Conjugal Partnership of

Gains
Liabilities/charges
DEWARA VS. LAMELA

GR 179010 APRIL 11, 2011

Facts:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara were married before the enactment
of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife
were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America,
while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to (3)
months, and to pay civil indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos
and Seventy Centavos (P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTC[ affirmed the decision of the MTCC and it became final and
executor.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile
Alvero, to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square meters (sq m), under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City, to satisfy the judgment on
the civil liability of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot
and subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested
buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and
Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the
consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation
of TCT No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
name of respondent spouses.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of
the lot in the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and
for damages against respondent spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile Alvero before the RTC of
Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because
the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for
the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she
received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the annulment of the sale and the annulment
of the issuance of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses.
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of
petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during
her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at
the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved
in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any
objection pending the levy on execution of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the paraphernal or exclusive property of Elenita or the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

Held:
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he
suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in
the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she may not be
compelled to answer for Eduardos liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property
may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name. The payment of
indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie
may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the
responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. This remedy
is provided for under Article 163 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned.
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the conjugal partnership may be
held answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she
may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property
of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both the husband and
wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal partnership may
be held to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.
Disposition
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. V. SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011

Facts:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140
square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years
later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he,
who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola
Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999,
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00.
On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to
heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio
and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of
the sale of the property. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he
had purchased it with his own money. On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property
was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.,
because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina);
that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the
late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there
was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and
that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it
was made without prior liquidation.

Ruling:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Their
property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
With Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any
specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta’s share and as a coowner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Disposition
JOE A. ROS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13,
1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners’
own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null and
Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNB’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner’s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

Held:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil
Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states “all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”. The loan was used for
additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
Disposition
SIOCHI V. GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010

Facts:
Alfredo Gozon and Elvira Gozon married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in
this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The
property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.
On December 23, 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. On January 2, 1992 Elvira filed a notice of Lis Pendens.
On August 31, 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an
agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the
property.
On June 29, 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision in the legal separation case decreeing the
legal separation between the petitioner and the respondent. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not
receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC
ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. 
On August 24, 1994, Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon.
Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred,
Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. 

Issue:
Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? 

Ruling:
In this case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines once again had the occasion to mention that
sale of the property forming part of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the other
spouse is void. This is true even if the spouses were separated in fact and Alfredo was the sole
administrator of the property at the time of sale.

The sale is void absent such consent or authority. The absence of the consent of one of the
spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating
for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law
for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the
Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer
is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and
then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
Disposition
AGABAO V. PARULAN

G.R. 165803 September 7, 2011

Facts:
The deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners spouses Agabao covering two
parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent
husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. was annulled.
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.)
tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by
Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on
April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action against Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses
praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and
the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners,
Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific
performance with damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
petitioners.

Issue:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio

Ruling:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their
situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to
substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property,
had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that
they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.
Dispositon
MANUEL O. FUENTES AND LETICIA L.
FUENTES VS. CONRADO G. ROCA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010

Facts:
On October 11, 1982, a 358-square meter titled lot owned by Sabina Tarroza was sold to her son
Tarciano T. Roca under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. The parties entered into an agreement wherein such deal
required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of Php 60,000.00 for the transfer
of the lots title to him. Within six months, Tarciano must clear the lot of structures and occupants
and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca. Upon Tarciano’s compliance
with the conditions set, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an
additional Php 140,000.00 to Php 160,000.00. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality
and payment. This agreement was signed in the presence of Atty. Plagata. Subsequently,
Tarciano executed a deed of sale contending that he was able to meet the conditions. He was paid
the amount of Php 140,000.00 as mentioned in their agreement. A new title was then issued in
the name of spouses. A year after this, Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G.
Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R.
Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad, filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses on the ground that Rosario did not give
her consent to the sale. The spouses denied the allegations of the respondents. The trial court
found in favor of the Fuentes spouses. It was, however, reversed by the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not only the sale of the property was in accordance with the law.

Ruling:
First, the Court agreed with the appellate court in its observation that Rosario’s signature on the
affidavit does not match with the specimen signatures. In other words, the signature in the
affidavit was forged. Second, the Court that the Family Code is the applicable law in the case,
since the conjugal property was sold to the Fuentes spouses on 1989. Under Article 124 of the
Family Code, the law does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husband’s sale of the real property. The action did not yet prescribe. Third, the Court
held that even if Rosario died the year after the sale, it does not mean that the right to have the
sale declared void is forever lost. The non-issuance of consents means that the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. Despite this, the Fuentes spouses
should be entitled to recover from the Rocas the Php 200,000.00 that they paid Tarciano, with
legal interest until fully paid. It was because they acted in good faith when they purchased the
lot and built improvements on it, believing that Rosario gave her consent to the sale.
To sum it up, the deed of sale executed by Tarciano in favor of the Fuentes spouse was declared
void. The register of deeds of Zamboanga City was hereby directed to reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel. Also, the
Roca’s were ordered by the Court to pay the petitioners the amount paid by the Fuentes spouses
to Tarciano. They were compelled to indemnify the petitioner spouses with their expenses for
introducing useful improvements on the subject land.
Dissolution
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. VS. PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

Facts:
During the union of Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga, Florencia bought from a 250-
squaremeter lot with a 3-door apartment in Makati City. TCT No. 156283 was issued in the name
of Florencia,"married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity of
Nicholson. RTC rendered a decision declaring their marriage nulland void. The couple separated
without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia together with spouses Nortberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a
loan of P58M from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.(Metrobank). To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses executed severalREMs on their properties, including one
bought by Florencia in Makati City. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the
loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision and
a document denominated as waiver that Nicholson purportedly executed. The waiver, made
infavor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not
incidentallyinclude the lot in question.
Florencia and the spouses failed to pay their loan obligation when it fell due and so Metrobank
initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the
Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of
the sale on three issues of Rebate. At the auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Nicholson learned of the foreclosure proceedings and so it filed before the RTC in Makati City a
complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. He alleged that the
property, which is still a conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Metrobank alleged that the disputed lot,
being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having apporved
the mortgage in good faith.RTC- declared the REM invalid- Metrobank had not overcome the
presumptive conjugal nature of the lot.

