THE “AS IF” CONCEPT NATHANIEL

ROSS,N . D .

I
T REQUIRES no more than a cursory consideration of “as if” phe-
nomena to open up a multitude of vistas for investigation. Be-
fore introducing this venture by way of a survey of the literature
-which I intend to present under a somewhat unconventional
plan-I should like to call attention to certain semantic and con-
ceptual ambiguities concerning this subject, and perhaps to intro-
duce some clarity into them.
With regard to the former, the semantic question, this will
not afford us much difficulty. When Helene Deutsch (5) first pub-
lished her classical paper on the “as if” personality, she made cer-
tain to define the term she was using as having “nothing to do with
Vaihinger’s system of ‘fictions’ and the philosophy of ‘As If‘ ” (p.
263). It has been used ever since in the psychoanalytic literature in
her restricted sense, as applying to certain individuals suffering
from a character disorder, which “forces on the observer the in-
escapable impression that the individual’s whole relationship to
life has something about it which is lacking in genuineness and yet
outwardly runs along ‘as if‘ it were complete” (p. 263). To elabo-
rate further upon the clinical picture presented by such individ-
uals, Deutsch observed that they did not seem to be aware of their
defect in feeling; to all outward appearances they had good intelli-
gence, displayed well-ordered emotional expressiveness, might
even be talented, and often impressed others as establishing in-
tense, loving, friendly, and sympathetic relationships. Nevertheless,
sooner or later, people acquainted with these “as if” personalities
would become aware of something which intangibly and indefin-
ably obtruded itself in their contact with people, and would ask,
59

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GO NATHANIEL ROSS

“What is wrong?” It was important, said Deutsch, to distinguish

between the types she was describing and outmardly cold individ-
uals whose fapde concealed truly powerful and highly differenti-
ated affects. For investigation revealed that the “as if” personalities
had undergone a loss of object cathexis and that their outward
behavior was simply mimicry, based upon a very early type of
identification. So facile, indeed, was their capacity for identifica-
tion, that they characteristically underwent the most kaleidoscopic
shifts in behavior, reflecting the personalities of the variety of indi-
viduals with whom they had come in contact. They were totally
devoid of object constancy. I n the words of a patient of mine, de-
scribing his wife, they were, “regular schlemieleons.” Further
manifestations ol this pathological state were: an enormous plastic
passivity concealing great hostility; a lack of affective response to
object loss despite an outward shorn of appropriate reaction; ex-
traordinary defects in moral structure, so that they were capable
of coming in rapid succession under the aegis of the most contra-
dictory extremes of morals, ideals, and convictions; labile shifting
from one group to another; and enormous suggestibility. Other
writers have added to this picture features which I shall describe
later; I wish only to pause at this juncture to return to the ques-
tion of semantics-the definition of “as if.’, One writer, Feldman
(9), expanded the use of this term in a paper called “The Role of
‘As If‘ in Neurosis,” published in 1962, suggesting its employment
in so broad a sense, that I believe it can only introduce a confusion
of tongues into the literature. Feldman proposed using the terms
in Vaihinger’s sense as referring to all types of phenomena such as
symbols, ego defenses, etc., as based upon an unconscious “as if”
state of the ego in neurosis, in addition to the factors of conflict
and fixation. Such usage would depart so far from the definition
of “as if” as employed by Helene Deutsch and would encompass
so wide a range of psychic phenomena, that, whatever its validity
as a concept, it seems inadvisable to superimpose it on an already
widely accepted definition. In this presentation I shall continue to
use the term “as if” in the narrower sense.
To continue with the content of Helene Deutsch’s original
formulations, she described as the crucial factor in the genesis of
the phenomenon she was examining the lack of affect in the up-

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 THE “AS IF” COXCEPT 61

bringers of her patients. T h e basic traumata appeared to center

about the failure to find objects for cathexis. T h e process of identi-
fication had not progressed beyond the early stage of imitativeness,
which may be regarded as a precursor of identification rather than
identification in the actual sense of the word. Such identifications
had never been consolidated, for lack of a constant, affectively
charged object, and there had been a consequent failure of inter-
nalization. Objects had been devaluated because of real deficien-
cies in them or because of traumatic experiences. These patients
had found it impossible to achieve sublimation of their instinctual
striving. Nor had it been possible to arrive at superego formation,
which appears to depend upon the existence of strong oedipal
object cathexes. Such individuals differ from hysterics in that the
belle indiffe‘rence of the latter conceals a powerful repression of
libidinal cathexes, from psychoses in general i n the preservation
of reality testing, and from depression in that the conflict in the
latter is internalized. I n “as if” personalities, all objects are kept
external. “As if” phases appear in schizophrenia and during pu-
berty. Indeed, “as if” personalities may be considered schizoid,
but, in pure culture, the “as if” phenomena do not appear sud-
denly, nor are they transient. Annie Reich (37) pointed out a
number of years later that the cases described by Deutsch and sim-
ilar ones from her own practice had shown clear evidence of
disturbances in object reIations before puberty, and that their
character traits did not seem to be the results of defensive opera-
tions.
Before embarking upon subsequent developments in the lit-
erature directly or indirectly referable to the “as if” concept, it is
necessary to ask ourselves whether there is such an entity as an “as
if” personality, or whether it might not be more productive to
speak of “as if” phenomena or states. Actually, the “as if” person-
ality in pure culture is rare in clinical practice, but clinical ex-
perience shows (8) that there are “as if” states which may occur
transiently in a wide spectrum of individual personalities ranging
from apparently normal to definitely psychotic. It is abundantly
clear that it is possible for many individuals to go on indefinitely
in this affectively poverty-stricken state without notable failures
of adjustment, at the same time as a considerable number of clearly

