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Taslik Al Nafs Full Version R7kolm
Taslik Al Nafs Full Version R7kolm
volume i
editor-ın-chief
Wahid M. Amin
general editors
Robert Gleave
Laura Hassan
Andreas Lammer
associate editors
Jari Kaukua
Sayeh Meisami
Matthew Melvin-Koushki
Sajjad Rizvi
Abdulaziz Sachedina
Meryem Sebti
Tony Street
Robert Wisnovsky
The Collected Writings Of Al-ʾAllāma Al-Ḥillī
املؤلف
املعروف بـ
by
also known as
al-ʾallāma al-ḥillī
jari kaukua
Copyright 2021 by AMI Press
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First edition
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-8384996-9-3
Table of Contents
i ~ on general things 4
1. On Premises 6
On Conception and Assent 6 • On Making Known 8 • On
Syllogism 10 • On the Matters and the Forms of Syllogisms 12
vii
table of contents
vi ~ on justice 254
1. On Intellectual Good and Bad 256
2. That He Most High Does Not Perform What is Bad or
Violate What is Obligatory 260
3. On the Creation of Acts 262
4. That He Most High Wills Obedience and Detests Disobedience 268
5. On the Charge 270
6. On Grace 274
7. On Pains and Compensations 276
8. On Appointed Times, Provisions, and Prices 280
viii
table of contents
Bibliography 368
General Index 372
ix
Foreword to the Series
Wahid M. Amin
Editor-in-Chief
xi
foreword to the series
expertise in all the major rational (ʾaqlī) and religious (naqlī) sciences of
his day, and in many respects is the first notable Shiʾi personality to do
so in an age when scholars were becoming increasingly multidisciplinary.
This is true especially given the post-Avicennan setting in which al-Ḥillī’s
career took shape, which was a period in which the study of philosophical
sciences became a gradually integral part of a scholar’s education and train-
ing. His importance to, and impact upon, the later Imami tradition cannot
be overstated; a firm grasp of his ideas and acquaintance of his work allows
one to have a better historical appreciation of what came after him. Indeed,
it could be argued that it was his formulation of that curriculum that has
since been developed through the centuries and which continues to ex-
ert its influence on large parts of Shiʾi scholarship in the modern period.
There is an extensive body of commentary literature on al-Ḥillī’s writings
and many of his works continue to be studied and commented on in Shiʾi
seminaries today. We hope that the publication of the volumes in this series
will help shed further light on this rich but largely untapped period within
Shiʾi intellectual history and provide future scholars with a springboard
from which to explore the commentarial tradition developed by al-Ḥillī’s
successors up to the Safavid period and beyond.
The volumes translated in this series have been carefully chosen to show-
case the breadth and depth of al-Ḥillī’s knowledge across a wide variety of
Islamic disciplines. Each one is translated by a specialist in the field and
is accompanied by annotations that explain the meaning and surrounding
intellectual context of al-Ḥillī’s remarks. They are further supplemented
by scholarly introductions, an index, and in some instances a glossary of
key terms. Each volume is presented in professionally typeset facing pag-
es, English on the left, Arabic on the right. Before publication, the quality
and accuracy of each work is checked and evaluated by myself and another
member of the editorial team, as well as an external blind reviewer. Al-Ḥillī
was a prolific author and composed several dozen texts, many of which
are published in multivolume Arabic editions. This series cannot obviously
translate all of his writings, and so our aim initially is to translate and com-
pile ten of the major works in al-Ḥillī’s oeuvre, though this list may increase
depending on future funding and support. It goes without saying that with-
out the assiduous hard work and dedication of the people who have la-
boured on this project none of this would have come to bear any fruit. I am
grateful to them, the individuals who supported this series financially, and
the divine hand that has helped and guided us to prepare the publication of
the first volume in the series.
xii
foreword to the series
xiii
ıntroduction
Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, better known as al-ʾAllāma al-
Ḥillī, is a formative figure in the Shīʾī amalgamation of Abū al-Ḥusayn
al-Baṣrī’s (d. 436/1045) Muʾtazilī theology and Avicennian philosophy.1
Born into a learned family in 648/1250 in al-Ḥilla in central Iraq, Ḥillī
began his studies in ḥadīth, theology, Qurʿānic exegesis, and grammar in
his hometown, and proceeded to study Avicennian philosophy, astrono-
my, and theology with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Najm al-Dīn
al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277), possibly at the famous observatory
complex in Marāgha.2 Ḥillī wrote commentaries on the works of both of
his teachers, and especially Ṭūsī’s importance to his thinking is difficult
to overestimate.
Probably from the mid-670s/1270s onwards, Ḥillī split his time between
al-Ḥilla and Baghdād, where he may have become acquainted with Ibn
ʾArabī’s (d. 638/1240) thought through Shams al-Dīn al-Kīshī (d. 695/1296).
Around the same time, he also studied dialectic with Burhān al-Dīn al-Na-
safī (d. 687/1288), grammar with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Naḥwī (d. 681/1282–3),
and Qurʿānic exegesis with the Ḥanafite scholar Taqī al-Dīn al-Kūfī. In ad-
dition, he may have studied Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī’s (d. 586/1190)
philosophy, on whose Talwīḥāt he also wrote a commentary, with ʾIzz al-
Dīn al-Wāsiṭī (d. 694/1292–3).3
Ḥillī’s fame as a scholar and teacher also brought him close to the polit-
ical power of his time. The Ilkhanid rulers of Iran had converted to Islam
in the 690s/1290s, with sultan Ūljāytū declaring Islam the state religion in
703/1304. Initially Sunnī, Ūljāytū turned to Shīʾism in 709/1310, possibly
under Ḥillī’s influence. Regardless of the truth of this famous story, at-
tempts to influence the cultural and religious policies of his time may have
motivated at least some of Ḥillī’s philosophical work.4 Towards the end of
Ūljāytū’s reign, in 715–6/1315–6, Ḥillī left the court to return to al-Ḥilla. He
spent his remaining years teaching and writing, mostly at his hometown,
where he died in 726–7/1325.5 The number of ijāzāt traced back to him sug-
1 Schmidtke 1991, 4.
2 Schmidtke 1991, 9-19.
3 Schmidtke 1991, 19-21.
4 Wisnovsky 2018 argues that Ḥillī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Shifāʿ arose from a politically
loaded discussion with the vizier Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamadānī (d. 718/1318).
5 Schmidtke 1991, 23-34.
xv
ıntroduction
gest that Ḥillī was a highly venerated teacher. One of his most celebrated
students is the famous logician and philosopher Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.
766/1365).6
Turning to his literary output, the first theological work Ḥillī wrote was
Manāhij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn, which was completed in 680/1281 and re-
mained one of his most important works on the subject. Around the same
time, he composed the much more concise Nuẓum al-barāhīn, to which
he also wrote an autocommentary, and began commenting on the Kitāb
al-yāqūt by a certain Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn al-Nawbakhtī, completing the
commentary in 684/1285.7 In 687/1288, he completed the theological part
of Muntahā l-wuṣūl, another work more concise in scope than the Manāhij.
Then, having gained some experience as a theologian, he started compos-
ing the Kashf al-murād, which was the first commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn
al-Ṭūsī’s widely read Tajrīd al-iʾtiqād (also known as Tajrīd al-ʾaqāʿid) and
one of Ḥillī most famous works. Ḥillī completed the Kashf in 696/1297,8
but probably already before finishing this commentary, he began writing
his theological magnum opus, the Nihāyat al-marām. The composition of
this work took him several decades, and it is quite possible that it remained
incomplete at his death. Its expansive scope notwithstanding, or indeed
perhaps because of it, the Nihāya was not as widely circulated as some of
Ḥillī’s other theological works.9
In addition to the aforementioned titles, Ḥillī composed three relative-
ly concise theological works at the request of his son and close associate
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥillī, better known as Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn
(d. 771/1369), who was a prominent scholar of law and theology in his
own right. The first of these was the Nahj al-mustarshidīn, completed in
699/1299, followed by the Kashf al-fawāʿid, a commentary on Ṭūsī’s Qa-
wāʾid al-ʾaqāʿid completed in 703/1304, and the present work, Taslīk al-
nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds, completed in 704/1304.10 Apart from these concise
summae, Ḥillī’s tenure at the Ilkhānid court yielded a number of polemical
theological works on specific topics. Among these works, written at Ūl-
jāytū’s request, are the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma, defending the Shīʾī
doctrine of the imamate, the Istiqṣāʿal-naẓar fī l-qaḍāʿwa-l-qadar on the
xvi
ıntroduction
Muʾtazilite doctrine of human freedom, and the Kitāb nahj al-ḥaqq wa-
kashf al-ṣidq, which challenges Ashʾarite theological doctrine. These
works gave rise to a series of refutations and counter-refutations by Sunnī
and Shīʾī authors, respectively. During the same period, Ḥillī also wrote
several smaller treatises on specific theological topics.11 One of his last the-
ological works was al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʾashar, a concise creed composed for the
wider public. This remains his most popular work, and along with a ninth/
fifteenth-century commentary by al-Miqdād al-Fāḍil al-Ḥillī (d. 826/1423),
it was translated into English as a representative text of Shīʾī doctrine by
an American missionary in the 1920’s.12 Apart from the aforementioned
works, several theological titles ascribed to Ḥillī are lost.13
By Ḥillī’s time, a strict division between theology (kalām) and philoso-
phy (ḥikma) is somewhat anachronistic, given how thoroughly Avicennian
concerns had influenced the theological debates. It would be even more
misleading to assume that the distinction tallies with our modern under-
standing of philosophy; from this point of view, texts from both kalām and
ḥikma belong in the same basket. With these qualifications in mind, a num-
ber of texts in Ḥillī’s œuvre has an approach or a source text that warrants
classifying them as more philosophical than the aforementioned theologi-
cal works. Ḥillī’s first treatise of this kind, the Kitāb al-asrār al-khafīya, was
also the most important one. According to Sabine Schmidtke, several parts
of the Asrār were probably finished already before the completion of Ḥillī’s
first theological treatise in 680/1281. The work has a traditional Peripatetic
structure of three parts, with an introductory section of logic preceding
ones on physics and metaphysics. As a sign of the tenuous distinction be-
tween philosophy and theology, even in this philosophical work Ḥillī is
openly critical of the Avicennian doctrine whenever it conflicts with his
preferred theological views.14
Ḥillī was also a capable logician,15 as evidenced by two of his logical
works that survive. The earlier of these, a commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsīya
called Qawāʾid al-jalīya, was completed in 679/1280, and the second, a
commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq called al-Jawhar al-naḍīd, short-
ly after that.16 Apart from the partial remains of two further philosophical
xvii
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In broad terms, Ḥillī’s approach to philosophy takes its cue from his
teacher Ṭūsī’s way of combining Avicennian philosophy with the later
Muʾtazilite theology of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers. The aim
was a concerted attempt at challenging the reformed Ashʾarism of authors
like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.21 This can be illustrated by a brief review of a se-
lect number of common points of debate.
For the entire earlier history of Islamic theology, one of the central prob-
lems had been the relation between God’s essence and His attributes. By
Ṭūsī’s and Ḥillī’s time, three main alternatives were available as answers
to this question, all of which came with problematic consequences.22 One
could adopt the Ashʾarite view, according to which the attributes were re-
ally distinct from God’s essence. This, however, came at the cost of violat-
ing God’s unicity: if eternality is characteristic of the divine, and if not only
the essence but also the attributes are eternal, how is this different from
the abomination of polytheism (shirk)? What is more, the postulation of
really distinct attributes threatened to lead into an infinite regress: if God
is eternal (qadīm) by an attribute of eternality, one may ask whether the
attributes, including the attribute of eternality, are also eternal on the same
grounds, and so forth. An attempt at mitigating such problems was to hold
that the attributes were neither identical with nor different from God’s es-
sence, but this was recognised to violate the principles of non-contradic-
tion and excluded middle. A second alternative was the early Muʾtazilite
xviii
ıntroduction
theory, according to which the attributes are not distinct from God’s es-
sence. This, however, threatens to collapse the attributes into one: if both
‘knowing’ (ʾālim) and ‘powerful’ (qādir) are identical to God’s essence,
then by virtue of the transitivity of identity, ‘knowing’ should be identical
to ‘powerful’ – which is evidently absurd. Moreover, such a deflationary
account was perceived to be ill at ease with the Qurʿān’s bold statements
about the attributes. Finally, a third alternative was introduced with the
Muʾtazilite Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʿī’s (d. 321/933) metaphysical use of the
grammatical term ḥāl, or “mode of being”. Modes are features, which are
grounded in existing things but which themselves neither exist nor do not
exist. For instance, being a knower is grounded in a really existing quality
of knowledge inhering in a really existing person, but it is not a further
third entity in addition to the person and her knowledge. Abū Hāshim held
that God’s attributes are modes, which are grounded in God’s essence but
the metaphysical status of which is different from the essence, because they
neither exist nor do not exist. This allowed him to do away with the prob-
lems of polytheism and infinite regress, but it left the theory vulnerable to
the charge that the modes violate the principle of excluded middle.23
Ḥillī’s favoured solution to the problem of God’s attributes was to adopt
the Avicennian notion of mental existence. In extramental reality, God is
absolutely one. However, when we think about such an absolute unity, we
realise that it entails a number of further features, and insofar as we con-
ceive these features as distinct separate from the essence that entails them,
they can be said to be distinct – but only in the mind.24 Ḥillī also followed
Avicenna in conceiving of God’s essence as consisting of necessary exist-
ence (He is wājib al-wujūd)25 and inferring the other attributes, like unici-
ty, goodness, knowledge, or voluntariness, from it. Similarly, he endorsed
other metaphysical views underlying the Avicennian doctrine, in particu-
lar, the distinction between essence and existence, the theory of modalities
that is based on this distinction,26 and the view that existence is predicated
23 On the Bahshamite doctrine of aḥwāl and its later reception, see Frank 1978, Thiele 2016, and
Benevich 2016.
24 Schmidtke 1991, 169-179.
25 Schmidtke 1991, 180-186.
26 In other words, the view that what exists is either necessary by essence (wājib bi-dhātihi) or
possible by essence (mumkin bi-dhātihi). Only God is necessary by His essence, whereas all
other existents are contingent, or things, the essences of which do not entail their existence.
On the other hand, insofar as a contingent thing actually exists, it is necessary due to an extra-
neous cause, or necessary due to another (wājib bi-l-ghayr). This classification also allows us
to speak of things that are impossible by essence or through another, although the question of
xix
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of God and created things in one and the same sense (ishtirāk maʾnawī)
but according to differences in priority and posteriority (bi-l-tashkīk).27
In the question of God’s knowledge, however, Ḥillī departs from the
Avicennian doctrine. According to Avicenna, God only knows particular
things “in a universal way” or “through their causes”.28 This is because were
He to know the particulars as such, His knowledge would have to change
as those things change. If God knew me in one and the same way, say as
a presently living person, prior to my birth, now, and after my death, He
would have to have first been wrong, then got it right for a number of dec-
ades, only to lapse into error again. For Avicenna, the alternative of allow-
ing change in God’s knowledge, and thereby in God Himself, was equally
unpalatable. Instead of this kind of reasoning, Ḥillī seems to have followed
Rāzī in endorsing Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s relational theory, according
to which knowledge only amounts to a relation or connection (taʾalluq)
between its subject and its object. The benefit of this view was that it al-
lowed its proponent to deny that change in the object entails change in
the subject – only the relation between the divine subject and the created
object comes into existence or ceases to exist together with the object.29
Interestingly, in the case of the related attributes of seeing (baṣīr) and
hearing (samīʾ), Ḥillī was more cautious than either Abū al-Ḥusayn or his
student Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141),
for he declined both from their literal assertion and from their interpreta-
tion as mere metaphors for knowledge in a more general sense. Instead,
he thought one must assert these attributes, because the Qurʿān is explicit
about them and because no inconsistency follows from their assertion.30
In his ethics,31 Ḥillī endorses the moral realism of the Muʾtazilites and
the philosophers. For him, moral value is independent from both divine
command and purely hedonistic calculus, and equally binding on both
God and man. On these grounds, he also rejects the Ashʾarite theory of
action, according to which the immediate agent of morally praise- and
blameworthy human acts is the omnipotent God, whereas human beings
which thinkers, if any, actually allowed such things in their metaphysics, remains a question
for further investigation.
27 Schmidtke 1991, 183-186; Wisnovsky 2018; cf. I.2.2 below.
28 For the first formulation, see Marmura 1962 and Adamson 2005. The second is put forth in
Avicenna’s posthumous Taʾlīqāt; see, for instance, §636, 358-360.
29 Schmidtke 1991, 191-197.
30 Schmidtke 1991, 198-201.
31 Schmidtke 1991, 99-135.
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are agents only by virtue of a relation of acquisition (kasb, iktisāb) that they
have to their acts. Were this the case, God would be unjust in condemning
or rewarding men for something He Himself has done. This does not mean
that Ḥillī postulates a radically free will in human beings. Instead, like his
main opponent Rāzī, he endorses the philosophical doctrine, according
to which human acts are indeed voluntary, but only in a specific, moder-
ate sense. In this view, only a determined (jāzim) will, or a combination of
power and motive, can constitute the complete cause of an act, and since
all motives in turn have an extraneous cause, the theory comes very close
to a moderate form of determinism.32 In line with his moral realism is also
Ḥillī’s theory of prophecy. He claimed that God had sent the prophets only
to consolidate people’s abidance by the rational moral values through the
promise of reward and the threat of punishment, and to inform human
beings of the specific rulings and matters of ritual that cannot be grasped
merely by means of reason.33
The present work, Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds, or ‘Clearing the Soul
for Paradise’, is a relatively short summa of theology that Ḥillī completed in
704/1304, a few years before his tenure at the Ilkhānid court. In his preface
Ḥillī tells us that he wrote the book for his son, whom we can identify as
Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn al-Ḥillī, a prominent scholar in his own right. The
result is a very concise, indeed at times overly condensed review of the var-
ious views theologians and philosophers had voiced on the central ques-
tions of metaphysics, theology, ethics, prophetology and imamology, and
eschatology. The impression one receives is that of a textbook or a teaching
manual, and perhaps Ḥillī intended it as such for his son, who at the time
of the book’s completion would have been in his very early twenties. Oc-
casionally Ḥillī declares his own view, but by no means always, and further
research is required to clarify the relation of the book to Ḥillī’s more exten-
sive theological works. At least eight manuscripts of the text survive, and a
certain Niẓām al-Dīn ʾAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Abī l-Fawāris Muḥammad ibn ʾAlī
al-Aʾrajī wrote a commentary on it with the title Īḍāḥ al-labs fī sharḥ Taslīk
al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds.34
32 Interestingly, Ḥillī seems to have extended this concept of will to God as well (Schmidtke
1991, 202-206).
33 Schmidtke 1991, 136-141.
34 Schmidtke 1991, 83.
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The Taslīk does not fit the rule observed by Heidrun Eichner,35 accord-
ing to which post-classical theological summae, including formative Shīʾī
works by Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, follow the structural outlines of Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ
fī l-ḥikma. There are similarities, of course, but the Taslīk is considerably
closer to another work by Rāzī, namely the Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqad-
dimīna wa-l-mutaʿakhkhirīna min al-ʾulamāʿ wa-l-ḥukamāʿ wa-l-mu-
takallimīna. It begins with a section, or an “observation” (marṣad),36 on
general matters that is further divided into concise chapters on the prin-
ciples of logic (I.1), on existence and non-existence (I.2), and on the mo-
dalities (I.3). Notable for its absence here is a chapter dedicated to quiddi-
ty; the concept and the term are simply introduced in the section on how
things are made known (taʾrīf, I.1.2). The second observation, dealing
with general ontology, is divided into a chapter, or an “aim” (maqṣid), on
the theologians’ classification into eternal and temporally initiated things
(II.1), and another on the Aristotelian category analysis (II.2). This obser-
vation corresponds to the second qāʾida in Ḥillī’s much more extensive
Nihāyat al-marām.
The third observation is an account of physical things, which takes its
cue from theological atomism, presenting arguments pro and contra (III.1),
and then proceeds to a similar review of arguments in favour of and against
Aristotelian hylomorphism (III.2). This survey of arguments is followed by
a discussion of the various accidents that physical things can have (III.3).
It is interesting that Ḥillī here refrains from taking a strong stance in favour
of either atomism or hylomorphism. However, later on in IV.2.1 on sub-
stances, Ḥillī focuses on the atomists’ notion of substance, all but ignoring
the hylomorphist concept. Another peculiar feature of this section is that
although Ḥillī’s treatment of accidents is superficially similar to the long
discussion of different kinds of quality (kayf) in the Nihāyat al-marām, the
latter work conducts its analysis within the framework of the Peripatetic
ontology of ten categories.
Ḥillī concludes his study of general metaphysics with the fourth obser-
vation’s discussion of the concepts of unity (IV.1.1), identity (or similarity)
and difference (IV.1.2), and causation (IV.1.3), as well as of further discus-
xxii
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xxiii
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ıntroduction
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ّ أ آ
��م�د ا �لن�� ا �ل� م�� خ���ت�ا ع�� � ��ه ال ئ����م��ة ّ ّ ّ ف ّ
ح����س ن� ا �ل�ع��ق���بى �ي� د ا را �ل����قرا ر؛ و�ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لى ����سي���د ن�ا حم ب�� �� ر و لى ل � �ا �ل�د ا ر �ل
ي
أ ت ق �ةً ق أ أ أ
ال� �ط�ه�ا ر وعت��رت��ه ال� خ�ي���ا رال� ب�را ر� ،ص�لا ت�ت��ع�ا �� ب� ع��لي���ه���م��ع�ا �� ب� ال� �ع���ص�ا ر.
ّ مّ �أ �أ �أ
ف ت ن ف �ذ ف
��م�د ج� ��ع��ل ن�� ا �ل�ل�ه ��د ا ك �ي� ����ص��ي�� �ه� ا �ّم�ا ب��ع�د ف���ق���د ج���ب� ت� ��س�ؤ ا �ل�ك يّ���ه�ا ا �لو�ل�د ا �ل���ص�ا �ل ح
ي ح
م������ت� م� اً ع�� ا �ل���م��س�ا ئ ا �ل� ه� ّ��م��ة ش ق � ظ �ة �نف ّ �ت ت
�� ا � ك��
�ل ���م� ل�ا ب� ا �ل���م��س���مى �بــــــــ���س��لي��ك ا �ل�����س إ� لى ح���ي��ر ا �ل�����د س � �� ل لى
�أ ف ف ّ ّ ا � ش ف �ة
�� ي���ه و ع�ا ن��ك ع��ىل ع���ي�����م��ة ا �ل��ل��طي�� ف����ة ،وب��ين��� ت� �ل�ك �ي���ه و���ق���ك ا �ل�ل�ه �ل���مرا �ض �� ت ا �ل� ظ
ل���ر�ي����� وا ��لن� ك �
�أ ف �أ �ُ �أ ض ّ �أ
ح� ت� �ل�ك (�ي���ه) ر�ش���د ك ا �ل�ل�ه �صول ��لا �ميّ����ة ،و و�� �� ت� ا �ل ك� ا �م��ت��ث�ا ل وا �مره ون�وا �هي���ه �ج �مي�� �ل� ب� ا ��لن� ك
ع
ّ ّ ق ّ ف �أ
ف
�مي���ل ا �لرئ�ا ����س��تي�� ن� ب����م ن���ه و�ل��ط�����ه. ا �ل���م��ط�ا �ل� ب� ا �ل�ع��ق����ليّ���ة�� ،س�ع�د ك ا �ل�ل�ه �� ا �ل�د ا ر � ن� ور ��ك ت� �ك
�ز
ي ي
�ة ت �ذ ت ق
ل�ا ب� ع��لى �مرا �ص�د ���س�ع� . و��د رت��ب�� ت� �ه� ا ا � ك��
Observation I:
On General Things*
* Since Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), a section on general or common things (al-umūr
al-ʾāmma) commonly began the metaphysical section of a theological summa. It was common-
place to devote this section to those features of existing things, which are common to all re-
gardless of the mode of their existence, such as essence and existence or the modalities. Unlike
most other authors, however, Ḥillī begins from the basic concepts of logic, although he does
include metaphysical themes as well, and my choice of ‘general’ as a translation of ʾāmm reflects
this – the topics discussed here hold generally of all further questions. Ḥillī’s focus finds a partial
parallel ʾAbdallāh al-Bayḍāwī’s (d. c. 685/1286, but perhaps as late as 716/1316) Tawāliʾ al-anwār
(see Eichner 2007, 183-188).
األول
المرصد ّ
ُ
العامة وفيه فصول
في األمور ّ
Chapter 1: On Premises
1 These are not just any parts but the constitutive parts of the definiendum, that is, its genus and
differentia.
2 This means equality in epistemic terms. In analogical reasoning, one arrives at a conclusion
concerning a given case based on another case that is similar in one way or another. Both cas-
es, however, are on the same level of generality. For instance, one might conclude something
about the donkey based on what one knows about the horse, relying on perceived similarities
between the two animals. In the case of a syllogism, by contrast, one concludes something
about the donkey based on its constitutive features.
6 6
األول :في المقدمات
الفصل ّ
� � ّ ة � �أ � ف �
ال���م�ق��د �م�� ا �ل� �و�ل�ى��[ :ي� ا �ل��ت�ص�ّور � او �ل��ت�
�ص�د �ي��ق�]
قٌ ص �ة ا � شّ ء ف� ا � ق � ن �غ ح ك ّ ت ا �ل�ع��ل إ� �ّم�ا �ت���ص ّو ٌر ،و�هو�
�م؛ و�إ�م�ا ����ص�د �ي� ،و�هو ح���صول � ور ل���ي� ي� ل�ع�����ل م�� ي��ر �
م
� ٌ � � �ت ٌ ن � ً �أ ً ض ت ّ ت ض ا �ل
������س� ب�. ضر ور ي� و م ك كل �م����ه���م�ا �� �م ب�ب��ع���� ا �ل���م�����صورا � ع��لى ب��ع���� إ� ي�ج��ا ب�ا و��س��لب��ا .و � ح ك��
ح���ص �ل�ه ع��ل ط�ل�� ��ك����س�� �كت ّ � � ن ��لت ّ ت � ل �ت �ّق ف ف
�����صور ب و و ى ب � � ضر ور ي� م�� ا ����صورا � م�ا ا ي�و �� ��ا �ل����
ضّ
� � � � � ض ل� ��ت���ص ّ � �ت �ّق ف �ت �ة ا �ل� �ة
� ��� ل� ا
ور �ج و هر و عر � و ر ور ي�. ل� ا ا �ك � ������س� ب� م�ا ي�و �� حرا ر وا �ل��برود ؛ وا �ل���م �ك
�� ّ �أ � ظ
ع�����م �م� ن� ا �ج�ل� ز�ء؛
ق �أ نّ تّ ���ف�� �ت���ص ّ ر ف����ه ف�� ا �ل ق ت ن �ت
كا ��ل����ص�د �ي� ب� � ا �ل ك�ل �م � ح ك� �م�� ا �ل����ص�د ي������ا � �م�ا ي� ك ي� و طر ي ي
�ت
� ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م. ح�د ث
� و �م ب� ح ك� ��ف��ي� �
كا �ل
� ������س� ب� �م�ا لاي� ك وا �ل���م �ك
أ ض ت ف أ ز �أ ت ف ت ّ �ّ
كا ����س� ب� ا ��ل����صور ا ل
ح�د و�هوا ��ل��عر�ي��� ب�ا ل� �ج��ا ء ،و ا �لر��س���م و�هوا ��ل��عر�ي��� ب�ا ل� �عرا �� � و�
� ّ ّ ٌ ّ
�خ�ا �ص، ح�� ج���ة؛ و�ه� � �ّم�ا �قي���ا ��س � ن� ا ����س��ت�د ل ب�ا �ل�ع�ا � ّمع��ل ا ل
� كا ����س� ب� ا ��لتّ����ص�د � ق� �هوا �ل
� �ة
�خ�ا ر ج�ي��� .و � ا �ل
�
ى إ ي إ ي
أّ ّ ّت ٌ ن � �ّ ا �ت ا ٌ � ن ن
كا � ب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س؛ و�إ�م�ا ����م��ثي���ل إ� � ا ����س��ت�د ل ب�ا �ل���م��س�ا و�ي� ع��ل� ا �ل���م��س�ا و�ي� .وال� ول وإ م�ا ����س� ��قر ء إ � �
ي
ن ّ ن ���ق���� ن ّ
� وال�أ�خ ي��را � ظ�ن��ي���ا �. �
ي يي
7 7
On General Things
3 That is, the differentia gives the conceptual means to distinguish one of the many species that
share one genus. In this sense, it is an answer to the question which, that is, which of these
many species the definiendum is. However, the differentia distinguishes the species “in its
substance”, that is, by virtue of an essential feature, as opposed to any accidental feature.
4 These are the five predicables (maqālāt) laid out in the Eisagōgē by the late ancient Neopla-
tonist Porphyry (d. c. 305 CE). Notice that this analysis is different from the Aristotelian the-
ory of ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, the relative, place, time, position, having,
acting, and being acted upon), which are referred to as al-maqūlāt.
8 8
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
ف ة ف � ال�� � ّ ة �
�ق�د �م�� ا �ل��ث�ا ��ني�����[ :ي� ا �ل���ت�ع �ر���]
م�
ي
�ت �ة ت ن ن ّ ن ّ �أ نّ
�
��ص �
�� ح��
� �
ل� ا
��
ح �� �
س
� � �� � ل ا
�م�� �
ه �� �ل� ط �
�
ك ��م�� ا ل �ه ك
� �
م � ل ه �
�� ��
م �
��ل� او �ه ك
� �
م � م � ل� ع
� ��م�ل� ا � ا ع��ل
يل ج � و � ل و�ج ي � ب � إ و � ل و�ج م
ً �أ
ا � �تّ�ة ف ا ّ ن ن �ت ق
�و� �م�ع�لو�م�ا �م� ن� و�ج �ه ح�ا �ص�ل؛ وع�د �م الا �ش��� ي��ا � إ� لى �م�ا لا �ش���عور ب��ه ل��ب� � ؛ ��ل ب��د و � ي� ك ا �ل
�
ّ ن � لً � ن �آ � ا � � ن
كل وا ح�د �م ن����ه���م�ا ب�ل �م�عرو ض����ه���م�ا، ���ه�ا � �م��ت غ���اي�را � .وا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� �ل��ي��س � ���هوا م�� �خر ،و لو ج و جم
���هي�� ن�.
� ا �لو ج� �ه ا �ل���م�ا �هّ����ة �ذ ا ت
ي وو
ُ ّ ت ّ
ً
كا ن� ت� �ج� ز�ء ا ن �غ
ح�د ي��د �ه�ا و�إلا �ع ِّر�� ت� ب�ا �لر��س���م لا ي��ر؛ و�إ� �
ف ����ةً �ج �ا �ز �
� ا �ل���م�ا �هّ����ة � ن� � ن ت
كا �� �مر�كب و
ي إ
ّ �ّ ن ّ
� ����هوا ��لت��ا �م،
� ا � ق ّ� ت ف
ح�د إ� � ا ش������ت���م�ل ع��لى�ج مي�� ل���م����و م�ا ح�د ي��د ب���ه�ا و� لا ف��لا .وا �ل �م� ن� �غ ي��ر�ه�ا �ج �ا �ز ا �ل��ت���
ع إ
� ن ا ف ت �ز ا � �ة � ن � � ا ف� ا ��لت ّ � ّل �ف ّ ف ن ق
و�إلا ����هوا ��ل��ا ����ص .وا �لر��س���مإ � ��ا د ����مي��ي�� ل���م�ا �هي��� ع���ج مي��ع م�ا ع�د �ه�ا ���هو ��ا �م وإ ا ���هو
� ّ � نّ �ت�أ �ّ ف � ن ا �ل ن ن ق
�����س وا �ل��ف�����ص�ل. ا ��ل��ا ����ص؛ وا �لح�د إ ����م�ا ي�� ل��� م�� �ج
� ق ئق ف �خ��ت�� فل���� ن ��ث�� � ن ��ّ ّ ا �ل���م��ق شت �ز �� ن���س �هوك�
�
� ي� � ا
��� �
�ح�
ل ا
� ي� ب م
� �م�ا ل ا �جل��ء ا �ل���م�����رك ،و�هوا �ل ك�لي� و ى ي ي�
ر �ك �
ل �
ع ل �� وا ��جل
�أ ّ �ث � ن ف ��ّ ّ ا �ل���م��ق ّ�ز �ز ف
ج�وا ب� �م�ا �هو .وا �ل�������ص�ل�هوا �جل��ء ا �ل���م���مي�� ،و�هوا �ل ك�لي� و ى يري� ي� ج و ب ي و
�ه ا�
م ���� � ا � � �� ��ك �
ل �
ع ل ��
ّ ف
� ب� �م ن����ه���م�ا �هوا ��لن�و . �ي� ج�و�هره .وا �ل���مر�ك�
ع
ّ ل ن ل ن ف �ق ت تت تّ ال أ � ن �� ض ف ق ض ل �أ ن ن
و���ر � ب� � ج ���ا س ب��ع������ه�ا �و� ب��ع���� ا ى � ي�����هي� إ� ى �ج ����س ا �ج ����س �و �ه ،و�ي��س���مى
أ ّ فُ ت أ
�� ن���س ا �ل��س�ا ��ل؛ وال� ن�وا ح��ت�ه ،و�هوا ��جل �ج � ن��� ال� ج� ن���ا ��س ،و ف�� ا �ل��ت ن���ا �ز ل � لى �ج � ن��� لا �ج � ن��� �
�
ع س س إ ي س
ذ
��� �ل�ك. ك
ّ ض � ّ ّ ف �خ�ا ر ج �ع� ن ا �ل���م�ا �هيّ����ة � ن� ا خ�ت����� ّ ب���ه�ا ف����هوا �ل
�خ�ا �ص��ة ،و�إلا ����هوا �ل�عر�� ا �ل�ع�ا �م. ص إ وا � � �
�ل
ّ ض �ل ّ �خ�م��س��ة لا �غ ي��ر :ا ��جل � �ه �ه��ذ ه ا �ل ف��ا �ل ك� ّ ت
�خ�ا �ص��ة وا �ل�عر�� ا �ل�ع�ا �م. �� ن���س وا �ل��ف�����ص�ل وا ��لن�و وا � � ���لي��ا ي�
ع
9 9
On General Things
5 An example of a first figure syllogism is ‘all B are C (major); all A are B (minor); therefore, all
A are C’ (the Barbara of mediaeval Latin logicians), and one of a fourth figure syllogism as de-
scribed here is ‘all C are B (major); all B are A (minor); therefore, some A is C’ (Bramantip).
A distinct fourth figure was first introduced by Galen (d. c. 200 CE), who divided the first
figure in two distinct classes depending on whether the middle term is the predicate of the
minor premise and the subject of the major or the other way around (as the figures are distin-
guished here by Ḥillī). By contrast, Aristotle had defined the first figure in a more inclusive
way, as a syllogism in the premises of which the middle term figures in different positions.
The legitimacy of the fourth figure was subsequently subject to a long debate. Avicenna de-
nied its independence, but after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Islamic logicians (like Ḥillī here) seem
to have accepted it without much ado. (Rescher 1966, 1-12.)
6 An example of the second figure is ‘no C is B (major); all A are B (minor); therefore, no A is
C’ (Cesare), and of the third ‘all B are C (major); some B is A (minor); therefore, some A is
C’ (Datisi).
7 That is, the major premise must have universal quantification (‘all B are…’), as opposed to
particular quantification (‘some B is…’).
8 The two “weak ones” (al-khiṣṣatayn) are particularity and negation. Thus, a valid fourth fig-
ure syllogism must not be composed of a particular and a negative premise, or include a par-
ticular negative premise – with the exception mentioned. The second condition is subject to
the first: combination of weak premises is allowed when the minor premise is particular, but
even then only with a universal negative major premise. The only valid syllogism composed
of weak premises is Fresison (‘no C is B [major]; some B is A [minor]; therefore, some A is
not C’).
10 10
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
�� ّ ة � �ث�ا � ث ة �ف �
�ق��ا ��س]
�ق�د �م�� ا �ل� �ل����[ :ي� ا � �ل� ي
الم��
ّ ن ف ّ �أ ق ّ ّ ّ ّ �أ ن ّ ق
� ب� �م� ن� �م��ق���د �م��تي�� ن� لا �أ�ز �ي�د ولا ��ل ،و�ي ش���ت��رك ا �ل���م��ق���د �م��ت�ا � �ي� ح�د كل �ي���ا ��س إ� ن����م�ا ي�ت��ر�ك� ا ع��ل � �
أ أ آ ز�أ �أ م
ه � ن ن � ن ن �ت ت
���بر. �خر�ي� �م�ا ال� �ص��غروال� ك (وا ح�د) �هو و��س��ط ،و�� ب��ا ي���ا � ب�ج � �ي� � �
أ ف شّ ً ف ن ن حم ً ف �ه��ذ ا ا �ل� ش
��ل ال� ّول؛ ل��� ك� � وع�ا �ي� ا �ل �ك
���بر �ى ����هو ا � ��مولا �ي� ا �ل���ص��غر�ى �مو �ض كا � ��م���ت��رك إ� � � و
ّ ًف ن ّ ً
ن ن حم ف
ف
ي�ه���م�ا ����هوا ��لث��ا �ل� ث�.
� وع�ا ���� كا ن� �مو �ض ن ف
ي�ه���م�ا ����هوا ��لث��ا �ي�؛ و�إ� � ��مولا ���� كا �
ّ
و�ع�ك��س�ه ا �لرا ب� ؛ و�إ� �
ع
��� � .ف� ا ��لث�ّ�ا �ن ا خ���ت�لا �ف� ا �ل���م��ق�� ّ�د �م��ت�� ن � �
ل ا ��ا ا � ص�� � ك�ّ�لّ���ة � � � ش���ت�� ط ف� ال�أ ّ
ي� ى ي� ي� و بر ك غرى ي و �ل�� � إ ب ي
�ج ل و وي ر ي�
ّ
ف ّ�ة
��ا ب� ا �ل���ص��غر�ى وك��لي�� إ� ح�د ا �ه�م�ا .و �ي� ���بر �ى .و ف�� ا ��لث�ّ�ا �ل� ث� � ي�ج� ّ�ة
��ا ب� وا �ل��س�ل� ب� ،وك��لي�� ا �ل �ك ب�ا ل� ي�ج�
إ ي إ
ّ �ذ ّ ّ
�خ����س��ت�� ن � ل � ا ن� ت ا � ص�� � �م �� ��ة � ز ئ�ّ���ة ،ا ����س��ت�ع� م�ا ا �ل��س�ا ��ل���ة
ب كا � ل��� غرى و ج �ب �ج � ي و �� ل � ي� إ ا إ � ا �لرّا ب� ع�د �م ا ج���ت���م�ا ا �ل
ع ع
���لّ�ة ا � � � � ا �ل � �ة ا �ل� ز ئ�ّ�ة ا � ص�� � ل �غ
���بر ى م ���مو ج ��ب� �ج � ي�� ل��� غرى ا ي��ر. ا �ل ك� ي�� ل ك
ع
11 11
On General Things
12 12
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
ة � �أ ة ف � ّ ة �
ال���م�ق��د �م�� ا �ل ارب����ع����[ :ي� � �م او د ا �ل� ��قي����س�� �و�ص�ور��ه�ا]
�م��ق�� ّ�د �م��ت�ا ا � ّ�د ��ل�� � ن ن�ت��ا �ق ��ط�عّ����ت�� ن ف��ا ��لن���ت�������ة� ذ � � ،ن ن�ت��ا ظ�نّ����ّت��� ن �أ � ح�د ا �ه�م�ا ف��ا ��لن���ت�������ة
يج ي ي� و إ كا
كا �� ي ي� ي ج ك�� ل�ك وإ� � ل يل إ � �
ّ ّ أ ن �ت �أ
ظ�ن��يّ����ة؛ ل� ���ه�ا ت�� ب� خ���س ا �ل���م��ق���د �م��تي�� ن�.
ع
ت ح�د ����س���اّ ت ّ ت ش ت ّ أ ٌ�ة �ت ت ضّ ّ
�
�جر �ا � وا ل
� ي� وا �ل����ر وري�ا � ����س� � :ال� و��لي��ا � وا �ل���م����ا �ه�د ا � وا �ل���م��� ب
ا � �ت ا ت� ا ت �ق ق ت
� �ا ي�ا �ي���ا ��س�ا ���ه�ا �م��ع�ه�ا.
و ل���م� و ر � و ���ض
ّ
���ت��س�ا � ا ��لن���ت�������ة � ،لا ��د �م� ن ت� ت���� مخ ّ
����صو�ص ق �ت ن ف� ��ف��� �
ي ج بل ب � ر ي ب ح���صول ا �ل���م�����د �م� ي��� ي� ا ك ب ل �ك
وا ي ي
ّ ن ّ ّ �أ
�� ن��ه���م�ا� ،ه ا �ل� ز ء ا �ل���ص � ّ �ل��لن���� ،ا �ل���م��ق�� ّ�د �م��ت�ا ن� � ز ا ءٌ �م�ا د ّ��ةٌ���� ،ص���ت
ح����ه���م�ا �ي���ص��ح ا ��ل����ظر ي وب �ج � ور ي� ظر و ب ي � و و �ج �
نف ً �أ ف
�و� ��ا ��س�د ا. وب���ف����س�ا د �ه�م�ا و���س�ا د إ� ح�د ا �ه�م�اي� ك
ت �غ �ذ ٌ ف ت ف ّ�ة �ت ف �ذ ش �ةٌ �خت صر�ةٌ
�� �ب� ن��ا ا �ل�ع��ق����ليّ���ة.
�ور �� �ك
ي ك �
م � ي�فر ��� �
�ل او ،� ب �
ل� ا
�ط �
��م��ل� ا � ب ا�
س �� ��
ك ا �
��
ي ����
ي�ك ى ل � م
����ه� ه إ� ����ا ر ������ إ
13 13
Chapter 2: On the Investigation of
Existence and Non-Existence
14 14
الفصل الثاني :في مباحث الوجود والعدم
�أ ٌ
و�هي� ر ب��ع��ة:
15 15
On General Things
11 Muḥammad ibn ʾAlī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1045) was a Muʾtazilite theologian who
had an important influence on Ḥillī (see introduction).
12 Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʾarī (d. 324/936) started as a student of the Muʾtazilite Abū ʾAlī Muḥam-
mad al-Jubbāʿī (d. 303/915) but subsequently turned against the teachings of the Muʾtazila,
allying with the more literalist approach of the Hanbalīs. Thereby he inaugurated the main-
stream Sunnī school of theology that bears his name.
13 The widely accepted view means that ‘existence’ is applied to univocally to all things that
are said to exist: you and the book you are reading exist in the same sense. The alternative
endorsed by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ashʾarī is that ‘existence’ is said equivocally: existing
means one thing for the book, and something quite different for you.
14 That is, the view that existence is univocal. What follows are two traditional arguments sup-
porting this view.
15 That is, were it not the case that both existence and non-existence are one, the principles of
bivalence and of the excluded middle would not hold.
16 When we consider the quiddity as a substrate of existence, we consider it in abstraction from
both existence and non-existence: it can be attributed with either existence or non-existence,
because it has neither in itself. However, this does not mean that there is, independent of
our abstracting consideration, a quiddity that neither exists nor does not exist. It is only an
abstraction, or alternatively, something that exists in the mind.
16 16
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
17 17
On General Things
Appendix
Since it has been established that existence is shared, it is established that
it is additional to quiddities. This is because it cannot be identical with
them, for otherwise it would follow that different realities share complete-
ness of quiddity.17 Nor can it be a part of them, for otherwise it would be a
genus, because it is the most common of the shared parts, and it would be
in need of a differentia. But the differentia of existence would be an exist-
ent, so that the genus would be included in the differentia, and this would
go on regressively.
17 If existence were univocal and identical with quiddities, then by transitivity of identity, the
quiddities would be identical to each other, that is, existing things of different kinds would
“share completeness of quiddity” with each other.
18 In other words, these Muʾtazilites hold that there are individual things, which do not exist
but which God has the power to create by bestowing existence on them, and that these things
subsist, or are “established” (thābita), as mind-independent individuals. They are infinite in
number, yet they are organised into species and distinguished by unique bundles of proper-
ties, just like the ordinary existing individuals that we find around us.
18 18
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
�ذ ٌ
���ت� �ن�ي�� ب�
� ث ت �أ نّ ا � � � ش ت ث ت �أ نّ �ز ا ئ ٌ ا � ّ ت ل �ت � ��ة �أ ن ن
�و� ن���ف�����س�ه�ا، ل���م�ا ��ب��� � لو ج ود م�����رك ��ب��� ��ه ��د ع��لى ل���م�ا �هي���ا � إ� ����س� ��ح�ا ل� � ي� ك
�ة �أ ن ن � ز ً ن ّ � ن ن ً ف ّ
��ا � �ج ����س�ا ح��ق���ا ئ� ق� ا �ل���م�� خ���ت�� فل����ة �ي� ت����م�ا �م ا �ل���م�ا �هي��� ؛ و � ي� ك
�و� �ج �ء ا �م����ه�ا و�إلا �ل ك و� لا �ل�ز �م ا �ش��ت��را ك ا �ل
�
إ
�ن ن ف ف ف �ت ف ف ة ت ش ز ن �أ ّ أ
�
ل ��� � ،ي����� ��قر إ� لى ����ص�ل؛ و����ص�ل ا �لو ج�ود �مو ج�ود� ،ي�� ك �و��ه �ع���م ال� �ج��ا ء ا �ل���م�����رك �ل ك
�و� ا �ج ����س
ًف
د ا �خ �لا �ي� ا �ل��ف�����ص�ل و�ي��ت��س��ل��س�ل.
� ا ��ل�� � �
ح ث� ا �ل�ث�ا �ل ث��[ :م�ا �ه� اول�م�ع�د �و�م؟]ب
� ض�ٌ � � � ش�� ء� .ذ �ه� �م�ا ع��ةٌ�م� ن ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز ��ة قّ ق ن �أ نّ
ل� � �ج � �
و ي� � و ي س ب ي� ٍ و ب �� �ل ح�� م � نف ٌ
� ��
� م �د ع
� ��م�ل� ا � ح��������و� إ� لى �ذ �ه� ب� ا �ل���م���
�ةً � �خ �ا جَ ا �ل��ذّ �ه� ن لا ت��أث��� �ل�� فل���ا ع� ف����ه � ،ف� جَ���ْع� ا �ل��ذ ا ت ل �أ نّ �ش�� ٌ ث تٌ
� �مو ج�ود ؛ وت��ل�ك � و ير ل ي ب ل ي� ِل ر�
إ� ى ��ه ي� ء �ا ب�
�خ�ا ه�ا .ا ��لث��ا � ت �م� ن ّ ن� ع�د د �غ�� �م��ت ن���ا هّ � ،ن��ه�ا �أ �� �ه�ا �م��تّ ف����ق����ة �أ
� �م��ت��ب�ا ي�ن���ة ب� ش���
� ا �ل���م�ع�د �م�ا ت
وإ � ب� سر ير و
�لع ك
� � ب و �ص
� � و
ف� ن �ذ تً ن ت �ت ن ّ
�ص ف���ا ت ّ
�. �و���ه�ا وا �ا ،و�إ����م�ا �� ب��ا�ي� ب�ا �ل�� ي� ك
19 19
On General Things
We may say that the concept of being established is nothing but exist-
ence, and so if that which does not exist were established in non-existence,
it would exist, which is absurd. Moreover, when God most high brings one
of them into existence, if they remained as they were, then this would be
like something with another being just as it is without the other, which is
necessarily false. If there were fewer of them, they would be finite, and so
the things that are in the power of God most high would be finite, which is
absurd.19 Besides, it follows that they would be independent of the Agent,
for the essences would be eternal and therefore not subject to the power.
According to them, existence is a kind of state,20 and so it is not subject
to the power. But being attributed is not anything additional to the quid-
dity and the attribute, for otherwise a regress would follow. Hence, the
existing essence is independent of the Agent. This is preposterous.21
19 Thus, the crux of the argument is whether the things that do not exist but are established, or
have thubūt, are finite or infinite. If they are infinite, nothing changes about them when God
bestows existence on some, which is absurd. If they are finite, then there are limits to what
is subject to God’s power to create (qudra), which is also inadmissible. Let me also note at
this point that the word maqdūr, which I have translated as “that which is in God’s power”
or “that which is subject to God’s power”, is ambiguous and could also mean that which is
included in God’s creative decree (qadar).
20 The concept of ‘state’ (ḥāl) was initially introduced by the Muʾtazilite theologian Abū Hāshim
al-Jubbāʿī (d. 321/933) in an attempt to solve the problem of God’s attributes. Denying the re-
ality of God’s attributes runs the risk of denying God’s explicit self-ascriptions in the Qurʿān,
whereas simply admitting them as entities in their own right threatens to violate God’s unity.
In this conundrum, Abū Hāshim suggested that the attributes are states, which neither exist
nor do not exist, but are rather modes of being of God – what we would today perhaps call
adverbial ascriptions. The theory of states was subsequently extended to hold of a number of
created phenomena, including the existence of created things, for instance by the Ashʾarite
theologian Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 479/1085). For a more detailed discussion, see Frank
1978, Benevich 2016, and Thiele 2016.
21 This argument is extremely dense, but perhaps it can be reconstructed as follows. Suppose,
with these Muʾtazilites, that there are essences that do not exist but subsist by themselves.
Now, what does God bestow on them when He creates them and brings them into existence?
He cannot bestow existence as a distinct attribute, because then this existence would also
have to exist, which gives rise to infinite regress. Hence, these Muʾtazilites argue, it is best
to think of existence as a state of being attributed with existence that neither exists nor does
not exist itself. However, there seems to be no new attribute that God thereby relates to
the self-subsisting essence, and Ḥillī can drive home his point: since the essences subsist
independent of God, and since their existence is a state of being attributed with existence,
without any distinct attribute thereby bestowed by God, the essences can have the state of
existing independently of God.
20 20
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
ً
��ا ن� �مو ج�ود ا كا ن� ا �ل���م�ع�د و�مث�ا ب�تً��ا ف�� ا �ل�ع�د �م �ل ك� � ل� �إ� ن����م�ا �ه او �لو ج�ود؛ ف�
ن �ث ت ّ
� �
ل� ا �
م � � ه ��لن��ا �أ نّ ا �ل���م��ف
���
ي و و � �بو م � �
كا ن� ا � ش ًف ت �أ ّ �ذ أ
�غ
ل����ء �م ي��ره��ك�هولا كا ن� ت� � �م�ا �ح�ا ل؛ ول� ن��ه إ� ا و�ج �د ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �م ن����ه�ا �ش���ي� ئ��ا �إ� ن� ب���ق��ي��� ت� ك� و�هوم
�
ي ع
ت ت ق ٌ ض ّ �ة ن نَ قَ صَ تْ تَنَ َ تْ ف �ت ن �غ
�مع ي��ره و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل����ر ور ؛ و�إ� ��������� �� ���ا �ه��� ،ي�����ا �هى �م�����د ورا � ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى و�هو
�ةً � �ذ ا ��ذّ ا ت �أ�ز ��لّ�ة ف ا ت ن أّ
�و� �م��ق���د ور .وا �لو ج�ود ح�ا ل؛ ول� ن��ه ي��ل�ز �م الا ����س��ت غ�� ن���ا ء �ع� ن� ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل ،إ ل� و � ي�� ��ل � ك م
�
� ن �م��ق���د ًا ،ال �تّ ص�ا �ف � � �أ �م ًا �ز ا ئ�دًا ع�� ا �ل� م�ا �ه����ة ف ح ا ل �ع ن أ ق
ي �� ى ل � يس ر �� �
ل � ��� ا و ور � يو ك � ا
ل �� م �
���ه �د �� و � �م� ن� ���بي���ل ال�
�ذ فٌ �ة �غ ً � ن ا �ل��ذ ا ت ف ف �ة ّ
� ا �ل���مو ج�ود � ن��يّ����ة �ع� ن� ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل� ،ه� ا �خ ��ل�. �ت
وا �ل���ص��� ،و�إلا �ل�ز �م ا �ل���س��ل��س�ل���ت كو�
ف �أ نّ �ت �زٌ ّ ّ ٌ �أ ّ ّ �أ نّ
كل �م��ت���مي�� ث�ا ب� ت�� .م�ا ا �ل���ص��غر�ى ��ل � ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م�م�ع�لو�م؛ ح��ت�� ج�وا ب� � ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م�م� ���مي�� ،و � ا�
�زٍ
ّ�زٌ أ
�ة ح كة ق نّ � �ت ّ �غ ً � ن � ش ق ل�أ نّ�ا ن��ع��ل ط�ل ا � ش
��� ا �ل���م�����د ور كل �م�ع�لو�م �م� ���مي�� ؛ ول� � ا ل�ر ��م���ر� ،و � ل������م��س �د ا م�� ا ل�
م وع
ق ع��� ا �ل���م�ع�د �م�ا ت ن ض ّ أ �ت ن ��لن��ا �م��ت���مّ���ز�ة �ع� ن ا �ل���م���م��ت ن���ع��ة � ن� � ن ت
� ي�را د و�و��ع�ه�ا و كا ���ا �م�ع�د و�م� ي���؛ ول� � ب�� � وإ ي �
�ف ّ ّ ن �أ ف ّ �أ ً�ز�ةّ ن ف ُ ض كا �ل�لّ��ذّ ا ت
���بر �ى ��ل � ا �ل���م��ت���مي���ز �هوا �ل���مو�صو� �و� �م��ت���مي�� .و �م�ا ا �ل �ك � ،و�ب�ع������ه�ا لا ي�را د��� ،ت ك �
ن �ت � قّ قً ًّ ف ف ل ش � ف �غ ُ �ذ
ح���������ا .ولا ��ع ن�ي� ب�ا ��لث��ا ب� ت� �ون��ه �م��ت�عي�� ن���ا �ي� ن���ف����س�ه �م� �� ي�ه�ا ي��ره ،و �ل�ك ي�����س��ت�د�عي� ك ب����ص����ةٍ ا ي�����ا رك�ه ����
ّ �ذ
إ� لا �ل�ك.
21 21
On General Things
They argue: What does not exist is distinct, and all that is distinct is es-
tablished. As regards the minor premise,22 it is due to the non-existent’s
being known, for we know that the Sun will rise tomorrow from the east,
and all that is known is distinct,23 as well as to the fact that the motions in
our power are distinct from those that are impossible, even if neither exist,
and to the fact that some non-existing things, like pleasures, are wanted to
take place whereas others are not, and so they are distinct from each other.
As regards the major premise,24 it is because what is distinct is attributed
with an attribute which is shared by nothing else, and that entails its being
realised and instantiated in itself. And we only mean that by ‘established’.
The answer is as follows. Distinction may be mental and it may be ex-
ternal, and what does not exist is distinct in the first sense but not in the
second, just as one may conceive of impossible things, composite things,
and existence, without any of them being established.25
22 22
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
� ة �ن �� � � �ا ا ��ل�� �
ح ث� ا �ل ارب��� �[ :ل� � او ���س ��ط�� �ب�ي� الم�وج �
�ود � اول���م�ع�د �و�م] ب
ع
ل أ نّ ا � ق �ق � � ض ّ �ة �أ نّ �ق ��لن ا � شّ ّ �أ ن
ل���ي�ء إ� �م�ا � لا وا ��س��ط��ة ب�ي�� ن� ا �ل���مو ج�ود وا �ل���م�ع�د و�م؛ � � ل�ع�����ل �ا ضٍ� ب�ا ل����ر ور ب� � و��ا:
�غ ٌ ف ً ً �أ ن
�و� �مو ج�ود ا و�م�ع�د و�م�ا ح�ا �صر�� ،ا �لوا ��س��ط��ة ي��ر�م�ع��ق��و�ل��ة. ي� ك
23 23
On General Things
26 This is the point mentioned in n. 23 above: if existence is attributed with existence, then this
second-order existence must also be attributed with existence, and so on ad infinitum.
27 Ḥillī’s answer is extremely elliptic, but it resembles an argument found, for instance, in ʾAlāʿ
al-Dīn al-Qūshjī’s (d. 879/1474–5) commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) Ta-
jrīd al-ʾaqāʿid (I, 153–154). First, it is simply assumed as evident that affirming anything of
the thing itself is inconceivable. Secondly, affirming non-existence of existence amounts to
negating the affirmation of existence of itself. Since a negative statement requires the prior
conception of the affirmative statement it negates, the negation of self-affirmation is also in-
conceivable. Third, and finally, denying both existence and non-existence of existence is just
a conjunction of the negations of the two first alternatives, and since both were inconceivable
to begin with, so must their negations be, for which reason the conjunction of their negations
cannot be conceivable either.
24 24
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
25 25
Chapter 3: On The Investigation of
Necessity and Its Counterparts
There are three investigations here.
28 That is, the modalities are not established in mind-independent reality. If they were, then one
could ask, for instance, what the modal status of the possibility of the birth of my great-grand-
daughter is. Whatever the answer, one can ask the same thing about the modal status of that
second-order modality, and so forth ad infinitum. (The other problematic consequence of the
mind-independent reality of modalities, that is, the existence of the non-existent, is spelled
out by Ḥillī in what follows immediately.)
29 In this context, Ḥillī’s “ancestors” (al-awāʿil) are early theologians, for the distinction be-
tween the denial of possibility (nafy al-imkān) and denied possibility (al-imkān al-manfī )
is related to the aforementioned discussion of things that subsist, and are therefore possi-
ble, but do not exist. Denied possibility refers to those self-subsisting things that are never
brought into existence, in other words, unrealised possibilities. Denial of possibility refers to
what is impossible per se, for instance, a partner to God.
30 Again, being established means having a mind-independent metaphysical status. If the early
theologians’ possibility were a real feature of the world, impossibility, in the sense of denial
of possibility, would also have to be such a feature.
26 26
الفصل الثالث :في مباحث الوجوب وقسيميه
و�هي� ث�لا ث��ة:
27 27
On General Things
31 This passage makes an interesting shift, not unparalleled in other Arabic philosophical and
theological texts, from a theologically neutral distinction between necessity due to essence
and necessity due to an extrinsic cause to a theological distinction between God and crea-
tion, which is made explicit only at the first mention of the word ‘God’ in the last paragraph
of the section. This is possible because the Arabic is ambiguous between the masculine and
neutral readings of wājib. Since I have not been able to reproduce the shift in English, I have
decided to capitalise the relevant term and to use the third person masculine throughout this
section – which is technically not wrong, but does lose an aspect of the original text.
32 Here and below, ‘possibility’ and ‘contingency’ (as well as ‘possible’ and ‘contingent’) are al-
ternative translations of the same Arabic term, imkān (or mumkin). There is no single English
term that brings the two meanings together naturally.
33 In other words, if we suppose that something other than God is the cause of God’s having ne-
cessity, then that other thing is the cause of God. But since God is the cause of the existence of
everything, He must also be the cause of the existence of His alleged cause. In this impossible
situation, either of the two alternatives (God’s cause either does or does not exist before God
brings it into existence) gives rise to absurd consequences: either a non-existing cause causes
God’s existence, or a cause existing before God is brought into existence again by God, and in
both cases the cause would cause itself by God’s mediation.
34 That is, possibility is intrinsic, and therefore necessary, to the quiddities of created things,
because otherwise they could change their modal status without any reason. Their intrinsic
possibility means that they can become necessary or impossible due to an extrinsic cause, as
Ḥillī states in what follows immediately.
28 28
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
29 29
On General Things
All that is possible in terms of existence exists or does not exist only by
virtue of a distinct cause, because it is impossible that one of two equal
alternatives could be preponderated to hold over the other without a pre-
ponderant. Furthermore, what is possible is made necessary with that
cause, for were that not the case, the equality would remain and it would
need something else. If it did preponderate, then it would be more appro-
priate for that which is preponderated over to take place at one time but
not to exist at another.35 That existence is specified at one of the two times
entails the need for a cause other than the first one, and so it is not possible
that one of the two extremes be more appropriate.
Possibility is the reason why an effective principle is needed, for the
intellect’s verdict of possibility is based on the effective principle and the
verdict of its rejection on the absence of the effective principle. That rea-
son cannot be coming to be in time, as some of the early theologians held,
because coming to be is a quality of existence and therefore posterior to it.
Existence is posterior to bringing into existence, which in turn is posterior
to a need, and this in turn posterior to the reason for the need. If coming
to be were the reason, it would follow that something is prior in status to
itself.
35 The priority (awlawīya) here means the realisation of one of two alternatives without a deci-
sive causal principle, which Ḥillī here rejects as incompatible with the notion of possibility.
30 30
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
31 31
On General Things
Appendix
Since it has been established that the reason of the need is possibility,
which is established also for permanent things, what is entailed by it is es-
tablished as well, namely the need for an effective principle. Yet some early
theologians maintained that permanent things are independent. They ar-
gued that if the effective principle has no effect on them, they are definitely
independent, whereas if it does have an effect on them, then either the
effect is the existence that had occurred in the first place, with the conse-
quence of bringing about something that already obtains, which is absurd,
or the effect is something new, but then the efficiency concerns that which
is new, not that which is permanent, and so the permanent is independent.
The answer is to reject the last implication, because what is permanent
does need renewed permanence.
32 32
ف� ال أ �م ا �ل��� �ا ّ�م��ة
ي� � ور ع
�ذ ٌ
���ت� �ن�ي�� ب�
ل � ا
���ح��ت
� ال �ه �ه، � ل�ع� م� ��ا ن� �ه ث�ا � ت� �ل��ل��ا �ق ث��� ت � م� ال ه � ا
���ح��ت
� ال �ل� م�اّ ث�� ت �أ نّ ع�ّ�ة
ي � إى ج ا و و ل و � و ب ب ي� �ب و ك �
ي � ي� إ ج ا �� ��ب � � ل�
ّ �أ ّ
ض ق � ا � �ت �ل ن � ل ا �ت غ ن ئ ا � �ت ا نّ ا � م�ؤ�ث � ن ّ � م�ؤ�ثّ �ذ
�� ن ل�
ك
رإ ي � � م � � �
��ل � � و جو ب � �
� �ح �ه. � ا
���
� � �
س
� ��� ي� إ ى ��م� �
�ك �م���ل ء ا
�م �د
� ا ل��� ر .و ب ب �
� ع���� � �ه�
�أ ً ت � ف �أث�ٌ ن � �ت غ ن ً ق ً � ن ن � �أث�ٌ ف ن ن
ح�ا �ص� ّولا �ل�ز �م �
� �ل
ح����صي���ل كا � �هوا �لو ج�ود ا � ل كا � ل�ه ر ��ا � � كا � م����س� ����ي���ا �����ط�ع�ا؛ وإ� � ل�ه �ي���ه ر �
ف� � �ق ف� ن ق �أ
كا ن� ا ��لتّ�� ث�ي��ر ف�� ا ��جل ً ن ن �أ ً ح�ا �ص� ،و�هو م �ل
�و� ا ��لب��ا �ي� ��د ي��د لا ي� ا �لب��ا ي� ،ي�� ك ي � ا �د�
ي �د �ج ار كا � �م ح�ا ل؛ و�إ� � � ا� ل
ً
�م����س��ت غ��ن��ي���ا.
قر � لى ا ��لب�ق���ا ء ا ��جل � ا � :ا �ل���م ن�� �م� ن ا �ل���م�لا �ز �م��ة ال�أ�خ �� �ة ،ل�أ نّ ا ��ل��ا �ق �م��ف����ت��ٌ �
��د ي��د. إ ير � ب ي� ع � وا �جلو ب
33 33
Observation II
On the Classification of Existents
المرصد ال ّثاني
في تقسيم الموجودات وفيه مقصدان
Aim 1: On the Classification According
to the Theologians’ View
They have said: An existent is either eternal or has come to be, because if
its existence does not have a beginning, it is eternal, that is God most high,
and if its existence does have a beginning, it has come to be and is some-
thing beside Him.
They explained the eternal by saying that it is that which is not preced-
ed by non-existence, and what comes to be as that which is preceded by
non-existence. Here there are three investigations.
1 The temporal attributes of eternity and coming to be cannot be attributed to time itself. If
time were eternal, in the aforementioned sense of eternity, it would have to accompany an
infinite series of past moments of another order of time. Had time come to be, then since we
do not have any non-temporal way to distinguish the period before its coming to be from the
period after it, there must be a second-order time underlying time. In both cases, the ques-
tion can be repeated about the second-order time, and so forth ad infinitum. Cf. the philoso-
phers’ second argument for the eternity of the world in Ghazālī, Tahāfut I.1.80, 31. The prob-
lem is addressed in a very similar way, albeit slightly more extensively, by Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal,
82. For discussion of similar arguments in Muḥammad ibn ʾAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d.
548/1153) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see Lammer 2018b, 229-239; and Adamson and Lammer
2020, respectively.
2 This could be ʾAbd Allāh ibn Saʾīd ibn Kullāb who, however, died in 240/855 and thus cannot
have been a follower of Ashʾarī. However, Ḥillī most probably draws this mention from Rāzī,
Muḥaṣṣal, 83, according to whom “ʾAbd Allāh ibn Saʾīd [is] one of us”. Perhaps Rāzī counted
Ibn Kullāb as one of the Ashʾarites, because of his endorsement of Ashʾarite doctrines avant
la lettre, such as the reality and eternity of God’s attributes. For Ibn Kullāb’s theological views,
see Bin Ramli 2016, 216-219.
3 The Karrāmīya were a notorious sect mainly active in Khorasan and Afghanistan from the
tenth to the thirteenth century. One of the theological doctrines, for which representatives
of the school were most maligned, was the idea that God’s constant creative involvement
with the world is due to temporally occurring (ḥādith) changes in Him, which then result in
36 36
األول :في التقسيم علي رأي المتك ّلمين
[المقصد] ّ
ه �أ ّ ف� � ق ُ ن � � ثً ل أ نَ � ن م
ّ �أ ن نَ ق ً �أ ُ ق
�ه � �د
���
� ل ا ه
��
إ � م ي � و ج و و �و ي م و و ، ل د � �
ل �
�
ك � ل
� �ه
� � ، ا
� �د ح �و� ��د ي����م�ا و ��ا �لوا :ا �ل���مو ج�ود إ� �م�ا � ي� ك
�أ ُ ت
� ،و�هو�م�ا ع�د ا ه. ح�د ث كا ن� �لو ج�ود ه ّول ف����هوا �ل���م��� ن
ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ،و�إ� �
ف ُ ح َ�د ث ْ �أَ ّ�ذ ّ
� ب����م�ا ����س��بق���ه ا �ل�ع�د �م���� .ه�ا �ه ن���ا و�ق�د �ي��ف����سرو ن� ا �ل��ق���د ي�مَ ب� ن��ه ا �ل� �ي� لا ي�����س��بق���ه ا �ل�ع�د �م ،وا �ل���م���
ٌ
ح� ث� ث�لا ث��ة: �م��ب�ا �
ب�ا ث �
� ا ��ل�� ث � �أ ّ � �ف
�
�
يم �د �
�ق�
ل � ا �ح �م�� [ بح�] ا �ل� �و�ل� :ي�
َ
� ن ق� ��لن ا � ت ل ق �ه �أ نّ � ق ن �أ�ز � ن �ةً ل ن �ة � ف� ن ا � ض�� � � ن
��ا � ا �ل�ل�ه م�ع�ى و��ا ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا ى ��د ي�م و �ا لو ��د ر �ا م��� ا ���ه�ا ي� �ل�ه�ا ي� �ج �ا � ب� ل���م�ا ي� ل ك
ٌآ ّ
�خر��ا ن� �ل�ل�زّ �م�ا ن� �ز �م�ا ن� � �
� ا �ل�ز �م�ا ن� و� لا �ل ك� ح�د ث
� و ح��بً�ا ��ل�ه�ا .ولا �ي�ع��ت��بر ف�� ا �ل��ق���د �م وا �ل
�ت�ع�ا لى �م���ص�ا �
ِ إ ي
�ت ت �ذّ �ل ث ن ّ ف ت ّ
� ا �ل� �هن��يّ����ة، � ا �ل��ث��بوت�يّ���ة ،ب�ل �م� ن� الا �ع� ��ب�ا را ح�د و� �م�� ا �ل���ص���ا و���ت��س��ل��س�ل .و�ل��ي��س ا �ل��ق���د �م وا �
ي
َ ّ�ة ف� � ث ن أ ف �ة ّ أ ًف �ت
�را �مي��� ي� ا �ل��ا �ي�.و� لا �ل�ز �م ا �ل���س��ل��س�ل؛ �خ �لا ��ا �ل�ع��ب�د ا �ل�ل�ه � نب� ��س�عي���د �م� ن� ال� �ش���عري� �ي� ال� ّول ،وا �ل ك�
إ
37 37
On the Classification of Existents
temporally occurring (muḥdath) created things. Despite the opposite claims of Ibn Kullāb
and the Karrāmīya that Ḥillī introduces here, both can be seen to derive from literalist in-
terpretations of the theological doctrine of God’s attributes. Hence, the key phrase in Ḥillī’s
dense presentation is that the attributes are mental considerations (al-iʾtibārāt al-dhihnīya)
– concepts that, although they are not entirely without foundation in reality, nevertheless do
not have distinct things or attributes as their referent.
4 In Avicenna’s philosophical theology (“the wise” [al-ḥukamāʿ] here refers to the falāsifa), God
is a creator in the sense that He necessitates (mūjib) the world by His essence. No choice (ikh-
tiyār) is involved, for prior to a choice, God would have had to refrain from acting according to
His essence, which is inconceivable. It is not entirely clear to me why Ḥillī thinks that the point
he has made dissolves the debate between the falāsifa and the theologians. Perhaps he means
that the debate about the eternity of the world boils down to different views about God.
5 An eternal created thing cannot not exist due to its essence, for that would mean that it is
impossible for it to exist at all. It cannot not exist due to an eternal causal condition, for then it
would never exist, the condition being always fulfilled. But why could it not become non-ex-
isting due to a cause that comes to be in time? Ḥillī does not tell us, but perhaps he thinks that
in the infinite past of an eternal thinig, this cause should already have occurred.
6 The underlying presupposition seems to be that a negative condition, such as the removal of
an obstacle, can both be pre-eternal (azalī) and cease to be fulfilled at some point in time –
though it is puzzling why exactly negative conditions should be different from positive ones
in this regard.
7 Ḥillī argues that the alleged cessation of a negative condition is inexplicable. The cessation
cannot be caused by the eternal thing or anything it causes, because nothing can cause the
condition of its own non-existence. If we presume that the cause of the eternal thing’s ex-
istence is also the cause of the sufficient condition of its non-existence, the same principle
would cause two contrary things, which is impossible. Since these alternatives are exhaus-
tive, the opponent’s argument has been refuted.
38 38
��ف �ت��ق����س�� ال��م � ت
�ود ا ��
ي�م �وج � ي�
�
� �د �
�ق�
ل
�
� ا �
� ا �
��ح ث �� �ث�ا ��ن �ف خ
� : � ل� ا � �
�ا ��بل
يم ي ي و ص � �
�� ن � ����سن���ا د ا �ل��ق���د � ل ا �ل� م�ؤ�ثّ ا �ل� م�� خ���ت�ا ،ل أ نّ ا �ل��ف���ا ع� ا ل خ���ت���ا � نّ�� م�ا ���ف���ع� � ا � ط��ة
ل ب� ا ي ر إ �� ي ل بو �س�� ي�م إ ى �� ر �� ر � � لا ي����م ك� إ
ّت ّ ّ ّ ّ
���ه�ه إ� لى ا �ل��ق�����ص�د والا خ���تي���ا ر ،و� ن����م�ا �ي���ص�� ت�و�ج �ه ا �ل��ق�����ص�د إ� لى �م�ع�د و�م ��ل�يو�ج �د ه ولا �ي���ص�� �و ج�
ح ح إ
�ت � ّ ن ت ف �ذ ح �ك �مو ج�ود .ن��ع���م����ص�� ّ � ����س���ا د ه � لى ا �ل���م ج���؛ وا �ل� ���ا ��� ا ل
�� ن �ز ن �ت ن
��ل�مي��� ي�ر����� ب���ه� ا �م�ا ء وا �ل���م� ك ع بي� وِ ب إ ي حإ
ع
ّ
ا ��لت� ف������صي���ل.
ق ً �أ �ذ �أ أّ ّ ّ
وا �ل��ق���د ي�ملا �ي���ص�� ع��لي��ه ا �ل�ع�د �م؛ ل� ن��ه إ� �م�ا وا ج�� ب� �ل� ات��ه و�م�ع�لول �ل�ه �م��ط��قل���ا و ب� ش���رٍط ��د ي�م؛
ّ ح
ُ ف ّ
حي���لع�د �م�ه. �ت ت
حي���لع�د �مع��ل��ه��� ،ي����س� ��� كلت���ق���دي�ر ي�����س��ت��� وع��لى �
ً أ شّ ّ
�ون��ه ع�د �ميّ���ا، ل���رط ال� و لي� � ،ل ك �و�ز �ز وا ل ا � لا ي���ق���ا ل� :ل�ملا ي�ت�وق���ف� ع��ل �ش��رط ع�د م� �أ�ز ل� ،و �
ى ٍ ي ٍ ي ٍ �جي
ة �ذ أّ ف
ق
��� �ل�ك ا �ل�ع�د �م �ل��ي��س �هوا �ل�����د ي�م �ي���ع�د �م ا �ل��ق���د ي� �مل�ع�د �م�ش��رط�ه .ل� ن�ا ن���ق��ول :ا �ل���م��ق��ت���ض���� �لو ج�ود �م��ل �ك
ي ّ
�ة ّ ف ف
ح�ا �ل��ة �ص�د ورا �ل���م��ت ن���ا �ي����ي ن� �ع� ن� ع�ل��ة وا ح�د . ولا �م�ع�لو�ل�ه �ل�ل��ت ن���ا �ي� ب�ي� ن���ه���م�ا؛ ولا ع��لت��ه لإ� ����س��ت���
39 39
On the Classification of Existents
The eternal cannot be more than one in number, because the Necessary
Existent is one and chooses, as will be elaborated, and all other existing
things have come to be.