Issue:
Whether or not the REM is void for the property mortgaged by Florencia is still a
conjugal property.
Held:
The petition is partly granted.
In the first issue, yes, but only with respect to the 1/2 undivided portion of the property
belonging to Nicholson. In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot
on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership.
Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage
was given is the provision of Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has theright to mortgage or even sell
her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2undivided portion of
the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undividedhalf.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share
in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver
allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the
conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of
the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may
become the root of a valid title in the hands of aninnocent buyer for value.
Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined
only to the1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The
other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in
question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership." This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Dissolution
DOMINGO V. MOLINA

G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016

Facts:
On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land
which was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title No. 16354. Anastacio has been
borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina all throughout his life.
Ten years after the death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses
Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2729677
and the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was transferred to the them.

One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17,
1999. Melecio claims that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father has
borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject
property without Flora’s consent, as she was already dead at the time of the sale. The spouses
Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his
debts and told them that they already own half of the land. They have been in possession of the
subject property before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the
property’s real estate taxes. The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted
them when they died during the pendency of the case.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that
his father did not sell the property to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could
dispose of conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it denied Melecio’s
motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA. The
CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant
evidence that there was fraud in the conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave
credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that Flora’s death is
immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding
Flora’s interest. Finally, the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed because he failed to
file the action within one year after entry of the decree of registration.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent
is valid and legal;
2) Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to
the spouses Molina is void without Flora’s consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.
Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity which was on
August 3, 1988 and so their property relation is a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora
died in 1968, pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.

The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties
pending liquidation and partition. This will also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share
of the conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific
portion of the conjugal properties without having done an actual partition first, either by
agreement or by judicial decree. On the other hand, Anastacio owns one-half of the original
conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. As a consequence,
he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s
interest. Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was
not totally void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred. The
spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any
portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a
co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for Partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina. The notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT
executed between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecio’s argument that no
document was executed for the sale of the disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioner’s belief
that his father, Anastacio, could not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be
considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered title over the subject
property.
Liquidation
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO VS. RITA C. QUIAO, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

Facts:
A complaint for legal separation was filed by herein respondent Rita C. Quiao against herein
Brigido B. Quiao, with the trial court subsequently rendering a decision granting the complaint.
Following this, the trial court ruled that Rita gets custody of the three minor children, the eight
remaining properties would be equally divided between the spouses, subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of unpaid conjugal liabilities, the share of Brigido of
the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of their common children,
and that Brigido would reimburse attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. No motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed. Then, the respondents filed a motion for execution with the
trial court granting it. Brigido partially complied by paying his share on the conjugal share, the
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. As to the term “net profits earned”, Brigido filed a
motion for clarification before the trial court. The trial court responded by saying that such
phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each spouse and the debts. Further, the court said that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to
Articles 63(2) and 43(2) of the Family Code. The court held that the Decision promulgated by
them was final and executory.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 129 of the Family Code is to be applied in this case.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that as to the property relations of spouses, it is to be governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains under the New Civil Code, having been married in 1977. However,
since at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the operative law is already the Family Code.
In so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned, Article
129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code is to be applied. The latter
provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights. The Court held that no
vested right was impaired by the application of Articles 129 and 63(2) of the Family Code. In
fact, according to Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may
be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner’s vested right claim may in
fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party. Such
decision was final and executory because of the petitioner not filing a motion for reconsideration
nor a notice of appeal.
Complete/Absolute Separation of Property
Liabilities/charges
YAO VS. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003

Facts:
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the property was
scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition alleging that the
subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The
trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention, but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion filed by Yao was late.

Held:
Yao’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other
hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to
intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his motion way beyond the
period set forth in the rules.
Void Marriages or Live-in Marriage
VIRGINIA OCAMPO vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO

G.R. No. 198908 August 3, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on January 16, 1978. On September 10, 1990,
petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
before the RTC Quezon City. Petitioner filed the said petition on the ground of psychological
incapacity. On January 22, 1993, the trial court declared the marriage null and void pursuant to
Art. 36 of the Family Code. The custody of their children was also given to the petitioner. Their
properties will be dissolved and liquidated as well upon inventory. On January 13, 2004, the trial
court rendered a decision that the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them
on a 50-50 sharing. On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a notice of Appeal before the trial court.
On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a motion to deny the notice of appeal. However, the
latter’s motion was denied by the RTC. He once again file a motion for reconsideration. Still it
was denied.
In the disputed decision dated August 11, 2010, the CA denied Virginia’s appeal. She filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied as well. Thus, the instant petition before the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains
by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

Held:
No. Pursuant Article 147 of the Family Code the share should be 50-50. Under the said
provision, man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. In the present case, both petitioner and respondent did not show any
impediment so as to not marry. Also, they lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
But, their marriage was found void pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code due to psychological
incapacity. The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court that the parties would share on
equal shares especially that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on
her own efforts. The petition is denied.
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
BARRIDO V. NONATO

G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014

Facts:
In the course of the marriage of Leonardo Nonato (Leonardo) and Marietta Barrido (Marietta),
they were able to acquire a house and lot. On March 1996, their marriage was declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-
ownership over the property, Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused. Thus,
on January 2003, Leonardo filed a complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC). Marietta claimed that the subject property had already been sold to their
children. The MTCC rendered a Decision ordering the conjugal property of Leonardo and
Marietta be adjudicated to Marietta, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain.
Leonardo appealed the MTCC Decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 2004,
the RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision
stating that although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 147, the dispositive portion of its Decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition
of the property. Marietta filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Marietta brought the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Article 129 of the Family Code has no application in
the present case.