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62 NATHANIEL ROSS

psychopathic individuals are of this type. T h e “as if“ phenomenon

characterizes the behavior of many individuals in the arts, in poli-
tics, and in the drama. It is, indeed, possible that in actual life,
“as if” personalities are far more common than in clinical practice.
T\’ith the lack of insight and deficient affect and the adaptive
efficacyof this condition, it is difficult to see what would motivate
them to come to treatment. As a matter of fact, we might even
venture to say that acting itself may be a kind of “as if” sublima-
tion. T h e deliria which periodically af€lict teenagers have strong
affinities to this state. There is also a parallel with depersona1’iza-
tion. I doubt whether many clinicians have seen more than an
occasional case of pure depersonalization, but they do exist. T h e
phenomenon of depersonalization itself, however, is widespread
and enormously worthy of discussion because, for but one reason,
it sheds important light on the operations of the ego. It is my own
bias to look upon the “as if” state in the same way as we ordinarily
do upon depersonalization (to which it is, indeed, allied). There
are, I believe, “as if” personalities as described by Helene Deutsch
-1 myself have treated one I am sure falls into this category-but
there are also “as if” states which are eminently worthy of dis-
cussion.
A mere enumeration of the behavior of the “as if” personality
impresses us with the crucial questions it raises in psychoanalytic
theory, not to speak of the formidable technical problems of treat-
ment. Thus, we find ourselves confronted with problems concern-
ing the nature and development of affect; the relationship of the
affectless state to anxiety; the meanings and vicissitudes of identi-
fication; the role and development of the ego ideal in these cases;
the particular type of narcissism which characterizes the “as if”
personality; the puzzling question of the preservation of reality
testing: the failure of development of the superego; the riddle of
the charm and apparent sensitivity, perceptiveness, and “empathy”
displayed by these individuals; the differences, if any, between the
“as if” states of the infant, the adolescent, the schizophrenic, and
the relatively stable “as if” personality; the relationship between
the “as if” state and the problem of identity; the relationship be-
tween “as if” and depersonalization; the “as if” state and the
psychology of the impostor; the questions of ego distortion, sub-

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 63

limatory aspects of “as if” states, and others. It is thus not difficult
to see why I have found it necessary to investigate the literature
from so many aspects in order to determine which contributions
might shed light on this subject. I cannot claim to have done this
with the thoroughness I believe the task requires, but I hope to
touch upon most of these subjects as they may be relevant to the
“as if” phenomenon. I n order to do so with some degree of organi-
zation, I have found it wise to disregard chronology and follow a
scheme which attempts to subsume various contributions under
their essential subject headings.
T h e first group of papers I shall discuss are clinical in their
primary orientation, but all contain theoretical illuminations of
our problem. I n 1938, Eidelberg (8) published a report on an
“as if” personality in a paper called “Pseudo-Identification,” in
which he described a patient who prided himself on his “ideal”
method of adapting himself to reality-by agreeing with every-
body, he protected himself from attack. H e also boasted of being
able to guess with invariable accuracy the attitudes and feelings
of others. In reality, he told Eidelberg, people had no effect on
him and he never really accepted their opinions-he was merely
playing a game. However, it was clear to the author that this man
did not have the control over his behavior which he claimed, for
he was quite incapable of behaving in any other way. T o Eidel-
berg, it appeared that the patient was continually protecting him-
self against narcissistic mortification by projecting his own wishes
(and opinions) onto others and, in addition, his own anticipated
narcissistic mortification at the possibility of being rejected. I n
other words, he did not really understand the feelings of others at
all, as it frequently appears “as if” personalities do. hfy own
opinion is that this is essentially true, because of the absence of
affective depth in them, but such individuals d o have an almost
uncanny ability to discern the more superficial motivations of
others-if these are esseiatially oral and anaclitic in nature. Eidel-
berg found it difficult to understand clearly the psychic processes
at work in cases such as he described, because:
1. Although the type of identification seemed to be a primary
one, this could not really be so, because they were capable of dif-
ferentiating between self and object.

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64 NATHANIEL ROSS

2. \Vhile their behavior looked autoplastic, since the psychic

process revealed an intermediary phase in which the individual
molded the object to himself, it also appeared to be alloplastic.
3. Although the identification seemed to be an external one,
because the changes in the patient were discernible from the out-
side, there were changes which were the result of projection and
hence also represented internal identification.
In 1954, Leo Bartemeier (1) contributed “A Psycho-analytic
Study of Pregnancy in an ‘As If’ Personality,” in which the patient
showed most of the characteristics described by Deutsch. This pa-
tient, who behaved “as if” she were a woman and a mother, shoived
evidence of faulty, incomplete identifications. Her family back-
ground was typical for such character disorders-her father was
conspicuously deficient in affect and her mother was insincere and
unreliable.
Annie Reich’s (37)well-known contribution, “Narcissistic Ob-
ject Choice in \\Tomen,” published in 1953, poses an important
question: does sexual differentiation play a role in the construc-
tion of the “as if” state, and if so, what is the differential interplay
of psychic forces as between male and female development? Does
this question have any bearing on the differing meanings of nar-
cissism in men and in women? TVe are all familiar with the wide-
spread tendency in women to pattern their traits, goals, aims,
interests, morals, attitudes, prejudices, ideals, etc., after those of
men they fall in love with. Reich, pointing out that it is possible
for a woman to make an object choice on a narcissistic level (i.e.,
to love an object which she once wanted to be) which is not
necessarily pathological, described two pathological forms of such
object choice: (i) women who are profoundly dependent upon and
subservient to a greatly admired man without whom they cannot
live (Hiirigkeit);and (ii) the “as if” type.
T h e former, who characteristically describe the men they love
in phallic terms, overcome their feelings of inferiority by a union
with the love object, in which the fusion is ultimately with the
mother. They display a primitive paternal type of ego ideal char-
acterized by grandiosity, weakness of the ego, immaturity of the
superego, disturbances in their object relations, and a tendency to
identification with a body organ. Their ego ideal, which is the