40 40
��ف �ت��ق����س�� ال��م � ت
�ود ا ��
ي�م �وج � ي�
41 41
Aim 2: On the Classification According
to the Ancients’ View
What exists either exists necessarily due to its essence, and this is exclusive
to God most high, or it exists possibly. This is ten in number: substance,
quantity, quality, where, when, the relative, possession, position, acting,
and being acted upon.9
One of them is a substance and nine are accidents, because the possible
either is in a subject, that is, in a substrate that subsists by itself and is in-
dependent of what inheres in it, and it is the accident, or it is not but can
be in a substrate, which is the substance. If it is a substrate to its like, it is
matter, if it inheres, it is form, if it is composed of both, it is a body, and
if it is separate, it is a soul when connected to bodies by a connection of
governance, and when not, it is an intellect. Hence, substance is existence
not in a subject. Matter is a substance that is receptive to form. Form is a
substance that is continuous by virtue of its essence and inheres in matter.
The body is a substance, which is receptive to the three dimensions that
intersect at right angles. The soul is the first perfection of a natural body for
potentially having life. The intellect is a substance separate from the body
in terms of both inherence and governance.
Quantity is that which is by essence receptive to equality and its priva-
tion. It is either continuous, which is a line if it is divisible in one dimen-
sion, a plane if it is divisible in two dimensions, a mathematical body if it
is divisible in three dimensions, and time if it is not stable, or it is discrete,
which is number and nothing else.
Quality is an accident, the conception of which is not based on a con-
ception of another and which has neither division nor non-division in its
substrate as its primary entailment. Its species are four. Sensible qualities
are passions, if they are firm, and feelings, if they are not. Qualities specif-
ic to quantities are either continuous, like straightness and curvedness,
or discrete, like evenness and oddness. Qualities of the soul are character
traits, if they are firm, and states, if they are not. Dispositional qualities are
potencies, if they are in the manner of inciting, and impotencies, if they
are not.10
9 These are the ten Aristotelian categories. What follows are standard definitions for the cen-
tral concepts of Peripatetic ontology.
10 A potency in this specific sense is a capacity, the exercise of which is up to the entity to whom
it belongs. For instance, I can exercise (or “incite into act”) my potency of writing at will.
42 42
المقصد الثاني :في التقسيم على رأي األوائل
�� ن ا � � ��ذ ات �ه ا � ت ل �خ ّ �ةً � �ّ �أ ن ن ّ �أ ن نَ
ك ��م
وإ � ي و� � �م� �
ك � ا
�م ، �ص � ا� ى ا�ع� � �ه ل�ل وو �ه، � �ل د �و� و ج ب و ج و
ل � �� ا ا �ل���مو ج�ود إ� �م�ا � ي� ك
� �ا �� وا �ل���م�ل�ك وا �لو �ض
ف � ا �ل��ك� ف� ال�أ � ن ع���ر�ة :ا ��جل ا �ل � د� .ه � ش
ع � ي� و�م�تى وا �ل���م���ض �و�هر وا �ل ك�م و ي و و جو و و
�أ ن �أ ن
و � �ي��ف���ع�ل و � ي�ن� ف���ع�ل.
�أ ف ن ّ �أ ن ن ف ٌ �ت �ة �أ ض ٌ أ نّ ٌ
� �
ي و ي� و وع ي� ي� ، �ض
� م� � � �ك � � ا�
م � �
�إ �
�
ك ��م���م �ل� ا � وا ح�د �م ن����ه�ا ج�و�هر وا �ل���س�ع� �عرا ��؛ ل�
ن �ز �أ ن ن ف ّ � ّ ف �ه ا � ض� � �ّ �أ ن � ّ �تق ّ �ذ ت
�و� �� م �ت غ ن ن �ل م
ح�ل �م� ��و�م ب� ا ��ه �م����س� �����ع�� ا ح�ا ل �ي���ه ،و و ل�عر �؛ وإ م�ا � ي و� و�ج � ي ي ل
�
ح� ك � ا
� �
ك � ال
ّ �ة ن ن ًّ � ّاً � �ث ف� ا � ّ �ة � ن ن ّ ً ف �ه ا �ل ُ ف ن
كا
كا � �مر ب�� كا � ح�ا لا ����هوا �ل���صور ،و�إ� � ح�ل ل���م� �ل�ه ���هو ل���م�ا د ،وإ� � كا ن� م �و�هر� .إ� � � و و �ج
ّ ف قٌ ّ ّ ت أ ّ ٌ نت �ّ ً ف
�جرد ا ����هون���ف����س إ� � ��ع�ل ق� ال� ج���س�ا �م ��ع�ل ق� ا ��لت��د ب�ي��ر؛ و�إلا ���ع�����ل. كا ن� م ن
���س���م ،و�إ� � �م ن����ه���م�ا ف����هوا ��جل
ه � � ّ �ة ا � ّ �ة � � ا �ل��ق ل� ا ه � ا � ّ �ة ف
�و�هر�هوا �لو ج�ود لا �ي� �مو �ض ف��ا ��جل
و و ي� ر ص�ل�� ). ر و ص��ل�� �
ل ( � وع .و ل���م�ا د ي� �ج و هر ب ل
� ا���
� � ا �ل��ق���ا ُ � �أ ��ع�ا د ا ��لث�ّ� ا ث�ة ا �ل� م��تق���ا ��ط�ع��ة � � � ا � تّ ��ذ ات ف� ا � ّ �ة
ل � �� ل �ل
و �ج و هر ب ل ب � ل ا �ه م ���
س �� ل
�ا ��جلو هر ل���م�����ص�ل ل� ��ه ي� ل���م�ا د و �ج
� ا .
ٌ ٌّ ّآ ل �ذ ٌ �أ
�جرد ح���ا �ة �ا �ل��ق�� ّ �ة .وا �ل�ع��ق��� ج�و�هر م
� و ب ي � � � � � � ع� ��
ي �
�ب ط م �
��س�� �م�ا ل ّول ��جل
� ع��ل �ز واي�ا ق�وا �ئم .وا ��لنّ� ف���� ك
�
ل ي ي ي س ى
ًت ً �ع� ن ا ��جل
���س���مح�لولا و��د ب�ي��را. �
�ف ق ن ن �خ ّ ّت ّ �ةَ ت �ذ ق
�م�هوا �ل�����ا ب�ل �ل� ا ��ه ا �ل���م��س�ا وا وع�د ��م�ه�ا .و�هو إ� �م�ا �م�����ص�ل و�هوا �ل��ط إ� � ا �������س���م ي� وا �ل ك�
�أ ف ّ ن ّ ل��س��ط�� � ن ا ن���ق����س���م ف� ��ع�د � ن ّ
� إ� � ا ن���ق����س���م �ي� ث�لا ث��ة ب��ع�ا د، ���س���ما ��لت��ع�لي�����يم ي� ،وا ��جل ي� ب ب��ع�د وا ح�د ،وا � ح إ �
�غ ٌ قّ ّ ّ ن ن
�� ن� ��ا را؛ و�إ�م�ا �م ن�� ف�����ص�ل�هوا �ل�ع�د د لا ي��ر. وا �ل�ز �م�ا � إ� � �ل�م ي� ك
ا �ل��ك� ف �ه ا �ل� ض� ا ��ذ � ل �ت� �ق��ف �ت ص ّ ه ع�� �ت ص ّ �غ�� ه ل ���ق��ت�� ض ا �ل��ق����س� م��ة
�� و ي � و عر � ل� ي� ا ي و � ��� ور لى ��� ور ير وا ي ����ي�
كا ن� ت�
�ة ف ن
ح��سو��س� � ،إ� � � � ا �ل���م��� � �ا ء �أ ّ ��لّ�ً�ا� ،أ ن� ا ع�ه �أ ��ع��ةٌ :ا �ل��ك� ف��ّ���ا ت �ض
��
ّ �ق �ة ف� م ّ �قت
�� ح�ل�ه اوا �ل�لا ��س���م� � �
ي ي ب ر وي و و ي
خ ت ّ �ة � ك ّ ت ّ �؛ ا �ل��ك� ف��ّ���ا ت � � لا ���ه ال� ن���ف���ع�ا لا ت ف ّ نف ّ ت �خ �ةٌ ف ��س
�مي���ا � ،إ� �م�ا � ا �ل���م��������ص� ب�ا ل � و ي ي را �� ����هي� ا ������ع�ا ��لي��ا وإ � ي� إ
ّ�ة � ف ّ ت ّ � ن ء � �ّ � ن ف �ةٌ ّ ن ّ �ةٌ
� ا ��لن� ف����س�ا ن�يّ���ة، كا �ل�ز و ج�يّ����ة وا �ل����فرد ي� ؛ وا ل��كي���ي���ا ح���ا وإ م�ا م�������ص�ل� � �س���ا �م��ة والا � كا لا � ق �مت�����ص�ل� �
ّ�ة ف ن ت ّ ف� ن ن ت ��س ٌ
فّ ت
ح�ا لا � .وا �ل��كي���ي���ا � الا ����س��ت�ع�د ا د ي� � :إ� �
� ت � و� لا ف����ه ا �ل �خ��ة ف����ه� ا �ل���م��ل ك�
��ا كا �� را � إ� � �
إ ي� ي
ق �ة ّ � ّف ف ن
ف �ة
حوا �ل�د �� ����هوا �ل��ق�� ّو و�إلا ����هوا �ل�لا � ّو . كا ن� � �
ع
43 43
On the Classification of Existents
11 Strictly speaking, this characterisation of the relative (muḍāf) by means of relation (nisba)
seems circular. However, Ḥillī is making a point familiar from Aristotle (Cat. 7, 6b27-7a30):
as a category of its own, the relative consists of things that are what they are only in a recip-
rocal (albeit not necessarily symmetrical) relation to their counterparts.
12 Here Ḥillī begins a series of revisions to Peripatetic ontology by first denying the reality of
prime matter. The argument was already given in I.1.3: if matter were real, it would have to
be contingent, and as a contingent thing, its possibility would have to be grounded in a more
primordial matter, and so forth ad infinitum.
13 Cf. III.1 and IV.2.2 below.
14 If position in time were real, there could not be a first moment of time, and thus no beginning
to the world’s existence, because it would always have a before.
15 Take the number two, that is, a set with two elements. As a quantity, twoness needs a subject
in which it exists. The only available candidates are the two elements, neither of which is two
on its own. If we suppose that it inheres in both of them together, Ḥillī’s problem follows,
namely one accident inhering on several substrates. Since discrete quantity is not real, the
qualities specific to it cannot be real either. Both depend on the arithmetician’s considera-
tion.
44 44
��ف �ت��ق����س�� ال��م � ت
�ود ا ��
ي�م �وج � ي�
أ ن ن �ة شّ
��ا ن��ه.
ل����ء إ� لى �م ك� ال� � �����س� � ا �
و ي� �ب ي
�أ ف ن
وا �ل���م�تى ���س�ب� ت��ه إ� لى �ز �م�ا ن��ه وطر��ه.
�ف �ه ا � نّ �ة ا � �ت � ّ �ة
�رر . � �ا � و و ل������س��ب� ل���م� ك وا �ل���م���ض
ّ ن
وا �ل�ِ��م�ل�ك و�هو�����س��ب��ة ا �ل��ت���م�ل�ك.
ن �أ ا �ل �ض �ه �ه����ئ��ةٌ �ت� ض� �ل��ل�����س��� ���س�� �ن����س� ��ة �أ � ز ا ئ��ه �� ض
ع���� ،و�����س��ب��ة �ج� ز�ا ئ��ه
ع�� ��ه�ا � ل �� ض
ى
إ ب � � و و�ع و و ي عر � ج م ب �ب ب� �ب �ج � ب
�ة �أ
كا �ل��ق��ي���ا �م والا ن�ت� ك�
��ا ��س. إ� لى �مور�خ �ا ر�ج � �ع ن���ه� ،
ّ�أ �أ ن
و � ي���ف���ع�ل و�هوا ��لت�� ث�ي��ر.
تَ�أ ّ �أ ن
و � ي�ن� ف���ع�ل و�هوا ��ل�� ث�ر.
ُ �ل �أ �لخ ُّ �أ ّ ُ ّ ٌ ّ �أ ّ ّ
�م�هوا �ج���س���م وا ���ط وا �ل��س��ط�� ح قّ� ن� ا �ل���م�ا د �ة �ل��ي����س� ت� ث�ا ب�ت���ة ،و� لا �ل�ز �م ا �ل��ت��س��ل��س�ل .وا �ل ك� وا �ل
�
ح إ
ّ�ةٌ نّ ّ�ة �ه � � ُ �أ � �أ �ت � � ُ ف
كا ن� ت� ث��بوت�ي�� �ل�ز �م ي�ه�ا .وا �ل���م�تى و�م�ا ب��ع�د ه �م� ن� ا �ل����س�ب� ي�� ؛ �لو � ح� ث� ���� و ي� ج وا هر فرا د ي� ي� ا ل��ب��
ض ّ �ز ق ث ت خ ت ّ �ة ن ف فّ ت �تّ
ا �ل���س��ل��س�ل .وا �ل��كي���ي���ا � ا �ل���م��������ص� ب�ا �ل���م�������ص�ل �فرع ع��لى ��بو��ه و�ل��ي��س ،و�إلا �ل �م �ي���ا �م ا �ل�عر��
ّ
ح�لي�� ن�. ب����م���
45 45
Observation III
On Investigating the Classes of Existents
المرصد الثالث
في البحث عن أقسام الموجودات وفيه مباحث
Investigation 1: On the quiddity of body
The theologians maintain that body is made up of isolated substances,1
each of which has a position, does not allow division either actually or po-
tentially, and is put in a relation such that length, breadth, and depth come
to be for it. The wise hold the view that it is made up of matter and form.
The investigation of this question relies on whether the part that cannot be
partitioned is asserted or denied.
Those who assert it infer on various grounds.
First, time has a past and a future, neither of which exists, and it has a
present, but if the present were divisible, then not all of it would be pres-
ent, and this is preposterous.2 If it is not divisible, then if motion through
it were divided, it follows that it too would be divided, because the time
in which half of the motion has taken place is half of the time in which the
whole motion has taken place, yet we supposed the time to be indivisible,
and this is preposterous. Hence, it has been established that motion taking
place in the now is indivisible.3 The interval, in which that motion takes
place in that time, is indivisible, because if it were divided, then the motion
to its midpoint would be half of the motion to its end, and the motion that
was supposed to be indivisible would be divisible, which is preposterous.
Hence, it has been established that there exists an impartitionable part of
the interval, which is what was sought for.
1 Here and throughout, it is important to note that the term ‘substance’ (jawhar) denotes two
very different kinds of thing, namely the Peripatetic ontological category and the theologi-
ans’ atom. It is common, and often reasonable, to translate the latter use straightforward-
ly as ‘atom’. I have opted against this, because that hides an important functional similarity
between the two kinds of substance: they both denote the ontologically foundational kind,
albeit in different metaphysical systems. In this abstract sense, ‘substance’ means the same
thing in both cases.
2 That is, if time were infinitely divisible, as the falāsifa hold and as the atomist theologians
deny, then we could not attribute any duration to the present. Any duration we assume
would be further divisible into past, present, and future, and so the time we supposed to be
the present would not be present in its entirety. Hence, time is only divisible into atomary
units.
3 The argument is somewhat dense, but the last sentence provides the key: we should think
about a motion that takes place in the present. If that motion were infinitely divisible, the
present would be such as well, and the aforementioned absurdity would follow. The conclu-
sion is that motion, like time, consists of atomary units.
48 48
األول :في ماهية الجسم
[البحث] ّ
قُ ن �ذ ّ �أ
ن �ؤّ فٌ � �ت ّ ن �ز � �أ نّ
� �����
� ا ل �ض
� ا
�ه��� م� �د ح ا ك
� )
� ج و هر فر و ل و ( د، ا � � ا � �
م � � ���
ل م� م �
��س�� ل
��ل�مو� ع�موا � �ج
� ا ا �ل���م� ك�
� و و ع ي �بل
ضٌ ٌ �أ ّ ُ
ٌ
ح���ص�ل �ل�ه طول و�عر�� و�ع�م ق�. حي��� ث� ي�
� ا �ل��ق����س���م��ةَ ب�ا �ل��ف���ع� ولا ب�ا �ل��ق�� ّو�ة ،ي�ت�� �ل��ف� ع��ل �ن����س��ب� �ّم�ا ب�
� ى �ةٍ ل
�أ �ة ت ّق فُ �ذ ف ّ ّ �أ ّ
ح�� �ي� �ه� ه ا �ل���م��س� �ل� ي��و���� ث �م�ا ء �ذ �ه��بوا إ� لى ��ه (�م �ل���) �م� ن� ا �ل���م�ا د وا �ل���صور .وا �ل��ب���
�ة �ة ف �ؤ ن ح �ك وا �ل
�
تّ ّ�ذ
� ا �ج�ل� ز�ء ا �ل� �ي� لا ي��ج� ز��ئ� ون���ف��ي���ه. ع��ل ث�� ت
ى بو
ّ ق
و��د ا ����س��ت�د ل �م��ث �ب� ت�وه ب�و ج�ود ه:
ٌ ف ن ن ن ٌ ن �أ نّ أ
كا � ضر� ،إ� � � ال� ّول � :ا �ل�زّ�م�ا � �م ن���ه �م�ا �� و�م ن���ه �م����س��تق����ب�ل ،و�ه�م�ا �م�ع�د و�م�ا � ،و�م ن���ه ح�ا ��
ضٍ
ح� ة ا � ق �ة ف� � ن ف ً ق ن ٌ
ف ُ ً �ذ ّ ً
�� ن� �م������س���م�ا ��ا �ل�رك�� ل���م������طوع� ي���ه إ � ن �خ
ضرا� ،ه� ا ��ل� .و�إ� �ل�م ي� ك �� ن�ك�ل�ه ح�ا �� �م ن��ق����س���م�ا �ل�م ي� ك
أ نّ �زّ ن ّ�ذ ق ف� ن فُ �ل� ن فُ ّ ن ّ�ذ
���ة ����ص� ا �ل�ز �م�ا � ا �ل� �ي� ي���ق�� ا ن���ق����س���م� ت� �ل�ز �م ا ن���ق����س�ا �م�ه ،ل� � ا �ل �م�ا � ا �ل� �ي� ي����� ي���ه ����ص� ا حرك
ع ع
ح� ة ا � ا ق �ةَ ف� الآ ن �ذ �خُ فٌ ف �ث ت �أ نّ ���ة ،ق��د � �ض ّ ن �غ ق ف ّ
�� ن���ا ا �ل�ز �م�ا � ي��ر�م ن������س���م� ،ه� ا ��ل�� �� .ب��� � ا �رك�� لو ���ع� ي� � �
ل�
حرك و فر كل ا �ل� �ي���ه �
�زّ ن �غ ُ ن ق �ة أ ّن �ل� ة ف �ذ ف ف�ة ّ ف �غ ُ
��� �ي� �ل�ك ا �ل �م�ا � ي��ر �م������س���م� ،ل� ���ه�ا �لو ي�ه�ا ت��ل�ك ا حرك ي��ر �م ن��ق����س���م��ة�� .ا �ل���م��س�ا �� ا ��لت�� ي���ق�� ����
ي ع
ح ك ة ّت آ
�ضَ ت �غ َ ���ة � ل � � �ه�ا ،ف���ت ك نُ � ���ةإ� لى ن���� فص����ه�ا ن����ص ف� ا �ل� ��ا ن� ت� ا �ل� ا ن���ق����س���م� ت� �ل ك�
��� ا ��ل�ي� �فر�� �� ي��ر �و� ا ل�ر حرك إ ى �خر حرك
ف ت ُ ً �ذ ُ فٌ ف
�م ن��ق����س���م��ةٍ �م ن��ق����س���م��ة� ،ه� ا �خ ��ل���� ،ث �ب�� ت� و ج�ود �ج� ز�ء لا ي��ج� ز��ئ� �م� ن� ا �ل���م��س�ا ���ة ،و�هوا �ل���م��ط�لو ب�.
49 49
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Second, the point is something that has a position but no parts, and if
it is a substance, what was sought for has been established. Were it an ac-
cident, then if its substrate is divided, it follows that the point is divided,
because what inheres in a divisible [thing] is divisible. For if it inheres in
all parts of the substrate, it is necessarily divisible, since it is impossible
for what inheres in one of two parts to be identical with what inheres in
another,4 and if it inheres in some of the parts, then what we supposed to
be a substrate turns out not to be a substrate, and this is preposterous. If,
however, the substrate is indivisible, this is what was sought for.
Third, if we posit a perfect sphere on an even plane, it will contact the
plane at what is not divisible, for otherwise the plane would be curved. If the
sphere rolls so that it ends up elsewhere on the plane, it will have contacted
the plane at a point next to the other one, which is what was sought for.
The deniers have argued in various ways.
First, if we posit three substances in contact with one another,5 and if the
one in the middle does not prevent the two outermost ones from touching
each other, then interpenetration will result, and it is known to be false.
If it does prevent them, then the side touching one of the two outermost
ones is different from that touching the other, and division follows as a
consequence.
Second, if we suppose a moving sphere that has completed a rotation
about itself, then every part supposed on the surface of that sphere will
have completed one circle. If we suppose a part on a belt to have moved
one indivisible part, then if what is closer to the pole has moved a similar
amount, the two circles will be equal, which is necessarily false, but if it has
not moved at all, disruption will follow. If it has moved a smaller part of the
way, what was sought for will be established.6
4 One might think that this part of the argument against the indivisibility of the point’s alleged
substrate begs the question. The debate is over whether an indivisible accident can inhere in
a divisible substrate, but the appeal is to the principle that an accident is divided through the
division of its substrate. The opponent could object by saying, for instance, that the division
of the substrate simply annihilates the indivisible accident.
5 Throughout these three arguments against atomism, ‘substance’ denotes the atom.
6 Suppose two different “belts”, or sections formed by two parallel planes that intersect a
sphere. The circumferences of these sections are different in length, and so when the circle
rotates, points on these sections must have travelled different distances, regardless of the
duration that we choose for measuring them. Now, if the atomists are right, there must be a
shortest possible time and distance the point on the larger section can travel – namely the
length of an atom. But then the point on the smaller section must have either travelled a dis-
tance shorter than this, which contradicts atomism, or not have moved at all, which breaks
the sphere into really distinct sections. As a consequence, atomism cannot be true.
50 50
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ل � ز � ف� ن ن ت � � ًا ث ت ا � ل ُ � ن ن ُ ٌ �ذ ن نّ
كا � كا �� ج و هر ��ب��� ل���م��ط�و ب� ،وإ� � � ا �ج �ء ل�ه ،إ� � � ا ��لث��ا �ي� :إ� � ا ��لن�ق����ط��ة �ش��ئ� و و �ض
ع
ن ق ٌ أ نّ ن ّ ف ف أ نّ ّ �ز ن ق ُ ً ف
�
ح�ا ل ي� ا �ل���م������س���م�م������س���م ،ل� ��ه إ� � ح�ل ي�
ق ن � ح�ل�هُ إ� ن� ا ن���ق����س���م �ل �م ا �������س�ا ��م�ه�ا ،ل� � ا �
ل� � �ا ��م���
�عر �ض
� ف ي� عي�� ن� ا �ل ح�ا ل ف� ا ح�د ا �ل� ز�أ � ن �و ن� ا �ل ً ّ
كا ن� �م ن��ق����س���م�ا ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور�ة ،لا ����س��ت���
ح�ا �ل��ة ك
�أ
�ج �مي�� �ج� ز�ا ئ��ه �
ح�ا ل �ي� �ج � � ي� ع
ق ن َ �غ ن ن ّ �ذ �خ فُ ن م ًّ ض ف ن آ
كا � ي��ر�م������س���م ح�ل� ،ه� ا ��ل�؛ و�إ� � ح�لا ب����م��� �� ���ا � �� ن� �م�ا �فر �ض�خر ،و�إ� ح�ل �ي� ب��ع������ه�ا �ل�م ي� ك ال� �
51 51
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
7 The sum of atoms in the diagonal would of course be seven and not eight, which would be
the sum of the sides of a corresponding geometrical square. However, the argument is not
concerned with a geometrical square but a square constituted by sixteen atoms. The sum of
atoms constituting two adjacent sides of the square is seven, the atom in the corner being
counted only once.
8 I have translated shakl al-ḥimār somewhat liberally here. This refers to a Euclidian theorem,
according to which for any triangle, the sum of any two sides of it is greater than the remain-
ing side. The name ‘donkey theorem’ probably refers to a later mocking remark by Epicure-
ans, according to whom the theorem needs no proof, since even a donkey knows that the
shortest distance between two points is a straight line.
9 In Nihāyat al-marām III.1.1.1, II.420-438, Ḥillī goes through fourteen arguments for atomism,
together with possible counterarguments and defences. The first and the third argument of
our text are included with much more extensive discussion (the first and the second argu-
ment in the longer list, respectively), and argument six in the longer list closely resembles our
second argument.
52 52
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
53 53
Investigation 2: On Refuting the Arguments of
the Wise Concerning Matter
The wise have said:10 A simple body is one in itself and continuous, for it is
impossible that it be composed of isolated substances. There is no doubt
that it is receptive of division, which is the privation of continuity from
something that should be continuous.11 If that which is receptive were the
continuity, something would be receptive of its own privation, which is ab-
surd, for that which is receptive and that which is received are combined.
If it is something else, that is what was sought for, because by matter we
mean nothing but that.
Objections are made in a number of ways. The first is denying the uni-
ty of the body, and we have already demonstratively established the part
which cannot be partitioned. The second is that the known division is only
supposed to be established, not such that it really separates. The first does
not entail that matter is established, but the second would. Third, combin-
ing that which receives and what is received does not have the absolute
consequence that the two are combined in existence. Reception of this sort
is not based on existence, since what is meant by it is the possibility of
attributing something with what it receives, and there is no doubt that a
contingent quiddity, insofar as it is such, is different from both existence
and non-existence but receptive of both, yet no impossibility follows from
that, and similarly here.12 Fourth, matter is divisible through the division of
form. If the division of form needed a substrate, matter would need anoth-
er matter, and there would be regress.13
10 Again, “the wise” refers to Peripatetic philosophers. I have refrained from translating straight-
forwardly as philosophers in order to differentiate between the terms ḥākim and faylasūf, the
latter of which I translate as ‘philosopher’.
11 I translate min shaʿnihi somewhat loosely as “should be”. The Arabic idiom is used in con-
nection with features that something ought to have by virtue of its essence, but it is free of
explicit references to essentialist terminology. Thus, a dysfunctional eye is blind only because
it should be seeing by virtue of its essence, but does not see because of circumstantial factors.
Rocks are not blind because they should not be seeing to begin with.
12 Ḥillī is trying to turn the Avicennian idea of the neutrality of quiddity with respect to exist-
ence and non-existence against the philosophers’ argument for matter. It seems to me that
the counterargument relies on the ambiguity of the Arabic word ʾadam, which is used to
mean both the Aristotelian concept of privation (Gr. sterēsis), or the non-being of a specific
attribute, and non-existence in an absolute sense. The philosophers’ argument for matter is
based on the former, Ḥillī’s counterargument on the latter. His idea is that since quiddities are
neutral with respect to existence and non-existence, the quiddity of continuity should be able
to receive its non-existence, even if this means division, its specific non-existence.
13 This argument is puzzlingly weak. It may be true that real divisions of matter always take
54 54
المادة البحث ال ّثاني :في إبطال ّ
حجة الحكماء في ّ
أ �ة ت ّ ف
�وا �هرال� �فرا د. ���ه �م� ن ا ��جل ���س���ما �ل��ب����سي����ط وا ح�د �ي� ن���ف����س�ه �مت�����ص�للا ����س��ت��� �م�ا ء ا ��جل
ح �ك ق��ا �ل� ت� ا �ل
�
ح�ا �ل� �ر�كب �
ا�
��� ن �متّ���� ص� اً .ف��ا �ل��ق ك �
�عّ � ن �ش �أ ن �أ ن
�ه ��� �
م ا
��م ا�
ص
تّ
� ال � �د ع ه� ، ل �ش��� ّ ف� �أ نّ�ه ق��ا ���قل����س� م��ة
بل � � ي و� � ل � ��
وا ك ي� � ب�ل ل �� و ي� م � ل �
ا
ُ ٌ تّ
ن ق ق
ح�ا ل لا ج���ت���م�اع ا �ل�����ا ب�ل وا �ل���م������بول ،و�إ� ل��ّ� ء �ق�ا ب�لاً �ل�ع�د �م�ه ،و�هو م
� كا ن� ا � ش � ل ا�
ص ��� كا � �هوالا �
�ن ن
إ� �
ي�
�ة ّ ّ ن أ آ
ن �ش���� ئً � � ف
�خر����هوا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� ل� ن�ا لا ��ع ن�� ب�ا �ل���م�ا د ��سوا ه. كا � ي��ا �
ي
���س���م ،ق��د � �ه ن���ا ع��ل ث�� ت أ
� ا �ج�ل� ز�ء و ب ر ى بو والا عت��را ض�� �م� ن و ج�وه .ال� ّول ا �ل���م ن�� �م� ن وح�د �ة ا ��جل
ع � �
ض ّ نَ ن ف ّ ث ت نّ ّ ن ت ّ
ك�. �
ا
�ا �ل��ذ �� لا ي��ج� ز��ى .ا ��لث��ا �� إ� ن� الا ن���ق����س�ا ن� ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م ��بو��ه إ� ����م�ا �هو ا �ل����فر��� د و� الا ����� ك�
ي ي ي ي
ال�أ ّ لا ���ق��ت���ض��� ث�� ت ا �ل���م�ا دّ �ة � ،ا ��لث�ّ�ا �ن .ا ��لث��ا �ل� ث لا ��ل�ز �م �م� ن ا ���ت���م�ا ا �ل��ق���ا � ا �ل���م�����ق
� ج ع ب ل و �بول � ي ب ل ي� و ول ي ي� بو�
�ذ ق فُ �ذ ف ن ف ً
�م��ط��قل���ا ا ج���ت���م�ا ��ع�ه���م�ا �ي� ا �لو ج�ود؛ �إ� � �م��ث�ل �ه� ا ا �ل��ق����بول لا ي�ت�و���� ع��لى ا �لو ج�ود؛ إ� ا �ل���مرا د ب��ه
غ �ةٌ ح��� ث ن ل��ّ ء ����م��ق��� ��ه ،ل �ش��� ّ ف� �أ نّ ا �ل� م�ا �هّ����ة ا �ل���م���م��كن���ة � �م ك� ن تّ ف ش
� ا�
� �
� ي ي� ي� يرم� ه� ه� � � �
م � ��ا � ا ����ص�ا �� ا � �ي� ب �بول وا ك ي� � �� ي إ
�ة ق ُ ّ ّ ٌ
�ت � ��ة ف � ذ �ذ ق �ة
��� ا �ه ن���ا .ا �لرا ب�ع ا �ل���م�ا د ت�ن�����س���م �ل�لو ج�ود وا �ل�ع�د �م و��ا ب��ل� ��ل�ه���م�ا ،ولا ي��ل�ز �م�م� ن� �ل�ك ا ����س� ��ح�ا ل� � ك
ّ �أ ّ ح�ّ ا ف���ت�� ت ّ �ة ف ف
�خر�ى � ا �ل���م�ا د �ة إ� لى �م�ا د �ة � � ل قر �صور�ة � لى م
إ ب�ا ن���ق����س�ا �م ا �ل���صور �� .لو ا ���ت��قر ا ن���ق����س�ا �م ا �ل��
ت
و���س��ل��س�ل.
55 55
Investigation 3: On Accidents
Accidents need either a substrate but nothing else, and these are the sen-
sible qualities and modes of being,14 or a substrate and a structure,15 and
these are life and what is conditioned by it. There are nine of them: pow-
er, belief, opinion, reflection, will, disgust, desire, aversion, and pain and
pleasure, these two being of one species.
When it comes to sensible accidents, they are through sight, namely
light and colour, or hearing, namely sounds and letters, or taste, namely
flavours, or smell, namely fragrances, or touch, namely heat and coldness,
moistness and dryness, heaviness and lightness, and softness and hardness.
When it comes to the modes of being, they are motion, rest, combination,
and separation.
Let us now treat assertively, albeit in a concise manner, various ques-
tions concerning each of these classes.
place through forms – for instance, when a sphere is divided, two hemispheres come into
being. However, this does not mean that the hemispheres have second-order matter that sub-
sists on the sphere’s first-order matter, which is precisely what is required to yield an infinite
regress of matters from infinite divisibility. Instead, it is the same first-order matter, albeit in
smaller increments with each actualised division, that functions as the substrate and thereby
the necessary condition of division.
14 The phrase ‘mode of being’ translates the Muʾtazilite technical term kawn, which Frank 1978,
93-104, renders as ‘presence in space’. It is an attribute proper to the atoms, which by nature
occupy some spatial position. Thus, the term could naturally be translated as ‘mode of being
in space’, a choice which would also be corroborated by the fact that the term for space,
makān, is derived from the same root. However, because the theologians sometimes explicit-
ly speak of an atom’s kawn in a makān, I have refrained from this explanatory translation, but
the reader should bear in mind that in this context, ‘mode of being’ signifies exclusively the
atoms’ modes of being, that is, modes of being in space.
15 This structure (binya) is a specific arrangement of atoms that some accidents require.
16 This point about motion is unclear to me, but perhaps the idea is that if light were in motion,
it could not appear immediately on a new surface, regardless of the distance between that
surface and the source of light.
56 56
البحث الثالث :في االعراض
�ة الأ� ا ن � �ّ �أ ن � � ا ح�ّ لا �غ�� � ،ه ا �ل��ك� ف��ّ���ا ت � � ا ل � �ت ا �ل� ض� � �ّم�ا �أ ن ���ف
ا
�م
و و و � وإ � ، ك � �
س �� ح��س ��
م ���ل � ل ير و ي� ي ي ��
م ���ل �� ���
عر � إ � ي قر إ ى
ٌ ت ّ
�ة
م���روط ب���ه�ا ،و�هو���س�ع��ة :ا �ل��ق���د ر والا �ع��تق���ا د ح���ا �ة �م�ا �ه � ش
�ي و و ح� وا ��لب�� ن�ي���ة ،و�هوا �ل ف �ت
ي������ ��قر إ� لى ا �ل���م���ل
ّ�ذ�ة �ة شّ �ة ّ فر�ة أ ّ
ل�����هو وا ��لن��� وال� �ل�م وا �ل�ل� و�ه�م�ا �م� ن� ن�و وا ح�د. �را �ه� وا � وا � ظل���� نّ� وا ��لن����ظروالإ� را د �ة وا �ل ك�
ع
ل��س���م �ه ال�أ �ص ا ت ّ ن ّ ّ ّ ت ف� ّ � �أ ّ
� و � ا� ا
�م�
إ ب ب صر و و و و و وإ ب ع و ي�� ، � ل� ل� ا ء ��ض
ل��� ا �ه �
� � � �
�ل ا
� ا
�م� � � ا�
س �� و ح��س �
�م�� ��
ل ا ا
�مو�
ّ ئ ّ ّ ّ شّ � ��ذّ ق �ل� �ف
ح ،و�إ�م�ا ب�ا �ل�ل�م��س و�هي� ل������ ّم و�ه� ا �لروا � � ا�ب ا�
م � �و ، م �و ع
� ط
��ل��و� و�ه� ا � �
ل ا
� ب ا�م �و ، � وا حرو
ي إ ي إ
أ
�خّ ف �ة ا � ّ ن ا � ّ ا �ة �أ �ّ ال ن ف ّ
�وا � ����هو ������ و ل�لي��� و ل���ص�ل ب� .و م�ا � ك حرا ر�ة وا �ل��برود �ة وا �لرّطو��ة وا �لي����بو��س��ة وا ��لث�ق��� وا �ل ا �ل�
ل ب
ف ق ح� ة ا � ّ ن
�و� والا ج���ت���م�ا والا �ت��را �. ا �ل�رك�� و ل��س ك
ع
ف �ذ أ ق ّ
كل وا ح�د �م� ن� �ه� ه ال� ���س�ا �مع��لى��س�ب� ي��ل الا خ�ت�����ص�ا ر �ي� �م��ط�ا �ل� ب�. ح� ث� �ع� ن� � ف��لن����ب���
� �أ ّ � ف � �� �
م��ط��ل ب� ا �ل� �و�ل�� :ي�ال�مب��
���صرا ت� ال �
ّ ّ ن �أ ّ ّ �ه �ا �ل��ذّ ا ت
���ة ا �ل���م�ض����ء
حرك � وء ف���ق��ي���ل إ� ن��ه ج���س���ٌم �ل��ت��ح
� ّرك
��ه ب� � وء وا �ل�لو�� .م�ا ا �ل���ض
ن
� �ش���ي� ئ��ا � ،ا �ل���ض و ي� ب
ي
ف ف أ �أ
ح���ة �م� م ن�� ع��ة �
� �ا ء وع�د ��م�ه�ا وا ل�رك �� و
�ة
���س���ميّ����ة وا خ���ت�لا ��ا �ي� الإ� �ض و�هو خ���ط� �ل��ت��س�ا و�� ال� ج���س�ا �م ف�� ا ��جل
ي ي
� ّ ا � ق �ة �ق � نّ ا � لّ ن �ت� ّ ت
��د د ب��ج��د د ل���م�����ا ب��ل� .و ي���ل إ ��ه ل�و�. ب�ل ي�ج
57 57
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
It is also said to be colour and it is said to be its appearance, such that ab-
solute appearance is light and absolute concealment darkness, and what is
in between is shadow. This is mistaken, because illumination is common to
black and white yet they differ by their quiddities.17 The truth is, rather, that
light is a simple quality on an opaque body and comes to be at an encounter
with that which illuminates, and that both the first and the second, that is,
the shadow, are from it.18 As regards darkness, it is the privation of light
from what should be luminous. Some of the Ashʾarites say that darkness
is positively existing, because it is sensed, but the minor premise is false.19
As regards colour, according to the Muʾtazilites it is the genus of black,
white, red, yellow, and green, and they have rendered the remaining col-
ours composites of these. Al-Balkhī20 has also asserted the colour of dust.
Some of the ancients held pure colour to be black, and when it came to
white, it was imagined to be due to the mixture of air with small transpar-
ent bodies, like in the cases of snow or the foam on water, but this is an er-
ror, because white is sensed and therefore positively existing. Indeed, some
of its causes may be those, but they may also be something else, like in the
case of the whiteness of a boiled egg, for it is seen to be white, although
fire has not brought airiness into it, given that it is heavier after the boiling.
The two masters21 concur that it is within God’s, high is He, power to add
to the five colours. The individuals of each genus resemble each other, and
so the appearance sensed of one of two blacks is sensed of the other. These
genera are opposed to each other. When it comes to black and white, they
are opposed in an absolute sense, whereas the others are opposed, if ex-
treme difference is not posited as a condition for two opposites. Al-Mur-
taḍā22 and a group among the ancients allowed the combination of black
and white, for instance in dust.
17 It is unclear to me why this should be a valid argument against the claim that light is colour. If
light were the genus for both black and white, like colour is, they could still differ by having
distinct differentiae.
18 That is, both of the two alleged types of seen light (colour, or the qualified appearance of
light, and shadow, or the intermediate state between absolute light and absolute darkness)
are effects of light, not light itself.
19 That is, the premise that darkness is sensed. The idea is that as a privation, darkness is inferred
from not seeing light, but it is not seen as such.
20 Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931), also known as al-Kaʾbī, was the head of the Baghdad
Muʾtazilites in the early tenth century CE.
21 The two masters are the two Jubbāʿīs, father and son (see nn. 14 and 22).
22 Abū l-Qāsim ʾAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) was an impor-
tant Shīʾī theologian.
58 58
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ت ّ ظ �ة ق �ق��� ظ��ه ه ،ف��ا � ظل����ه ا �ل���م��ط�ل ق �ه ا �ل���ضّ ء ا �ل�خ ف
������ا ء ا �ل���م��ط�ل� �هوا �ل����ل�م� وا �ل���م� و��س��ط �هو � و �و و � ور و يل � ور
ّت �ة خ �ت ف ض ف ّ �أ ّ
� �ا ء وا �� �لا ����ه���م�ا ب����م�ا �هي������ه���م�ا .ب�ل ا � ظل����ل؛ و�هو خ���ط� لا �ش��ت��را ك ا �ل��سوا د وا �ل��بي���ا �� �ي� الإ� �ض
� ن �أ ّ ث ن ح�� ص� �ع ن���د �م��ق���ا ��ل��ة ا �ل���م�ض � �ث ف �� ف��ّ����ة �م ن��� ط��ة ّ �أ ّ
�ه ا �ه��م ء �
� �� ��
ك ل ا �س �
ل
� ا � � �ك �ه�ق ن ا �ل
ي� و و و � و � ل ��� ب ي ي ل � � م �� �� ى �ج ل ع ��س�� ح� � ي ي �ب
ض ال أ �ش �عر�ة � ّ �عّ � ن �ش �أ ن �أ ن ن � �ض ً ق ُف ّ �أ ّ
� �ي� ئ��ا .و��ا ل ب��ع���� � ���ا �و� م�� � وء �م�ا م�� ��� ��ه � ي� ك ا � ظل����ل .و �م�ا ا � ظل����ل�م��ة ����ه� ع�د �م ا ل���ض
ي
�ة � ّ � �ذ أّ ّ
�ة
كا ب� . ح��سو��س� ،وا ل���ص��غرى � � ن���ه�ا و ج�ود يّ��ة ل� ن���ه�ا م
� إ
� ر�ة ا � ّ فر�ة ا �لخ ضر�ة ض ّ ٌ ن �ة �أ ّ ف ن ّ ّ �أ
و �م�ا ا �ل�لو� ���ع ن���د ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� ن��ه �ج ����س �ل��ل��سوا د وا �ل��بي���ا �� وا �لح�م و ل���ص�� و ����� ،
ق ّ
�خ
� ع��� ال�أ ا ئ �� ّ ا �ل غ�ُ��� �ةَ �� .ض ����ة �م ن���ه�ا� .أث��� ت� ا ��ل���ل�� خ
ص و �ه � ل�� � ا
� ل
� ا �
ع ��� �
ب ي� بر و ب � و ل ج ل و ج���ع�لوا ا ��ل�بوا �ي� �مر�كب � و �ب
شّ فّ ف�ة ّ غ �ة ف ّ ّ �أ ُ �أ
�م�ا �ي� �ز ب� ِ�د �خ�ا �ل��ط��ة ا ��ل�هوا ء �ل�ل ج���س�ا �م ا �ل������ا �� ا �ل���ص��ي��ر ك� �خ يّ��� �ع ن���د م
� ل��سوا د ،و �ّم�ا ا �ل��بي���ا ض�� ف�� نّ��ه ي�ت�
�
ّ
ا�
ل إ
ن ض �أ ًّ ن ق �أ أ
�ذ
�و� ب��ع���� ����س��ب�ا ب��ه �ل�ك �و� و ج�ود ي�ا�� .ع���م��د ي� ك
� �� ف� ن
ح��سو س ي�� ك ا �ل���م�ا ء وا ��لث�ّ��ل���ج ،و�هو خ���ط� ل� نّ��ه م
ت �أ ّ �أ
� ث ف
� �ي���ه ح�د �م�ا ف�� ب���ا ض�� ا �ل��بي�� ض��� ا �ل���م��س�لو ق� ،ف��نُ��ه ي�ر �ى ب�� ض��� �م ن� ا ��لنّ��ا ر �ل�م � �و ن� �غ ي��ره ك�
ق
و��د ي� ك
ع � ي إ � ي ي
�أ أّ
�هوا ئ�يّ���ة ل� ن��ه ب��ع�د ا �ل��ط��ب���خ ث���ق���ل.
�خ �ُ ّ ن �أ ت ا تّ���ف�� ق ا � ش
�� �� ك
� ا
� �خ�م��س��ة ف�� �م��ق���د وره �ت�ع�ا لى .و ش���
� �� ��ز �ز ا ئ��د ع��ل ا �ل ل��ّ�����ي�� خ��ا ن� ع��ل �ج�
ل س �ج ص ي ى و
ى ي و �
�ذ آ � ّ �ن �أ ّ ٌ
�خر .و�ه� ه ح��سو��س��ة �م� ن� ال� � ي� �ه� ا �ل���م��� �ة ن �ت ث �ة ف� ن � �ئ�ة � �
�م� ���م�ا ��ل� ،إ� � ا �ل�هي��� � ا ل���م��ح��سو��س� �م�� ح�د ا ل��سوا د ي
� ّ�د � ن ف� ّ
� ل��س ا دُ ا �ل� ���ا ض�ُ ف��م��ط��قل��ً�ا �أ �ّم�ا ا ��ل� ا �ق ف�� �ذ ا �ل�م� ش أ ن ��ُ ت ّ �ةً �أ ّ ّ
ي� �ض
ل�� ا ط ���
و بو ي� إ ي ر ي� � �ا د � .م�ا ا � و و �بي � ال� ج����ا س �م�����ض
ض� ك ف َ ّ أ ٌ � ّ �ز ا � ت ف �غ ُ
�م�ا �ي� ضى و�ج �م�ا ع��ة �م� ن� ال� وا ئ�ل ا ج���ت���م�ا ا �ل��سوا د وا �ل��بي���ا � � ��� � � ر ��م�ا ي��ة الا خ���ت�لا �� .و ج و ل�
ع
�ة
ا �ل غ����بر .
59 59
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Colour does not need a structure, pace al-ʾAllāf,23 for otherwise it would
be lacking when the structure ceases through crushing. It is not within our
power, for otherwise we could change our colours to what we want. The
implication requires reflection, because it is possible that His, high is He,
power applies to our colours, and resisting Him is impossible to us.24 Some
of the Baghdadians25 say that colour is within our power, because when we
strike the body of a living being, red becomes apparent, just as pain comes
into existence. Hence, it is necessarily generated from the strike. This is
undermined by saying that that is the red of the blood insofar as it is drawn
by the strike, but it is not generated thereby, because the generating causes
are familiar and what has generated it is not among them.26
The Baghdadians maintain that it is generated from another, persisting
colour,27 based on the judgment that what we witness later is what we wit-
nessed earlier,28 and that its existence is not dependent on light, pace Avi-
cenna, based on the decisive judgment that colour persists in the dark. He
has argued that we do not see it in the dark, and this is not because what is
dark has a quality that precludes seeing, for otherwise a distant and a close
fire would be equally unseen at night. Since the consequent is false, the an-
tecedent is likewise, and all that remains is that this is due to the privation
of colour. 29
The answer is to reject the restriction of alternatives. Instead, not being
seen is due to the lack of a condition, which is light.
23 This is Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʾAllāf (d. ca 226/841), one of the most important early Muʾtazilites.
24 In other words, Abū l-Hudhayl’s argument is not decisive, because it leaves open the possibil-
ity that colours are indeed “naturally” subject to our power, were it not that God has decided
to overrule our power with His.
25 That is, Baghdad Muʾtazilites.
26 The generating causes (asbāb muwallida) are accidents endowed with the power of causing
other accidents. Note that Ḥillī is here using the Muʾtazilites’ own doctrine to refute them,
not necessarily committing himself to their view of the generating causes.
27 This is a further attempt, related to the argument above, at explaining in what sense redness is
indeed brought into being by the drawing of blood. Concealed in the veins, blood is not red,
for the appearance of red is generated from the blood’s inherent colour once blood is drawn.
The active cause of drawing blood, and thereby of the blood’s appearance as red, is the strike.
28 The idea might be that once blood coagulates and becomes black, its inherent colour be-
comes visible again. Since there is no change in light, the cause of the blood’s redness is the
blood’s being drawn by the strike.
29 Cf. Avicenna, Shifāʿ: Nafs III.1, 92-94. Since colour is a qualification of light, it is actual only
when there is light. The material properties of opaque bodies of course do determine the kind
of colour light receives when it is reflected from the bodies, but those properties themselves
are not colours.
60 60
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
� ن �ة ّ ّ ً ّ ف �ت ُ ّ ُ
ح ق�. ل��س��� قر ا �ل�لو ن� إ� لى ا ��لب�� ن�ي���ة �خ �لا ف��ا �ل��ل�ع�لا �ف� ،و� لا ��لن�ق�����ص �ع ن���د �ز وا ل ا �لب���ي�� ب�ا � ولا ي������ ��
إ
�أ
ف� ا � ا �ز � �ة ن ٌ �ل �ز ن نش ت �أ أ ّ
�ل���� �م��ق���د ًا ��لن��ا � لا ل� �م ك ن ن ت غ ُ ن ن
�وا � ������ا ���ي��ي��ر �لوا ���ا إ� لى �م�ا ����������هي���ه .و ي� ل���م�ل م� ����ظر�،ج ور وإ وي س
ٌ ّ ُ
ع���� ا ��لب� غ���د ا د ي���ي ن� إ� ن��ه �م��ق���د ور ��لن��ا �ت��ع�لّق ��د ت��ه ��ع�ا ل � �ل ا ن�ن��ا�� ،ت���م ن�� �م ن���ا �م��ق���ا �م��ت�ه�� .ا �� ض
ق ّ ُ �أ ت ق
و لب و ى ب و وي ع ي � ر
ُ ّ فُ �أ � ٌ ف ُ ت ّ �ه � ن ض ّ ٌ �ل ّ ف أ نّ ن ُ
� �ع��� �م�ا �يو�ج �د ل�م��� .ي�� ج�� ب� �و�ل�د �م�ا ع�� ا �ل����ر ب� .و�ي���ض ��ي�� ظ�����هرح�مر�ة ،ك� حضر ب� ج���س���ما � ل� �ا �����
ي
ف��ةٌ ّ �ة ّ ً �ذ أ ّ ُ ّ �أ ّ
حي��� ث� ا ن��ز�ج�ع ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ب� ولا ي���ق�� �م��تو�ل�د ا ،إ� ال� ����س��ب�ا ب� ا �ل���مو�ل�د �م�عرو � ب� ن� ت��ل�ك ح�مر�ة ا �ل�د �م�
ع
ّ
و�ل��ي��س �م ن����ه�ا �م�ا �يو�ل�د ه.
�أ ّ أ �أ ّ َ ٌ ّ
�م ب� ن� �م�ا �ش���ا �ه�د ن�ا ه ح ك� و�ذ �ه� ب� ا ��لب� غ���د ا د ي�و ن�إ� لى ن��ه �م��تو�ل�د �ع� ن� �غ ي��ره �م� ن� ال� �لوا ن� و�هو ب�ا ق�؛ �ل��ل���
ً ّ ق فُ �أ ً ً
ح ك� ق ّ
�ما �ل��������ط�عي� � وء �خ �لا ف��ا لا � نب� ��س�ي� ن��ا� ،ل��ل���
ث�ا ن�ي��ا �هو�م�ا �ش���ا �ه�د ن�ا ه ّولا ،ولا ي�ت�و���� و ج�ود ه ع��لى ا �ل���ض
ل أ نّ � ظ ف ف ّ �أ ّ
��م�����ل �ي���ه ��� �ل�ك]؛ � � ا ل�
ذ �ة
ح��ت���ج ب� ن�ا لا ن�را ه �ي� ا � ظل����ل�م� ،و�ل��ي��س [ ك ب�ب�ق���ا ء ا �ل�لو ن� ف�� ا � ظل����ل�م��ة .ا �
م ي
ّ ف ً ُ ّ ُ ّ ٌ ن ٌ
�ي� ف��يّ����ة �م�ا ��ع��ة �ع� ن� الإ� ب����ص�ا ر و�إلا �ل���س�ا و�ى ا ��لب��عي���د �م� ن� ا ��لن��ا ر وا �ل����قري� ب� �م ن����ه�ا ��لي��لا �ي� ع�د �م ا �لر�ؤ ي� ،
�ة �ت �ك
ٌ ف ذ قّ ف ق ّ ّ
ب� إ� لا �ل�ع�د �م�ه. ��� ا ا �ل���م�����د �م��� ،ل ي��وا ��لت��ا لي� ب�ا ط�ل� �ك
ّ م
�ذ شّ �ة �ؤ ُ ُ
� وء. ح���صر ،ب�ل ع�د �م ا �لر ي� �ل�ع�د �م ا �ل���رط ا �ل� �ي� �هوا �ل���ض �وا � �م ن�� ا �ل
� ا �ل
و �ج ب ع
61 61
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
30 Abū Iṣḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār ibn Hāniʿ al-Naẓẓām (d. c. 220–30/835–845) was an early
Muʾtazilite theologian.
31 This is a rather strange argument, but the point seems to be that if sounds were not fleeting
but persistent, the phonemes of the word ‘Zayd’ (z-y-d) could be perceived in any of their
six possible permutations. The argument is spelled out in slightly greater detail in Nihāyat al-
marām II.2.3.2.2.4.1.5, I.569. It is not clear to me why persistence of sound should annihilate
the initial temporal order in which the phonemes were initially produced.
32 The last point seems to hinge on the idea that if sound were air in motion, it would be impos-
sible for any two persons to hear the same sound at exactly the same time, because one’s place
as well as the intervening objects would affect the air’s motion – which seems sound in terms
of physical acoustics, although the differences are often imperceptibly small.
62 62
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
63 63
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Some sounds resemble each other, some differ from each other. They
differ in terms of opposition. The two masters maintained that there is
opposition in what differs in terms of sound, but Qāḍī l-Quḍāt33 and Abū
ʾAbdillāh34 hesitated about that. When air undulates and a body, such as a
mountain or a smooth wall, resists that undulation, so that it rejects the un-
dulation by sending it back with the same form as the first undulation and
in the same configuration, a sound comes to be from that, namely the echo.
When it comes to the phoneme, it is a configuration which accedes upon
sound and through which another sound is aurally distinguished from its
like in terms of sharpness and weight. Phonemes are either voiced, which
are prolonged and soft phonemes and with which one cannot begin, or
they are silent, which are other than those.
Speech is composed of phonemes that are organised into a specific rela-
tion. The two masters differ, for Abū Hāshim says that speech is a specific
sound, whereas Abū ʾAlī says that it is added to sound. He maintains that
speech remains after the sound and asserts that it is heard when sound is
connected to it. The Ashʾarites maintain that speech is a meaning in the
soul, and subsists through the speaker, either manifestly or hidden. The
Kullābites35 assert a hidden but not manifest speech in the soul.
According to Abū Hāshim, an idea is concealed speech, which God pro-
duces in the hearing of the subject or which the angel produces at His or-
der, high is He. Abū ʾAlī’s statement is different, for he sometimes makes
the idea to be a thought, while in other cases he says that it is a belief, and
sometimes that it is an opinion, but he rejects its being speech.
A wish, according to Abū Hāshim, is a meaning that exists in the soul,
whereas according to Abū ʾAlī, it is a specific statement, which inevitably
includes belief and intention, so that if someone says, ‘if only such and such
were the case’, he both believes that he would benefit from it and intends
this statement, for it is thereby that he wishes. The foundation is a state-
ment and what is beside it is a condition, because the people of language
have included it among the classes of speech.36
33 This is Qāḍī ʾAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the towering figure of late Muʾtazilism who served
as the chief judge (qāḍī l-quḍāt) of the province of Rayy during his career.
34 This is probably the prominent Shīʾī theologian al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022).
35 Kullābīya refers to the followers of Ibn Kullāb, a pre-Ashʾarī critic of the Muʾtazilites (see p.
34, n. 2).
36 The “people of language” (ahl al-lugha) may mean either a linguistic community, that is, the
speakers of a language, or experts in the science concerning language. In any case, it denotes
people with authority in matters concerning a language, either because of their experience
as native speakers or because of their scientific learning. For the same term in Ḥillī’s jurispru-
dential works, see Gleave 2012, 41-44.
64 64
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ّ خ ن ت ّ ت �ت ث ٌ �خ �ت فٌ أ
� �ا د ل�������ي����ا � إ� لى ����ض � �ا د .ف���ذ �ه�� ا � ش �ض��
خ��تُ ف ف� � تّ
� �ل ا � ل�� � ا . � ل
�� ��و ف�� ال� �صوا � �م� ���م�ا � و م
ب � ي و ل ي
�ق ت �ذ �ذ ف �أ �ة ق ض ق ف ّ
ق ت ف ف
� �ا و ب�و�ع��ب�د ا �ل�ل�ه �ي� �ل�ك ،و�إ ا ����م ّو ج� ا ��ل�هوا ء و �ا و�م ي�ه�ا و�و���� ��ا ��ي� ا �ل�������ض �م�ا ا خ���ت��ل� ����
ن ف ل �خ ف ّ �ت � � ثُ � ّ �ذ �أ
���ب� و�ج �د ا ر �م��ل�� ب�
ٌ �أ
ك �تّ ّ جَ �ذ
وي و� �
ك � ، � ل
�� � �ه
�
و ج� ب صر إ ى �
� � � ��م
� � ل ا �ك ل� حي����يرد س �ل�ك ا �ل� ���مو� ج���س���م�ج ل
ّ
� �هوا �ل���ص�د �ى.
تٌ ث ن �ذ �ئت ��ل�ه �ش�� ك� أ ّ �ش�� ك�
��ل ال� ول ،وع��لى �هي�����ه ح�د � �م�� �ل�ك �صو
ًّ ّ ت آ �ث ف � ّ � ��ت���مّ���ز �ةٌ ّ ح �ف ،ف� ه �ه����ئ��ة �أ
و �ّم�ا ا �
ح�د �ة وا ��لث�ق���لت����مي���ز ا ��خر�م� �ل�ه �� ا ل
ي ِ � � � و ص � ا
�ه��
� ب ي ي
�ص ت
و �ل�� �ل� � �ض
� ر ا
�ع ي و ��� � ر�ل
ّ ّ ّ ف ٌ ُ ّ
�ع� ن ا �ل���م��س���م � .ه � �م�ا �م���ص ّ ت
�� ن� الا ب�ت��د ا ء ب���ه�ا؛ و�إ�م�ا �رو�� ا �ل���م�د وا �ل�لي�� ن� ولا ي����م ك � و�هوح و وع و و إ �
ٌ
�ص�ا �م� ت� و�هو�م�ا ع�د ا �ه�ا.
ن خ �ت ف شّ ح �ف ا �ل���م ن��ت�� ظ�����م��ة ع�� �ن����س� ��ة مخ ّ
ل�������ي�� خ��ا �، ����صو�ص��ة .وا �� ��ل� ا � لى �ب � ب� �هوا �ل�رو� ��لا �م ا �ل���مر�ك� وا �ل ك�
�، � ا �ل���م�� خ����ص �ص��ة� ،ق�ا ل �أ � ع��ل � نّ��ه ا ئ� ٌ�د ع��ل ال�أ �ص ا ت ف���ق���ا ل �أ � �ه�ا �ش�����م � نّ��ه �ه ال�أ �ص ا ت
و ى ر ي� إ و ب و و و إ و بو
�ذ ً ن ق ن�ة ّ �أ
نَ ّ ت ث ت
� �ل�ه .و �ه��ب� ت� �ص ت
��لا �م د و� ا �ل���صو� و ��ب���ه �م��س���موع�ا �ع���د �م�����ا ر � ا �ل�� و و�ذ �ه� ب� إ� لى ب���ق���ا ء ا �ل ك�
�أ �أ ن ً ف نّ ف ق ئ ٌ �ت ّ �أ ّ أ
��لا ب�يّ���ة ث��ب� ت�وا ���ل �ش���ا �ه�دًا و�غ�ا ئ�بً��ا .وا �ل ك� ��لا �م �م�ع�ى �� ا ��ل�����س ��ا �مب�ا �ل���م� ك� ال� �ش���ا �عر�ة إ� لى ن� ا �ل ك�
م ي
ً ن �غ ً
��لا �م ا ��لن� ف����س�ا �ي� �ا ئ�ب��ا لا �ش���ا �ه�د ا. ا �ل ك�
ك ا �ٌم خ��ف�� ٌّ ���ف���ع�ل�ه ا �ل�ل�ه ف� د ا �خ � ��س���م ا �ل���م ك�ّف �أ ف �خ�ا �ع ن���د �أ � �ه�ا �ش وا �ل
���ل� ،و ي������ع�ل�ه ا �ل���م�ل�ك ل ع � ي ي� ي ل � م �� �
�� � طر بي�
�ةً ّ ٌ ٌ ّ ف �أ ّ ٌ خ ف ق �أ �أ ت
�خر�ى إ� ن��ه ا �ع��تق���ا د ،وت�ا ر إ� ن��ه ظ�� نّ�، �ًرا و � � ف���ت�ا ر�ة ج���ع�ل�ه � ك� ب� �مره ��ع�ا لى .وا ���ت��ل� �ول ب�ي� ع��ل
ي
ً
كلا �م�ا. �ون��ه � و�م ن���ه �م� ن� ك
ٌ َّ ف ا �ل��تّ���م ن� ّ�ع ن���د �أ � �ه�ا �ش����� �م�ع ن� ً � �د ف� ا ��لنّ� ف���� � ،ع ن���د �أ � ع�� ّ � ن��ه ق� مخ
����صو�ص لا ب��د �ي���ه بي� ل� إ ول س و م ى يو�ج ي� بي� و ي�
ّي
�ذ ن �أ ف� ن � ن �ق � ت ن ذ
كا ن� ي��ت� ف�� ب��ه و�ق���ص�د إ� لى �ه� ا ��� ا» وا �ع��تق���د ن��ه � كا � ك �م� ن� ا �ع��تق���ا د و����ص�د؛ إ� � م�� �ا ل «لي���� �
ق
ع
�أ ق �ة ّ أ نّ �أ ُ أ ُ فّ
ا �ل��ق��ول؛ �إ� ن��ه �م��ت���م� نّ� .وال� �ص�ل�هوا �ل��ق��ول ،و�م�ا ع�د ا ه �ش��رط؛ ل� � �ه�ل ا �ل��ل غ��� ع�د وه �م� ن� ���س�ا �م
��لا �م.
ا �ل ك�
65 65
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Appendix
The two masters differ, and Abū ʾAlī as well as Abū al-Hudhayl say that
narration is what is narrated, because they made speech to be a persisting
meaning that is different from sound, making ‘reading’ to mean the sound
and ‘what is read’ to mean the persisting letter, and said that this that is
heard is identical with what God most high brought into existence.37
Abū ʾAlī asserted speech to exist in a substrate through another, just as
he made the existence of a substance in an area to require another. He said:
If it is recited, it exists with sound, if it is memorised, it exists with memory,
and if it is written, it exists with writing. Hence, he asserted speech with
memory and writing just as he asserted it with recitation, because if what
is heard were different from what God most high brought into existence,
the miracle would be annihilated, for one of us would have the power of
performing something similar.38
Abū Hāshim said that narration is not what is narrated, because speech
does not persist, and so what is heard is not what God most high brought
into existence. If narration were what is narrated, then one who narrates
about fire would burn, and if there were speech in what is written, it would
be heard, and likewise for preservation.
37 Here ‘reading’ (al-qirāʿa) means the reading of the Qurʿān. The discussion concerns the ear-
ly theological question about the relation between God’s word and its human recitation.
38 Speech here is the speech of God in the revealed text, which is why its miraculousness is an
issue. However, the theory about the relation of meaningful speech to its various modes of
reproduction holds more generally. The point is to have a theory of speech that is applicable
both to ephemeral speech acts and the theologically loaded case.
66 66
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ذ ٌ
���ت� �ن�ي�� ب�
ّ أ �أ �أ
��لا �م �؛ ل� ن���ه���م�ا ج� ��ع�لا ا �ل ك� �ح يك��اي��ة �ه� ا �ل���م���ح ك�ل��ّ�����ي�� خ��ا ن� ،ف���ق���ا ل ب�وع��ل ّ و ب�وا ��ل�ه��ذ ي� ا �ل
� ا خ���ت��ل ف� ا � ش
ي ل ي�
ق ق � �ة � ّ تَ � َ ُ ّ �ل� ف �ص ت ن ً قً �غ َ ّ
حر�� ا ��لب��ا �ي� ،و��ا لا � ،و ج���ع�لا ا �ل���مرا د ب�ا ل����قرا ء ا ل���صو� وب�ا ل�ـ��م����قرو ا و �م�ع�ى ب�ا �ي���ا ي��ر ا �ل��
ِ
ت �أ �أ نّ �ذ
ب� � �ه� ا ا �ل���م��س���مو ن���ف����س �م�ا و�ج �د ه ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى.
ع
غ �ة ف َ �أ غ ّ ف ً َ �أث��� ت� �أ � ع�� ّ
���ه� ب���ي��ره، �و�هر �� ج� �م�ا و ج�� ب� و ج�ود ا ��جل ح� ب���ي��ره ك
� � ��م����
ل ا ��لا �م�مو ج�ود ا � �
ك �
ل ا
ي ل �ي و �ب بو لي�
ً ف � ف �ظ � �ذ ا ن ف ً � ّ ت �ذ �ق �ذ ن ً
كا � �م��كت�وب�ا ��م ح��ف��وظ��ا ��م ا �لح������ ،وإ � كا ن� م
� � ،و�إ ا � و كا � �م��ت�ل ّوا و�ج �د �م ا ل���ص و �ا ل إ� ا �
ع ع ع
� ن �غ أ
ّ �ة نّ �أ � ف �ظ � ت �ة ً ف�أ ت
كا � ي��ر �م�ا �م�ا ث��ب� ت��ه �م ا ��لت��لا و ،ل� � ا �ل���م��س���موع لو � كلا �م�ا ك� ل�ا ب� �ل�ا ب��ة �� .ث��ب�� ت� �م ا �لح������ وا ك�� ا � ك��
ع ع
�ث ه ا � ت ل ��ل ت ا � � ز�ة � �ذ ن �أ ُ ن ق ًا ال ت� ن �أ
كا � ح�د �ا ��ا د ر ع��لى إ� ي��ا � ب����م� �ل�ه. و�ج �د ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا ى ب���ط�ل�� ل���م�ع���ج � ،إ �
�أ ُ ّ أّ �ق �أ ش �ل ُ
��لا �م �غ ي��ُر ب�ا � ،ف��ا �ل���م��س���مو �غ ي��ُر �م�ا و�ج �د ه �؛ ل� ن� ا �ل ك� �
ك ��اي��ة �غ ي��ُر ا �ل���م���
ح و �ا ل ب�و�ه�ا ������م ا �
ح ك�
ع قٍ ي
ن ف ن نّ ت قً �ّ �ل ك� ن ن
�
ح��ر� و ي� � � �م� ا ��ل��ا ر م
� ��اي��ة �ه� ا �ل���م��� �� ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى .و�لو � ن ت �ل
� ا
ك
� ل و ، ا
� ��ا � �م�� ح كى � ح يك� كا �� ا ح ك ي
� ذ�� ا ا �ل ً ا ٌ� � ن
ح��ف���ظ�� .� ��ا � �م��س���موع�ا ،وك كل �م ل ك ا �ل���م��كت�و ب� �
ال���م ���ط��ل� ا ��ل�ث�ا ��ل ث��� :ف� ا ��ل�����ط�ع�و�م � او ��ل ّر� او ئ�
ح ي ب
ٌ ف� ن ف �ل��كنّ � ش ّ �ة ّ ق ق �ةً �أ ًّ �أ ن نَ ّ �أ ن َ
�و� �ل�ه ��ط�ع���م ي� �������س�ه�� ،ه ل����د ح��س�ا ب� � ي� ك ح����ي����� و� �و ن� ع�د ي�مَا �ل����ط�ع���مإ� �م�ا � ���س���مإ� �م�ا � ي� ك ا ��جل
�أُ ّ ن ف �ذ �ت ف ت
� �أ ز ئ ت ف � ّ � � � � �خ
� ح�لّ�ُ �م ن���ه �ش�� ءٌ ت� ك� ث ف �ت�
س ح�� ا
�ه���
� ��
يط �ل��
� و �ه
� ا �
�ج �
�
يل ي ي ل � �ل�ح � �
�� �
ح ا ا �
إ . � ا
�س�� �ل
��
ل ا طل��� ا�� ي ي� ��ا ������ه لا ي� ل
ّ �أ ن ن �ذ ّ َّ ُ
�و� ا ��ط�ع���م. ح�د ي��د ،و�ي��س���مى ا ��لت�فِ���ه؛ و�إ�م�ا � ي� ك �ح�ا ��س وا �ل ��ط�ع���م�ه� ،م��ث�ل ا �ل ن�����
67 67
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The simple flavours are eight, because the body that carries flavour is
subtle, dense, or balanced, and what is efficient in the three is heat, cold-
ness, or a potency balanced between the two.39 If the hot acts on the dense,
hotness comes into being, if it acts on the subtle, pungency comes into
being, and if its acts on the balanced, saltiness comes into being. If the cold
acts on the dense, acridity comes into being, if it acts on the subtle, sour-
ness comes into being, and if it acts on the balanced, astringency comes
into being. If the balanced acts on the dense, greasiness comes into being,
if it acts on the subtle, sweetness comes into being, and if it acts on the bal-
anced, blandness comes into being. The Muʾtazilites made the simple ones
to be five: sweetness, sourness, bitterness, saltiness, and pungency.
Two flavours may be combined in one body, like bitterness and astrin-
gency in the state of decay, and it is called repugnance, bitterness and salt-
iness in a salty lake, and it is called tainted, bitterness, pungency and salti-
ness in the eggplant, or bitterness and blandness in the endive.
Flavours are not within our power, and they can persist.
The Qāḍī l-Quḍāt made it a condition of perceiving flavour that the pal-
ate must touch the substrate of the flavour, but Abū Hāshim and Abū ʾAb-
dillāh did not make that a condition. According to their statement, even if a
flavour exists without a substrate, it can be perceived, pace the Qāḍī.
When it comes to fragrances, no name has been posited for their spe-
cies, except with respect to approval and disapproval, so that it is said, ‘a
fragrance is pleasant or foul’, or a name has been derived for them from as-
sociated tastes, so that it is said, ‘a fragrance is sweet or sour’, or it is related
to the substrate, so that it is said, ‘the fragrance of musk or camphor’. There
is similarity and opposition between fragrances.
39 It is unclear why there should be eight basic tastes when nine classes are arithmetically deriv-
able from these two sets of three principles, as below.
68 68
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
69 69
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
40 In De caelo II.7, 289a19-21, Aristotle argues that the heat in the celestial spheres and bodies,
such as the Sun, must be due to the only kind of change they allow, that is, their rotation. It
cannot be due to fire, because the celestial spheres are not constituted of the four elements.
70 70
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
71 71
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Reminder
If the species of a body entails moistness, it is moist, and if not, it is not. If
what is moist is attached to it, it is soaked when immersed in it, otherwise
it is merely wetted. If what is moist is not attached to it, it is dry.
Question 6: On Tendency
It is a sensed ground, and the wise call it inclination. Al-Kaʾbī has denied
it. Sensation points towards it, for resistance that tends upwards prevails in
an inflated skin that is held under water by force, and a resistance tending
downwards is sensed in a rock that is held in air.41
41 Hence, tendency (iʾtimād) or inclination (mayl) primarily mean the elements’ innate motions
to their natural places, air and fire tending upwards, water and earth downwards. However,
Ḥillī also recognises the notion of forced inclination, which was introduced as an explanation
of projectile motion by John Philoponus (d. 570 CE) and subsequently adopted by Avicenna.
Here the idea is that the mover gives to the projectile an impulse, which is sustained in it as a
forced inclination, and the course of the projectile’s motion will be determined as the sum of
its forced and natural inclination, as well as other circumstantial factors. For a more detailed
discussion, see Lammer 2018a, 240-251.
72 72
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ت ن ُ
� �ب����ي�ه
ن �تق ُ ف ّ ُ ّ �ةَ ف ّ ُ ّ ف ف ن �ل ُ ن قت
ضى ن�وع�ه ا �لرطوب� ����هوا �لرط� ب� ،و�إلا ��لا� .إ� � ا ��لت����ص ق� ب��ه ا �لرط� ب� ����هوا �ل���م��� �� ���س���مإ� � ا �������
ا �ج
ع
ّ ُ ّ ّ
� ن ن �غ ئ ً ف� � ل ف� ا � �ت ّ ا �ل ف ن
��ا �� إ� � �ل�م ي���لت����ص ق� ب��ه ا �لرط� ب�.
كا � �ا ����ص�ا ي���ه؛ وإ ا ���هو ل���م��ب� �ل و �ج
إ� �
ف �ا ت � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ّ�س�ا د ��س�� :ي� ا �ل� ��ع�م�ا د
ُّ ّ �أ
ف نّ
��ك�ع� ُّ .وا �ل ً
�م�ا ء �مي���لا .وق��د ن� ك� ح �كح��س ��ٌس ،و�ت��س� ّ��م���ه ا �ل
� و�هو�م�ع ن� م
ح��س ي��د ل ع��لي��ه؛ �إ� � � �ره ا �ل � بي� ي � و ى
ّ ّ ن � تَ � �ق ً ت ّ ّ
ف� عَ�ةَ ث ت�ةٌ ف� �زّ ق ن ف خ � ُ
َ
�� ن � ح َوا �ل���ص�عود ،وا �ل
� سرا �
� �� ن �
ِ� ك ��م��س
�ل� ا�جر�
�ح �� ء ا
�م��� ل ا ��ح ا �ل���م�د ا ��� �ا ب��� ي� ا �ل ِ� ا �ل���م����و� ا ل�ـ �
ك ��س��م
ف� �ة ن� ّ ف ّ ُّ
ح��س ف�ي���ه ب�ا �ل���م�د ا ��ع� �
ح َو ا �ل��س ف���ل. �وي�
� �� ا ��جل
ي
73 73
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
This resistance is not the same as the nature, because the two exist with-
out each other, like psychic resistance and the natural body in its place,42
nor is it motion, because it exists without motion in what is at rest by force.
It is a ground that necessitates motion, either upwards, and then it is called
lightness, or downwards, and then it is called heaviness.
Hence, heaviness is a natural power through which a body is moved to
where its centre is next to the centre of the world, in case the heaviness is
absolute, or close to that, in case it is relative. The absolutely light is that
which floats above the other elements, and it is fire, whereas the relatively
light is that which moves towards the circumference for most of the inter-
val extended between the centre and the circumference, such as air.