Held:
No, the CA is correct in holding that Article 129 of the Family Code has no application in the
case. The records reveal that Leonardo and Marietta’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage, the
conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides
for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147
specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. For Article
147 to operate, the man and the woman: 1) must be capacitated to marry each other; 2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.
All the above-mentioned elements are present. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to
have existed on the part of either Leonardo or Marietta. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Here, the former spouses both agree that
they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares. Marietta, however, claims that the ownership over the property
in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the
title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of
sale does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial
seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making
it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Marietta failed to prove
its due execution and authenticity. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Leonardo and Marietta, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-
ownership.
The Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Void Marriages or Live-in relationships
DIÑO -VS- DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Alain Diño and respondent Caridad Diño have been childhood friends and
sweethearts, who then lived together for ten years but afterwards got separated. After two years,
they reunited then decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity of Caridad.
Alain alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was
irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also averred that Caridad tended to be violent toward
him. Extrajudicial service of summon was sent to Caridad who was living in the United States at
that time. She did not file an answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she
was already granted a divorce in the States by the Superior Court of California and that was
married with another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion
between the two parties.
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was found to be
long-lasting and incurable.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code

Ruling:
In order to apply Article 147 of the Family Code, the following elements must concur:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements were present in the case, thus, Article 147 of the Family Code, which applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage but such marriage is nonetheless void, is applicable to the property relations between
Alain and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code.
Section 19(1). Decision – If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that the aforementioned Sec. 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45 of the same Code. Article 50 is not applicable to marriages declared as void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties. The rules on co-ownership shall governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by the parties whose marriage was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Void marriages of Live-in relationships
MAXEY V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. L-45870 May 11, 1984

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in 1903
in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the
parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before
the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the
herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide “When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Thus, the property in question is
owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone was
invalid.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey
thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying Article 144
of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying Article 144
then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code
was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was
still open to controversy because the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the
applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the
estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the
petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.
Void marriages of Live-in relationships
SANTIAGO CARINO V. SUSAN CARINO

G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee
Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago
passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Held:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage
does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable
to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been
sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well
for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Void marriages of Live-in relationships
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON
CITY, AND CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992,
Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It
also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision.  She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing
that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio
on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently
with Article 129.

Issue: 
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code is the correct law governing the disposition of
property in the case where the parties are psychological incapacitated.

Ruling: 
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed. 

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract
is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses. 
Void marriages of Live-in relationships

BUENAVENTURA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 23, 2005

Facts:
On July 12, 1992, Noel Buenaventura, the petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of
court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed
an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
The lower court found that the petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry,
and deceived private respondent Isabel Singh Buenaventura to marry. Noel Buenaventura was
unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son Javy, as a father.
More so, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such in times of trouble, he’d rather
choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.

Issues:
Based on the findings of the lower court, is the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh may
be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been
defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning “psychological incapacity” to the most serious case of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Property regimes of unions without marriage
Void marriages of Live-in relationships

FRANCISCO L. GONZALES VS. ERMINDA F. GONZALES

G.R. No. 159521 December 16, 2005

Facts:
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living
as husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this
union, four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica and
Marco Manuel.On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite. The
complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations
of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies
her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they lived together, they acquired
properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. She prays for
the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains.In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is respondent who is
psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage.
In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza
representing 80% of the total management of the same and that all income from said business are
conjugal in nature. In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and
ordered the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties
between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided,
Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties.

Ruling: 
The provisions under Article 147 enumerate the two instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and
woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void
marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties
have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business,
petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in
managing the business. In his handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he admitted that
“You’ve helped me for what we are now and I wont let it be destroyed.”
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his partner
in his pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in
1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the
personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for
work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance.
Property regimes of unions without marriage
Void marriages of Live-in relationships

MERCADO-FEHR V. FEHR
GR No. 152716 October 23, 2003
Facts:
In March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved
in with respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. Consequently, Suite 204 at LCG
Condominium was purchased in instalment basis and registered and issued in the name of the
petitioner when the final payment was already made. The relationship bore a fruit, begot their
first child, Michael Bruno. This prompted them to get married in March 14, 1985.
Elna Mercado-Fehr filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity against her husband Bruno Fehr. After trial on the merits, the trial court
granted the petition. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the
parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the
said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by creditors. The trial court issued an order
resolving the various motions filed by respondent after the case has been decided.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication
of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. The said property was
purchased on instalment basis while the parties were still living together without the benefit of
marriage, as such, Article 147 of the Family Code should govern. As a result, the trial court
resolved the motion, there being a marriage declared void ab initio, the rule on co-ownership
applies. The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the
properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof, proportionately among them and their children.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code should govern in the partition of the properties.

Ruling:
The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the
properties acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned. The condominium unit
was acquired during their cohabitation. Hence, the rule on co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Family Code should apply.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are attendant to the present
case. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry
each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved
in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however,
was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on instalment basis
on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together.
Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. As regards the
settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership should apply.
Property regimes of unions without marriage
Void marriages of Live-in relationships

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR. vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA

G.R. No. 202370 September 23, 2013

Facts:
Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married in September 1985. Five months after, Aguila gave
birth to their daughter, Josan Jiselle. Salas left their conjugal dwelling and since then no longer
communicated with Aguila or their daughter. In 2003, Aguila filed a petition for nullity of
marriage, stating that they have “no conjugal properties whatsoever”. In 2007, the RTC rendered
a decision declaring the nullity of marriage.
After this declaration, Aguila filed a manifestation stating that she discovered two properties
belonging to Salas. The registered owner of the Discovered properties is “Juan S. Salas”, married
to Rubina C. Salas. Rubina is Salas’ common-law wife. The RTC granted the petition of the said
discovered properties that are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed
between Salas and Aguila. However, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that the
Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties. She claims that she authorized her brother
to purchase the same, but because he was not well- versed with legal documentation, he
registered the properties in the name of “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas”.
The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived
Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state
that Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas
and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they
claimed. The CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not Rubina owns the Discovered Properties.

Held:
The court ruled, no. On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title
is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a
strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute
the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only
when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered
Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.
29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground
for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired
during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-
ownership. 30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and
the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
Property regimes of unions without marriage
Void marriages of Live-in relationships

DIAZ-SALGADO and SALGADO V. ANSON

G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

Facts:
Luis Anson alleged that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina).
They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-
Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. During his marital union with Severina,
they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila. According to Luis,
because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the alleged properties
pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed
three separate Unilateral deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring properties in favor of Jo-
Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties. When Severina died on
September 21, 2002, 11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.
Luis claimed that he has a lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a
compulsory heir of Severina. In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which the
trial court considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard, Jo-Ann countered that she was
unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and
Severina had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally
terminated through a Partition
Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned
to him by virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were
under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband.

