THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997.]

PACITA DAVID-CHAN , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL.

RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. , respondents.

Bienvenida N Carreon for petitioner.

Conrado C . Genilo, Jr. for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED. — The questions raised are all issues of
facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the
trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has
not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL BASED ON EQUITY; APPLICATION; NOT PROPER IN
CASE AT BAR. — The appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly
described as "justice outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. As found by respondent
Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private
respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings. There
are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they
may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied
with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience
may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention
on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the
latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of such choice.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the requirements of
law but fails to provide factual support to show her entitlement thereto. Since findings of
facts by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme
Court, the petition must thus fail. Even petitioner's plea for equity becomes unavailing
because resort to equity is possible only in the absence, and never in contravention, of
statutory law.
The petition assails the Decision 1 of respondent Court 2 promulgated on April 30, 1992.
The Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July 26, 1989, of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The
dispositive portion of the affirmed decision of the trial court reads: 3
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 "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiff's petition
to be without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed with costs
against plaintiff.

On defendant's (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby dismissed for

insufficiency of evidence."

The Facts
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from
fencing its property and depriving her of access to the highway. Petitioner alleged that her
property, consisting of around 635 square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando,
Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, was delineated on its northern and western
sides by various business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern
boundary was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern boundary,
and lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot with an area
of approximately 161 square meters owned by private respondent. In short, petitioner's lot
was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway.
Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches
wide through the aforementioned property of private respondent. Petitioner believed she
was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of
private respondent. The prospective subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot
consisting of 7,239 square meters and covered by TCT No. 163033-R, which was formerly
owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Singian Brothers")
and was sold to private respondent without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, who
was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of
redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to complete the
construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner
of the only available right of way, and that therefore, she was constrained to petition the
trial court to enjoin private respondent from fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot
and to pay the damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of
petitioner were never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they
were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 4865. The dispositive portion of the judgment of
ejectment reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo
David including their agents/representatives and, any and all persons given
access by them to the disputed premises claiming any right under them, are
hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area in question, remove all the
improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the plaintiff corporation
jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos — as Attorney's fees and the
costs of this suit.

The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby
dismissed as the action has become moot.

The defendants' counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is

hereby dismissed for lack of merit."

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 Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The land sold
by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it
needed the property. Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing
through the lot in question.
The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they alleged that
they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed lot. As their affirmative
and special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner
stated no cause of action because, being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way
cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers;
therefore she was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally,
petitioner had another access to the National Highway which, however, she closed during
the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended the construction of her
fence. 5
The Issues
Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now submits the
following issues for consideration of this Court:
"I. In its reaffirmation of the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals
missed to temper with human compassion of the Art. 649 and 650 of the
New Civil Code of the Phil. which requires the presence of four requisites
for a compulsory easement of way." 6

"II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal
niceties to favor respondents, violating time-honored and deeply-rooted
Filipino values." 7

"III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in favor
of the respondent despite the facts existing at the background." 8

"IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet
measuring two (2) feet and four (4) inches to the national highway without
passing through respondent's property as per the commissioner's report." 9

In her Memorandum 1 0 dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one
issue:
"Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over that
portion of the property of respondent Rabbit?"

On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues: 1 1

"1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private
respondents?

2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way of ' pakikisama'
and ''pakikipagkapwa-tao'?"

After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds that the
issues can be condensed into two, as follows:
(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private
respondent's property?
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 (2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the
recognition and application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and
pakikipagkapwa-tao?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, 1 2 petitioner submits that "the owner of an
estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the
existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the
isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." 13
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements.
Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not "without adequate
outlet to a public highway" as follows: 14 cdtai

"1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the
southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda
family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance
which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway without passing
through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she
can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass
through the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch
on the Commissioner's Report, has an open space on the southern boundary of
plaintiff's land.
2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot,
plaintiff has no more way to the National Highway.
Plaintiff's apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer
fence off their property because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence to
separate the two properties. And even granting that the Pineda family would
eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement of right of
way from the Pineda family."

The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement
because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property,
thus: 1 5
"1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to separate
her property from that of the Pineda family on the southern boundary. And she
even closed the small opening causing her property to be isolated and losing one
access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed to meet the third requisite for
the grant of an easement of right of way. As held by the Hon. Supreme Court in
the case of Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, 534-535:
'The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private
respondent had been granted an adequate access to the public highway
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 (Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even as he was
trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for
another passageway through the latter's property. If at the time he filed suit
against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila)
could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by
erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began
for no reason to which the record can attest except to demonstrate the
isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But the law makes it
amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act
isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of
way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the
claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his
property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought
about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an
easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot
860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and
that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also
because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an
existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an
alternative location.' (Emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of
the proper indemnity, to wit: 1 6
"2. The second requisite — that there was payment of the proper indemnity
was likewise not met by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's complaint contained no averment
that demand for the easement of right of way had been made after payment of
the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff ever made a tender of
payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, 'The
fact that plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the
disputed premises hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the payment of the
proper indemnity.'"

The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the public highway,
or (2) she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a tender of the proper
indemnity are all issues of facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon. 1 7 The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 1 8
It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial
court are binding upon this Court. 19 While there are exceptions to this rule, 2 0 petitioner
has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.
Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values
Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims to be an
"ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources" pleads that "those who have less in life
should have more in law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama
and pakikipag-kapwa-tao in resolving the case.
Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 2 1 As found by respondent Court, petitioner is
not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private respondent. Thus, such
equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
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 There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate
before they may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be
strictly complied with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before
such inconvenience may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve
judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by
their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the
consequences of such choice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April
30, 1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 19-31.

2. Fourth Division, composed of J. Jaime M. Lantin, ponente, and JJ. Vicente V. Mendoza
(now a member of this Court) and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring
3. Rollo, p. 19.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
5. Ibid., pp. 19-26.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. Ibid., p. 14.
9. Ibid.
10. p. 3; Rollo, p. 62
11. Ibid., p. 75.
12. Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage,
the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate
without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage
caused by the encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor's own acts.
Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
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 prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest.
13. Petitioner's memorandum, pp. 4-5, Rollo, pp. 63-64.

14. Rollo, pp. 27-28.

15. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
16. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
17. Inland Trailways, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178, 181, March 18, 1996;
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, 313, February 7, 1996; Quebral vs. Court
of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 368, January 25, 1996.
18. Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, 171, July 14, 1995; Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193, July 14, 1995;
Banson vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 42, July 13, 1995; Floro vs. Llenado, 244 SCRA
713, June 2, 1995.
19. Binalay vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 380, March 18, 1991.
20. In the case of Florentino Reyes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110207,
promulgated on July 11, 1996, this Court, through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, listed
ten exceptions, to wit:
"In the case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. CA, this Court held that the factual findings of the
trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal. The exceptions to this rule are laid down in the case of
Floro v. Llenado citing Remalante v. Tibe, as follows: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeal is based on misapprehensions of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record."(Citations omitted).

21. Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615, 625, July 4, 1994.

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