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 65

sternal phallus, and is thus based on a part-object identification,

xorbs their libido at the expense of object cathexis. An enormous
iuntercathexis is required to overcome the inflation and over-
iluation of the object and the hostility toward it.
T h e “as if” type of woman functions on a more regressive
:vel. Her behavior is characterized by alternations between rapid,
ansient episodes of “falling in love,” with glorification of the
we object, with whom the identification is a total one, and rejec-
on and denigration, which are equally extreme. T h e rapid se-
uence of identifications is a means of appeasing objects, the ego
weak, sublimation is deficient, and the superego is unformed.
ust as in the submissive type, the ego ideal is a grandiose one, but
fhereas in the latter there is a well-internalized ego identification
i t h the man, who must have definite qualities, in the former any ‘
bject will do, or else an object whose worth is recognized by
thers. This brings up the question whether there may be a rela-
we lack of sexual differentiation in the object choice, narcissistic
3 be sure, of the “as if” personality, whether male or female.
Reich makes the important observation that the mothers of
0th submissive and “as if” women are outstandingly narcissistic,
iuch concerned with the impression they and their children make
n others; they use their children for exhibitionistic purposes.
:hese findings correspond exactly with those in a male patient of
line, whose father and mother both were models of middle-class
onformity of the most extreme degree.
Proceeding to a discussion of the psychic mechanism opera-
ive in her patients, Reich first described the normal develop-
nental process of maturation, beginning with imitation, an ego
ctivity which is a precursor of identification that can occur with
ny impressive object, and proceeding gradually to a genuine ego
dentification with a good stable object, which facilitates the devel-
ipment of skills, interests, and reality testing. I t is well to interpo-
ate here that while the “as if” personality is capable of developing
kills, these rarely if ever go on to a genuine professional level,
hat he has no genuine interests, and that dilettantism is conspicu-
)us in his makeup. However, his reality testing seems to show no
ignificant defects; in fact, the retention of this ego function at
L high level distinguishes him from his kin, the schizophrenic.

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66 NATHANIEL ROSS

T h e women described by Reich were unable to achieve the

ability to love an object without taking over his qualities, to experi-
ence an ego transformation through true identifications, based on
desexualization of the libido. Their ego ideal represented an
identification with the early, glorified, maternal object. Since the
maturation of the superego requires full independence from the
environment, of which such individuals are obviously incapable,
their superego was literally absent. Their enormous vacillations
of self-esteem are characteristic of the infantile ego, which swings
rapidly from states of gratification, which lead to a feeling of
omnipotence, to hunger, which is equated with helplessness. Since
the differentiation between self and object is so poor, aggressive
attitudes toward the object are invariably reflected upon the self,
which thus also experiences rapid shifts between a sense of omnip-
otence and self-destructiveness.
Distinguishing the “as if” relationships during adolescence as
attempts at restitution of the object from which cathexis has been
withdrawn because of fear of the overwhelming instinctual drives
characteristic of this period, Reich considers such defensive maneu-
vers as essentially different from the “as if” traits of her patients
and Deutsch’s. T h e latter had appeared before puberty and did
not have the character of defensive structures. “As if” states which
appear suddenly are dangerous, premonitory of a psychotic break,
because they signal the attempt, which may fail, to repair a loss
of object cathexes.
Between 1958 and 1960, there appeared a number of clinical
contributions relevant to our subject. Greenson (ZI), expanding
the concept of the “screen,” which had already been elaborated
beyond its original reference to screen memories by Fenichel,
published a paper called, “On Screen Defenses, Screen Hunger
and Screen Identity.” Here he described patients who resembled
“as if” personalities. Like the latter, they were continually seeking
the company of others, in search of need-satisfying objects. Cease-
lessly looking for new experiences and objects, they were incapable
of being alone. Like “as if” personalities, they were well oriented
to reality and usually socially successful. They were often percep-
tive, sensitive, and apparently empathic, narcissistic, orally fixated,
and exhibitionistic. Their superegos were eminently corruptible.

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 67

Greenson felt that what he called their “screen” experiences served

to deny past disappointments. They resembled Deutsch’s “as if”
patients, but were not as sick (their fixations, according to Green-
son, were on the oral, phallic, and adolescent levels), and Reich’s
patients in their narcissistic object choices. It is my impression
that most of the patients described by Greenson fall more into the
“pseudo-as if” personalities described by M. Katan (29) because
their potential for affect seems far greater. Nevertheless, they cer-
tainly display “as if” manifestations.
I n a Panel Discussion (36) on neurotic ego distortion pub-
lished in 1958 Gitelson presented the case of a man in whom “as if”
features were prominent. Unlike the cases described by Helene
Deutsch, he was aware of his tendency to imitate people. H e said,
“I experience something; then I think of something I have read
and compare the situation I am in with it and then I know what
.
the feeling is. . . I let myself appear to be and I get to feeling
like the crowd I’m with.” I n this respect, and also in the presence
of conscious homosexual feelings, he resembled the patient to
whom I have alluded. Parenthetically, I d o not believe one can
exclude the diagnosis of “as if” states because of the existence of
insight into them, nor that these are incompatible with conscious
homosexual tendencies. In Gitelson’s patient, a finding important
to the understanding of “as if” states emerged as a result of the
arousal of homosexual transference manifestations. These pro-
voked a dream of being engulfed by waves and led to the insight
that the patient was afraid of being engulfed by feeling. T h e
threat of such feelings was provoked by massive rage and destruc-
tive impulses aroused by enormous overstimulation by the seduc-
tive mother. His fear of such engulfment led to denial and isolation
of all affects. This man was a pregenital and not a hysterical char-
acter. I believe one cannot rule out the “as if” state because of
the presence of underlying affect. T h e affect was of a primitive
narcissistically oriented type, and not that of a true object relation-
ship. Such fear of overwhelming affects may well exist in all “as if”
personalities, although Deutsch, Reich, and Katan all make the
point that the “as if” state does not reveal a defensive character
structure. Perhaps the original stimulus barrier, a precursor of
defense, persists in these individuals against a very early threat