Inclination is natural, like the resistance of a rock held in the air, psychic,
like in an animal tending towards another, or forced, like in a rock thrown
upwards by force. The natural directions are up and down, and so there
are two natural tendencies. Two natural inclinations that differ in direc-
tion cannot be combined, because it is impossible that a body be naturally
turned both towards and away from a direction. It is possible to combine a
natural and a forced inclination that are to two directions, so that there oc-
curs a composite motion towards the direction of the superior of the two,
if there is one, or rest, if there is not, or to one direction with an increased
motion. If the direction is different,43 the inclination aims at an intermedi-
ate direction in relation to the two.
In order to assert inclination, the ancients have argued that were it not
for it, motion with a resistance would be equal to motion without resist-
ance, for if something moves a certain distance with an inclination, it moves
that distance in a shorter time without it. But then, with an inclination that
is lesser in correlation to the two times, it will equal the time of that which
lacks inclination.44
42 There is no inclination when an elemental body is in its natural place. Psychic resistance is
tendency due to a soul, as explained in what follows.
43 That is, if the direction of the composite inclination is different from the directions of both
constitutive inclinations.
44 The argument is extremely dense, but it is explicated in Nihāyat al-marām II.2.3.2.2.2.4.9,
I.517-518. The hindrance here is the contrary natural inclination in an object that is moved by
force. If we suppose that the natural inclination is not a necessary feature of all bodies, but
continue to appeal to it in explaining differences between the movability of different bodies
by an identical force, we end up with the absurdity that a body with a small natural inclina-
tion moves as easily as a body without inclination. The only remaining alternative is to say
that a body without inclination moves instantaneously, which is also absurd. Hence, our way
of explaining differences in motion requires that all bodies have a natural inclination.
74 74
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
� �����س� ت �ه��ذ ه ا �ل� م�د ا ف���ع��ة ن���ف�� ا � ط� ���ع��ة �ل � د ّ �م ن���ه� م�ا د نَ ال أ � � �ل� م�د ا ف���ع��ة
كا ��
كل � �� و� � �خرى � ��س ل�� �بي و ج و � �� ول�ي �
ّ
���ة. حرك
ن �ق ً
سرا د و ن� ا �ل� ��� ��
ف
���ة �لو ج�ود �ه�ا �ي� ا �ل���م��س ك حرك �؛ ولا ا �ل� ّ ���س���م ف�� �م ك�
��ا ن��ه ا �ل��ط��بي���يع ا ��لنّ� ف����س�ا ن�يّ���ة وا ��جل
ي
ً �أ ف فُ ّ ةَ ّ ف ُ ّ ّ ً �أ ُ
�س���ل���ي��س���مىث���ق���لا. ��� إ� �م�ا إ� لى �و ق� ف���ي��س���مى خ���ف����ة و إ� لى � حرك � ا �ل� ن
و�هو�م�ع�ى �يو ج�� ب
ً ُ � ُ ٌت ٌ ّ
كا � �م��ط��قل���ا
�ك�ز ا � �ل � ن ن
حي��� ث� ي�ن���ط� ق�ب� �مر�ك�ز ه ع��لى �مر ل�ع�ا �م إ � � ���س���مإ� لى ح ّرك ب���ه�ا ا ��جل ف��ا ��لث�ق���لق� ّو�ة ط��بي���عيّ����ة ي��
ئ ن ّ ف ق �ل�خ ف ف فً ُ � ن �ذ � � ن ن �أ
�����ي��� ا �ل���م��ط�ل� �هوا �ل��ط�ا �ي� ع��لى ��س�ا �ر ا �ل�ع���ا �صر و�هو � �ا ��ا .وا كا � �م���ض و ي�����قر ب� م�� ل�ك إ � �
�ذّ ت �أ
ل
ةً
� �
ح � � �ث�� ا �ل���م��س�ا ف���ة ا �ل���م���م��ت ّ�د �ة ��� ن ا �ل���م�ك�ز � �ا �فُ� �ه ا �ل� � �� ّ ُّ
ا ��لن��ا ر ،وا �ل���م���ض
� ��ك
بي� ر و ي ر إ ى ط �� ح
�� ��
م ���ل ا حرك ر
ك و ي� ي
كا ��ل�هوا ء. حي����ط � ا �ل���م���
ُ ن ٌّ ّ ّ ُ ّ
� ن
ح��يوا � ع��ىل � ّو ،و�إ�م�ا ن���ف����س�ا �ي� ك�
�م�ا �ي�ع��ت���م�د ا �ل �� ن ف�� ا ��جل ك ��م��س��
ل ا �جر� �
� �م�د ا ف���ع��ة ا �ل
�
ح ��ك ّ
ع� ��
ي �
�ب ط ا
�موا �ل���مي���ل إ� �
�ي ِ ي
ُ قُ ّ � تُ ف ق ق ً ّ ّ ق ٌّ �غ
� ا �ل��ط��بي���عيّ����ة ا �ل��ف��و� وا �ل��س ف���ل؛ �جر ا �ل���مرمي� إ� لى �و� ���سرا .وا �جل���ه�ا ح����كا �ل ي��ره ،و�إ�م�ا ���سر�ي� �
ّ ُ ُ
ح�ا �ل��ة ت�و�ج �ه
���ه�ِ�ة ،لا ����س��ت��� ���ت���م �مي���لا ن� ط��بي���عيّ���ا ن� م
�خ��ت�� فل���ا ا �جل
� � ف��ا لا �ع��ت���م�ا د ا �ل��ط��بي���ع ّ ا ث�ن��ا ن� .ولا ي�ج�
ع ي�
ّ ُ
ح���ص�ل
ف � وا �ل��ق����سر�� إ� لى ج�
���ه��تي�� ن���� ،ي��� ّ
�
ع ��
ي �
�ب طل�� �و�ز ا ج���ت���م�ا ا � ���ه��ة و�ع ن����ه�ا .و �
ي ���س���مط��ب�عً�ا إ� لى ج� ا ��جل
ي ي ع �ج
فت�ز ُ � ن � ن ن �أ � نً � ن ةٌ ّ �ة ن
���ه��ة وا ح�د �ةٍ ��� د ا د �� ن� ،و� لى ج�
إ ك � ل � ا
كا � و و� إ � �م ي �
ك �س ا
�م
� ل � �� إ � � �ه���م � �ض ا� ف
�����
ل ا ح َ � ه��ة
��� و ج �
�� �
� ��� �مر�كب �رك ح
نّ ّ
���ه��ة �م��تو��س��ط��ة ب�ي� ن���ه���م�ا ع��لى ا �ل������س��ب��ة. ���ه��ةُ �ق���ص�د ج� ���ة .و�لوا خ���ت�� فل��� ت� ا �جل
� حركا �ل�
ح ّرك
ت
���ةَب��د ون��ه ،ف�� نّ��ه �ل � ك �
حل ���ة �م ا �ل�ع�ا ئ� ق ا � ك �
ح�ا �
ل ا ����س��ت ّ�د ل ال�أ ا ئ�ُ ع��ل ث�� ت��ه ��أ ن�ّ�ه �ل لا ه �ل��س�ا ت
إ و ر ع � ر و و ل ى بو ب و و
ت �ز نَ �ة ّ ن ن ّ ق �أ ّ ق �أ ن �ز ف نت ً�ة ف
�مع �مي���ل �م��س�ا �� وب��د و��ه ��ل�ك �ي� �م�ا � ��ل و�مع �مي���ل ��لع��لى �����س��ب� ا �ل�ز �م�ا �ي�� ن� ��س�ا و� �م�ا � ع�د ي�م
ا �ل���مي���ل.
75 75
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The theologians have argued for that by saying that if a rope is pulled
with an equal power at both ends, it stays still because of the balance be-
tween the two acts upon it. This, however, is not rest, because the act of
one is of the same genus as the act of the other, and two likes do not pre-
clude each other, and so it is tendency.
Tendency is momentary, because it exists at the moment it is acquired,
as well as persistent, because it is the cause of transferring, and so it exists
together with it. It allows for intensity and weakness.
Natural tendency intensifies well by small resistance but forced tenden-
cy does so in a medium, because heat occurs by means of friction, and even
if the potency becomes weaker, the subtleness contributed by heat com-
pensates for what is lost through the weakening.45 When the contrary push
matches the potency, it becomes weaker and the heat no longer suffices to
compensate for the weakening.
According to Abū Hāshim, tendency is perceivable by touch, and so
there is no need for evidence in order to establish it, although evidence
is needed to establish variation in tendency, because when one considers
what is perceived, they may be similar. Abū ʾAlī opposed him.
Some tendencies are similar, namely those which are determined to the
same direction, for unity in what is caused entails unity in the cause, and
some are different, namely those whose directions are many. According to
Abū ʾAlī, they are opposites, because they cannot be combined in a single
body, whereas according to Abū Hāshim, they are not opposites, because
two equal pulls perform two tendencies in two opposite directions, and
so they have been combined.46 If they were opposites, their combination
would not be possible.
45 In other words, the heat produced by friction makes the matter of the medium subtler and
thus easier for the moving object to penetrate. Hence, the object may move at constant speed
because the decrease of its power of movement (or its tendency) is commensurable with the
increase in the surrounding matter’s subtlety.
46 Consider, for instance, the earlier example of a rope being pulled at both ends. According to
Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʿī, the two mutually opposing tendencies produced by the two efforts
of pulling are combined in the rope. Since that is the case, the tendencies cannot be opposites
in the metaphysical sense, on the grounds of the general principle that two opposite qualities
cannot inhere in one subject at the same time. The elder Jubbāʿī, Abū ʾAlī, relies on the same
principle when he denies the inherence of the two tendencies in the rope.
76 76
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
77 77
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The genera of tendency are six, in accordance with the number of direc-
tions. That which can persist, according to the Muʾtazilites, is the concom-
itant tendency downwards and upwards,47 because if the tendency did not
persist in a rock, then it would be either impossible or very easy for us to
carry a heavy rock. The consequent is intuitively false in both cases, [and
likewise the antecedent]. The implication is shown by saying that if God
most high made a tendency in it, we would not be able to counteract it,
but if He did not, its movement would be easy, because there would be no
resistance.48 What is neither of those two tendencies cannot persist and so
it is imported, for there is no accident one can point at that could not be
brought into existence without any of these genera remaining with it.49
According to Abū Hāshim, heaviness goes back to inherent downward
tendency. Abū ʾAlī has said that it goes back to an increase of the parts of a
substance. This is falsified by the inflated skin, for it is filled with air, yet it
is lighter than the fewest parts of lead.
47 I understand Ḥillī’s term al-lāzim al-iʾtimād as referring to the motion that naturally follows
from, or is concomitant to, an essence.
48 The idea here seems to be that the only constraint for God’s creation of accidents is posed
by those properties that are natural or concomitant to the essence that will bear those acci-
dents. Hence, if there is no natural inclination in the rock, and thereby no natural downward
pressure that we experience as weight, God could create it as either extraordinarily heavy
or weightless. But we know that rocks are neither weightless nor extraordinarily heavy, but
rather their weight is comparable to their size.
49 This is a very complicated way of saying that the remaining four genera of inclination (to the
four horizontal directions) are not concomitant to any essence. The criterion for their acci-
dentality is that any essence can be conceived to have an accident that rules them out.
78 78
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
79 79
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Tendency produces three kinds of thing. The first is that which it pro-
duces by itself, namely the modes of being. Being in its own substrate, ten-
dency produces them in what is not its own substrate on the condition
that there is contact.50 The second is that which it produces under some
condition, such that it could not produce this at all, were it not for the con-
dition, namely sounds, for it produces them on the condition of beating.51
The third is that which it does not produce by itself but through an inter-
mediary, namely composition and pain, for it produces proximity, which
produces composition, and it produces rupture in the body of a living be-
ing, from which weakness and pain are produced.52 Apart from tendency,
there are no causes that produce anything like it, and tendency produces
nothing that it produces without producing another tendency thereby.53
50 Imagine a rock in its natural downward movement hitting a stationary balloon and setting it
in downward motion.
51 That is, a surface must be struck in order to produce a change in air pressure, which in turn
can be perceived as sound. The capacity to produce the air pressure, a kind of inclination, is
inherent in the sounding thing, but it can only be brought into act by the strike. On a related
note, see Gimaret 2009, 304-305.
52 That is, the rupture caused by inclination will only result in pain if it is inflicted on a living
body. Life is the medium that is required between the effect of an inclination and pain.
53 Interestingly, Ḥillī seems to treat the concept of tendency as equivalent to physical efficient
causation, and what is more, he seems to reduce all causation of motion to it.
54 The polysemous term maʾnā is notoriously difficult to understand, let alone translate.
According to Frank 1967, 249, in its present use, cases of which are found as early as Abū
al-Hudhayl, maʾnā is equivalent with ‘accident’. In later Muʾtazilites, such as ʾAbd al-Jabbār,
the term denotes the principle for a manifest activity; for instance, man is powerful (qādir)
because of a maʾnā of power (qudra) in him (Frank 1967, 249-250). A maʾnā in this sense is
needed when the subject does not possess the attribute in question due to its essence. I think
it is this latter sense, which I render as ‘ground (for the object’s having the relevant attribute)’,
that Ḥillī has in mind here.
80 80
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ت ف ّ ّ أ �أ �ق��س�ا �مت� ��ل��د ه ث� ا ث��ةٌ �أ ح�د �ه�ا �م�ا � �لّ�د ه �ن� ف
�وا ن� والا �ع� ���م�ا د �� م
�
ح�ل�ه و�يو�ل�د �ه�ا ك � الو �هو �ه س���� يو ب وي ل و
ي
ّ �أ ن ّ ّ ّ ّ
ح�ل�ه ب� ش���رط ا �ل���م���م�ا ��س��ة .وث�ا ن�ي���ه�ا �م�ا �يو�ل�د ه ب�ن� ف����س�ه ب� ش���رط ،ولا �ي���ص�� � �يو�ل�د ه ع��لى و�ج �ه ف�� �غ ي��ر م
�
ح ي
ّ ّ ّ ّ ف أ ّ
نف � �� ،ن��ه � �ل�د �ه�ا � ش��� ط ا �ل���م���ص�ا ك ة ث ث � لا � ش��� ط �ه ال� �ص ا ت
��� .و �ا ��ل���ه�ا �م�ا �يو�ل�د ه لا ب������س�ه ب�ل ب ر إ يو و إ ب ر وو
تّ ق ف ُ ّ ت ف �أ ّ �ة ت ت ّ ّ
ن أ أ تّ ف�أ �ة
ب�وا ��س��ط� ،و�هوا ��ل�� ��لي�� وال� �ل�م؛ ل� ��ه �يو�ل�د ا �ل���م�� ج��ا ور ا ��ل�ي� �و�ل�د ا ��ل�� ��لي�� ،و�يو�ل�د ا ��ل���فر�ي� �ي�
ّ ف أ ٌّ أ ���س� ا �ل� ّ
� .وا �لو�ه� نُ� وال� �ل�م�م��تو�ل�د �ع ن���ه و�ل��ي��س �ي� ال� ����س��ب�ا ب� �م�ا �يو�ل�د �م��ث�ل�ه ��سو�ى الا �ع��ت���م�ا د ��
ج م حي
ّ �ت ً آ �ت ش ئً ّ ّ ّ ّ
�خر�م�ع�ه.ولا �يو�ل�د الا �ع� ���م�ا د ����ي���ا �م���م�ا �يو�ل�د ه إ� لا و�يو�ل�د ا �ع� ���م�ا د ا � �
81 81
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Abū Hāshim held that. He stipulated that when we move or halt a body,
we bring into effect a tendency in it, akin to a pull or a push, and so motion
and rest occur. Abū Hāshim said that we bring into effect an additional
ground called motion, and that ground necessitates the body’s being in
motion. That ground is additional to tendency and being in motion. Hence,
he asserted a mode of being, what is entailed by it, and a state caused by it,
and this is being in a certain mode.55 Other theologians contradicted him.
We might say that if we brought that into effect, we would know it either
summarily or in detail, but the consequent is intuitively false, for we find
in ourselves that we do not know it at all, and so the antecedent is likewise
false. The conditional proposition is necessary, for one endowed with pow-
er only brings into effect what he knows. Furthermore, if that ground could
not exist before the substance has occurred in that space, there would be a
circle, whereas if it could, it would entail the substance’s occurrence in that
space, and so it would be a tendency,56 for otherwise the substance would
not occur in that space rather than another.
55 Thus, in Abū Hāshim’s somewhat profuse ontology, the event of moving entails three distinct
metaphysical items in addition to the moving body: the body’s tendency to move (a ground),
the motion in the body (an additional ground), and the body’s state of actually being in mo-
tion (a mode of being, or in Abū Hāshim’s novel terms, a “state”).
56 In other words, there is no additional ground of motion for the body’s moving into a certain
space, but only the body and its combined inclination to move in a certain direction.
82 82
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
حَ�
�
�ت ً ن
� ك � ً �أ � نكّ ه �فَ�عَ��لن ف
�
�أ نّ �ذ ّ ن
� ه � �ذ �ه� �أ � �ه�ا �ش����� � ل �ذ �ل .ت
و ا د ا
�م �
�� �ع ا �ه
��
ي ا
�� � �س�
ا
�� و ا
�م���
س �� ج ا
�� ح ا � ا
�
مإ ى �ك و قري إ رر �� ��� ب� بو
ش نّ ن ف ُ ن �ز ئ ً ّ �أ � ّ � ّ ن �ق ّ
�و� .و �ا ل ب�و�ه�ا ������مإ� �ا ������ع�ل �م�ع�ى ا ��د ا ي���س���مى ح���ص�ل ا �ل��ت��حرك وا ل��س ك ���ذ ب� وا �ل�د ف�� ،ف���ي��� ا ��جل
ع
ن �ز ئ ٌ � ّ ً �ذ � �ذ
� �ت ���س���م�م��ت��حر � �و ن� ا ��جل ���ة� ،ل�ك ا �ل���م�ع ن�ى �يو ج�� ب� ك
كا .و �ل�ك ا �ل���م�ع�ى ا ��د ع��لى الا ع� ���م�ا د وع��لى حرك
ئ ن ّ�ةُ ن ف ق �ت ّ �ل �ةَ ّ �ةَ � نَ� ا �ل���م��ق��ت �تّ
��ل�مي�� ن�. ��ا ��ي�� و������ا ه ب�ا �� ا �ل���م� ك� ح�ا �ل� ا �ل���م�ع�ل�ل� ب��ه و�ه� ا �ل ك� ضى �ل�ه وا � ��� ��� و و ك � ّرك؛ ف��اث��ب�� ت� ا �
ل ح�
� ا �ل�
ي ي
�أ ّ ن ف نّ ن ُ �أ ً �أ �أ ّ
��د �م� ن� ن��ف������سن���ا ن�ا لا ��لن��ا ن�ا �لوف���ع��لن��ا ه �ل�ع�ل�م ن���ا ه � �ج �م�ا لا وت��ف������صي���لاً ،وا ��لتّ��ا ل� ب�ا ط� ب�ا �لو�ج �د ا �� �� ،ا �ج�
إ ي ل إ
�ذ أ نّ ف ّ�ةٌ ف نّ ق َ نّ ُ
�ة ّ ّ ّ ُ ّ�ةَ ف ن
ضر وري� ؛ �إ� � ا �ل�����ا د ر إ� ���م�ا ي�����ع�ل �م�ا �ي�ع�ل�م�ه .ول� � �ل�ك ��ع�ل�م�ه ا �ل��ب��ت� �� ،ا �ل���م��ق���د �م�م��ث�ل�ه وا � شل���رطي��� ��
ن �صّ ف ن قت ّ َ ّ
ح �إ� � ا ������� حي�� د ا ر ،و�إ�
� ّ�ز�و�هر ف�� �ذ �ل�ك ا �ل ح���صول ا ��جل ا �ل���م�ع ن�ى إ� ن� �ل�م �ي���ص�� و ج�ود ه إ� لا ب��ع�د �
ضى ي ح
ّ�ز �أ ف �أ �ت ُ ّ
�غ
حي�� و لى �م� ن� ي��ره.
�ذ
ح���ص� �� �ل�ك ا �ل
� �
� ن ح�� ����ه الا �ع� ���م�ا د ،و� لا �ل�م � ك ن
�ي و
ف ّ
�ز ح���صو�ل�ه ف�� �ذ �ل�ك ا �ل �
��� ب� � ي ل ي إ ي ي
83 83
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
57 Speech, as a certain type of sound, is an accident we bring about in the substrate of air. We are ca-
pable of modifying various aspects of it, such as what is said, or the volume and pitch of the sound.
58 This is a distinct argument for Abū Hāshim’s claim, but its formulation is rather elliptic. The
point is that only in strict terms, what is an effect of an agent’s act must be intended by the
agent. Now, a mode of being, such as motion, may vary independently from an agent’s inten-
tion, and thus is not an effect of the agent’s act. For a very helpful discussion of the relevant
concept of agency, see Frank 1978, 124-134.
59 The weak agent did not cause the thing’s being in motion in the first place, because as brought
out by the stronger agent’s intervention, it depends on factors extrinsic to the agent’s inten-
tion. All that the weak agent caused is the ground for motion in the thing it attempts to move,
and this ground persists in the thing even when the stronger agent prevents it from resulting
in the thing’s being in motion.
60 The two agents bring about two distinct grounds of motion in the thing. The thing’s being
stationary is the combined effect of the two contrary grounds.
61 The root here is the principle, according to which one cause, insofar as it is one, can have only
one effect. The branch, I presume, is the agent considered as a cause. The fallacy is due to
replacing the one cause, insofar as it is one, with agent without the necessary qualifications.
84 84
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ن ً َ قَ ن �أ ّ
ئ �ذ ت ئ نً �غ ت ّ
كا ���ا �م� ن� ي��ر �و��س��ط �م�ع�ى �ل�����د ر �ا ع��لى ا ��ه و��س�ا �ر ���س���م � ح��ت���جّ ب� ن�ا �لو�ق�د رن�ا ع��ل ج� ��ع� ا ��جل ا�
ى ل
نُ شّ ّ ُ ُ ّ ٌ ّ
��لا �م؛ ل���رطيّ����ة ا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س ع��لى ا �ل ك� � فص���ات��ه ،وا ��لت��ا لي� ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور�ة ف��ا �ل���م��ق���د �م �م��ث�ل�ه .وب�ي��ا � ا �
نُ ق ّ �أ نّ ق ّ ن ُ ف ف ل أ نّ فص����ةَ ا �ل � ن �ة
ي�ه�ا ا �ل��ت�ز ا ي��د�� ،لا ت���ق�� ب�ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل .ب�ي��ا � ا �ل���م�����د �م � ا �ل����و�ي� ي����م�� ��ا ئ��يّ�� �ي���ص�� ����
ك و� � �
ع ع ح
أ نّ ق �ذ ّ ن ف ق ف ف �أ ً �ز ئ ً ت
� �عي�� ف� �ع� ن� �
ّ
حر�ي�ك �م�ا ��س��ك��ه������ ،د ���ع�ل �ي���ه �مرا ا ��د ا ع��لى �م�ا إ� ا �ل�م ي��������ص�د �م ن���ع�ه؛ ول� � ا �ل���ض
آ َ �أ
ح�ا ��ة ً
�� ن� �م��ق���د ور�ه�م�ا وا ح�د ا ،لا ����س��ت��� ل� �خر�ل�م ي� كا �ل��ق���ا د ري� ن� إ� �ذ ا د ف�� ح�د �ه�م�ا �ج� ز�ءًا ح�ا ل �ج ��ذ ب� ال� �
ع
�أ�ز ف ُ ث ّ
ن �أ ف �ةّ ف ّن �أ �ةّ ّ َ
�ق �م��ق���د ���ق���ا د � ن ��� .ا � ا � ش
ن
ن ت�ؤ � كا �ل�ع�ل� � � ،ك
�م�ا ���ه�ا لا � �ر ي� �ي�د �م�� ل���رطي��� � ا �ل�����ا ع�ل � ور ب ري� وبي و وع
ذ ف ُ ف ن َ ّن أ ذ �ة �ة
��� ا �ه ن���ا.كا � ب�ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل ا �م��ت ن�� �ي���ه ا �ل��ت�ز اي��د � �ك��� ا ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل؛ ول� � ا �لو ج�ود �ل���م�ا � � فص��� وا ح�د ك
ع
ُ فّ فٌ ف ُ �ل ُ ن ُ ن شّ
فر ��� �عي��� �ي� ن���ف����س�ه وب�ا ط�ل �ه ن���ا؛ �إ� ن��ه ج���ع�ل ا �ل�� ل���رطيّ����ة ،وا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س �ض وا �ج�وا ب� ا �ل���م�� �م�� ا �
ع ع
ّ�ز �أ ٌ ّ ئ ن ّ�ة أ �أ
� �ذ ا �ة حي�� .و م
ح�ا � ف
ح���صول �� ا �ل � �ة ن
��ا ��ي�� ل� ���ه�ا �ع��ب�ا ر �ع� ن ا �ل �ك �
ل ا � �ص�لاً ،وا �ل��ت�ز ا ي��د �غ ي��ر �م�ع����ول �
ف ق
ي � ي
�ظٌ َ ن ً �ز ً ف نّ أ ً �ز ً ّف آ
ح�� �وا � �ع ن���د �ه���م لا � �ون�ا ا ئ��د ا؛ �إ� � ال� ك �خر ،وا �ل��ق��و�ي� ���ع�ل ا �ع��ت���م�ا د ا ا ئ��د ا ،لا ك ���س���م ل� � ا ��جل
ّ�ةَ �أ نّ �ة ف ق ّ ن ن ��له�ا ف� ا �ل���م ن�� ،ن����م ن�� ُ ا ����س��ت��� �ةَ ق ق
ح�ا �ل� و�وع �م�����د ور ب������ا د ري�� ،و����م ن��ع �م��س�ا وا ا �ل�����ا ع�ل ا �ل�ع�ل� � ،مع � � ي� ع و ع
ت ٌ أ
�ون��ه ب�ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل.ال� �ص�ل �م���م ن��و ؛ ون����م ن�� ��ع��لي��ل ا �م��ت ن���ا �ت�ز ا ي��د ا �لو ج�ود ب� ك
ع ع ع
85 85
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
62 The “similar” (mutamāthil) mode of being is the one an atom has by virtue of the position
(jiha), in which it is. It is the foundation of the “mutually opposed” (mutaḍādd) modes of
being, all of which are relational, either with regard to other atoms in other positions (con-
junction and separation) or with regard to the same atom’s positions at different moments
(motion and rest). For a helpful discussion of the background to this very dense passage, see
Frank 1978, 95-104.
63 The mutually exclusive modes of being are conjunction and separation, which can exist at
successive moments.
64 The modes of being that are not mutually exclusive are motion and rest, which only emerge
from the successive positions of one substance. The reason why they are not mutually exclu-
sive is probably that considered at one moment, one substance can be both in motion and in
rest. Supposing that the substance is in a different position than at the previous moment, it is
in motion, and supposing that it is in the same position in the next moment, it is at rest.
65 That is, atoms are composed into bodies when they are conjoined, that is, when they have
the mode of being of conjunction, and proximity between the atoms is a necessary condition
for this mode of being. The point about the negative condition of the ceasing of possibility is
somewhat puzzling, but perhaps the point is that a negative condition can only be grounded
in its positive counterpart, such as the proximity between atoms.
86 86
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
87 87
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Reflection 3: On Motion
Motion is the first occurrence of a substance in a space after it was in anoth-
er space. According to the ancients, it is “the first perfection of what is in
potency insofar as it is in potency”,66 for it is impossible that an existent be
in potency in every respect, rather, it is in act either in every respect or in
some respect. In the latter case, it proceeds to act either instantaneously or
gradually, and the latter is motion. Hence, motion’s existence in act, which
is the prior of two perfections, requires a certain potency in that which
moves, and when it exists, it becomes a second perfection. It differs from
other perfections, the existence of which does not entail any potency in
that which has the perfection.
There is debate concerning its existence. Those who have verified it have
done so, because it is a secondary percept. One group has denied it, be-
cause it does not exist when something is sedentary in the first space, for
it is not moving then, nor does it exist in the second space, because the
motion has ended, and there is nothing between them. It is countered by
rejecting the atom.
There is no doubt that six things belong to motion: where it is from, where
it is headed, what it is in, through what it is, what it belongs to, and time.
No body can move by virtue of its essence, for otherwise motion would
persist through the persistence of the body. Motion is only possible in
place. A group of Muʾtazilites has said that motion does not occur in place,
because it inheres in the substance itself, and so it needs nothing else, just
like colour. Yes, but there is no doubt a direction. If God most high creates
a heavy body, it will fall when there is no support, but if there were no
place, it would not move in place. This depends on how place is explicated,
and what they mean by it is that which prevents the tendency of what is
heavy from descending.67
Locomotion can be in terms of the where, in terms of position, and in
terms of quantity.68
As regards qualitative motion, it is motion in terms of quality, like when
a body is gradually transferred from heat to coldness or from black to white.
Motion does not take place in other categories than those.
88 88
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
��ة
��ح ك���� �ن ���� ا ��ل��ث�ا ��ل ث��� :ف� ا ��ل � ظ
� ر ي ا �ل� ر
ٌ َ أ �أ ّ آ ح� ة �ه � ٌ �أ ّ � � ف� ّ�ز �أ ن
�م�ا ل �خر .و�ع ن���د ال� وا ئ�ل ن���ه�ا « ك� كا ن� ف�� حيّ���ز � � � � ا �ل�رك�� ي� ح���صول ول ل��ل�� ج�و هر ي� حي�� ب��ع�د
ي
ح�ا ٌ ّ� � � ،م�ا �ا �ل��ف ُ �أ ُ
�ع� �� ل ك ّ و�ج �ه م
� � ح��� ث� �ه �ا �ل��ق�� ّ �ة» ،ف�� نّ� ا �ل���م ج� د �ا �ل��ق�� ّ �ة �م� ن � ّول �ل���م�ا �ا �ل��ق�� ّ �ة �م� ن
ل ب لإ ب و �ل ب و و و إ ب و ي و � ب
ّ �أ ً�ة ف ّ ف �ذ ن ّ ض �أ ن ّ
�خر ج إ� لى ا �ل�����ع�ل إ� �م�ا د ���ع� وع��لى ا ��لت��د ري�ج�، كل و�ج �ه و�م� ن� ب��ع���� ا �لو ج�وه .وا ��لث��ا �� إ� ا �
ي �م�� �
�
ق ًّ قُ �أ �ذ ف ّ ن
� ّرك، �م�ا �لي�� ن� ي�����س��ت�د�عي� � ّو�ة �م�ا �ل�ل�م��ت��ح �ب� ا �ل �ك ���ة� ،و ج�ود �ه�ا ب�ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ا �ل� �ي� �هو ����س� حرك وا ��لث��ا �� �هوا �ل�
ي
َ ق َ�ةٌ �م�ا لا ت ّت ت ف قُ ت ً
�ت ق
� ا ��ل�ي� ي�����س� �ع����� ب� و ج�ود �ه�ا �و ر� ��س�ا ئ�را �ل �ك ا
� �� ��
� � ه �م�ا لا ث�ا ن�يً��ا ،و� � �ص�ا ر� ك� ف�� �ذ ا �د ت
إ و�ج
ِ ي
�م�ا ل. �ل��ذ �� ا �ل �ك
ي
ت ثّ ن �ة ن�أ ّ
ن أ ن ق ّ
ق ف ف فَ ُ خ ق
� ا ��ل��ا �ي�� ،و � ك� ن � � � � � �ت � �
�ره و �د ا � �ِ�ل� ي� و ج ود �ه�ا� ،ا �ل���م��ح��������و� ع��لي��ه ل� ���ه�ا �م�� ا �ل���م��ح��سو��س�ا ِ
ف� � ثّ ن حّ�ن �ت ّ ن ف� أ ّ أ نّ ُ �ت �ةٌ أ نّ
� ا
�� �ل
ب م ر و ي� ي� ا ال ك، ي �ل � �د ع
� � �ه
� � ل ل � ي� و � ال �
�ك ��م � � م�� ��
ل ا � و �ك ل ا
�ح �ج �م�ا ع� ل� و ج و ي س
�� ���
ل ا
�ه � د � �
�ة ّ ُ �ةَ
���ة ،ولا وا ��س��ط� ب�ي� ن���ه���م�ا .و�هو إ� ن����م�اي�رد ع��لى ن���ف���ا ا �ج�ل� ز�ء. حرك لا ن���ق����ط�ا ا �ل�
ع
ل ّ � � ن �تّ�ة �أ �م � � ن � � ��ل � ف� � � � ا ��زّ� ن
وا ب��د �ل�ه�ا م�� ����س� � ور :م�ا م���ه و م�ا إ ي��ه و م�ا ي���ه و م�ا ب��ه و م�ا ل�ه و ل م�ا �.
ّ ّ �أ
ح� ة � ل ف� � � ن ت ّ
ح ّرك ج���س���م �م�ا �ل� ات��ه و�إلا ��لب�ق��ي��� ت� ب�ب�ق���ا ئ��ه .ولا ����ص�� ا �ل�رك�� إ ا ي� م ك
ٌ ّ �ذ �� ن ن� ي�ت�
��ا �.
ح ولا ي����م ك�
�ّ نفُ ّ أ ّ ُ ٌ
�غ
�و�هر��لا ي���ف����ت��قر إ� لى ي��ره،
�ل ف
ح�ل �������س ا �ج ��ا ن�؛ ل� ن���ه�ا ي� وق��ا ل �ج �م�ا ع��ة �م� ن� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ةإ� ن���ه�ا ت���ق�� لا ف�� �م ك�
ع ي
فَ ْ ً ّ ّ
ً ت
���ه�ِ�ة .و�لو�خ �ل ق� ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ج���س���م�ا ث���ق��ي���لا ��ل�هو�ى �ع ن���د ���ق�� ِ�د ا �ل�ع�لا ئ� ق�، كا �ل�لو ن� .ن��ع���ملابُ��د �م� ن ا �جل
� �
�
� � ن �ؤ ن ٌّ ح ّ ل ف� � � ن نٌ ف ت ن
��ا �؛ و�ه لا ء �ع ن��وا ب��ه �م�ا � ع��لى ت���ف����سي��ر ا ل���م ك ��ا � .و�هو�م��ب� ��ا � ���ق���د �رك ا ي� م ك �� ن� �م ك� و�إ� �ل�م ي� ك
ي
ّ ّ
ي����م ن�� ا �ع��ت���م�ا د ا ��لث�ق��ي���ل �م� ن� ا �ل ن���ز ول.
ع
ف
� ن ت ق ف
� ن ّ�ة ق ت ن ف� أ ن ق ت نُ �ل ةُ
�م. �و� ي� ا �ل ك� � و��د � ك ا �ل �ض
و� ي� ي� و و� ي� و ع
ال� � ��د � ك
� ��ا �ي�� ��د � ك
� ��� ا �ل���م ك� حرك وا �
� ن ت ق �ل
ُ ف حرك ة ف� ُ �أ ّ
�ة
�را ر إ� لى �برود و�م� ن� ��سوا د
� � ن ح �ة ك
��� ي� ا �ل��كي��� ،م�ا ي������ل ا �ج ��س���م م�� و �م�ا ا �ل��كي� ف��يّ����ة ف����ه� ا �ل�
ي
ت ق
��� �ي� ي��ر �ل�ك �م� ن� ا �ل���م����ولا �.
�ذ �غ ف ة
حرك إ� لى ب�ي��ا ض�� ع��لى ا ��لتّ��د ري�ج� ،ولا ����� ا �ل�
ق ت
ع
89 89
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
69 That is, movement is in every part of a moving body in the same way as it is in the whole. If a
projectile were split in the course of its motion, both halves would continue in the motion –
assuming, per impossibile, that the split is not due to any additional force.
70 If the speed of motion were reducible to the proportion of morsels of motion to those of rest,
then presumably the motion in these primitive morsels would be uniform in speed. The ar-
gument then is that if we take as our standard a very fast motion (the rotation of the celestial
sphere) that we perceive as continuous, then a comparably slow motion (that of the galloping
horse) should appear to us as a series of phenomenally distinct moments of motion and rest.
71 That is, composed from linear and circular phases.
72 This position resembles that of Avicenna in Shifāʿ: al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʾi IV.8. According to Av-
icenna, there cannot be two opposite inclinations in the moving body; instead, the natural
inclination of the body must inhere in it as a potency for movement that is actualised once the
forced motion has run its course. The reason why there must be a moment of rest between
90 90
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
91 91
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Others deny it, for otherwise the rock’s return would not be necessary.
Its halting would be due to a cause, and it is impossible that the cause’s
non-existence be due to its essence, nature, or the body or anything exist-
ing in it, otherwise it would not exist together with anything of the cause.
Hence, only an extrinsic cause remains. If the rock’s arrival is necessary, the
existence of the cause is impossible, otherwise the arrival would be due to
chance.73
Motion is by virtue of to an essence, namely natural motion, forced, or
voluntary, or it is due to an accident, like in the case of contents that are
moved by the movement of a vessel. Forced motion involving departure
is subject to debate.74 It is said that the mover produces a tendency, that
tendency necessitates motion, and then that motion produces a tendency
and that tendency produces a motion, until the production ends due to
the weakness that results from the penetrated air. On the other hand, it is
said that the mover bestows the moved with the power to move to a deter-
mined direction, and the power remains to the end of the motion but be-
gins to weaken because the penetrated air strikes back, until the weakness
increases and is vanquished by the natural power, so that the body begins
to move downwards.75
the two motions is that there must be a moment at which the first motion has ended and the
body has reached the zenith of its motion, but in which the second motion is not yet actual.
For a more detailed discussion of the debate concerning the quies media in Avicenna and Abū
al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. ca 547/1152), see Nony (2010). The denial of substance here means
Avicenna’s denial of the theologians’ concept of substance, namely the atom.
73 This argument resembles Abū al-Barakāt’s rejection of the Avicennian theory of a quies media
in Muʾtabar II.24, 101-102; see, again, Nony (2010). Abū al-Barakāt holds that when a rock is
thrown upwards, two inclinations inhere in it: a forced inclination upwards that it receives
from the person throwing it, and its natural inclination downwards. The trajectory of the
rock is caused by the natural inclination gradually cancelling out the forced inclination, and
then immediately causing the rock’s return downward. If the rock were to rest in between
the upward and downward motions, the rest would have to be due to a third, extrinsic cause
apart from the two inclinations. Then one would have to explain why this extrinsic cause
ceases to keep the rock at rest. If this is explained by means of the natural inclination, the ex-
trinsic cause becomes impossible, given that the sufficient reason for the rock’s fall is already
there. If it is not explained, then also the rock’s fall is inexplicable, or a matter of chance.
74 That is, the forced motion of an object away from the mover, like in throwing a rock.
75 The first of these views resembles Abū al-Barakāt’s theory, whereas the second seems to be
that of Avicenna.
92 92
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
93 93
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Question 8: On Life
It is an accident, which inheres in the body of the living, entails sound pow-
er and knowledge, and is conditioned by a balance of mixture, and it is in
relation to it that the whole becomes like a single thing. It no doubt has a
specific structure, pace the Ashʾarites, for otherwise it could exist in the
impartitionable part.78
94 94
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
أ � ظ� �
� ن ف �ق � � �
ا �ل��ن ��� ار �ل ارب��� �� :ي� ��ب�ا ��ي� ا �ل� ك�� او �
ع
� ن أ ئ نّ ّ ف
ح���صو�ل�ه �� �ذ �ل�ك ا �ل
َ ّ ف �و ن� �هو�
حي���ز ب��عي�� ن���ه .وع���د ال� وا �ل إ� ��ه �
ي
حي���ز ب��ع�د � ���س���م �� ا �ل
�
ي
ح���صول ا ��جل ا �ل��س ك
ة �ذ ف قَ � ن ن نّ ث ت ّ أ ّ ة � ّ ش �أ ن �أ ن �ت ّ ُ
��� ؛ إ� لا ��ا ر� حرك � ل� ن��ه �م� ن� ن�و ا �ل� حرك» .وع���د �ا إ� ��ه ��بو ي� ��� ع�م�ا �م� ن� ���� ��ه � ي� ك ر «ع�د �م ا �ل�
ح
ع
ة ف� ن �أُ قَ نّ�ز ُ ف ظ ٌّ أ نّ � ن ن ً ث ت�ةً ق ن
ر إ ِ� ل�ط � � ، �
��ك �
ح م � �د ع ب�ي����ه���م�ا ��سو�ى ا ��لب����ا ء وع�د �م�ه؛ وا �ل�� اع �ل�������ي�؛ ل� � �ل��ل��س�ا ك�� ِ�����س��ب�ا �ا ب��� و
ُ
� �ق ل
� � ن �خ ُّ �نُ ال أ ّ ف� ث� �ت ٌّ � ن �أ ل ق ا ��لثّ �ن ف
ب ي� ا�
� �ل ا م�� �
س �� ا ل � ا ل م
�و� ع��لى � ول ���هو �بو ي� ،وإ� � ى ي� � و ي� و ي � و �ج
� �
�ك ��م
� ؛ �د ع ه�� ا
�� �
ل �
ع �ط ا �ل��س ك
ن
�و�. ���ة وا �ل��س ك حرك�ع� ن� ا �ل�
ةً ث ف� نّ � � ف� � � ن ثُ َ �أ
���
ّ � نً �ق
و ؛ ا
� ك م ��� س ���و ، ا
�
نً
�
ك �س � الو �� �
ك ر�
ح �� ��ل� � �
ا
�ك م � �ه ل ص ح��
� � � �ه�و �د
ح ل ا
�ح � د ا
�حل
��ّم�ا ا �
و ي ى و يل س ي و ي إ
ةٌ �ق نّ ت �ت آ ض ن � ن�ا ت نٌ أ نّ أ نَ ّ
��� �رك �خر .و ي���ل إ� ��ه ح كا � ب�ا �ع� ��ب�ا ر� � �ر � �و� ب��ع������ه�ا ح � وت� ك ك
ك� و�س � ا�
ه ��ل�وا � � �و�؛ ل� � ال� ك �هو��س ك
ّ �ت ّ ٌ
�رك. ح�ل �م� ��ح وا �ل���م���
�خ �ت ّ ث � ثٌ ال فت ا قُ �ه ُن حي��� ث� لا ي� �و�هر� ن� ف�� حيّ���ز � ن� ب� � ن �ل �ت
�و���ه���م�ا �� �ل���ل�ه���م�ا �ا ل�� .و ا ���ر � وك � ي والا ج�� ���م�اع �هوكو� ا �ج ي ي
ث � ثٌ � �أ � ا � �ذ ال ف�ت ا قَ � ن ً �ز ا ئ ًا الأ� ا ن � ي�ت�
�خ ف� ّ�ز ن � ثُ
��ل���ل�ه���م�ا �ا ل��؛ و ج ��ع�ل بو �ل�ه� ي�ل ا ��ر � م�ع�ى ��د ع��لى � كو � ،و و
�ه � حي�� ي�� ب�
حي��� ي
ن �ف ُ �ذّ ً
�ق ل � ع��ل لا؛ � �ه�ا �ش�����م� ��ع�ل�ه �ع� �ا �ع� ن ا �ل ك ن ن
�ة �أ ً ّ �أ ّ �أ
ح���ص� ب���ه���م�ا ا ��جل ن �
���س���م�ا � ي� �و�ي��� ا �ل�ل� �ي� ي� ل �ب ر � ج و بي� ي� و و بو
��ا ن��� ن ��ع���د � ن
ي�. �م ك� ي� ب ي
95 95
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Question 9: On Power
It is an accident, which entails its substrate being such that it acts whenev-
er it wants to act and refrains whenever it wants refrain from acting. It is
not the same as the mixture, because the mixture is a quality intermediate
between the hot and the cold, and so it is of their genus and its effect is of
the same genus as their effect, whereas the effect of power is opposed to
their effect.
79 The principle of sufficient reason would be violated, because there would be no reason why
one inherence would be a condition for the others.
80 The elder Jubbāʿī seems to be saying that if life were due to the presence of spirit in the living
body, all lifeforms would be similar. It is unclear why this would be the case, but perhaps the
idea is that if the need for spirit were the only explanatory factor for life, then the variation in
different forms of life would be inexplicable. Thus, for him, having spirit is a differentiating
factor between forms of life.
81 Q 67:2. Unless otherwise mentioned, the Qurʿān is quoted in M. A. S. Abdel Haleem’s trans-
lation (see bibliography).
96 96
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ة ف � � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ت�ا ��س� �� :ي� ا � �ل�
�ق�د ر�
ع
�� ح�لّ�ه � �ذ ا �ش���ا ء �أ ن ���ف���ع�َ ف���ع� � � ،ذ ا �ش���ا ء �أ ن �ت�� ك ت� ك� ،ل������س� ت ن���ف
�� �م نَ
�
ك �� � �ه �ع ض�ٌ ���ق��ت���ض
س � ير ر وي � ي ل ل وإ � إ � و ي� ر � ي ي� و
ف ن ت�أث ه � ن ن ف نُ � ن ن � �
ل
� َ ٌ
�� ف��ّ����ةٌ�م��ت ��س��ط��ة ��� ن
ّ أ نّ ز
ا �ل���م�ا ج�؛ ل� ي ي و بي� ر و ب ر ي و � �ج � ي و ير � �ج س
���� �
م ��� � � �
ك ��
� ا،
�م �
��ه���س�� �
م � �
ك ��
� د، ا�
� �ل ا ا
�ح ا �ك �ه �
ّ �ة �أ �ة �أ ُ �أ
� �ا د ��لت�� ث�ي��ر�ه�م�ا. ت� ث�ي��ر�ه�م�ا ،وت� ث�ي��ر ا �ل��ق���د ر �م���ض
97 97
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
98 98
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
99 99
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
One power pertains to infinite things from one genus at one and the
same time, if the substrate is multiple, for we can move an infinite number
of light bodies.85 It also pertains to infinite things from one genus in one
substrate, albeit at different times, for any act emerging from the power
can have its like brought into existence at its departure. However, if the
genus, the time, and the substrate are all one, the power cannot pertain
to more than one part, for otherwise it would pertain to infinite parts, be-
cause none would be more appropriate than the others.86 This would refute
the disparity in excellence between two powerful things, and it would en-
able the weak to lift mountains just as much as one endowed with strong
potency can.87 One power also pertains to an infinite number of different
things, although the substrate and time are one, for there is nothing we
cannot actively will, and that would not be possible if our power did not
pertain to all these different volitions.
85 The point is not that we can actually move an infinite number of light bodies, but that given
an infinite number of alternative light bodies, our power enables us to move any one of them.
86 Although the term ‘part’ (juzʿ) usually means the atom, here it probably refers to a part of
the entire living body. We can think of the power of the living entity as divided into different
“subpowers”, according to the specific functions of the organs: your power relative to your
hand is different from your power relative to your heart, for instance. Thus, the atom-parts
that constitute the organ are considered as a single part in their relation to the specific pow-
ers. If we held that the power’s substrate is an atom, we would run into the problem Ḥillī
mentions, namely that no atom would be more appropriate to function as a substrate than
another. For this use of ‘part’, see Frank 1978, 108, who renders it as ‘discrete unit’ or ‘quan-
tum’.
87 Another problem with the view that power inheres in an individual atom is that the physical
differences between a strong and a frail person would be inexplicable: differences in power
are only explicable by virtue of the substrate, and the individual atoms, which are the sub-
strates of the two persons’ respective powers, are identical in every relevant respect.
100 100
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
101 101
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The two masters differ. Abū Hāshim allows power to be devoid of both
seizing and refraining, unless a motive for one of the two exists. If either
were necessary, it would be such by virtue of something that is traced back
to just being endowed with power, and the like would follow for the most
high Eternal as well.88 Alternatively, it would be necessary by virtue of
something that is traced back to the power, which is equally related to what
is produced and what is initiated, so that if this is possible in one case, it is
possible in the other as well. However, the consequent is absurd.89 Were
this not the case, then if someone strong kept a body at rest, he would have
made it reside by all his power at every moment, so that someone weak
would not succeed in moving it. Yet we can move what someone mighty,
and indeed, He who is powerful by virtue of Himself, has kept at rest.90
Abū ʾAlī and al-Kaʾbī have said: One who is powerful due to a power
cannot neither seize nor refrain in the case of direct acts, unless there is an
obstacle, for if avoiding both were possible at some moment, it would be
possible always, and that would entail the possibility of him being neither
obedient nor disobedient, and deserving neither praise nor blame. More-
over, even if it were possible for him to avoid acting, it would be necessary
that when one enters the house of another at the other’s invitation and then
keeps him from being seated, that beautiful act is transformed into a sin.
Hence, the mode of being is inevitably renewed from moment to moment,
and so the blame is deserved.91
88 In other words, if power were not undetermined with regard to acting and refraining, one of
the two alternatives would necessarily result from power alone. But then the act, and by the
same token God’s creative act, would no longer be voluntary.
89 The argument is extremely dense, but here is one plausible reconstruction. If power neces-
sarily entailed either acting or refraining, this would have to be so in both types of act, namely
direct and indirect acts. Indirect acts, however, depend on conditions additional to the pow-
er, and for this reason cannot be necessitated by the power alone. Since the consequent states
just this, it is incoherent and therefore false. The antecedent is false by modus tollens.
90 If power necessarily entailed indirect acting or refraining, then once realised, the indirect
effect will remain in act indefinitely. Thus, what has once been laid rest by a supremely pow-
erful agent can never be moved by anyone else, which is evidently false, given our capacity to
move things laid in place by an omnipotent God, who is powerful by virtue of Himself (li-naf-
sihi) and not by virtue of a delimited power that is specific to a certain act. For the distinction
between being powerful by oneself and being powerful by way of a power, see Peters 1976,
237-239.
91 The example is strange, but perhaps the idea is that even passive behaviour, such as not offer-
ing a seat to a guest, may be counted as morally culpable, and therefore an act.
102 102
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ذ تّ ّ خ �ت ف شّ خ ن ف �أ
� ّو�ز ب�و�ه�ا �ش�����م�خ �ل ّو ا �ل��ق���د ر�ة �ع� ن� ال�أ�خ � وا �ل��رك إ� لا �م و ج�ود د ا وا �� ��ل� ا �ل�������ي����ا ��،ج�
ع ع
ت ف ف ق ًف فّ أ فّ �أ
�ون��ه ��ا د را ���ق����ط� ،ي���ل�ز �م �م��ث�ل�ه �ي� ا �ل��ق���د ي�م��ع�ا لى، إ� لى ح ِ�د �ه�م�ا؛ �إ� ن��ه �لوو ج�� ب� �إ� �م�ا ل� �مر ي�ر ج�� إ� لى ك
ع
�ز ف �أ �ت �أ �ت ّ ن �ة ت �أ � ش
ل����ء ي�ر ج�� إ� لى ا �ل��ق���د ر �م ���س�ا و�ي� ���س�ب����ه�ا إ� لى ا �ل���م� و�ل�د وا �ل���م��ب� �د ؛ و�لو�ج �ا �ي� ح�د �ه�م�ا
ت
�كَ ع ع و ي
ن ق ف ف� ّ ّ ٌ ن ّ
كلح�ا ل �و� ��د ���ع�ل ي� �
�ذ
���س���مإ� ا ��س� ن��ه ا �ل��ق��و�ي� ي� ك �� ن� ا ��لتّ��ا ل� ب�ا ط�ل و� لا �ل ك�
��ا ن� ا ��جل �ل ف
��ا �ز �ي� ا ��لث��ا �ي�� ،ل ك
�ج
إ ي
نّ ّ نّ ت ّ ف ت ق �ة ف ت�أ تّ ف
حر�ي�ك �م�ا ��س��ك��ه �� ن� �ي���ص�� �م���ا � ��ه� ،ل ك حر�ي �ك� �عي��� � ��مي�� ��د ر �� ،لا ي��� �ى �م� ن� ا �ل���ض � ن ب� ����ه �م� ن ا �ل��س ك
ح ي � و� �ج ع
ُ ّ
ا �ل��ق��و�ي� ب�ل ا �ل��ق���ا د ر ��لن� ف����س�ه.
أف �أ ت ف ق �ة ق ّ � �زُ ق��ا �أ � ع�� ّ
�و �خ �ل ّوا �ل�����ا د ر ب������د ر �م� ن� �أ�خ ��ذٍ و�رك �ي� ا �ل���م��ب�ا �ش��ر�م� ن� ال� ���ع�ا ل ��ك�عب�ي�لا ي�ج � وا �ل � ل ل
و بو ي
ً ّ َ
� ��ا �زَ د ا ئ����ًم�ا� ،ذ �ل�ك ���ق��ت���ض��� � ا �ز �خ �ل ّ ه �م� ن ا �ل��ط�ا ع�ا ت
و و ج ي و � لا �ع ن���د �م ن�� ؛ � �ذ �لو�ج �ا �زَ ا �ل
�خ�ل ّو وق���ت�ا �ّم�ا ��جل
�
� ي� إ ع إ
�ذ �خ �ز �خ ّ ن ف أ
�ذ ّ نّ ّ � �ص � ن �ت � ق ق
ح�����ا � ا �ل���م�دح وا �ل� �م؛ ول� ��ه �لو�ج �ا �لوه �م�� ا �ل�����ع�ل �لو ج�� ب� إ� ا د �ل وا ل���م�ع�ا ي� و م�� ا ����س� ��
ت �َ نُ ق ً ف ُ ّ �أ
� ا� ن
�و� ح�ا�� ،لا ب��د �م� ن� �ج��د ي��د ل ك ح����س� ���ب��ي��� د ا ر �غ ي��ره ب�� �ذ ن��ه �ثمّ ن���ه�ا ه �ع� ن ا �ل��ق���عود ن� ي�ن�ق���ل� ب� �ذ �ل�ك ا ل
� � إ
ً ف� ً �ث ت �ت ق ق �ذّ ّ
ح�����ا � ا �ل� �م. ح�ا لا ��لي����ب�� ا ����س� ��� ح�ا لا �
103 103
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
This requires reflection, for in the first case, the holding back may be
rejected but modes of being persist,92 whereas in the second case the im-
plication is rejected, because it happens due to motives of need, so that
he is inevitably an agent at some moment.93 The one who denies the seat
deserves blame, even if modes of being were not renewed, because he has
not acted as he should have at the outset, just as he would deserve blame, if
he had laid out his furniture after the invitation and then denied their use,
even in case modes of being were not renewed.
92 This is an objection to Abū Hāshim’s last point. We do not have to think that a stationary
object is such, because a powerful agent (or God) actively keeps it still, for although its mode
of being at rest has been caused by a powerful agent in the past, it henceforth persists on its
own. Thus, a weaker agent may move the object, because it only has to overpower the ob-
ject’s state of rest, not the power of the stronger agent.
93 This is an objection to the first point made by Abū ʾAlī and Kaʾbī. Muʾtazilite ethics makes
a distinction between motives of need (dawāʾī l-ḥājja), which are based on the agent’s own
good, and motives of charity (dawāʾī l-iḥsān), which are based on the good of others. Ne-
cessities of survival, such as procuring nourishment, inevitably give rise to motives of need.
Thus, even if being endowed with power allowed for the possibility of neither acting nor
refraining at some moment, a motive of need, and thereby an act, would certainly arise at
another moment. This suffices to invalidate the implication (“if avoiding both were possible
at some moment, it would be possible always”).
104 104
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ز �ة ف ثّ ن أ نّ ض أ
ح��� ف� ال�أ ّ ل ���ق���ا ء ال� ك ن ن ف� ن ٌ ن �ل
�وا � ،و�م��ع ا �ل���م�لا �م� �ي� ا ��ل��ا �ي� ،ل� ��ه �ي�عر�� �
و ي���ه ����ظر؛ �ل���م��ع ا صر ي� و وب
ن �ت قٌ �ذّ
� �ع� ن� ا �ل��ق���عود �م����س� ���
ن ُّ � �ل �ة ف� ا ّ ن� ن ف� اً �ق �تً ّ
ح� �ل�ل� �م و�إ� �ل�م ه���
و �ي
م �
�� ل� ا ا،�مح�ا �ج � �ل ب��د �م�� كو��ه �ا ع�ل و � �ا � �ل�د وا ع� ا �
ي
َ ّ�ذ ّ أ ن أ ُّ
� �م��ت�ا ع�ه ب��ع�د ح ق� ا �ل� �م �لوو �ض�م�ا ي�����س��ت���
�خرو ج ك� �وا �؛ ل� ن��ه �ل�م ي���ف���ع�ل�م�ا و ج�� ب� ع��لي��ه �م� ن� ا �ل� ي�ج�
��د د ال� ك
ع � أ
� ّ ال ن ف �أ ّ �ذ ن ث ّحَ
�وا � �ي���ه. الإ� �� ،م����ظرَ ع��لي��ه �م ن��ه �ل�م ي�ج��د د � ك
ع
105 105
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
94 At first glance, the argument seems obviously flawed: knowledge that something is good is
not contradictory to a belief that the thing is bad. The key to its validity, I think, is that an
object of power is specific to each power considered together with the epistemic specifica-
tions it is appended with. Thus, someone who is endowed with the power over an act and
believes that the act is preferable has power only over that act, not over its omission. If that is
the case, then the same object of power pertaining to two agents with the contrary epistemic
specifications would have to be both good and bad.
95 If, per impossibile, two powers could have one object, nothing would rule out one person
being endowed with both. Thus, I could have both of the aforementioned epistemically spec-
ified powers.
96 This inference is not entirely clear to me, but perhaps the idea is that if there is no strict cor-
relation between powers and objects of power, powers are independent of their objects. This
raises the question of what determines the independent powers. The only other candidate
is that the person endowed with the power has a second-order power to determine it. This,
however, contradicts empirical evidence – we do not have the power to decide what powers,
or how great powers, we are endowed with.
106 106
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ف ف ق � ن �ذ � ُ ف ت ّ
�و�ز ا خ���ت�لا �� د وا �ع���
ي�ه���م�ا �ي���ع��ل �ج ورا �لوا ح ِ�د ب������ا د ري�؛ إ� ي و�م ن���ع� ن� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �ي� ��ع�ل ق� ا �ل���م��ق���د
ُم ِ
�ذ ف ف آ ّ �أ ُ ُ
ق
ح�ه؛ �ي�����صر��ه �ه� ا الا �ع��ت���ا د
ق
�خر ���ب���ح����سن���ه ،ف�ي���د �عوه ا �ل�د ا �ع� إ� لى إ� ي������ا ع�ه و�ي�ع��ت���د ال� �
ق ق ح�د �ه�م�ا �
ي
خ �ت ف قُ َ ُ ت �ذ ن ف ف
� �ا � .و�إ ا و ج�� ب� � غ���اي�را �ل���م��ق���د ور و ج�� ب� ا �� �لا �� ا �ل�����د ر، �ع� ن� إ� ي���ق���ا ع�ه��� ،ي�� ج���ت���م �ي���ه ا ��لن�ق��ي�����ض
ّ ع
ً ث ق �ت ن �ذ ّ ف ت �ت ث �ةً ت ّ �ةً أ نّ ت ّ �ت ّق ت نّ
كا � ا �ل���م� �ع�ل� وا ح�د ا؛ �م � �ا د ا �ل���م� �ع��ل���ا � إ� ����م�ا �ي���ص�� إ� ا �
ح
� �ا د ل� � ����ض ��ل��ي����س�� �م� ���م�ا ��ل� ولا �م�����ض
أّ ّ ٌ ّ آ ّ ُ �أ
� ف
�خ��ت��ل�، �خر؛ و�ه��ذ ا �م���م��ت ن�� ف�� ا �ل��قُ���د ر ،ل� ن� �ت�ع��لق����ه�ا �غ ي��ر م ي�ت��ع�ل ق� ح�د �ه�م�ا ب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س �م� ن� �ت�ع�ل ق� ال� �
عي
���
�خ �ت ف �ةً �صّ � �ل��كث
ا د � �
ل��� � م
� كا ن� ت
� ا
�ذ
� .
ٌ � ن ئ�ذ ت ن �ت ث �ةٌ
��
ل � ا�
م ��� �م� �
ك � �
� ����
ح ، �د ح ا ا�
ه ���ف��ل���� � ّلا ل�أ نّ �م��ت�ع��لّق
ير حو جو � وإ � و و ي �و ي سإ �
ق ق �غ ت ّق ف قُ ق ن ف ّ
ح�ل وا ح�د و�ي���ص��ح ا ��لب����ا ء ع��لى ا �ل�����د ر �م� ن� ي��ر �و���� ع��لى ب������ا ء ا �ل���م�����د ور و�ل��ي����س� ت� �م����ه�ا �� م
�
ي
�ةً � ن ّ أ ن ن �أ ن ن�ز ف� ق
ن
������ا � � �ي�د ي� �وا �ا. �م��ق���د ور �ل��ا و�إلا ل� �م ك
ر�ة �أ ّ �أ �زُ ُ � ق �ة �عّ ن ش �أ ن �أ ن ن ق ً
�و� ��ا د را؛ و�ع ن���د الا �ش���ا �ع و ب�ي� ع��ل� و ب�ي� �ه�ا �ش�����م وا �ل�ع���ج �ع�د �م ا ل�����د ر �م�ا �م�� ���� ��ه �ي� ك
ي
�أ
� ن� � ح�د ا �ه�م�ا ع�د �ًم�ا �ل�ل�أ � �ى و لى �م� ن ّ �ةٌ ق �ة أ نّ �أ ّلً � نّ�ه فص����ةٌ � د ّ�ة
� �خر ك
ي سو إ �� ���
ل �ه
� �ل ؛ ر ا �د �
ل���ل� د ا
� �ض
� م�� � وا إ � � و ج و ي�
ّ أ ٌ
ح��ت���م�ا ل لا �يو ج�� ب� ا �ج�ل� ز��م. � �عي�� ف� ل� ن� الا � ا �ل�ع�ك��س؛ و�هو �ض
107 107
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
108 108
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ف � � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل�ع�ا �����شر�� :ي� ا �ل�ا � ت�
�ع��ق�ا د
�أ ن ّ �ة �غ ق � ُّ و�هو �مر �ذ �ه ن�ّ ي�ج�
�أ
�� ن� � � �م� ن� ن���ف����س�ه و�ي�د ر ك ا ��لت���فر���ة ب�ي� ن��ه وب���ي ن� ي��ره ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور ؛ و�ي���م ك ح��د ه ا ل� ِي�
ي
قً ن ن أ ّ ّ �أ ُ ّ �أ ن ن �ز ً �أ �ذ �أ
� ف����ه �ن� ف�� � ث���ا ت
�و� �م��ط�ا ب������ا �و� �ج �ا �م�ا ولا ،وال� ول إ� �م�ا � ي� ك �م إ� �م�ا � ي� ك ح ك���؛ و�ه� ا ا �ل ح ك�م ي ب ي� و إ ب ي�
�
�ق � �هوا �ل�ع��ل و�غ ي��ره �هوالا �ع��تق���ا د ا �ل �أ ل ف ن ن � قً ف �ّ �أ ن ن ث تً �أ ل � ثّ تُ
ح� �و� �ا ب���ا و ا ،وا �ل��ا ب� كا � م��ط�ا ب������ا �إ� م�ا � ي� ك و ا� ،إ� � �
م ُ
� �ز � ن ن ا ��ً ف ُ
ح�ا ����هو كا � ر �ج
�غ
��ا �ه�ل ،و ي��ر ا ��جل�ا �م إ � � ا �ل���م��س��ت ن��د � لى ا ��لت�ق����لي��د ،و�غ ي��ر ا �ل���م��ط�ا ب� ق� �هوا �ع��تق���ا د ا ��جل
إ
شّ ّ �ت ُ ف ً ن ن ُ
كا � �مر ج�وح�ا ����هوا �لو�ه���م ،وا �ل���م���س�ا و�ي� ا �ل����ك. ا � ظل���� نّ� ،و�إ� �
�أٌ ّ ح ُّ�د � ّلا د ا � .ق��� � نّ�ه ��س��ل ّ ُ
�� ن� ��س�ل� ب� �؛ و�هو خ���ط� ،و�إلا �ل�م ي� ك � وإ ر و يل إ � ب� وا خ���تُ��ل فَ� ف�� ا �ل�ع��ل ،ف���ق��ي��� لا ي�
يِ ي م ل
ف ن ن ً ن ُ ث ت ًّ ن ن � ً ن ُ ن �أ ّ ش
��ا � ع�د �م�ه كا � إ� ي�ج��ا ب�ا �ل ك�
كا � ا �ل�ع��ل ��بو�ي��ا ،و�إ� � كا � ��س��لب��ا � كا � ،ب�ل ��س�ل� ب� �م��ق���ا ب��ل�ه؛ �إ� � � �ي� ���ي� ء �
م
�ف �ة ق نّ ن ُ قً ف نُ قً
�و� ا �ل�ع��لم�ص�ا د ��ا ع��لى ا �ل���م�ع�د ود .و�ي���ل إ� ��ه ا ���ط��ب�اع �صور ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م ي� �ص�ا د ��ا ع��لى ا �ل�ع�د �م� ،ي�� ك
�أ َ �أ نّ ت ّ � �ة ن ًّ
ح�ا ص� � � ا �ل� م�ا �هّ����ة � ّ���د ف�� نّ� ا �
ل
� � � ا حرا ر � ا �ل�ع�ا �ِل�م؛ و ب� ِ��ط�ل ب� � �م� ن� ����صور ا ل�
ي بل � �� ليس�� �ل � كا � ح�ا ر ي س ي إ
�جب �� � �
ل و ،
فُ ّ �ة �ل قّ �أ نّ ف �ةٌ ّ ٌ
� �ا ���ة إ� لى ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م. ح��ق��ي��ق����ة ي��ل�ز ��م�ه�ا الإ� �ض
ح� ��ه �ص��� � ا �ل���صور ؛ وا �
ح ا ���ع�ل ا ا �ل�ع َ �ع �ضً�ا � �� ُ ا �ل�ع�ا �ل� مّ����ةَ� ،أث�� ت� ا �ت�ع��لّق��ً�ا ���ل�ع�ا �ل� مّ����ة ق ن أ
ل �� ي �� ي و �ب و ا �ل�����ا ئ��لو� ب�ا ل� �و ل ج و ��ل ر� يو ج ب�
ّ م
�غ ً ُ شّ ن ق ذ ك ُّ
�م�ا ��ع��ل ط�لو ا �ل������م��س �د ا؛ ��� ا ي���ع�ل� ب�ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م ،ك� ت ك �م�ا ي�ت��ع�ل ق� ا �ل�ع��لُ ب�ا �ل���مو ج�ود ب�ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م ،و�
م ع م
�ت ّ�زٌ ّ ّ أ نّ ّ ت ّ �أ �خ � ا ف�ً�ا ��ل�� ض
كل�م��ت���مي���ز ث�ا ب� ت�. كل�م�ع�لو�م�م� ���مي�� ،و � حي��� ث� و ج���بوا ��ع��لق���ه ب�ا �ل���مو ج�ود؛ ل� � � ع������ه���م� ، ل ب
109 109
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The answer is that being positive is more general than the mental and
the external. Besides, if that which does not exist is simple, it is known
through a relation, like when we say, God most high has no opposite, His
relation to it is like the relation of black to white. If it is composite, knowl-
edge depends on its existing parts, like knowledge concerning the non-ex-
istence of a combination of two opposites, for we understand black, white,
and combination, and then we understand that combination will not occur
between black and white. Knowledge follows that which is known and re-
ports it in the sense that the principle in the state of adequacy is what is
known, even if knowledge could be prior, like a report may be prior.
There is a doubt concerning whether knowledge depends on the know-
er’s soul, insofar as dependence requires a relation between two different
things.101 The defence by saying that his being a knower is different from
his being known, or by means of the difference between the particular and
the universal, is false,102 because the difference between being a knower
and being known is posterior to knowledge, and so there is a circle. The
universal is a part of the quiddity, not the same as it.
Abū al-Hudhayl has said that knowledge is a ground distinct from belief,
for otherwise all beliefs would be knowledge. This is false, for knowledge
is a specific belief. Abū ʾAlī has said that it is of the same class as belief, for
otherwise it would be either opposite to belief, so that the two could not
be combined, or different from it, so that they would not be contradicted
by one and the same opposite. Hence, he opts for similarity.
101 Although Ḥillī does not explicate it, the problem arises from self-knowledge. If knowledge
is a relation that depends on two relata, that is, the knowing subject’s soul and the object of
knowledge, how do we explain self-knowledge, in which the latter relatum is missing?
102 These are two attempts at explaining self-knowledge according to the relational model. Ei-
ther there is a difference between two aspects of the knowing subject, namely as subject
and as object of knowledge, or we have a particular subject knowing herself by knowing the
universal of which she is an instantiation, such as the concept of human in the case of a human
subject.
110 110
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
111 111
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Knowledge is within our power, since the order applies to it,103 although
necessary knowledge is of His doing, high is He. Since adequacy is a con-
dition for knowledge, one knowing cannot pertain to two known things.104
Al-Kaʾbī did allow one knowing to pertain to two known things that entail
each other, for what is known summarily is known in one respect and un-
known in another. However, the two respects are different, and the known
respect is not a mere summary, whereas the unknown respect is not known
at all.105 Yes, when the two respects are combined about something, the
opinion arises that the summary and the detailed are different, and the
contrariety between the two beliefs concerning the two opposites is es-
sential.
Knowledge can pertain to knowledge. They differ on this, the two mas-
ters saying that it is knowledge of what is known, whereas Abū ʾAbdillāh,
Abū Isḥāq,106 and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt say that it is knowledge that knowledge
is in a certain state, or a judgment. There is no opposition in knowledge,
but there is similarity and difference in it. Two beliefs may be opposed, re-
gardless of whether both are ignorance or one is knowledge and the other
ignorance.
Knowledge of Him is necessary, as is acquaintance with Him, high is He,
because it is induced by the fear that results from the disparity, and because
gratitude is necessary but cannot be completed without it. By the same
token, knowledge of what He has assigned is necessary.
Negligence, according to the two masters and Abū Isḥāq, is a ground
opposed to knowledge. Qāḍī al-Quḍāt and Abū Isḥāq also say that it is pri-
vation of knowledge concerning things, which are customarily known. The
truth is that it is privation of knowledge after knowledge has occurred. As
regards doubt, according to Abū ʾAlī and Abū al-Qāsim, it is a ground op-
posed to knowledge, pace Abū Hāshim.
112 112
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ّ ف ت ن ّ أ ٌ
ضر ور �ي� �م� ن� ���ع�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ،و�ل���م�ا �ش��رط� ت� وا �ل�ع��لُ �م��ق���د ور ��لن��ا�� ،لت�و�ج �ه ال� �مر ب��ه�� .ع���م ا �ل����
م
ّ ت ّقَ �ز ّ � ن ق ت ُ
ن �ت ق �ةُ ف
�
��ك�عب�� ��ع�ل� ا �ل�ع��ل ا �لوا ح�د ا �ل���م��ط�ا ب������ ي� ا �ل�ع��ل ا �م� �� ��ع�ل� ع��ل وا ح�د ب����م�ع�لو�مي��� .و ج و ا �ل �
م ي م ع
آ ٌ ُم ً
ت
���ه�ا � �خر ،وا �لو ج� ن
���هول �م�� � � ب����م�ع�لو�مي�� ن� �م��ت�لا �ز �مي�� ن�؛ وا �ل���م�ع�لو�م إ� �ج �م�ا لا �م�ع�لو�م �م�� و�ج �ه و ج�
م ن
ّ ن َ
�غ
���هول ي��ر �م�ع�لو�م ا �ل��ب��ت��ة�� .ع���م �ل���م�ا ا ج���ت���م�ع�ا �م��ت غ���اي�را ن� .ف��ا �لو�ج �هُ ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م لا إ� �ج �م�ا ل ف�ي���ه ،وا �ل���م�� ج�
� ن �ذ ت ّ ف َ �ةُ ف
ي� ا �ي�. �ي� �ش��ي� ء ظ�� نّ� �م غ���اي�ر الإ� �ج �م�ا لي� �ل��لت� ف������صي����ل� ،وا �ل��ت ن���ا �ي� ب�ي�� ن� ا �ع��تق���ا د �ي� ا �ل���ض
� �د
ي ّت ّ
ق �أ ّ ن ف
و�ي���ص�� ��ع�ل ق� ا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا �ل�ع��ل ،وا خ���ت�� فل��وا �����ا ل ا �ل�������ي����ا � إ� ��ه ع��ل ب�ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م ،و �ا ل ب�و�ع��ب�د ا �ل�ل�ه
� ٌ ن خ ش ق �
�أ م م م ح
ت َّ �ف ن ٌ ن �ة ق ض ق ق و ب�و � ��س
�
�أ
� �ا د ي� ا �ل�ع�لو�م ،ب�ل �م .ولا ����ض �و� ا �ل�ع��ل ع��لىح�ا ل وح ك� � �ا إ� ��ه ع��ل ب� ك ح�ا � و��ا ��ي� ا �ل�������ض إ
م ّ م ُّ
��ه�ل�� ن �أ �أ ح�د �ه�م�ا ع�ل�مً�ا ال�آ �ُ ن ن ق �ت ت
�خ��ت��ل� .و�ي���ص�� ����ض
فٌ ٌ
ي�ه�ا �م��ت���م�اث� و م ف
و �خر كا �ا ج� � ي� و � �ا د ا �ع� ���ا د ا ��� ،سوا ء �
ح
� ل ����
ً
���ه�لا. ج�
أّ
ف
ح�ا �ص�ل �م� ن� الا خ���ت�لا ��، ��م�عر ف���ت�ه �ت�ع�ا لى؛ ل� ن���ه�ا د ا ف���ع��ةٌ �ل��ل�� خ�و�ف� ا �ل
� �؛ ك ٌ ُ ن
وا �ل�ع��لم �م���ه وا ج�� ب
ّف ّ ن ٌ ل�أ نّ� ا � ش
كا �ل�ع��ل ب�مك��ل� ب��ه. �روا ج�� ب� ولا ي��ت���م ب��د و���ه�ا ،و � ل��� ك� و
ق �ة �أ ُ
ّ �أ ّ م �أ
ق ق ض ح�ا ق ن�ه �م�ع ن ً ل�������ي�� خ�ي�� ن� و �� � ��س ّا �ل���سه �ع ن���د ا � ش
� �ا و ب�و � �ا د ا �ل�ع��ل .و��ا ل ��ا ��ي� ا �ل�������ض ى �ي���ض �� � � إ ي ب و �و
ّ �أ ُ �أ ُ م ّ أ ّ �أ
َ ُ �ّ �ً�ا ن��ه ع�د �ُم ا �ل�ع��ل �ا ل� �م ا ��لت� � ت �ق
ح ق� ن��ه ع�د �م ا �ل�ع��ل ب��ع�د � ا �ل�ع�ا د �ة ب� ن� �ت�ع��ل .وا �ل �جر ر و ب ح�ا � ا �ي���ض � ��س
م م � ي م إ
ح���صو�ل�ه. �
113 113
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The two masters concur concerning the possibility that acts of knowing
remain within their genus.107 Abū Isḥāq and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt reject altogether
that acts of knowing and different species of belief remain, for otherwise
they could only be annihilated by their opposites, but the consequent is
false, for one of us may cease to be a knower due to negligence or doubt.
