ISSUE: Is Lucimo Sr. considered to be co-owner of the said property?

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property.
Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria , he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to
Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. Art. 150 Family relations include those (1)
Between Husband and Wife ; (2) Between Parents and Children (3) Among other descendants
and Ascendants and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether full or half. In point of law,
therefore Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property, Teodora is. Consequently, he cnnot
validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason,
prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.
#24
GR. NO. 202805
BANGUIS- TAMBUYAT vs. BALCOM- TAMBUYAT
 FACTS:
On September 16, 1965, Adriano M. Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda
Balcom-Tambuyat got married. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several properties,
including the subject property, a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon
which was bought on November 17, 1991The deed of sale was signed by Adriano alone as
vendee; one of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis- Tambuyat, who signed
therein as Rosario Banguis. When the Transfer Certificate of Title No. t-145321 was issued,
however it was made under the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
All this time petitioner Banguis was still married to Eduardo Nolasco, they got married on
October 15, 1975, thus Nolasco was still alive and his marriage to petitioner still exist and was
never annulled. On June 7 1998, Adriano died intestate. On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a
petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321 with the Regional Trial
Court. She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano, TCT T-145321 was erroneously
registered in the name of Adriano Tambuyat married to Rosario E Banguis, that per annexed
marriage contract, Rosario Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that the issuance of the title in
Banguis name as Adriano’s spouse was due to an insidious machination by her and the person
who brokered the sale of the subject property, allegedly a cousin or a relative. Thus she prayed
for the cancellation of TCT T-145321 be cancelled, and that a new certificated of title be made
out of Adriano’s name with her (Wenifreda) as his spouse. Banguis denied that the property was
acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage, thus she claimed that she claimed that
she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds; that she and Adriano were
married on September 2, 1988 , they had a son; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
cancellation, that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the property is
conjugal or exlusive property, and since she ( Rosario) and Adraino have a child whose rights
will adversely affected by any judgment in the case.

ISSUE:
Who should be the includd in the title to the subject property as Adriano;s spouse,
Banguis or Wenifreda

HELD:
The Supreme court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals . The Court of
Appeals sustained the application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Banguis name was
included in TCT T-145321 by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that
Wenifreda and not Banguis, is the lawful wife of Adriano. The preponderance of evidence points
to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano Documentary Evidence among
others , the parties respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates are
considered the primary evidence of marital union. It indicates that Adriano was married to
Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco and both marriages were subsisting at the
time of the acquisiotn of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title. Thus, it
cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other, it cannot even be
said that that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be
included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to
Wenifreda alone.

#25
GR. NO.154132
HIYAS vs. ACUNA

FACTS:
On November 24, 2000, private respondent, Alberto Moreno filed A
complaint with the RTC against petitioner Hiyas Saving Loan Bank, his wife Remedios, the
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner Hiyas Saving Loan Bank,
nor he did not sign any contract of mortgage because he was then working abroad , that his wife
acting conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses owe , who benefitted from the loan. On May 17,
2001 , petitioner Hiyas Saving Loan Bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private
respondent Alberto Moreno failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code provided that
no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made , but the
same have failed. Petitioner Hiyas Loan Bank asking for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the complaint does not contain any fact that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made prior to its institution. Private respondent Alberto Moreno’s comment, he argues that
in cases where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under
Article 150 of the Family Code , he asserts since three party-defendants are not members of his
family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its motion to dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.
The RTC agrees with plaintiff that the earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required
before the filling of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who
are strangers to the family.

ISSUE:
Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed?

HELD:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides No suit between members of
the same family shall propser unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise has been made, but that the same have failed. If it shown
that no such effrts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to
cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code . Article 222 of the
Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken essentially contains the same
provisions, to wit: “ No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless It should appear that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. In the case of Martinez v. Martinez ruled
that Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or
among family members. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of
the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts made
towards a compromise before the action can propser.
#26
Honntiveros v. RTC 309 scra 340

FACTS:
On December 3, 1990, Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, herein petitioners
filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Gregorio and Teodora Ayson before the
RTC. Petitioner alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, located in Capiz . Petitoners
were deprived of income from the land, such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land
amounting to P66,000.00 from 1968 to 1987 and P595,000.00 per year thereafter. Private
respondents filed the land registration case and withheld the possession of the land from
petitoners in bad faith. Private respondent denied that they deprived petitioners of possession of
and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of a writ of possession issued by
the clerk of the Regional trial court Capiz, since then petitioners have been directly receiving
rentals from the tenants of the land; a that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it
did not allege that the earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made considering that
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. On November 23, 1995,
the trial court denied petitioners motion. At the same time, however it dismissed the case on the
gorund that the complaint was not verified as required by Article 151 of the Family Code and
therefore did not believe the earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts
exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151
HELD ;
The Supreme Court Held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson
as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of scope of Article 151. Under
this provision, the phrase “ members of the same family” onl refers to the (1) husband and wife
(2) parents and children (3) ascendants and descendants and (4) brothers and sisters whether full
or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in
this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria Hontiveros, spouses of Gregorio and Augusto respectively
are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family.