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68 NATHANIEL ROSS

of being overwhelmed by the instinctual drives not yet structured

by object relationships.
In most respects Gitelson’s case showed typical “as if” mani-
festations: he was immature and his object relations were severely
impaired, but he nevertheless showed a need for objects, whom
he could charm in rather typical “as if” fashion; he made multiple
shifting identifications on an imitative level; he experienced no
feelings, only the somatic equivalents of affects, no love, n o con-
scious anxiety; his ethical standards revealed marked contradic-
tions. Nevertheless, he maintained his existence on a successfully
adaptive level.
Gitelson concluded that in such cases the ego is not weak b u t
strong, because it is capable of mobilizing successfully adaptive
measures at a time of crisis, and to mobilize other of its functions
to cope with reality and with the threat of total object loss. T h e
ego is intact, but arrested in its development.
Gitelson thus contributed additional facets of clinical and
theoretical importance to the “as if” picture. H e emphasized the
strength of the ego in its adaptive and compensatory activities,
pointed to the persistence of object hunger (like Greenson in his
description of screen personalities), called attention to the intact-
ness but arrested development of the ego, and by implication
directed attention to the need to investigate whether the apparent
affectlessness of certain cases of so-called ego distortion may
not, after all, represent a massive fear o€ being overwhelmed by
the drives.
In his discussion of the above case, M. Katan (29) pointed to
the necessity of distinguishing between true “as if” and “pseudo-as
if“ states-in the former identifications are of the primary type,
while in the latter they are secondary; thus the identifications in
the latter are genuine ego identifications with real objects. T h e
“pseudo-as if” personality contains a hysterical core. Furthermore,
like Reich, Katan distinguished between “as if” personalities and
temporary “as if” reactions, as in adolescence and prepsychotic
states; such temporary reactions are attempts to restore lost object
cathexes, while the former represent fixations at the level of pri-
mary identifications. H e also suggested that perhaps the reason
why “as if” personalities occur almost exclusively in women (with

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 69

which I cannot agree) is that in them the absence of a penis coin-

cides with the absence of a constant maternal object. Furthermore,
he distinguished between identification in the “as if” personality
and in the artist (the latter may superficially resemble the “as if”
personality because of his strong tendency to make identifications)
by pointing to the secondary nature of the identifications in the
latter, who brings something of his own unconscious into the proc-
ess because of the genuineness of his feelings. Finally, he found
the preservation of reality testing in the “as if” personality puz-
zling and suggested that perhaps this ego function in such cases
may possess autonomy.
Discussing Gitelson’s case, Katan expressed the opinion that
the means by which the patient warded off his feelings were so
predominantly defensive in nature that he regarded the case as a
“pseudo-as if” one and not a true “as if” personality.
Commenting on the “as if” personality in a paper entitled
“Clinical Aspects of the Schizoid Personality,” Masud Khan (30) ex-
pressed the view that the passivity of “as if” patients characterizes
the intrapsychic relations of their egos. I t succeeds in “sidetrack-
ing” strong affects (note the implication that there are strong
affects possible in these individuals) and in this way makes it pos-
sible to maintain the conflicts without losing egosyntonicity. H e
referred to TVinnicott’s description of “false self” personalities, in
whom the “false self” hides and protects the “true self,” which
is able to maintain its continuity. T h e “true self” suffers from
impoverishment because of its lack of experience, while the “false
self” cannot experience life and feel real. We shall soon discuss
the relationship between different selves in the impostor, a person-
ality type allied to the “as if.”
It is not possible at this point to present Khan’s careful detail-
ing of the sources and meanings of the enormous difficulties in
analyzing these and other schizoid personalities, but he believes
that it is possible to treat them successfully by being aware of their
fixation at the primary undifferentiated phase, the existence of
autonomous capacities of their egos, and their ability to test reality
against the reconstruction of their very early grandiose fantasies.
I n analysis they must be shown how they are trying to relive the
early fragmented reality and how they try to carry out this reliving