Since knowledge is an occurrence, and according to the consideration of
the considerate ones, an occurrence is not separable from an occurrence
of the occurrence, knowledge of something necessitates knowledge of the
knowledge of it, pace the two masters.
Intellection, which according to one group is a matter of obligation, is
knowledge of the necessity of necessary things and the impossibility of
impossible things, for otherwise one could be separated from the other,
which would be weak due to the possibility of mutual implication.108 In ad-
dition to the foregoing, the Muʾtazilites say that intellection is knowledge
concerning the goodness of the good and the badness of the bad. Judge
Abū Bakr109 says that it is knowledge of the necessity of necessary things,
of the impossibility of impossible things, and of the habitual course of cus-
toms. The truth is that it is an instinctive faculty, from which self-evident
knowledge of this sort follows when the senses are sound.
107 The question here is whether a cognitive act, say, S’s believing that P, remains of the same
genus when its truth value changes.
108 If something is necessary, its contradictory is impossible, and if something is impossible, its
contradictory is necessary.
109 This is the famous Ashʾarite theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013).
110 The argument is not neatly reconstructed in any of the basic figures, but the following might
be close to the idea: ‘opinion can be mistaken for knowledge (minor); what can be mistaken
for knowledge is of the same genus as knowledge, namely a belief (major); therefore, opinion
is of the same genus as knowledge, namely a belief ’. The major premise is debatable, because
there is a counterexample of the general principle.
114 114
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
��ا � � ش �ف ا �� ���ظ�نّ
ال��م���ط��ل� ا ��ل
ح د ي� ع���ر� :ي� ل� ب
� ��ز �خ ا ف� ُ�� نُ ال � �تق �غ ُ ا � �تق ا � �� ن ّ �ز ن ت �أ ت
ح�ا �. و�هو�ر ج���ي��ح ح�د ا �ل���م�� ج�و ي�� �مع �ج�وي �ل �ه ،ور�جح�ا � ا ع� ���ا د ي��ر ع� ���ا د لر�ج
شّ ّ ُ ُ ً ّ �أ
ل����ء إ� ن����م�او�هو�م� ن� �ق��بي���ل الا �ع��تق���ا د �ع ن���د ب�� �ه�ا �ش�����م؛ ف�إ� ن� ا � ظل���� نّ� �ق�د ي�ب���ل�غ �م��ب��ل غ���ا ي���لت���ب��س ب�ا �ل�ع��ل ،وا �
ي م ي
� شّ �ة �ةَ ّن ف ٌ ن ُ
���بر �ى �م���م ن��وع��ة� ،إ� � الإ� را د ت���لت���ب��س ب�ا ل�����هو . ي���لت���ب��س ب����م�ا �هو�م� ن� �ج ����س�ه؛ وا �ل �ك
115 115
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Abū ʾAlī, Abū Isḥāq, Abū ʾAbdillāh, and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt say that it is dif-
ferent from belief, because there is a difference between our being in the
state of opinion and our being in the state of belief.
The verified account is for us to say that if decision is made a condition
for belief, it is different from opinion, but if not, it is its genus, and opin-
ion is opposite to knowledge. If it pertains conversely to what knowledge
pertains to, like knowledge that Zayd is in a house and the opinion that he
is not in it, then opposition also takes place between instances of opinion,
like the opinion of Zayd’s being in a house and the opinion that he is not in
it. An opinion may depend on an opinion. There are good, bad, and oblig-
atory opinions.
111 The formal cause of reflection is the order, the efficient cause the act of ordering, the material
cause the mental content that is ordered, and the final cause the acquisition of further mental
content.
116 116
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
117 117
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
On whether there is opposition in it, Abū ʾAlī has said that reflections
concerning two things that are opposite in every respect are opposite. He
is challenged by Abū Hāshim, because it is a condition for the opposition
of those which pertain to something that that to which they pertain is one,
and when two reflections pertain to one object reflected upon, they are
similar.112 According to the Muʾtazilites, it cannot persist, because one of us
may cease to reflect without any opposite, for due to the foregoing, there
is no opposition within the reflection, nor is anything else opposed to it,
for there is nothing that could not be combined with it, except knowledge
of something with evidence, since reflection cannot be combined with ev-
idence.113 This, however, is not due to an opposition between knowledge
and reflection, for otherwise reflection could not be combined with opin-
ion, because opinion is opposed to knowledge, and what cannot co-exist
with one of two opposites cannot co-exist with the other either. The con-
sequent is false, since opinion concerning something with evidence can be
combined with reflection – indeed reflection requires that the contradicto-
ry contrary to knowledge is possible.114
112 According to a generally valid principle, opposition between two things requires a shared
foundation. For instance, black and white are opposed in terms of the shared property of
being colour. Such a shared foundation is lacking, when our reflections aim at a statement
and its negation. These are two distinct mental contents, and the two inferential processes
are thereby necessarily distinct.
113 The question concerns whether one act of reflection can persist from one object of reflection
to another. The Muʾtazilites, perhaps with the exception of Abū ʾAlī al-Jubbāʾī, deny this
because there is no shared basis, which would allow us to speak of one reflection when the
contents differ. All sorts of considerations, with the exception of evidence that brings the
matter to a close, can be included in the process of reflection, however.
114 The point here is that we cannot deliberate or reflect on something that we know based on
sufficient and indubitable evidence or argument. However, we can deliberate about some-
thing that we know by a less secure method, as well as about something for which there is
some evidence but which is nevertheless a matter of opinion.
118 118
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
119 119
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Let it not be said that it ceases with what is equivalent to its opposite,
namely knowledge of that which has evidence. For we say: Reflection may
cease before the occurrence of knowledge. Sustained thinking is not one
but many thoughts renewed by the one reflecting, and its being attribut-
ed with length is metaphorical. It is within our power, because it emerges
according to intention and motive. It is not produced by anything else, for
induction shows that there is nothing that produces it.115 It cannot be from
intention and motive, because otherwise all acts would be produced by
them, and because they cannot both be its reasons, for it is impossible to
have many causes when what is caused is one. It is not from will either, be-
cause what emerges from will is merely possible, and so it is not counted as
a necessitating reason, nor is it from a motive, because a motive may con-
sist of necessary knowledge so that what is produced by it is necessary, nor
is it from reflection, for otherwise the existence of what is infinite would
follow.
115 That is, the following induction reveals that there is nothing that could produce reflection. It
just emerges, without a cause as it were, when we have the motive and the intention to reach
a certain conclusion by way of a process of reflection.
120 120
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
121 121
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
It necessarily yields knowledge, for one who knows that the world is
changeable and that all that is changeable has been brought into being,
knows necessarily that the world has been brought into being. The Sum-
nites’116 objection is sophistry. They argue that the knowledge of a belief,
which occurs at the heels of two premises, being knowledge is not certain,
because it is often revealed false, nor is it due to reflection, for otherwise
there would be regress. Since divine things are hidden, and we are even
incapable of perceiving our own essences, how could knowledge be ac-
quired about them? The answer is: The knowledge, that the conclusion of
a supposed syllogism is knowledge, is due to reflection and occurs from
two premises, one of which is that that conclusion follows necessarily from
two necessary things, and whatever follows from two necessary things is
necessarily knowledge. Hence, the conclusion of the supposed syllogism
is necessarily knowledge. This conclusion is due to reflection and acquired
from two premises.117 Besides, knowledge that the conclusion of the sup-
posed syllogism is necessarily knowledge is self-evident and occurs from
just conceiving them both, and so the regress is interrupted. Difficulty is
not evidence of impossibility.118
122 122
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
123 123
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
119 If the conclusion of a syllogism follows logically from the premises, then having understood
the truth of the premises, one cannot fail to immediately understand the truth of the conclu-
sion.
120 The Ashʾarites’ counterargument is an application of occasionalism to the psychological
equivalent of logical consequence: if there are no worldly causes, then it is perfectly possible
that at time t1, a person (or a “servant”, the term here used in the sense of human beings,
who are obliged to serve God) understands the premises ‘all A are B’ and ‘all B are C’, but
God withholds from creating the understanding of the conclusion ‘all A are C’ at time t2. The
minor premise that Ḥillī objects to is ‘the servant’s acts are traced back to (i.e. caused imme-
diately by) God’, which is little more than a flat denial of occasionalism about human affairs,
121 In other words, if it is possible to recall something without a prior intention but not impossi-
ble to arrive at a conclusion without an intention, the Ashʾarites’ analogy fails. If unintention-
al recollection is not possible, the Ashʾarites must say why that is the case, that is, they must
further specify the foundation of the analogy.
124 124
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
125 125
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
When it comes to flawed reflection, they concur that it does not produce
ignorance, for otherwise someone ignorant would be absolved from guilt.122
Furthermore, no ignorance results when someone who is right reflects on
the doubts of someone who is wrong, whereas the one who is wrong will
be refuted when he reflects on the evidence of the one who is right, and
so there is inevitably belief in the truth of the premises. The validity of the
reflection is due to the validity of its order, which is its formal part, as well
as the soundness of its premises, which are its material part. Reflection is
flawed due to the invalidity of either both or one of the two, and there is no
doubt that this is due to the first alternative, for otherwise those endowed
with understanding would agree about matters of reflection, and error
would vanish.123 They both vary the way in which something inhering in a
substrate does, and there is no regress, because reflection holds between
the material parts, not absolutely.124
122 The idea that ignorance is morally culpable but flawed reflection is not might seem strange
at first glance. The background is the widely held theological principle, according to which
intellectual reflection on the central articles of faith and the arguments in their favour is a
necessary condition for sound religious belief, and thus obliged upon every Muslim endowed
with sound cognitive capacities. However, failure in a sincere reflective effort is different
from failing to engage in the effort; among other things, the two failures have different moral
status: failed reflection is not culpable, whereas failure to reflect is. On the question of under-
standing and taqlīd about the principles of faith, see Pessagno 1979 (on Māturīdī), Frank 1989
(on classical Ashʾarism), and El-Rouayheb 2015, 173-203 (on later Ashʾarism).
123 In other words, it must be the case that errors in reflection are due to both logically invalid
inferences and false premises. All inferences are ultimately based on indubitable first prin-
ciples, and if people did not make invalid inferences, no invalid posterior premises could be
derived from these principles.
124 There is no regress, because not all premises, which are the material parts of syllogism, are
acquired by way of reflection.
126 126
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
127 127
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
125 The heretical view is that God’s existence is not demonstrable by way of reflection. The falla-
cy they commit is the assumption that reflection must begin from something accepted that
is accepted on authority, say, from a teacher of transmitted knowledge. This is not the case,
because some principles are known simply because they are self-evident or indubitable to a
sound intellect.
126 In other words, the heretics could answer that the first teacher’s knowledge of God is re-
ceived from without, presumably by way of revelation, and a divine miracle is recognised as
such by the help of a teacher.
127 That is, the arguments from regress and vicious circularity that were brought against the her-
etics include the elements of an answer to their defence. In the case of the regress argument,
one could say that everyone endowed with sound intellection is bestowed with the same foun-
dational knowledge as the first teacher. This foundational knowledge, possibly accompanied
with further knowledge about the world, also gives the ground for the recognition of miracles.
128 We may fail to realise that one is in possession of all that is needed to infer to the desired
conclusion, if we are inattentive to what we know and its relation to the conclusion. This
inattention is a sufficient lack of knowledge to make reflection feasible.
129 Unlike simple ignorance, which is the mere lack of a piece of knowledge, composite igno-
rance involves a contradictory false belief. Thus, one has made a commitment without prop-
erly investigating the matter.
130 That is, reflection and composite ignorance are incompatible, because being compositely ig-
norant of something entails the erroneous belief that one knows that thing, which precludes
any motive to investigate it by means of reflection.
128 128
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
129 129
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
131 That is, we are not acquainted with God’s existence simply because the sentence ‘God exists’
is logically valid, or analytically true simply by way of the meaning of the terms and their
logical order.
132 Imitation of authority is based on reflection in the sense that the authority must have knowl-
edge by virtue of reflection. Were that not the case, the commitment to a piece of alleged
knowledge, instead of its negation, would be arbitrary.
133 This point concerns reflection as a religious duty. Ḥillī is saying that the fear of failing to meet
the duty is not dispelled by merely having an opinion of matters of religious importance. The
requirement of reflection is valid absolutely, for otherwise the duty would be assigned arbi-
trarily to individual believers.
134 The obligation to reflect cannot be based on revelation, because the revelation cannot be
understood without engaging in reflection.
135 Q 17:15.
136 In metaphorical terms, sound intellection, as a necessary condition of understanding the
prophets’ message, is one of the messengers of an obligating order.
130 130
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
قَ ًّ ّ
ضر وري��ة ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور�ة ،ولا طر�ي� ��سوا ه �ذ ف ٌ ّق ف
وا ��لن����ظروا ج�� ب� ��لت�و���� ا �ل���م�عر���ة ع��لي��ه؛ إ� �ل��ي����س� ت� ��
� ن �غ ّ �ز ت ع��� ال�أ�ز �م�ا ن ،ا ��لت�ق����ل��د �����س��ت�ل�ز � ّلا لا �ل��ت�����أ ا �ل�ع��ق��� ا ء � ��ل��ه ف� �� ض
�� �
ر ج يح � يرم �� �
�� ��
ل� ا م � �
ل ال � �ه
م � � ل إ ي ي� ب �
وإ و ي ي ج وإ
ف ن ّ
ق
�خر ج� ا �ل���م��ط�ل� �� ب� �ش��رط إ� ي���ق���ا ا �ل���م��ط�ل ق�� ، �خو�� ب�ا � ظل���� نّ و�لو�ل�م ي�ج�
�
ضر ر ا �ل
� �مرج� .ولا ي��ت� ف��� ��
ع ي ح
ّ �ذ ن أ ق ّ ّ �ز ف
� ق ف ت ق �أ
ح�ا �م ال� ����ا ء؛ � لا ��� ص�� ���لي�� �م�ا لا �ي��ط�ا � ،وو ج�وب��ه �ع������ل و� لا �ل �مإ� � �ز
�ع� ن إ� ط�لا ��ه و�ل �م � ك�
�ب ي إ ي�ح ي� إ �
ُ �ة ّ � ش�أ ً
ف �خ ق ف ن ّ �ة ف
ن � � � � �
�م�عر � ا �ل��س���مع إ� لا ب�اَ ��ل����ظر .ولا ي�ج�� ب� ��ع�ل�ه ��ب�ل ا �ل�ع��لم ب�و ج وب��ه �لا �ا �ل�ل ����عري� .وا �ل���مرا د �م��
�ة �أ ّ�ة ق أ �ذ �ق �ل�ه �ت�ع�ا ل َ� ( :م�ا ُن��ّ ُ عَ�ذّ َ ن ف
كا �م�� ِ ب�ِي�� ن�) ����ي� ا ��لت��ع� ي� ب� ع��لى ال� وا �مر ا �ل��س���م�عي��� ���ب�ل ا ��لب��ع��ث� وا ����س��ت�ع���م�ا ل و ى و
�ف ّ ً
ح�ا �م.
ف
��ا �ز ا ،و�هوف���طر�� ا �ل��ق��ي���ا ��س�� ،لا ي��ل�ز �م الإ� � ا �لر��سول ف�� ا �ل�ع��ق��� �جم
ي ل ي
131 131
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
137 Knowledge of things that are neither self-evident nor stated in the revelation may be acquired
by inference from these two types of principle.
132 132
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
�ة ف �� ة � � � �� �
� ار ��ه�م��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ث�ا �ل ث� �ع �����شر�� :ي� ا �لإ� را د� � او � ك
ل�� ال �
�أ ّ ّ �أ ّ ق ٌ ُ
� وا �ع��تق���ا د ه وظ� ن���ه حا خ���ت��ل ف� ا ��لن��ا ��س ،ف���ق���ا ل �و�م الإ� را د �ة �هي� ا �ل�د ا �عي� ،و�هو�ع��ب�ا ر�ة �ع� ن� ع��ل ا �ل�
م ي
�أ
�� ن و�ص ��ل�ه�ا � ��ل��ه و � لى �ذ �ل�ك ا �ل غ����ر�م� ن �غ��ر�م�ا ن� �م� ن ك ��م
�� �� م�ا ��ه �أ �ل غ���� ه �م� ّ��م� ن ��ؤ�ثّ �خ �� ه ف����ه �م ن�� ف���ع��ة
ي � ي ع � ي � و إي إ ب �� ل و ير � ي ر ير ي
ً ًّ �أ ن ف أ ن �أ �أ آ �أ ت �أ
��د �م� ن� ���������سن���ا �مي���لا �مرت�ب��ا ع��ىل �خرو ن� �م ًرا �ز ا ئ��دًا؛ ل� نّ�ا �ج� � ��ة و�غ ي��ر�ه�م�ا .و ث��ب�� ت� � � ��ع� ب� و�م�ع�ا ر �ض
ف ت �ّ ف �ذ
ح ق� �ي�� ن���ا ،لا �ي���ه ��ع�ا لى. �ه� ا ا �ل�ع��لم ،و�هو
133 133
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Willing something is not aversion towards its opposite, for one may pay
no heed to the opposite in the state of willing, although the aversion is
concomitant to the will under the condition of noticing the opposite. It is
different from desire, for a patient has a will to drink the medicine but does
not desire it. According to one view, there is an essential incompatibility
between willing opposite things, for willing one of them preponderates
that to exist, as does willing the other, and just as they are counterparts,
so are the wills towards them. According to others, willing one turns away
from willing the other, and this is within our power to initiate without any
cause producing it, because it takes place according to our intention and
motives, and because the will to sin is sinful, and so it cannot emerge from
Him most high. It is not possible to point at anything that produces it, for
we may will without any preceding thought so that it cannot be produced
from this, nor is it from any motive, because the knowledge can be neces-
sary. The agent of the reason and what it is a reason for is one and the same,
and God most high is not the agent of sin, whereas sinning is not precluded
from this will. Hence, it is not produced from a motive, nor is it produced
from a will, for otherwise there would be a regress.
The will either concerns something that pertains to it, namely that which
can come to be, or it does not, namely that which cannot come to be, such
as persistence and other such things,138 pace Abū Hāshim, insofar as he has
said that if one believes that something persisting comes to be from one
moment to another, one can will it. How could something that does not
pertain to anything come to really pertain merely by considering the belief
of the one who so believes?139 Will can pertain to its own coming to be, like
in blessing we order someone to become closer to God most high, so that
we will his will, although we do not necessitate it, for there is no way to
necessitate it insofar as he lacks the motives to it. Will does not take place
as something intended in itself, but rather it acts following another, and so
there is no point in obliging its own willing. When willing is willed, it is not
willed by itself but by another will, and so it only pertains to what comes to
be in turns, nor does one willing pertain in a detailed way to more than one
object willed, like knowledge.
138 The point, not entirely clear in Ḥillī’s formulation, is that will can be directed at something
that the willing agent is able to produce as well as something that is not within her power.
An example of the latter are things that already exist (or “persist”) and which thus cannot be
brought into being by a voluntary act.
139 In other words, it is highly implausible that the persisting thing should become subject to the
power of the willing agent merely because she believes it to be such.
134 134
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
135 135
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
136 136
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
137 137
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
140 By its very nature, desire entails a preference for something that does not yet exist, or for a
counterfactual state of affairs: something should be otherwise than it factually is, or it should
be in a certain way in a future moment. Thus, it makes no sense to have a desire directed at
something that already obtains.
138 138
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
139 139
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
141 The characteristics (aḥkām) are manifest features of things, which are grounded in attributes,
which the thing has but which are not always manifest. For instance, life is manifested by
the capacity to perceive or to move voluntarily. For an excellent overview of the Muʾtazilite
concept of ḥukm, see Frank 1978, 58-64.
142 The point here is that since pleasure and pain are primitive percepts, they cannot be captured
by means of a definition. This does not mean that the suggested definitions are not valid char-
acterisations of pain and pleasure.
143 This is Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925). On Rāzī’s theory of pain and pleasure, see Adamson 2008.
140 140
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
141 141
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
144 That is, we are not able to bring about pain directly, but we can perform an act on a living
body that causes pain intermediately.
142 142
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
143 143
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
145 Bishr ibn al-Muʾtamir (d. 210/825) was a crucial figure in the earliest phase of Baghdad
Muʾtazilism.
144 144
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
ف �� � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ّ�س�ا د ��س�ع �����شر�� :ي� ا �لإ� د را ك
�أ �أ ّ �أ أ
ح�ا �ص�ل �م ن���ه ح�ا �ّ�س��ة .وا �ل
� ح��سي�� ن� ،ن��ه �ع��ب�ا ر�ة �ع� ن ت� ث�را �ل
� ا خ���ت��ل ف� ا ��لن��ا ��س �ه ن���ا ،ف���ع ن���د ال� وا ئ� و �� ا �ل
�
� ل بي
شّ ق ّ �أ ٌ �أ ّ ٌ ّ
�ة �ة
ح�ا ��س� �ل��ل��فر� ب�ي�� ن� ح�ا �ل� ا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا �ل����ء �هوع��لٌ�خ �ا �ص .و�ع ن���د ا ��لب��ا ق�ي�� ن� ن��ه ن�و �م غ���اي�ر �ل��ل�ع��ل ،و��لت�� ث�را �ل
�
م ي م ع م
��م� �ةل� �ة ف ّ �ذ ف �خ
�ل� � ّ ق ن ُ ق ن
حوا ��س ا �م��س .وا �ل���مو�صو�� ب���ه� ه ا �ل���ص��� ا �ج ل� ��ه و��ع�د ه؛ و������س���م ب�ا �������س�ا �م ا ل
�
ي ح�ا ل إ� د را ك ب
ُ
ف � ّ ً أ
�� ن� � فص��� الإ� د را ك لا
�ة حوا ��س ت��د ر ك ب���ه�ا و�ل ك د و ن� ال� �ج� ز�ا ء� ،خ �لا ف��ا �ل��ب ش���ر ب�ي�� ن� ا �ل���م�ع��ت���مر�� .ا ل
�
ّ
�ي���ص�� ر ج�و��ع�ه�ا إ� ��لي���ه�ا.
ح
�ز ّ ً ق فً ن ن �أ ن �ذ �أث ت �أ
ح���صول �
كا� ،مو و��ا ع��لي��ه و ج و � � �و� ح�د �ا �م�د ر � و ��ب��� ب� او ��ل�ه� ي�ل الإ� د را ك �م�ع�ى ،و ج���ع�لك
ن ف ق �ذ �ت �ة ف شّ ئ ن ًّ
حي���ا �مع ا �ل���را ���ط ا �ل���م� �ع��بر �ي� الإ� د را ك ولاي��د ر ك ا �ل���م�د ر ك �ل���������د �ل�ك ا �ل���م�ع�ى .و�هو �و��ه � ك
ن ً ً �أ �أ
حيّ���ا وو ج�ود �و��ه �كا؛ �ل ك� ��ع�ل�ه ب�و�ه�ا �ش�����م�م�ع ن�ى ،ب�ل ج� ��ع�ل ح�د ن�ا �م�د ر � �م��ذ �ه�� الا �ش���ا �عر�ة .و�ل�م ي ج�
ب
�ذ ه ال أ �م ُ ت ن ن ف ن ت�أثّ ن ًّ �ز ح� ا �ل �ة ّ
ا �ل���م�د ر ك و�ص
�و� حي���ا ،و�ه� � ور � ك �و��ه � �و� ا ��ل�� �ر �ل ك حوا ��س و وا ل ا �ل���موا � � ،ي�� ك � �
ع
ت
كا � فص����ةٌ �ج�
ً �ل قّ أ نّ نَ ً ش ً ف� قت � ن � ّ َ
�� ب� �و� ا �ل���م�د ر ك �م�د ر � ح�؛ ل� � ك كا .و�هوا � �ون��ه �م�د ر � � �ا ء كو��ه حي���ا ك ���روط�ا ي� ا ������ض
حت���ه�ا ف�� ّن��ه�ا �ت����س��ت غ�� ن� �ع� ن �م�ع ن� ���ق��ت�����ض� ��� �ذ ق ت ض ن �ّ ت
�� إ� ��� �ع���د ص ح��ةً و � ّ ف �ة � كا ن� ت� �ص
�
ي�ه�ا ،إ� ا �ل���م����������ي� ي� � ى ي � كل�ص��� �ج ب ح��ي��� �لو �
ّ ت �أ ّ أ
ل��س����س��ط��ة،ح��ة �ل�ز �م ا � ف �� ب� ع��لى ت���ق���دي�ر ا �ل���ص��� �لو ج�و���ه�ا ن���ف����ُ �ذ ا ت���ه�ا .و���ا ن� ال� و لى ،ن���ه�ا �لو �ل�م�ج�
بي س ب
ح��ة ا �ل���م ا ن� �م ت���ف���ع��ة ٌ�ة ئ ٌ
ت ٌ ش ق �ةٌ �أ ن ن ن �أ
ح��ي��� و و ع ر حوا ��س�ص
� ضرت���ا ج���ب�ا ل ����ا �ه����� و �صوا � �ه�ا ��ل� وا �ل
� ح�����و� ب�
� �ل��ت�� ج�و�ي�ز � ي� ك
ن
ح� ن� لا ن��د ر��ك�ه�ا. �ل���را ئ���ط ح�ا �ص�ل��ة ،و � ا�ش
و
� �ة ف ن ن �ذ
ح�ا ��س��ة ���س���ٌ �����ة مخ ّ ُ
حي���ا � ،ي���د ر ك ب��ه �م�ا لا ي��د ر ك ����صو�ص��ة �ز ا ئ��د �ة ع��ل ب��ي���ة ا �ل ج م وبي �و�را د ب�ا �ل
ى ي
�أ ن ت ن � ��ٌ � �ذ أ ف �ةٌ ّ ف ّ ّ ُ غ
�و� حوا س .و�ل�ه� ا � �ا ء � � ك حي���ا ،و�إلا �ل�ز �م �ي� �ج �مي�� ال� �ع���ض ح�ل �ي���ه � �ك م
ب���ي��ره ،ولا ي�را د ب��ه �ل
ع
�ّ�ة ح�ّ ا � أّ ّ �أ
ح ا �ة
ح� إ� د را ك ا �ل�ر ر حي���ا �ة � ش���ت��رك ف���ص ل
� ا �ل���م�ع ن� ن���� ب�و �ه�ا �ش�����م ا �ل�ل�م��سَ ح�ا �َ�س��ة ،ل� ن� م
�
ي ي ل ى فى
ن �ة �ل �ة نَ �ة �أ ٌ
ا �ل�� د �ة؛ �ه ��ل��ط ،لا � �ت
�غ
حي���ا د و� حوا ��س ب� �مور �ز ا ئ��د ع��ل ب��ي�� ا � �ع��� ا �ل ض شت
ح� ���م�ا ل ا �����را ط ب�� � و برو و و
ى
ع����. ا ��ل�� ض
ب
145 145
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
The sense of touch is more useful than others, because an animal is com-
posed of the elements and its health is due to their balance and the persistence
of their mixture, whereas its corruption is due to their conflict and some of
them exceeding the balance. It is a necessary entailment of divine wisdom
to bring to existence a faculty that operates in all parts of the animal in order
that the animal perceives and is wary of what is incompatible by means of
it, and this is touch. Other senses, such as taste and smell, are intended for
acquiring benefit and repelling harms before acquiring the benefit.
Every animal that has the faculty of touch must have a faculty of mov-
ing, in order that it approach what is appropriate and depart from what is
incompatible.
The faculties of touch are four: one judges between hot and cold, one
between moist and dry, one between hard and soft, and one between
coarse and smooth. This is on the basis that two things do not emerge from
one faculty, which is precluded.
It is a proprium of touch that its bearer is the medium. One of the con-
ditions for a medium is lack of the qualities, which touch conveys to the
perceiver, in order that he be thoroughly acted upon and that awareness of
this be complete. Hence, what is closer to a balance senses more intensely.
Some of the ancients posited sense for the simple elements, due to their
intimacy with what is appropriate and distance from what is incompatible,
but the argument is weak and what it seeks far-fetched.
Taste requires the moistness of saliva emitted by the salivating faculty.
It is inevitable that it lacks flavour, for otherwise it would not be fond of it
in the proper way, like in the case of the sick person. Either this moistness
is capable of being acted upon by that which has flavour, so that the sensa-
tion is not through a medium, or the moistness is mixed with parts of that
which has flavour and then the moistness is submerged in the tongue until
it mixes with it, and so the sensation is through a medium.
Smell perceives by means of parts transmitted from what has fragrance,
which parts have dissolved through evaporation, mixed with the interme-
diate air, and arrived at the nostrils, because squeezing that which has fra-
grance necessitates that the intermediate air is acted upon by that quality.
Furthermore, that which has fragrance decreases when there are many
smellers. As to him who makes smell pertain what is smelled, since that
which has fragrance is more remote in name, no doubt there are subtle
parts in that which has fragrance that are capable of being mixed with air.
It is because of this that the fragrance is not perceived when straws or am-
bergris are cut but not set into fire.
146 146
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
147 147
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Hearing requires that the air that is compressed between what strikes
and what is struck arrives at the membrane of the eardrum, according to
the ancients, al-Naẓẓām, al-Kaʾbī, and Abū ʾAlī in particular. It has already
been dealt with.146
The ancients differ concerning sight, some of them holding that it takes
place due to the form of what is seen being impressed in the eye, whereas
for others it is through the emission of uniform rays from the eye in the
shape of a cone, the tip of which is in sight and the base in what is seen.147
This is endorsed by Abū Hāshim, but he attributed error to the eye, be-
cause when a ring in a finger approaches the eye, it is seen as greater than it
actually is, for the rays are distributed broadly, so that due to their breadth
the ring is imagined to be broad, and when it recedes, it is seen as small due
to the thinness of the other end.
The two statements are both false in my view, due to the impossibility
of the large being impressed in the small. Furthermore, if vision were due
to impression, we would not perceive distance, so that we would not per-
ceive the close in its closeness and the distant in its distance.148 Moreover,
if what emerges from the eye were a body, it could not encounter the half
of the sphere, for a body of these dimensions cannot emerge from the eye,
small as it is. According to you, the spheres cannot be penetrated, for oth-
erwise they could not be change their position. Furthermore, its motion
cannot be natural, otherwise it would only be in one direction, nor can
it be forced, for then it would be subsequent to a natural motion, nor can
it be voluntary at all. Finally, seeing occurs without any disturbance even
during strong winds that uproot large trees. Instead, the truth is that the
eye’s being faced with what is seen, when the conditions have been met, is
a preparatory or necessitating cause for perception.
148 148
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
149 149
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
For our part, perception depends on ten things apart from the health
of the sense: the opacity of what is seen, in the sense that it has colour
or radiation, radiation taking place on it, being faced with something or
its temporal equivalent, the transparency of the medium, the absence of
excessive smallness, radiation, distance, or closeness, the attention of the
one who has the organ of sight, and that what necessitates error is not in-
volved. When the conditions are met, sight follows necessarily, according
to the ancients and the Muʾtazilites, pace the Ashʾarites. The parts of what
is distant are not equally positioned in the pupil, because the column sup-
posed to extend from the eye to the base that is supposed in what is seen is
shorter than the two extremes, for it shoots out acutely whereas they shoot
out in right angles.149 The reason why the distant thing is small is either
that it is impressed in an angle, which is smaller due to the distance of the
two supposed lines, or that the rays have been dispersed so that no perfect
perception results.
The equal relation of a polished surface to both the eye and what is seen
is a preparatory cause for perceiving it, but not for the impression of a form
first in the polished surface, and then from that form in the eye. Were that
the case, the form would not change its place when a third thing ceases. For
instance, if a wall is green because green is reflected on it, it will not change
when the one regarding moves. Nor is the relation of the polished surface
to the eye and what is seen the cause for the reflection of rays from the eye
to the polished surface and then from it to what is seen.150
149 The comparison here is between the axis and the sides (or the “extremes”) of the visual cone.
Suppose that the base of the cone lies on a level surface that is seen, and the apex in the eye.
It is a simple geometrical fact that the axis will be longer than the sides of the cone. The next
sentence suggests Ḥillī thinks this observation can be used to explain the reason why distant
objects appear small to us. This idea would be somewhat similar to Ibn al-Haytham’s theory;
perhaps Ḥillī was drawing from it in his own view.
150 The phenomenon under consideration here is, of course, our seeing things in mirrors. It
was often considered fatal for both the intramission and the extramission theory; see, for
instance, Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq I.3.4.104, 72-73.
150 150
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
151 151
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
151 According to this Muʾtazilite view, annihilation does not have to be created, because it is a
necessary concomitant of the creation of the opposite of the annihilated thing.
152 152
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
� � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ّ�س�ا ب��� �ع �����شر:
���ّل�م���ن
� ت ق ف ه�ا � ع ا ف �ن �� ف �ق ّ ة �أ
��خ�ل� �� �ب�� ال�م� ك� � ا �ل
� ��ي� ��ب � ي��� ر �ض وع ي�
� ��� � �� ا ع�
ي ي
ٌ
و�هي� ث�لا ث��ة:
فً ��ك�ع ّ �ق �أث� ت ال أ �ش � ر�ة � ن �ق ئ ً ��ل �ق ق ت ض ق ه ذ أ ُ
�� ،خ �لا ��ا ��� ا ا �ل � ب�ال� ّول ا ��لب�ق���ا ء ،و �د ��ب��ه � ���ا ع م�ع�ى �ا ����م�ا ب�ا ب��ا ي� ي������������ ب������ا .وك
ي ي
ف �ةً أ نّ �ذ تً �أ �أ ن ّ ّ
ن
�و� ج���ع�ل�ه ا �ا و لى �م�� ج���ع�ل�ه �ص��� ،ول� � ح ق�؛ و�إلا �ل�ز �م ا �ل��ت��س��ل��س�ل ،وك ��لب��ا �ق� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة ،و�هوا �ل
�
ي
ن �أ َ ً ق ّ� ن� ا � ش ن ف ن آ ّ ف ّ�ذ ٌ
� د ا �ل���ص ف����ة ت�ا � �ل � د ا �ل� ا ت ّ َ
ل���ي�ء ب�ا �ي���ا ب��ع�د � �ل�م كل � ��� .لوا ��ع�ك��س د ا ر .وكو � �ي� � بع و ج و و جو
�ت ّ�ة ت�ت ّ ّ ث ّ
�
� ف ت � ف� ن� ً ن ن ً ف� ن ف �ق �كن
��� لا ي��د ل ع��لى و ج�ود ا �لب����ا ء �م�ع�ى ي� �������س�ه ،إ� � �ك�ي��را �م�� ا �ل���ص���ا � الا ع� ��ب�ا ري� �ج �د د ع��لى ي
ً �ّ ت ا �ل��ذ ا تّ
ح��ق�� ق� ��ل�ه�ا �عي�� ن���ا.
� ولا �
ق �أ نّ � � ق ق ن �ذ ّ ن
��ا د ح���ص� ال� ي�ج�
ل إ
�م�ا ي�
� ك
� ل �
ع ا� ح�� ص� �ا �ل��ف
�� ي لب � �
� �د
� م� ا �دع ح��������و� �ه��بوا إ� لى إ
�ال � ا ��لث��ا �ي� ا �ل��ف�� ن���ا ء ،وا ل���م��
ق ن � ّّف �أ ت ّ ٌ
� �د �ي� ا ��لب��ا �ي�. ب��ه ،و�ج �م�ا ع��ة �م� ن� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �م ن���عوا �م� ن� ��ع�ل ق� الإ� ع�د ا �م ب�ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل و و ج���بوا طر �يا � ا ل���ض
ّ ق �ؤ ه �أ ث آ ن ّ �ذ ّ ق ّ
���ر �م� ن� � � وا ح�د، كل �م�ا �ي��ق����ب�ل ا �ل��ف�� ن���ا ء �ع ن���د ه لا �ي���ص�� ب������ا ك وا ��لن� ظ����ا �م ��ا ل إ� ن��ه �ي��ف�� ن�ى �ل� ات��ه ،و �
ح
�� ّ�دًا �ل��ل��� ا � ،ل�أ ّن��ه�ا �ا �ق����ةٌ �ل��ذ ا ت��ه�ا ،لا ����م�ع ن�م �ي� ث�ا �ي� ح�د وث��ه� ،ي�ع�د �م .و�م��ث �ب� ت�وه ج� ��ع�لوه �ض
ثّ ف ن
� ب ى ج و هر � ب ي
ّ ُ �ذ ت أ ض ّ ف ت
� �د ��ل�ه�ا �م� ن� ال� �عرا �� ��سوا ه ،ولا �ي���ص�� ع�د ��م�ه�ا �ل� ا ���ه�ا ولا ب�ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل، ح��ت�ا ج إ� ��لي��ه �ي���ه ،ولا �ض �
�
ح �
ن ف �ة
و�هي� وا ج���ب� ا �ل�������ا ء.
153 153
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
152 Although it is true that atom-substances cannot inhere in each other, this is not sufficient
to make them opposites to each other. Assuming that a substance can only cease to exist by
being replaced with its opposite, the thinkers that Ḥillī is discussing here postulate annihi-
lation as something metaphysically real that is opposite to substances. Since it cannot be a
substance, annihilation must be an accident. It must be posterior to substances, since when
there is no substance, it would not make sense to speak of its annihilation either.
153 This dense argument is not entirely clear to me, but perhaps it can be reconstructed as fol-
lows. If annihilation could exist independently of atoms, or “that which has a position”, it
would have to be annihilated by its opposite, namely its own annihilation. If the creation of
atoms requires the non-existence of annihilation, this second-order annihilation would also
have to be first annihilated by a third-order annihilation, and so on ad infinitum.
154 This is Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʾAlī ibn Maʾjūr ibn al-Ikhshīd, a Baghdādī Muʾtazilite famous for
his learning, who died in 326/938.
155 Abū ʾAbdillāh Muḥammad ibn ʾUmar al-Ṣaymarī (d. 315/927) was a student of Abū ʾAlī
al-Jubbāʿī and an opponent of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʿī’s renovations to Muʾtazilism.
156 According to this second horn, individual instantiations of annihilation would be completely
isomorphic atoms. Ḥillī does not present a counterargument to this alternative, perhaps be-
cause he finds it self-evidently absurd: annihilation, which was introduced to have an oppo-
site to atoms, would then be an atom, and we have just learned that atoms are not opposites
of each other.
154 154
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
155 155
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Annihilation is not within our power, for otherwise we would have pow-
er over the other opposite, namely substance. The implication is preclud-
ed, for regardless of which substance is annihilated by its emergence, all
substances would be thereby annihilated, because it is abstract and sub-
stances are equal in terms of quiddity, and so they would be equal also in
relation to it.157
The third is composition. The first to assert composition as a ground that
subsists through two substrates was Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʾAllāf, and he was
followed by a group of Baṣrians, such as Abū ʾAlī, Abū Hāshim, and others.
The rest contradicted him due to the impossibility of an accident subsisting
through two substrates, just as it is impossible for a body to reside in two
places.
Those who assert it have argued by saying that some bodies are difficult
to disentangle, and this is no doubt due to a ground that necessitates that.
It does not subsist through either of the two substrates, because neither is
more appropriate for this, and so it must subsist through both substrates.
This is false, because the difficulty of disentangling goes back to the choos-
ing agent.
157 In other words, if we had the power to annihilate substance insofar as it is substance, we
would have the power to annihilate all substances, each of them being a substance insofar as
it is substance.
156 156
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
157 157
On Investigating The Classes of Existents
Abū Hāshim precluded its subsistence through more than two sub-
strates, for otherwise disentanglement would follow, if a single part were
added to them, because a composition is non-existing when its substrate is
non-existing, and conversely for existence. However, absence of existence
is not evidence of impossibility.158 Composition persists, otherwise it would
follow that disentanglement is either impossible or easy, for if God most
high wants to bring composition into existence one moment after another,
what He wants is more appropriate to exist, but otherwise its disentangle-
ment would be easy, and the difficulty vanishes entirely. Abū Hāshim has
said that composition is produced from adjacency, and because of this, it
takes place in accordance with it, for when two are adjacent horizontally,
composition between them takes place, and so it can exist both in what are
and what are not difficult to disentangle, given that its cause exists. Hence,
the aforementioned premises are denied.159
According to Abū Hāshim, pace Abū ʾAlī, composition is not perceiva-
ble by either touching or seeing, for otherwise we would perceive the dif-
ference between little and much of it. It is similar throughout and there is
neither opposition nor difference in terms of it, because all its individual in-
stantiations are equal in terms of its most proper attribute, namely its need
of two substrates in existence, and because the possibility of combining its
individual instantiations precludes their mutual opposition. The respect in
which combination is possible is that a single part can be composed with
six of its like.160 Composition does not have an opposite from without its
genus, for no accident can be deemed its opposite, except detachment,
but detachment is not its opposite, for otherwise the substrate of the two
would be one, and detachment would need two adjacent substrates, just
as its opposite does. The consequence is necessarily false, and likewise the
premise. Composition is within our power, because it takes place from us
according to intention and motive, albeit produced from adjacency, which
we have indirectly made, pace AbūʾAlī.
158 Abū Hāshim’s argument may be that if composition subsisted through more than two at-
oms, then the annihilation of one of the atoms would annihilate the composition, even if the
remaining atoms remained together. The only way to prevent this counterintuitive conse-
quence is to say that composition subsists in the minimum of two substrates. Ḥillī’s objection
states that even if composition were factually annihilated through the annihilation of one
atom in some cases, this does not demonstrate the impossibility, in other cases, of composi-
tion subsisting through the remaining atoms.
159 This last statement is puzzling and my translation is rather interpretative. I take Ḥillī to refer
to God’s willingness to create or not create composition: if composition follows by necessity,
when two atoms are adjacent, then these alternative contradictories are precluded.
160 The idea is that one atom can be connected to six other atoms, in each of the main directions:
up, down, left, right, front, and back from it.
158 158
ح ث� �ع ن �أ �ق� �ا � ال��م � تف �
��ي�ا ب�ل�� � ��س م �وج �
�ود ا ��
159 159
Observation IV
On the Characteristics of Existing Things*
* For the central concept of characteristic (ḥukm), see p. 138, n. 141 above.
المرصد الرابع
في أحكام الموجودات وفيه مقصدان
Aim 1: On Common Characteristics
1 If unity were not a secondary intelligible, or a concept without a really distinct extramental
referent, then each thing that is one would be one because unity is added to it. Supposing,
however, that the unity is itself one, it must also be one because of added unity, and so forth
ad infinitum.
2 That is, if a multiplicity is said to be one in the essential sense.
3 The species and genera form a Porphyrian tree, in which some genera are species to higher
genera. For this reason, we can say, for instance, that the genus ‘substance’ is further removed
from the species ‘horse’ than the genus ‘body’.
4 Implicit in the argument is that the three alternatives in the antecedent are exhaustive: there
is no other sense in which the two could conceivably become one.
162 162
األول :في األحكام العامة
المقصد ّ
ف
و�ي���ه �م��ط�ا �ل� ب�
�أ � ف � �
[ال��م ���ط��ل ب�] ا �ل�� �ّو�ل ��� :ا �ل� او �
�ح�د �و���م��ق�ا ب���ل�ه
ي
ت ّ ا � �ة ا � �ث �ة � � ٌّ � �م ّ � ن ا � �ة �أ �ع �فُ � ن َ ا � ق ا � �ث �ة
���ر �ع ن���د ��� لوح�د ر� ع���د ل�ع�����ل و ل ك ���ر �ضر ور ي� ل���م�ا ر ،ل ك ����صور لوح�د و ل ك
أ �أ �ت ّ �ة �خ���ا ل� ،ه�م�ا �م� ن ا �ل���م�ع��ق�� لا ت
كا ن� ت� � ا ��لث��ا ن�ي�� و�إلا �ل�ز �م ا �ل���س��ل��س�ل .و ث��ب� ت���ه���م�ا ال� وا ئ�ل .و�ل���م�ا � و ا �ي و �
�ل
ُ ّ �ةً � ض� ن ت � ّ�ة �أ ل ف � �ث �ةُ ذ �ة
��� �ل�ك ��لت�ق�� ّو��م�ه�ا �م ن����ه�ا .وا �لوا ح�د إ� �م�ا ���ر ك �� ي��� و ى�� ،ا ل ك كا �� ب�ا ل�عر �ض � � ل��ل�عر � � ا �لوح�د ع�ا ر �ض
ّ ن ُ ض �ذّ ت �أ
ح�ا ل ا �لر ب�ا � �ع ن���د ا �ل��س ف��ي�� ن����ة. �م�ا ي���ق���ا ل :ح�ا ل ا �ل���م�ل�ك �ع ن���د ا �ل���م�د ي�ن���ة ك
� � و ب�ا �ل�عر�� ،ك� ب�ا �ل� ا
�أ ّ ن ن ق ً ث أ
ف ن نق
ح�د ب��ه ولا ي������س���م ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ره؛ �إ� � ���ر و ج��� ا �ش��ت��را��ك�ه�ا ف�� �مري�ت�
� ل
ي ب ى �ةٍ
ك �
ل �
ع ا و �
���م� � ا
ك
� � وال� إ
� ل و
� ت� ف�� ا �ل
ح��ق����ق����ة
� ي
ح��ق����ق����ة ا ��لنّ� �عَ����ة � ،ن � ن ت ن � ّ�ةً ش ت
� ي و ي وإ� � ت� ف�� ا �ل �خ ّ�ةً ش ت كا ن� ت� ا �ل �كث �ة ش���
كا �� �وعي��� ا �����ر�ك� ي ���ر ����صي��� ا �����ر�ك� ي �
� ن ّ�ة تت ف ت ً ُ ً
� �قر ب�ا و�ب�ع�د ا. ا ��جل������سي��� و�����ا و
نَ ّ ف ّ �أ ن �ةَ ف ن ُ شّ
�� ن� ف����هو ا �لوا ح�د ب�ا � ن
�و� �ل�ه ل����� خ����ص� .إ� � �ل�م ي���ق����ب�ل ا �ل��ق����س���م� �بو�ج �هٍ �م�ا �إ� �م�ا � لا ي� ك و�إ� �ل�م ي� ك
�أ
� ن��ه �ش���ي� ئ�ً�ا �غ��ر �م ن��ق����س���م ،و�ه ن���ف����ُ ا �ل ح�د �ة ،و�ه و لى �ا ��س���م ا �ل ا ح�د �م� ن �ز ئ ف
� و ب و و س و ي �م������هو�م ا ��د ع��لى كو
ف� � ن ق �ة ن �ق ق �ةَ قُ ف �ذ نَ ف ن ق �أ
� ����هوا �ل���م��ف���ا ر� و�إلا ���هوا �ل�����ط� ،و�إ� ��ب�ل ا �ل������س���م� �� ن� ا و �ض �و�؛ �إ� � �ل�م ي� ك ا ��ل�بوا �ي� ،و ي� ك
ع
تّ ُ ضٌ ض ٌ �أ ن ق �ذ ت ّ ف ّ �أ ّ �أ ف
ح�ا د �
��� ا � ن ����هو خ���ط و��س��ط�� و ج���س���مإ� � ���ب�ل �ل� ا ��ه ،و�إلا �إ� �م�ا ع�ا ر�� �ل�ه و�م�عرو�� ،ولا ي����م ك
ح
�أ �أ ُ �أ ق � ن ف ت �غ ُ ن أ ّن
ح�ا د.كا �ا ��لا ا �
� الا ث�ن�ي�� ن� ل� ���ه���م�ا إ� � ع�د �م�ا وو�جِ �د ي��ر�ه�م�ا و ح�د �ه�م�ا و ب�����ي���ا ك�م�ا �
163 163
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
5 That is, if the ten units are not the substrate of tenness together, then each unit on its own is
a substrate of tenness, and one has become ten. Thus, we need a distinct accident to explain
the initial togetherness of the units – but then the same question concerns its inherence in the
units. The only conclusion is the one Ḥillī draws next.
6 Ḥillī brings together two objections here. First, the quiddity of the numbered things does not
determine the number in any way. If there are ten horses in the pasture, it would be equally
valid to count them as ten horses as to count them as two groups of five horses: neither spe-
cies of number is more appropriate. Second, it is generally true that no metaphysically real
quiddity can subsist through multiple substrates. Since any number subsists through multiple
units, number cannot be a metaphysically real quiddity.
7 Two similar things can only occur simultaneously if they occur in different places. Suppos-
ing, per impossibile, that they occur in the same place, the principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles would hold: since they are similar, we cannot appeal to any of their properties in
order to distinguish between them.
164 164
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
�ّ َ ن ضَر ور�ة و�ل������س� ت� �م�ا �هّ���ا ت���ه�ا م تٌ �أث��� ت� ال�أ ا ئ� ا �ل�ع�د دَ� � ،ذ �ه ن
�و���ه�ا�جرد ك ي ي ��
�ل� � ا
� ب � ا د و �د ع� م � ا
��� إ ول و �ب
ً ً ٌ �أ ً �أ ف� ُن أ ُ �أ
�و���ه�ا ع�د ا د ا �مر�م غ���اي�ر��ل�ه�ا ،و�ل��ي��س ع�د �م�ا �م��ط��قل���ا ولا ع�د ا دًا ،ب�ل �م�ا �هيّ���ا ت���ه�ا �
ح��ق���ا ئ� ق� ال� ش�����ي���ا ء ،ك
��م ُ ال أ �م ا �ل � د ّ�ة ن ن ف ُ � �ة � نّ � ت ّ ٌ �أ � ّ �م��ل � ة
� ب� �م ن����ه�ا .و�جم وع � ور و ج و ي� كا � ���ع�د �م ا لوح�د .ل��ك��ه م��ر�ك� كا ن� ت� ،ب�ل إ� � � ��� �
ي� ك
ً نُ
�و� ع�د �مي���ا. لاي� ك
ع��� ّ�ة م ً
ح�لا �ل��ل� ش ري� ح�د ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ره ��لي����صي��ر ��
�أ
ع���ر�ة � ن� �ل�م �ي�ع�ا ر ض�� ��ل�ه�ا �مٌر ي�ت� �ه خ���ط��أ ل�أ نّ� �أ � ا د ا �ل� ش
إ فر وو
ّ �أ ض ن ق ن � ثَ ف ّ
ح�� �ي� ا �ل�ع�ا ر�� ،ب�ل�هي� �مٌر ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ر �ي� وت���ق�� ّو�م�ه ح�ا ل و�إلا �������ل��ا ا �ل��ب�� ع���ر�ة ،و�هوم
� �ص�ا ا �ل ا ح�د � ش
رو
ّث أ
� � ال � �ة � ال ن� ا ا � �ت ن ت ق ّ � ا � � ّ�ة ل � ز ا ء ا � �ت � �ة أ ف ّ أ آ ّ
إ� ن����م�ا �هو�م� ن� ال� ح�ا د ل�ع�د م � ولو�ي ي� � وع و م� ���اع �����و م ل���م�ا هي��� ب�ا � �ج � ل���م� ك
���ر
ا �ل���م��ت��ب�ا ي�ن���ة.
�ن ف � �
ال��م ���ط��ل ب� ا ��ل��ث�ا ������ :ا �ل�ت��م�ا �ث��ل �و���م��ق�ا ب���ل�ه
ي ي
ّ ّ
�ص� ح�� ك ّ و�ج �ه ،ب� لابُ��د �م� ن �م�ا �ئ�ز �هو ا ��لت��عيّ�� ن� ،و�
حي��� ن� ئ���ذ ي�
� � �ث��ر لا �ُ�ع��ق��� �م ا �ل��ت��س�ا و�� �م� ن ا ��لت� �ك
ل � ل ي � ل ي لع
ن ّ ف خ ف ن ف ن ن ّ ّ آ ّ �أ
ف
كل و�ج �ه ����ه���م�ا ا �ل���م��ث�لا � ،و�إلا ��ا �ل���م�����ت��ل���ا �؛ �إ� � �خر �م�� � ا ��لت� غ���اي�ُر ،ف�إ� ن� ��س�د ح�د �ه�م�ا �م��س�د ال� �
ن �ة ف
���ه��ة وا ح�د ����ه���م�ا ا �ل���م��تق���ا ب�لا �. �� ن� ا ج���ت���م�ا ��ع�ه���م�ا ف�� �ش��� ء وا ح�د ف�� �ز �م�ا ن� وا ح�د �م� ن� ج� �ل�م ي����م ك
ي ي ي
أ ر�ة ن أ ئ � ق ق �ة� �د ا ن� ف�� ا �ل
ّ ف ن
ح����ي����� �ع ن���د ال� وا �ل وال� �ش���ا �ع إ� � �ل�م ي �� نُ� ا ج���ت���م�ا ��ع�ه���م�ا ����ه���م�ا �ض
وا �ل���م��ث�لا � لا �ي���م ك
�خ � ا �ل�ل ا �ز �م ا �ل�ع ا ض� � .ش
م����ا ي� � ش���ت�� ط ا �ل��ت� �ا ع�دّ � ،لا ل�أ ت���ف�� الا �م��ت���ا �ز �� ن��ه���م�ا ف� ا �ل��ذ ا ت�ّ��ا ت
ر
ي ب ي � ي� ي و و و و � و وإ ر ع ي ر �ب
ف ن ن ن ن أ ض ش �ت ت�ز �ة ّ �ز
ع��� ال� �لوا � و����م�� ا �
� �ت
ح���ص�ا را �ل��س�ب�� ب� �ي���ه.
ع ا �ل���م�ع�� �ل� ج�و وا ا ج�� ���م�ا ��ع�ه���م�ا لا ����� �د ا د ب�� �
165 165
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
If both contraries are positively existing things, they are relata, in case
they are understood as mutually concomitant and both of them are said in
comparison to the other, otherwise they are opposites. If only one of them
is positively existing, then they are a privation and a disposition, in case
they are specific to one subject, but if not, they are mutually exclusive.
One thing does not have more than one opposite, if we pose the condi-
tion of extreme disparity, but otherwise multiplicity is possible. One of the
two may be concomitant to a subject or it may not be such, either so that
the substrate cannot be devoid of both of them, like health and sickness,
or so that it can, like heat and coldness. The most strongly deviating con-
traries are negation and assertion, because the belief that something is not
black is contrasted with what is essential, and the belief that it is white is
contrasted with its not being white, which is accidental, and the contrast
with what is essential is stronger in terms of deviation than the contrast
with what is accidental. One and the same thing is not an opposite of two
different things. All opposites have an ultimate genus, and no two genera
are mutually opposed, based on induction.
Similarity, difference, and opposition are mere considerations that are
secondary intelligibles. The intellect produces them as intelligible things,
considering what is like them in terms of them, and there is no regress, for
it ends when the consideration ends.8 The ancient Muʾtazilites maintained
that two different things differ due to a ground, and likewise for two simi-
lar, opposite, and unlike things. This is an error, for otherwise regress will
occur.
8 That is, concepts do not give rise to vicious regress, even if they were in principle always ap-
plicable to themselves, because each factual application of concepts, no matter in how many
higher orders, will always be finite.
166 166
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
� � � ف � ّة � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ث�ا �ل ث��� :ي� ا �ل��ع��ل�� � اول�م��ع��ل�و�ل
ّ ً شّ ُ ّ ّ
ل���ي�ء �م�ع�لولا .و�هي� إ� �م�ا �ج� ز�ء ا �ل���م�ع�لول ا �ل�ع�ل��ة �م�ا ي���س��ت ن��د إ� ��لي���ه�ا و ج�ود �ش��� ء ،و�ي��س���مى �ذ �ل�ك ا �
ي
ن �ةٌ ن ق �ة ن ّ �ةٌ أ ٌ �أ
و �خ �ا ر�ج ��ة �ع ن���ه .وال� ّول �م�ا د إ� � و�ج �د ب���ه�ا ا �ل���م�ع�لول ب�ا �ل����و و�صور إ� � ��ا ر� و ج�ود �ه�ا
ّ ق
167 167
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
9 The concept of complete cause includes all the circumstantial conditions that are required
for a cause to produce its effect. Thus, if we endorse the aforementioned Aristotelian theory
of four kinds of cause, none of them can be a complete cause on its own – otherwise the
remaining three would be redundant.
10 For instance, the birth of a new human being requires a certain cause by virtue of its essence –
for the sake of argument, let us say that this is the emergence of an instantiation of the human
essence. This, however, is a generic cause that is the same in every individual. To explain the
emergence of this particular person, we need to include additional causes in the complete
cause, such as the genetic contribution of the parents, the nourishment of the mother during
pregnancy, and so forth.
11 The idea seems to be that a relation between the efficient cause and the recipient of its effi-
cacy does not allow the emergence of multiple things from a single cause. If the recipient
determines the efficacy of the single cause, and if the efficacy in turn brings the recipient into
being, the recipient will have determined itself.
12 If we suppose, per impossibile, that the series of worldly causes is infinite, then the series can-
not be caused by a worldly cause, for two reasons. First, it would not necessitate the series,
but only those members that it precedes in the series. Second, a search for causal ancestry for
the series as a whole would have to proceed without end along the infinite series.
13 This is an Avicennian argument; see, for instance, Ishārāt, namaṭ 4, 141-142.
168 168
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
169 169
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
What is caused cannot lag behind its complete cause, for otherwise one
moment would be preponderated for the occurrence instead of another.
If that were not due to a preponderating factor, then it would follow that
one of two contingent terms is preponderated over another without any
preponderating factor, which is false. Should that not be the case, then the
preponderating factor is included in being the cause, although it was sup-
posed to be complete in the beginning, and this is incoherent.14
There is no impossibility in attributing something simple with both
bringing into effect and receiving one and the same thing. Necessity is with
respect to bringing into effect and contingency with respect to reception,
and so there is no impossibility.15
Being a cause and being caused are attributes of mere consideration,
which can be appended to both concrete and mental things according to
one definition, and so there is no impossibility in attributing them to a pri-
vation of a disposition.16 When it comes to absolute privation, however,
that is not the case.
An intellectual cause can depend on a condition and be composite, even
if what is caused were simple.17 The final cause is a cause in terms of its
quiddity and caused in terms of its existence. The animal motive faculty
is triggered by desire, which is triggered by imagination or thinking. Had
the goal of desire not occurred, the motion would have been in vain. The
goal of a cause, which leads to what it causes always or for the most part, is
essential, otherwise it is coincidental.
14 This is an argument that Avicenna applied to prove the eternity of the world; see, for in-
stance, Ishārāt, namaṭ 5, 152.
15 Ḥillī’s formulation is puzzling. The idea that one thing can have the two modal properties of
necessity and contingency is an Avicennian commonplace: the created world is both neces-
sary (with respect to God’s creative act) and contingent (with respect to the world in itself,
considered in isolation from God). Reception and bringing into effect, however, are not sim-
ilarly attributable to the world, or indeed anything in it. By the same token, the two modal
properties are commonly taken to signal that the subject that has them is not simple. One
might think that the point concerns God, but attributing Him with receptivity, let alone con-
tingency, seems problematic.
16 In other words, since causality is a mind-dependent concept, there is no problem in conceiv-
ing of a cause for privative things, or things that can have no positive existence.
17 For example, a sculptor’s creative intention might include many motives from a passion of
self-expression to the need to sustain one’s offspring, yet it results in a sculpture that is simple
(in relative terms, anyway).
170 170
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
نَ أ ق ت ق �أ �خ��لّفُ ا �ل���م�ع�ل �ع� ن ع�ّ�لت��ه ا ��لتّ��ا �ّم��ة � ّلا �ل ك� ن ت ت
�و�ز � ولا ي�ج�
��ا � �ر ج���ي��ح ح�د ال� و��ا � ب�ا �لو�وع د و� إ و � ل و � �
ّ ّ آ ف ن �أ ّ
�خرلا �ل���مرج� و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ،و�إلا �� ن� ع��لى ال� � ح�ا � ح�د طر �ي� ا �ل���م���م ك كا ن� لا �ل���مر� �ل�ز �م ر�ج�� ن
ي��ره إ� � �
�غ
ح ح ج
�خ ٌ ف ّ ّ�ة ق ض أ ّ ت ًّ �ذ �خ فٌ �� ن
��ا � [ �ل�ه] �م�د �ل �ي� ا �ل�ع��لي�� و��د �فر�� ال� ول �ا �م�ا �ه� ا ��ل�. لك
� ن� ا �ل ج� � �م� ن ك � �د، ح ا ء � لا ا �م��ت ن���ا َ ف� ا �تّ���ص�ا �ف� ا �ل�����س����ط �ا �ل���م�ؤ�ث ّ��ة ا �ل��ق��� ل � ش
ل��
� ب و و و يو و �ب ي ب ري و �بو ي� ع ي� و
ف� ا �ت �ةَ ن ن� ُ
ح�ا �ل� . حي��� ث� ا �ل��ق����بول� ،ل ا ����س� ��� حي��� ث� ا �ل���م�ؤ�ثرّي��ة والإ� �م ك�
��ا � �م�� �
ّ
ح�ا �ُق ه�ا ا ل أ �م ا �ل�ع��� ن� ّ���ة
� � �� �
ل
� � ن ��
ك ��م� ا �ل�ع��ل�َ��ة ا �ل���م�ع�ل ��لّ���ة �م� ن ال�أ �ص�ا �ف� الا �ع��ت� �ا ّ��ة ا �ّ�لت
�
�ب ري ي� ي � إ � ب ور ي ي و ي و وي � و
ف قُ ُ ّ �أ ف ّ
ت َ ف �ذّ �ة
���ة ب���ه���م�ا� .م�ا ا �ل�ع�د �م ا �ل���م��ط�ل� ��لا. وا �ل� �هن��ي��� ع��لىح�د وا ح�د�� ،لا ا �م��ت ن���اع �م� ن� ا ����ص�ا �� ع�د �م ا �ل���م��ل �ك
���ه�ا � ن ن ا �ل���م�ع�ل �����س��طً�ا ،ا �ل غ���ا �ةُ ع�ّ�ة تّ ّ�ة ق ّ�ة � ت ُق ف
ول ب ي�� و ي� ل� كا � �و�ز �و���� ا �ل�ع�ل� ا �ل�ع������لي�� ع��لى �ش��رط و�ر�كب � وإ� � و ي�ج
ت ّ
�خ ّ� ن ّ�ة ت ن ث ن ش ق ن ث ن � ���ة ا �ل ب����م�ا �هي��ت����ه�ا �م�ع�لو�ل��ة ب�و ج�ود �ه�ا ،وا �ل��ق�� ّو�ة ا �ل���م��ح
� ّرك
ح��يوا �ي�� ��ب��ع�� �ع�� ���و� �م����ب�ع�� �ع�� � ي���ل
ُ ّ ئ ً �أ �أ ث ًّ ّ � �غ �ة � ش ق ف ت �أ ف
���ري�ا ح ة �ة
��� ب�ا ط�ل� ،وا �ل��س�ب�� ب� ا �ل���م�ؤ د �ي� إ� لى �م��س�ب� ب��ه د ا ����م�ا و ك ل���و� ��ا �ل�رك ح���ص�ل �ا ي� ا � .ف�� ن� �ل�م� �ك �
و ر إ
ّ ق ّ ّ �غ �ذ
�ا ي�ت��ه ا ت�يّ���ة و�إلا ا ت���ف���ا �ي����ة.
171 171
Aim 2: On Specific Characteristics
18 Note that the paradigmatic concept of substance at issue here is the theologians’ concept of
atom.
19 For this shape, see Dhanani 1994, 135.
20 Ḍirār ibn ʾAmr (d. ca 200/815) was an independent early theologian associated with the early
Muʾtazilites.
21 Abū ʾAmr Ḥafṣ al-Fard (d. early third/mid-ninth cent.) was a student of Ḍirār ibn ʾAmr.
22 Accidents, by definition, belong to a body. If a body were composed of accidents, then the
accidents would belong to themselves.
172 172
الخاصة
ّ المقصد ال َثاني :في األحكام
�أ ٌ ف ف
و�ي���ه ����صول [ ر ب��ع��ة]
173 173
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
23 This is the Aristotelian definition of place adopted by Avicenna; see Shifāʿ: al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʾī
II.9.1, 201.
24 For this definition of place, see Dhanani 1994, 70-71.
25 Note that the concept of absolute space (ḥayyiz, muḥādhāt) and the relational concept of
place (makān) are contrasted here. Ḥillī is saying that corporeal substances entail space but
not place, because place depends on a relation to other bodies. If all bodies were in a place,
every body would have to have a surrounding body (or bodies), ad infinitum.
26 This resembles the Baṣrians’ third argument for the void, as discussed in Dhanani 1994, 84-85.
We should think of, say, a deflated bladder, which is compressed so that its two sides are in
contact. Then one pulls apart the two sides. This should be impossible, unless there is void
between the separated sides.
27 Here we are dealing with a different argument, and the wa-illā in the beginning of the argu-
ment should be interpreted not to refer to the previous sentence, but to the general debate:
were there no void, the following difficulties would also follow. The argument here resembles
the Baṣrians’ first argument, as discussed in Dhanani 1994, 81-83. If the world were a plenum,
how could things move from one place to another? If the thing in the place of destination of
a moving thing does not budge, the two things will interpenetrate, which is impossible. If it
moves to the place of the first, the slightest movement will put the entire universe in motion.
28 See III.2. The implication is that the phenomena of rarefication and condensation are due to
less or more atoms, respectively, gathering in a certain magnitude of empty space.
174 174
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
175 175
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
Most of the ancients opted for the second alternative and al-Kaʾbī main-
tained it as well, because place comes in degrees and therefore is quantity
or something that has quantity, and because matter is finite and therefore
shaped. If the shape were essential, the part and the whole would be equal.
If that is not the case, a recipient is necessary, and so a body has been estab-
lished. Furthermore, it would follow that motion with an obstacle would
be like motion without it, although quickness is in what is equivalent with
thin and slowness in what is equivalent with its opposite. Hence, if we sup-
pose unrestrained motion through a determined interval to take place in
a certain time, with an obstacle it will take place in a longer time, let us
suppose twice as long. Then let us suppose something thinner than the first
in relation to the difference of the two times, so that the movement would
take place in the time of a void.29
The measure is mental for a merely supposed body.30 The shape is con-
flicted by the simple globe.31 The error is in making the time to be because
of the obstacle. Instead, motion has a measure of time by virtue of its es-
sence and another measure with respect to the obstacle, so that in the case
of that which has an obstacle, the two are combined. Since they differ by
what is added with respect to the obstacle, they are never equal.
(e) Substance has no opposite, because subject is denied of it. He who
posits species forms faces the consequence that opposition is possible for
them.32 Substance is that which is intended by pointing at it, for pointing
depends on the individuation of what is pointed at, and the individuation
of accidents follows the individuation of their substrate.
29 Cf. the argument in III.3.6. The idea here is that the differences in motion are only explicable
by means of differences in resistance by the matter through which it takes place. Supposing a
zero degree of resistance, as in the void, leads to an absurd conclusion.
30 That is, the initial ground of the plenum theorists, namely that place has a magnitude, is de-
pendent on the mind’s application of an imaginary measure to it, not a real feature of the
world.
31 This argument against the plenum theory is not entirely clear, but perhaps Ḥillī is saying
that this claim contradicts the plenum theorists’ own view that the entirety of the material
universe has a spherical shape. In this sense, matter would be spherically shaped by essence.
The fact that it can also be otherwise shaped only points out the inconsistency of the plenum
theory.
32 The target of critique here is hylomorphism.
176 176
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
� ّ ل أ ّن � �ت ن �ة ف
� ك �ًّ �أ �ذك ا ��لثّ �ن �ق ا � ّ ��لت ق ّ ه ف� ن �ث��ُ الا ا ئ
�أ
ي� ه ��
� ، �
��
ي ه � ا�
�� �م ا
�ه ��
� � و ، م � ا و ا
��م � �
ك
يو �� ، ر �د��� �
بي� ع�ك
��
� ل ل ا
� �ه
� و �
لى ي ب ا
�� �
ل �
ع � و ر ك و
ّ ُ ش �ة ف� ن ن ش �ذ ت ًّ ت ّ
���س���م؛ �� ّ و� لا و ج�� ب� ا �ل��ق���ا ب� ف���ث �ب�� ت� ا ��جل � �ل� ز � � كا � ا �ل��� ك� � �م��� ك�
ل ��ل ا ي��ا ���س�ا وى ا �ج �ء وا ل كل إ ��ل� .إ� � �
ق�ة � ط�ؤ ف
� �ل ا � ا ���ة ��د ن��ه ،ف�� نّ ا �ل�� ع��ة ف� �م��ق �
ح�
ل ���ة �م ا �ل�ع�ا ئ� ق ل
�
ح� ا ل أ نّ ل�ز �أ ن ن
�و� ر ع � ر ب و إ � سر ي� ب ر و ب ي�
��� �
� ل �ه
ل�� ا
��� ك ا
ك
� ك و� ��ه ي�� �م � ي� ك
ئق ف ف�ة ّ ن �ة �خ �ة ت ق ف �ز ن ق ت ن �ل� ة ف ف ق �ة ّ
��� �ي� �م��س�ا �� �م�عي����� �ا ��لي�� �����ع �ي� �م�ا � و���ع�� �مع ا �ل�ع�ا �� �ي� �� ���ا ا حرك� �د �ه�ا�� .لو�فر �ض �م�����ا ب��ل� �ض
� ف �ث ّ ن ض� �أ قّ ن أ ّ ن �ة ت ف ت �ز ن ن ف� �ت ّ ف �أ ث
�رك �ي� � �ع��� ،م �����فر � ر� �م�� ال� ول ب������س��ب� ������ا و� ا �ل �م�ا �ي��� ي��� ��ح � �ه ا ل���ض ���ر ،و��لن���فر �ض ك
�خ�لا. �ز �م�ا ن� ا �ل
�
�ة غ ف� � � ض� ُ�ن�ت ق ض ُ ا � شّ �ُ � � �ة ّ ُ �ذ ّ
�ر ا �ل��ب����سي����ط� ،وا �ل����ل��ط ي� ج���ع�ل ��ل ب�ا ل كوا ��لت�ق���د ر �ه ن�� ��جل ��س���م م����فرو � .وي ������� ل��� ك
ي
ق�ة آ ن ٌ ق �ذ ق
�خر، �ت �ز
��� �ل� ا ���ه�ا ��د ر �م� ن� ا �ل �م�ا � ،وب�ا �ع� ��ب�ا ر ا �ل���م�ع�ا و�� � � ت ة
�رك ا �ل�ز �م�ا ن� ب���س�ب�� ب� ا �ل���م�ع�ا و�� ،ب�ل �ل��ل��ح
�ة
ن �أ ً ق ف �ق�ة ت ف ت ف �ذ تُ ف
� �ي� ا �ل�ز ا ئ��د ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا را �ل���م�ع�ا و���ة ��لا ي���ت��س�ا وي�ا �) �ص�لا. (�����س��ي�� ج����م��ع�ه���م�ا ا � ا �ل���م�ع�ا و � وي�����ا و
� ��ز �
ن ّ�ة �ز ت
�ه م � ل� �
��ع � � �
�ل ا ص � ا � �ع ن���ه� .م� ن �أث��� ت ّ
� �د �ل�ه لا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ا �ل���مو �ض �و�هرلا �ض
ا �ل ُ
�ج وي �
ور و ي ي �ل�� � و � �ب ع و �ه� -ج
� � ُ �ه ا �ل���م��ق�����ص د � ��ل��ه �ا ل� �ش���ا �ة ��لت� ُق���ف���ه�ا ع��ل �ت ش����� خّ���� ا �ل� ش ف
� �د ي��ة ����
��م����ا ر إ� ��لي��ه، ص و إي ب إ ر و � ى ي�ه�ا .وا ��جلو هر و ا �ل���ض
ّ ٌ ّ أ
و�ت ش����� خ���� ال� �عرا ض��ت�ا ب� �ل��ت ش����� خ���� م
�
ح���ل�ه�ا. ص ع ص
177 177
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
33 The four attributes that an atom has on its own are existence, non-existence, spatiality, and
being in a certain space, each of which Ḥillī briefly explains in what follows.
178 178
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
179 179
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(h) Substances come to be, pace the ancients, because they are not devoid
of [things] that come to be, and whatever is not devoid of things that come to
be necessarily comes to be itself. As regards the minor premise, it is because
they are necessarily not devoid of motion and rest, for if they remain in their
places, they are at rest, otherwise they are moving, there being no mean be-
tween the two contraries, both of which come to be, because the quiddity
of both requires the precedence of something else, whereas nothing that is
eternal is like that. Moreover, if any individual motion or rest were eternal,
it would never not exist, but the consequent is false by virtue of sensation,
the admission of opposition, and the contingency of the category of posi-
tion.34 If the species of motion, or the whole of its individual instantiations,
were eternal, the individual would be eternal, because a species cannot exist
detached from the individuals, and because if no motion exists in eternity,
then the whole has come to be, otherwise it would be eternal, although no
individual motion can be eternal.35 Furthermore, because every particular
has come to be, it is preceded by pre-eternal non-existence, for which there
is no beginning. Hence, the whole of non-existences is pre-eternal. If some
motion existed together with them, it would be equal to both the preceded
and the preceding, for otherwise the whole would have come to be. Hence,
things that have come to be cannot extend infinitely.