Issue:
Whether or not the partition agreement is valid

Ruling:
Yes, the partition agreement is valid. Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of
their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement in November
1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to
annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere
execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."
The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture. As there is no showing that Luis and Severina
were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing
their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Accordingly, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-
owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in
general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be
validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x." The law does not impose a judicial approval
for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by
Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
Bigamous, adulterous relationships

SANTIAGO CARINO v. SUSAN CARINO

G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee
Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago
passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Held:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage
does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable
to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been
sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well
for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was
contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Bigamous/Adulterous Relationship
TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that
it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together
with Mario Fernandez. Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and
that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other
apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.
Ruling:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that “In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the
parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.” Guillerma Tumlos
fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the property. In Article
148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is unsubstantiated.
Bigamous, Adulterous, etc. Relationships
FRANCISCO VS. MASTER IRON WORKS

GR 151967 FEBRUARY 16, 2005

Facts:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina
purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the
name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco”. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of land
in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to
annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be held
liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.

Held:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to answer
the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefina’s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it.  Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her
mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the
petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer
was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the
other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
Bigamous, adulterous,etc. relationships
JOAQUIN V. REYES

G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004

Facts:
Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died; that Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam
and Rodolfo, Jr. are the legitimate children of respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with
petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino; that before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and
Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after
retirement, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,011.79;
that respondent wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.The complaint
further alleges that, a Deed of Sale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in
favor of Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register
of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of Milagros B. Joaquino; that the
funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo
A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as Joaquino was without the means to
pay for the same; that petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A.
Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the
balance of the purchase price; that said Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he
secured a life insurance policy with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount,
assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation; that the monthly
amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the
time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life
Insurance policy.The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioners’
possession and that the real and personal properties in petitioners possession are conjugal
partnership properties of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half
belongs exclusively to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A.
Reyes to be apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore,
pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses
Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property
in respondents favor; that the two cars in petitioners possession be delivered to respondents and
that petitioner be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as
attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes.
Ruling:
A preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by
Rodolfo Reyes, using his salaries and earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents showed the
following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner, Barnes and
Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he received a sizeable
retirement package; 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly purchased, he
applied for a mortgage loan intended for housing from the Commonwealth Insurance
Company; 3) that he secured the loan with a real estate mortgage over the same property; 4) that
he paid the monthly amortizations for the loanas well as the semi-annual premiumsfor a Philam
Life insurance policy, which he was required to take as additional security; and 5) that with the
proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by
Philam Life Insurance Company. All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought
during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is
conjugal. More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by
Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries
and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims that she was financially
capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments
therefor.Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 1961 when
the property was purchased. Hearsay are the Affidavits and the undated Certification she had
presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry
business. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, who
had not testified on these matters. Based on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and the
Certification have to be rejected. In fact, they have no probative value. The CA was also correct
in disregarding petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had come from the sale of a
drugstore four years earlier.Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent
registration of the realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to
Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void,
because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation.The prohibition against donations between spouse must likewise apply to donations
between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated
than the former.Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it is enough to
stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be
used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. It has been held that property is conjugal
if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage,
even if it is titled in the name of the common-law wife.] In this case, a constructive trust is
deemed created under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which the court quote:Art. 1456. If
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly designed to deprive
Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is
deemed to hold the property in trust for them.Therefore, she cannot rely on the registration in
repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness
of a certificate of title.
Bigamous, Adulterous Relationship
JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

Facts:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married but separated de facto
from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief courtship they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up their nine-year
cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner in the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of the personal properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and
the amount of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of their house be
reimbursed to her.

Issue:
Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and
reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.

Held:
The court ruled that, yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and
reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions..."Proof of actual contribution is required.

The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Bigamous, Adulterous Relationships
JUANIZA VS. JOSE

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

Facts:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on
November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of
its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos
but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in
a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry;
2) Whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and
severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same.

Ruling:
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of
the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos,
there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited
provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to
the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of
Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers
of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages
caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a
public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to
its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
Bigamous, adulterous, etc. Relationships
Marino Adriano, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.

G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

Facts:
Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado on October 29, 1933 wherein they subsequently had
three children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, herein private respondents. Sometime in
1942, the wedded couple separated. Gliceria died on June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even earlier,
Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa, with whom he had eight children, namely, Marino, Renato,
Leticia, Imelda, Maria Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all surnamed Adriano. All his
children with Vicenta were the named petitioners in this case, with the exception of Jose Vergel,
who died before the inception of the proceedings.
Five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta until they decided to separate in
1972. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his
properties in favor of his wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriages as
devisees and legatees. When Lucio died, private respondent Celestina Adriano was instituted in
Lucio’s will as its executrix. The petitioners, however, instated an action for annulment of Lucio
Adriano’s will. They alleged that Lucio and Vicenta lived together as husband and wife. Hence,
they contend that the properties bequeathed in Lucio’s will are undivided “civil partnership
and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and Vicenta Villa”, and thus, the will sought to be
probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or
properties of Vicenta.
The trial court held in favor of the private respondents. The appeal of the petitioners was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, and affirmed in toto the Joint Order of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not a co-ownership of properties existed between Lucio and Vicenta during their
period of cohabitation before their marriage in 1968.
Ruling:
No co-ownership of properties existed between Lucio and Vicenta prior to their marriage
because Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria was then subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144 of
the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Since the questioned property
was acquired while Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria was subsisting, such property is presumed to
be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Also, the
petitioners did not submit any evidence that would show that Vicenta actually contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question.
Bigamous/Adulterous Relationship
YASUO IWASAWA vs. GANGAN

G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013

Facts:
 Iwasawa is a Japanese national and he met Felisa in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines.
Felisa introduced herself as "single" and has never married before. Since then, the two became
close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married Felisa on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009,
Iwasa noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the
Philippines, he confronted his wife about it and to his shock, Felisa confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away. Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth
and discovered that she indeed was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for
the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.

Issue:
Is the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of
the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight?