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70 NATHANIEL ROSS

under magic control. Although they appear to try to seduce the

analyst to guide and control them, this is not so, and the analyst
must be strong enough not to be seduced into collusion or rejection.
Allied to the “as if” personality is the impostor, to the under-
standing of which Helene Deutsch and Phyllis Greenacre have
made notable contributions. Deutsch compares “as if” individuals
with impostors (6). Both are attached to reality, they are both affec-
tively empty, and they lack originality. Unlike “as if” individuals,
impostors do not show a proclivity for multiple identifications and
they identify with objects corresponding to their ego ideal. T h e
grandiosity of the latter contrasts with their egos, guilt-laden
and devaluated.
According to Greenacre (ZO), the “as if” personality repre-
sents a diffuse form of imposture. Related to both “as if” and
imposture are certain forms of pathological behavior i n women-
malingering, kidnapping, and the successful assumption of the
interests and traits of men with whom they are subserviently i n
love. Greenacre calls attention to the great interest displayed by
impostors in imitation and gesture, corresponding to the “as if”
phase in children from two to three years of age. I n the latter there
is great skill in mimicry, associated with much charm (frequently
present in both “as if” personalities and in impostors). She observes
that in children of this age, imitation is strongly cathected because
of the great pleasure in the acquisition of new skills. I n addition,
Greenacre (19) has written on the relation of the impostor to the
artist, On the one hand, the artist often feels like an impostor,
especially at the beginning of his career, while imposture may
impress others as close to artistic achievement. Both artist and
impostor have two selves. “In both creative artist on the brink of
a new surge of creativity and in the impostor, between periods of
imposture, there is a sense of ego hunger and a need for comple-
tion-in the one, of the artistic self; in the other, of a satisfying
identity in the world” (p. 540). I have already referred to the obser-
vations of others (Greenson, Gitelson) on the ego hunger of patients
resembling “as if” personalities. I should also like to observe that
the dilettantism of “as if” personalities frequently takes the form
of shallow interests in the arts. One of these, in my experience,

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 71

was a superficial, self-styled connoisseur of painting; the other, a

prominent actress who commiserated over her lack of talent.
T h e profession of acting seems to attract “as if” personalities,
and is allied to imposture. Fenichel (12) observed that actors are
people easily disposed to identifications and in need of constant
narcissistic supplies. I n acting there is a concealment of the true
self. T h e actor plays at what he might have been-the relationship
to the impostor here is a clear one. Fenichel considered that play-
ing parts represents test-identifications, with attempts at the dis-
charge of affects otherwise fraught with potential anxiety, through
identifications with others. T h e prevailing motivations in actors
are attempts to relieve anxiety, to seduce and overpower the audi-
ence (like the impostor), and to master the external world, like
children at play. Curiously enough, while many great actors are
individuals without well-formed egos and with colorless personali-
ties (i.e., “as if“ personalities), others are well-integrated person-
alities. This dichotomy, in my opinion, poses a metapsychologi-
cal problem.
A word about the relationship between depersonalization and
the “as if” state. Jacobson (27) observes that states of affect, block-
ing, or emptiness may lead to depersonalization. T h e vividness of
the “I” experience depends on feeling of aliveness and may be
diminished to an extreme degree when the affects are absent or
disappear. Occasional attacks of depersonalization have been ob-
served in “as if” personalities (Deutsch, Zilboorg, Gitelson). Sarlin
(40) believes that depersonalization can be viewed as a withdrawal
of cathexis from the self representation, accompanied by a patho-
logically hypercathected identification with the object, with a
corresponding loss of identity. TVe may ask whether this applies
to the “as if” personality, with its persistent submergence of the
self in objects. If depersonalization is a defense against powerful
id drives and their associated affects viewed as a threat to survival,
and it does appear in “as if” personalities, the question again
arises whether defense mechanisms play any role at all in the “as
if” state. I have suggested the possibility that not defense itself
but a precursor of defense may be operative-the elementary exer-
cise of the barrier against overwhelming stimuli.
What are the genetic determinants of the “as if” state, whether

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72 NATHANIEL ROSS

crystallized in the form of the “as if” personality or only occasion-

ally evident in “as if” states? TVe have already observed that there
appears to be general agreement that there is a fixation at the level
of imitativeness, coinciding originally with the stage of primary
identification and taking more active form during the period
between two and three years of age, when the child is so superb
a mimic. TVhy, in certain cases, is there arrested development at
this level, when multiple identifications are the rule, affect is rela-
tively primitive and shallow, the self and the object poorly differ-
entiated, object constancy not yet established, reality testing
rudimentary, and the superego unformed, yet reality testing pro-
gresses to a level which avoids the eventuality of psychosis and
the defensive functions of the ego remain too rudimentary to
eventuate in neurosis? Recently Frosch (17) proposed that there
is a substructure of the ego which he designates as reality con-
stancy, which can mature to a high degree while object constancy
does not develop. I wonder whether in such instances, under the
rubric of which falls the “as if” personality, there is not enormous
cathexis of reality in the form of the material, nonhuman environ-
ment, while object cathexis is conspicuously lacking. T h e unequiv-
ocaI case of “as if” personality which I have treated reveals this
dichotomy to a striking degree.
This man of thirty-two, profoundly lacking in affect, enor-
mously popular with others, who considered him a warm, percep-
tive, outgoing individual, confessed to me that he had never had
the slightest feeling of tenderness or affection for anybody as far
back as he could remember. H e was an excellent salesman, because
he was able to identify himself with the widest variety of indi-
viduals. H e was completely and shamelesslyopportunistic. Although
extremely bright, he had no interest in anybody or anything,
except to find acceptance by the wealthiest and most prominent
members of society-at which he succeeded. H e came to analysis
only because the richest and most socially prominent girl he could
find to marry, had broken off their engagement and he wondered
what could have been wrong. I n his family, the whole mode and
ideal of life were conformity to the most conventional standards.
His father was a distant, extremely passive man, utterly lacking
i n any interests except clothes, money, and acceptance. His mother