If motions were infinite on the side of the past, then the existence of
today would depend on the passing of what is infinite, which is absurd. If
we suppose a whole from now to pre-eternity and another whole from the
flood to pre-eternity, and then juxtapose one to the other, then if they are
equal, what is more will be equal to what is less. That is necessarily false,
but otherwise that which is less will have ended, and so both of them will
have ended.36
34 We perceive that most, if not all, motions and rests have a limited temporal duration. Moreo-
ver, motion and rest are opposites, and nothing in the essence of either rules out the possibil-
ity of its counterpart. Thus, they cannot be eternal by essence. Finally, the philosophers, who
endorse the eternity of the world, and thereby of motion, have held that the celestial spheres’
revolution, which is motion in the category of position, is eternal. However, since everything
in the category of position is contingent, celestial motion is such as well, and in a theological
analysis, contingency just means that the thing has begun and has the possibility of ceasing.
35 This is an uncharitable, and it seems to me unsuccessful, argument against the philosophical
doctrine of the eternity of the world. As far as I can see, there is no argument for why a series
of revolutions of celestial spheres cannot be eternal, even if each individual revolution had a
beginning and end in time. When it comes to the whole, the philosopher would say that the
infinite cannot be adequately conceived as an ordered actual whole.
36 The first one is an ancient argument derived from Philoponus, cf. Davidson 1969. The second
one resembles Avicenna’s “mapping” argument against the infinite spatial extension of the
world; see McGinnis 2010.
180 180
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
ك ّ �م�ا لا ي�
�خ ح اد ث �خ�لو�ع� ن ا �
ل �
ت ث�ة �خ ا ف�ً � �أ ا ئ ل أ ّن -ا ��جل
��لو ل � و ،� � و� � ال ا
�ه��
� �وا �هر ح�ا د � � ،ل �ا ل�ل و �ل؛ � ح
ح� ة ا � ّ ن ت ّ
ن �أ ف ّ ّ �أ �ة ّ ض ّ ف
�و� �خ�لو�ع� ن� ا �ل�رك�� و ل��س ك � ب�ا �ل����ر ور .و �م�ا ا �ل���ص��غر�ى ��ل ���ه�ا لا �
� � ���ه ح�ا د ث
حوا د � و
� ث �ع� ن ا �ل
�
ن �ةَ ٌ�ّ ة ف ّ ن
ح���ا �ز �ه�ا ن� ت ��س�ا �ك �ة �أ ف ق ت ن ّ
ن أ �ة ّ ض
��� ولا وا ��س��ط� ب�ي��� ��� و�إلا ����هي� �م��ت��حرك كا � � ب�ا �ل����ر ور ؛ ل� ���ه�ا إ� � ب�����ي���� �ي� �ي
قّ ث ن أ نّ ّ�ة ّ ّ
كل �م ن����ه���م�ا ي�����س��ت�د�عي� ا �ل���م����س��بو�ي����ة ب�ا �ل غ��ي��ر ،ولا �ش��ي� ء كلا �ه�م�ا ح�ا د �ا � ،ل� � �م�ا �هي��� � � ي�� ن� ،و � ا ��لن�ق��ي�����ض
ن ً ُ ح� ة ا � شّ خ� ّ�ة ا � ّ ن أ نّ ّ � ن �ق � ذ
كا � �أ�ز ��ليّ��ا �ل���م�ا ع�د �م،�و� �لو � كل وا ح�د �م� ن� ا �ل�رك�� ل����� ����صي��� و ل��س ك ��� �ل�ك؛ ول� � � م�� ا ل�����د ي مك
ح�� ّ �ت��س�ل����� ا �لخ ٌ
� .
�� � ن
��ا � �م��ق��و�ل��ة ا �لو �ض �����ص���م وإ م ك م ي و وا ��لتّ��ا ل� ب�ا ط� ب�ا �ل
�
ع س ل ي
ف ن ً ق ّ ن �أ �أ ً ق ن ح ة ُ ن
ل����� خ����ص ��د ي����م�ا ،لا �م��ت ن���اع و ج�ود �وع �م ن�����ك كا � ا � ش ��موع �فرا د �ه�ا � كا � ��د ����م�ا �جم
ي و و�وع ا �ل�رك
��� �لو �
ثٌ ّ ن ق ً ف� أ�ز �ش ٌ ن �ل ة ف ّ أّ �ع� ن ش���خ
كا � ��د ي����م�ا. ��لح�ا د � و�إلا � ��� �� ،ا �ل ك� حرك ����ص ،ول� ن��ه إ� ن� �ل�م �يو�ج �د � ال� ل ��� ء �م�� ا � �
ي ي
�أ ّ َ �أ�ز ّ ق ف ث ّ ئ ز ة أ نّ ّ ّ خ ش ُ ق
�� ن ��د �م ���
كل�ج�� �ي� ح�ا د � ����هو�م����س��بو� ب��ع�د �ٍم لا ول �ل�ه لي�، ��� ول� � � �رك ����ص �م�ا �ل��ل��ح ولا ي����م ك�
ق ّ
� ي���س�ا و�ي� ا �ل���م����س��بو� وا �ل��س�ا ب� ق�، كا ت � ،ف�إ� ن� و�ج �د �م��ع�ه�ا �ش��� ء �م� ن� ا �ل� ت �أ�ز ّ
� ف�
حر � ي �م�� ج����موع ا ل�ع�د �م�ا � لي
أّ ّ ّ ن ّ ً
كا ن� ت� � �لو � كا تحر � � إ� لى �م�ا لا ن���ه�ا ي��ة �ل�ه .ول� ن� ا �ل� ح اد ث
�و�� نُ ت�را م� ا �ل
� ك ��م ��
ي ��لح�ا د ث�ا ،ف��لا كا � ا �ل ك� و�إلا �
ي
ُ
� �ا ء �م�ا لا ي���ت ن��ا �هى ،و�هو م ّق ف ض ف �غ َ
ح�ا ل. � ي��ر �م��ت ن���ا �هي����ة �ي� �ج �ا ن� ب� ا �ل���م�ا ��ي� ��لت�و���� و ج�ود ا ��ل�يو�م ع��لى ا ن���ق�����ض
ُ
�ة �أ � � �ث ّ أ�ز ف ن �ز ن �ةٌ أ�ز آن أّ
�� ن���ا �م� ن� ال� � إ� لى ال� ل �ج �م�ل� ،و�م� ن� �م�ا � ا �ل��طو��ا � إ� لى ال� ل �ج �م�ل� �خرى ،م ول� ن�ا �لو�فر �ض
ّ �ة ٌ ّق ّ ت ف نت أ
�خر�ى� ،إ� � ���س�ا وي�ا ���س�ا و�ى ا �ل�ز ا ئ��د وا ��لن��ا ����ص ،و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور ، �أط��بق�� ن���ا إ� ح�د ا �ه�م�ا ب�ا ل� �
ّق ف ّ
و�إلا ا ن���ق������ط�ع� ت� ا ��لن��ا ����ص��ة ��ا ن���ق������ط�ع��ت�ا �م�ع�ا.
181 181
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
The ancients have argued by saying that for everything, which inevitably
produces an effect, if it is eternal, eternity of the effect follows, for other-
wise a regress would follow. The first implication is precluded,37 whereas
the second is contradicted by what comes to be anew today.38 When it has
been established that substances come to be, it has been established that
what depends on them, namely bodies, come to be, because bodies are
composed of them and because evidence concerning bodies leads to them
and accidents.
(i) Substance is not within our power, neither directly, because interpen-
etration is impossible, nor as production, if there is a unity of substrate.39 If,
however, there is a distinction of substrates, that through which the act is
carried out is a tendency, and it does not produce a substance. Otherwise,
if we pressed on a receptacle for a time, we would bring substances to exist
in them, as we do when we blow in them.
The ancients have another method in this topic, namely that the agent
is the form, because the recipient is not an agent. The form, however, only
acts by sharing position, and it is because of this that fire burns what it en-
counters, and then, by means of what it encountered, it burns something
that encounters what it encountered. The agent in the composite is simul-
taneously active in a part of it, and there is no sharing of position between
matter and form.
37 If the unhindered first cause is a voluntary agent, it does not entail an eternal effect.
38 The fact that new things are created by an eternal God at every moment shows that this en-
tails no impossible regress.
39 We cannot create substances directly, because the created substance would have to come
into being in our own substrate, which entails interpenetration of substances. For the same
reason, if the atom is to be created in our own substrate, we cannot produce them by using
our substrate as an instrument either.
182 182
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
183 183
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(j) We have already shown the falsity of matter.40 Those who claim that
it is established preclude its separation from form, for otherwise either it
would come to be in every place once it is attributed with form, and it
would follow that a body comes to be in more than one place, which is nec-
essarily false, or it would come to be in some places, and preponderance
without a preponderating factor would follow.41 This is incomplete, be-
cause it only provides evidence for the impossibility of attributing form to
what is separate. It is contradicted by the particulars of one element. They
also preclude the form’s separation from matter, for otherwise it would be
a point or such that its divisibility is precluded by the transformation of the
First.42 Hence, division through matter follows.
184 184
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
ّ �ة ّ ف ن ت ّ َ ّ
�جرد �ه�ا �ع� ن� ا �ل���صور ،و�إلا �إ� � ��� -ق�د ب�ي� نّ��ا ب���ط�لا ن� ا �ل���م�ا د �ة .وا �ل��ق���ا ئ��لو ن� ب���ث�بوت���ه�ا �م ن���عوا �م� ن� �
ي
ن ث ف �أ ن ّ ف ف ّ
ت َ
��ا � وا ح�د ،و�هو ���ر �م� ن� �م ك� ���س���م �ي� ك ح���صول ا ��جل ��ا � �ل�ز �م� كل �م ك� ح���ص�ل� ت� ب��ع�د ا ����ص�ا ����ه�ا ب���ه�ا �ي� � �
ّ
�غ ّ
ح ،و�هو ي��رت�ا �م �ل�د لا ��لت��ه ع��ىل ع��� ال�أ �م��كن���ة �ل�ز �م ا �لت�� ّ ����� ُ �م� ن �غ�� �م � ض ّ �ة �أ ف� ض
ر ج يح � ير جر ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل����ر ور ؛ و ي� ب�� �
� ا �ل�ع ن����� ا �ل ا ح�د� .م ن���ع ا �م� ن ت� ّ
�جرد �ص �ة�ُ .ن�ت�ق�� ض��� � ز ئ�ّ��ا ت ّ �ة ّ
�
ل�� ا
� د � ��م����
ل ا �
�ت ن تّ �ف
ا �م� ���ا ا ����ص�ا
� و و و صر ي � ب
�ج ي � و ر و ب �جر ع
ّ أ �ة ُ ق ن ن ً ّ
�ة �أ ً�ة ق ن ّ �ة ّ
ح�ا �ل� ال� ول وا ����س��ت�ل�ز ا �م كا ن� ت� �������ط� وح�ا �ل� إ� � ا �������س���م� ت� و�ي���م��ت ن�� ا ����س��ت��� ا �ل���صور �ع ن����ه�ا ،و�إلا �
ع
ّ �ة
الا ن���ق����س�ا �م ا �ل���م�ا د .
� ّ �ا �ن ف �أ � � �أ �
ا � ف�ل����ص�ل ا �ل��ث ��� � ��� :ك�
ح��ا �ما �ل� �ج����س�ا م� ي ي
ش �ً
ح��ث�ا: و�ه� [إ� ح�د �ى �ع���ر] ب�
ي
� ن��ه�ا ط ���ة �ةّ ف ت ّظ ّ
ن ً
ف �خ �ة ث أ ف �أ
�ل��� -ال� ج���س�ا �م �م��ت���م�ا ��ل� �لا ��ا �ل��ل�����ا �م؛ لا �ش����را��ك�ه�ا �ي� ا �ل���م�ا �هي��� ،و�هي� كو � ويل�
ق ئ �أ �أ �أ ّ
�ت
�وا �هر ا �ل��ق���ا ب��ل��ة �ل�ل ب��ع�ا د ا �ل���م��تق���ا ��ط�ع��ة ع��لى �ز وا ي�ا �وا �م ،ولا �ش��� ب��ا ��ه�ه�ا � ��ة �ع�مي��ق����ة ،و ن���ه�ا ا ��جل
�عر�ي���ض
أ
ح��سً�ا �ع ن���د ا ت���ف���ا �ق��ه�ا ف� ال� �ع ا ض� ���� .ت ن� ع��ل � ش �ّ
��مي�� وع��ل ا �ل��ت��س�ا و�� ف�� ا �ل
ح��ق��ي��ق����ة �ع ن���د
� م����ا �ه�د �ة ا �ج�ل
و � ر � �
ي ي ى ع ى �
ي �بي ي
ف� �ل ّ
ح��س. ا �ل��ت��س�ا و�� � ا �
ي ي
ً ن ث َ
��م����ا �ه�د �ا ���ا �ه ا �ل� ش ّن �أ ّ ّ ض ّ
ظ ّن ً
ف �خ �ة
� -ال� ���س�ا �م �ا ���� �لا ��ا �ل��ل�����ا �م� ،ل��ل�ع��ل ا �ل���� � � � ا �ل� شق أ
��م����ا �ه�د ي و م ر ور ي� ب ب ي ج ب
ف �ت �أ ً
ّولا ،والإ� ع�د ا �م�م��س� ن��د إ� لى ا �ل�����ا ع�ل.
ّ �أ ن ُ ن �أ ظ ُ �أ ّ ً ّ تّ �خ ٌ
ع�����م �م� ن� ح�د �ه�م�ا، ح�ا ل �خ �لا ف��ا �ل��لنّ� ظ����ا �م� ،ل��ل�ع��ل ا �ل�ض���ر ور �� ب� � ب��ع�د�ي� � ج -ا ��ل��د ا � م
� ل
ي م �
�زن ف� ّ
وا �م��ت ن���ا ا ج�� ���م�ا ج���س���مي��� ي� حي�� وا ح�د.
�ت
ع ع
185 185
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(d) Bodies can be devoid of all accidents apart from the mode of being,
pace the Ashʾarites, because air is like that. The analogy of colour with be-
ing is not comprehensive, and the analogy of what is before it to what is
after it is rejected in the foundation.43
(e) Bodies are seen by means of light and colour, and this is necessary.
(f ) Bodies are finite, pace the wise of India, for otherwise we could sup-
pose two lines, like two sides of a triangle, that extend infinitely, but then
the distance between them would do the same, and what is infinite would
be confined between two limits, which is necessarily false. Furthermore,
if a sphere is supposed such that its diameter is equivalent with an infinite
line, then when it moves in position, the diameter is transferred from the
equivalent position to the other side, and a point comes to be that is the
first point on the other side. That is not possible in the case of the infinite,
yet it is due to valid correspondence.44
(g) We have already shown that the world has come to be anew and does
not have to be eternal, pace the ancients and the Karrāmites, because its
quiddity allows non-existence, for otherwise it would be eternal and nec-
essary due to its essence, and it could not be traced back to a necessitating
factor. Non-existence, however, can be traced back to an agent.
43 As Ḥillī reports at slightly greater length in the Nihāyat al-marām III.1.4.3, II.590-591, the
Ashʾarites argue that bodies necessarily have colour by virtue of the analogy of colour with
kawn, which is uncontroversially necessary for bodies. Like here, Ḥillī flatly denies that the
analogy is comprehensive, which amounts to saying that it is invalid. The point about the
states before and after is related to a further argument by the Ashʾarites, namely that once
an atom or a body has a certain attribute, such as colour, the colour can only cease to exist
by being replaced by an opposite attribute from the same genus, in our example, another
colour. Hence, the argument goes, in this qualified sense at least, a body cannot be devoid of
some colour. Ḥillī objects by saying that first of all, the argument does not entail that initially
uncoloured bodies must have colour, and secondly, the qualification is unacceptable once the
possibility of body’s lacking colour is asserted in a foundational sense (fī l-aṣl) – a coloured
body can cease to have colour by the absolute annihilation of colour from it.
44 This resembles an argument against the infinitude of the body of the world presented in
Suhrawardī, Talwīḥāt II.1.1.3, 106, where it is somewhat clearer. Suppose a sphere with an
infinite diameter that rotates 180 degrees, or any number of degrees for that matter. If we
consider any point on the diameter within a finite length from the centre of the sphere, it is
obvious that the motion traverses a finite interval and can conceivably do so in a finite time.
However, if consider another point on the diameter, this time infinitely far from the centre,
we realise that that point must have traversed an infinite distance at that same, finite time.
This is absurd, and since the principles we are applying are perfectly valid for finite spheres
and diameters, the absurdity must be due to the assumption of the infinitude of the circle.
186 186
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
187 187
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(h) A body is either simple, that is, such that there is no composition
from potencies and natures in it, and its parts are similar to each other
in terms of completeness of quiddity, or it is composite, that is, such that
there is composition from potencies and natures in it, and its parts are not
similar to each other.
The simple body is either celestial or elemental. All in all, the celestial
spheres are nine, based on their not being receptive to tearing and rejoin-
ing, and so this is denied.45 The encompassing sphere is finite in terms of
directions, because the directions of up and down are different by nature,
and it is not possible that a direction be privative, because there is no dis-
tinction between what is privative. Moreover, a direction is the objective
for what is moving, that to which pointing pertains, and indivisible, for
otherwise, if that which arrives at a midpoint in a certain direction were
aiming beyond it in that direction, that would not be the same direction,
and were that not the case, the midpoint would be the direction. A dis-
tinction in terms of an equidistance or by means of two bodies distinct in
position is not possible, because each one is defined by its proximity to the
encompassing sphere without that distance. Hence, it is inevitable that the
proximity is defined by the surface of the encompassing sphere and the
distance by their centres. Deprivations of disposition may be distinguished
by means of their respective dispositions, for a body aims in its motion
towards whiteness, which does not exist, as well as to something to which
pointing pertains, such as certain spaces, distances, and their endpoints.
One of two distances is different from the other by its specific determina-
tion and its position. This suffices for distinguishing the directions. More-
over, both are ends of the distance deemed between the centre and the
circumference, and a distance results when distances are cut.
(i) They have said: The celestial sphere is simple, for otherwise it would
be composite and it could come apart. The limiting sphere cannot come
apart, for otherwise it would have a direction and be preceded by it.
Hence, its motion is circular because its parts are equally related to things
extraneous to it. Motion is possible for it and it has a circular inclination
but no straight one, because the two inclinations are contraries. Hence, it
is neither thin nor thick, it does not allow tearing apart or rejoining, it is
neither hot nor cold and neither moist nor dry. Instead, it is a fifth nature,
different from the natures of the elements.
45 The matter of the celestial spheres cannot be torn apart (kharq) or their parts rejoined (il-
tiyām). For the same reason, they cannot be penetrated (kharq), which makes space travel
impossible.
188 188
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
189 189
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
These principles are false, first, because because even if admitted, they
only apply to the limiting sphere. Second, because they are conflicted by
eight spheres, since it is possible for every sphere to touch another equally
on its concave side and its convex side. Third, because possibility of mo-
tion does not entail necessity of inclination, for otherwise the preparedness
would have been complete, which is denied. Fourth, because if inclinations
were not combined, the two motions from a weak and a powerful mover
would be equal.46 Fifth, why can two inclinations not exist in two moments
in two states? For instance, inclination comes to exist in a moving thing
when it departs from its place, and ceases to exist when it arrives at its place.
We have told the remaining objections in the book Nihāyat al-marām.47
(j) The simple elements are four. There is earth, which is in the middle,
with the centre of the world as its centre, and it has two qualities, an active
one, namely coldness, and a passive one, namely dryness. It is surrounded
by water, with the exception of one populated region that is revealed from
water due to the wisdom of birthing animals. It has two qualities, an active
one, namely coldness, and a passive one, namely moistness. Air surrounds
water and has two qualities, an active one, namely heat, and a passive one,
namely moistness, in the sense of being receptive to figures, not in the
sense of humidity. Fire surrounds air and has two qualities, an active one,
namely heat, and a passive one, namely dryness.
They are receptive to generation and corruption, because fire becomes
air when it is extinguished, and conversely when it is blown into, air be-
comes water when it is cooled down, like the drops of water that conform
on the side of a vessel that contains ice, and conversely when it is heated, and
earth becomes water, like what the fellows of the elixir do, and conversely.
Indeed, much of the water in springs sediments into hard rocks. From these
elements are composed mineral, vegetative, and animal composites.
(k) When the elements are mixed, the purity of each quality is destroyed.
Fire does not remain in the purity of its heat, nor does water in the purity
of its coldness, air in the purity of its subtlety, or earth in the purity of its
dryness, but an intermediate quality between these qualities comes to be
in accordance with their ratio, and it is the mixture.
46 Combination of inclinations is ruled out by the argument for the circular motion of the en-
compassing sphere (“it has a circular inclination but no straight one, because the two inclina-
tions are contraries”). The counterargument here is that if that were true, a strong force that
moves a body in a circle and a weak force that moves it forward would remain distinct and
with equal effect on the body. This is because in order for the strong force to overpower the
weak one, they must first be combined.
47 Nihāyat al-marām III.243-246.
190 190
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
191 191
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
There is a problem here, for if that which destroys and that which is de-
stroyed are joined in action, then the one conquered conquers in the state
of being dominated, which is absurd. If the act of either one were prior, the
conquered one would conquer after its destruction, which is absurd.
They answer by saying that what acts is the form and what is acted upon
is the quality, but this can be set in doubt by saying that the form only
acts by means of the quality. Moreover, it is conflicted by hot water that is
mixed with cold.
48 One could argue that the receptive cause is the substrate. However, Ḥillī’s point is, I believe,
that insofar as only the resulting composite as a whole is a substrate for actual knowledge, it
is indivisible. If it is divided, knowledge dissolves and there is no substrate for it either.
192 192
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
193 193
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
49 In the philosophers’ theory, the first emanated thing must in turn be capable of further ema-
nation – that is, of functioning as an efficient cause in turn. Since matter is incapable of this,
emanation stops at it, and so it cannot be the first emanated thing.
50 These are two conceptions of God as creator. According to the philosophers, He creates ne-
cessitated by His own essence, and creation should be understood as the necessitation (ījāb)
of the existence of the created things. The theologians, by contrast, maintain that creation is
a voluntary choice (ikhtiyār) by God.
194 194
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
195 195
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(c) Those who posit the soul differ concerning whether it is one in spe-
cies or not. Some of them opt for the first alternative, because souls coin-
cide in definition, but this is weak, since defining goes back to conception.51
Others opt for the second, because souls differ in terms of wit, mercy, and
their opposites, but difference in terms of attributes does not entail differ-
ence in terms of quiddity.
(d) Speaking of the soul, we say that it comes to be. Most ancients opt
for this, because bodies necessarily come to be, and if the soul had preced-
ed them, it would have been either one or many, but both alternatives are
false. As regards the first, this is because if the soul remained one after the
connection, human individuals would be one individual, which is nec-
essarily false, and if it became many, it would have been a body, because
what is divisible is a body. As regards the second, this is because it cannot
be multiplied through essential or concomitant properties, since they are
united in the species, but not through accidents either, because the deter-
mination of some particulars of a species, to the exclusion of others, by
accidents is only because of matter, and the matter of soul is the body, and
so there is no matter before it.52
(e) Transmigration is false. According to us, this is evident due to the
soul’s coming to be, once we have established this. According to most of
the ancients, this is because what comes to be ends at a general and eternal
principle of emanation, and coming to be is only by means of preparedness
in the recipient. The recipient of soul is the body, and the body’s coming to
be necessitates the emanation of a soul connected to it. Hence, if another
soul were transferred to it, then two souls would be combined in one body,
which is absurd.53
51 This is a radical conceptualist point: since all definitions concern merely our concepts, and
not the real essences of things, no reliable inferences concerning things in themselves can be
drawn from them.
52 Cf. Avicenna’s argument for the soul’s coming to be in time in Shifāʿ: Nafs V.3, 223-225.
53 This is Avicenna’s argument against transmigration; cf. Najāt II.6, 227.
196 196
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
أ ّ تف ق ف �ة ن �أ ف ض خ �ت ف �ث ت ن ف ف �أ ّن
ج� -ا �� ��ل� �م� �ب��وا ��ل�����س �ي� ���ه�ا وا ح�د ب�ا ��ل�وع ولا��� ،ب�ع������ه���مع��لى ال� ول لا ������ا ����ه�ا �ي�
ث ن خ �ت ف ف ٌ ٌ ّ
ض ت ّ
ح�د ي��د را ج��ع إ� لى ا ��ل����صور؛ و�ب�ع������ه���مع��لى ا ��ل��ا �ي� لا �� �لا ����ه�ا �ي� � �عي�� ف� إ� �ذ ا �ل��ت��� ح�د؛ و�هو �ض
ف ّ ف �ذّ
� ا خ���ت�لا �� ا �ل���م�ا �هيّ����ة. �ص ف���ا ت � �د �ه�م�ا ،ولا ي��ل�ز �م�م� ن� ا خ���ت�لا �ِ� ا �ل�� كا ء وا �لرح�م��ة و �ض ا �ل� �
ٌ ّ �ة أ نَّ أ ن �أ ث أ �ةٌ ف نق
���رال� وا ئ�ل ،ل� � ال� ب��د ا � ح�ا د ث��ة ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور ، د -ا ��لن� ف����س إ� � ���لن��ا ب���ه�ا ����هي� ح�ا د ث� .وع��لي��ه ك
ن �أ ّ أ ّ ُ ف �أ ّن ن ن ��ا ن� ت � �ّم�ا ا ح�د �ةً �أ �كث �ةً ق ق �ةً ف��ل � ن ت
��ي��ر ،وا �ل������س���م�ا � ب�ا ط�لا �� .م�ا ال� ول ��ل ���ه�اإ� � و كا �� ��س�ا ب������ ع��لي���ه�ا �ل ك� �إ و و
ٌ ّ �ة ش �ة شّ أ ّت ّ
ل����� خ����ص ،و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور ؛ �خ�ا �ص ا �ل��ب���ري� ب�ا � � ال� ش���
� ح�د ت ب���ق��ي��� ت� وا ح�د �ة ب��ع�د ا ��لت��ع�ل ق� ا �
�
ّ �أ ن ّ
�ث�� �ه�ا �ا �ل��ذ ا ت�ّ��ا ت � ���س���مّ� .م�ا ا ��لث�ّ�ا �ن ف��لا �م��ت ن���ا ت �
ل كا ن� ت ���س���ًم�ا � �ذ ا �ل���م ن��ق �ث�� ت ت
� ع ر ب ي ك � ي� و و �جا �هم ���
س �� �� ج إ � � � و�إ� � �ك ر
تّ ّ
� ا
�ع� � � � ا ��لن ع��� � ز ئ�ّ��ا ت ح�ا د �ه�ا ف� ا ��لنّ� � ،ا �ل�ع ا ض� ل�أ نّ ا خ�ت���� ص�ا �صَ �� ض �
� وا �ل�لوا �ز �م لا
وع ب ر ضٍ� ب � �ج � ي ي� وع وب و ر � � �
ّ �ة ن ف ّ �ةُ ّ ّ �ة نَ �غ ّ
د و� ي��ره إ� ن����م�ا �هو ب���س�ب�� ب� ا �ل���م�ا د ،و�م�ا د ا ��لن� ف����س ا ��لب��د ���� ،ق����ب�ل�ه لا �م�ا د .
�أ ّ ن �أ ث � ا ��لن� ف���� � ن� �أث����ت ن ح�د ث � ا � �ت ن ��س�خ ٌ �أ �ّ � ن ن ف� ظ � ٌ
ر ���
ك �د] �� ع� [ ا
�م � و ا. �ه� ا
��� س إ �ب ل
�
�ه -ل� ���ا ب�ا ط�ل .م�ا ع���د �ا ����ا هر و
،
ح�د ث � نّ�� م�ا �ه � ا � ط��ة �أ �أ ّ أ
� و� إ �� و بو �س�� � ي�ن�ت���ه � لى �م��ب�د ق��د ي�مع�ا � ّم ا �ل��ف��ي�� ض��� ،وا �ل ح�ا د ث ال� وا ئ� ف��ل ن� ا �ل
�
� ي� إ ل
ف ق ق ّ َ
ح�د ث��ه � �� ُ ف������ض ن ن ف ف
ن � نف ق ق
� �ا � �������س �م��ت�ع��ل����ةٍ ب��ه؛ ��لوا ن�ت����ل� ت� ا ����س� �ع�د ا د ا �ل�����ا ب�ل ،و��ا ب�ل ا ��ل�����س ا ��لب��د � � و يو ج ب� ي
�ت
ٌ ن ف ٌ �أ
�خر�ى ا ج���ت���م ن���ف����س�ا ن� ع��ل ب��د ن� وا ح�د ،و�هوم
ح�ا ل. �
ى ع
� إ� ��لي��ه �������س
197 197
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(f ) According to the ancients, the soul is not annihilated with the annihi-
lation of the body. Were that not the case, the possibility of non-existence
would need a substrate, and that is not the soul, because nothing can be
the substrate for the possibility of its own non-existence, for what receives
and what is received must be combined. Hence, there would inevitably
be something else, namely matter, and so the soul would be material and
therefore a body. We deny that possibility needs a substrate, but even if we
did concede that, receiving would be an attribute of the recipient and so it
would not inhere in another, for otherwise it would follow that possibility
is denied in an absolute sense. The soul’s being material does not entail its
being a body, especially since according to you, it would be classified under
the genus of substance, and so it would have a differentia and be composite.
(g) The soul perceives universals by itself, but when it comes to par-
ticulars, the ancients have precluded that, except by means of corporeal
faculties. If we imagine a square with two squares as its wings, then inev-
itably something has made them distinct. This is not through essential or
concomitant properties, because they are equal in terms of species, nor
is it through accidents, and the distinguishing factor is not external, since
the squares were supposed to be mental. Hence, the difference of the two
substrates must be mental, and so we reject the restriction.54
(h) The ancients have asserted internal sensitive faculties, which are five.55
There is the common sense, which is a faculty appointed in the front of
the first ventricle of the brain. All senses convey what they have perceived
to it, in order for it to judge that what has this colour is what has this fla-
vour. Were it not for the unity of the faculty, this judgment would not be
possible. Yet this is false, because the judgment belongs to the soul with
respect to the senses, and it tackles the particular by means of a judgment
concerning the universal.
There is the imagery, which is a storehouse of the common sense. It re-
tains but does not perceive, due to a difference between what retains and
what receives, like water for instance.56 But this is not universally neces-
sary. Besides, retention inevitably involves reception, and so one faculty
will be attributed with both.
54 That is, the restriction of the soul to perceiving only universals. The argument is derived from
Avicenna, Shifāʿ: Nafs IV.3, 188-189. However, Avicenna uses it to argue for the corporeality of
the faculty of imagination that enables us to conceive of the two squares on the sides of the
central one as distinct.
55 The following classification is, again, derived from Avicenna; cf. Shifāʿ: Nafs I.5, 43-45.
56 Being fluid, water is highly receptive to new spatial forms, but for the same reason, it cannot
retain them. In this regard, it is contrary to earth.
198 198
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
199 199
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
57 That is, the imagination’s acts of analysis and synthesis require some kind of knowledge of the
objects with which it operates.
58 Ḥillī argues that the hostility, which he takes to be intelligible, and the individual object, to
which it is related, must be part of one cognitive act. One cognitive act, in turn, entails one
subject of cognition, and this rules out the kind of co-operation proposed here between the
soul and the estimation. Such a counterargument is a rather uncharitable reconstruction of
Avicenna, who insists on the unity of cognition despite the distinctions between faculties
(see Shifāʿ: Nafs V.7, 252-257).
200 200
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
201 201
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
There is a problem, namely that what needs the replacement is not the
compound of what ceases and what persists, because it does not exist after
that which ceases has ceased, nor is it that which ceases alone, the com-
pound of what persists and what follows, or just that which follows. If it
were any of these, then it would be that which persists, but it is equal to
that which follows and it cannot be in need of that. Besides, the income of
food necessitates rupture, which necessitates pain. When it comes to that
which persists, it is inevitable that something persists in it, but it is neither
form nor matter, because the body is constantly coming apart and it is not
the case that some of it especially deserves to persist. Hence, growth is
being brought to be anew.
When it comes to the formative faculty, it is necessary to judge that the
different formations and the extraordinary organs are traced back to a vol-
untary agent, not to a potency that has no sensation or perception.
(j) Angels, jinn, and devils are subtle bodies that are capable of different
formations. The ancients asserted as angels the celestial souls that are sep-
arate. The earliest Muʾtazilites denied the jinn, because if they were subtle,
they could not dominate over any acts, whereas if they were coarse, we
would have to observe them. It is feasible that they are subtle in the sense
of transparency.
59 Muʾammar ibn ʾAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830) was a leading representative of early Baṣrian
Muʾtazilism.
60 Qualified specification (al-ikhtiṣāṣ al-nāʾit) refers to the connection holding between an at-
tribute and its subject.
202 202
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
�ز ق أ ّ �غ ُ � م َ ّ �أ ّ
��ل ب� ن� ا �ل���م���
��موع ا �ل�ز ا ئ�ل وا ��لب��ا �ي� ،ل� ن��ه ي��ر�مو ج�ود ب��ع�د وا ل ح��ت�ا ج� إ� لى ا ��لب��د ل ل��ي��س�ج و� ش��� ك�
ي
ف� � �ق ن آت � � �ق آ ت ئ ّ ّ
كا �م �ا �لب��ا ي� ،و�هو ا �ل�ز ا ئ�ل ،ولا ا �ل�ز ا �ل وح�د ه ،ولا �جم�موع ا �لب��ا ي� وال� �ي� ،ولا ال� �ي�؛ ب�ل إ� � �
ّ �ة غ �ذ ت أن ّ
�م��س�ا و �ل�ل� �ت� ،ف��لا �ي���ص�� ا �
آ
ح��تي���ا �ج �ه إ� ��لي��ه ،ول� � �م�د ا �خ �ل� ا �ل��� ا ء� ،و ج�� ب� ا ��لت���فر�يق� ا �ل���مو ج�� ب� ح ٍ ي
�ة � ّ �ة أ ن � ن ئ ً �ف ف
� �ش� ق ن ّ ُ ا ف
� ق� � ّ �أ �أ
ي� ا�
م ���
� ا د � �د
� ب�ل ا � � ل ؛ د ا
�م��� ل ا ال ص� ل��
ي� ي و ي س ور و� ا �� ���
ل �ه�� ء � ء ا�����
� �ل�ل �ل�م .و ب ي� ب � ب
�م � �د � ل � ا
�� �ل ا ا
�م�
ً ا � �ت � ّ � ا ��ل ض �أ ل � ن ا ��ل �ق ف ن
�و� ا �لن�����مو إ� ح�د اث�ا. ل� ��ح�ل�ل ،ول��ي��س ب��ع���� و ى م�� ب��ا ي�� ،ي�� ك
أ ّ ف ّ �أ ّ
�ة
� �ا ء ا �ل��غري�ب�� إ� لى �خ��ت�� فل����ة وال� �ع���ض ��م ��لا ت �م��ة ب�ا ��س��ت ن��ا د ا �ل��ت ش��� ك� و �م�ا ا �ل���م���ص ّور�ة ��ا �ل�ض���ر ور�ة ح�ا ك�
َ ق �ة
�خ��ت�ا ر ،لا إ� لى �و ل ��ل�ه�ا ولا إ� د را ك. ف��ا ع� م
�
اح ل
�ة ف خ ��لا ت ّ �ت ٌ
�ة ق ٌ�ة ف ٌ �أ ّ ة
� ا �ل���م�����ت��ل��� . ل�����ي���ا طي�� ن� ج���س�ا �م �ل��طي����� ��ا د ر ع��لى ا �ل� ش��� ك� �� ن ا � ش
��� وا ��جل � و �ي� -ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك
� ّ ا �ه ا � ا ئ � ة �أن � �أ ا ئ ا � ت�ز ��ة ا �ل أ ّن �أث�� ت ال أ ا ئ ا ��لن� ف�� �� ا �ل��ف����ل��كّ���ة
�� نّ� ،ل� ���ه�ا �ج �
ل ��
ع ���م � ل �
و رو ل �ك � . ���
ك � ل �
م �
��ل �
ي �جر تٍ ي� د م و ��ب � � و �ل و س
�أ ن ن ن ن ت �ث ً أف � ن ا ن� ت �ل��ط�� ف����ةً �ل ت� ك ق �ةً ش
�ي�� ف����ة و ج�� ب� � � ش����ا �ه�د �ه�ا. كا �� �ك� �� ن� ��ا د ر ع��لى���ي� ء �م� ن� ال� ���ع�ا ل ،و�إ� � ك � ي �م إ� �
ن ت ن � ف �ةً ن � ش ف َ �أ ُ
ل��� ف���ا �يّ����ة. �و� ل��طي����� ب����م�ع�ى ا ح��ت���م�ل � � ك و�
�ي
ف �أ � � أ � �
ح��ا �ما �ل�� ���عرا ��ض�
ا � �ل��ف��ص�لا �ل ار ��� � ��� :ك�
بع ي
�أ
�: �
حو�ه� ر ب��ع��ةُ�م��ب�ا �
ثٍ ي
�ت ّ ن أ نّ ّ�ة ت ش خّ أ ّ أ
��لي���؛ ل� � ع�ل� ����������ص�ه ا �ل��ف� -ال� �عرا ض�� لا �ي���ص�� ع��لي���ه�ا الا ن�ت�ق���ا ل �ع ن���د ال� وا ئ�ل وا �ل���م� ك�
ح
ح�ّ ف����ه؛ ا �ل� م� ا �ز �م��ة ّ ّ ّ ّ
� ل ي و �� ل
ف
ح� ��لا ي� � � ا خ
م���������ص�ه �ع� ن��ا ن� �م����س��ت غ��ن����ً�ا ����م �د ه � ش� � ل � �
ل �
�م �
��ل � و �جي و ب ك ل ا ا ل���م��ح�ل ،و�إ
ٌ
�م���م ن��وع��ة.
ّ �ذ ّ ن �� ن ق����ا �ُم ا �ل� ض� ����م��ث�ل�ه �ع ن���د ا �ل���م��ت ك�ّ ن �خ فً �أ ئ
��لي��� �لا ��ا �ل�ل وا �ل و�م�ع���مر ،إ� لا ب��د �م�� ب� -لا ي����م ك� ي عر � ب
ّ ّ ٌ ّ
���ة وا �ل��سرع��ة. حرك �وا �ز ا �ش��ت��را ط ا �ل���م��تو��س��ط �
كا �ل� ح� .و�هو�م���م ن��و ��جل
ل �و�هر ف����هوا �ل���م��� الا ن�ت���ه�ا ء � لى ا ��جل
إ
ع
ّ
وا �ل���مرا د �م� ن� ا �ل��ق��ي���ا �م �ه ن���ا الا خ�ت�����ص�ا �ص ا ��لن��ا �ع� ت�.
203 203
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(c) Some accidents can persist, pace the Ashʾarites. Abū al-Ḥusayn in-
sists that that is necessary, for we know necessarily that black persists in
tar and white in cotton, just as we know that the body observed at two
moments persists, and since they were possible in the first moment, for
otherwise they would not have existed, they are such in the second as well,
for otherwise it would follow that something is transferred from essential
possibility to essential impossibility.
We have objected to this in the Nihāya by saying that the possibility of
persisting is different from the possibility of existence in an absolute sense.61
The second can be established without the first, and it does not follow that
what is possible becomes impossible.
They argue by saying that persistence is an accident and therefore does
not subsist through an accident, as well as by saying that the subsistence of
an accident would entail the impossibility of its non-existence, because it
would not cease to exist by virtue of its essence, otherwise it would have be-
come impossible, nor would it cease due to the emergence of an opposite,
for the non-existence of the first is a condition for the emergence of the op-
posite, and if it were caused by that, there would be a circle. The persistence
would not cease to exist by virtue of a voluntary agent either, because to
make something not exist is to deny an effect, not to bring anything to exist-
ence, and if at that denial nothing comes to be, there is no effect whatsoever
for the agent, whereas if something does come to be, it will be something
positively existing, and this is to bring into existence, not to make some-
thing not exist. Nor would the persistence cease due to the annihilation of
a condition, because the condition for the persistence of an accident is the
substance, and it does persist. The discussion concerning its non-existence
is like the discussion concerning the non-existence of the accident.
We deny that persistence is an accident, but an accident can subsist
through its like, and its non-existence can be traced back to its essence in
a third moment, just as they have granted about the second moment. We
deny that the annihilation of what precedes is a condition for emergence,
but making something not exist can be traced back to an agent, and that
which is brought forth does not have to anything positively existing. The
denial of existence is an effect, just as bringing to be is an effect. We deny
that the condition is restricted to the substance. Instead, what persists can
be conditioned by accidents that do not persist. When they are no longer
brought into existence, what persisted ceases to exist.
204 204
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
205 205
On The Characteristics of Existing Things
(d) An accident cannot inhere in two substrates, pace Abū Hāshim con-
cerning composition, and some of the ancients concerning coincidental re-
lations, for otherwise a body could inhere in two places. The refutation by
means of the impossibility of two bodies, unlike two accidents, inhering in
one place is false, because the impossibility here is due to having volume,
which is denied of the accident.
It is said that the inherence of an accident in two places – in the sense
that what inheres in a substrate is identical to what inheres in another – is
false, for otherwise the accident would be independent of each substrate
by virtue of the other one, and so what inheres independently of each one
would be in need of both. However, in the sense that it inheres in a com-
pound of two things, which by being combined become one substrate for
it, this is possible, like in the case of the tenness that subsists through the
units when they are brought together, subsisting through them as one. The
discussion concerning unity is like the discussion concerning the tenness.
206 206
ح��ا � ال��م � ت ف أ
� م �وج �
�ود ا �� ��� � � ك�
ي
ح�لّ�� ن �خ � ا ف�ً�ا ل�أ � �ه�ا �ش����� ف� ا ��لت���أ ��ل� ف ��ل�� ض �� ن ح�لول �عر ض�� وا ح�د ف�� م
� ع��
م ي� ي � و ب � بي� � ي� ل ي د -لا ي����م ك�
���س���م ف�� �م ك� ��ا �ز ح�لول ا ��جل
ّ
� ا �ل���م��تّ ف����ق����ة ،و� لا ��جل � �ا ف��ا ت أ ئ ف
��ا ن�ي�� ن� .وا ��لن�ق�� ض���� ب�ا �م��ت ن���ا ي إ �ض � �
ال� وا �ل ي� إ
ال
ع
نّ �ت ن ن أ ن ٌ
ح���� مّ����ة
� ي��� ب�ا ط�ل ،ل� � الا �م� ���اع �ه���ا ك �ل��ل��� ج �� ي �خ�لا �� ا �ل�عر �ض
� ف ��ا ن� وا ح�د ب� ���س���مي�� ن� ف�� �م ك� ح�لول ا ��جل
ي
ض
ا �ل���م ن�� ف��يّ����ة �ع� ن� ا �ل�عر��.
ٌ ّ ّ آ ن �أ نّ � ّ ف ّ ُ ض ف ّ
�خر -ب�ا ط�ل ،و�إلا ح�ل�هو ب��عي�� ن���ه ح�ا ل ف�� � � ح�ا ل �� م
� �خ�لي�� ن� -ب����م�ع� � ا ل
� ى
�قي��� ح�لول �عر�� �� م
� ل
ي ي ي
�غ ً ن ف آ
ن ن ن
كل وا ح�د �م����ه���م�ا ح�ا ل � ���ا ه �ع���ه؛ وب����م�ع�ى
ن ح��ت�ا �ج �ا إ� لى �
�و� م
� ��ل �م ن����ه���م�ا �ع� ن� ال� �
�خر�ي�� ك لا ����س��ت غ�� ن�ى ب� ك�
آ نٌ ش ّ ً م ًّ ح�ل �ل�ه ف� �جم
ع���ري��ة ا �ل��ق���ا ئ����م��ة ب�ا ل� ح�ا د كا �ل� ح�لا وا ح�د ا �ل�ه �م���م ك
��� � ��مو �ش���ي� ئ�ي�� ن� �ص�ا را ب�ا ج���ت���م�ا ��ع�ه���م�ا �
و ي� ع
ّ ��لا �م ف� ا �ل� ش �ة � ف � ن ّ ق
ع���ري��ة. كا �ل ك� ي� ��لا �م �ي� ا �لوح�د � �� ���م� ت� و��ا �م� ت� ب���ه�ا وح�د ه .وا �ل ك ل���م�ا ا ����ض
207 207
Observation V: On Establishing the Most
High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
المرصد الخامس في
إثبات واجب الوجود تعالى وصفاته وفي مقاصد
Aim 1: On Establishing the Most
High Necessary Existent
He is proven by means of either contingency or coming to be, and with re-
gard to either the essence or the attributes, and so there are four divisions.
(a) The world is contingent by virtue of its change and multiplicity, and
it will be concluded that what is necessary is one and persisting. Every con-
tingent thing inevitably has a producer, and if that ends at what is neces-
sary, then it is what was sought for, but if not, then there is a regress or a
circle, and both are false due to the foregoing.1
(b) Bodies are equal in terms of corporeality, as has been mentioned,
and so the specification of each of them by its accident, which subsists
through it, is something contingent, and it no doubt has a producer.2
(c) Bodies have come to be, according to the foregoing, and so it is in-
evitable that they necessarily have something that has brought them to be.
This is the method of the Friend, peace be upon him.3 If that which brings
into being is eternal and necessary, then it is what was sought for, but if not,
there is regress.4
(d) Semen is transformed into a blood clot and then an embryo, then
into flesh, bone, and blood, and it is inevitable that it has a producer. This is
not the man himself, nor can it possibly be his parents, and so there is inev-
itably a wise producer. It is impossible to trace these extraordinary effects
to the procreative faculty, for it has neither awareness nor choice, so that
only one thing emerges from it, and its figure is spherical.
The first method is the most powerful of them, and just as it provides
evidence for asserting the Maker, it proves His necessity, unlike the other
methods, for they need the first for proving necessity.
1 This is a very concise account of Avicenna proof for God’s existence; see, for instance, Ishārāt,
namaṭ 4, 141-142.
2 This is the classical kalām proof for God’s existence, reportedly introduced by Abū al-Hud-
hayl. For a concise historical account, see Davidson 1987, 134-143.
3 In Q 74:82, Abraham rejects a star, the Sun, and the Moon as worthy objects of worship on
the grounds that they rise and set, which entails temporal finitude.
4 This comes close to the kalām cosmological argument popularised by Craig 1979.
210 210
األول :في إثبات واجب الوجود تعالى
[المقصد] ّ
ث ّ ف �ذّ ت �أ ّ ف ت ف �أ ق �أ �أ ّ
��� ،ل�ل ���س�ا �م ر ب��ع��ة: ح�د و� ،إ� �م�ا �ي� ا �ل� ا � وا �ل���ص���ا ��ا ن� وا �ل
� و�����س��ت�د ل ع��لي��ه إ� �م�ا ب�ا لإ� �م ك�
ي
ّ � نف ّ ٌ ّن �أ ت �أ ث ّ َ ف
ن
��� ��لا ب��د �م�� كل م���م ك ���رت��ه ،و����سي��� �ي� � ا �لوا ج�� ب� وا ح�د ب�ا � و � �� نٌ� ��لت� غ��ي��ره وكا �ل��� -ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م�م���م ك
قٍ
ّ ن �أ ّ ت ف ثّ ف ن
�م�ؤ �ر� ،إ� � ا ن�ت���هى إ� لى ا �لوا ج�� ب� ��ا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� ،و�إلا ���س��ل��س�ل ود ا ر؛ و�ه�م�ا ب�ا ط�لا � ب����م�ا ت���ق���د �م.
ِ
ّ ُ خ ف �ةّ ف �ة �ت أ
� �ه كل وا ح ٍ�د �م ن����ه�ا ب��عر �ض ���س���مي��� ع��لى �م�ا �م ّر�� ،ا �ت�����ص�ا �ص � ب� -ال� ج���س�ا �م �م���س�ا و � �� ا ��جل
ي ي
ثّ ف ّ ئ �أ
�� نٌ� ��لا ب��د �ل�ه �م� ن� �م�ؤ �ر. ا �ل��ق���ا �م ب��ه �مٌر�م���م ك
ُ ّ ّ أ
���ق����ة
طر � ه � ب�ا �ل�ض��ّ�ر ور�ة ،و� ح�د ث
ِ
ج -ال� ج���س�ا �م ح�ا د ث��ة ع��ل �م�ا ت���ق���د �م ،ف��لا ب��د ��ل�ه�ا �م� ن م
� �
ي ي ى �
ّ ت ف ً ً ق ن ن ف
كا � ��د �ي���م�ا وا ج���ب�ا ��ا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� ،و�إلا ���س��ل��س�ل. ح�د � إ� � � ث �خ��لي��لع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م�� .ا �ل���م��� �ا �ل
ثّ ق �ةً ث ّ غ �ةً ث ّ �لً ظ ً ً ف ّ ّ
�ه ����ل ، ن �ؤ
��م�ا و�ع�����م�ا ود �م�ا؛ ��لا ب��د �ل�ه �م�� �م ِ�ر و ي س و
� � ��� �مح د -ا ��لن���ط��ف����ة ت�ن�ق���ل� ب� ع��ل��� �م�م���ض
���� �� .م��ت ن�� ُ ا ��س��ت ن��ا د �ه��ذ ه الآثا ا �ل�� ����ة ثّ
� � �� م �� ك ح � ال� �ن��س�ا ن� لا �أ � ا ه �ا �ل�ض��ّ� �ة ،ف��لا � ّ�د �م� ن �م�ؤ
ر غري ب ب � ِر ي وي ع و بو ب ر ور إ
نُ ن ش ٌ ٌ � ل ا � ق ّ �ة ا � � �ة ف ن ل �ش َ � ل ا خ �ت َ ف � ن ّ
�و� ��ا � �ي���ص�د ر �ع����ه�ا ���ي� ء وا ح�د و�ي ك إ ى ل����و ل���مول�د � ،إ� ��ه ا ���عور �ل�ه�ا وا �� ي���ا ر � ،ك
�� ا � � �ة
�ر . �ش�� ك�ل�ه ل ك
ُ ف ُّ
�خ ا �ف �ق
ا
� � ل ��� �ه،� � �
ل �
ع ل
ن ّ
�د� � ا�ص�ل��� ا ��م�ا ��د ّل ع��ل � ث���ا ت �ك �ه ا �ل�� � ق ال�أ ّ ل �أ �ق ا �ه�ا �� ،ن
�
ب ي� ب ج
ى و وب عي ىإ ب و طري� و و إ ي
أ ف ق ف
ا �ل��طر� لا ���تق���ا ر �ه�ا �ي� ا �ل�د لا �ل��ة ع��لى ا �لو ج�و ب� إ� لى ال� ّول.
211 211
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
212 212
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
�أ نّ ث ت � � ٌ ن � �ة أ نّ ن � ً ض ّ �ة ف� ن ن ً
كا � وا ج���ب�اي�ه� ،ل� � �ه���ا �مو ج ود ا ب�ا �ل����ر ور ،إ� � � وا ع��ل � ��بو� ا �لوا ج � ب� قري� ب� �م�� ا �لب��د ��
م
ّ نٌ ّ ُ أ ف نً ف� ن ت ّ
�ة ن
���لا ب��د �ل�ه �م�� ع�ل� . �ة ن �
��م�ا .إ� � ���س��ل��س�ل �م�� ج����مو ال� �مورا �ل���م���م��ك�� �م���م ك كا � �م� ك��
ن
� ا ف��ا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� ،و� ل
ع إ
ن ً ّ ّ ّ ّ ف
�� ن� �م��ط�ل ق� ا �ل�ع�ل��ة ،ب�ل لا ب��د �م� ن� ع�ل��ة ت�ا �م��ة �ي���صي��ر �م��ع�ه�ا وا ج���ب�ا ،وب��د و���ه�ا ��ف��� �ي� و ج�ود ا �ل���م���م ك ل �ك
وا ي ي
ن �ةً ف ن �ةً أ ّن � ُ �أ ن ت ن ن ً ف ّ ّ
كا ن� ت� �م���م��ك�� �إ� � �و� وا ج���ب� ،ل� ���ه�ا �لو � � ي�ج�� ب� � � ك ��م�ا ت�م���م��ت ن���ع�ا�� .ا �ل�ع�ل��ة ا ��لت��ا �م��ة �ل���م�� ج����مو ا �ل���م� ك��
ع
ن �ةً ف� ن ن ت ّ�ةً ّ
ن أ ً �ةّ ت ن ن ت ّ�ةًت ّ �ةً ّ
كا �� ع�ل� كا ن� ت� �م���م��ك�� .إ� � � كا ن� ت� ع�ل� ل� ���ه�ا �لو � ��م�ا � � ��ل وا ح�د �م� ن� ا �ل���م� ك�� كا �� ع�ل� �ا �م� �ل ك� �
ّ
ن ن ت �ةً ن ّن أ ً ّ ن ت �ةً ّ
كا �� ع�ل� � ،و�إ� � كا ن� ت� ع�ل��ة ��لن� ف�����س�ه�ا ل� ���ه�ا �م� ن��ج �م�ل��ة ا �ل���م� ك��
��م�ا ت �� ��م�ا ت
��ل وا ح�د �م� ن� ا �ل���م� ك�� �ا �م� �ل ك�
كا ن� ت� � ز ءًا �م� ن ا �ل�ع�لّ��ة ا ��لت��ا �ّم��ة �ل���م������م ا �ل���م� نك�� ت ��م�ا ت د ن �� ض ن ت�ا �ّم��ةً ��ل�� ض
��م�ا � ،و�هي� ع و ج � � �ج � � ع��� ب � و � ع���� ا �ل���م� ك�� ب
ّ تق ً نف ّ ُ
� ن� ا � ش ُ ن ٌ
��ع�� ن���ه�ا ع�ل��ة �ل���م������م ا �ل���م� ك�� ت ف �ز ّ
ل���ي�ء �ج� ز�ء ا �م� ن� �������س�ه ،و�ل���م�ا ������د �م �م� ن� إ� ب���ط�ا ل ��م�ا �� ،ي���ل �م كو ج وع بي�
ا �ل��ت��س��ل��س�ل وا �ل�د ور.
213 213
Aim 2: On His Attributes, High Is He
5 If God were one who necessitates, that is, if creation were necessitated by God’s essence (see
p. 192, n. 50 above), and if He is eternal, then since He alone is the complete cause of the
world, the world would always have emerged from Him. The world could have come to be
from nothing only if God, as its complete cause, had come to be in time, but this is nothing
short of outright blasphemy.
214 214
المقصد الثاني :في صفاته تعالى
وفيه فصالن
� �أ ّ �� �ف ا �� ّ ��ف�ا ت � ثّ ت ّ �ة �
[ا � �ل��ف��ص�ل] ا �ل� �ول�:ي� ل�
�ص� � ا �ل ب� �� �و���ي�
وفيه مطالب
� �أ ّ � ف �أ ّ ت � � �
�ود [ال��م ��ط��ل ب�] ا �ل� �و�ل�� :ي� ���ن�ه ���ع�ا �ل�ى �م�وج��
�� ن � ض ّ �ة أ نّ � ا ��� ا �ل � د �ت�ع�ا ل .ا �ل��ث� ت ق��د ت���قّ���د �م � ث���ا ت
� ك �
ي م �ل و �
ل �ه
� �لو ، ور ر ��
� ل� � ا�ب دو �ج و �
ل ا � �بو و ى و ج و ب ج و إب
ُ �ةَ ً �ذ �م � ًا � � ن
��ا � �م�ع�د و�م�ا إ� لا وا ��س��ط� ب��ي ن���ه���م�ا ،وا �ل�ع�د �م لا �ي���ص��ل�� �ل�ل�م��ب�د ا ئ�يّ���ة. و ج ود ل ك
ح
ق �أ
ا �ل���م�لا ح�د �ة �ق�ا �ل ا � نّ��ه �ت�ع�ا ل �م� �د �ل�ل�م��تق���ا �لا ت
كا �لو ج�ود وا �ل�ع�د �م ،وا �لو ج�و ب� و�����سي�����مي���ه، �� ب ى �ب وإ و
ن ف �أ ُ
ف ّ
ت ت �تق �أ �ة ث �ة
���ر ؛ و�م��ب�د ا �ل���م� ���ا ب�لا � لا ي�����ص� ب� ح�د �ه�ا���� ،هو �ل��ي��س ب����مو ج�ودٍ ب�ا �ل���م�ع�ى وا �لوح�د وا �ل �ك
�ث�� �ة ،لا ا �� �ا �ل���م�ع ن� ا �ل���م��ق ق ن ق
ل � ب ا
��� ا �ل���م�����ا ب�ل �ل��ل�ع�د �م ،ولا ب�وا ح ٍ�د ب�ا �ل���م�ع�ى ا �ل���م�����ا ب�ل �ل��ل �ك ر و و ج ب� ب ى
��ا ن � ،لا �م� �د �أ �ا �ل���م�ع ن� ا �ل���م��ق���ا � �ل�ع�د �م ا �ل���م� �د ئ�ّ���ة ،لا �م� �د �ا �ل���م�ع ن� ا �ل���م��ق
بل � ا
��� �ب ً ي و �ب ع ب ى بل �ل�لإ� �م ك� � ب ل و �ب ب ى
�ُ � ن � ث � ن � �أ � ل �ة ا � �ث �ة
���ر ،و�م��ب�د �ل�لو ج�ود ك � �ه ،و�هو�مو ج�ود ووا ح�د و م��ب�د م��حي���� كو��ه م��ب�د ل�وح�د و ل ��لن�ق��ي�����ض
ع ع
�ة ف ئ �ة ف م ّ �ذ
ح���ص�ل� . ��لا �م لا ��ا ��د �ي���ه � وا �ل�ع�د �م ا �ل���مت�����ص ّور ب�� �ز ا ء ا �لو ج�ود .و�ه� ا ا �ل ك�
إ
215 215
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
6 As becomes clear from Ḥillī’s discussion in the next paragraph, ‘intermediate’ here refers to
intermediary causes between God and each contingent thing. The idea is that since circum-
stantial conditions must be fulfilled for the creation of a contingent thing, genuine contingen-
cy of the world is compatible with the view that creation is necessitation.
216 216
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
ّ
�ة ق
�� ب� ا �ل�����د ر ح��ي�� ا �لو ج�ود ف�� ال�أ�ز ل ا �ل��ت�ز �م ن���ا ا �ل��ق���د �م ،و� لا �ل�م ي�ج� كا ن �ص
� ن
لا ���ق���ا ا �ل�ع�ا �ل � �
إ ي ي ل �م إ � � ح
َ �أ ن أ نّ ل� � ن أ ُق ف
��ا � ا �لوا ��س��ط��ة؛ ول� � ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل � ا ����س��ت�� ج����م �ج �مي�� كا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل ،و إ� م ك ��لت�و���� ال� ث�ر ع��لى ا �ل��ق���ا ب�ل �
ع ع
أ ف ق �ةّ أ نّ ت �غ ّ ت ثّ
� ا �ل���م�ؤ �ري��ة ا �م��ت ن�� ا �ل��رك و�إلا ا �م��ت ن�� ا �ل��ف���ع�ل�� ،لا ��د ر ؛ ول� � ا �ل��رك ي��ر �م��ق���د ورل� ن��ه ��ه�ا ت
ج� �
ع ع
ٌ ف �ذ
��� ا ا �ل��ف���ع�ل.
ع�د �م� ك
� ا � � ف� ال أ�ز � ن ا ��س��ت ن � ل ا � � � �ت � ٌ ن �ت أ
حي���ل إ� � ا ��س� ن��د ح��ي�� لو ج ود ي� � ل إ � ��د إ ى ل���مو ج � ب� ،م����س� �� ل� نّ�ا ن���ق��ول ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م�ص
ح
� ث ف� � ن ُ ُ ن ق �أ ً ق ح�ا ��لت � ل ا �ل��ق���ا د �� .س�ّل�م ن���ا ا ����س��ت
��ا � �خر�ج �ه �ع� ن� ا �لح�د و� ك �� ن و ج�ود ه �� � � و�ج �د لاي�
�بل � ك �
ل ا�
ل�� ��طم��� �ه
� � �
� ر إى
ن ّ ّ ق ن �أ
�� ب� � �يو�ج �د ���ب�ل و ج�ود ه �لو ج�ود ا �ل�ع�ل��ة ا ��لت��ا �م��ة وا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ا �ل���م�ا � ،وا �لوا ��س��ط��ة ب�ا ط�ل��ة ب�ا لإ� �ج �م�ا . ي�ج�
ع ع
ت �ة َ ف ت ل أ ّن �م���م��كن �ةٌ ف �ت ن
�و� �م� ن� ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م�� ،لا ��ع��ق���ل وا ��س��ط� ب�ي�� ن� ا �لوا ج�� ب� وا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م .وا �م��ت ن���اع ا �ل��رك و� ���ه�ا �� �� ك
�ذ �ذ ق �ة أ نّ َ تُ ُ شّ
�خر ج ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل�ع� ن� ا �ل��ق���د ر ل� � ا �ل���م�� خ���ت�ا ر إ� ا �أ�خ � �م ��د رت��ه ل��� ا ئ�ط ل � ا �ع��ت� �ا ا ����س��ت �� م�ا ا �
ع ب� �ب ر �� ج �� ع ر �� ا �
ّ ن ف ن نّ ت
�� ��� ّمإ� ��لي��ه ا �ل�د ا �عي� ،و ج�� ب� .و�م�ع ن�ى الا خ���تي���ا ر ا ����س��توا ء ���س�ا و�ى ا �ل��طر��ا � ب�ا �ل������س��ب��ة إ� ��لي��ه ،و�إ� �ض
�أ ن ّ �أ ن ّ�ذ �ة ن �ة ف
ا �ل��طر�ي�� ن� ب�ا �ل������س��ب� إ� لى ا �ل��ق���د ر وح�د �ه�ا .وا �ل��ق���ا د ر �هوا �ل� �ي� �ي���ص�� � ي���ف���ع�ل و � لا ي���ف���ع�ل ،لا
ح
ت �أ ن
� ي���ف���ع�ل ا �ل��رك.
ال���م ���ط��ل� ا ��ل��ث�ا ��ل ث��� :ف �أ�نّ�ه �ت��ع�ا ��ل� ��ع�ا ��لٌ
�م ى ي� ب
ك �ة �تق ن �ة ّ
� � �
ح �
�م ��
ل تّ ف ق � ق ا ّل ق � � ف ا � ف �ة ع��ل ل أ نّ ت ل ف ال أ ف
ل ك
� و ، �
���� �م �
��ل ا �
م � �� ا ل ا
�ع��� ا ������ ا ل�ع�����ل ء إ� ا ��د م�ا ء ا ل�����ل �س��� ي��ه؛ � ��ه ��ع�ا ى ���ع�ل �
أ نّ ت �خ �ت ٌ ف ن ً أ نّ ّ ٌ �ن ن ذ
ضر ور �ت��ا ن� .ول� ��ه ��ع�ا لى م
�� �ا ر �ي�� ك
ق �ت ن ف
�و� ع�ا �ل���م�ا؛ ل� � ��� �ل�ك ����هوع�ا �ل�م .وا �ل���م�����د �م� �ا � �� ي كا � ك م�� �
ّ
�ذ
ا �ل���م�� خ���ت�ا ر�هوا �ل� �ي� ي���ف���ع�ل ب�وا ��س��ط��ة ا �ل��ق�����ص�د.
217 217
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
7 Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār (d. 220/835) was an early theologian, many of whose beliefs
were at odds with the Muʾtazilite views of his time.
218 218
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
219 219
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
8 The point is that the master’s order can be interpreted as either stating an objective or as
expressing the master’s will. See V.2.1.7, p. 222 below.
9 This is probably Rukn al-Dīn ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārizmī (d. 536/1141), an important fol-
lower of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Muʾtazilism.
220 220
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
ٌ ف �أ ّ ت � ُ � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل��ّ�س�ا د ��س�� :ي� �ن�ه ����ع�ا �ل�ى ��م�د ِرك
ّ أ ئ نّ
ال � ن �
ل
� �
ٌ ٌ خ �ت ف ف ق �أ
ل تّ ف ق � ل ن �أ نّ ت
� � ا �
و ل بو ي� و بي� و و ل إ � �ع�ك
��
� ل ا ��
س ح�� ا ا�
����� ا، ل���� �
� اا ������ ا ل���م��س��مو� ع��لى ��ه � ى يع ب� ير و
��ص �� � �� م �
��س�� ا�
ع �
�و ن� �هوالإ� � ا ت ل �ت � �أ ن
حوا ��س ولا ح��س�ا ��س ب�ا �ل
� ح�ا �ل��ة � ي� ك � وا �ل���م ب�����صر � ا ����س� �� �م�ع ن���ا ه ع�ل�م�ه �ا �ل���م��س���م ع�ا ت
و ب
ّ ّ �أ ت �أ أ
��ل �م�ع�لو�م و�ل��ل��س���م . �م�ا ع�د ا ه �غ ي��را �ل�ع��ل ل� نّ��ه �غ ي��ُر�م�ع��ق��ول ،و����سي��� �� ن��ه �ت�ع�ا لى ع�ا �ل�م ب� ك�
ع ي
أ نّ �خ �ز ّ �أ ً �ز ئ ً ت ّ ّ ش �أث ت ُّ ئمّ ن أ
ضى وا �وا ر مي� �مرا ا ��د ا ع��لى ا �ل�ع��ل ،ل� � ل� ���ب�ا �ي��ا � وال� ����عر�ي� وا �ل����سي���د ا �ل���مر����� و ��ب��� ا ��جل
م
ق ض �ذ �ة
��م����ا �ه�د وب��ين��ه �ع ن���د ع�د ��م�ه�ا .وا �ل���م����ت������ي� �ل� �ل�ك كا �ز ا ئ� ٌ�د ع��ل ع�ل�م ن���ا �ل��ل�� ق ��� ن ا �ل�ع��ل�ع ن���د ا �ل� ش
�
�
ن
إ� د را
م � ي ب � فر ى
ّ ف �ةٌ ث ّ ق ّ تُ ٌ ٌّ ف ت ًّ
� �عي����� � .م ا ����س��ت�د �لوا ع��ىل� �ض ��ه �ز ا ئ��د ،وا �ل���م�����د �م�ا حي���ا ،وا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �حي� �إ� د را ك �و ن� ا �ل���م�د ر ك � ك
ن �أ ث�� ت�ه ن�ه �ت�ع�ا ل �ح ّ ف��� ص�� ّ ن �ت� ص ف ا �ل��س���م ا ��ل� � ،م� ن �صّ ت ف ف �ة �أ ُ �أ
ح ا ����ص�ا ��ه ب����ص��� و ج�� ب� � كل � و ب ���صر و � �� �
ى ي� ي �ح � ي � � ب ع
�� بو� ب� �
ّ ّ �أ
ح�ا ل. � �د �ه�ا ن���ق�����ٌ ،و�هوع��ل ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى م
� � �د �ه�ا ،و �ض
ّ ف
ي�ت����ص� ب���ه�ا و ب����ض
ى ص
221 221
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
The truth is to trace that back to the tradition, and it is not necessary that
what is alive is validly attributed with hearing and seeing, for most reptiles
and fish have no hearing, whereas the scorpion and the mole have no sight.
Worms and many reptiles have neither hearing nor sight. Even if it were
not impossible to attribute those species with hearing and sight, all their
individual instantiations are devoid of both. Since it is possible that some
differentiae of the species can exclude that attribute, the universal is false.
Nor is it necessary to attribute something with one of two opposites, like
the transparent for example.10 Yes, it is necessary that what is receptive to
an attribute is attributed with either it or its privation, but we have preclud-
ed that the opposite of either can be a deficiency in the case of Him most
high. The comparison is false, since His life, high is He, is different from our
life. The commonality is not necessary, because being receptive is denied,11
just as our life allows desire and dislike, unlike His life, high is He.
10 The counterexample is the body’s capacity of being coloured. This does not entail that a body
necessarily has some colour, because there is the third option of being transparent.
11 Receptivity to objects of perception is, of course, central to human perception, but since
receptivity entails passivity, it is ruled out from God.
12 Q 4:164.
222 222
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
��ٌّ ال���م ���ط��ل� ا ��ل���س�ا ��� �� :ف �أ� ّ��ن�ه �ت���ع�ا ��ل� �� ت
م� ك�
��ل� ى بع ي� ب
ِم
أ ن ث تٌ َ ّ َ َّ ُ ُ � تَ ْ� ً َ ت �ذ ن ّ
� ��ِ�لي�����م�ا) ولا د ور ،ل� ��ه إ� �ب��ا ك�ل ا �ل��ل�ه �مو �سَى � ك ا ت���ف�� ق� ا �ل���م��س�ل�مو� ع��لى �ل�ك �ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( ،و �
م
ق ز�ة أ نّ �ق ٌ ّ ق �� ت
كل �م�����د ور. ��لا �م�ه ��ع�ا لى ب��إ خ���ب�ا را �لر��سول ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م�ص�د ��ه ب�ا ل���م�ع���ج � ،و� ��ه �ا د رع��لى �
ل � � لك
ّ �أ �أ ّ �أ
ا خ���ت�� فل�� ا ف���ع ن���د ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة ن��ه �خ �ل ق ف� ���س�ا �م �م�ا د ّ��ة �ص اتً�ا د ا �ل��ة ع�� �م�ع�ا ن مخ
����صو�ص��ة، لى � �ج ي و � ي� ج و و
�ذ ّ
ف����هو�م��ت ك�
���لٌ ب���ه� ا ا �ل���م�ع ن�ى.
أم
ن ن ف ن ًّ ق ئ ً �ذ ت � �ت �ّ غ � ً ت ث �ذ �ز ّ ر�ة
���ل �م���ايرا �ل��ل�ع��ل �� ن� ا ��ب��وا �م�ع�ى �������س�ا �ي��ا ��ا ����م�ا ب� ا � ا ل���م� ك وال� �ش���ا �ع ج�و وا �ل�ك �ل ك
م م
�
ٌ
ل ع��ل �ذ ه �ل� �ف ال أ ص ت �أ نّ �ق � ٌ ف� � قّ ت �ة
يس ���� ل �د ح او ى ا
�ع�والإ� را د .ي��د ل ي��ه �ه� ا حرو� و � � وا � و ��ه �د ي م ي� ح�����ه �
ً فً ف أ نّ ّ ّ ّ �أ
ن
كا � �مت����� فص���ا �و� �مو�صو��ا ب��ه �
ن
��لا �م�� .لو�ل�م ي� ك � �ي���ص�� ا �ت���ص�ا ف��ه ب�ا �ل ك�حب� �مر ولا ن���ه� ولا �خ ��بر؛ ل� ��ه �
ي ح ي
نق ٌ ّ
� �د ه ،و�هو��������ص. ب����ض
223 223
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
13 In other words, in order for an argument to provide evidence for a claim, the claim must first
be conceived – and thus conceivable, of course.
224 224
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
ف �أ
�ح�ًث�ا ع����شرب� �ح�د �ى � � ���ص�ف��ا ت� �و��ه� إ� � �ل
� �
��ا �م�ه��ذه ا �
ح ك�
�
ال��م ���ط��ل ب� ا ��ل��ث�ا �م�ن � ��� :
ي ي
ّ�ةٌ ّ ّ
�ص ف���ا ت ر�ة �أ نّ �ذ �ة �ة �ذ ف
� و ج�ود ي� ،و�إلا ا �ل��� � -ه� ب� �ج �م�ا ع� �م� ن� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� والا �ش���ا �ع إ� لى � �ه� ه ا �ل��
��ث�� ًا �م� ن ا �ل�ع�د �مّ���ا ت �ز �ة ن �ة ف نّ ُ
� �ي���م��ت ن��ع ح�م�ل�ه ع��ىل ي ر ي �ك � �ي���ص�� ّ ح�م���ل�ه�ا ع��ل ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م .وا �ل���م�لا �م� �م���م��وع� ،إ�
�
� ى ح
ق ت ُّ ُ ّ�ةً ّ ّ
ن �أ �أ أ
ح��سي�� ن� ���ه�ا �ل��ي����س� ت� و ج�ود ي� و�إلا �ل�ز �م ��ع�د د ا �ل�����د �م�ا ء. ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م ،و�ع ن���د ال� وا ئ� و �� ا �ل
�
ل بي
225 225
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
(b) They are identical to the essence externally, even if they are addi-
tional in intellection, which is what the ancients and Abū al-Ḥusayn opt
for, due to the foregoing as well as the fact that if existence were additional,
it would be contingent, because it would be attributed to the quiddity, so
that it would not be necessary, which is incoherent.14 Furthermore, what
produces it would be the quiddity either without the condition of exist-
ence, so that what does not exist would produce that which exists, or with
existence as a condition, in which case a regress, a circle, or something oth-
er than the quiddity would ensue, so that He would be in need of another.
According to a group of Muʾtazilites and Ashʾarites, they are addition-
al, since there is a difference between our saying, ‘the Necessary Existent
exists’, and our saying that He is powerful. Moreover, both of them are in-
formative, unlike our saying ‘the Necessary Existent is a necessary exist-
ent’. Finally, we may know the essence but be in doubt about the attributes.
All of that is evidence for a mental distinction.
(c) These attributes are eternal, for otherwise, they would need a pro-
ducer, and if that were His essence, a circle would ensue, whereas if it were
another, He would be in need of the other. Moreover, His producing an
effect in another requires that they are established, and so they would be
established before their cause.15
(d) These attributes are essential, according to the Muʾtazilites and the
ancients, because they cannot be traced back to anything apart from His
essence, due to the foregoing. According to the Ashʾarites, they are caused
by grounds, so that He is powerful through power, knowing through
knowledge, alive through life, and so forth for other attributes.
Those among them who reject the states have said that knowledge is
identical to being a knower and power is identical to being powerful, both
being attributes added to the essence, whereas those who assert them have
said that His most high being a knower is an attribute caused by a ground
that subsists through Him, that is, knowledge.
14 God exists necessarily due to His essence. If His existence were really distinct and additional
to His essence, this addition would need a cause, which means that it would be contingent.
15 God is powerful because He has the attribute of power. Now, if God were powerful because
He produces effects on created things voluntarily, the created things are part of the complete
cause of God’s being powerful. However, since God’s being powerful is due to His having the
attribute, the attribute is a condition of, and thus prior to, its own cause.