#27
GR. NO. 129242
VDA vs. De Manalo

FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven. At the time of his death,
Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On
November 26, 1992, eight of the surviving children namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rocalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia and Imelda herein respondents filed a petition of judicial settlement of
he estate of their late father, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo as administrator
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila . On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued a order
setting the said hearing on February 11, 1993.On February 11, 1993 the petitioners were granted
10 days to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts
toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition?

HELD:
It is fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition
shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of distribution
of the estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The provision of Article 151 is only applicable to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from
the term “suit” that refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury of enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code of Commission
as revealed in the report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to
civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of
estate is special proceeding and as such remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish
a status, right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not
being sued in such case for any cause of acion as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
#28
SANTOS v. Court of Appeals 475 SCRA 1
Gr. No. 112019

FACTS:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos- Guerrero are
brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano and Candelaria Santos, both deceased. Sometime in
1956, Nicanor and 8 of their siblings executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering the
properties inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein
respondent Andres Guerrero, filed suit with the Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner
Nicanor and 2 other brothers for recovery of the inheritance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the new civil code in relation to Section 1 (j) . Rules of the
Court has no application

HELD:
 A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the
maintenance of an action between members of the same family . As it were, a complainant in
ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code. Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under the Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules
of the Court. Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a
complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary avernments of a defective complaint.

#29
Mendoza vs. CA

FACTS:
On August 4, 1978 petitioner Natalia Mendoza and her husband signed a
promisory note, promising to pay Thomas B. and Nena T. Ascuncion , husband and wife , the
amount of $456.00 each month starting from April 1978 and 120 consecutive months. On April
1988, the entire balance of principal and accrued interest then remaining unpaid shall be due and
payable. Should default be made in the payment of the entire balance of principal when due, the
entire balance of principal and interest then remaining unpaid shall become immediately due at
the option of the holder of this note. From 1978 to December 1981. Natalia made monthly
payments, a total of $22.5K, additional payments were also made to private respondent’s
daughter and to Regina Pangan and/or Teresita Angeles amounting to $180.17. Further payments
of the appellees amounting to $8,500. From October 1982, petitioner stopped payments and was
then sued by the Spouses Ascuncion, After due trial, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action, stating that the entire balance of he principal and
accrued interest remaining unpaid shall become due and payable in April 1988. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the acceleration clause in the promissory note be used?
HELD:
No, petitioner contends upon default of the payment can invoke the second
statement of the promissory note and therefore justify the settlement of the unpaid principal and
interest upon the maturity date in April 1988. Article 1374 provides that stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from
all them taken jointly. The First sentence of the promissory note provides the regular payment of
the principal and accrued interest, the second and third statements provides for the discretionary
exercise of leniency by the creditors, herein respondents. The second and third statements
provides an option in case of default and for the creditor to invoke the acceleration clause and
collect the entire balance without waiting for April 1988, and cannot construed as conferring on
the debtor the right to default only on the montly payments. These options are granted to the
creditor and not the debtor. Furthermore , the civil code provide subsequent and
contemporaneous acts of the contracting parties shall be considered judging the intention. It
should be noted that every month fro April 1978 until October 19, 1982, petitioner faithfully paid
the amount of $500.00. Such monthly payments show petitioners concurrence in her obligation
and to elect a new term of payment.
#30
GR.NO 185920
TRINIDAD – RAMOS VS PANGILINAN

FACTS:
In 2003, Respondent Pangilinan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against E.M Ramos Electrinc Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos herein petitioners.
On April 15,2005 the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruled In favour of the respondent thus,
ordering Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.00 representing the
backwages, a separation pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. The decision
become final and executory. On September 8,2005, a writ of execution was issued by the Labor
Arbiter which the NLRC implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered by TCT
No. 38978 (Pandancan Property). Alleging that Pandacan property was the family home, hence,
exemot from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash
the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one
in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was
denied and the appeal was also denied by the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan Property was Valid?
HELD:
 Yes. For the Family Home to be exempt from execution, distinction must
be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets
of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3,1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under the Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the civil code. On the other
hand, family homes constructed after the effectivity of the family code, there is no need to
constitute extra judicially or judicially, and exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as ong as any of it beneficiaries under Article 154 actually resides therein.
Further the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Article 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3,1988. In
both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In this case since the petitioners claim
that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 2988 or as early as 1944, they must
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandancan property was judicially or extra-judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home
cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan Property.