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 73

was flat, colorless, timid, undemonstrative, and frightened to death

of public opinion. T h e sole topics of conversation in the family
as far back as the patient could remember, were money, clothes,
possessions, things-material substances-and social acceptance.
Numerous writers concur in the view that the lack or relative
deficiency of affect, the tendency to multiple identifications, and
the superego defect are prominent features of the schizoid, which
includes the “as if” personality; such patients invariably show a
history of maternal deprivation in the form of indifference or
smothering, narcissistic possessiveness (2, 3, 24, 28, 30). James (28)
has described an infant who was neglected by her mother and cared
for by a nurse on a rigid schedule; this child, within the first three
months of her life, displayed what the author calls premature ego
development. This baby was always hungry, restless, showed
unusual alertness to sounds, and at eight months showed a degree
of appealingness which James believes was evidence of object
hunger. H e postulates that such infants have to take over the func-
tions of the mother in a nonphase-specific way. They reveal “pseu-
dosublimations of an impaired sense of identity and fluidity of
identifications.” At five she showed an unusual capacity to take
over the mannerisms, accents, postures, and interests of other chil-
dren-such behavior was a substitute for object relations. Such
an eventuality arises from the flooding and hypercathexis of mem-
ory at the perceptual end of the psychic apparatus in the absence
of the capacity for discharge. T h e traumatic flood of images
threatens to organize into thoughts, even though secondary proc-
ess is not possible at so early an age. T h e progress from perception
to motility is disturbed. Thoughts tend to be regarded as realities,
and there is diminished cathexis of both the infant’s and the
mother’s body. James’s penetrating analysis of the causes and con-
sequences of such premature ego development gives us clues to
the meaning of the deficient affectivity and the empty verbaliza-
tion of “as if” personalities.
Edith Jacobson (25, 26) has made the most illuminating con-
tributions to the problems of self, self and object representations,
the differentiation of the self from the object world, the process
of identification, normal and pathological, the development of
object relations, and the earliest precursors of feelings, thinking,

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74 NATHANIEL ROSS

and purposeful motor activity. It would be most fruitful to sum-

marize her description of early psychic development in metapsy-
chological terms, but to do justice to such an endeavor would be
too space-consuming. I can only select certain of her observations
as especially germane to our subject. (i) Successful ego activities
are not merely narcissistic gratifications. Creative activity (con-
spicuously lacking in “as if“ personalities) suffers if the primary
urge is not an autonomous interest in the subject. (ii) I n order
to be satisfying, affects must be both self and object directed. (iii) A
predominance of object libido is characterized by a wide and rich
affective scale, subtle feeling shades, warm and vivid emotional
qualities. Such object libido shows a variety of fusions with neu-
tralized energy. In schizoid personalities the range of feeling is
limited to coldness, hostility, anxiety, hurt, shame, security, inse-
curity, etc. This points to the existence of uninhibited, aggressive,
self-directed discharge processes. (iv) T h e first playful imitations
of the young child are not true identifications, although the child
may feel that he is the parent while he is imitating him. These
are “as if” phenomena, based on the magic and illusion of being
the mother. There is strong ambivalence in such states between
helpless dependency and active aggressive strivings. (v) T r u e
ego identifications, characterized by awareness of the future and
the tendency to become the object in partial ways representing
deep-seated ego modifications, follow the above stage in the normal
course of events. Jacobson (26) cites the case of a psychotic woman
who revealed striking “as if” features before her breakdown. Espe-
cially interesting is the fact that when she became actively psy-
chotic, there was an outburst of enormous aggressiveness with
attempts to act out fantasies of killing or being killed by the object.
Again, we are bound to question whether “as if” personalities are
as affectless as they seem to be. Helene Deutsch has mentioned
the underlying aggressiveness in these individuals. Perhaps what
we mean by affectlessness in them is their lack of libidinal cathexes,
whereas there exists in them an enormous reservoir of aggression.
Hendrick (22), also discussing the early development of the
ego, makes reference to the stage of imitation, which initiates, but
does not necessarily mature into, complete identifications with
components of the object’s ego. H e also emphasizes the necessity

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 75

for both frttstratiott and gratification in stimulating the develop-

ment of the ego-a well-recognized necessity for optimal develop-
ment and one which is important in the etiology of schizoid states,
including “as if” ones.
Koff (31), in an attempt to distill out of the literature the
various meanings of the term identification, also makes the already
familiar distinction between primary (transitory, imitative, fleet-
ing) identification and true, ego, secondary identification, the
latter resulting from the renunciation of an object which had origi-
nally been: invested with libido. I n both forms of identification,
the economic function is the same-to conserve libido, in the
primary form, before an object relationship is formed: in the sec-
ondary type, after it has been formed. There is, however, a differ-
ence in structure between the two: in imitation, there is not a
structural change but a dynamic regression, while in true identifi-
cation there is a structural modification of the ego which is altered
in accordance with characteristics identical with or opposite to
those of the object.
T h e developmental vicissitudes of the sense of identity were
taken u p at a panel discussion of the American Psychoanalytic
Association (35), where Mahler described an “as if” boy treated in
both childhood and adolescence. H e had feelings of emptiness and
lifelessness. Because of an early sexual symbiotic relationship with
his mother, abruptly followed by sexual overstimulation by the
father, this boy could not accept either parent as a figure for identi-
fication because of his massive aggression toward both. He was
left with a depleted body image and loss of self cathexis. Here our
attention is called to the relationships between the body image,
self cathexis, and the development of the “as if” state.
Since we are discussing the relationships of the “as if” state
to developmental phenomena, I should like to call attention briefly
to Anna Freud’s observation that the “as if” behavior of adoles-
cents, including the violent “love fixations” of teenage girls, repre-
sents not object relations but very primitive identifications. Such
passionate love relations constitute desperate attempts to recapture
the external world, the cathexis of which is threatened because of
the rupture of old relationships and the antagonism to instincts
characteristic of this period. One is reminded of the association