226 226
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
227 227
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
(e) His will is either identical to the motive, as in the foregoing, or some-
thing added to it that is traced back to His essence, like the choice of a car-
penter, pace the majority. According to the two Jubbāʿ īs, He wills through
a volition that comes to be but not in a substrate. This is because if He
willed by virtue of His essence, His will would be general, like knowledge,
so that He would be willing two opposites. If He willed by virtue of an eter-
nal volition, it would follow that many eternal things are established. If He
willed by virtue of a voliion that comes to be in His essence, He would be
a substrate to things that come to be. If the volition came to be in another,
then were that other alive, the characteristic would go back to it, for other-
wise the volition could not inhere in it. The existence of a volition not in a
substrate is unintelligible.
(f ) His report, high is He, is veridical, because a lie is understood to be
bad and thus not emerging from Him. Moreover, if a lie were eternal, no
truth could come from Him, but the consequent is false, since it is known
that truth can emerge from one who knows something. The best proof is
that of the Ashʾarites, although it is incomplete, because it is based on the
claim that the eternal speech is identical with the report, being one report,
and because its evidence is not based on the truth of the expressions.
(g) His power, high is He, pertains to all that is subject to power, for it is
equal in terms of the cause, which is contingency.16 The ancients preclud-
ed the emergence of two from Him, because He is simple, but we would
not arrive at one who is powerful, if that were possible. Dualists as well as
the Magi have precluded the emergence of evil from Him, for otherwise
He would be evil. According to the Magi, the agent of good is Yazdān and
the agent of evil is Ahriman, and they mean thereby an angel and a devil,
whereas God most high is deemed above the agency of good and evil.17 The
Manicheans trace that to light and darkness, and likewise the Dayṣānites.18
16 Whatever is subject to power (maqdūr) is such that its existence is not necessary, because its
opposite could equally well take place, barring other things from consideration. Hence, con-
tingency is the cause for such things’ being subject to power. God’s power is equally related
to all contingent things, in the sense that He is the ultimate efficient cause of their existence.
Hence, God’s power is equally related to all that is subject to power, and this in the sense that
they all are subject to His power.
17 The Magi are Zoroastrians, and Yazdān (Ahura Mazda) and Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) are the
two primary principles of their dualistic cosmology.
18 The Dayṣānites of Arabic literature are a semi-mythical dualist sect. Historically, the name
goes back to the Syrian gnostic Bardesanes (d. 222 CE).
228 228
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
�م�ا ت���ق�� ّ�د �م �أ �أ �مٌ �ز ا ئ� ٌ�د ع��ل��ه �م��س��ت ن� ٌ�د � ل �ذ ات��ه � ،خ �ت ك �
ّ ت ّ نف
كا �� ي���ا ر إى ي ر و � � ع
�ه -إ� را د ��ه إ� �م�ا �������س ا �ل ي
ا �د
� ّ � �ذ � ن �أ ّ ٌ ا �لنّ���� ج��ا ر �خ �لا ف�ً�ا �ل��ل�� ج�����م�ه ر .و�ع ن���د ا �ج�
ّ
كا � ح�ل؛ إ لو � ���بّ�ا ئ�ي��� ن� ن��ه �مر��د ب�� را د ح�ا د ث� لا ف�� م ل و
�ةٍ ي ي إ �ةٍ ي
ق �أ ّ ّ ف ّ ً �ذ
� ا �ل��ق���د �م�ا ء، � �د � ن ،ل� ا د ��د ����م� �ل�ز �مث�� ت
كا �ل�ع��لم� ،ي��ر�ي�د ا �ل���ض ي� و إ ر �ةٍ ي �ةٍ بو �مر�ي�د ا �ل� ات��ه �ل�ع���م� ت� إ� را د ت��ه �
ّ ث �أ �ة ث�ة ف� �ذ ت ن م ً �أ
حيّ��ً�ا ر ج�� ح �ك
��م�ه�ا إ� ��لي��ه و�إلا � ،و ف�� �غ ي��ره .ف�إ� ن� � د او ح�لا �ل��ل���
ح كا � � � �ه
� ا � � د ا�
ح د ا ر �إلو
ع ي ي
ق �غ ف
ح�ا ل ح�لو��ل�ه�ا ف�ي���ه ،وو ج�ود � را د لا �� م
�ة
ح�ل ي��ر�م�ع����ول. � إ ا ����س��ت���
ي
� ن ل أ نّ ا � � ذ � ن ن ً ف قٌ � ق � � ذ ت
كا � ��� ب� إ � � ��� ب� �ع��ق���لا�� ،لا �ي���ص�د ر ع���ه؛ و� � ل ك و � -خ ��بره ��ع�ا لى �ص�د � ل������ب�� ا ل ك
ح
ن ق
��ا � �ص�د ور ا �ل���ص�د � �م�� ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م
ن ّ
ح�ا ل �م ن���ه ا �ل���ص�د ق� ،وا ��ل��ا ل� ب�ا ط�ل �ل��ل�ع��ل ب�� �م ك�
ت � �
� ق��د ����ًم�ا ا ����س��ت
م إ ي ي
�أ ّ ّ �أ أ ّ
�خ��بر ،و ن��ه ���لا �م ا �ل��ق���د ي�م�هوعي�� ن� ا �ل ل����ء .وال�أ�خ ي��ر د ��لي��ل ال� �ش���ا �عر�ة ولا ي��ت��� ّم �ل��ب ن���ا ئ��ه ع��لى ن� ا �ل ك� �ا � ش
ب ي
ق أ ٌ ٌ
�خ ��بر وا ح�د ،و�ل�ع�د �م د لا ��لت��ه ع��لى�ص�د � ال� �ل��ف���ا �ظ .
��ا ن � .م ن�� ال�أ ا ئ �� ّ �م��ق���د �ل�ل��تّ��س�ا � ف� ا �ل�ع�لّ��ة ا �ّ�لت �ز �ق ت ت تت ّقُ
�
وع ول � �
ك م � �ال
ي� ي� إ ه� � � -د ر��ه ��ع�ا لى ���ع�ل� ب ل ور و ي� ي� �
ك �
�أ أ
�م� ن �ص�د ور ا ث�ن��� ن �ع ن���ه ل� نّ��ه �����س����ط ،ولا ي�ت�� �تى ف�� ا �ل��ق���ا د ر �ل �ص .و�م ن�� ا �ل��ث ن�� ّ��ة وا �ل���م�� ج� ��س �م� ن
و � وح ع وي ي ب ي ي� �
ش ّ �أ ّ
ن ف
�خ ي��ر ي��ز د ا � و��ا ع�ل ا �ل���ر �هر�م� ن�. �كا ن� �ش�� ّر� ًرا .ف���ع ن���د ا �ل���م�� ج�و��س ف��ا ع� ا �ل ل��� ِّر�ع ن���ه و�إلا ��ص�د ا � ش
ور
ِ ل ي
ن ّ�ة ت �ذ شّ ٌ ً
ل���ر .وا �ل���م�ا �وي� �����سن���د �ل�ك �خ ي��ر وا � ���ا و ش�����ي����ط�ا نً�ا ،وا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى �م ن���زّ �ة �ع� ن ف���ع� ا �ل
و�ع ن��وا ب���ه���م�ا �م��ل ك�
� ل
� ظ ل �ة ذ
��� ا ا �ل�د �ي���ص�ا ن�يّ���ة. إ� لى ا ��لن�ور وا ل�����م� وك
229 229
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
According to all of them, good is that, all the acts of which are good,
whereas evil is that, all the acts of which are evil. However, good and evil
are not good and evil due to their essence, but in relation to something
else. Since it is possible that one and the same thing is good in relation to
one thing but evil in relation to another, it is possible that the agent of that
thing is one.
Al-Naẓẓām precluded His power over what is sinful, because that is ab-
surd, for what is sinful is evidence of ignorance or need. The impossibility
is with respect to the motive, not insofar as power is concerned.
ʾAbbād19 precluded His power over what is known to take place or to not
exist due to its necessity or impossibility. That negates power and knowl-
edge follows it.
Al-Balkhī precluded His power over what is like that which is subject to
the servant’s power, because it is either obedience or impudence, both of
which are attributions that do not entail essential difference.
The two Jubbāʿ īs preclude His power over the very thing that is sub-
ject to the servant’s power, because it is impossible that two powers be
conjoined over one thing that is subject to power. If that thing took place
through either of them, each would be independent of the other. If it did
not take place through either of them, the precluding factor would be its
taking place through the other, so it would take place through either of
them while not taking place through just either of them. Finally, if it took
place through only one of them, the other would not have power, and the
second power would be precluded.
(h) His knowledge, high is He, pertains to all that is knowable, because
He is alive, and so it is possible that He knows all that is knowable. If it per-
tained specifically to only some knowable things, it would need a specify-
ing factor, which is absurd. Moreover, since it is possible that He knows all
that is knowable, it is necessary, because this is an attribute of the essence,
which is necessary when it is possible.20 The premise that He is alive and
that it is possible for Him to know all that is knowable is evident, because
one who is alive is one for whom it is not impossible to know. The relation
of possibility is one and the same to all knowable things.
19 This is probably Abū al-Qāsim Ismāʾīl ibn ʾAbbād (d. 385/995), the Būyid vizier and Muʾtaz-
ilite commonly known as ṢāḥibʾAbbād.
20 Attributes of essence are attributes that God has simply due to His essence. Since the pos-
sibilities of His essence cannot be dependent on any extrinsic factor, they are necessarily
realised. They are to be distinguished from attributes of act that He has due to His essence
and the object of the relevant agency. In their case, the realisation of a possibility depends on
the contingent objects.
230 230
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
231 231
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
Some of the ancients preclude His knowledge of His own essence, be-
cause it is a relation and therefore entails distinction. This is contradicted
by our knowledge of ourselves. Some of them preclude His knowledge of
another, because forms cannot inhere in His essence. This is contradicted
by the One’s knowledge of Himself, because it is a relation, not a form, and
because emergence from it obtains in a way superior to that of an extracted
form, which emerges from one who understands by virtue of participating
in an intelligible. Besides, even that form is known through itself, and all
the more here.21
Some of them preclude His knowledge of particular things insofar as
they are changing, except in a universal sense, so that He does not know
whether the changing thing has taken place or will take place, for if knowl-
edge were to persist during the thing’s non-existence, ignorance would
follow, and if not, knowledge would be changing.22 Some of them have
answered by saying that knowledge of a thing’s being brought into exist-
ence in the future is different from knowledge of its existence during the
existence. This is an error, because knowledge requires adequate corre-
spondence. Instead, the truth is that the change concerns relations, just as
the change of what is subject to power entails change in its relation to the
power, not in the power.
(i) The necessity of His existence by virtue of His essence entails the im-
possibility of His non-existence at any moment. Hence, He is pre-eternal,
everlasting, persisting, and sempiternal. His persistence is due to His es-
sence, not due to a persistence through which He subsists, pace al-Ashʾarī,
for otherwise He would need another in His existence, and this is inco-
herent. Furthermore, His persistence would persist, and so there would
be either a regress or a circle, depending on whether it persisted through
another or by essence, and if it persists due to His essence, all the more so
He in His essentiality.
21 Ḥillī’s argument builds on a comparison of God’s knowledge of particular things with the
knowledge an artisan has of the thing she is about to manufacture. That thing emerges from
the artisan by virtue of an extracted form, or a blueprint she has acquired from prior experi-
ence with similar things. In the case of God, the emergence is superior, because the blueprint
is not acquired from without but is included in God’s knowledge of Himself as the complete
cause of the world.
22 This is the Avicennian view according to which God knows particulars but “in a universal
way”. For an extended discussion, see Marmura 1962 and Adamson 2005.
232 232
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
233 233
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
23 The point is that the truth of the principle is not dependent on time or place at all.
24 That is, creation is necessary when God’s will and power are combined.
25 The Ḥanafites here is probably not intended to refer to the legal tradition but to some
Māturīdī theologians, who often were Ḥanafites and who are known to have endorsed gener-
ating, or “making be” (takwīn), as an attribute of God distinct from both power (qudra) and
will (irāda).
26 Q 36:82. The order kun is the root for the attribute takwīn.
27 That is, possibility of existence does not have to be created distinctly for anything that is
contingent by virtue of its essence. Instead, possibility is the modal status inherent to a con-
tingent essence.
28 This Qāḍī is Bāqillānī.
234 234
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
235 235
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
The others maintain the denial of anything added to the seven, because
we have been charged with knowledge, and if one is to acquire knowl-
edge of the attributes, there must be a way to it. This can only be inference
through effects and declaring above deficiency, and these two only point at
seven. We deny being charged with the perfection of knowledge.
236 236
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
� ص� ����م� ف���ة
�ح�� �
ف�ة نّ ت
ا
�م �
��� � ، �� ��م�
�ل� ا
� ا�
��� ز �م �آ � ن� �ن� ف�� �م�ا �ز ا د ع��ل ا �ل����س� �ع��ة ،ل�أ نّ�اك��لّف�� ن
ل عر ب إ و ب عر ى �ب و�ج � �خرو ب ي�
ن ّ آ ّ ّ ف ت ف ُّ
��� ،لا ب��د �م� ن� طر�يق� ،و�ل��ي��س إ� لا الا ����س��ت�د لا ل ب�ا ل� ث�ا ر وا ��لت� ن���ز �ي�ه �ع� ن� ا ��لن�ق�����ص�ا � ،و�إ ن����م�ا ا �ل���ص���ا
ف ّ
�م�ا ل ا �ل���م�عر���ة. ���لي� ف� ب� �كي��د لا ن� ع��ل ا �ل����س��ب�ع��ة ون����م ن�� �م� ن ا ��لت� ك�
ع � ى
ح ّ ي�ز � �أ � ف �أ ّ ت � � � ت � �
[ال��م ��ط��ل ب�] ا �ل� �ّو�ل�� :ي� �ن�ه ����ع�ا �ل�ى �لي����سب��م�� ���
�أ ّ ّ �ة أ نّ ّ فً ّ
ن ف ن
�و� �و� �ي�� ك���ة وا �ل��س ك حرك حيّ���ز لا ي�ن� ف���ك �ع� ن� ا �ل�كل �م��ت��� ا ت���ف�� ق� ا �ل�ع��ق���لا ء ع��لي��ه �خ �لا ��ا �ل�ل�م�� ج���س���م� ،ل� � �
�غ ً �أ ً ت ّ �أ كف ن ٌ ف ن ًّ ُم َ ثً أ نّ � ن �ذ ّ
�و� ح�ا د ث�ا و�ج� ز�ء ا لا ي��ج� ز� ،و�هو ي��ر �م�ع��ق��ول، �و� �مر ب��ا �ي�� ك حي���� ئ�� إ� �م�ا ج���س���م �ي�� ك ح�د �ا ،ول� ��ه �
ً ن ًّ أّ �ذ تّ ف
كا. كا ن� ج���س���م�ا �ل ك�
��ا � �مر ب��
�غ �ة
لإ� �م��ت ن���اع ا ����ص�ا �� �م��ث�ل �ل�ك ب�ا �ل��ق���د ر وا �ل�ع��ل ي��را �ل���م��ت ن���ا �هي����ي ن�؛ ول� ن��ه �لو �
م
�ت�أ ّ �ةٌ ظ �ة آ �ت ف
�
آ
� ي� �ل��ي�� �هوا �ل
� ح�ا �ص� ل�أ ح�د ا �ل� ز�أ � ن�ل ف�
�خر ي��� �ع�د د ال� ��ل�ه� .وا �ل���وا �هر �م� � و�ل� ، ح�ا �ص�ل �ل�ل � س �ج � �ا �ل�ع��لم ا � ل
� ز ا �ل �ه��� لا ��ع�ا ض� ا �ل��ق������ط ا �ل�ع��ق���� ّ
�. ل و�ج�ع� و م
ي ر � ع ي
237 237
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
238 238
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
ّ�
� ف �أ ّ ت � � � �
ال��م ��ط��ل ب� ا �ل ارب��� �� :ي� ���ن�ه ����ع�ا �ل�ى ���غ�ي�ر�مرك� ب�
ع
ُّ �غ ّ ٌ أ ُّ ّ
�� ن� .ووا ج�� ب� ا �لو ج�ود ٌ �ت ف
كل �م����� �� �م���م ك ز�ؤ ئ ز �ت ف ن
�� ن� ،ل� ��ه �ي����� ��قر إ� لى �ج����ه و�ج�� ه ي��ره ،و � � ب� �م���م ك كل �مر�ك��
�أ قرٍ ّ �أ �أ
� ق ّ�ة ن �ل ن �ة ّ �ة ّ�ة ن ز �ل��ي�� ب����م���م ك ن ف�
��� �ل��ي��س �ل�ه �ج��ا ء �م�ا �هي��� � ،ع�ي� ا �ل���م�ا د وا �ل���صور ،ولا ع������لي�� � ،ع�ي� ا �ج�����س س
ت ً ن ً ف ً ن ف �غ ّ ت �ةّ ق ف
�� �ع ن���ه ي��ره ��ل��ي�� �ج ����س�ا ولا ����ص�لا ولا �وع�ا ي�ن��د ر ج �
ح��ت�ه
�
� س وا �ل�������ص�ل ،ولا �م�����د ا ري� ؛ ولا ي���ر�ك� ب
�غ � � ن �غ ه � �ذ �ت � �أ ن ّ �أ ٌ
حي���ل � ي�ن� ف���ع�ل�ع� ن� ي��ره. �فرا د ،ولا ي�ت��ر�ك� ب� ع���ه ي��ر إ ي�����س� ��
239 239
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
29 This is Avicenna’s argument against the theory, which he attributes to Porphyry (d. ca 305
CE), that knowledge consists of a union between the subject and object of knowledge; see
Shifāʿ: Nafs V.6, 239-241. However, the “leader” (raʿ īs) Avicenna himself seems also to have
endorsed the theory at some point in his career, most notoriously in the relatively early
al-Mabdaʿ wa’l-maʾād (I.7, 6-10).
240 240
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
241 241
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
Appendix
It is impossible to attribute Him with any quality that is conditioned by
position, such as colours, tastes, smells, and other accidents, because He
most high cannot be acted upon.
30 The minor premise here is ‘God knows His own perfection’. It is unclear to me why this
should not be true. The analogy based on the manifest (al-qiyās ʾalā al-shāhid) is a method of
inference used by the theologians, in which one infers something about God’s attributes on
the basis of connections between similar attributes of created things. On the method and its
context, see van Ess 1970, 32-33.
242 242
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
�ذ
���ت� �ن�ي�� ب�
ف ل أ � ا ن ا � ّ � ا � ّ ا ئ� �غ �� ف��ّ����ة � ش ت ف ّ
ح و ي��ر�ه�ا �ي� كا � لو � و ل����ط�عو م و لرو م���روط��ة ب�ا �لو �ض
� � ، ي ��ل �ك
ي ي�����س��ت���
حي���ل ا ����ص�ا ��ه ب� ك�
ع
ت أ ض
ال� �عرا �� ،لا �م��ت ن���ا ا ن���ف���ع�ا �ل�ه ��ع�ا لى.
ع
243 243
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
31 The last sentence may seem unrelated, but the point is to say that the relations that God has to
other things by virtue of attributes, such as knowledge, power, and will, do not compromise
His self-sufficiency.
32 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) is one of the most prominent post-Avicennian Ashʾarite
theologians. Student of al-Juwaynī, he was pivotal to the critical adoption of Avicennian phi-
losophy into kalām.
33 The minor premise here is ‘God’s reality (or essence) is identical with His existence’.
244 244
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
� �ث�ا �ن ف �أ ّ ت ع�ا � � � ًَ �
حوا د ث�
�ح�ل�ا �ل���ل� ال���م ���ط��ل� ا �ل� �م ��� ��� :ن�ه ���� �ل�ى �ل���� �م
ي س ي ب
أ نّ ف� �ذ ت ف �ت ن � ت غ ّ �ّا �مّ����ة ،لا �م��ت ن���ا ا ن���ف �خ فً تّ ف ق أ ث
�ل �ه،
ي ع ير ي و � � �ل�ع ������ل ا �� �م��� ��� �ه� ا ي� �ه ل� ا� ع
� �� ر ي �
ك �ل
��
ل ا
�� ا�ر ي ل� �ه ��ل�ع ��ا ������ ال� ك
ع
أّ �ت � �خ ّ ه � ن �أ�ز لً ّل �ت � تّ ف
ح�ا ل ا ����ص�ا ��ه ب���ه�ا ،ول� ن��ه �م�ا ل ا ����س� ��ح�ا ل �لو ع����ه�ا ا ،و�إ ا ا ����س� �� كا ن� � فص����ة ك� � ث ن
� إ� � � ا �لح�ا د
ف� �ت ن ّ ت �ذ ّ ّ تّ ف
�و� ح�ا �ل��ة �عرو ض����ه�ا ،و�إلا ���س��ل��س�ل � ،ك ح��ة لا�ز �م��ة �ل� ات��ه لا ����س��ت��� كا ن� ت� ت��ل�ك ا �ل���ص����لو�ص ا ����ص�ا ��ه ب��ه �
ح
ٌ ث �أ�ز ً �ة � ث ت �ت � ّ ف ت �ة�أ�ز ّ�ة � ّ
ح�ا ل. م
ح�ا د � لا ،و�هو� �
ل
ح� و ج�ود ا � ص �
ح�ا د � �����س� �دع� � ل
ح� الا ����ص�ا �� ب�ا � ص
��لي�� .و �
ي
ال���م ���ط��ل� ا ��ل��ت�ا ��س� �� :ف �أ���ن�ه �ت���ع�ا ��ل� ���غ ن� ّ
ى �ي� ع ي� ب
نٌ م ٌ ّ ��ه�ا ت نّ أ � �ذ ا � ن �أ ظ
ح��ت�ا ج إ� ��لي��ه،
��� � كل �م�ا ا ع�د ا ه �م���م ك � و ، � �
ل
� ا ��م �
و ج ب ى يع ج � �ج �
ل �
ع � �
� ا �ه
� � ل �ب �
ل� ا
�ط �
��م��ل� ا ��
ه� م�� �هر
�
ف ت ن ف � ق ق �ت ف �ت غ ن ف �ة أ نّ �ذ ت �غ ف ا ق � �ت ت
ح����ي����� �ه��� ،ي����س� ���ي� �ي�ح� ي���ا �ج �ه ��ع�ا لى إ� لى ي��ره ،ول� � ا ��ه وا ج���ب� ،و�ص���ا ��ه �������س ��ل �ي�ع�����ل ا
ثٌ ح� ّاً � � ا ث �غ أ
� �ل��ي����س� ت�� �ا ف��ا ت
� ،والإ� �ض � ،و ي��ره ح�ا د �ل ل��ل��حو د �ذ ات��ه و� فص���ات��ه ،ول� نّ��ه �ت�ع�ا لى �ل��ي�� م
س
ّ
و ج�ود ي��ة.
245 245
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
34 This section deals with seeing in an ambiguous way. The most natural way of understanding
the title fī istiḥālati l-ruʿyati ʾalayhi taʾālā is that it denies seeing as an attribute of God. How-
ever, some of the arguments Ḥillī addresses clearly deal with the question of whether God
can be seen. I have tried to keep the translation similarly ambiguous, wherever appropriate.
35 In other words, Ashʾarites hold both that God is immaterial and that He can be seen.
36 This is a reference to intromission and extramission theories of vision, respectively. In both
theories, seeing requires a physical process connecting the object and the subject, which is
impossible for a non-physical entity like God.
37 That is, the object seen must be directly facing the seer, or situated in a position similarly
related to the position of the seer.
38 Q 6:103.
39 Q 7:143. God is addressing Moses.
246 246
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
247 247
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
They have argued by saying that both substances and accidents are seen,
and being judged together, they no doubt have a shared cause, which can
only be existence or coming to be, but the latter is not suitable for being
a cause, because a part of it is non-existing.40 Furthermore, He most high
has said, on that Day there will be radiant faces, looking at the blessing of
their Lord.41 Finally, He most high conditioned seeing upon the stability of
a contingent mountain, because it is a body and because Moses, peace be
upon him, asked for it.42
The answer is that His existence, high is He, is identical with His real-
ity, and it is different from our existence, and so equality in terms of the
two characteristics is not necessary. We deny that the possibility of seeing
needs a cause, for if all characteristics had to be based on a cause, there
would be regress. Moreover, possibility is privative. We deny that the pos-
sibility of seeing a substance and the possibility of seeing an accident are
equal, and it is possible that something common to them is caused by two
different causes. We deny the restriction to the existence of possibility, and
so it is possible that there is a cause for the possibility of seeing, even if it
were privative.43
Coming to be is existence that is preceded by something. The existence
of what is caused does not follow from the existence of the cause, for de-
pendence on a condition or the occurrence of an obstacle is possible. The
word īlā is the singular of ālāʿ, ‘blessings’,44 or it is elliptical and implies ‘to
the bounties of their Lord’. The condition of stability during motion is ab-
surd. The questions took place because of Moses’ people, for He most high
has said, they demanded even more than that of Moses when they said, ‘Show
us God face to face’.45
40 The Ashʾarites’ argument can be spelled out as follows: both substances and accidents are
seen, and they must be so for the same reason; this reason can only be existence; but God has
existence; hence, God must also be seen.
41 Q 75:22-23. I have modified Abdel Haleem’s translation to fit Ḥillī’s interpretation below.
42 The context is Q 7:143, cited above.
43 That is, Ḥillī denies that the capacity to be seen must be grounded in some really existing
feature. Instead, he holds that the ground of being seen can be privative or something that
does not exist as such (ʾadamī).
44 This refers to Q 75: 22-23, cited above.
45 Q 4:153.
248 248
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
م���ت�����ة��م���ت�� ك لا ��د �ل�ه �م� ن ع�لّ��ة � ش �ما �ل� ش ل� � ا �ل� ض� �م ئ�ّ��ا ن� ،ا � � �ت ّ �أ نّ
�� ���
ل و ، ك ر ر �
ك �
ح و عر ر ي � و هر ل�ج ا � ح� �� ج�وا ب� ا�
يس � ب و
� ٌ ُ ّ ّ أّ ّ
� ،وال�أ�خ ي��رلا �ي���ص��ل�� �ل��ل�ع��ليّ���ة ل� ن� �ج� ز�ء ه ع�د مي� ،و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى (و ج وه ح�د ث ل
� �
إ� و ج و و و ا د � �
ل ا ال
ح
أ ّ أ ٌ هَ َ َ ٌ
ٌ ّ
�� ن� ،ل� ن��ه ج���س���م ي� ْو�َم��ئ� نّ�ا ض��رَ�ة � لَى َرّ����ا نَ�ا ظ�رَ�ة) ،ول� نّ��ه �ت�ع�ا لى ع��لق����ه�ا ع��ل ا ����س��ت��قرا ر ا ��جل
���ب�ل ا �ل���م���م ك ى ِ�ذٍ ِ إ بِ ِ
�أ أن
ول� � �مو��سي� ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م ��س� ��ل�ه�ا.
ف �خ فٌ � ن ف� � ت
�� ب� ���س�ا وي���ه���م�ا �ي� ��ا �ل��� �لو ج ود �ا� ،لا ي�ج ح��ق��ي��ق����ت�ه و�هو م �وا ب� :و ج�ود ه �ت�ع�ا لى ن���ف����س� وا ��جل
أ ّن ت ت ّ�ة �ذ �ّ�ة ّ �ة ��ا �م .ون����م ن�� ا �
أ
�ٍم���س��ل��س�ل ،ول� ���ه�ا كلح ك� ح� ا �لر�ؤ ي� إ� لى ع�ل� إ� �لو و ج�� ب� ��ع��لي��ل � ح��تي���ا ج �ص
�
ال� ح ك�
ع
�ّ �ّ
ت ش � �ز ت
ح� ر ي� ا �ل�عر�� ،و ي�ج�و ��ع��لي��ل ا �ل���م�����رك
ض �ة �ؤ �ة �و�هر و ص
� � �ة
ح� ر � ا �جل�ؤ �ة ع�د �ميّ����ةٌ .ون����م ن�� �ت��س�ا و�� ص
�
ي ي ع
� � � ال � � ن ف �ز �أ ن ن ّ�ةًل � � ن ا � �ؤ �ة � ن
��ا � لر ي� وإ� �و� ع�ل� إ� م ك ��ا � ���ي�� ج�و � ي� ك �خ��ت�� فل����تي�� ن� .و����م�� ا �لح���صر بو ج ود إ� م ك
ن ن �ب��ع��لت��� ن� م
ي
ع
ً ن
كا � ع�د �ميّ���ا. �
�ز ت ق فّ �ةّ
�وا ا ��ل�و���� � �ه او �لو ج�ود ا �ل���م����س��بوق� ،ولاي��ل�ز �ُم�م� ن و ج�ود ا �ل�ع�ل� و ج�ود ا �ل���م�ع�لول ��جل ح�د ث
� و وا �ل
�
ح�� ص �م�ا ن� � « .ل » ا ح�د «ال�آ لا ء»� ،أ �أ نّ ف����ه�ا � �ض ً ت ق ش �أ
�� ���م�ا را ������دي�ره« :إ� لى و � ي� إ ع��لى���رط و� � ول ع و إ ى و
س�ؤ ق ق عَ ّ
ح�ا ل .وا �ل�� ا ل و��ع �ل����و�م�مو��سى ���ة و�هو م
� حرك نِ�����م رب���ه�ا» .وا ��لت��ع��لي� ق� ع��لى الا ����س��ت��قرا ر ح�ا �ل��ة ا �ل�
�أَْ بََ ن �ذَ َ ف ق فَ قَ ُ �أَ نَ َّ َ جَْ رَ�ةً �فَ قَ ْ َ �أَُ ُ ت
�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ( �����د ��س� �لوا �مو �سَى ك��ر �ِم�� �ِل�ك)����� ،ا لوا ( �����ا لوا ر �ا ا ل��ل�ه ���ه ).
� � � � � � � �
ِ
249 249
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
46 This means that ‘necessity due to essence’ cannot be concomitant to an essence, because
it would only be realised once there is an individual instantiation of the essence. Then that
individual instantiation would not have been necessary by its essence but due to something
else, and the essence would only be necessary due to the cause of the instantiation, that is, it
would be necessary through another.
47 The relevant specifying factor is probably ‘not being due to another’. Alternatively, it could
be ‘not the other’ for the two necessary beings, supposed per impossibile.
48 There are altogether six spatial dimensions: North, East, South, West, up, and down. Accord-
ing to this view, light and darkness are infinite in all but one, namely the direction in which
they encounter an object.
49 See the proof for the finitude of the world in IV.2.2.
250 250
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
ف �أ
ال���م ���ط��ل� ا ��ل��ث�ا ���ن � �
ع����شر� ��� :نّ�ه �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى � او �
�ح�د ي ي� ب
�أ ن ف �أ ن ن �ذ ت ًّ ف �ذ
�و� ا �ي��ا ��ل�ه���م�ا و �ي�� ن� �ي� �ه� ا ا �ل���م�ع�ى� ،إ� �م�ا � ي� ك م���ت��رك كا ن� ف�� ا �لو ج�ود وا ج���ب�ا ا �لو ج�ود �ل ك�
��ا ن�ا � ش �
لو � ي
ّ ن نً � ّ � ن ف� ن ّ أ ض �أ أ
��م�ا .وا ��لث��ا �ي� وا ��لث��ا �ل� ث� �و� �م� ك�� كل م����ه���م�ا ي�� ك ل� ح�د �ه�م�ا وع�ا ر�� ��ل�ه���م�ا .وال� ّول ي�����س��ت�ل�ز �مت�ر�ك� ب� �
ً ف �ذ �ت ل�ز ّ � ن �أ ن ل ن
� �ه �ي� ات��ه وا ج���ب�ا. �و� �م�عرو �ض كل م����ه���م�ا � اي� ك ي�����س� � �م �
ّ ش ت �خ ّ �ذ ت �أ
�خ�ا ر ج� إ� لا �ص��ة � �ذ لا و ج�ود ف�� ا �ل
� ن � �ز ن ن
ولا ي�ج�و � ي� ك
ي �و� ا �لوا ج�� ب� �ل� ا ��ه �هوا �ل���م�ع�ى ا �ل���م�����رك �ا إ
غ �ت ّ ّ ً ّ مخ ّ ً ل � �أ ن
ح���صول ح���ص�ل إ� لا ب��ع�د � �و ن� ا �ل���م�� خ����ص���ص ��س�ل��بيّ���ا ،ف�إ� ن� ��س�ل� ب� ا �ل��ي��رلا ي� ��� �و�ز �ي� ك ����ص���ص�ا .وا ي�ج
ت ف ق ٌ ن �ةٌ أ ن ّ �ة أ نّ
�� ،ي�����ص�� كل وا ح�د �م ن����ه���م�ا ��ا د رع��لى�ج �مي�� ا �ل���م��ق���د ورا ا �ل غ��ي��ر؛ ول� � ا �ل���م�� خ��ا �ل��ف��� �م���م��ك�� ،ل� � �
ح ع
�ه ن ا
ّّ
� ا ح���ص� ا �ل���م ا د ا ن� ا ���ت � �أ �ه� � ل ّ � �ق الآ �ُ ف� ن �أ ن ���ق
وو � �د �ض
�ل�� ��م � � � ، � �د ص� �� ا
�م �د �ض
� ا
�م �دح �د ص����� �ي
ج ع ل ر �خر إ إى
ن َ ال � ف آ ن � ن ن �أ
�خر�ي���ل�ز �م و ج�ود �ه�م�ا و�إ� ُو�جِ �د كل�م ن����ه���م�ا و ج�ود �مرا د � كا � ا �ل���م�ا � �م� ن� �مرا د � ح�ا ل ،و � ع�د م�ا � �م
ع
ُ ف �أ
ح�د �ه�م�ا ����هوالإ� �ل�ه؛ و�ل��ل��س���م .
ع
ّ ش ف� ن ظ �ة ّ ف ف �ة ظ ّ�ة ق
كلكل���ر�م�� ا �ل����ل�م� ،و � ن
كل ي��ر �ي� ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م��م� ن� ا ��ل�ور ،و � �خ و��ا �ل� ت� ا �ل��ث ن��و�ي ب��ق���د �م ا ��لن�ور وا �ل����ل�م� و �
ح����ةٌ �ا �ه�ل��ةٌ�� .س��� ح�د ث �خ .ا ��لن� �ح ٌّ ع�ا �ل ٌ ا � ظ��لم��ة � ت �ل �م ن����ه���م�ا لا ن���ه�ا ي��ة �ل�ه ف�� ا �جل
� و و �ب ب ���ه�ا � ا ��م��س و ور ي� �م و ل�� � ي �ج
�
ي
خ ظ أ �أ �ة ظ �أ �أ
ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�ما خ���ت�لا ط �ج� ز�ا ء �م� ن� ا ��لن�ور ب� �ج� ز�ا ء �م� ن� ا �ل����ل�م� .و را د ا ��لن�ورال� �ع�����ما ����س��ت����لا �صت��ل�ك
أ ّ أ
�خ�ل ق� �ه��ذ ا ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م و�خ �ل ق� ال� ج���س�ا �م ا ��لنّ�يّ��ر�ة ف�ي���ه ،ب�
حي��� ث�
� ال� �ج� ز�ا ء �م� ن ا � ظل����ل�م��ة .ف���ل ي���م��كن��ه � لا ب�
� إ م �
ت ال أ � ز ��لن ن�ّ�ة � ن � ظ ل �ة ف� �ذ �خ ت ف ت
�����س��ت�� خ���ل���ص ب�ن�ور �ه�ا ��ل�ك � �ج � �ور ي�� م�� ل�����م� .إ� ��ل����ص�� �� ل�ع�ا �م.
ل� � ا ن � ا ا ا ا ء ا
ي
ه � ا
�����لا �مك�لّ�ه خ���ط��أ ،ف�� نّ� ا ��لن� �ع ض�ٌ لا ���ق�� �م ��ذ ات��ه ،ا � ظل����ل�م��ة ع�د �م��� ،ع�د �م ا �ل��ت ن
ُ �ة ّ و�ه��ذ ا ا �ل ك�
ي� ي و و إ ور ر � ي و ب
ّ ُ ٌ
ح�ا ل �ل���م�ا ت���ق���د �م. م
�
251 251
On Establishing The Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes
The Magi have said that the world has a maker who is powerful, know-
ing, alive, and wise, calling him Yazdān, and that whatever is good in the
world is from him. They have said that he thought, ‘If I should have an
opponent among the angels, what would be my situation with him?’ The
devil came into being from that thought, and whatever is evil in the world
is from him. They called him Ahriman. Some of them say that the devil is
eternal, which is also evidently false.
The Christians have said: The most high Creator is one substance and
three hypostases, the hypostasis of Father, who is His existence, the hy-
postasis of son, who is His knowledge, and the hypostasis of the Holy Spir-
it, who is His life. If they meant the attributes, there is no dispute except
with regard to terms, otherwise that is an error, due to the foregoing.
252 252
�
�ود �ت���ع�ا ��ل�ى �و� �ص��ف�ا �ت�ه ت
إ� ��ث ��ب�ا �� � او ج� ب� ا �ل�وج��
253 253
Observation VI: On Justice
المرصد السادس في العدل وفيه مطالب
Investigation 1: On Intellectual Good and Bad
If an act has no attribute added to its coming to be, it is like the motion of
someone who is inattentive or sleeping. If it does have, it is good either
without any attribute added to its being good, and then it is licit, or with an
added attribute, so that if blame is entailed by its omission, it is obligatory,
but if not, then it is permitted, or it is vice, that is, such that the knowing
agent of it deserves blame by virtue of its state.
The Muʾtazilites agree that there are things, which are necessarily known
to be good or bad, such as the goodness of beneficial truthfulness, justice,
charity, or thanking the benefactor, or the badness of lying, injuring, op-
pression, or obliging what another is incapable of, and there are things, the
goodness or badness of which is known through reflection by the intellect,
such as the goodness of disadvantageous truthfulness or the badness of ad-
vantageous lying, and there are such that are known with respect to law, not
in the sense that it is a cause for the goodness or badness but in the sense
that it reveals the law concerning the thing also to the decision of one who
does not believe. Were it not for it, miracles could become manifest from
the hand of a liar and there would be variance in its promise and threat.
Punishment would be for obedience and reward for disobedience, and so
the benefit of obligation would be annihilated. Let the prophets be heeded!
The Ashʾarites have said that both are legislated, so that the good is that
which the Legislator has ordered whereas the bad is that which He has de-
nied, because knowledge concerning them is not a obtained through re-
flection or consensus, nor is it necessary, for otherwise it would be equal
to knowing that the whole is greater than the part. The consequent is defi-
nitely false, and likewise the antecedent. Furthermore, lying may be good
when it includes common good, like liberating a prophet from a tyrant, or
when someone says, ‘I shall lie tomorrow’.1 Besides, He most high obliged
the one whom He knew not to have faith, and it is absurd that anything
should be different from God’s knowledge, high is He, and He obliged Abū
Lahab to have faith, according to all that is reported of him. It is among the
reported things that he did not have faith, and so He obliged him to have
faith in his not having faith, which is a compound of two contraries.2 Final-
ly, the acts of servants are coerced, and so there is no goodness or badness.3
1 This is a moral variation on the liar’s paradox: if someone uttering this sentence lies on the
day after, she acts morally by living up to her promise.
2 Cf. Q 111.
3 The Ashʾarites deny that human acts are due to the creature’s exercise of free will, since this
would compromise God’s omnipotence. Human responsibility is due to the notoriously en-
256 256
األول :في الحسن والقبح العقل ّيين
[المطلب] ّ
ن ن ف ّ ئ ن
كا � ����هو إ� �م�ا ��� ا �ل��س�ا �هي� وا ��لن��ا �م .و�إ� �
� ة
حرك �� ن� �ل�ه � فص����ة �ز ا ئ��د �ة ع��لىح�د وث��ه ف����هوك� ا �ل��ف���ع�ل إ� � �ل�م ي� ك
�ذ ف �ة �ز �ة ف ن �أ �أ
ح����سن���ه و�هوا �ل���م��ب�اح؛ و �ل�ه �ص��� ا ئ��د � ،إ� � و ج���ب� ت� ا �ل� �م ع��ىل ح����س نٌ� لا � فص����ة �ز ا ئ��د �ة ع��ل � �
ى
� �ذ
ح�ا �ل�ه ا �ل� �م. ح قّ ف��ا ع�ل�ه ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م ب� � ��ا �لت�� ك ف���ه ا �ل ا ��� � ّلا ا ��لن��د �؛ � �ّم�ا �ق� ���� ٌ �ه �م�ا �����س��ت
ب وإ �ب يح و و ي � ر � و و ج ب وإ
� ن � نً �ق ً أ ّ �أ ّ
� ن
ضر ور ،ح����س�
ح�ا ب�ا �ل���� �ة ك وا ت���ف����ق��� ت� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة ع��لى ن� �م� ن� ال� ش�����ي���ا ء �م�ا �ي�ع��ل كو��ه ح����س���ا و ��ب��ي���
م
ظ
� �ا ر وا �ل�����ل ��� ب� ا �ل���ض
ذ ق ن
�ر ا �ل�م�ـ���ع���م و���ب�� ا �ل �ك ح��س�ا ن� و�ش�� ك� ا �ل���ص�د ق� ا ��لن��ا ف�� والإ� ن����ص�ا �ف� والإ� �
م ح ع
� ن � ق ق ن ق ن ن ق ف وا �ل��ف����س�ا د وت� ك�
ح�ه ب�����ظر ا �ل�ع�����ل ،كح����س� ا ل���ص�د � ح����س���ه و���ب��� ���لي�� �م�ا لا �ي��ط�ا �؛ و�م����ه�ا �م�ا �ي�ع��ل �
م
�أ ّ ّ
ح����س ن ل���ر ،لا ب����م�ع ن� ن��ه ع�ل��ةٌ ف�� ا �ل
� ��ه��ة ا � ش ن ن
��� ب� ا ��ل��ا ��ع ،و�م����ه�ا �م�ا �ي�ع��لم م�� ج �
� � ن ف �ق � � ذ
� �ا ر و ��ب�� ا ل ك ا �ل���ض
� ي ى ع ح
أ �أ ّ
ز�ة
��ا �ز إ� ظ���ه�ا را �ل���م�ع���ج�� ع��لى ي��د ل���ر ب��ه ،ول� نّ��ه �لولا ه ��جل كا �ش�� ف� �ل� ز �م�م� ن �ل�م ��ع��تق���د ا � ش � �ه�ا �ل��ق��� �� � ن
ع ي � � �ج و �بح ب ل
ن
�ة � ت ف ف �ة ث �ة �ذ ت ف
�ل�خ � ف � � �ذ
��ا ب� ،وا ���ل� ي� وع�د ه وو�عي���د ه وا ��ل��ع� ي� ب� ع��لى ا �ل��ط�ا ع� والإ� �ا ب� ع��لى ا �ل���م�ع����صي��� ي�������ي� ال ك
أ ف
��م� ت� ال� ن��ب� ي��ا ء. ���ل� ف� ل�أ �
ح ف ئ �ة ت
��ا ��د ا ��ل� ك� ي و
أ نّ ن ق ت أ ش ر�ة ن ش ّ ن ف �ل نُ �أ شّ
ل����ا رع ب��ه وا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� �م�ا ���هى �ع ن���ه؛ ل� � ا �ل�ع��ل ح����س� �مرا � و��ا �ل�� ال� ����ا �ع إ� ���ه���م�ا ���ر�عي���ا � ��ا �
م ح
� تّ ع�����م �م� ن ا �ل� ز �� ّ �أ � ظ �أ نّ ًّ ّ ً ن ًّ
ل ا
�
� �ج � و ي�� �ل ا ء، �
ك �
ل ا � �وى م ب ��لع� ل� ا � ا�
س ل��� ا ل � ، ا
� ور �� ال ا�
ع ا
�م� �ج ب��ه �ل��ي��س ����ظري إ
� ا�
ل و ضر ي وإ
ح��ة �ك��ت خ نّ أ قّ ق ً ف �ذ
������لي����ص ح����س ن� إ� �ذ ا ا ش������ت���م�ل ع��لى �م���ص��ل��� � ذ�� � ق��د ي�
� ��� ا ا �ل���م�����د �م .ول� � ا �ل �ك ب ب�ا ط�ل�����ط�ع�ا � ك
ف ّف ن ّ � ن ظ �ل �أ ق ل ذ ّ �غ ً أ ّ ت أ
��� � نب� �د ا ،ول� ن��ه ��ع�ا لىك��ل� �م� ن� ع��ل ع�د �مإ� ي����م�ا ن��ه ،و�خ �لا �� �م�ع�لو�م �ب�� م�� ��ا �م ،و��ا ل � ك
م ي
ق � ن �ة � �أ�خ �أ نّ ل �ؤ � ن �ف �أ�خ ن
ح�ا .ك��ل �ا ��له� �ا ل� ����م�ا ب� �أ ف ّ ت
��مي�� �م�ا ��بر ب��ه .و م���ج �م�ل� م�ا ��بر ��ه ا ي� م�� �����د ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا ل م
�
ى ل و � ب � ب� ب إ ي � �ج ع
� ��طرا رّي��ة ،ف��لا أ نّ �أ ف ٌ َ �أ ن ّ �أ ن
� ي�� ن�؛ ول� � ���ع�ا ل ا �ل�ع��ب�د ا �ض ك��ل ف���ه ب� � ي��ؤ �م� ن� ب� � لا ي��ؤ �م� ن� .و�هو�ج �م ب�ي�� ن� ا ��لن�ق��ي�����ض
ع
ق
ح����س ن� ولا ���ب�� . �
ح
257 257
On Justice
The answer is to deny the implication, for certain assents differ due to
the difference of conceptions in terms of perfection and deficiency,4 as well
as to falsify the consequent, for lying is never good. There must be ambigu-
ity in the liberation of a prophet, so that lying disappears, or it results from
the form of the reports, not being intended by the person but rather by the
inquiry. Lying must be refrained from in the morrow, because that includes
two aspects of goodness, namely refraining from lying and refraining from
actualising the decision to lie, although it does also include an aspect of
badness, but it is preferable to lying which includes two aspects of badness,
namely lying and actualising the decision to lie, and one aspect of good-
ness, which is truth. Knowledge follows from it, and it has no effect on that
from which it follows.
We deny lack of faith in His report about Abū Lahab. The Sura contains
his disparagement, not information about the lack of his faith. This can ar-
rive after his death. It is corroborated by His most high saying, neither will
help him,5 and His most high saying, it makes no difference whether you warn
them,6 the descent of the verses being possible both after their death and at
the moment of their heedlessness. The heedless is not obliged. The choice
of the servant will be clarified later.
Appendix
The sinner only sins in what is up to him. The same holds of obligations,
for when those endowed with understanding come to know an injustice, a
failure to return a deposit, or refraining from thanking a benefactor, they
reproach the agent for that, and when they come to know of returning a
deposit or thanking the Bestower, they commend the agent. When they
are inquired for the cause, they hasten to resort to reporting the injustice,
the withholding of deposit, the unbelief in the Bestower, or the giving or
denial of thanks. Were their knowledge not necessarily known, they would
not hasten to resort to these things, for that would be circular. Hence, it is
necessary that when there is injustice, there is badness. When the injustice
ends, its badness ends, and so it is a cause.
igmatic “acquisition” (iktisāb or kasb) of the acts God has created. Cf. VI.3 below.
4 In other words, the Ashʾarites’ implication ‘if there were moral intuitions, they would be as
uncontroversial as logical axioms’ is false, because even true conceptions come in degrees of
epistemic certainty.
5 Q 111:2.
6 Q 2:6.
258 258
ف �
��ي� ا �ل��ع�د �ل
� �ت� ف���ا ت � ا �ل���� �ة تت ف ت � ا �ل���م ن�� �م� ن ا �ل���م�لا �ز �م��ة ف�� نّ ا ��لت����ص�د ���ق���ا ت � ُ �
� ضر وري� �����ا و ب و ي إ� ع � وا �جلوا ب
ً � ذ�� � �ل��ي�� ب� ن تّ نق ن � ف�� ا �ل �ك
ح����س ن� �م��ط��قل���ا.� ن
�م�ا ل وا ��ل������ص�ا � ،و�م�� ب���ط�لا � ا ��ل��ا لي� ،وا �ل �ك ب س
�ت ّ ت
ا �ل����صورا ي
ِ
ن �غ ق �ة خ �أ �أ ت � نّ ّ ف���� ن�ت ف � � ذ �ة خ
��� ب� ،و ي� �ي� ب����صور الإ� ���ب�ا ر�م�� ي��ر����ص�د �ل�ه ،ب�ل �� ب� ا ��لت�وري� �ل��ت�����لي����ص ا ل��ب�� ي ���ي� ا ل ك و�
ي�ج
ي
� � ن �ه ت� � � ذ ذ ف �ل�لا ����س��ت ف����ه�ا �م .و �
��� ب� ��� ب� �ي� ا �ل غ���د لا ش������ت���م�ا ل ع��لى و ج���هي� ح����س�� ،م�ا رك ا ل ك �� ب� ت�رك ا �ل �ك ي�ج
ل � ن � �ذ �أ ق ن
ش �ت
��� ب� ا �ل���م����� ���م�ل ع��لى وت�رك إ� ت����م�ا �م ا �ل�ع ز��مع��لي��ه و�إ� ا ش������ت���م�ل ع��لى و�ج �ه ���ب�� ،و�هو و ى م�� ا ل ك
ح
ٌ
ح����س ن� و�هوا �ل���ص�د ق� ،وا �ل�ع��ل ت�ا ب� ف��لا � ذ�� ب� و� ت����م�ا �م ا �ل�ع ز��مع��لي��ه ،وع��ل و�ج �ه � � ق
���هي� ���ب�� �ه�م�ا ا �ل �ك وج
مع ى إ ح
ف ثّ
ي��ؤ �ر �ي� ا �ل���م��ت��بو .
ع
�ذ ّ ت �ت ش �ة ن �أ ن ن خ
�ن
و����م��ع إ� ���ب�ا ره ع�� ب�ي� ��ل�ه� ب� ب��ع�د �م الإ� ي����م�ا � .وا �ل��سور ا ����� ���م�ل�� �أَع��لى �م�ه لا ع��لى
َ �غْ َ ْ ق ّ ق ت ُ� �تَ
ح� ���م�ل ن��ز و��ل�ه�ا ب��ع�د �موت��ه .و�ي�ؤ�ي�د ه �و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى (�م�ا � ن�َى�ع ن���هُ) و�و�ل�ه الإ� خ���ب�ا ر ب��ع�د �مإ� ي����م�ا ن��ه .و ي�
�أَ�أَ
��
ا � غ ف� �غ
� ا
��� ل . م �
��ه��
ف �غ �أ ت َ ن
ح� ���م� ��ز ��له�ا ��ع�د �م ��ه���م ح�ا ل � ������لت �تَ ُ
�
� )
ْ
م ���
ُ
ه ��
تَ ْ �ذَ
��ت�ع�ا ل (�َ�سَ ا ءٌ َع��لَ ْ��ه��� ْم ن
� و ل ير ل و� ب و� و ي ر� ّى و ي �ِ
ن �أ ت � �ف
���ل� .و����سي��� �ي� ب�ي��ا � ا خ���تي���ا را �ل�ع��ب�د. مك
�ذ ٌ
���ت� �ن�ي�� ب�
ظ �أ ن ّ ت ف نّ ئ ّ
�� ،إ� � ا �ل�ع��ق���لا ء �م�تى ع�ل�موا ا �ل�����ل و�م�� ر د ��� ا ا �لوا ج���ب�ا
ذ
ح� ت� �ل���م�ا �هي� ع��لي��ه .وكا �ل��ق����ب�ا � إ� ن����م�ا �ق��ب���
م ع ح
�ة �أ �ة ّ �ذ ف ّ �ذ ت �أ �ة
حوا�را ��لن��ع���م� �م�د �
�را �ل���م ن���ع���م �موا ��ا ع�ل �ل�ك .و�م�تىع�ل�موا ر د ا �لود �ي�ع� و�ش�� ك� ا �لود �ي�ع� و�رك �ش�� ك�
ل �ذ� � ظّ �أ � ن � �ة �أ � ن ��لن �ة �أ ف ّ�ة ن ف �ذ ف
��ا ع�ل�ه� .إ� ا ط�ل� ب� �م����ه���م ا �ل�ع�ل� ب�ا د روا إ� ى كر ا ل�����لم و م���ه ا لود �ي�ع� وك����فرا � ا ��ع���م� و ل
�
ع ���
ن ن ف نّ ّ ّ ّ ف ش �أ
كا ��ر وا �لرد�� .لولا ع�ل��م�ه���ما �ل�ض���ر ور �ي� ب�ا �ل�ع��ل �ل���م�ا ب�ا د روا إ� ��لي���ه�ا �ل�ل�د ورا �� ،إ� � ا �ل�ض���رر�م�تى � ا �ل��� ك�
م
ظ ً ن ق ً �ذ ن ت ظ ن ت ق ف ن ّ
��ا � ع�ل��ة.
ح�ه � ك� ح�ا .و� ا ا ����فى ا �ل�����ل ا ����فى ���ب���
إ
كا � ���ب��ي��� ��ل�م�ا �
م
259 259
Investigation 2: That He Most High Does Not
Perform What Is Bad or Violate What Is Obligatory
It is proven by saying that He is alienated from what is bad, because He is
independent of it and knows its badness, and He has no motive to it, due to
both lack of a motive of need and wisdom, and so the act does not emerge
from Him at all.
The Ashʾarites trace bad acts back to Him, high is He above that, be-
cause He obliges the non-believer although He knows that faith is impos-
sible in him, and obliging that which cannot be heeded is bad according
to you. Moreover, He most high brings men and women together in this
world, making some available to others and both producing and denying
in them a tendency to union, and that is bad, just as it is bad of us to unite
a servant with a maiden.
We have already shown that knowledge is subsequent. The objective of
charging is to point at the ground that He produces in order to enable the
acquisition of a benefit, and the objective has been reached.7 If the one who
brings the servant together with the maiden forbids them from acquiring
each other, threatens them from it by great harms, does to them whatev-
er brings them closer to consenting and distances them from dissenting,
appoints them with someone that is quick to discipline them when they of-
fend what they have been ordered, and promises for their consenting great
benefit, which can only be acquired thereby, then that is not bad.
7 In other words, the point of moral obligation in the Revelation is to make believers attentive
of their freedom and their consequent responsibility for their own acts.
260 260
المطلب الثاني :في أنّه تعالى ال يفعل
القبيح وال ُي ِخ ُّل بالواجب
ّ أ نّ �غ ن ٌّ فً �أ نّ
ح�ه ،ولا د ا �عي� �ل�ه إ� ��لي��ه لا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ��ع ن���ه وع�ا �ل�مٌ ب���ق����ب��� ي��د ل ع��لي��ه � �ل�ه �ص�ا ر��ا �ع� ن� ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ،ل� ��ه � �
ي ح
ُ ف � ن �ق ً حك ف
�م��ة�� ،لا �ي���ص�د را �ل�����ع�لع���ه ����ط�ع�ا. �� ح�ا �ج ��ة وا �ل د ا �ع� ا �ل
�
ي
ف ّ ّ أ �ذ �ذ ت ئ ق �أ ر�ة أ
� � �م ع�لم�ه ا �م��ت ن���ا � � ل ن�ه ��ل ا �ل � وال� �ش���ا �ع ����سن���د ا ا �ل����� �ا � � ��ل��ه ��ع�ا ل �ع� ن ك
و �ب ح إ ي ى � ر ل�ك � � ك � ك�ا فر ع � ب� ع
ن ف
� �م .ل�أ نّ��ه �ت�ع�ا ل �ج �م ��� ن ُ قُ ق ٌ ن ن � ن ت� � ف
ي� ء ا�
س ����ل� ا ل ا�
ى ع بي� ر�ج و�
ل ا ���لي�� �م�ا لا �ي��ط�ا � ���ب��ي��ح �ع���د ك� و الإ� ي����م�ا � م���ه ،و ك
�ذ ق ً ع�� ��ه��� �م� ن �� ض �� ن �� ض ن ّ
�م�ا� ّر�م�ه ،و �ل�ك ���ب��ي�� ك� ع���� ،و ج���ع�ل ��ل�ه���م�مي���لا إ� لى الا ج���ت���م�ا وح ب � م � � ب ا �ل�د �ي��ا و�م �
ك
ح ع
ّ
�ي��ق����ب�� �م ن���ا �ج �م ا �ل�ع��بي���د والإ� �م�ا ء.
�أ ّ ع ح
ض ف ف ض ٌ ّن �أ ّ ق
حي��� ث� � ��ع�ل�ه ب�
� ���لي�� �هوا ��لت��عر���� ع��ل �م�ع ن� ن��ه ي ج� و��د ب�ي� ن��ا � ا �ل�ع��لَ ت�ا ب� ،وا �ل��غر�� �� ا ��لت� ك�
ي � ى ى ي م ع
ال � ء � �ذ ا ن ن � ض
ح���ص� ا �ل��غر�� ،وا �جل ق ف ن ي��ت���م ك ن ن
��ا �مع ب�ي��� ا �ل�ع��بي���د و إ� م�ا إ ���ه�ا �ه���م ��� �م�� ا �لو�صول إ� لى ا ��ل���ع و��د � ل
ع��������م ا �ل���� ر ،و ف���ع� ب���ه���م�م�ا ُ����� ّ ���ه���م�م� ن ع��� ت� ّع�د �ه��� ع��ل��ه �� ظ ض ض ن
� بقر ي ل ضر ي م ي ب �ع�� و�صول ب��ع������ه���مإ� لى ب�� � و و
ً ُ
�أ ّ ّ ُ ّ
الا �م��ت��ث�ا ل و���ع�د �ه���م�ع� ن� ا �ل���م�� خ��ا �ل��ف����ة ،ون�����ص� ب� ��ل�ه���م�م� ن� ي��ؤ د ب���ه���مإ� �ذ ا �أ�خ �لوا ب����م�ا �مروا ب��ه ع�ا �ج �لا
يب
� ّ � ن �ق ً نف ّ
�ذ ظ �ث
ح�ا.��� ��ب��ي����� ن� ا �لو�صول إ� �لي��ه إ� لا ب��ه ل�م ي� ك ووع�د �ه���مع��لى الا �م��ت� �ا ل ب��ع���ي�����ما ��ل��� ا �ل� �ي� لا ي����م ك
ع
261 261
Investigation 3: On the Creation of Acts
Jahm ibn Ṣafwān8 maintained that there is no agent apart from God most
high, and Ashʾarites and Najjārites have said that the one who brings to
be is God most high, whereas the servant merely acquires, and that He
most high creates the act and the power in the servant together. They dif-
fer concerning acquisition, and Ashʾarī has said that it is an unfolding of
God’s custom, high is He, of bringing into existence the act and the power
together at the choice of the servant, the servant’s power having no effect.
Some of his companions have said that it means that the servant’s power
is effective concerning the act’s being obedience, disobedience, frivolous,
or according to some other of those attributes of action, with which one
is charged and through which praise and blame are deserved. Others have
said that it is unknown.
The people of justice9 have maintained that the animal has acts taking
place through its power and choice, and according to Abū al-Ḥusayn and
his followers this is known necessarily. This is the truth. According to other
masters of the Muʾtazilites as well as the Imāmī masters following them,
they are acquired.
In our view, everyone endowed with understanding knows necessarily
the goodness of praising virtue and blaming offence, and this is based on
the agency of the one praised or blamed, as well as on our acts taking place
in accordance with our objectives and being excluded in accordance with
our refusals. This is what it means to be an agent. Furthermore, the neces-
sity is decisive due to the distinction between our voluntary and forced
motions, and it would be bad of Him most high to order and prohibit the
way it is bad to order and prohibit inanimate things. Finally, there is that
which is heard from tradition.
8 Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) was an early theologian who became notorious for his rigid
determinism.
9 The people of justice are the Muʾtazilites who maintain that justice is a standard we can apply
in reasoning about God’s acts.
262 262
المطلب الثالث :في خلق األعمال
ق ت أ ش ر�ة ن ّ ّ�ة نّ ّل � ُ ت � � ن ف ن ل �أ ن ل ف �ذ
�
و ج ري إ � � ا�� ����ل� ا �
ع ا���� � ال � ��
ل ا�
� ى و ، ل ا
�ع� � �ه
ل � ل ا ا �
�ه� ب� ج���ه���م ب� �ص��وا � إ� ى � ا ل إ
�
ع ا
��
ً � ق �ة �ت ٌ �أ ّ
�خ�ل ق� ��د ر �ل��ل�ع��ب�د وا �ل��ف���ع�ل �م�ع�ا. �؛ و ن��ه �ت�ع�ا لى ي� ت
� �هو ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى وا �ل�ع��ب�د �م �ك ح�د ث
������س� ب ا �ل���م��� ِ
ا � ق �ة ت �جرا ء ا �ل�ع�ا د �ة ب�� ي�ج� أش ّ ف� ق ف
ف
��ا د ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ا �ل�����ع�ل و ل�����د ر � �هو إ� � خ� �ت ف � �
إ وا � ��ل��وا ي� ا ل�ك����س� ب������ ،ا ل ال� ����عر�ي
ف � � ن ه ت�أث �ق �ة ض �أ �ق ل �أث� � ق �ة ً ن خ �ت
� ص �
�ب ي� �د �
ع ��
ل ا ر �د ير ��� � ا
���ع� م �ه�ب ا
�ح �م�ع�ا �ع���د ا �� ي���ا ر ا �ل�ع��ب�د ،وا ر ل�����د ر �ب و ب �
�
ع��� � ل ا� �د. �ع� �
ل ا
�ةً �أ � �ةً �أ � �ثً �غ � ن ف ت � ف �ّت ��ت ن � ��لت� � ف ن
���لي�� وب���ه�ا �و� ا �ل��ف���ع�لط�ا ع� و م�ع����صي��� وع��ب� �ا و ي��ر�ه�ا م�� �ص���ا � ا ل�����ع�ل ا �ل�� ي� ��ا و�ل�ه�ا ا ك ك
ي
ا ��ذّ � ّ ق �آ � ن ّ �غ �ت � ّ
�خرو� إ� ن��ه ي��ر�م�ع�لو�م. ح ق� ا �ل���م�دح و ل� م .و��ا ل ي�����س� ��
ف ن �أ خ �ت � ل �أ نّ � � ن �أ ف ً ت ق ق ت �أ �ذ
ح��يوا � ���ع�ا لا �����ع ب������د ر���ه���م وا �� ي���ا ر �ه���م��� ،ع���د ب�ي� و �ه� ب� �ه�ل ا �ل�ع�د ل إ ى � ل��ل��
�ة ح قّ � .ع ن���د �ا �ق � ش ٌّ � ن ن ت �أ نّ
�خ ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� و�م� ن�ت�ا ب���ع�ه���م م����ا ي� م ب ضر ي� و و � و ب ي� ل
�� ا �ه � ور �� �ه
� ع
��ل � �
ل ا � ح��سي��� و�م�� �ا ب��ع�ه ا ل
�
ّ�ة �أ نّ ٌّ �م� ن ش������� خ
�. � الإ� �م�ا �مي��� ��ه��ك��س� � يو
بي
�ة ّ ّ�ذ ال � ن ُ
ضر ور�ة � ق ّ ّ�أ ن
ح��س�ا � وا �ل� �م ع��لى الإ� ��س�ا ء ، ح����س نَ� ا �ل���م�دح ع��لى إ� كل ع�ا ��ل �ي�ع��ل ب�ا �ل���� ��لن��ا � �
م
ح����س�� �ق���ص د �ان � ا �ل� م��ذ �م � ف��ا ع� اً؛ ل أ نّ �أ ف���ع�ا ��لن��ا ا �ق��ع��ة ن قف
و�هو ي�ت�و���� ع��لى ك
و ب � و ب �و� ا �ل���م���م�د وح و �� و م ل و� �
ق أ نّ ّ �ة ق ف
كا ت�ن��ا�ر ��� ي����ة ب�ا �ل����فر� ب�ي�� ن� ح ح����س� ب� �صوا ر� ن���ا ،و�هو�م�ع ن�ى ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل .ول� � ا �ل�ض���ر ور ��ا �ض و�م ن����ت ف��ي����ة ب�
�
ن
��م�ا د و���هي���ه؛ �م�ا ���ق��� �� �أ �م ا �ج�ل �ك ه ��� �� ا ّ��ة� ،ل��ق��� �� �م ن���ه �ت�ع�ا ل ال�أ �م ا ��ل ن ّ
الا خ���تي���ا ري��ة والا �ض
ر و � ي� ي �بح ر ى ح �ب و ير طر
و�ل��ل��س���م .
ع
263 263
On Justice
The opponent has argued that if the servant cannot refrain at the time
of acting, the act is coerced, but if he can, then if the preponderance is not
based on any preponderating factor, it follows that something contingent
is preponderated without a preponderating factor. If it is based on a pre-
ponderating factor and if this is from the agent, the investigation returns.
Were this factor not from the agent, coercion would follow, because the
act is impossible without it and necessary through it. Furthermore, if he
brought his act into existence, then he would know its ramifications, for a
universal objective is not sufficient for the occurrence of what is particular,
because its relation to all particulars is equal. The consequent is decisive-
ly false, because there is no knowledge of the intermediate rests in slow
motions.10 Moreover, if the servant wanted to move a body but God most
high wanted to keep it still, then were both or neither to take place, an ab-
surdity would follow, whereas were one of them to take place, there would
be preponderance without a preponderating factor, since both of them are
independent. Finally, if He knows that something will take place, this is
necessary, otherwise it is impossible, and so there is no power.
The answer is that he is capable of refraining with regard to power but
incapable with regard to motive, and the motive does not emerge to him
from the power, because the two alternatives are equal in relation to power
alone, but terminates in what is the due share of the Necessary Existent.
General knowledge is sufficient for bringing into existence. A particular act
can be triggered by a universal objective when its specification by substrate
and time is considered, but not with respect to the objective. The power of
Him most high is stronger, so that His act emerges first, and the necessity
that is traced back to knowledge is subsequent.
10 This counterargument is based on the theory, mentioned above in III.3.7.3, that differences
in speed between motions are due to the amount of short intermediate phases of rest. In a
slow motion, there are more such phases than in a fast motion. The argument here is that if
we were the knowing and voluntary agents of our acts, we should know all that is included in
carrying them out. For instance, if I were to walk slowly to the other room, I should be aware
of the alteration of the phases of motion and rest – and indeed, of both phases as my own acts.
264 264
ف �
��ي� ا �ل��ع�د �ل
265 265
On Justice
11 If we suppose P instead of not-P, then P necessarily holds, but only by virtue of the supposi-
tion. By the same token, if we suppose (God’s) knowledge that P instead of (God’s) knowl-
edge that not-P, then (God’s) knowledge that P holds, but only by virtue of the supposition of
knowledge and the entailed supposition of P as the ground of its truth. As Ḥillī has said time
and again, he believes that knowledge universally conforms to what is known, not the other
way around.
266 266
ف �
��ي� ا �ل��ع�د �ل
267 267
Investigation 4: That He Most High Wills
Obedience and Detests Disobedience
This is the doctrine of those who endorse justice,12 pace the Ashʾarites, be-
cause He has a motive for obedience but no distraction from it, and He has
a distraction from disobedience and no motive for it, for He is wise and one
who is wise has a motive for the good, obedience being good, and distrac-
tion from the bad, disobedience being bad. Moreover, willing what is bad is
bad, for those endowed with understanding concur about the blame upon
one who wants what is bad. Besides, He has ordered obedience and pro-
hibited disobedience, which entail will and detest, for an order is an order
with respect to willing what is ordered. Finally, He most high has said: The
evil of all these actions is hateful to your Lord,13 and he lies who says, ‘If God
had willed, we would not have ascribed partners to Him’,14 and He has said:
God does not will injustice for His creatures,15 God does not like corruption,16
He is not pleased by ingratitude in His servants,17 I created jinn and mankind
only to worship Me,18 though all they were ordered to do was worship God
alone, sincerely devoting their religion to Him.19
They have argued by saying that willing obedience from an unbeliever
entails its taking place and detesting disobedience entails its non-existence.
Moreover, an order may be brought into existence without willing, like in
the case of the one who seeks an excuse for hitting his servant in the latter’s
heedlessness towards him, for he orders the servant but does not will him
to act, in order for his excuse to be evident. He most high has said: Had
your Lord willed, all the people on earth would have believed.20
The answer is that He willed it to take place by choice and detested dis-
obedience taking place by choice, lest the obligation be annihilated. The
Lord brings to existence the form of the order, not its heeding, nor is there
will for it, whereas the verse only refers to coercion.
268 268
المطلب الرابع :في أنّه تعالى يريد الطاعات
ويكره المعاصي
فَ ً فً �أ ر�ة أ نّ �ذ �ذ
�ه� ا �م� �ه� ب� ا �ل�ع�د ��ليّ���ة �خ �لا ��ا �ل�ل �ش���ا �ع ،ول� � �ل�ه د ا �عي���ا إ� لى ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة ولا �ص�ا ر�� �ل�ه �ع ن����ه�ا،
�َ
�ي�����ٌم؛ وا �ل أ نّ ��ه ص�ا �فٌ �ع� ن ا �ل���م� �ص����ة
ح���سَ� ن�، �ي�����م �ل�ه د ا � لى ا ل
� عإ ك ح� ك ح �ه� � ل ا،�ه��
� �
�ل
ي إي� �ه ل� � ع � ا د ا لو ول � ر� � ع��� ي
�ة ق �ق �ةٌ ّ أ �ة �ق ٌ ٌ
ح��ة؛ ول� ن� إ� را د ا �ل������ب��ي�� ��ب��ي���
ح� ح����سن����ة ،و�ل�ه �ص�ا ر�ف� �ع� ن� ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� وا �ل���م�ع����صي��� ��ب��ي��� وا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة �
ح ح
�ة ن �ة أ نّ �أ �ذ ّ ل �ت � ن
ح��س�ا � ا �ل�ع��ق���لا ء �م �مر�ي�د ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ،ول� ��ه �مر ب�ا �ل��ط�ا ع� و���ه� �ع�� ا �ل���م�ع����صي��� .و ه�م�ا
� ن ا ����س� ��
ي ح
�ة �أ �أ ف نّ أ ّ
�را �ه��ة؛ �إ� � ال� �مر إ� ن����م�ا �هو �مٌر ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ر إ� را د ا �ل���م� �مور ب��ه؛ و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ي�����س��ت�ل�ز �م�ا ن� الإ� را د �ة وا �ل ك�
َّ َ َ ق ذ ُ ُّ �ذَ َ َ نَ َ ّ ئُ ُ � نْ َ َ ّ َ َ ْ ُ ً ت
��� ب� �م� ن� ��ا ل� ( :ل ْو �� شَ��� �ا ءَ ا �ل��ل�هُ ���م�ا �رو�ه�ا) وك كا � ��س�ِي���ه ِع���د رب��ك �م ك� (كل �ِل�ك � ��ع�ا لى� :
ِ �أَ ْ َْنَ
َّ ُ ُ ُّ � سَ َ َن َ َّ ُ ُ ُ �ُ ًْ ّْ عَ َ ق
�
كا) و و�ل�ه( :و���م�ا ا �ل��ل�ه ���ي�ر�ي�د ��ظ�ل�م�ا �ِل��ل��� �ا �ل�ِ��مي���)( ،وا �ل��ل�ه لا ي�ِ��ح� ب� ا �ل�� ��فَ�� �� �ا د)، � �����ش�ر��
َ ِ
� نَّ ال � سَ � ل ّ ��لَ ْ ُ ُ ن ل� �َ �خَ َ�ْ تُ ُ �ْ َ
ضَىِ�ل�ِ���ع��بَ�ا ِد ِه ا �
يَ ْ
(ولا �� �ر��
و�)، ِ �د �ب ���ع� �
يِ ا إ ��ن�� � �إ و � � �ج ا � �
��ق ��ل
�� ا�م ( و )، ر �
�ف �
���
�ك ل
ِ
نَ �َ ُ � ّ � نَ َ �أُ ُ َّ �يَ ُْ ُ َّ َ ُ ْ
ي�). ���خ�ِ�ل��ِ�صي��� ل�ه ا ل ِ�د (و���م�ا ���م� وا � لا �ل���� �ع��ب�د وا ا �ل��ل�ه م
�
ِ ر إ ِ
ّ �أ
�ة ت � � �ت����س��ت�ل�ز � ق� � ه�ا ك �ة
�را �ه� ا �ل���م�ع����صي��� �����س��ت�ل�ز �م ح��ت�� ج� ا � نّ� � را د �ة ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة �م� ن
م و و�ع� و فر ا�
�
ك ل� ا � ا� و ب إ
ق �ذ ن أ نّ أ ق
ضر ب� �ع��ب�د ه ب��ع�د �م ���بو�ل�ه ع�د ��م�ه�ا؛ ول� � ال� �مر ��د �يو�ج �د ب��د و� الإ� را د �ة�ك��ط�ا �ل� ب� ا �ل�ع� ر �ع� ن� ��
َ ْ شَ َ َُّ َ آ َ نَ َ ن ف ق ت ف َ ظ هرَ �ذ ن ف �أ
�م���ه� ،ي��� �مره ولا ي�ر�ي�د ���ع�ل�ه ��لي������ ع� ره؛ و�و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :و�لو����ا ء رب�ك ل� �م���م�� ِي�
�
ُ ُّ ُ ْ�جَ ً أَ
ْض
ك��ل���ه��م ِ����مي���ع�ا). ال� ر�ِ� �
��لت� � ف ً ّ ً ُ �أ ّ �أ
���لي��. �ره إ� �ي��ق���ا ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة ا خ���تي���ا را�� ،لئ��لا ي�ب���ط�ل ا ك �وا ب� ن��ه را د إ� �ي��ق���ا ��ع�ه�ا ا خ���تي���ا را وك وا ��جل
ع
�ة آ ّ أ
�م�ا لا إ� را د ،وال� ي��ة ي��د ل ع��لى ا �ل��ق����سر. وا �ل���مولى �يو�ج �د �صور�ة ال� �مر ولا ط�ل� ب� ك�
269 269
Investigation 5: On the Charge
It is the will of one who must be obeyed with respect to initiating21 that
which is laborious and under the condition of having been made known.22
It is good because it is an act of Him most high, for God performs no bad
acts. It inevitably has an objective, since frivolousness is bad, albeit not
an objective that returns to Him most high, for He is self-sufficient, or to
anything other than the one charged, for it would be bad to bestow labour
for the benefit of another. When the one charged is harmed because of his
badness, this is not initiated anew, nor is he availed by knowledge of his
unbelief when he has rebelled against the charge, and his pleading for avail
or about the harm due to his badness does not validate initiation anew, for
then the charge would become frivolous. Hence, benefit cannot be initiat-
ed anew.23
The Ashʾarites have denied an objective in His acts, for otherwise He
would be deficient in His essence and perfected by that objective, since by
obtaining it He would obtain that which is appropriate to Him. This is not
sound, for otherwise frivolousness would follow and goals would be nulli-
fied in products of evident wisdom. The benefit is preposterous, just as it is
in the case of His being a creator.