Ruling:
The documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. Under Article
410 of the
Civil Code, “the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
  As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due ex
ecutionand genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. The Court has
consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from
the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant
case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely es
tablish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous.
Bigamous, Adulterous Relationship
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN JR
G.R. No 201061 July 3, 2013

Facts:
On September 10, 1973, respondent Benjamin married Azucena Alegre and their relationship
begot three children. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with petitioner Sally
Go-Bangayan. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally cohabited which eventually produced two children. On March 7, 1982,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City, so as to appease her father, there
they signed a purported marriage contract. She assured his father that the said contract would not
be registered due to Benjamin’s status. During their cohabitation, they acquired real properties.
The relationship of Benjiamin and Sally came to an end when Sally left for Canada. Afterwards,
she filed a bigamy case and falsification of documents against Benjamin, and she made use their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin responded by filing a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and he also prayed for the partition of the properties he acquired with
Sally pursuant to Art. 148 of the Family Code. Sally filed a demurrer to evidence but it was
denied by the trial court. She file a motion for reconsideration but it found no favor. She then
lifted it to the CA asking for the issuance of temporary restraining order, but the CA never issued
such.
In a decision of the Trial Court dated March 26, 2009, the latter favored Benjamin. Sally filed a
Verified and Vigorous Motion for inhibition with motion for reconsideration. However, the trial
court denied it. It was appealed before the CA, and it was partly granted. She then moved for the
reconsideration of the CA’s decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial
court’s decision regarding the property relation of Benjamin and Sally.

Held:
No. The CA correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally shall be governed
by Art. 148 which provides “Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.”
Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage. As provided by the above
provision, the only properties they can own in common in proportion to their respective
contributions are those acquired by them through their actual contribution of money, property, or
industry. Therefore, those properties given to Benjamin by his father solely belongs to him. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Bigamous, Adulterous, etc. Relationships
VENTURA, JR. V. ABUDA

G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013

Facts:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) married Crispin Roxas (Crispin) on April 1952. This marriage was not
annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban Abletes (Esteban)
on June 1980. Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s
death in 1960.
Both Socorro and Esteban had children from prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter named
Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), while Socorro had a son from whom she had a grandson named
Edilberto Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto).
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot (Vitas property) and the remaining
portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970. The
Vitas property was issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres.”
Starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at Tondo,
Manila (Delpan property). To reiterate, Socorro and Esteban got married on June 1980.
On September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino). Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro
passed away on July 1999.
In 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, a
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was filed.
Paulino and Evangeline argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim
any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and them.
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ruled that the marriage between Socorro
and Esteban was void from the beginning. According to the RTC, the Vitas and Delpan
properties are not conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article
144 would state that the property acquired, by either or both of the unmarried man and woman
living together as husband and wife, through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 485 states that the share of the co-owners
shall be proportional to their respective interests. The RTC concluded that Socorro did not
contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-
owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
The Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the decision of the RTC. CA ruled, however, that the RTC
should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil
Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. The CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that
Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties.
A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, the petition before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Edilberto has a right over the Vitas and Delpan properties being claimed by
virtue of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban.

Held:
No, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were
acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman who
are incapacitated to marry each other, the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase “married to
Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property. Both the RTC and the CA found that the properties were acquired prior to
the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts
evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto
failed to show any evidence showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.
Socorro cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas
and Delpan properties.
The Family
Coverage of Family Relations
GUERRERO -VS- RTC

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

Facts:
Petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Pedro
Hernando which was dismissed by respondent Judge Luis Bello of the Regional Trial Court of
Ilocos Norte on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have
alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Guerrero and Hernando, their respective wives being half-sisters, are brothers-in-law, thus, being
very close relatives, the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a
jurisdictional defect.
Guerrero then moved for reconsideration and claimed that brothers by affinity are not members
of the same family, hence, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. He
likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a
motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer. Judge Bello denied
said motion and held that the failure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same, the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case. He then dismissed the case when Guerrero failed to amend his
complaint within the 5-day period allowed by said trial court.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family

Ruling:
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution. Such is also embodied in Article 149 of the Family Code which
recognizes the family as the foundation of the nation, thus, protected and cherished by public
policy; and given flesh in Article 151 of the same Code which prohibits suit between members of
the same family unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. Said rule is not applicable to cases
which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Since Article 151 starts with the negative word ‘No’, it is mandatory and obligatory that the
complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that if it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court complemented the requirement under Article 151 and
made such as a ground for a motion to dismiss.
As explained by the Code Commission, this requirement was introduced because it is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family
for such litigation allows the breeding of hate and passion in the family and generates deeper
bitterness compared to that of between strangers.
In Gayon v. Gayon, the Court held that the enumeration of ‘brothers and sisters’ as members of
the same family does not comprehend ‘sisters-in-law’. It was emphasized that ‘sisters-in-law’
(hence, also ‘brothers-in-law’) are not listed under Article 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. And under Article 150 of the Family Code, which repeats
essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, provides that family relations are
limited only between husband and wife; between parents and children; among other ascendants
and descendants; and among brothers and sisters, either full or half-blood.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court GRANTED, SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of the Regional
Trial Court and DIRECTED for the continuance on the civil case of accion publiciana with
deliberate dispatch.
Coverage of Family Relations
INING V. VEGA

GR NO. 174727 AUGUST 12, 2013

Facts:
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter
parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon
was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
who are now both deceased.
Sibling No. 1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by
his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling No. 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein
petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are
Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are
transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s
heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.

Issues before the lower courts:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

Ruling of the lower courts:

Regional Trial Court
1. Leonardo is not entitled. The declared lot will be the common property of the heirs of
Gregoria Roldan Ining.
2. It was concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez
never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of
Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. The claim has already prescribed (30 years adverse possession).

Court of Appeals::
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of
Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as
successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining
2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of
sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by
petitioners’ failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but
from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying
the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o
prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”

Issues:
1. Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the
decision of the trial court because Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on
February 9, 1979.
2. tWether or not The appellate court erred in not upholding the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription and laches.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and
had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of
Leon’s estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription
shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has
been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and
has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of
Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within
the period prescribed under Article 1141.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is
merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is
merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
Coverage of Family Relations
BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT vs. BALCOM-TAMBUYAT

G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

Facts:
Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda)
were married on September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real
properties, including a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (the subject property), which was bought on November 17, 1991.
The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the
signing witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who
signed therein as "Rosario Banguis”, that per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis was still
married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to Adriano; that the issuance of
the title in Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due to an insidious machination by her and
the person who brokered the sale of the subject property, allegedly a cousin or relative of
hers; and that consequently, she suffered damages.
When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis. On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate and on
October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged
therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano and that the TCT was erroneously
registered and made in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis
married to Nolasco. Winifreda prayed that the TCT be cancelledand that a new certificate of title
be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be ordered to
surrender her copy of CTC.