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76 NATHANIEL ROSS

between the disgust of existentialists for the external world, “beat”

poets, and the writers of the theater of the absurd, and the so-
called sexual revolution, with its enormous promiscuity, dissolu-
tion of sexual differentiation, and mass orgies.
T h e affectlessness, or apparent affectlessness, associated with
the “as if“ state is a most interesting phenomenon. Certainly, as
Jacobson (25) has pointed out; the increasing richness, variety,
and shading of affect are functions of increasing ego maturation.
There are defenses against affects as well as against instinctual
drives (1 1, p. 1.61ff.). Affectlessness itself may constitute a defense.
Fenichel (10) has described a case characterized by a “total lack”
of affective response to analysis and to the analyst in a patient who
had all his life shown a defiance to father substitutes by remaining
without apparent feeling in the face of the most extreme provoca-
tions. His equanimity was only occasionally disturbed by feelings
of depersonalization, at which time he would claim that every-
thing was absurd except music, because it was remote from reality.
Fenichel concluded from material presented by this patient that
he was an anal-sadistic character who made his father ridiculous
by rendering his rage impotent by remaining unmoved by it. As
a child he considered adults ridiculous because they prohibited
pleasurable activities which they nevertheless engaged in them-
selves. I n accordance with Katan’s formulation (29), this patient
would be considered a “pseudo-as if” personality, because he func-
tioned on a more advanced level than the true “as if” personality.
But is there really no defensive meaning to the “as if” affectless-
ness? Is it possible that the affectlessness is perhaps a deep defense
against primary anxiety-a genuine fear of primitive ego dissolu-
tion by the onslaught of overwhelming instinctual (aggressive)
drives? Zilboorg (42) wrote a very interesting paper called “Anxi-
ety without Affect” before the appearance of Helene Deutsch’s
paper on the “as if” personality. He pointed out that the compo-
nents of the anxiety reaction are (i) its ideational content, (ii) its
affect (feeling tone) and (iii) the motor reaction. I t is easily possible
to conceive of the presence of conscious ideational content with
the affect and motor reaction repressed, as in obsessional states,
of the affect and motor reaction combined, with repression of the
ideational content, as in anxiety attacks, and motor reactions (neu-

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 77

rotic lacrimation, visceral phenomena) with ideation and affect

repressed, but it seems impossible to imagine anxious ideational
content and motor reaction without affect. However, Zilboorg
describes a case strongly reminiscent of what Deutsch later called
the “as if” personality, in which “anxiety” took place “without
affect.” This patient had several attacks during analysis, precipi-
tated by situations with passive homosexual meanings, in which
he experienced all the ideational and motor phenomena of anxiety
without experiencing the feeling of anxiety. I n dreams all the
components were fused, but not in waking life. Zilboorg attempted
to explain this phenomenon by postulating that such patients
undergo temporary total regressions to the earliest, most primitive
responses to massive influxes of stimuli. This is a regression to
what Zilboorg at the time called the primary undifferentiated nar-
cissistic state; he likened it to the prestuporous states in certain
schizophrenics which contain contents suggesting the wish for
fusion with the primal mother. T h e effect in such cases is not
recognized as one’s own. When the ego is given up, so is the affect.
Novey (34) furnishes us with a review of affect theory. Ger-
mane to this discussion is his description of the affects of the
preobject state, which are pleasure and unpleasure. T h e latter
is divided into (i) primary anxiety, which is synonymous with
traumatic anxiety in Freud’s sense; (ii) aphanisis, the complete
inability to achieve libidinal gratification; and (iii) primitive rage,
usually a response to inhibition in motor activity. All these are
interlinked. I do not intend to give a complete summary of Novey’s
views on affect but would like to point out that a consideration of
the dynamics of the “as if” personality makes it necessary to dis-
cuss the questions of (i) possible precursors of defense against trau-
matic anxiety, (ii) the presence of aphanisis, and (iii) the tendency
to outbursts of primitive rage (Deutsch) in these individuals.
Glauber (18) has made observations on what he designates a
primary form of anhedonia-a chronic state of lack of conscious
pleasure punctuated by acute anxiety. WhiIe these also seem to
fall into the “pseudo-as if” category of Katan, we find here too the
mention of detachment, a lack of pleasure in all relationships,
absence of closeness, and feeling of emptiness. Here too the etio-
logical factors are severe early traumata. T h e anhedonics are

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78 NATHANIEL ROSS

fixated at an earlier level of development than the depressives.

They are narcissistic and orally fixated and fear ego impoverish-
ment or annihilation. Their ego ideals are of a magical, grandiose
nature. When the anhedonic defense fails, there may be outbursts
of violent aggression in the form of storms of purposeless motor
activity; there ensues anxiety followed by states of emptiness and
aff ectlessness. There are numerous resemblances here to the “as
if” state,
Zetzel’s (41) contributions to the problem of anxiety are out-
standing. I n connection with the subject under discussion, it is
noteworthy that all those who have written on the “as if” problem
make note of the apparent absence of anxiety. TVhat does this
mean? Zetzel, emphasizing the distinction between primary (trau-
matic) and secondary anxiety, makes the point that the capacity
to generate and tolerate secondary anxiety is essential for the
maturation of the ego, the development of psychic health, and the
ability to attain insight in the therapeutic situation. We cannot
assume that the “as if” personality has more than a rudimentary
ability to reach the level of secondary anxiety. In schizophrenia,
the ego disintegrates under the impact of traumatic anxiety. We
have seen how the schizoid and the “as if” personalities may show
evidence of the temporary breakthrough of such disintegrative
states. Again I raise the question: is affectlessness simply a state
oE the arrest of ego development, or does it in addition constitute
a primitive barrier, at the expense of ego maturation, to the
threatened onslaught of the traumatic influx of overwhelming
stimuli derived from the instinctual drives?
With the ego operating at so primitive a level, it is not diffi-
cult to understand the finding in Deutsch’s original cases that the
superego seemed totally undeveloped. After all, to achieve the
oedipal level, the ego must have firmly established its capacity for
true object relationships, albeit still at an infantile level. Since it
is a matter of substantial agreement that the superego as an inter-
nalized structure is not established except through the resolution
of the oedipal conflict, it is impossible to see how an “as if” per-
sonality could have a real superego. However, precursors of super-
ego formation may exist in such individuals, such as reaction
formations and talion fears, although these too may have a strong