The charge is necessary according to the Muʾtazilites, pace the Ashʾarites,
for otherwise He would be seducing to what is bad, because one endowed
with understanding has an inclination to what is bad and is alienated from
the good. Were it not for the charge that restrains from what is bad, the
inclination would be pursued.
21 That is, the servant must obey God in the acts he initiates himself.
22 That is, God must have informed the servant of His will.
23 The point here is that God will not intervene to save a sinner from his responsibility and its
consequences, nor are there alleviating circumstances, such as God’s alleged knowledge of
the sinner’s unbelief.
270 270
المطلب الخامس :في التكليف
م���قّ����ة � ش��� ط ال� ع�لا �م .و�ه � ن ��ه��ة الا �ت��د ا ء �م�ا ف����ه � ش �ت
�� ب� ط�ا �ع� �ه ع��لى ج� � ب و�هو � را د �ة �م� ن ي�ج�
ح����س� و ب ر إ ي � إ
ً ّ ف ت أّ
ل� ن��ه �م� ن� ���ع�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ،وا �ل�ل�ه لا ي���ف���ع�ل ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ؛ ولا ب��د �م� ن���غر�ضٍ� �ل��ق����ب�� ا �ل�ع��ب� ث� ،و�ل��ي��س ع�ا ئ��د ا إ� ��لي��ه
ح ح
� � ّف ف �ة ش قّ ت ل ل �ت غ ن ئ ل ل �غ � �ّف
���ل� ضر ر ا ل���م ك ���ل� �ل��ق����ب�� إ� �ل�ز ا �م ا �ل���م������ ��ل��� ا �ل��ي��ر ،ولا ��
غ ن ��ع�ا ى ا ����س� �����ا ��ه وا إ� ى ي��ر ا ل���م ك
ع ح
ت �ت� � ف
ح�ه ،ولا ضرر �ل��ق����ب��� � �ه �ل��ل���������فره ،ولا ��عر�ي���ض ���لي�� �م� ن� ع��ل ك � �ه ب ك ح�ه ا ب�ت��د ا ء ،ولا ن���ف���ع�ه لا ن�ت�ق���ا �ض �ل��ق����ب���
م
ً ف أّ ّ
ت
��� الا ب���د ا ء ب��ه. ن ��لن� ف�� �ي���ص�� الا ب�ت��د ا ء ب��ه ل� ن��ه �ي���صي��ر�ع��ب��ث�ا؛ ����هوا ��لت��عر�ي ض���� ��ل��� لا ي����م ك
ف ن
ع ع ح
� اً �ذ � � �ض �ت ت �ذ ف ً ق ن ن ّ ف ض ف �أ ف ن ر�ة أ
��ا � �ا ����ص�ا �ي� ا ��ه �م����س� �كم�ل ب� ل�ك ا ل��غر �، وال� �ش���ا �ع �����وا ا �ل��غر�� �� ���ع�ا �ل�ه و� لا �ل ك�
إ ي
ّ أ
ت �غ ث
� ي���د ،و�إلا �ل�ز �م ا �ل�ع��ب�� و�إ ب���ط�ا ل �ا ي�ا �
ّ ح���ص� �ل�ه �م�ا �هو ال� و لى �ل�ه .و�ل��ي�� ب�ج� � � �ذ ب�
�
س ح���صو�ل�ه ي� ل إ
�ةّ ق �خ ف
�م�ا �� ا �ل ك �ة �ة ف �ت هر�ة
� ا �ل����ا � ح �ك ظ ا �ل���م����ص ن�� ع�ا ت
��ا �ل����ي��� . ��م�ه�ا .والا ����س� ���ا د ب�ا ط�ل� � ي و
ً ق أ نّ ً ن ّ ر�ة �أ ً
ف
��ا � �م��غر �ا ب�ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ،ل� � �ل��ل�ع�ا ��ل �مي���لا و�هو وا ج�� ب� �ع ن���د ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �خ �لا ��ا �ل�ل �ش���ا �ع و� لا �ل ك�
ي ح إ
ت �ز ق
�جر�ع� ن� ا �ل������ب��ي�� �ل �م ا ر� ك� ���لي� ف� ا �ل ا �
�ز ح����س ن .ف��لولا ا ��لت� ك� ن ف ً ن �ل ق
��ا ب��ه.
ح إ� لى ا �ل������ب��ي��ح و�����ورا �ع�� ا � �
271 271
On Justice
Its condition is that the one charged knows the attribute of an act, lest
he be charged with what is bad or what is indifferent, and the degree of
reward it merits, so that he believes in ending oppression. Further condi-
tions are that there is power to bring about the act, that he is above acting
badly and free from necessity, and that what he is charged with is possible,
for it would be bad to charge with the impossible, that the act is such that
it merits reward, like a duty, a commission or refraining from what is bad,
that the one charged have power over it when he distinguishes between it
and that with which he is not charged but of which he is capable in terms of
the instrument and the knowledge of what it requires. The reason for why
it is good to charge the believer also holds of the unbeliever, for knowledge
is not produced and the pleading for benefit is established for him, too. The
choice of unbelief does not remove the goodness of what is good.
272 272
ف �
��ي� ا �ل��ع�د �ل
273 273
Investigation 6: On Grace
When the one charged is endowed with it, he is closer to acting obediently
and further removed from doing what is bad, but it has no share in enabling
him, nor does it reach the limit of coercing. Hence, an instrument is not
grace, because it is included in enabling. Coercing would deny the charge,
unlike grace. Grace is necessary, pace the Ashʾarites, for otherwise it would
follow that the objective is invalidated. Since He most high knows that the
one charged will not choose to obey or is not close to it, unless there is an
act, which He performs through him, He is necessitated to act, for other-
wise He would have invalidated His objective. By the same token, if one
has prepared food for another, knowing that the person will not eat unless
an act of unlaborious and unobjectionable courteousness is performed to-
wards him, but does not perform that act, he did not want the other person
to eat.
Let it not be said: If an act is possible without grace, it does not depend
on grace. Were that not the case, grace would become part of the whole
enabling, like power. Moreover, the aspect of necessity is not sufficient in
the case of one, from whom the aspects of badness have not been removed,
but why cannot grace encompass the bad aspects as well? Finally, if grace
entails preponderance that precludes the contradictory, it is coercing. If it
does not preclude that, it does not suffice for the existence of the act, and if
it does not entail preponderance at all, its use vanishes.
For we say: An act depends on a motive. Grace is a motive, its cause,
or something that strengthens it, and so the act depends on it but it is not
enabling. The aspects of badness are restricted and precisely determined,
because we are charged with avoiding them, and they are precluded from
grace. The consequence of preponderance that precludes the contradic-
tory does not entail coercing, any more than does the motive through
which an act is necessary, for even if it did not preclude the contradictory,
it would suffice together with the motive and the power.
If grace is an act of His most high, His performing it is necessary, but if
it is an act of the one charged, He most high must make him acquainted
with it and necessitate it. If it is an act of something other than either, He
could not charge him with an act depending on that grace, unless He knew
decisively that that other performs the act.
274 274
المطلب السادس :في ال ّلطف
�ظٌّ ف �أ ف �أ �ه � ن � �ّف
ح�� �� ن� �ل�ه � ���ل� �م�ع�ه �قر ب� إ� لى ���ع�ل ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة و ب��ع�د �م� ن� ���ع�ل ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ،و�ل�م ي� ك كا � ا ل���م ك و و م�ا �
ح
ًف ً أن ��� ن �ل ����ل�غ � ل ح ّ�د ال �ل ف آ �ة ف �ت
�ي�� ن�. ��ا ء�� ،ا ل� �ل� �ل��ي����س� ت� �ل��ط��ف���ا؛ ل� � ��ل�ه�ا �م�د �خ �لا �ي� ا �ل��ت���م �ك إ� �ج �ي� ا �ل� ���م �كي� و�م يب إ ى
�خ� ا �ف ا �ل��لّ��ط��ف � ،ه ا �� ٌ �خ � ا ف�ً�ا �ل� �أ �ش��� ّ��ة؛ � ّلا �ل�ز �م ن��ق�� ض ��ا ء ي�ن��ا ف�� ا ��لت� ك� ف �
� وال� ��جل
� � �� ���لي�� ب ل � � و و و ج ب� ل ل عري وإ ي إ
��ل ّل � ن �ف ن �أ �ة �أ �خ ف ّ ّ ن �أ �ذ ت ّ ف ض
�و� قر ب� إ� ي���ه�ا إ� ا ع���د ��ع�ل
���ت�ا ر ا �ل��ط�ا ع� ولاي� ك � ���ل� لا ي� ا �ل��غر��� ،إ� ن��ه ��ع�ا لى إ� ا ع��ل � ا �ل���م ك�
�أ ّ �أ �غ ً � ن قّ ً ق ُ ن ف م ّ
كل
ن
� �ه؛ ك�م�� ��د �م��ط�ع�ا �م�ا إ� لى ي��ره و�ي�ع��ل ��ه لاي� � � �ا �ل��غر �ض ن
كا � �م���ا ����ض ي��ف���ع�ل�ه ب��ه و ج�� ب� ع��لي��ه ���ع�ل�ه و�إلا �
ً أ م
ف �غ ّل �ذ ف � ن ً � ن ��لت�أ ّ ل � ش ّ ف
�� ن� �مر�ي�د ا ل�ك�ل�ه. � ��ة�� ،لو�ل�م ي��ف���ع�ل�ه �ل�م ي� ك � �ا �ض م���ق����ة �ي���ه ولا ����ض إ� اإ� ا ���ع�ل م�ع�ه �وع�ا م�� ا �� د ب� ا
��م�ا �ل �ت� �ّق��ف ع�� ا ��لّط��ف ّ � ،ل ص�ا �م� ن �م� �ة نً ن ا� ف � ن ن
كا � �م� ك�� �م ي و � لى ل� �� � وإ ا � ر ��ج ل� لا ي��ق���ا ل ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ب��د و� ل��ل��ط��� إ � �
ف ن ف ف �غ �ة أ نّ ّ
كا �فٍ� �ي���ه �م�ا �ل�م ي��ت�� �ع ن���ه و ج�وه ا �ل��ق����ب�� ��ِ� ،لَ لا كا �ل��ق���د ر ،ول� � و�ج �ه ا �لو ج�و ب� ي��ر � �ي�� ن� �
ا �ل��ت���م �ك
ح م
ن ح�ا نً�ا �م�ا ن��عً�ا �م� ن ا ��لن�ق���� ض ف ن قت أ نّ ق �ّ ف � �ز
� ي � � اك
� ��� �� ��
إ � ضى ر�ج� � �
�� ا � � ��
ط �ل�� �
ل� ا �و ا ش������ت���م�ا ل ا ل��ل��ط�� ى و�ج �بح و �
� ل ، �
� �� �ه �
ل �
ع � ي�ج
ف ً ���ف� ف�� و ج�ود ا �ل��ف���ع�ل ،و� ن� �ل�م ي��ق��ت�� ض���� ر�ج�� ��ا ءً .و� ن� � ن �غ ن �
ح�ا ن�ا ا �ل��ب��ت��ة ا ن�ت� ف��� ت� ��ا ئ��د ت��ه. إ كا � ي��ر�م�ا �ع ل�م ي� ك ي إ
� ��جل
إ
�أ ق ّ ف �ت ق فّ �أ ّ ف ّ ّ ّ ف ت ق فّ ّ نق أ
ل� ن�ا �����ول ا �ل�����ع�ل ي��و���� ع��لى ا �ل�د ا �عي� .وا �ل��ل��ط��� إ� �م�ا ا �ل�د ا �عي� و��س�ب� ب��ه و�م����و�ي�ه� ،ي��� و����
ه � ا؛�ه�� ا
� ���لّف�� ن� �ا ���ت ن
�� �
ك م � ا
�
�ة أ نّ
�� ��بوط� ،ل�
�ة
ح���صور �م���ض �ي�� ن��ً�ا .وو ج�وه ا �ل��ق����ب�� م
� ع��لي��ه ا �ل��ف���ع�ل و�ل��ي��ست����م ك
و ب ج ب � و ي� ح
ّ ن قت ف ٌ
�
كا �ل�د ا عي� ��ا ء� ، ح�ا ن� ا �ل���م�ا � �م� ا ��ل���ي����� لا ي�����س� �ل �م ال� �جل
� �ز �ت ض ق ن ن � �ا ء ا �لر�ج�� �م ن�� ف��يّ����ة �ع� ن� ا �ل��ل��ط��� ،وا ������ض
إ � ع �
�ة ّ ن � ا�ف �ن ه � ن ن ّ�ذ
����فى �م ا �ل�د ا �عي� وا �ل��ق���د ر . كا � �غ ي��ر�م�ا � ك ا �ل� �ي� ي�ج�� ب� ل�����ع�لع���د ،وإ� �
ع ع
ف ّ ف ن ن ف � ف ن ن ف ت
���ل� و ج�� ب� كا � �م� ن� ���ع�ل ا �ل���م ك� كا � �م� ن� ���ع�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى و ج�� ب� ع��لي��ه ���ع�ل�ه ،و�إ� � وا ل��ل��ط��� إ� � �
ّ
ن ن ن ف� �غ �ه � � ز ن � ف ً ق ً ّ �أ ت �أ ن ُ ّ ف ّ ُ
���ل ف���ه ���ع�لا �م��تو���ف���ا كا � �م�� ��ع�ل ي��ر �م�ا ل�م ي�ج � � ي� ك عر��ه إ� ي�ا ه و�يو ج���ب�ه ع��لي��ه ،و�إ� � ع��لي��ه ��ع�ا لى � �ي�
ق ً ن �ذ �أ �ذ ّ ّ ف �ذ
ع��لى �ل�ك ا �ل��ل��ط��� إ� لا إ� ا ع��ل � �ل�ك ي���ف���ع�ل�ه �����ط�ع�ا.
م
275 275
Investigation 7: On Pains and Compensations
Some pain is bad, namely that which emerges from us and the compensa-
tion of which belongs to us, and some is good. If this is from our activity, it
is permitted, recommended, or obligatory, and its compensation belongs
to Him most high, but if it is from His activity, high is He, it is either with
respect to the desert of punishment or with respect to initiation.24
This is controversial, and Bakrites25 have denied it, whereas Ashʾarites
have said that there is no compensation from Him most high for the pain
He has inflicted or ordered. The transmigrationists have said that He most
high inflicts pain only with respect to punishment. According to the en-
dorsers of justice, He most high inflicts pain by way of initiation, provided
that it includes a common good, which cannot be brought about without
it, and it is grace either for the one in pain or for another. If the one in pain
were compensated for encountering it, it would be multiplied many times,
insofar as the one suffering the pain would choose compensation and pain,
for withholding compensation from the one in pain would be oppression,
whereas withholding grace would be frivolous.
Compensation is a deserved benefit that is devoid of laudation and ex-
altation. That which belongs to us is equal to the pain, whereas that which
belongs to Him most high due to His act, permission, order, or enabling
the one not endowed with understanding, is more than the pain.
24 That is, pain can be a way for God to incite us into action.
25 These are followers of a certain Bakr ibn Ukht ʾAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Zayd, an early adversary of
the Muʾtazilites, who flourished probably in the second half of the second/eighth century.
276 276
المطلب السابع :في اآلالم واألعواض
ً �أ
� كا ن �م� ن ف���ع��لن � نٌ ف ن ن حَ
� ن � نّ � ض� ف ال أ �ل � ن ق
�ب و ا
�ح ا� �م ا�
� � إ� � � � �� ، س
� ��� �ه��م � �م م���ه �ب يح و و ر و و � ي ي و
ا. �
�� ��
ل �ع �ه��� ع
� ل ا ا
��� ع د ا�
ص � �ه ، ���� ��
ال �ت � ق ق فّ ن ن ف ت ت ً ف ض ً �أ
ح�����ا � كا � �م� ن� ���ع�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �إ� �م�ا ع��لى و�ج �ه ا ����س� �� �م ن���د وب�ا و وا ج���ب�ا ��ا �ل�عو�� ع��لي��ه ��ع�ا لى ،و�إ� �
���ه��ة الا ب�ت��د ا ء. ب�ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� و� �ّم�ا ع��ل ج�
إ ى
أ ف أ ق ّ
ف ت ض ر�ة
�ر �ي ،و��ا �ل� ت� ال� �ش���ا �ع لا �عو�� ع��لي��ه ��ع�ا لى �ي� �م�ا ي������ع�ل�ه �م� ن� ال� �ل�م
�ة وا خ���ت��ل ف� ف�ي���ه ف� ن�����ا ه ا ��لب� ك�
ف
�أ ّ � ّ ت �أ
�غ
�خ يّ����ة إ� ن��ه ��ع�ا لى ي��ؤ �ل�مع��لى و�ج �ه ا �ل�ع��ق��وب��ة لا ي��ر .و�ع ن���د ا �ل�ع�د ��ليّ���ة ن��ه ولا ف�� �م�ا ي� �مر ب��ه .وق��ا �ل� ت� ا �ل��ت ن���ا ��س
ي
ّ ف ّ م�ؤ �ة ت
ح���ص�ل ب��د و��ه ،و�هوا �ل��ل��ط���؛ إ� �م�ا �ل�ل� �ل�م
ن ح� لا �
� �ت�ع�ا لى ي� �ل�ما ب���د ا ء ب����رط ا ����� ���م�ا �ل�ه ع��لى �م���ص��ل���
�ت ش ش ً ت �ؤ
�أ فً ث �أ ض ٌ م�ؤ �أ
���ت�ا ر ا �ل���م��ت� �ل�م
�خ
حي��� ث� ي� ��ي��ر�ةً ب�
� � �ع�ا ��ا �ك �و� �ي� �م��ق���ا ب���لت��ه �عو�� �ل�ل� �ل�م ي��ز �ي�د ع��لي��ه �ض
ن ن ف
و�ل غ��ي��ره .و�إ� ي� ك
ٌ ّ ف ض أن أ ض
ا �ل�عو�� وال� �ل�م؛ ل� � �عرا ء ه �ع� ن� ا �ل�عو�� ظ���لٌ و�ع� ن� ا �ل��ل��ط��� �ع��ب� ث�.
م
ن �ت � قّ ف ظ ت ن ح قّ ا �ل�خ �ت نف ض
��ا لي� �م�� ��ع���ي�����م و�إ�ج �لا ل�� ،ا �ل���م����س� ��ح� ع�لي�����ا �م��س�ا ٍو وا �ل�عو�� �هو ا ��ل���ع ا �ل���م����س� ����
�أ �أ �أ �أ �أ
ق
�ي�� ن���ه �ل غ��ي��را �ل�ع�ا ��ل �ز ا ئ��د ع��لي��ه. ح��ت�ه و �مره وت����م ك ح قّ�ع��لي��ه �ت�ع�ا لى ب���ف���ع�ل�ه و إ� ب�ا � �ل�ل �ل�م ،وا �ل���م����س��ت���
277 277
On Justice
26 The same tradition is cited in Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād III.3.14, 312-313. It seems to be based on
similar texts in Bihār al-anwār, cf. VII.92; VII.245; and LXIV.6.
27 Cf. Bihār al-anwār XC.267.
28 Ḥillī means that there are two ways of reading the crucial word in the ḥadīth: either as jab-
bār, meaning tyranny, or as jubār, meaning an act for which no retaliation is demanded, and
which is without consequences in this sense.
29 In other words, since the obligatory compensation does not always take place in this life, one
who has suffered injustice must persist in the hereafter in order to be compensated.
278 278
ف �
��ي� ا �ل��ع�د �ل
279 279
Investigation 8: On Appointed Times,
Provisions, and Prices
(a) The appointed time is a moment at which something comes to be. ‘Mo-
ment’ means something that comes to be and is made into a sign of the
coming to be of another. For instance, it is said, ‘Zayd will arrive at the sun-
rise’. The appointed time of life is the moment in which it comes to be, and
likewise the appointed time of death. Hence, regardless of which deceased
is about to die, and regardless of the variety of the causes of death, his death
is in its appointed time.
There is a debate concerning the one to be executed if he is not executed,
and it is said that he would definitely live, for should he definitely die, the
slaughterer of a sheep in his stead would be charitable to him. It is also said
that he would definitely die, for otherwise it would follow that His knowl-
edge, high is He, would be transformed into ignorance, were he to live.
The first implication is precluded, because it neglects the compensation
belonging to God most high, which is greater than the compensation be-
longing to him. The second one is also precluded, because of the possibility
that knowledge of death depends on the killing, and were it not for it, there
would be life.
When it comes to provision, according to those who endorse justice, no
one is to deny it from Him, if it is at all possible to benefit from it, for He
most high has said, Give out of what We have provided for you,30 and God
most high does not order what is prohibited. According to the Ashʾarites,
provision is something that is consumed, even if it were prohibited. It can
be pursued as a whole, due to His most high saying, disperse in the land and
seek out God’s bounty.31
When it comes to the price, it is the measure of the replacement for
which things are sold. Let it not be said that it is the replacement, because
the replacement is of a value or an object of value. Neither of them is a price.
It is either cheap, which is a price that is lower than what follows the cus-
tom, time and place being one, or it is expensive, which is the opposite of
that, and both of them are either from God most high or from the servants.
30 Q 63:10.
31 Q 62:10.
280 280
المطلب الثامن :في اآلجال واألرزاق واألسعار
ً � ث ّ�ذ ق ق ت ّ�ذ � ث ف شّ
� ا �ل� �ي� ج���ع�ل ع�ل�م�ا ل����ء ،و�ي�ع ن�ى ب�ا �لو�� ت� ا �لح�ا د ح�د ����ه ا � ال� � �ه ا �ل �� ا �ل� � �
أ�ج ل و و � ي� ي � ي ي
ق ت ّ�ذ � �ة ل������م�� .و�أ�ج � ا �ل ش � ق ق �ز ن ك � ث �غ �ل
حي���ا �هوا �لو��� ا �ل� �ي� ل ح�د و� ي��ره� .م�ا ي������ا ل�� :د �م �ي�د �ع���د ط�لوع ا � س
ت ف نّ خ ف �أ ف��أ ّ ّ
� �م�ا � ع��لى ا ���ت�لا �� ����س��ب�ا ب� ا �ل���مو� �إ� �
ت � ت�ذ � ث ف� �
يح�د � ي���ه ،و�أ�ج �ل ا ل���مو� ك�� �ل�ك� � .ي� �مي تٍ
���
ف
�موت��ه �ي� �أ�ج �ل�ه.
��ا ن� �ذ ا ب� � ق�����ط�عً�ا �ل ك� ا خ���ت��ل ف� ف� ا �ل���م��ق����ت ل �ل �ل� ���ق����ت� ف���ق����� �� :ع�� ش�� ق�����ط�عً�ا ،ل�أ نّ��ه �ل �م�ا ت
ح و و و م ي ل يل ي ي � ي� و
ً ّ ً ً
ح����سن���ا � ��ل��ه .ق���� ���� :م ت
���ه�لا �لوع�ا ش���. � ق�����ط�ع�ا ،و� لا �ل�ز �م ا ن���ق���لا ب� ع�ل�م�ه �ت�ع�ا لى ج� � إ ي و يل ي و �غ� ن�����م�غ ي��ره م
إ
ض ت ض ٌ أّ ف ّ أ
وا �ل���م�لا �ز �م��ة ال� و لى �م���م ن��وع��ة ل� ن��ه �وت��ه ا �ل�عو�� ع��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى .و�هو�أ�ز �ي�د �م� ن� ا �ل�عو�� ع��لي��ه.
� �ة � ب�ا �ل��ق����ت� وا �ل � ا �ز �ت�ع�لّق ع��ل ا �ل���م ت �ً�ا �ج�
ل
ث ن �ة �أ
حي���ا �لولا ه. ل و � م و �ض
�� وا ��ل��ا �ي�� ي
�
�أَ ُ ت أ ّ ق ف �أ ّ
�� ن�ل� ح�د �م ن���ع�ه �م ن���ه� ،ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى (و ن���فِ����ق��وا و �م�ا ا �لر�ز � ���ع ن���د ا �ل�ع�د ��ليّ���ة �م�ا �ص الا ن�ت� ف���ا ب��ه و�ل�م ي� ك
أ ر�ة �ز ق �أ ع ح
ن ن� ً �أ َّ َ�زَ ْقَ ُ
كا � حرا �م�ا. كل و�إ� � ش
حرا �م .و�ع���د ال� ����ا �ع ا �لر � �م�ا � ن �مْ) ،وا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى لاي� �مر ب�ا �ل� �ِم���م�ا ر � ن���ا ك�
فَ ْ َّ فَ ن �تَ ش ُ ف أَ ْ ض ْتَ غُ ت ً
�
� �ل ا ل��لِ�ه). �و�ز ط��لب��ه إ� �ج �م�ا ع�ا و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى (��ا ����� ا � ال� � ا ���� ا م� ���ض
� ن � و�
ِ رو ِي� ر ِ� و ب و ِ � ِ ي�ج
أ نّ ق ش أ ف ق ت ف ّ ّ �أ
و �م�ا ا �ل��س�عر����هو������دي�را ��لب��د ل �ي�����م�ا ي�ب��اع ب��ه ال� �����ي���ا ء .ولا ي������ا ل �هوا ��لب��د ل؛ ل� � ا ��لب��د ل �هو
ح��ط�ع�مّ�ا � ت ّ ُ ن� ّ ّ خ ٌ ً �أ ا �ل��ث���م� ن �أ ا �ل���م��ث
� ����م����
ل ا � ل��س� ا �ه ، �
�� � ا�
م � � �ه . ا �س� � ا
�مه
� � �د ح �����
ل . ن �م �
��
�جر عر و و إ ر ص و و عر � وي س �و
ت ّ ّ ّ
��ا ن� ا ح�د؛ � �م�ا �غ�لا ءٌ� ،ه �م�ا ���ق���ا ��ل�ه؛ � ن ٌ قت �ة
كل �م����ه���م�ا إ� �م�ا �م� ن� ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى وو ي ب و وإ ب��ه ا �ل�ع�ا د ،وا �لو��� وا �ل���م ك� و
�أ
و�م� ن� ا �ل�ع��ب�ا د.
281 281
Observation VII: On Prophecy
المرصد السابع في النبوة وفيه مطالب
Preface: Who Is the Prophet?
The prophet is a man informed by God most high without the mediation
of any human being, which excludes the angels, the one who is informed
by someone other God, and the one who knows. It is inevitable that he
is distinguished by the evidence of a miracle by his hand, which proves
his truthfulness. A miracle is that which breaks with the custom, either es-
tablishing what is unusual or precluding what is usual while matching his
claim, and it is included in his genus and among his attributes.
284 284
ّبي]
مقدمة[ :من هو الن ّ
ف �أ
���ة ا �لن��ّ� ّ �هو ال� �ن��س�ا ن� ا �ل���م�� خ���بر �ع� ن ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى ب� غ��ي��ر وا ��س��ط��ة ح�د �م� ن ا �ل��ب ش���ر� ،
�خر ج�� ت� ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك
� ٍ � � إ بي�
ت ّ ز�ة ظ خ ّ ُ ت �غ خ
وا �ل���م�����بر�ع� ن� ي��ر ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى وا �ل�ع�ا �ِل�م .ولا ب��د �م� ن� ا �ت�����ص�ا �ص�ه ب������هور ا �ل���م�ع���ج�� ع��لى ي��د ه ��د ل
�أ ع��ل �ص�د �ق�ه ،ا �ل���م�ع��� ز�ة �م�ا � ق ا �ل�ع�ا د �ة �م� ن ث�� ت
� �م�ا �ل��ي��س ب����م�ع��ت�ا د و ن��ف��� �م�ا �هو�م�ع��ت�ا د �م � بو و �ج � �خر� ى
ع ي
ف ن ف ّ ق
�م��ط�ا ب�������ت�ه �ل�ل�د �عو�ى و�ي�ع�د د ه �ي� �ج ����س�ه و�ص����ت�ه.
285 285
Investigation 1: On the Possibility of the Mission
The ones endowed with understanding concur about it, except the Brah-
mins and the Sabians,1 because there is common good for the world but
nothing corrupt in the mission, and what is such will take place. Hence, it
is possible.
They argue by saying that the messenger, peace be upon him, only brings
forth what conforms to the intellect. Hence, there is no need for it, because
the benefit is denied. Were that not the case, he would have been rejected.2
The answer is that the benefit is evident even concerning that which
conforms to the intellect, for the intellectual is confirmed by means of the
traditional, and the excuse of the one charged is undermined, as He most
high has said: so that mankind would have no excuse before God, after receiv-
ing the messengers.3 Moreover, the intellect may be incapable of perceiving
the truth and in need of revelation, like in the case of the useful attributes
that are heard from the tradition, or like the bad things that are traced back
to it and the benefits known from it, or like the arts and other such things.
What does not conform to the intellect is not rejected, if the intellect does
not entail its contrary.
1 By the Brahmins, Ḥillī probably refers to Hindu believers in transmigration. The Qurʿānic
Sabeans may here refer to Mandaeans, according to whose gnostic soteriology the body is
fundamentally evil and the soul’s salvation requires liberation from it.
2 That is, if the prophet’s message did not conform to the intellect, he would not have been
received favourably by anyone in her right mind. The argument here is that of those who deny
the mission of prophets, such as the Brahmins and the Sabeans.
3 Q 4:165.
286 286
األول :في إمكان البعثة
المطلب ّ
�ة ف �ةً أ نّ ف �ة ّ ّ ّ
ي�ه�ا؛ و�م�ا ح� �ل��ل�ع�ا �ل�م ولا �م��ف����س�د ���� ي�ه�ا �م���ص��ل���ا ت���ف�� ق� ا �ل�ع��ق���لا ء ع��لي��ه إ� لا ا �ل��برا �ه�م� وا �ل���ص�ا ب�ئ���ة ،ل� � ����
نً ن� ذ � ف� ا ق ٌ ف ن
�و� �م� ك��
��م�ا. كا � ك�� ل�ك ���هوو �� �ي�� ك �
ع
ف ف ّ �ة ّ �أ نّ
ح��ت�� ج�وا ب� � ا �لر��سول ع��لي��ه ا �ل���ص�لا وا �ل��س�لا �مإ� ن����م�ا �ج �ا ء ب����م�ا �يوا � ق� ا �ل�ع��ق���ل ��لا ح�ا �ج ��ة إ� ��لي��ه، ا�
ً ل ن�ت ف ا � ف ئ �ة � ّل ن
كا � �مرد ود ا. ا ����ا ء ل�����ا ��د وإ ا �
�ذ ق ّ نق ّ ق �أ ف ٌف ُ �ل ُ
�ي��د ا �ل�ع������لي� ب�ا ��ل�����لي�؛ و�����طع ع� ر �وا ب� ا �ل��ف���ا ئ��د �ة ظ��ا �هر�ة �ي� �م�ا �يوا � ق� ا �ل�ع��ق���ل ،و�هوت� �ك وا �ج
ز أ نّ ق ق َ
� ئَ اَّ َُ نَ نَّ �� َ َّ ُ�حّ�ةٌ بَ ْ َ ُّ ُ � � ّف ك ق ت
�� ��ع�د ا �لر��س� ِل) ول� � ا �ل�ع�����ل��د �ي�ع���ج�� �و� �ِل��ل��ا ِس ع��لَى ا �ل��لِ�ه �ج �م�ا ��ا ل ��ع�ا لى�ِ( :ل��ل ي� ك ���ل� � ا ل���م ك
ئ ّ ّ
كا �ل��ق����ب�ا � �ة
� ا �ل���م����س��ت ف���ا د �م� ن ا �ل��س���م � ، �ص ف���ا ت كا �ل��
ف
كا �ش���� ، ح��ت�ا ج� إ� لى � ح قّ� ف���ي�����ع� ن � د را ك ا �ل
� ع و ح �إ
ن ق � قف �غ ئ ّ �ة ف �ة �ت
�و� كا �ل����ص ن���ا � و ي��ر�ه�ا .و�م�ا لا �يوا � ا �ل�ع�����ل لا ي� ك ا �ل���م��س� ن��د إ� ��لي��ه وا �ل���م ن���ا �� ا �ل���م�ع�لو�م� �م ن���ه� ،
ع ع
ن ً �ذ
� �ه. �مرد ود ا إ� ا �ل�م ي���ق��ت�� ض���� ا �ل�ع�����ل �����ي�����ض
ق ق
287 287
Investigation 2: On the Necessity of the Mission
Those who endorse justice concur about it, pace the Ashʾarites, because
things reported by the tradition are altogether necessary and a grace be-
stowed upon intellectual things. This is known necessarily, for the one who
perseveres in the obligations reported by tradition is closer to performing
the intellectual obligations, God most high having pointed at this in His
saying, high is He: prayer restrains outrageous and unacceptable behaviour.4
Grace is necessary and things heard from the tradition can only be known
through the mission. Furthermore, knowledge of punishment and its du-
ration, as well as of the duration of reward, is definitely grace, which is in-
cluded in the charge, and the grace is necessary, for that can only be known
through what is heard from tradition.
The ancients have another method in this topic, namely that man is ur-
ban by nature by virtue of the constant need in his state for assistance and
co-operation, insofar as each of them is devoted to some good of the other,
so that each of them acquires from the community the matters of liveli-
hood he needs. It is inevitable that a community is a place for conflict and
competition, and its benefit only endures by custom and justice that are
ordered with respect to the use that the affairs of the species derive from
them. That custom and justice no doubt are pronounced by one who is
distinguished above the sons of the species, because none of them is prior
in status, and each prefers that which is closest to himself. That distinction
is through an act, which no other from among his likes can attain, that is,
through a miracle.
Besides, many people are such that they despise the disturbance due
to the affairs of the species when they have obtained what they need as
individuals, and so there is a need to scare and threaten them with the ob-
tainment of reward and punishment in the hereafter, according to dispute
and congruence. At the occasion of forgetting, man needs, as a reminder
of that, repeated remembrance of the Lord most high and His threat and
promise. That takes place by applying legal obligations, and so the mission
of messengers, who warn of reward and punishment, is necessary in His
wisdom, high is He, who legislates the frequent reported obligations ac-
cording to what is entailed by divine wisdom.
4 Q 29:45.
288 288
المطلب الثاني :في وجوب البعثة
��ةٌ ً � �أ � �فٌ ف ل��س���م�عّ���ا ت�خ ا فً �أ ش � ر�ة أ نّ ّ ّ�ة تّ ف ق ت
ي� � اط
� ل�� و ي�ه ا
�ع ا�م � �ج ا ����������� ا �ل�ع�د ��لي�� ع��لي��ه �ل ��ا �ل�ل ����ا ع ،ل� � ا � ي و ج �ب إ
� � �� ا �
ل ف ّ�ة �أ � �ل��ل�ع��ل ا �ل�ض��ّ� � ّ ��أ نّ ا �ل���م ا ظ��� ع��ل ف���ع� ا �ل ا �� �ا ت ا �ل�ع��ق����لّ��ا ت
ل �ع� �� ى �
إ � ب قر � ���
ي ع� ��م �سل�� � ا � م ر ور ي� ب � و ب ى ل و ج �ب ي
ْ
ن فَ َ َ ْ تَ �ةَ َّ َّ
ح ش����ا ِء � ا �ل�ع��ق����ليّ���ة؛ و�ق�د ن�بّ��ه ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى ع��لي��ه ف�� ق�و�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى( :إ� ن� ا �ل���ص�لا � ن���هَى�ع�� ا �ل������� ا �ل ا �� �ا ت
و ج �ب
أ ِ ي
كَ
نّ �ة
�إ� لا ب�ا ��لب��ع��ث� ؛ ول� � ا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب�
ّ ل��س���م�ع���ا ت ن ف��ةُ ّ
� ا � م� � �
�ك ��م
�� ا ل ، �
� ف �ٌ
� ا � ��ط��
ّ
�ل
�ل ا ). �� ا �لْ� ُ��م ن
��
م ي و ج ب و ي � عر ِر و و
ن � �ةف ٌ ف ّ �أ �فٌ ف� � ت � ف ق ً ثّ
��� م�عر�� ���لي�� �����ط�ع�ا ،وا �ل��ل��ط��� وا ج�� ب� ولا ي����م ك ود وا �م�ه ود وا �م ا ��ل�وا ب� �ل��ط�ا � ي� ا �ل� ك
ّ ّ �ذ
�ل�ك إ� لا ب�ا �ل��س���م .
ع
�أ نّ ن ن ن ّ آ �أ
ف ف
�خر ،و�هو � الإ� ���س�ا � �م�د �ي� ب�ا �ل��ط��ب لا ���تق���ا ره �ي� ا ن�ت� ظ����ا �م و�ل�ل وا ئ�ل ف�� �ه��ذ ا ا ��لب��ا ب� طر�يق� � �
ع ي
ف آ ض ك �م ن ّ فر�غ ح��� ث ن
ح ا �ل�ه � ل �م�ع�ا � � ش �أ
ح���ص� �م� ن � �
� ��� ، � � ال ل� ا
�ص� م�� � � ع�� � � �ل� م �
��ه��� � �
���� � �
�ب ك ر ا�
م��� و إى و و �
ي ي ل � ب � ح �خر ي ل �
ّ �أ ّ �أ
ّ
ال ���ت� م�ا � ظ� ن����ة ن ف
ح��ت�ا ج� إ� ��لي��ه �ي� �مور �م�ع�ا �ش���ه .ولا �ش���ك �ي� � ا ج �� ع م��
ف �� ّ وا ح�د �م�ا ي�
� ا �ل���م�� ج����موع �ل ك�ل
�أ ّ ّ
حوا ل ا �ل��ت ن���ا �ز وا ��لت� غ���ا �ل� ب� ،ف��لا ي�����س��ت���مر ف��ا ئ��د ت��ه إ� لا ب���ُ��سنَ��� وع�د ل ي�ن�ت� ظ�����م ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ر ا ����س��ت�ع���م�ا ��ل�ه���م�ا �
�ةٍ ع
أ ّ�ة �ف ن ن �زّ �ت ن ّ �ةّ
َن ت ن
ا ��ل�وع .و��ل�ك ا �ل����س��� وا �ل�ع�د ل لا ب��د ��ل�ه�ا �م� ن� �ا ��ص� ب� �م� ���مي�� �ع� ن� ب��ي� ا ��ل�وع �ل�ع�د �م ال� و�لو�ي ي�
� ن �ذ � ال � �ت �ز � نّ� �ه ف ل ��ت ن �غ ن
ن
��� ي��ره �م�� كا � ي���ف���ض���� إ� لى �م�ا ي�����قر ب� م���ه .و ل�ك ا م� ي���ا إ ���م�ا و ب������ع�ل ا ي ���م ك � و� ا �ل ا �ض
ي و ع
ز�ة ن
الإ� ت�ي��ا � ب����م��ث�ل�ه و�هوا �ل���م�ع���ج�� .
ح��ت�ا ج � ��لي��ه ب� � ن ��ث�� ًا �م� ن ا ��لنّ��ا �� �م� ن �����س��ت��� خ �ت ث ّ نّ
ح����س� ب� � ح����قر ا �� �لا ل ح�ا ل ا ��ل�وع ب�و�صو ُل �م�ا ي� � إ �م إ� � �ك ير � س � ي
�ع��ق���ا � ��ل��ه �أ � ّ�� ن �ع ن���د ا �ل� م�� خ��ا �ل��ف����ة ث �خ ف ت
ح��ت�ا ج � لى � ف ش خ
�� �و�ي��� ووع�د ب�و�صول �وا ب� و ب�إ ي �خرو�ي ي� ا �ل���������ص��� ،ي��� � إ
�ك
ن ال ن ن ف� � ض� � ن ن � �ت ف� ت�ذ �ذ � ل ت � �ذ
��ك � � ا
� � ح ا ا
���
س
� ��� � ا م� ا
�س��� ا�
م �ل� . �أ ا �ل���م ا ف���ق����ة
إ ى رير ر �ك ل ر ا
ك
� � � ي� ج � ي �ل ي� عر � � �إ � اك
� �� و و و
ف
ل���ر�عيّ����ة� ،و ج�� ب� �� ح �ك ف ف �ذ
ا �لرّ ب� �ت�ع�ا لى ووع�د ه وو�عي���د ه .و �ل�ك ب�ا ����س��ت�ع���م�ا ل ا ��لت� ك�
�م��ت�ه ي
��ا ��ل�� ا � ش
ي
�ّر�ة ب� ّ�ة �ت ���لت � ف
�� ،ش���ا رع ل � ك �ت�ع�ا ل ��ع� ث ��س �م ن����ذ �ث� ا � �ع��ق
ح����س� ب� � ��ا ��لي�� ا �ل��س���م�عي��� ا �ل���م� ك�ر ا�
��
ى ب � ر ول ر ب و بٍ و بٍ
�م��ة الإ� ��ل�هيّ����ة. ح �ك �م��ق��ت������ ا �ل
�
ضى
289 289
Investigation 3: On the Necessity of
Being Safeguarded
The Imamites in particular maintain the necessity of the prophet’s being
safeguarded from acting badly or violating what is obligatory, pace the
entire sect, for the majority of Ashʾarites and superficialists5 allow all sins
for them, except unbelief and lying in executing their task. Some Muʾtazi-
lites have said that only small sins due to inattention are possible for them,
whereas others maintain, by way of interpretation, that this can be inten-
tional, and still others that it can be by way of an objective, lest the sins turn
out as unbelief.
According to us, denying their being safeguarded results in denying the
objective of mission, namely their acceptance and imitation of their orders
and prohibitions, for if they allow the one charging to sin, then it is also
possible that the ones ordered by him are sinful. Moreover, it would be
permissible to perform some of what is ordered to be performed as well
as to perform what is not ordered, and so the benefit of mission would be
annihilated. Besides, if he performs a sin, he must be disowned and his
status falls from being accepted. Finally, if we allow sin for him, we are not
obliged by the example of his statement except after knowing its truth, and
a circle follows.
He must be safeguarded from inattention in what he carries out, pace the
entire sect, for otherwise it would follow that the objective of mission is
denied. He must be declared above the baseness of pride and adultery with
mothers, for otherwise, he would become loathsome and his status would
fall from being accepted.
290 290
المطلب الثالث :في وجوب العصمة
فً ف ق �أ ًّ �ذ
�ه� ب� الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ة �خ �ا �ص��ة إ� لى و ج�و ب� �ع����ص���م��ة ا �لن��ب���ع� ن� ���ع�ل ���ب��ي�� و إ� �خ �لا ل ب�وا ج�� ب� �خ �لا ��ا
ح ي
ّ �ش ّ أ ّ
�����فر ح���و�ي�ة ج�و وا �ج �مي�� ا �ل���م�ع�ا �صي� ع��لي���ه���مإ� لا ا �ل ك
�ز ّ ��مي�� ا �ل����فر ق�؛ ف�� ن� �ج ��م�هور ال� �ش���ا �عر�ة وا �ل �ل
ع إ �ج ع
ض غ ئ ً � ذ�� ف� ال�أ د ا ء� .ق�ا �� ض
ع��� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة � نّ����م�ا � �ز
�و ع��لي���ه���م ا �ل���ص���ا �ر ���س�هوا ،و�ب�ع������ه���م إ ي�ج و لب � وا �ل �ك ب� ي�
ّ �أ ّن ت ق ّ ر�ةً �ع�م�دًا ع�� ��س��� ا ��لتّ���أ � �� ،ض
���ف�� . ع������ه���مع��لى��س�ب� ي��ل ا �ل��ق�����ص�د إ� لا ���ه�ا ����� �م ك لى �ب ي ل ويل و ب
ع
�ث ق �ة ض نق ض �ة �أ نّ ف
��لن��ا � :ا ن�ت����ا ء ا �ل�ع����ص���م� ي�����س��ت�ل�ز �م ��������� ا �ل��غر�� ب�ا ��لب��ع��ث� ،و�هو ا �ل������بول �م ن����ه���م والا �م��ت� �ا ل
ّ �ز ن �أ ف نّ � � ّ �ز � �َّف ن أ
�و� �م�ا �مروا ب� ���ل� ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة �ع ن����ه���م ج�و ك ي�ه���م� .إ� ��ه لو ج و ا ل���م ك ل� وا �مر�ه���م و�وا �ه���
ع �أُ
ف���� ن�ت ف ف� ئ �ة ئ �أ ن �ؤ ّ �غ �أ � �ز �أ ن ��ؤ دّ � �� ض �ةً أ نّ
�
ع���� �م�ا ِ�مر ب��إ د ا ��ه و � ي د ي� ي��ر م�ا �مر ب��ه ،ي ���� �ا ��د
� � �
ي ب ي � �
�م�ع����صي��� ،ول� و
ي
�ج �ه �
ي
ل� ا
� ح�لّ�ه �م� ن ا �ل��ق���ل � .ل�أ ن م
� ط
�� ��ا ع��ل��ه ،ف��� ق
��س�� �
ك �
أ
ا ��ل��ع��ث��ة؛ ل� نّ��ه � �ذ ا ف���ع� ا �ل���م�ع����ص����ة ��� ال� ن
� وب و و ي ي ر ي وج ب إ ل و إ ب
ق �ز ّ ن �ت �ث ق ّ
�� ب� ع�لي�����ا ا �م� � �ا ل �و�ل�ه إ� لا ب��ع�د ا �ل�ع��ل ب����ص�د ��ه ،و�ي�ل �م ا �ل�د ور. ج� ّو�ز ن�ا ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة ع��لي��ه �ل�م ي�ج�
م ّ
ض ق ّ �ز ن ق ض ّ ف �ؤ �خ فً �ل ً � �أ ن ن
�و� �م�ع���صو�م�ا �م� ن� ا �ل���س�هو�ي� �م�ا ي� د ي��ه �لا ��ا �ج��مي��ع ا �ل����فر� ،و�إلا �ل �م �����������غر�� و ي�ج�� ب� �ي� ك
�س��وط � ن �ُم ن���زّ �هً�ا �ع� ن د ن�ا ء �ة ال�آ �ا ء ��ع ال�أ �ّ�مه�ا ت ّ � ،لا �ل�ز �م ا �ل��ت ن�� ف���� �ع ن���ه � ق ا ��ل �ث�ة �أ ن
ير و إو � � هر � و ب � �ب��ع� � ؛ و ي و
ك � �
ّ
ح�ل�ه �م� ن� ا �ل��ق���ل� ب�. م
�
291 291
Investigation 4: On the Prophecy of Muḥammad,
God Bless Him and His Family and
Grant Him Peace
Since he has laid claim to prophecy and a miracle has become manifest by
his hand, he is truthful. The first statement is necessary. When it comes
to the second, it is because the Qurʿān was manifested by his hand, and it
is a miracle, because he challenged with it the eloquent of the Arabs and
they found themselves incapable of attaining anything like it. He asked the
opposition for either something like it or war, and they chose war, and it
is known that had they been able to oppose, they would not have resorted
to the more laborious of the two things. Furthermore, many miracles were
manifested by his hand, such as the splitting of the Moon, the gushing forth
of water from between his fingers, the satiation of a great number of people
by little food, as well as others. Even if all of them were not reported unin-
terruptedly, the meaning is reported uninterruptedly.
When it comes to the third, it is necessary, for if one who lays claim to
being sent by a king says in the presence of a large crowd, ‘Oh king, if I am
truthful, make an exception to your custom’, and the king does that time
after another, those present will be ascertained of his truthfulness.
The Jews have argued by saying that abrogation is false, for otherwise
it would follow that the bad had been ordered and the good prohibited.
Furthermore, if Moses, peace be upon him, had appeared during his law,
the abrogation of his truthfulness would have been false. Had its end been
announced, then necessarily there would have been an uninterrupted re-
port, for uninterrupted report is the foundation of his law. If nothing is
announced, then acting just once is entailed. Besides, he, peace be upon
him, has said: “Keep the Sabbath forever.”
The answer is that the good and the bad vary according to the variation
of common goods and harms that are different in different times. The Jews’
sequence of tradition has been cut, and declaring something to last forever
is not evidence of persistence, for He said in the Torah to Noah, peace be
upon him, at his exiting the Ark: “I have made every living animal edible
to you and to your offspring, designating them for you forever, just like the
growing plants, but do not eat that which lacks blood”,6 but then He pro-
hibited many animals in the tongue of Moses, peace be upon him.
292 292
محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم
نبوة ّ
المطلب الرابع :في ّ
ّ ٌ �أ ّ
ضر وري��ة .و �م�ا
أ
�و� �ص�ا د ��ا .وال� و لى ��
قً هف ن ز�ة
� ا �ل���م�ع���ج�� ع��لى ي��د �ي�� ك ل�أ نّ��ه ا دّ �ع ا �لن��� �ة ظ�� ت
ى �بو و �هر
ّ ت أ آ
� ز وا �ع� ن
� ح�ا ء ا �ل� � و�ج�ع
عر � ��ص� �� �
� � ف
�ه�ب ى �دحا ��لث��ا ن�يّ���ة ف��ل�أ نّ��ه ظ���هرع��ل ي��د ه ا �ل���قر� ن� و�هو�م�ع���ج� ز� ،ل� ن��ه �
ّ ٌ
� ب ى
ٌ �أ ّ خ ف �ة �ث �أ ت ن �ث أ نّ �أ
ن �ت
حر ب��� ،ا �� �ا روا ا �ل� � � ب����م� �ل�ه وا �ل� الإ� �ي��ا � ب����م� �ل�ه؛ ل� ��ه ��س� ��ل�ه���م ا �ل���م�ع�ا ر �ض
حر ب�؛ و�م�ع�لو�م ��ه �لو
ز تٌ ث �ةٌ �أ ا � ل �أ �ش�� قّ ال أ �م � ن ل أ نّ ظ ��كن� ا �م� ن ا �ل���م�ع�ا �ض ��ة ت ّ
ير ���� �ك � ا� � �
�ج�م�
ع � ه �د � �
ل
�هر ى ي �
ع �� �ه � � .
ي ج و إ ى � ري� و � �� ���ل
� م ل
�� � ر ����م و �
�أ
ث
�خ�ل ق� ا �ل��ك�ي��ر�م� ن� ا �ل����ط�ع�ا �م ا �ل��ق����لي��ل، كا �ن ش���ق���ا ق� ا �ل��ق�����مر ،ون��بو ا �ل���م�ا ء �م� ن ب�ي�� ن� �ص�ا ب��ع�ه ،و� ش������ب�ا ا �ل
� �
إ ع � ع
�ة ً ف ّن ن ّ ن �غ �ذ
كل وا ح ٍ�د �م ن����ه�ا �م��توا ت�را �إ� ���ه�ا �م��توا ت�ر ا �ل���م�ع ن�ى. ��� � و ي��ر �ل�ك .و�إ� �ل�م ي� ك
ظ �أ ّ ّ ّ �أ �ّ ا ��لث ��لث�ة ف
� ور�ج �مع �ع���ي�����م ي���ه�ا ا �ل���م�ل�ك ح���ض ضر ورّ��ة ،ف�� ن� �م� ن ا د �عى ر��س�ا �ل��ة �م�ل�ك و�ق�ا ل ب�
� ��
�� � و م�ا ��ا ��
ي إ �
�أ ً �خ
ف ً ن ن
ن
ضرو� ح�ا �� �خر�ى �ج� ز��م ا �ل
� ��ا �ل��ف� ع�ا د ت��ك ،ف���ف���ع�ل ا �ل���م�ل�ك �ذ �ل�ك �م ّر�ة ب��ع�د � ���� ت� �ص�ا د �ق�ا � إ� � �ك
ق
ب����ص�د ��ه.
أ نّ ن �َ �أ أ ٌ ّ �أ ّ ّ ّ
ح����س ن�؛ ول� � ح��ت�� ج�� ت� ا ��لي���هود ب� ن� ا �ل�ن���س���خ ب�ا ط� ،و� لا �ل�ز �م ال� �مر ب�ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� وا ��لنّ���ه �ع� ا ل
� ا�
ي � � ح ل إ
ن ّ نق ق نّ ن ّ
�مو��سى ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م إ� � ب�ي�� ن� د وا �م �ش��رع�ه ب���ط�ل ا �ل����س���خ �ل���ص�د ��ه ،و�إ� ب�ي�� ن� ا �������ط�ا ع�ه و ج�� ب�
�ةً ً قت ّ ن �أ ت
ضى ا �ل��ف���ع�ل �م ّر .و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م: �وا ت�ره�� ،لت�وا ت�ر �ص�ل�ش��رع�ه ،و�إ� �ل�م ي�ب�ي�� ن� �ش���ي� ئ��ا ا �������
�أ ً ت ّ
�وا ب�ا �ل��س�ب�� ت� ب��د ا». «����م��س ك
�خ��ت��ل ف ا خ���ت� ا �ف ا �ل� ص�ا �ل ا �ل���م��ف���ا ��س�د ا �ل� م�� خ���ت�� فل����ة � ُ �أ ّ
�� � � ب� ل � ��م��� ح و ح����س ن وا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ي� � :ن� ا �ل
� �وا ب وا �جل
ح �
ا � ّ ا � � ق � ف� ا ��لتّ ا �ة ّ ت�أ نق خ �ت ف أ�ز ن ت ت
ب�ا �� �لا �� ال� �م�ا � ،و�وا �ر ا ��لي���هود ا ���������طع ،وا ��ل�� ب�ي��د لا ي��د ل ع��لى ل�د و م ل����ول�ه ي� �ور
�ذ ّ ت ّ ّ�ة ّ�ة �أ ً نّ
كلا �ل�ك و�ل� ري�ت��ك حي��� �م� � كل د ا ب� � �خرو�ج �ه �م� ن� ا �ل��ف���ل�ك« :إ� �ي� ج� ��ع�ل�� � ��لن�و ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م�ع ن���د �
ح
ن ّ ث ّ ف �أ ً ن ت ش �أ �ذ ُ ق
ّ ت �خ ت
�ر�م ع��لى �ل��س�ا � �مو��سى �����ب�ا � ا �ل�ع����� ب� ب��د ا �م�ا �لا ا �ل�د �م ��لا �ك�لوه»� ،مح �م�كو�أط��ل���� �ل�ك �ل ك�
ث
ح�� ا ن�ا ت ��ي�� ًرا �م� ن ا �ل
�. � يو ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م �ك �
293 293
On Prophecy
It is written in the Torah: “Every day sacrifice two lambs, the morning
lamb and the evening lamb between sunsets. This is a continuing sacrifice
incumbent upon you.”7 Then that continuity was cut.
He has said: “A slave shall serve six years, then he shall go free, but if he
does not, his ear shall be pierced and he shall serve forever.”8 However, in
another place it is written: “He shall serve for fifty years, then at that year
he shall go free.”9 These are many.
294 294
�ف ا �� � ة
ن�و�
�ي� ل� ب �
295 295
Investigation 5: On the Aspect of Inimitability of
the Qurʿān
The two Jubbāʿīs have maintained that it is eloquence. Al-Balkhī has said
that something of the kind of the Qurʿān is not within the power of men.
Al-Juwaynī has said that it is eloquence and style. Al-Murtaḍā and al-
Naẓẓām have maintained that God most high diverted and prevented the
Arabs from resisting despite their ability, because the Arabs were capable
of both the individual terms and composition, and so they had the power
over the whole. The early ones argued by saying that if the inimitability
were due to diverting, then it would have to be extremely weak, and power
over authoring would be admitted in absolute terms, but when it comes
to power over authoring the Qurʿān, it is denied, and the implication is
denied.
296 296
المطلب الخامس :في وجه إعجاز القرآن
آ ن �غ �ة ق ا ��ل خ ّ نّ ن ن �أ ّ
��ي� إ� � �ج ����س ا �ل���قر� � ي��ر �م��ق���د ور �ل�ل��ب ش���ر. ���ب�ا ئ�يّ��ا � إ� لى ن��ه ا �ل��ف�����ص�ا ح� .و��ا ل ب���ل�� �ذ �ه� ب� ا ��جل
�أ نّ ت نّ ظّ ت �ذ �ة أ �ل ّ ّ ق
ضى وا ��ل�����ا �م إ� لى � ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �و�ين�� إ� ن��ه ا �ل��ف�����ص�ا ح� وال� ��س�لو ب� .و �ه� ب� ا �ل���مر����� و��ا ل ا �ج
ّ ّ ي
كا ن� ا �م��ت���م��كن��� ن �م� ن أ نّ � ��ة �م ت����م��ك ن ف
� � �
ل� ا � �ل ؛ م ���ه�� �صر�� ا �ل�عر ب� و�م ن����ع�ه���م�ع� ن� ا �ل���م�ع�ا �ض
ي � � و ب عر � ر ع
� �ز � ن ّ أ ن �أ نّ ��ا ن� ا �ق�ا د � ن ع��ل ا �ج�ل ف ت تّ
كا � ح��ت���ج ال� ّو�لو� ب� � الا ��جع�ا لو � ��مي�� .وا � ر �ك � ، � ��
ا �ل���م����فرد ا � وا �ل��ر ي ب
��
�ك
ي� ى ع و
�أ ف ّ �أ ّ ّ�أ ف ُ �أ ن ن ف �غ �ة ّ ة ق �ةُ ّ ف
��� وا �ل�����د ر ع��لى �م��ط�ل ق� ا ��لت�� ��لي�� �م��س��لٌ؛ �م�ا ع��لىت� ��لي�� �و� �ي� �ا ي� ا �لر �
كا ك �ل��ل���صر���ة �لو ج�� ب� � ي� ك
م
ٌ آن فّ
ا �ل���قر� � �إ� ن��ه �م���م ن��و ،وا �ل���م�لا �ز �م��ة �م���م ن��وع��ة.
ع
297 297
Investigation 6: On the Verification of
Being Safeguarded
Some people deny the power to sin from one who is safeguarded, so that
he is equal with others in terms of corporeal properties, but being safe-
guarded is the power to obey, or so that there is no power to sin, which
is the statement of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʾarī, or so that he is specified in his
soul or body with a property that entails the denial of his audacity to sin,
as some of them maintain. Some of them assert the power and explain the
safeguarding by saying that it is an order, which He most high has given to
the servant, such that with it he will not have the audacity to sin, provided
that it does not end up coercing, for otherwise laudation would not be de-
served and the charge would be nullified. Furthermore, He most high has
said: I am just a mortal like you.10
According to them, the causes of being safeguarded are four: the occur-
rence of a property in his soul or body that entails a disposition preventing
immorality, the occurrence of knowledge of the laudation due to obedi-
ence and the blame due to sin, the confirmation of that knowledge through
a succession of inspiration, and refraining from negligence of the blame
due to refraining from the first. The condition of successive inspiration
must be reflected upon, because the imams, Maryam, and Fāṭima, God
bless them, were safeguarded without inspiration. The verified account is
that God most high performed this as a grace, with which the motive to sin
was erased, although there was power to it.
10 Cf. Q 23:33.
298 298
المطلب السادس :في تحقيق العصمة
�ة غ ف ��خ ّ
�وا �ص �م� ن ا ��لنّ��ا ��س �م� ن ��س�ل� ب� ا �ل��ق���د ر�ة ع��ل ا �ل���م�ع�ا �ص� �ع� ن ا �ل���م�ع���صو�مّ� � ،م�ا �م �م��س�ا وا ا �ل��ي��ر �� ا ل
ي إ ع ي � ى � �
ق �أ �ة ق �ة �أ �ة ق �ة �ة
�� ن� ا �ل�ع����ص���م� �هي� ا �ل�����د ر ع��لى ا �ل��ط�ا ع� وع�د �م ا �ل�����د ر ع��لى ا �ل���م�ع����صي��� ،و�هو�ول ب�ي� ا ��لب��د ن�يّ���ة؛ �ل ك
�أ أ ش ّ �أ
ق �خ ّ�ة ت ق ض
��ا ��صي��� �����ت������ي� ا �م��ت ن���اع إ� ��د ا �م�ه ع��ىل � ،و�م ا خ�ت�����ص�ا �ص�ه ف�� ن���ف����س�ه و ب��د ن��ه ب� ح����س ن� ال� ���� � ا �ل
�
ي عر ي ع
�أ �أ �ة ف ّ �أ �م�ا �ذ �ه� � ��ل��ه �� ض
ع������ه���م .و�م ن����ه���م�م� ن� ث��ب�� ت� ا �ل��ق���د ر و���سرا �ل�ع����ص���م��ة ب� ن��ه �مٌر ي���ف���ع�ل�ه ب� إ ي ب ا �ل���م�ع�ا �صي� ك�
ّ �أ � ثُ
��ا ء ،والا �ل���م�ا � لا ي���ق���د �م �م�ع�ه ع��ل ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة ب� ش���رط ن� لا ي�ن�ت���ه � لى ال� ��جل �ت�ع�ا لى ب�ا �ل�ع��ب�د ب�
حي���
ي� إ إ ى
�أَ َ
نَّ َ ن بَ ش ٌ � �ثُْ كُ� ْ ح قّ� ا �ل���م�د و��لب���ط� ا ��لت� ك�
�م). ���لي� ف�؛ و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى( :إ� ����م�ا �ا ����َر ِم� ��ل ح ل ا ����س��ت���
ةٌ �أ �أ �أ ٌ �أ
��� ّ�ة
ح���صول �خ �ا ��صي��� ��لن� ف����س�ه و ب��د ن��ه ت���ق��ت���ض���� �م��ل �ك و ����س��ب�ا ب� ا �ل�ع����ص���م��ة �ع ن���د �ه���م �مو ٌر ر ب��ع��ة� :
�أ ي
�ذّ ّ ٌ
�ي��د ت��ل�ك ح���صول ا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا �ل���م�د ع��لى ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة وا �ل� �م ع��لى ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة؛ وت� �ك �م�ا ن��ع��ة �م� ن� ا �ل��ف���� ج�ور ،و�
ح م
ف ت ت ش ف أ ت ن ت ت ت ت ف
ا �ل�ع�لو�م ب���را د �� ا �لو�حي� و�رك ا �ه�م�ا ل �م�ع�ا ��ب���ه �ع���د �رك ال� و لى .و �ي� ا �����را ِط �را د �� ا �لو�حي�
�ت ق ق �أ نّ ن ٌ ّ أ
ي� � ح������ظر ،ف�إ� ن� ال� ئ����م��ة و�مر�م و ف��ا ط��م��ة ع��لي���ه���م ا �ل��س�لا �م �م�ع���صو�مو ن� �م� ن� �غ ي��ر و�ح� .وا �ل� ��� ����
ي ي
ق ً ن ت
ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �ي��ف���ع�ل ب��ه �ل��ط��ف���ا ي��ت� ف��� �م�ع�ه د ا �عي� ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة �م ��د رت��ه ع��لي���ه�ا.
ع ي
299 299
Investigation 7: On the Time of Being Safeguarded
The Imāmites concur concerning their being safeguarded both before and
after the prophecy, in matters both small and great, and with regard to both
intent and inattention, for otherwise it would follow that the objective in
obeying and venerating them would be nullified, because one who is a sin-
ner would have fallen from his status. Faḍlites among Khārijites allowed
the mission of one whom God most high knows to be an unbeliever.11 Ibn
Fūrak allowed the mission of one who is an unbeliever, but this has not
come to pass.12 Some superficialists have maintained that the messenger of
God, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, was an unbeliever
before the mission, because He most high has said: find you lost and guide
you,13 but those who have ascertained the truth are in agreement about its
falsity.
Most Ashʾarites allow great sins for prophets before the mission, be-
cause of the story of Yūsuf ’s brothers.14 The remaining ones deny their
prophecy. Some counted among the Imāmites concur in allowing small
sins for them before the mission, but al-Naẓẓām and al-Aṣamm15 allow it by
way of inattention.
11 The Khārijites were a radical group that emerged in the early period of dissent over the ca-
liphate. They held that any morally blameless Muslim was fit to serve as a caliph, and that a
caliph must be dethroned, should he be found guilty of sin. Many Khārijites also held that
sinning amounts to unbelief. The Faḍlites were Khārijite followers of a certain Faḍl ibn
ʾAbdillāh. Reportedly, they believed that faith amounts to the sum of righteous acts, and this
belief might be behind Ḥillī’s mention of them here. See van Ess 2017, II.199.
12 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) was an Ashʾarite theologian.
13 Q 93:7.
14 This is probably a reference to the plot, which Yūsuf designed against his brothers and which
involved a certain amount of dishonesty. Cf. Ṭabarī, History II, 167-174.
15 Abū Bakr ʾAbd al-Rahmān ibn Kaysān, better known as al-Aṣamm (d. 200-201/806-807), was
a maverick theologian often associated with the Muʾtazilites.
300 300
المطلب السابع :في وقت العصمة
ً ً ّ �ة ق ّ
ل�ا ئ�ر�ع�م�د ا و���س�هوا، ا ت���ف����ق��� ت� الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ة ع��لى �ع����ص���مت����ه���م ���ب�ل ا �لن����بو و�ب�ع�د �ه�ا �ع� ن� ا �ل���ص غ���ا ئ�ر وا � بك��
ً �ّ � ن ن ع�������� ��له��� � ق ظ نق ض نق ض ّ
كا � ع�ا ��صي���ا؛ ح�ل م�� � ل��س��وط م و�إلا �ل�ز �م ��������� ا �ل��غر�� �م� ن� الا �����ي���ا د إ� ��لي���ه���م وا ��لت�� ي م � م
ن �أ نّ ُ � ن ف ت
� ّ �ز ��ع��ث��ة
ب و ج ك ر و� �����فر ،وا ب� �خوا ر ج ب��ع��ث��ة �م� ن� �ي�ع��ل ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �م���ه ��ه ي� ك
� � � ا �ل��ف�����ض
� ��ليّ���ة �م� ن ا �ل � ّ �ز ت
و جو
م �
ن �أ ن �أ � ش �ة كا � ًا �ل ���ق�� �� .ض �ن ن
كا � ح���و�ي �ز �ع���م � ر��سول ا �ل�ل�ه �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل ( ن��ه) � ع��� ا �ل
� ب و ي م � و فر م�� �
كا � �
م ّ ع
ق ا� � ن ً
َ�جَ َ َ �ضَ فَ هَ َ ت ًق
ح��ق����ق��و� ع��لى ب���ط�لا ن��ه. كا �فرا ���ب�ل ا ��لب��ع��ث��ة� ،ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :وو �د ك � �ا لا �����د �ى) ،و�أط��ب� ل���م�� �
�ة ف ّ ق أ �ة ث أ ر�ة �أ
���ر ال� �ش���ا �ع ج� ّو�ز وا ا �ل��كب�ي��ر ع��لى ال� ن��ب� ي��ا ء ���ب�ل ا ��لب��ع��ث��ة �ل��ق�����ص��ة إ� خ�و �يو��س� .و�م ن�� وك
ع
ا ��ل��ا ق� ن �م� ن ن�� ّ ت��ه��� .ا ت���ف�� ق �م� ن ع�د ا ال� �م�ا �مّ����ة ع�� � ا �ز ا �ل�� ص غ���ا ئ� �م ن���ه��� �ق� � ا ��ل��ع��ث��ة� ،ل ك نّ
��� إ ي لى ج و � ر � م �بل ب ب و� � بو � م و � �
ّ أ ّ ّّ
ا ��لن� ظ����ا �م وال� ��ص���م ج� ّو�ز ه ع��لى��س�ب� ي��ل ا �ل���س�هو.
301 301
Investigation 8: On Marvels
The Ashʾarites concur about their possibility, which is the truth in my
view, because of the stories of Maryam16 and Āṣaf17 as well as the miracles
that are uninterruptedly reported of the Imāms, peace be upon them. The
Muʾtazilites deny miracles of them, because they cannot be evidence of
prophecy. The answer is that marvels are distinguished from miracles by
the challenge.18
302 302
المطلب ال ّثامن :في الكرامات
آ
�ص��ة �م �مَ و� �ص فَ� و�م�ا ت���ق��� �م��ت ا ت� ًرا �ع� نق ّ
�� �
����
ل ؛ � �د ح قّ �ع ن
�� �
ل
� ا �ه ا،�ه� ا تّ���ف����ق��� ت ال�أ �ش���ا �عر�ة ع�� � ا �ز
ل و � ري و و � ي� لى ج و �
�ة
� .و�م ن��ع �م ن���ه ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� لا �م��ت ن���اع الا ����س��ت�د لا ل ب��ه ع��ىل ال�أ ئ����م��ة ع��ل��ه���م ا �ل��س�لا �م �م� ن ا �ل���م�ع��� ز ا ت
�ج � � ي�
ز�ة �ت ّ ّ �أ �ل ُ نّ ّ �ة
ح�د �ي�. �وا ب� :ن��ه ي��ت���ميّ���ز �ع� ن� ا �ل���م�ع���ج�� ب�ا �ل� ���
ا �ل����بو .وا �ج
303 303
Investigation 9: That Prophets Are More
Excellent than Angels
With the exception of al-Qāḍī, the Ashʾarites agree about it, because He
most high has said that God chose Adam, Noah, Abraham’s family, and the
family of ʾImrān, over the two worlds,19 including the angels. Moreover, in
their service they are preoccupied with the attractions of desire and anger
as well as external obstacles, so that their service is more laborious, and he,
peace be upon him, has said, “the most excellent labour is the most bitter”.20
But the Muʾtazilites and the philosophers have said: The angels are more
excellent, because He most high has said, ‘Your Lord only forbade you this
tree to prevent you becoming angels or immortals’,21 and He has said, The Mes-
siah would never disdain to be a servant of God, nor would the angels who are
close to Him,22 as well as, ‘He cannot be mortal! He must be a precious angel’.23
Moreover, angels are separate substances and therefore nobler than men.
The answer is that the verse points at the preference of angels over Adam
at the moment of His speech to Iblīs, not after the election. Alternatively,
the intention is only that they are two angels that do not eat food. Denying
the pride of angels is not evidence of preferring them above the Messiah.
Instead, they are mentioned after the Messiah, whom the Christians claim
to be the son of God, like the polytheists say that they are sons of the Merci-
ful. People imagine that although the magnificence of angels is greater than
the magnificence of men, this is not evidence of the preference of angels
to them.
304 304
أن األنبياء أفضل من المالئكة
المطلب التاسع :في ّ
نَّ َّ َ ْ طَ آ َ َ نُ ً آ َ ق ت ّ ق ض أ ر�ة تّ ف ق
ا ���������� ت� ال� �ش���ا �ع ع��لي��ه إ� لا ا �ل�����ا ��ي�� ،ل����و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :إ� � ا �ل��ل�ه ا ����ص����فَى � د �م و�و��ح�ا و� ل
� �ة �ت ْ نَ َ عَ َ َ َ آَ َْ
���ة؛ ولا ش������ت غ���ا ��ل�ه���م ب�ا ل�ع��ب�ا د إ� ب�را ِ����هي�����م و� ل ِ���ع��مرَ ا � ع��لَى ا �ل��� �ا �ل�ِ��مي�� ن�) و�هو ي�� ن��ا ول ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك
ت �أ ً ق �خ � ّ�ة ف� �ت ن �� � ب� وا �ل���موا ن� ا �ل � � ا �ذ ا � شّ �ة
�و� �ع��ب�ا د ���ه���م �ش�� ق�؛ و��ا ل ع��لي��ه ��ا ر ج ي��� � ،ك ل�����هو وا � غل�����ض م ج و ب�
ع ع
ة ف�أ �ة ف ف �ة ق �أ أ ف �أ
� �ل ��� ����ض � �ل ال� �ع�م�ا ل ح�م ز��ه�ا» .و��ا �ل� ت� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� وا �ل�����لا ��س��� :ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك ا �ل��س�لا �م���� « :ض
�َ َُّ ُكَ َ نْ هَ �ذ شَّ َ�ة َّ �أَ ن تَُ �نَ َ َ َْ ن �أَ ْ تَُ نَ َ َ هَ ُ ت
�و�� �ا �ي��� و � ك �و� �ا ���م��ل �ك �� �ر إ� لا � � ك ���م�ا �ع�� ��� � ِ ِه ا �ل����� � جَ �ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى���( :م�ا ن����ا ك�م�ا رب� �
ِ ِ
َ ا ئ َ ةُ ُ �أَ ن َُ نَ َ ْ ً َّ َ ن َ ْ �تَ ن فَ َ � نَ ق نَ � خَ
�و� �ع����ب�د ا �ل��لِ�ه ولا ا �ل���م�ل ِ� �ك
��� ���� ا �ل���م ِ�����س��ي�� � ي� ك ي�) ،و�و�ل�ه ( :ل�� ي������س� ��ِك ��� �ا �ِل ِ�د �م� ا ل
� ِ�
ح َ
� ّ �ة ة ّن أ ٌ ُ َُّ نَ َ َ�ذَ بَ ً نْ هَ �ذَ ّ َ َ ٌ كَ
�جرد ��� ج�وا �هر م ���� �را إ� � ��� � ا إ� لا ���م�ل�ك�ِر�يم) ،ول� � ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك ا �ل���م����قَرب�و�)���( ،م�ا �ه� ا � � شَ
ف� �ت ن �أ ف
�و� �ش��ر�� �م� ن� ا �ل��ب ش���ر. �ك
ق ت �خ �ت �أ آ تف ّ آ
�ل ُ نّ �ة ت �أ
��ا ط��ب� �ه ب��ل��ي��س ،لا ب��ع�د �� ي��� ا �ل���م�ل�ك ع��ل � د �م و��� م
ى وا �ج�وا ب� � :ال� ي� ��د ل ع��لى ��������ض ل
�أ ّ �أ �أ �أ
��ا �ف� �ع� ن �ك �كلا ن ا �ل����ط�ع�ا �م ن��ف�� الا ��س��ت ن
� � � ال ��� ن
�
ك �ل
�م� ا
� �نك الا ���ت� �ا ء؛ نّ� ا �ل��ق�����ص�د � لا ن� ت
�
� � ي و ي � ي و إ ج �ب و
�ذ ق ّ �ذ ّ ّ
�ر�ه���م ب��ع�د ا �ل���م����س��ي��ح ا �ل� �ي� ��ا �ل� ت� �� ي�����ل�ه���مع��لى ا �ل���م����س��ي�� .ب�ل إ� ن����م�ا ك ���ة لا ي��د ل ع��لى ت���ف�����ض ا �ل���م�لا �ئ �ك
ح
ش ن ّن ن ت ّ ن ت�خ ّ نّ �أ نّ ق ّ ّ
� ي���ل ا �ل����س�ا ء � �ج �م�ا ل �ي��� � ���ه���م ب���ا � ا �لرح�م� .و �
� �����ول ا �ل���م���رك إ ا ��لن����ص�ا ر �ى إ� ن��ه ا � نب� ا �ل�ل�ه ،ك
ّ �أ ث
�� ي���ل ا �ل���م�ل�ك ع��لي��ه. ���ر�م� ن��ج �م�ا ل ا �ل��ب ش���رلا ي��د ل ع��لىت���ف�����ض ا �ل���م�ل�ك ك
305 305
Observation VIII: On the Imamate
المرصد الثامن في اإلمامة وفيه مطالب
Investigation 1: On Its Necessity
The imamate is general leadership by an individual in matters of religion
and this world. Its necessity is debated. It is denied by al-Aṣamm and al-Fu-
waṭī,1 but others endorse its necessity. According to the Imāmites, Abū al-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and the Baghdadians, the method for showing its necessi-
ty is the intellect, but the Imāmites make it incumbent on God most high,
because it is necessarily a gift of grace, for when they have a leader, people
seek justice for one who is wronged and repel the wrongdoer, approaching
the right-minded and distancing from the corrupt, and grace is necessary,
due to the foregoing.