Issue:
Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.

Ruling:
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3)
when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has
been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the
marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of title.44 The present case falls under (3) and (7), where
the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of
"Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis" when, in truth and in fact, respondent
Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are "summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions
of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues." Banguis’s opposition
to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed
ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano.
However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s
petition, the evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject
property, while a resolution of the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the
complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the
Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s
spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the
parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered
the primary evidence of a marital union – indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda,
while Banguis was married to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the
acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot
be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said
that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or
named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda
alone.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
The Family: Suit among
Members of the Same Family

HIYAS V. ACUNA

G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006

Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan
City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute
any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the
spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the
contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad. On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided
that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or
averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to
Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member
of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing
the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the
party-defendants are not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to
Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in
default for their failure to file their answer on time.  Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment
with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to Declare Defendants in Default. 7 Private
respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. 
Issue:
Is a compromise is required in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are
strangers to the family are involved in the suit?

Ruling:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.This rule shall not apply to cases
which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.Article 222 of the Civil Code
from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions,
to wit:No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the
Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains:It is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation
is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
These considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to
compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a
stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not
always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much
less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings’ between or among relatives more
often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of
a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in
any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the
latter would settle their differences among themselves. 
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law
no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.
The Family: Suit among
Members of the Same Family

Hontiveros v Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

Facts:
On December 3, 1990, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages
against Gregorio Hontiveros and TeodoraAyson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 25. The complaint involved a parcel of land located in the town of Jamindan, Province of
Capiz. Augusto and Maria Hontiveros claimed that they were deprived of income from the land
consisted of rentals from tenants. On November 23, 1995, the complaint was denied for it failed
to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that Augusto
Hontiveros and Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers.

Issue:
Whether or not earnest efforts toward a compromise should be made prior to the filing as
required by Article 151 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Article 151 of the Family Code requires earnest efforts toward a compromise among
members of the family prior to the filing of the complaint. On the case at bar, the inclusion of
Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband
and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full
or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in
this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151
of the Family Code.
The family: suit among members of the same family
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129242  January 16, 2001

Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children,
namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita
Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo,
and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the
province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop with
offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty
Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On November 26, 1992, respondents, who are eight of
the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered
mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses
mentioned therein.On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of
general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners namely: Pilar S.
Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten days within which to file
their opposition to the petition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997, the motion for reconsideration
of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the letters of administration be issued to petitioner Romeo Manalo for the
administration of the estate of the deceased Toradio Manalo upon the giving of a bond in such
reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
2. Whether or not after all the properties of the deceased Toradio Manalo have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the
deceased fully determined, that the said estate of Troadio Manalo be settled and distributed
among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
Ruling:
1. Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate
court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and
issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule
has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of
an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in
the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant
petition for settlement of estate. Petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough.
2. The oppositors are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in
fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as
such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. The petitioners therein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can
validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
Suit among members of the same family/
Necessity of earnest efforts toward compromise

SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR no. 134787 April 24, 1967

Facts:
Nicanor T. Santos and Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are siblings, whose parents, spouses
Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, are now both dead. In 1956, all the children of the latter
executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering properties left by their parents.
Misunderstandings, however, lead Consuelo and her husband to file a suit to recover the former’s
inheritance from her parents.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court be applied.

Ruling:
Article 151 of the Family Code provides that no suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not
be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine litigation conducted between members of
the same family. It must be shown that earnest efforts must have been made toward a
compromise before such litigation takes its course.
A complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It can be
inferred from the facts of the case that there were no such allegations contained in the complaint.
A complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence,
effectively, supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.
Prohibited Compromise
MENDOZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967

Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to
Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14
July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has
failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of
plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while
defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of
the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear
when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law
forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the
showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause
of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in
earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it
may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and
the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last
proviso of said Article 222, future support.
Family Home
TRINIDAD-RAMOS V. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was
issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the
Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment
award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that
it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is
actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the
NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

Ruling:
Yes the levy is valid. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be
made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets
of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the
family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the
courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the
execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property.
Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor
from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon
the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply
as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot be
availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to
execute the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accounts were already closed while other
properties in his or the companys name had already been transferred, and the only property left
was the Pandacan property.
The Family Home
ARRIOLA v. ARRIOLA

G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008

Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent) ,his son
with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald
Arriola (petitioners). On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of
theparcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by
and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in
equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees
thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially
agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The
respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied
by the RTCfor lack of merit. When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the
respondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be
allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The
CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the house
built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.
Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition

Held:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in
view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject
house immediately partitioned to the heirs. Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Article 153. The family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the
subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years
back. Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefore. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.
The Family Home, Benefits/Exemptions
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO BREVA

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Facts:
On January 29, 1988, the CA rendered a judgement in Francisco Salinas et al vs. Jose
Modequillo case ordering the defendants-appellees to pay certain amount to the plaintiff. In line
with that, the RTC of Davao City issued a writ of execution on the goods and chattels of the
defendants. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential and a parcel of
agricultural land of the defendants. A motion to quash and/or set aside levy of execution was
filed by Jose Modequillo alleging that the residential land located in Poblacion Malalag is where
the family home was built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case, hence exempt
pursuant to Articles 152, 153 and 155 of the Family Code. The trial court denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration followed but it was to no avail. Hence, the herein petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the family home of petitioner is exempt from execution of the money judgement
rendered by the CA.

Held:
No. The vehicular accident took place in March 16, 1976 and the judgment rendered by the CA
was on January 1988. Both of them happened before the effectivity of the Family code. Hence,
the family home only became a family by operation of law. As to the time of the incident it was
not yet regarded as such. Thus, it is not exempt. Art. 162 cannot be applied in the present case.
Art 53 of the Family Code says “The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law”
Benefits Or Exemptions Of Family Home
JOSEF V. SANTOS GR 165060, NOVEMBER 27, 2008

Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August
29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in
favor of respondent is legal.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
The Family Home
Kelly, Jr. v Planters Products, Inc.