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 79

imitative tinge, based on primary identifications with parental

models. Jacobson (25) states that a basic function of the superego
is the central regulation of narcissistic cathexis, which promotes
the stability of both, protects the self from dangerous instinctual
stimuli and hence from narcissistic harm, and also promotes the
stability of moods. Such a regulatory function does not exist in
the “as if” personality (nor in the adolescent or schizophrenic in
the “as if” state), who is capable, through identification, of the
most bizarre types of instinctual acting out and the wildest swings
between states of narcissistic enhancement and of degradation.
Maenchen (32) has described a case of superego disintegration in
a boy who, after a childhood of severe maternal deprivation, lost
his father, who had been his ego ideal, and became prey to violent
aggressive outbursts and complained that nothing was meaningful,
“everything was bunk,” and life meant nothing to him.
Before he had fully formulated his concept of the superego,
Freud (14) spoke of the ego ideal as the heir of infantile narcissism
(see also 38, 39, 33, 23). Sandler (39) has pointed out the double
gain derived from the earliest attempts of the child to conform
to the ego ideal set forth by its mother-in imitating her, it gains
from doing what she wants and at the same time being like her.
Thus, the passivity and its skillful mimicry of the “as if” person-
ality reflect this fusion with the ego ideal and identification at
a primitive level. There is no introjection as yet at this level-the
conformity is at an external level-in both the child and the
“as if” personality. Just as the “as if” personality suffers little from
anxiety because he can always submerge himself in an immediate
object, so is he singularly lacking in that kind of anxiety we desig-
nate as guilt, because this requires a process of internalization
which he has not undergone. If the superego is tolerated by the
ego only as long as it supports the latter (24), the ego can disregard
the superego if it can get its narcissistic supplies elsewhere. Con-
sequently, if even relatively well-developed superegos can disinte-
grate under the impact of group mores, attitudes, political
movements, etc., how much more susceptible is the “as if” person-
ality, whose superego is lacking?
Reich (38) points to the persistence of imitative identifica-
tions-fantasies of being the object or being like the object-in

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80 NATHANIEL ROSS

individuals who, for various reasons, regress easily to the level of

grandiose early ego ideals. These individuals are in a state of
permanent unsatisfied narcissism. I think this consideration cer-
tainly applies to the “as if” personality. T h e nature of the ego
ideal in these individuals requires further study. Helene Deutsch
(7) has also pointed to the fact that when the ego of an individual
is fixated on precursors of the ego ideal, there results the “as if”
type. In the impostor, she says, the ego ideal is fragmented-the
more real ego ideal is suppressed (presumably because it is deni-
grated). Murray (33) asserts that the possession of a mature ego
ideal is a most important force in maintaining integrity and bal-
ance between instinctual demands and legitimate restraints. Libidi-
nal objects enter into its construction and the affects entering into
such object relationships may undergo sublimation. G. Bibring
(4) points out that the ego ideal belongs to and must be integrated
into the superego and neutralized by a healthy ego. Hendrick (23)
adds that the ego ideal is “not fully abstract” until adolescence-
before then it depends on the actual existence of a person who
personifies the ideal. I n severe pathological states such as schizoid
states, there is a fragility of the ego ideal.

Siirnmary
It is perhaps more fruitful not to isolate the “as if“ personality
as a sharply demarcated syndrome, but to consider the “as if” state
as ranging along a spectrum, with the “as if” personality in pure
culture at one end, and numerous “as if” states with varying
degrees of pathology, “pseudo” states resembling the “as if” in the
middle, and “as if” phenomena in individuals who appear rela-
tively normal and well functioning at the other end. Perhaps we
can even speak of sublimations of the “as if” state, such as acting,
political activity, extreme conformity, etc. (This “spectrum” is
not meant to describe descending degrees of pathology.) It is gen-
erally agreed that the “as if” phenomenon is represented develop-
mentally at the two-three year level of imitativeness, and does not
represent true or secondary identification. Narcissism is extreme
and object choices, if they can truly be called such, are of the
narcissistic type. Affect is singularly poor and presumably reflects
the severe retardation of ego maturation, especially with respect to

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 THE “AS IF” CONCEPT 81

object relations. Most writers feel that this relative affectlessness

is predefensive in nature, although it may be incorporated into
later defensive structures. I have raised the question whether it
may not represent the persistence of the operation of the primitive
stimulus barrier against overwhelming instinctual pressures. While
this is not technically speaking ego defense, its breakdown would
account for the bizarre outbursts of primitive rage and pseudo
anxiety (without affect). T h e superego in the “as if” state is unde-
veloped, and the ego ideal is of a fragile, magical, early grandiose
type. I have raised the question whether the scarcity of true “as
if” personalities may not be more apparent than real, because it
is difficult to imagine what would motivate such individuals to
seek psychiatric treatment. With extreme conformity the rule,
affectlessness in the upbringers of children a widespread phenome-
non, marked emphasis on material values as primary in so many
families, and the very common denial of the most elementary
psychic realities, it seems likely that the “as if” personality
may be a far more common type than we have encountered in
analytic practice.
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830 Park Avenue
Arew York, N.Y. I0021

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