G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite demand,
PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57. The RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Sheriff
Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property located in Naga City.
After being belatedly informed of the sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley
(Doris) filed a motion to dissolve in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the property was
their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure
to comply with the three-day notice requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that
is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
Family Home
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ vs. ROEL, NOEL and
JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES

G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005

Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of
the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with
their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and
is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the
time they occupied it in 1972

Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.

Held:
The court ruled, yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the
family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other
things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent
contends that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family
home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted
in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls
within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home.
Family Home
MANACOP VS. CA

G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997

Facts:
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed
between petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a
complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a
consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy
was issued on August 11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop, petitioner.

The petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him
and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
Issue:
Whether or not the parcel of land is a family home and cannot be subject for attachment.

Ruling:
Petitioner believed that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a family home within the purview
of the Family Code and therefore should not have been subjected to the vexatious writ. Yet,
petitioner must concede that respondent court properly applied the discussion conveyed by
Justice Gancayco in this regard.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation
of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in
the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987.
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity on August
3, 1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This fact alone will militate
heavily against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2,
Article 155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo.
Family Home
Pablito Taneo, Jr., et. al. vs. Court of Appeals and Abdon Gilig

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999;

Facts:
As a result of judgment for recovery of property in favor or private respondent, two of the
petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about Php 5,000.00: one
was a parcel of land with an area of about five hectares situated in Opol, Misamis Oriental, and
the other was the family home also located in the same area. Such properties were sold at a
public auction with Abdon Gilig winning as the highest bidder. A final deed of conveyance was
executed, definitely selling, transferring and conveying the said properties to Gilig. The
petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void. It was alleged in the action
that the petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on
February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, the property had
been acquired through free patent. Hence, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject
to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. They also
alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on
February 9, 1968. A Sheriff’s deed of conveyance was issued in favor of the private respondent
over the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially constituted in
accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent
was able to obtain in his name TD No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over
the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.

Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Ruling:
In this case, the Court held that the applicable law is the Civil Code where registration of the
declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question,
erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at the time when the debt was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
Family Home, Art 152-162 FC
FORTALEZA vs. LAPITAN

G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012

Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan
(creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los
Baños, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness
including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba
City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul
Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate
of Sale that was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The one-year redemption
period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan
executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and the registration
of the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses
Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property.

Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners
were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption
price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property,
especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their
children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale
of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on
January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even
notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced
sale before it was sold at the public auction.
Family Home
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO DE MESA vs. SPOUSES
CLAUDIO ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO

G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2012

Facts:
Petitioners purchased the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were cohabiting. Later
on, a house was built on the said property. From thereon, it became their family home. In 1988,
Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio Acero and it was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. Aracelo issued a check to Claudio but it was dishonored. In 1990, Claudio filed a
complaint for violation of BP 22 against petitioners. The RTC acquitted the petitioners but
ordered them to pay Claudio. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte
levied upon the subject property. Thus the property was sold for public auction, and eventually
Claudio won the bid. Thereafter, Claudio leased the property to petitioners and Juanito Oliva.
Petitioners and Juanito were not able to pay the rent and their accountabilities to Claudio
amounted to Php 170,000. This prompted the respondents to file a complaint for ejectment
against petitioners and Juanito. The petitioners, in their defense, averred that they are the lawful
owners of the property. The MTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The decision was appealed
before the RTC but it was dismissed. Same is true with the motion for reconsideration. On
appeal, it was also denied by the appellate court. Thus this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a negligence on the part of the petitioner in raising the subject property
as a family home.

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Family Home is a real right. Thus it cannot be seized by creditor
pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code. However, this right can be waived or be barred by
laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of
the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. In the present case, the petitioners not do anything
invoking the property as a family home when the sheriff levied it. It took them approximately 4
years from the time of the auction sale that the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a
family home, thus exempt from execution. Through their negligence, they have waived or
declined their right. Thus, the Court denied the petition.
Concept of Paternity, Maternity, Filiation
SURPOSA UY V. NGO CHUA

G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009

Facts:
Jose Ngo Chua (Jose), who was then married, had an alleged illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa (Irene). Jose and Irene had two children, Joanie Surposa Uy (Joanie) and Allan. Jose
attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to Joanie on April 1959, and instructed that
Joanie's birth certificate be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as
father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene's
father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene's mother. Jose financially supported Joanie
and Allan and became known in the Chinese community as Jose's illegitimate children.
Joanie filed on October 2003 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for the issuance of
a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose. Jose denied that he had an illicit relationship with
Irene and that Joanie was his daughter. Joanie testified that Jose was the only father she knew.
It turned out that prior to instituting the October 2003 Petition, Joanie had already filed a similar
Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against Jose which was eventually
entered into a Compromise Agreement on February 2000 approved by the RTC. The
Compromise Agreement included therein Joanie and Allan’s declaration, admission and
acknowledgement that there is no blood relationship or filiation between them and Jose. The
RTC ruled that its hands are tied, unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise
Judgment the RTC rendered. The RTC denied Joanie's Motion for Reconsideration which
resulted to the filing of the instant Petition with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement entered between Joanie and Allan with Jose, stating
that they are not in blood relation, is considered a valid declaration of non-filiation.

Held:
No, the Compromise Agreement is not valid. The Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the
Civil Code stating that no compromise upon questions on the civil status of persons, future
support, and future legitime shall be valid.
The Compromise Agreement between Joanie and Jose obviously intended to settle the question
of Joanie's status and filiation. It was an acknowledgment that Joanie and Allan are not the
children of Jose, and that Jose would pay Joanie and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although
unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that Joanie also
waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of Jose.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement between Joanie and Jose is covered by the prohibition
under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established,
and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement
between Joanie and Jose is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The RTC had no authority to approve and give effect to a
Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was
executed and submitted for approval by both parties.
Kinds/Status of Children
DE ASIS -VS- CA

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999

Facts:
Private respondent Vircel Andres, the legal guardian of the minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
filed an action for maintenance and support against petitioner Manuel de Asis before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and alleged that petitioner, as the father of Glen, refused
and/or failed to provide for his child.
In his Answer, Manuel denied his paternity of Glen; hence, he has no obligation to give support
to the latter. Vircel then made a manifestation wherein she claimed that withdrawal of the
complaint would be more practical since Manuel made a judicial admission/declaration denying
Glen as his child. Hence, pursuant to said manifestation, Vircel and Manuel moved for the
dismissal of the case which the RTC granted.
However, another complaint was filed, in the name of Glen, represented by Vircel, for
maintenance and support against Manuel before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan. Manuel
subsequently moved for its dismissal due to res judicata which the trial court denied and ruled
that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support because renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. Manuel filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that can be left to
the will or agreement of the parties

Whether or not an action for support can be barred by res judicata

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties but such must be judicially established and
that it is only for the court to declare its existence or absence.
Also, the denial of the civil status of a person, from which the right to support is derived, is given
no effect unless an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.
The Court ruled that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata. The law expressly
prohibits the renunciation, transmission or compensation of the right to receive support pursuant
to Article 301 of the Civil Code which provides that the right to receive support cannot be
renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what
the recipient owes the obligor. It cannot also be the subject of a compromise agreement as
provided for under Article 2035(5) of the same Code.
The reason behind the above-mentioned prohibition is founded upon one’s constitutional right to
life and the need of the recipient to maintain his existence. By allowing renunciation or
transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow
either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden which is contrary to public
policy.
In this case, the manifestation sent by Vircel was viewed by the Court as an act of renunciation,
while the agreement for the dismissal of the complaint entered into by Manuel and Vircel was
considered as that of a compromise; thus violated the prohibition laid down in Articles 301 and
2035.
In Advincula vs. Advincula, the Court held that when the first dismissal for an action for support
was predicated upon a compromise, such dismissal cannot have force and effect, thus, cannot bar
the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of the
appellate court.
Kinds/ Status of Children
FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ

GR NO. 143256 AUGUST 28, 2001

Facts:
An extra-judicial partition was executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa
Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, on the estate of the deceased. A Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son. After learning the transaction, respondents, being
nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, filed an action to declare the Extra-
Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. The lower court found the extra-
judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of
Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation
to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the
deceased spouses Fernandez for determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject
of the extra-judicial partition.

Ruling:
The Court can pass upon the relationship. It must be noted that the respondents' principal action
was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial
partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent
court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to determine Rodolfo's right to the
deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we
are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, this doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that respondents'
claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez
Legitimate children: action to impugn legitimacy
CONCEPCION V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Facts:
Gerardo Conception and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year later,
Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have
his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before
he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty
years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with
Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared
Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated
when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of
Gerardo. She argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should
be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. Applying the best interest of the child
principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas’ motion.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the
trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of
Gerardos surname but was denied affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. It ruled that at
bottom, it was the childs welfare and not the convenience of the parents which was the primary
consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a week.Undaunted, Ma. Theresa filed
a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved
in the controversy. After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the
appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
The court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born a
little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married.

Issue:
Whether or not Gerardo has standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo.
Ruling:
Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo when invoked Article 166
(1) (b). Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. Gerardo invokes Article 166
(1) (b). Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. Various evidence exist that
appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in
the same vein, the Supreme Court cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code
mandates: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Thus, implicit from the above
provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/ her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only
the law determines who the legitimate or illegitimate children are for one’s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change
his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. The status and
filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who
is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. In the recent case of Cabatania v. Court
of Appeals the presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Action to Impugn Legitimacy
Angeles v. Maglaya

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Franciscos estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being
the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving
spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his
estate. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf. Respondent also offered in
evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon
the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate?

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.

Ruling:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove
the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. For, save for respondents gratuitous
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. In all, no evidence whatsoever was
presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when
and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons
present, and like significant details. Petitioner, however, contends, that [respondents] Birth
Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva
who are legally married. The Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against
whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending
physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, whocertified to having attended the birth of a child. Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth
of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition,must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or
by the mother alone if the father refuses. Also respondent can hardly derive comfort from her
marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records which
indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles isher father. The same holds true for her
wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers
or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are
not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.
Action to Impugn Legitimacy
JANICE MARIE JAO, ARLENE S. SALGADO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO

 G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

Facts:
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, a minor, represented by her mother and
guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so
the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test,
held in January 21, 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of
Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff"s second
motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the
child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support. Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the trial court’s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there
was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests,
Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of
his non-paternity. The Court of Appeals upheld Jao’s contentions and reversed the trial court’s
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

Ruling:
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and
the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by
consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and
indisputable proof of non-paternity. 
Moreover, the cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the child.
This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the period of
conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the
supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground
for recognition. 
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject for
accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she, represented by
her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even
as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.
Grounds for Action to impugn legitimacy
BABIERA V. CATOTAL

GR no. 138493 June 15, 2000

Facts:
Sometime in 1990, Flora Guinto, a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, gave
birth to a baby girl in the latter’s house. The father of the child was a carpenter. Without their
knowledge, the child was registered bearing the name of Hermogena as the mother, forging her
signature. During those times, Presentacion claimed that she was 15 years old and she witnessed
all that had happened.
Presentacion presented pieces of evidence to prove her claim. She averred that her mother,
Hermogena, could not have borne a child at the age of 54 while her father was already 65. Even
so, there was no proof that would show that she was pregnant, carrying Teofista. Moreover, the
fact about the condition of Hermogena, being too old to give birth, why wouldn’t the family risk
her life and not bring her to the hospital and instead undergo hilot to deliver the child. Notable
irregularities were also seen in the birth certificate. It did not contain any signature of the local
civil registrar but contained the signature of Hermogena which when compared to her other
signatures, it did not match.
Presentacion Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Teofista, in her
response, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the former has no cause of
action and that her legitimacy cannot be collaterally attacked.

Issue:
Whether or not Presentacion has the legal capacity to file an action to impugn the legitimacy of
Teofista.

Ruling:
Teofista avers that Presentacion has no legal capacity to sue her because Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or in special
circumstances, his heirs. The Court, however, considered the petition misplaced. Presentacion
has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the partition which the latter filed against the
former.
Furthermore, what is being asserted under Article 171 is not applicable to the case because it
only applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of wife’s child. It presupposes
that the child was the undisputed offspring of the wife. The present case does not exhibit such,
the child was never even related to the family as she was only the child of the househelper.
Another is the issue on the application of the assailed provision under Article 170 on the
prescription of the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child within one year form the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, or in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birt took place or was
recorded.