Let it not be said: The imamate can be a grace, such that something else
may subsist in its place, and it is not necessary itself,2 for there is grace,
such that nothing else may subsist in its place, like knowledge of the desert
of reward and punishment, and there is grace, such that something else
does subsist, like the charges from tradition, for otherwise the one charged
could not dispense with the charge from tradition. We grant this, but it can
include a bad aspect. It is not sufficient for necessity to assert the respect
in which it is necessary, unless the corrupt aspects have been eliminated
from it.3
For we say: The consensus of those endowed with understanding, at all
times and places, concerning the institution of leadership is evidence for
denying any other form of grace, and the aspect of badness is restricted. It
is beneficial here.
Abū al-Ḥusayn and the Baghdadians have said that it is necessary ac-
cording to those endowed with understanding. This is an error, because
there is disagreement about it that leads to corruption. The two Jubbāʿīs
and the Ashʾarites maintain that it is necessary, according to what is heard
from tradition.
1 Hishām ibn ʾAmr al-Fuwaṭī (d. before 230/845) was an early Muʾtazilite from Baṣra.
2 That is, the function of the imamate is necessary, but the function may be served by other
institutions as well.
3 That is, even if the imamate were good in a certain respect, or fulfilled a certain function, this
does not make it necessary, unless one can also show that it is the best way of fulfilling that
function – or at least the one with the fewest counterproductive consequences.
308 308
األول :في وجوبها
[المطلب] ّ
خ �ت ف ف
� �خ
�
� ن أش
��
�أ
ال� �م�ا �م��ة �ا ��س��ة ع�ا �ّم��ة ف� �م ا �ل ّ�د � ن ا �ل ّ�د ن���ا � ش
ل����� خ
ي� � ل
�� �
� اص و . � ا
� �ال ص � �
م � � �� � ي� ور ي� و ي ري إ
ّ�ة �أ ف ن ن ق �ذ ّ ف أ �ن ن ف
و ج�وب���ه�ا� .م��ع �م���ه ال� ��ص���م وا �ل����وطي� ،و �ه� ب� ا ��لب��ا �و� إ� لى و ج�وب���ه�ا��� .ع���د الإ� �م�ا �مي��� و ب�ي�
�أ أن ّ �أ نّ ّ
ح��سي�� ن� ا ��لب����صر�ي� وا ��لب� غ���د ا د ي���ي ن� � طر�يق� و ج�وب���ه�ا ا �ل�ع��ق���ل؛ ل� � الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ة و ج���بو�ه�ا ع��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ا �ل
�
ن ف ن ً ّ �ة ف نّ ّ ت ل � ن
كا � ��ل�ه���م رئ��ي��س ي��ت����ص� �ل�ل� ظم����لو�م و�يرد � تى � �و���ه�ا �ل��ط��ف���ا ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور � ،إ� � ا ��لن��ا ��س �م ��ع�ا ى ل ك
ع
ّ ٌ ف ّ �أ �أ ّ
كا ن�وا �م� ن� ا �ل���ص�لا �قر ب� و�ع� ن� ا �ل��ف����س�ا د ب��ع�د؛ وا �ل��ل��ط��� وا ج�� ب� �ل���م�ا ت���ق���د �م. ا � ظل����ا �ل�م �
ح
ّ ف ً ف نّ
�و ن� ال� �م�ا �م��ة �ل��ط��ف��ً�ا ي���ق��و�م�غ ي��ر�ه�ا �م��ق���ا ��م�ه�ا ف��لا ي�ج�
�أ
ق � �ز ن ت
�� ب� �عي�� ن���ا� ،إ� � �م� ن� ا �ل��ل��ط��� لا ي������ا ل:ي�ج�و � � ك إ
� ن � ق �غ ه ��لتّ � ف �ت ق ّ �غ
��ا ��لي�� كا � ك ح��ق���ا � ا ��لث�وا ب� وا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� ،و م���ه م�ا �ي����و�م ي��ر � كا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا ����س� ����م�ا لا �ي��ق��و�م ي��ره �م��ق���ا �م�ه �
ّ ّم ّ
�ت ش �ز � ن ن ف � ت � ن �خ � � ف ل��س���م�عي����ة ،و� لا �ل�م ي� ّ
��� ي�ج�و ا ����� ���م�ا ��ل�ه�ا ع��لى و�ج �ه ���لي�� ا �ل��س���م�ع��� .س�ل�م���ا �ل ك ���ل� �م�� ا �ل� ك ك ��ل م إ
ا�
ي
ن ف
���ه�ه �م�ا �ل�م ي��ت�� �ع ن���ه و ج�وه ا �ل���م��ف���ا ��س�د. � و ج� ��ف�� ف� ا �ل � � ث�� ت ق
���ب��ح .ولاي� ك ي� ي� و ج و ب بو
ن ا تّ ف ق ا � ق ا ف� ّ � � ن أّ
��ا � و�ز �م�ا � ع��لى ن�����ص� ب� ا �لرّ�ؤ ��س�ا ء د ��لي��ل ع��لى ا ن�ت� ف���ا ء كل م ك ل� ن�ا ن���ق��ول������ :ا � ل�ع�����ل ء ي� �
ٌ أ
�ة
ح���صور .و�هي� �م ن�� ف��يّ����ة �ه ن���ا. �غ ي��ر�ه�ا �م� ن ال� �ل��ط�ا �ف� ،وو ج�وه ا �ل��ق����ب�� م
�
ح �
ٌ ق �أ
ح��س�� ن ا ��ل� غ���د ا د � ن � ّن��ه�ا ا �� ��ةٌ ع�� ا �ل�ع��ق��� ا ء� ،ه خ���ط��أ �ل���م�ا ف����ه �م� ن ا �ل��تّ ن���ا �ز و��ا ل ب�وا �ل
ي � ع يو� إ � و ج �ب لى ل و و � ي� و ب
ٌ ً � �ذ ا �لُ ن أ ر�ة �أ ّن
���ب�ا ئ�يّ��ا � وال� �ش���ا �ع إ� لى ���ه�ا وا ج���ب��ة ��س���م�ع�ا. �ه د. ا�
س �� ا �ل���م�ؤ دّ � � ل ا �ل��ف
��
و ب �ج� ي� إ ى
309 309
Investigation 2: On the Necessity of
the Imam’s Being Safeguarded
The Imāmites and the Ismāʾīlites endorse it, pace the remaining groups, for
otherwise regress would follow, because the aspect of necessity is the pos-
sibility of error in the imams. If the leader is such, another leader is needed,
and regress ensues. Furthermore, he is the preserver of law, and so he must
be safeguarded.
When it comes to the first point, it is because the book and the custom
are not exhaustive with regard to legal judgments, and because conflict has
taken place concerning them, and because they are finite whereas there is
no end for things that come to be.
Consensus is not sufficient, because error is possible for each person sin-
gly, and the same holds of the whole.4 Nor is analogy sufficient, because it is
not an argument, for our law is founded upon the coincidence of different
things, like the unity of urination and sleep in judgment,5 as well as upon
the difference of coinciding things, like the obligation to fast at the end of
Ramaḍān and the breaking of the fast at the first of Shawwāl. Hence, the
law does not remain without the imam. If error were possible in him, no
confidence would remain for his word, because of the possibility of his er-
ror and his inattention.
4 The consensus of the community of Muslims, an influential jurisprudential principle for the
Sunnīs, is unreliable, because the judgment of each individual member is fallible, and as a
consequence, the consensus is fallible.
5 Both urination and sleep are judged to invalidate ablution, and in this sense they are one. The
point is that this connection cannot be inferred by any analogy between the two things.
310 310
المطلب الثاني :في وجوب عصمة اإلمام
�ذ ّ ق ّ فً ق �ذ
�ه� ب� إ� ��لي��ه الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ة والإ� ��س���م�ا �عي����ليّ���ة �خ �لا ��ا ��لب��ا �ي� ا �ل����فر� ،و�إلا �ل�ز �م ا �ل��ت��س��ل��س�ل؛ إ� و�ج �ه
آ أ ّ �ة ف ن ّ �ز خ �أ
�خر و�ي��ت��س��ل��س�ل. � ذ�� �ل�ك ا ف���ت��قر إ� لى رئ��ي��س � � كا � ا �لرئ��ي��س ك ���ط� ع��لى ال� �م� �� .لو � ا �لو ج�و� ج�وا ا �ل
ب
ً ل أ نّ ف� �ظ � شّ ف� � ن ن
�أ ٌ
�و� �م�ع���صو�م�ا. و� ��ه ح�ا �� ل��ل���ر ��ي�� ج � ب� � ي� ك
ع
ف� ن ل � � ش � ّ�ة � �ق � نّ�ز �ف أ �غ �ة ّ ت �أ ّ أ ف �أ نّ
ي�ه���م�ا��ا �م ا ل���رعي��� ولو وع ا ل�� اع ��� ل�ا ب� وا �ل����سن��� ي��ر وا ي����ي� ب�ا � ح ك �م�ا ال� و لى ��ل � ا � ك��
ح اد ث ي�ه���م�ا وع�د �مت�ن��ا �ه� ا �ل وت�ن��ا �ه���
�. �و ي
�ّ أ ّ �ز خ �أ
���ة، � ذ�� ا ا �ل���م�� ج����مو .ولا ا �ل��ق�����ا ��س ل� نّ��ه �ل��ي�� �جح ف �ل �ل
س ي ع
�
ك � �د،
ح او ولا الإ� �ج �م�اع �ج�وا ا ���ط� ى ل
ك
� �
ل �
ع
ّ ت
خ ف ح�ا د ا ��ل� ل وا ��لنّ� �م ف�� ا �ل � �ذ �م� ن� �ش�� �ع ن���ا ع��ل ا تّ���ف���ا ق ا �ل���م�� خ���ت�� فل���ا ت
�م ،وا ���ت�لا �� �
ح ك�
و ي بو �
� اك
� ، � إ �ب ى ر ى �
ف ّ شّ ف ق �أ ص �� � ن ف آ ا �ل���م��تّ ف����ق���ا ت
� �ا � و�إ���ط�ا ر ول ���وا ل��� ،لم ي��ب� ��سو�ى الإ� �م�ا �م؛ ��لو ��ا ب� � و�م �خر ر م���ض � ،ك� ي�ج�
إ
ٌ �أ
�ج �ا �ز ا �لخ���ط� ع��لي��ه �ل�م ي��قب� وث�و ق� ب���ق��و�ل�ه ��جل�وا �ز خ���ط�ا ئ��ه و���س�هوه.
311 311
Investigation 3: That He Must Be Most
Excellent and Appointed
This is because if he were equal, he would not more appropriate for leader-
ship, and if he were more imperfect, his precedence to the excellent would
be disgraceful to the intellect. Moreover, He most high has said: Say, ‘God
shows the way to the Truth. Is someone who shows the way to the Truth more
worthy to be followed, or someone who cannot find the way unless he himself
is shown? What is the matter with you? How do you judge?6 Hence, he is
the most knowing, the bravest, the most generous, the most abstinent, the
most pious, and the gentlest, and likewise for other attributes of perfec-
tion. He is above the lowliness of pride and adultery with mothers, lest his
status fall from acceptance.
He must be appointed, because being safeguarded is an internal thing,
which is not known to anyone but God most high. The appointment is ei-
ther through the creation of a miracle by his hand subsequent to the claim
to imamate, or through his being specified as safeguarded, the way a proph-
et or an imam is.
6 Q 10:35.
312 312
المطلب الثالث :في أنّه يجب أن يكون أفضل
[ومنصوص ًا]
ً ق ن �أ ّ �ة �أ ً ل أ نّ � ن
� �ل�ع��ق���لا؛ كا � ن���ق�����ص ���ب�� ت���ق���د ي����م�ه ع��لى ا �ل��ف���ا �ض �� ن� و لى ب�ا �لر �يا ��س� ،و�لو � كا � �م��س�ا وي�ا �ل�م ي� ك � ��ه لو �
َّ َ �أَ �أَ �أَ ح �أَ
حَ ُّ ن ُ َّ �بَ َ َّ ّ َ �َ ّ �فََ ن َ ْ ت
حق� � ق� � ي�����ت� �م� ن� لا ي�����ه�د �ي� إ� لا � لَى ا �ل
إ � �
ي �د
ِ �ه و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى� ( :م�� ي����
ع تَ ُُ ِ
�أ �أ�ز ف ن �أ �أ ش �أ
�� ��فَ َ َ ُ ْ �كَ ْ فَ �ْ نَ �أَ ن ُ ْ َ
�ر�م و �ه�د �
�و� ع��ل و ج�� و ك �
�����ي� ح��مو�) .ي�� ك ك � �م � � �
� ي�����ه�د �ى ��م�ا �ل ك
و روع م ع
أ آ
� ن �م ن���زّ �هً�ا �ع� ن د ن�ا ء �ة ال� �ا ء ��ع ال� �ّ�مه�ا ت �أ ح��ل � ل �غ�� �ذ �ل�ك �م� ن � فص���ا ت
�، ب و �هر � ك
وي و� � . ل ا
�مك
�
� �
ل ا � و م إ ى ير
� �
ّ ��لئ�� ا � ق
ح�ل�ه �م� ن� ا �ل��ق���ل� ب�. ��س����ط م
� لي
ّ ن �ة تّ �ة �أ أ نَّ ً ن ن �أ
�و� �م ن�����صو�ص�ا ع��لي��ه ،ل� � ا �ل�ع����ص���م� �م� ن� �مور ا ��لب��ا ط��� ا ��ل�� لا �ي�ع�ل��م�ه�ا إ� لا ا �ل�ل�ه �� ب� � ي� ك و�
ي�ج
ي
�أ ّ بَ ّ ُ
ّ ّ
�ة ق
��ل ق� �م�ع���ج�� ع��لى ي��د ه �ع����ي���� ا د ع�ا ء الإ� �م�ا �م� و ب�ت��عي����ي ن� ا �ل���م�ع���صو�مع��لي��ه �ت�ع�ا لى .وا ��لن���� � �م�ا ب�
�خ
زٍ صإ
ن ّ �أ
� و إ� �م�ا �م. ����
�ك
بي
313 313
Investigation 4: That the Imam after the
Prophet, God Bless Him and His Family and
Grant Him Peace, Was ʾAlī,
upon Whom Be Peace
The Shīʾites maintain that for a number of reasons.
(a) If one is to be the imam, one must be safeguarded, and such a one
was ʾAlī, peace be upon him. Now, the antecedent is true due to the fore-
going, and likewise the consequent. The conditional is shown to be true
by consensus, since no one has spoken of anyone else being safeguarded.
(b) A citation from the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant
him peace, reported in an unbroken transmission by the Shīʾites, sets him
as the substitute from among the forefathers, as in his statements, “Grant
him the order of the believers”, “Listen and obey him”, and “You are the
substitute after me”.7
(c) He most high has said: Your only true allies are God, His Messenger,
and those who believe…8 The verse and the word ‘only’ are in order to lim-
it the transmission and to stabilise the situation, as well as to prevent the
conflict of several rivals for one position and the arrival of the denial, as was
mentioned before. Hence, the converse was requisite.
What is meant by ‘true ally’ is one who is first in governance with regard
to custom and position. It means ‘someone’, because it is attributed with a
specific attribution. Such is ʾAlī, peace be upon him, because the attribu-
tion is not there for anyone else yet it has been asserted of him, due to what
was assented by his seal at his kneeling.
7 Cf. Bihār al-anwār XXVIII, 266; XI, 265; and III.311, respectively.
8 Q 5:55, slightly modifying Abdel Haleem’s translation.
314 314
النبي صلى الله
أن اإلمام بعد ّ
المطلب الرابع :في ّ
علي عليه السالم
عليه وسلم هو ّ
�ذ �ذ ت شّ
ل�����ي���ع��ةإ� لى �ل�ك �لو ج�وه: �ه��ب�� ا �
ٍ
ّ ق ّ قٌّ � ن �م�ع�� ص �ًم�ا ف���ه ع�� ّ � �أ ن �ن ن ف
�� ن
� �
ح م � �د �� �� ��م
�ل� ا � ك �
ل ، م� ا
ل �
س �
ل�� ا �ه��ل
ي �ع ل
و و ي� � � � كا � الإ� �م�ا �م ي�ج�� ب� ي و
ك � � ا �ل��� -إ � �
�ذ ق ن شّ ّ
�غ
ل���رطيّ����ة الإ� �ج �م�ا إ� لا ��ا ئ�ل ب��ع����ص���م��ة ي��ره. �ل���م�ا ����س� ق�ب� ،ف��ا ��لت��ا لي� �م��ث�ل�ه .وب�ي��ا � ا �
ع
ت ن ق شّ �ة �خَ فً � ن ف ف� �ق -ت� ا ت� ا ��لنّ���� ّ �م� ن ا �لن�� ّ
� �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل �����ل�ه ا �ل�����ي���ع� ��ل���ا ع�� ��س��ل� ي� و�ل�ه: � ب�
م و ر ص � بي
�خ�ل� ��يف����ة �أ ن تَ �أ ر�ة ّ
� �� � ا �ل «��سَ� �ل�موا ���ع��لي��ه ب��إ �م ا �ل���م�ؤ ����من��ي�� ن�» ،و «ا ���س��م�عوا و ���طي���عوا �ل�ه» ،و « �
�م� ن� ب��ع�د �ي�».
ّ آ نَّ َ ��لُّ كُ� ُ � َّ ُ َ �ُ �ُ ُ �َّ�ذ � نَ آ َ ُ �ق ت
ي� � �م ن��وا ).......ال� ي��ة و�ل��ف�� ظ�����ة إ� ن����م�ا ج� -و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :إ� ����م�ا وِي��ما ل��ل�ه ور �سول�ه وا ل�ِ
� نّ ف ّ ّ
�� وا �م��ت ن���ا ت�وا ر د ا ��لن�ق��ي�����ض ن م ح���صر ب�ا ��لن�ق���ل ،و��لب�ق���ا ء ا �لو �ض �ل��ل���
� ي��� ع��لىح�ل وا ح�د ،وورود ا �ل���ي� ع��لى ع ع
� �ذ ف ّ
�ور���ت�عي�� ن� ا �ل�ع�ك��س. ا ل���م� ك
تّ ف �ض �عً�ا .ا �ل���م ا د ا ��ل�� ض فً أ ل �ت ّ ف ّ
ع���� ،لا ����ص�ا ��ه و ر ب صر�� �عر��ا وو� وا �ل���مرا د ب�ا لـو لي� �هو ال� و ى ب�ا �ل����
ت ّق ث ت ف �غ ف نت ف ّ ف �خ ّ ف
ب�و�ص� �ا �ص���� .هوع��لي� ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م لا �����ا ء ا �لو�ص� �ع� ن� ي��ره ،و��بو��ه �ي���ه �ل���م�ا ����ص�د �
�وع�ه. �خ�ا ت����م�ه ح�ا ل ر ك ب�
�
315 315
On The Imamate
(d) The unbroken tradition transmits from him, God bless him and his
family and grant him peace, a saying on the day of Ghadīr: “Am I not prior
to yourselves for you? They said: Indeed. He said: He for whom I am lord
has ʾAlī as his lord. Oh god, befriend his friend, be an enemy to his enemy,
support his supporter, and abandon the one who abandons him!”9 What
is meant by ‘lord’ is the most prior. This is because earlier a principle was
introduced for it and because it cannot mean any other of its meanings, for
it is absurd that the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him
peace, should have gathered the community at the time of midday heat,
erect something like a pulpit, and raised ʾAlī’s arm, peace be upon him. He
meant: He for whom I am his cousin has ʾAlī as his cousin, he for whom I
am the substitute has ʾAlī as the substitute, and he for whom I am the sup-
port has ʾAlī as his support. Besides, He most high has said: The believers,
both men and women, support each other.10
(e) He, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, has said, “You
are to me in the same position as Aaron to Moses, except that there will be
no prophet after me”,11 and the exception entails generalisation. All in all,
his position is such that if he survives the prophet, he remains the substi-
tute, for otherwise the position would collapse. Because he is safeguarded,
he deserves to be the substitute.
316 316
�ف � � ا �ة
�ي� ا �لإ� ��م� �م�
317 317
On The Imamate
(f ) ʾAlī, peace be upon him, was the most excellent, and so he was the
imam. As regards the implication, it is due to the foregoing concerning
how bad it would be to prefer someone who is excelled. As regards the
truth of being the most appropriate, it is because all scholars associate it
with him. He, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, has said,
“Appoint ʾAlī”. This was on the condition of knowledge and abstinence,
and because the companions went back to him on their matters. ʾUmar
has said in a number of occasions, “Were it not for ʾAlī, ʾUmar would have
perished.”12 Furthermore, he made extraordinary judgments, such as ‘the
slave’s chain is measured by water’,13 or the eighth part per dirham in the
judgment concerning the eighth part of bread, donating one dirham to the
fellow with three loaves and the rest to the other.14 There are other extraor-
dinary judgments.
The exegetes agree that what is meant by His saying ourselves15 is ʾAlī,
peace be upon him. Unity is impossible, and so what is meant is that which
is equal. Furthermore, there is the report of the bird, when he, God bless
him and his family and grant him peace, said: “Oh God, bring the dearest
of Your creation to me so that he can eat this bird with me.”16
318 318
�ف � � ا �ة
�ي� ا �لإ� ��م� �م�
319 319
On The Imamate
320 320
�ف � � ا �ة
�ي� ا �لإ� ��م� �م�
321 321
Investigation 5: On the Imamate of the
Others among the Twelve Imams,
Peace Be upon Them
What has been said before on the imamate of ʾAlī, peace be upon him, is
evidence for that, namely the necessity of being safeguarded and the pas-
sages and reports about the substitute, in an unbroken transmission from
the forefathers, to the effect that ʾAlī appoints each of the ones after him.
The report is transmitted from the prophet, God bless him and his family
and grant him peace, in his saying to Ḥusayn, peace be upon him: “This
is my son, the imam, the son of an imam, the brother of an imam, the fa-
ther of nine imams, the ninth of whom will be the one standing among
them.” The occultation of the imam, peace be upon him, is traced back to
the refusal of grace by those charged by themselves, or it is due to a hidden
benefit of which God most high alone has knowledge. Grace does not van-
ish, because it can become manifest at every moment in which vices are
restrained.
322 322
األئمة االثني
المطلب الخامس :في إمامة باقي ّ
عشر عليه السالم
�ت ت �ة نّ ّ ن ق �ة ّ ق ف ّ
ي��د ل ع��لي��ه �م�ا ����س��ب� �ي� إ� �م�ا �م� ع��لي�ع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م�م� ن� و ج�و ب� ا �ل�ع����ص���م� وا ��ل����ص وا ��ل����ل ا �ل���م� وا �ر
ّ ن ّ ّ �أ نّ َ �خَ ً
كل وا ح ٍ�د �م ن����ه���م ����ص ع��لى �م� ن� ب��ع�د ه ،وت�وا ت�ر ا ��لن�ق���ل�ع� ن� ا �لن��ب�� �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه �� فل���ا �ع� ن� ��س��ل فٍ� ب� � �
ي
ح��س�� ن ع��ل��ه ا �ل��س� ا � �« :ه��ذ ا � � ن � ��� �ا �ٌ ا � نُ � �م�ا � �أ خ� � �م�ا � �أ � �أئ�� ّ��م��ة ف ق
إ ب�ي� إ م م ب� إ ٍم و إ ٍم بو ع��لي��ه و��س��ل �ي� �و�ل�ه �ل��ل��� ي� ي ل م
م
���لّف���� ن ن ُ �ت ن �ةٌ �ة �غ ُ ئ ق ُ ت ت
������س�ع��ةٍ� ،ا �����س��ع�ه���م��ا �����م���ه��م» .و � ي����ب� الإ� �م�ا �مع��لي��ه ا �ل��س�لا �م�م��س���د إ� لى �م��ع ا �ل���م ك� ي�
أّت ّ �أ ّ ف �أ �أ ن���ف
� ��ز
و ح��ة خ���ف��يّ����ة ا ����س��ت� ث�را �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى ب��ع�ل��م�ه�ا؛ ولا ي�ن��ا ف�� ا �ل��ل��ط��ف� ،ل� ن� �ج�
��� �
�لص� �
��م��ل�و � �
�ط���ل
��
ل ا م �
��ه���س
� ��
ي ي
ئ
�جر�ع� ن� ا �ل��ق����ب�ا �.ك ّ �آ ن �ز ا �ٌ ف ظ
ح ���هوره �ي� �ل ٍ�
323 323
The Seal
It is necessary to order what is recognised and prohibit what is denied,
due to common consensus and what is heard from tradition, for otherwise
that which is recognised would not be maintained and that which is de-
nied would take place, or God most high would necessarily be offended,
because the order of what is recognised is attributed to Him, and the pro-
hibition is preclusion from what is denied. If they are necessary according
to the intellect, they are necessary for Him most high, because whatever
is necessary according to the intellect is necessary for one to whom the
aspect of necessity pertains. They do have the conditions that what is rec-
ognised should be known as recognised and what is denied as denied, and
that it should be possible to both perform and to refrain from what is de-
nied, both for one who is corrupt and for other believers.
324 324
ٌ
خاتمة
ّ أ ً ً ّ ف أ
�ر إ� �ج �م�ا ع�ا�� ،س���م�ع�ا ع��لى ال� �ش����هر ،و�إلا �ل���م�ا ا رت���ف�� �� ب� ال� �مُر ب�ا �ل���م�عرو�� وا ��ل ن���ه� �ع� ن� ا �ل���م ن�� ك� ي�ج�
ع ي
أّ أ ق ن ٌ �أ ن ت ُم ً فٌ
�م �خ� ّلا ب�ا �لوا ج���؛ ل� ن� ال� �مر ب�ا �ل���م�عرو�ف� �هوا �لح
�
� � ى ل ا
�ع� � �ه
ل ��
ل ا � اك
� و ، ر�
�
ك ��م� �� و ا
�م����
لو � �م�عرو�
ل ب ع
أ نّ ّ ت � ن �ن � ن� ف ّ
�
بٍ �كل وا ج� �ر�� .لو و ج���ب�ا ب�ا �ل�ع��ق���ل �لو ج���ب�ا ع��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ،ل� � � ع��لي��ه ،وا ��ل ن���ه� �هوا ل���م�� م�� ا ل���م�� ك
ي
ع
ف ئ �أ ن �ٌ �ق ّف
ح���ص�ل �ل�ه و�ج �ه ا �لو ج�و ب� .و��ل�ه���م�ا �ش��را ���ط� � :ي�ع��ل ا �ل���م�عرو�� � ع��ل �م� ن� �
ى ب � ����هو وا ج � ع������ل
ي
م
��ا ا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ا �ل���م��ف���ا ��س�د �ع ن���ه �ع� ن �� ض
ع���� ا �ل���م�ؤ �م ن��ي�� ن�. �ًا ،ت� �ز ت�أث ن �م� ف�ً�ا ا �ل���م ن�� ك� ن
و �ب �و�ي � �ي��رالإ� � ك� ر و �ر�م�� ك�ر و�ج عرو و
325 325
Observation IX: On the Return
المرصد التاسع في المعاد وفيه مطالب
Investigation 1: On the Possibility of
the Creation of Another World
Those who are religious agree about it, pace the philosophers, because two
like things are to be judged equally, and possibility is one of the concomi-
tants of quiddity according to both common consensus and His most high
saying, Is He who created the heavens,1 and the rest of the verse.
They argue by saying that the world is spherical, and the existence of
another one would entail a void. The minor premise is denied, and we deny
both the impossibility of the void and the implication.
1 Q 36:81. The full verse reads: “Is He who created the heavens and earth not able to create the
likes of these people? Of course He is! He is the All Knowing Creator.”
328 328
األول :في إمكان خلق عالم آخر
[المطلب] ّ
أ ا تّ���ف�� ق ا �ل���م��لّ� ن ع��ل��ه �خ � ا ف�ً�ا �ل�� فل��� ا � ف
�ز ال � � ن
��ا � �م� ن� �لوا �م ��ا �م ،و إ� م ك �س����ة �ل��ت��س�ا و�� ا �ل���م��ث�لي�� ن� ف�� ال� ح ك� ل � يو� ي ل
ي ي �أَ
آ َّ � َقَ َ
َْ سَ ّ�ذ
�) ال� ي��ة. ل��س���مَ َ ا ت��
ا �� �ل
خَ ا �ل���م�ا �هيّ����ة؛ و�ل�لإ� �ج �م�ا ،و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لىَ ( :و�ل�����ي�� ا �ل�ِ �
ِ و � ي ع
�ص�� � �م���م ن�� ع��ةٌ ن����م��ن ّ �أ �أ �خ �ز ٌ�ة َ �ت ّ �أ نّ
و ى �
ل�� او . ى � � د � ج و ��ل �م� ن ل � و��ل �م ا � ك م ل
�� ا
�ع��
ل ا � ح� �� ج�وا ب�
ا�
ع و غر �خر و � ر ي
�ت �ة �ل �أ
�خ�ل و�ل�ز و�م�ه. ح�ا �ل� ا �ا ����س� ���
329 329
Investigation 2: On the Possibility of
the World’s Non-Existence
Those who are religious, with the exception of the Karrāmites, agree about
it, pace the philosophers, because the world is contingent and has come
to be, and so its non-existence is possible. The non-existence of time is
also possible, and the non-existence of the world does not need time, as
is the case in the case of the priority of some of its parts to others. The
Karrāmites argue that its non-existence is not due to an agent, because if
withholding existence were something positively existing, it would not be
identical to the world’s non-existence, but something that annihilates it,
and so it would be withholding existence through its opposite. If it were
not something positively existing, it could not be traced back to anything
that produces an effect, since there is no difference between not having an
effect and having non-existence as an effect. The world’s non-existence is
not through its opposite either, because then its coming to be would de-
pend on the annihilation of the other opposite.
If it were reasoned that the opposite is annihilated by coming to be, this
would be a circle. Furthermore, the annihilation of neither of the two by
the other would be more appropriate than the converse, and the potency
of that which comes to be, due to dependence on a cause, is common to
both. The world’s non-existence is not due to the non-existence of a condi-
tion, because it is nothing but an accident, and so a substance would be in
need of an accident. It is a false circle, because the withholding of existence
does not exist.
The difference between denying an act and performing non-existence
is evident, for the first is judged when nothing whatsoever emerges what-
soever and the state of affairs stays as it was, whereas the second is judged
when it emerges from the agent.
330 330
المطلب الثاني :في إمكان عدم العالم
� �زُ ��ا �زنٌ ُ ثٌ ف ّ�ة �خ ا فً ف ا ف �ة أ نّ ّ ن ّ
و ي�ج و� �ه؛م� �دع � �ج � �د ح م
� �و �
�
ك ��م�م� �ه� �ل ، ��س�� � ل �
ل���� �
ل ا
�� ل � �ه� �ل�ع
ر ي ي �
��م� ا �
�
ك �
ل ا ا ل ا ت���ف�� ق� ا �ل���م��لي�و� إ�
ع��� .ا � �ت ض ض �أ ز ئ ف تق ّ
ع�د �م ا �ل�زّ�م�ا ن� ولا ي���ف����ت��قر إ� لى �ز �م�ا ن� ،ك�
ح� �� ج��ا�ج �م�ا �ي� ������د �م ب��ع���� �ج��ا ��ه ع��لى ب�� � و
ًّ � ف ل أ نّ ال أ ا � ن ن ّ�ة �أ نّ
�� ن� عي�� ن� ع�د �م ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م كا � و ج�ود ي�ا �ل�م ي� ك �را �مي��� ب� � ع�د �م�ه �ل��ي��س ب�ا ل�����ا ع�ل � � � ع�د �م إ � � ا �ل ك�
ثّ �ذ ًّ � ف ً � ف� ن �أ ا �ً � ّ ّ ن
�� ن� و ج�ود ي�ا ا �م��ت ن�� إ� ����سن���ا د ه إ� لى ا �ل���م�ؤ �ر ،إ� لا � �د؛ و�إ� �ل�م ي� ك �و� ع�د م�ا ب�ا ل���ض �� ي���ا ل�ه ،ي�� ك ب�ل م�������ض
ع
ّّ آ قف نّ أ ّ �أ �أ ق
�خر. � �د ال� � � �د ،ل� � ح�د وث��ه �م��تو���� ع��لى ا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ا �ل���ض �فر� ب�ي�� ن� لا ث�ر �ل�ه وب���ي ن� ث�را �ل�ع�د �م؛ ولا ب�ا �ل���ض
آ �أ �أ أ ّّ ف��ل ع�لّ� ا ن�ت� ف
� �ه��ذ ا د ا ر .ول� نّ��ه �ل���� ا ن�ت� ف���ا ء ح�د �ه�م�ا �ا ل� � و لى �م� ن ح�د ث
و � �د ب�
� �ضل�� � ا ء ا���
� �خر ب س ي و ل
ض ّ �ذ شّ ّ
ق ّ �ة �ل ث ت ق ّ
ل���رط إ� �ل��ي��س إ� لا ا �ل�عر��، ���ة .ولا ب��ع�د �م ا � م���ت��رك
ل��س��� � ش
ح�ا د � ��ل��ع�ل� ا � �ب ب ا �ل�ع�ك��س ،و�و ا �
ًّ ٌ ٌ أ نّ ض � ً ف
ح��ت�ا �ج �ا إ� لى ا �ل�عر�� .و�هود ور ب�ا ط�ل؛ ل� � الا ع�د ا �م �ل��ي��س و ج�ود ي�ا. �و�هر م �و ن� ا ��جل �ي�� ك
� ��ع�د � ص�د �ش�� ء ا �ل� ��ت��ة
م �ك ح ا �ل���� ق ��� ن ن��ف�� ا �ل��ف���ع� ف���ع� ا �ل�ع�د �م ظ��ا � ٌ ،ف�� نّ ال�أ ّ
ور ي� �ب � مب ل هر إ � و و فر� بي� ي� ل و ل
ن ّ
� � �ت ّ � ن � ث � ك� ٌ �أ نّ
�م ب����ص�د وره �ع� ن� ا �ل��ف���ا ع�ل. كا � ،وا �ل��ا ي� ح و � ا �لح�ا ل م����س� ���مرع��لى م�ا �
331 331
On The Return
Non-existence is renewed after not having been there, and the two
non-existences are distinct, either by being related to two existences or
by one of them being specifically related. That which comes to be does not
depend on the non-existence of what persists. Instead, the non-existence
of what persists is caused by that which came to be as well as the need, even
if it is common to both, except that that which brings to existence is strong-
er than that which maintains.2 This is because bringing into existence is
bestowing an existence, which was not there at all, whereas maintaining is
preservation of an existence that has already occurred. Because it is strong-
er, it makes that which comes to be preponderate, and what is preponder-
ated upon no longer exists. Constricting the condition to the accident is
precluded, because it can be privative.
We admit that, but the respect of need is different, for a designated sub-
stance needs some accident, not a specific one, whereas a designated acci-
dent needs a designated substance.
2 Think of two temporally successive created things in the same material substrate. For as long
as it exists, the prior thing persists because God maintains its existence. God never causes
the thing’s non-existence, but when He creates the posterior thing in the same substrate, the
prior thing’s non-existence necessarily follows. Both created things are in similarly need of
God as the cause of their existence, but in this case the cause’s aspect of bringing something
new into existence overpowers its aspect of maintaining what was already there.
332 332
ف �
��ي� ا�لم��ع�ا د
ن �أ ن �ت �ز ن ّ �أ ن
ن �ت
�� ن� وا �ل�ع�د �م�ا � ي� ���م�اي� ا � :إ� �م�ا ب�ا لا ����س�ا ب� إ� لى و ج�ود�ي� و ��د د ا �ل�ع�د �م ب��ع�د � �ل�م ي� ك وب�ت�ج�
ق ق قف �ص��ةً .وا �ل �أ �ه �خ ّ
� لا ي�ت�و���� ع��لى ع�د �م ا ��لب��ا �ي� ،ب�ل ع�د �م ا ��لب��ا �ي� �م�ع�لول ح�ا د ث � ب�ا ن���ت��س�ا ب� ح�د �م�ا �ا
أّ �أ ّ �أ ّ
��ا د إ� �ع��ط�ا ء � ت�؛ � لا ن� ا �ل���مو�ج �د ق�و�ى �م� ن ا �ل���م��ب�ق� ،ل� ن� ال� ي�ج� � �ة ن ش ت � وا �ل ح�ا د ث ا �ل
�
إ ي� � ح�ا �ج � و�إ� ا �����ر�ك� إ
ّ
� ن��ه �أ ق� � �ت�� � � �ح��ف���ظ�� ا �لو ج�ود ا �ل
� �� ن �أ ص� اً .ا �ل��تّ� ق������ة �
ل
ّ�ذ
�
جح ر ي ى و و ك لو . ل �ص � ا�
ح ي �ب و ل � � ك �
ي م� � ا لو ج�ود ا �ل� ي
�
ً � ا �ز �أ ن ن ض شّ ف ن
�و� ع�د �ميّ���ا. ل���رط �ي� ا �ل�عر�� ��جلو � ي� ك ح���ص�ا را � � و��ع�د �م ا �ل���مر ج�و و����م ن�� ا �
� ي
ح�ا د ث ا �ل
�
ح يع
ض ّ ّن م ٌ
ح��ت�ا ج إ� لى �عر�� �م�ا لا ب��عي�� ن���ه، �و�هر ا �ل���م�عي��� �
ّ
�خ��ت�� فل����ةٌ؛ ف�� ن� ا ��جلح��تي���ا ج م
� � اال �� ن � ه��ة
�� ك ل� ا،
� ��س�ّل�م ن
��
� إ � � ج�
نّ وا �ل�عر ض�� ا �ل���م�ع ّ�� ن� م
ح��ت�ا ج إ� لى ج�و�هر�م�عي���. � ي
�
333 333
Appendix
The majority of the theologians maintain that the world is made to not ex-
ist, because He most high has said: Everyone on earth perishes,3 Everything
will perish except His Face,4 He is the First and the Last,5 and We shall repro-
duce creation just as We produced it the first time,6 and just as the initiation
was from non-existence, so is the reproduction.
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī has said that the world does not cease to exist but
its parts are scattered, because if it ceased to exist, it could not return, and
since the consequent is false, likewise the antecedent. As regards the con-
ditional, it is false because of what follows. When it comes to the falsity of
the consequent, it is because the one charged deserves reward, and if the
world did not return, injustice would follow. Besides, necessary knowledge
from the religion of Muḥammad, God bless him and his family and grant
him peace, as well as the unbroken transmission of verses point towards it.
3 Q 55:26.
4 Q 28:88.
5 Q 57:3.
6 Q 21:104.
334 334
تذنيب
ٌ
�لَ ْ هَ فَ ن ُ ُّ َ ت �أ نّ �ت ّ
�ذ �ه� ب� �ج ��م�هور ا �ل���م� ك�
(كل �م� نْ����عَ � ي����ا ��ا ٍ�)، ��ل�مي�� ن� إ� لى � ا �ل�ع�ا �ل�م �ي�ع�د �م� ،ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى� :
كَ َ بَ َ�أْ نَ �أَ َّ َ � ْ َّ ْ هَ ُ ُ َ أَ َّ ُ آ � ُ ٌ ُ ُّ شَ ْ هَ
�
قٍ� ل� ��خَ ول ا
� �د �� ا
��م ( )،(كل���ي� ءٍ ��� �ا �ِل�ك إ� لا و ���ج��ه)�( ،هو ال� ول وال� ِ��خ�ر �
�ة ف� � ذ ن نُ ُ ُ
��� ا الإ� ع�ا د .كا � الا ب�ت��د ا ء �ع� ن� ع�د �م ك ��ِ���عي���د ه)؛ و�ل���م�ا �
� تّ َُ ت ق �أ ز �ؤ أ نّ ّ نّ ُ ن ل �
ق �أ
ل
ي و ي� ا
�� �ل ا �د،ع� � م �ل� م� �د
ع و �
ل �ه
� �ل ؛ه ا � ��
ب ل فر� �ج � ��
ي � م� �دع� و��ا ل بو � ب صر ي� إ ي
� ا ل �ه� � : � ���� �
�ل ا س
� �ح��� ا �
�ت � قّ ٌ ف � ق ّ � �ث �أ �ّ � شّ ّ�ة ف ل �أ �ت �أ �ّ ا ن � ا �ز ف �أ نّ � �ّف
���ل ي �
ح �� �س
� � ��� � ب�ا ط�ل��ا ل���م�����د �م م� �ل�ه .م�ا ا ل���رطي��� ���م�ا ي� ي� .و م�ا ب���ط�ل � ا ل�ل �م ��ل � ا ل���م ك
ن مّ
ت ت
��م�د �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��لم ،و�وا �ر ا ��لث�ّوا � .ف��لو�ل�م �ي�ع�د �ل�ز �م ا � ظل�����ل ،و�ل��ل�ع��ل ا �ل�ض��ّ�ر ور �� �م� ن د�ي�ح
ي � م م ب
آ ت ّ �ةّ
ال� ي�ا � ا �ل�د ا �ل� ع��لي��ه.
335 335
Investigation 3: On the Possibility of
the Return of the Non-Existent
People differ on that but the majority maintain it, because its quiddity is
receptive to both existence and non-existence, so that they can succeed
each other upon it. Were that not the case, pure contingency would not be
transformed into either alternative, which is necessarily false.
The philosophers, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and the Karrāmites maintain
that it cannot return, because it is pure negation, so that the possibility of
returning cannot be judged of it. Moreover, if it did exist, it could not be
distinguished from its like, and because if it were to return, its time would
also return, and it would both be initiated and return.
The answer is that if the possibility of return cannot be judged of it,
neither can its impossibility be judged of it. Moreover, judgment requires
mental assertion, and a lack of distinction for us does not entail its lack in
the thing itself, and it can be judged to both return and be initiated in two
considerations.
336 336
المطلب الثالث :في إمكان إعادة المعدوم
�� ن
ف�أ �� ه ُ � ��ل��ه؛ ل أ نّ �م�ا �هّ����ت�ه ق��ا ���ة �ل ف�ذ خ �ت ف نّ ف �ذ
� ك م� �� ،م � �دع��
ل اا �� ��ل� ا ��ل��ا ��س �ي� �ل�ك� �� ،ه� ب� ا �ج �م� ور إ ي � � ي ب ل� و ج و و
د � ل��
ل
ٌ ّ �ة �أ ق � ن ّ ف ّ ت ق
��ا � ا �ل���صر�� إ� لى ح�د �����سي�����مي���ه و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور . ��ع�ا ����ب�ه���م�ا ع��لي��ه ،و�إلا لا ن���ق���ل� ب� الإ� �م ك
ت أ نّ ن ف ٌ م ض ٌ ّ ف �أ �ذ
ح����، �را �ميّ����ة إ� لى ا �م��ت ن���ا إ� ع�ا د ��ه ل� ��ه ����� � ح��سي�� ن� ا ��لب����صر�ي� وا �ل ك� �س����ة و ب�وا �ل
� و �ه��ب� ت� ا �ل��ف���لا �
ي ع
أ أ ّ �أ أّ ّ
ّ
ح��ة ا �ل�عود؛ ول� ن��ه �لو و�ج �د �ل�م ي��ت���مي���ز �ع� ن� �م��ث�ل�ه ،ول� ن��ه �لو �عي���د ل� �عي���د ح ك�
�مع��لي��ه ب����ص��� �ف��لا ����ص�� ّ ا �ل
ي ح
ق �ت ف ن �ت �أً ً
�و� �م��ب� �د �م�ع�ا د ا. و�� �ه� ،ي�� ك
أ
�مح ك� �مع��لي��ه �ا �م��ت ن���ا ع�ه ،ول� نّ� ا �ل
� ح ك� ��ا ن� ا �ل�ع د لا �م��ت ن�� ا �ل
� �مع��لي��ه ب�� �م ك� � ا �� :ل �ل�م ����ص�� ا �ل
�
ح ك� ا �ل
ب ع و إ و �ج و ب و ي ح
ّ أ ف ُ �����س��ت�د�ع ا �ل��ث� ت ا ��ذّ �ه ن ّ
� ،وع�د �م الا �م��تي���ا �ز �ع ن���د ن�ا لا �ي��ق��ت���ض���� ع�د �م�ه �ي� ن���ف����س ال� �مر؛ و�ي���ص�� ي� �بو� ل� � ي
ح ي ي
�ة
ا �ل�ح ك��مع��لي��ه ب�ا لإ� ع�ا د والا ب�ت��د ا ء ب�ا �ع��ت��ب�ا ري� ن�.
337 337
Investigation 4: On Establishing the Return
Muslims as a whole agree that a corporeal return has been established. As
regards those who allow the return of what does not exist, that is evident,
because it is possible, and God most high has announced that it will take
place. As regards those who deny the return of what does not exist, they
say the return takes place in the sense that parts are gathered after being
dispersed. This is also possible in itself. With regard to the recipient, this
is because the body is receptive to the accidents that subsist through it,
this receptivity being essential. With regard to the agent, this is because
He most high knows all that is knowable, thus knowing the parts of every
individual, and He has power over all that is subject to power, so that He
gathers together the parts of every body and creates life in them.
The ancients precluded corporeal return, because a mixture’s coming to
be entails that a soul comes to be, and then two souls would depend on one
body. Moreover, if a man eats another, one of them would be lost.7
The answer is what has preceded concerning the denial of the existence
of soul and its dependence on a body prepared for a second soul. What is
eaten are superfluous parts in relation to the eater.
7 The first argument is the Avicennian refutation of transmigration mentioned above in IV.2.3.
The second is an ancient argument against the idea that in resurrection, the parts of the orig-
inal body are gathered together again. If a missionary has been eaten by a cannibal, will the
parts of the missionary’s body that have been digested and become parts of the cannibal’s
body rejoice in Heaven or burn in Hell?
338 338
المطلب الرابع :في ثبوت المعاد
ف ٌ أّ �ة ن ّ �أ ّ كا فّ���ةًع��ل � ث���ا ت ن
� ا �ل���م�ع�ا د ا ��لب��د �ي�� .م�ا �م� ن� ج� ّو�ز إ� ع�ا د ا �ل���م�ع�د و�م� ظ����ا �هر؛ ل� ن��ه ا ������ ا �ل���م��س�ل�مو� � ى إ ب
تف ق
� ف نّ ق ال �ة �ة �أ ّ ق ت
�� نٌ� ،وا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى �أ�خ ��بر ب�و�وع�ه .و �م�ا �م� ن� �م ن�� �م� ن� إ� ع�ا د ا �ل���م�ع�د و م �إ� ��ه ي�����ول :إ� ع�ا د �م���م ك
ع
ق ف �أ نّ نٌ �أ ً �أ ّ نّ ف أ
� �ا� ،م�ا ب�ا ��ل����ظر إ� لى ا �ل�����ا ب�ل ��ل � ��� �ي���ض ب����م�ع ن�ى�ج �م ال� �ج� ز�ا ء ب��ع�د ت�����فر�ي��ق����ه�ا .و�هو �ي� ن���ف����س�ه �م���م ك
ع
ت ف ف� �أ نّ �ذ ق �ذ ت ّ �أ ّ � نّ �ة ئ ق ض � ق ٌ �أ
ا �جل
���س���م��ا ب�ل �ل�ل �عرا �� ا �ل�����ا ����م� ب��ه ،و�ه� ا ا �ل������بول ا �ي�؛ و �م�ا ب�ا �ل����ظر إ� لى ا �ل�����ا ع�ل �ل ��ه ��ع�ا لى
ت ف
���� ،ي�� ج����م
ق ٌ
����ص ،و�هو��ا د ر ع��لى�ج �مي�� ا �ل���م��ق���د ورا ك ّ ش���خ� ء ا � ،ف����ع��ل �أ � ز �� ّ ا �ل���م�ع�ل �م�ا ت
ع�ا �ل�مٌ ب� ك�
ع ع ل � �ج م ي و ل
� �ة
ي�ه�ا ا �لحي���ا .
� ُف ك ب��د ن� و �
�خ�ل ق� ���� � ء ا �أ � ز
ي �ج ل �
ف �ت ق ث نف ث ز قت ض ّ أ
نّ ن أ
ئ ن ن
و�م��ع ال� وا �ل �م�� ا �ل���م�ع�ا د ا ��لب��د �ي� ،ل� � ح�د و� ا �ل���م�ا ج� �ي����������ي� ح�د و� �������س� ،ي��� �ع�ل�
�أ أ نّ ن نً �أ آ ن ن
� �ا ح�د �ه�م�ا. �خر �ض كل � � � و ن���ف����س�ا � ب�ب��د � وا ح�د؛ ول� � إ� ���س�ا �ا �ل
ع
�ة ن �ت ّ ت ّ ّ
�وا ب� �م�ا ت���ق���د �م �م� ن� ا �ل���م ن�� �م� ن� و ج�ود ا ��لن� ف����س و�م�� ��ع��ل����ه�ا ب�ب��د � �م����س� �ع�د ��ل�����س �ا �ي�� ،
ن ث ف ن ق ن وا ��جل
أ ع �أ
� �أ � ز ا ء ف��ا �ض �ة نّ �ة
كل. � �ل� ب�ا �ل������س��ب� إ� لى ال� � وا �ل���م� ول �ج �
ك
339 339
Admonition
Everyone, who has a right in front of both God most high and others, must
return in order that justice be meted out to him. Muslims have agreed about
the return of unbelievers and the children of believers, even if they did not
deserve compensation and no compensation were deserved against them.
340 340
تنبيه
ٌ
ن ق ف ت
�� ب� إ� ع�ا د ��ه �ل�لا ن�ت����ص�ا �� �م ن���ه ،و��د �أ�ج �مع ا �ل���م��س�ل�مو� ك ّ �م� ن �ل�ه �
ح قّ� ع��ل ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى وع��ل �غ ي��ره ي�ج�
ى ى �ل �
ضٌ �ت � ّ م�ؤ ن ن ن � �ت � قّ � ً �ة ّ
ح ق� ع��لي���ه���م�عو��. ���ف���ا ر و�أط��ف���ا ل ا �ل��� �م��ي��� و�إ� ل�مي�����س� ��ح����وا عو �ض
� �ا ولا ي�����س� �� ع��لى إ� ع�ا د ا �ل ك
341 341
Appendix
Other things heard from the tradition, such as the torment of the grave,
the path, the scale, the opening of the books, the speech of animals, or
the states of the jinn and the fire, are possible things, even if they did not
deserve compensation and no compensation were deserved against them.
342 342
تذنيب
ٌ
���ت� ب� و� ن���ط�ا ق� ا ��جل ّ �ذ ئ ّ
ر �وا ك � �م� ن� ع� ا ب� ا �ل��ق����بر وا �ل���صرا ط وا �ل���مي���ز ا ن� و�ت��ط�اي�ر ا �
ل ل��س���م�ع���ا ت
ي ��س�ا �ر ا �
ح إ
ف ق ق ٌ ق �ل ّ ّ �أ ٌ �أ
� ن����ة وا ��لن��ا ر �مور�م���م��كن���ة ،و��د �أ�خ ��برا �ل���ص�ا د � ب�و�و��ع�ه�ا ���تق�� .�ج حوا ل ا و�
ع
343 343
Investigation 5: On the Promise and the Threat
The people of justice, with the exception of al-Kaʾbī, agree that one who
obeys deserves a reward for his obeisance, pace the Ashʾarites, for other-
wise charging would be wrong, because of what has been said above con-
cerning uncompensated labour. If the like of that compensation had been
possible to begin with, charging would have been in vain, and so it is such
that it is not possible initially, that is, a reward.
They argue by saying that if obeisance necessitated reward, then even
if an apostate died in his apostasy, he would be rewarded with the reward
of a believer, but the consequent is false according to common consensus,
and likewise the antecedent.8 The conditional is shown by saying that he
deserves a reward for his faith, and it will no doubt be conveyed to him.
The answer is that the desert of reward depends on arriving at the end,
and the people of justice agree that the sinner deserves a punishment for
his sin, pace the Ashʾarites, for according to the Murjiʿites9 and some Im-
āmites, knowledge of it is acquired from the reported tradition. According
to the Muʾtazilites and some Imāmites, this knowledge is acquired by the
intellect, for there is grace in it, because knowledge of the punishment for
renouncing obeisance and performing sins brings one closer to performing
obeisance and renouncing sin, and so knowledge of the punishment is in-
evitable. Moreover, God most high has obliged certain acts, and this only
because of what benefit there is in them. This is false, because of supererog-
atory acts or because of the harm there is in renouncing them. This is what
was sought for.
8 The idea here is that the apostate deserves reward for having been a believer.
9 Murjiʿites were an early Islamic sect that adopted an intermediate position concerning the
sinner’s status as a believer and denied that sinning makes a Muslim an apostate.
344 344
المطلب الخامس :في الوعد والوعيد
�ة ّ فً �أ ّ �ت � ّ ّ �أ نّ ّ ّ �أ
ح ق� ب���ط�ا �ع��ت�ه ا ��لث�وا ب� �خ �لا ��ا �ل�ل �ش���عري� ،و�إلا �ع��لى � ا �ل���م��طي�� ي�����س� �� ��ك�عب�ا ت���ف�� ق� �ه�ل ا �ل�ع�د لإ� لا ا �ل �
ع ي
ت ض ن� ّ �ذ ض �غ �ة ّ
ق ش ّ � ن �ت � ف ق ً
ح�ا �ل���م�ا �مر �م� ن� ا �ل���م������ �م� ن� ي��ر�عو�� .و �ل�ك ا �ل�عو�� إ� � ص الا ب���د ا ء ���لي�� ���ب��ي��� ��ا � ا �ل� ك �ل ك
ح
ّ ّ ً ف ّ �ث ن ��لت� � ف
���لي�� �ع��ب��ث�ا���� ،هو�م���م�ا لا �ي���ص�� الا ب�ت��د ا ء ب��ه و�هوا ��لث�وا ب�. كا � ا ك ب����م� �ل�ه �
ح
ّ أ �أ
ح��ت��� ا � نّ ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة �ل �� � ت� ا ��لث�ّ ا � ل�ث���� ا �ل���م ت� ّ�د �ل �م�ا ت �أ ّ
� ع��لى ر د ت��ه ث�وا ب� ا �ل���م�ؤ �م� ن�، و ب يب ر و و و ج �ب ا� جو ب �
ف ُّ ن �ت ّ ّ �أ ّ ن شّ ّ ً ف ٌ ّ
ح ق� ا ��لث�وا ب��� ،لا ب��د ل���رطيّ����ة :ن��ه ب�� ي����م�ا ��ه ي�����س� ���
إ � ذ�� ا ا �ل���م��ق���د �م .ب�ي��ا � ا �
وا ��لت��ا لي� ب�ا ط�ل إ� �ج �م�ا ع�ا � �ك
�م� ن� إ� �ي���ص�ا �ل�ه إ� ��لي��ه.
�أ نّ ف �ة تّ ف �أ ّق ف �أ نّ �ت ق ق ّ
ح�����ا � ا ��لث�وا ب� ي�ت�و���� ع��لى ا �ل���موا ��ا ،وا ����� ق� �ه�ل ا �ل�ع�د ل ع��لى � �وا ب� � ا ����س� ��� وا ��جل
ح قّ ����م�ع�� ص��ت��ه ا �ل�ع��ق���ا �خ � ا ف�ً�ا � �أ �ش��� ّ�ة .ف���ع ن���د ا �ل���م ���ئ��ة �� ض� ال �م�ا �مّ����ة �ت
ر ج و ب ع�� � إ� ي ب� ل ل�ل عري� ا �ل�ع�ا �صي� ي�����س� ���� ب � ي
�
��ع��� ال� �م�ا �مّ����ة �أ ن�ّ�ه �م����س��ت ف���ا دٌ �م� ن ا �ل�ع��ق ل��س���م � .ع ن���د ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �� ض �ت ف ٌ ن ّ
� ا �
م � د ا
��� �
س
� �م�� � �ه� ��ل ع
� �
ل ا
�أ نّ
� ل وب � إ ي � ع و � مب
ّ أ ّ
ف �ة ّ �ة ف ت ق ن ف ف ن
�ل���م�ا �ي���ه �م�� ا �ل��ل��ط��� ،ل� � ا �ل�ع��لم ب�ا �ل�ع�����ا ب� ع��لى �رك ا �ل��ط�ا ع� و���ع�ل ا �ل���م�ع����صي��� ي�����قر ب� إ� لى ���ع�ل
�أ ف ً ف ّ ف أ ّ ت �أ ف ّ �ة
ا �ل��ط�ا ع� وت�رك ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة�� ،لا ب��د �م� ن� ا �ل�ع��ل ب�ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب�؛ ول� ن��ه ��ع�ا لى و ج�� ب� ���ع�ا لا �إ� �م�ا �ل���م�ا ����
ي�ه�ا
م
ٌ � نّ ف� �أ ف� ت� ن ض ّ
�م� ن� ا ��لن� ف�� ،و�هو ب�ا ط�ل ب�ا �ل�وا �ل ،و�ل���م�ا ي� �ر�ك�ه�ا �م�� ا �ل����رر ،و�هوا �ل���م��ط�لو ب�.
ع
345 345
Moral
The Muʾtazilites and those Imāmites that agree with them maintain that
knowledge of the eternal duration of reward and punishment is intellectu-
al, because thereby the one who is charged is brought closer to performing
obeisance and refraining from what is bad. Hence, it is included under the
heading of grace, and it is also included under the heading of necessity.
Moreover, what entails reward and punishment, or praise and blame, is
obeisance and sin, and as long as praise and blame endure, reward and
punishment must endure in the hereafter, for what is caused endures as a
consequence of its cause enduring, which in turn follows from the endur-
ing of what it causes. The Murjiʿites and those Imāmites that agree with
them maintain that this is heard from the tradition.
346 346
فائدة
ٌ
ق ّ أ نّ �ذ �ه� � ت ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �م� ن ا ف���ق���ه�ا �م� ن ال� �م�ا �مّ����ة � ل �أ نّ ا �ل�ع��ل ��د ا �م ا ��لث�ّ ا � ا �ل�ع��ق
ب ي� ��ل ، �
ل �
���
�ع� � ا
��� و �و � � إ ي إ ى � م ب و و ب و �ب �
ّ ف ف ف ن �أ ف ن �أ � � ّف
�و� د �خ �ل �ي� ب�ا ب� ا �ل��ل��ط���، �و� �قر ب� إ� لى ���ع�ل ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة وت�رك ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� ؛ �ي�� ك ���ل� �م�ع�ه ي� ك ا ل���م ك
ح
�ذّ ّ ق أ نّ ق ت ض ثّ ف� ن �أ �خ ف
�و� د �ل �ي� ب�ا ب� ا �لو ج�و ب� .ول� � ا �ل���م����������ي� �ل��ل�وا ب� وا �ل�ع�����ا ب� وا �ل���م�دح وا �ل� �م�هو ي�� ك
آ ّ ّ
�خر�ي ن�؛ لا ����س��ت�ل�ز ا �م كا ن� ا �ل���م�د وا �ل��ذ �م د ا ئ����مي�� ن� و ج�� ب� د وا �م ال� � �
ف
ا �ل��ط�ا ع��ة وا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة�� ،ل�م�ا
ح
ّ
د وا �م ا �ل���م�ع�ل ل د وا �مع��لت���ه�ا ا �ل���م����س��ت�ل�ز �م �ل�د وا �م �م�ع�ل ��ل�ه�ا� .ذ �ه� � ت� ا �ل���م ج���ئ��ة و�م� ن وا ف���ق����ه�ا �م� ن
� � ر �ب و و
ّ ّ �أ
الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ةإ� لى ن��ه ��س���م�ع�.
ي
347 347
Admonition
It is possible that reward depends on a condition, for otherwise one who
knows God most high but does not reflect on, and thereby does not know,
the prophet’s order, would deserve reward, but the consequent is false by
common consensus, and likewise the antecedent. The conditional is shown
by saying that knowledge of God most high is obeisance that is independ-
ent in itself. Hence, if the desert were not conditioned, it would follow that
the prophet is paid the reward of a liar, which is false.
348 348
تنبيه
ٌ
ف ّل � � ن � ن � �ف � ت ل �ل ن ف� �أ � ن ّ ف � ت ّق ف ّ
� ���ل �ي�عر��ه ��ا � م��عر� ا ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا ى و�م ي�����ظر ي� �مرا ل��ب� �و�ز �و���� ا ��لث�وا ب� ع��لى�ش��رط و�إ ا ل ك ي�ج
ي م �أ ً
ن ش ّ�ة ن ف�ة ت ّ ّ ُ ُ ّ ف ق ً ٌ ّ ّ ّ
�ث
� ب�ا ط�ل إ� �ج �م�ا ع�ا ��ا �ل���م�����د �م�م� �ل�ه .ب�ي��ا � ا �ل���رطي��� � � :م�عر�� ا �ل�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى ح��ق���ا �ل��لث� ا � ،ا ��لت��ا ل �م����س��ت���
و ب و يِ
نّ ّ ذّ �ت ق ق ش ً ف ٌّ ٌ
��� ب� �ل�ل��ب�ي� ،و�هو
�ة
م���روط�ا �ل�ز �مإ�ث�ا ب� ا �ل���م �ك ط�ا ع��ة �م����س��تق���ل��ة ب�ن� ف�����س�ه�ا�� .لو�ل�م ي� ك
�� ن� الا ����س� ���
ح�����ا � �
ٌ
ب�ا ط�ل.
349 349
Appendix
The desert of reward, or punishment for the one who has fallen, is condi-
tioned by arriving at the end, for He most high has said, If you ascribe any
partner to God, all your work will come to nothing,10 but not because the
work took place for nothing, for the annihilation pertains to polytheism.
Hence, if desert has been established, annihilation means the fall of the
deserved reward due to a new ascription of a partner. If desert has not
been established, the annihilation of the work means not having reached
the condition of desert, which is arriving at the end, and so it does not de-
serve reward, and the work takes place for nothing.
10 Q 39:65.
350 350
تذنيب
ٌ
�أَ
�ْ َ ْ تَ � ق � ت ل �َئ نْ ف �ة �أ ق ٌ ح��ق���ا ق ا ��لث�ّ ا � � ش
�� ِ� ����ش�ر�ك� م���روط ب�ا �ل���موا ��ا و��س�ا ���ط ب�ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� ،ل����ول�ه ��ع�ا ى ( :ل�� ا ����س� ��� � و ب
�ت
ف ن ن ن شّ ً أّ ََ ْ بَ طَ َ ََ ُ َ
كا �ل���رك� ،إ� � � �ل��ي�����ح���� � نّ� �ع���م�ل�ك) ،و�ل��ي��س ل� ن� ا �ل�ع���م�ل وق�� ب�ا ط�لا ��لت��ع��لي� ق� ا ��لب���ط�لا � ب�ا �
ع
ال �ت � ق ق ث �تً ن � ن ا ��ل ا ن � ق ا ��لثّ ا ا � �ت � قّ � شّ ا � �ت � ّ � ن
كا � م�ع�ى ب���ط�ل � �س��وط �و ب� ل���م����س� ��ح� ب�ا ل���رك ل���م� �� ج �د د؛ وإ� ا ����س� ��ح�����ا � �ا ب��ا �
ف �ةُ ف ّ�ت � ق �ذ ن ن �ل ن ن
ح��ق���ا � ا �ل� �ي� �هوا �ل���موا ��ا ��� ،ل كا � �م�ع ن�ى ب���ط�لا � ا �ل�ع���م�لع�د �م الإ� ت�ي��ا � ب� ش���رط الا ����س� �� ��� � �م ي� ك
م
ً �ت � قّ ا ��لثّ ا ف ن
�و� ا �ل�ع���م�ل ب�ا ط�لا.ي�����س� ��ح� �و ب�� ،ي�� ك
351 351
Investigation 6: On Cancellation and
Declaring Unbelief
The Imāmites, the Ashʾarites, and the Murjiʿites endorse the denial of
both, because if reward and punishment are not denied, that is what was
sought for, whereas if they were denied, it would not be more appropriate
for the new occurrence to end that which remains than it would be for that
which remains to preclude the new occurrence from existing.
Moreover, if the addition is considered in the new occurrence, as Abū
Hāshim says about the balance, and if the one lacking it does not miss an-
ything, then existence and non-existence are equal for the one lacking it.
This is false, for He most high has said, whoever has done an atom’s-weight.11
If he does miss something with respect to it, none of the units will more
appropriately be missed, but if all are missing, there will be a difference in
balance.12 If the addition is not considered in it but the posteriority of the
new occurrence is sufficient for its being the one that denies, regardless of
whether it adds or diminishes, it follows that one who is a servant of God
most high for the period of his life and then decides to sin at the end will be
equal to one who has not served at all.
The Muʾtazilites endorse asserting both, because if none of the rewards
and punishments cancelled each other when they are added or posterior,
both would come upon the one who is charged, for the desert would re-
main. However, the combination is not possible, for it is a condition of the
reward that he is clean of taints and associated with exalting and venerating
Him. Neither of them will be prior because both must endure, which is
denied on the grounds of what has been mentioned.
11 Q 99:7.
12 Suppose that a person has lived a virtuous life but sins just before her moment of death. If
this new addition is concerned in the calculation of her desert in the hereafter, as seems to be
Ḥillī’s preferred view, then it should be considered on par with her earlier acts, for when we
consider all the morally relevant acts she has performed during her entire life, none of them
deserves to be added more than another (or “is more appropriately missed”) – the temporal
order in which the acts are performed is irrelevant for their moral value.
352 352
المطلب السادس :في اإلحباط والتكفير
ن �ت ف أ نّ ّ أ ّ �ذ
ي�ه���م�ا؛ ل� � ا ��لث�وا ب� وا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� إ� � �ل�م ي�� ن��ا �ي���ا �ه��ب� ت� الإ� �م�ا �ميّ����ة وال� �ش���عري��ة وا �ل���مر ج���ئ��ة إ� لى ن���ف�����
�أ
�� ن ا �ل��ط�ا ر �ئ� �� �ز ا �ل��ة ا ��ل��ا �ق� و لى �م� ن �م ن�� ا ��ل��ا �ق� ا �ل��ط�ا ر �ئ� �م� ن ن تن ف ف
� � ع ي ب ب ي بإ ��ا �ل���م��ط�لو ب� ،و�إ� ���ا �ي���ا �ل�م ي� ك�
ا �لو ج�ود.
�م�ا ���ق�� �ل�ه �أ � �ه�ا �ش����� ف� ا �ل���م ا �ز ن��ة ،ف�� ن �ل � ق ك
� ل أ نّ ا � �ئ � ن ا � �ت ف� ا ��زّ �ة
��س����ط إ � � يم ي� و م ي و بو ، و� � ل��ط�ا ر � إ � ع� ��بر ي���ه ل �يا د
��فَ َ ن ٌ ق ت ً ن ق ا ��لن ق � ن �ش���� ئً ن
كا � و ج�ود ا ��ل��ا ����ص وع�د �م�ه ��سوا ء؛ و�هو ب�ا ط�ل �ل����و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى�� � ( :م�� ��ا ����ص م���ه ي��ا �
ن ّق ض آ �أ
�س����ط ب��إ �ز ا ئ��ه �ل�م ي� ك�َ�ْ��ع َ��م�ْ ����م��ثْقَ���ا َ �ذَ ّ ) � .ن � ق
�� ن� ب��ع���� ال� ح�ا د و لى ب�ا �ل��س��وط .و�إ� ل رَ�ةٍ وإ� ي لِ
فً ّ �أ ف ُ
ف ّ �ة ن ُف
�ون��ه ن�ا �ي���ا ت� �خ�ره، ��ف��� �ي� ك ��م�� �ل�ز � �خ � ا � ا �ل���م ا �ز ن�ة� � .ل ��ع��ت�� ����ه ا �ل�ز ا د � ،ك �س����ط ا �ل �ق
�ج يع م ل � و � وإ� �م ي بر ي �ي ب�ل ي ي
� ن �م� ن �َع��بَ َ�د ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا ل �م ّ�د �ة �ع�م ه ث ّ�ع ز � ف� �آ � ه ع�� �م� �ص����ة ك �
��ز �أ ن
� ل ، � ��س ا ء �ز ا د �أ ن���ق
��
ي �� ع� ل
ر � ي� �خر ى م م� ى يو � � � م و ص �� و
ً
�م��س�ا وي�ا �ل���م� ن� �ل�م �ي�ع��ب�د ا �ل��ب��ت��ة.
آ أ نّ
ح ب����ط ال� � ك ّ وا ح�د �م� ن ا ��لث�ّوا � وا �ل�ع��ق���ا � �لو�ل�م ي�
� ت�ز �ة ث ت �ذ ت
�خر ب ب � و �ه��ب�� ا �ل���م�ع�� �ل� إ� لى إ� �ب��ا ���ه���م�ا؛ ل� ل
� �
ن �ل ف نّ � ه � ا ل � �ّف ��ل ق ال �ت � ق �أ �أ ّ
��م ؛ �إ� � �ش��رط �ج ��� اح��ق���ا � ،ولا �ي���م ك ���ل� ب����ا ء ا ����س� �� �ع ن���د �ز ي�ا د ت��ه وت� �خ ر لو�ص�ل إ� ى ا ل���م ك
ع
�أ �ة ّ ظ
ل���وا ئ� ب� ،و�م��ق���ا رن� ا ��لت��ع���ي�����م والإ� �ج �لا ل �ل�ه ،ولا ����س� ق�ب� ح�د �ه�م�ا �لو ج�و ب� ا ��لث� ا � �خ �ل �ص�ه �م� ن ا � ش
و ب و �
ن ٌ �أ ت
د وا ��م�ه���م�ا ،و�هو�م���م��و �ل���م�ا ي� �ي�.
ع
353 353
Investigation 7: On Repentance
The Bahshamites have said that it is remorse for sin and a determination
to refrain from lapsing again, but al-Khwārizmī did not make the latter
either a condition or a part. It is necessary, because it repels the harms of
punishment.
If it is for a bad act which includes bringing harm to another, such as
injustice or slander, it is not valid, unless one reaches out to the victim of
injustice or to his heirs with what is his due, if possible, or determines to
amend, if that is not possible. If it is for deception, it is not valid, until one
has revealed to the deceived person the falsity of one’s word and revoked it,
if possible. If the act does not include bringing harm to another, like adul-
tery or drinking wine, remorse and determination to refrain from doing it
again suffice.
If it is for an offence against what is obligatory and can be performed at
any moment, like giving alms, it is only valid once that has been executed,
if possible, but if it is specified for a certain time, like prayer, one needs to
heed the ordinance, if possible.
354 354
المطلب السابع :في التوبة
�ل�خ �ز ّ ّ
�وا ر مي� � ��ع�ل اه������ميّ����ة � ن���ه�ا ا ��لنّ��د �مع��ل ا �ل���م�ع����صي����ة وا �ل�ع ز��مع��ل ت�رك ا �ل���م�ع�ا ود �ة ،و�ل�م ي ج�
ق��ا �ل� ت� ا ��ل�� ش
ب�
ى ى إ
ٌ ن ف ّ أ ٌ ً
ضررا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب�. ال�أ�خ ي��ر�ش��رط�ا ولا �ج� ز�ا ءً .و�هي� وا ج���ب��ة ل� ���ه�ا د ا ���ع��ة �ل����
�ذ ف ت ّ ّ ف� ن ن ت ن ف� �ق تت ّ
كا � ظل�����ل وا �ل��ق��� ��� ،ل�م����ص�� إ� لا ضر ر إ� لى ا �ل غ��ي��ر� ، �� ���م� ن� إ� �ي���ص�ا ل ��
كا �� �م�� ��ع�ل ��ب��ي�� �����ض إ� � �
ح أم ح
ال ا � ن �ل ن � ن ن �أ ث�ت � ن � ّ ن �أ ظ
كا � ���؛ وإ� � �� ن� وا �ل�ع ز��مع��لى � د ء إ � �م ي� ك ح��ق���ه إ� � �م ك �خرو ج� إ� لى ا �ل���م����لو�م وور ��ه م�� ب��ع�د ا �ل�
ن ن �أ �أ ن ّ ن ّ ّ ّ ً
�� � ّ��م� ن �� ن � .ن �ل ت�ت ا ن �ق
إ � � وإ� م ��ض
� � � � ك م� � �ه��م� �هع �
ب � و ور ج و�ه ل� ل�ط ��� ل ا
� �ض
��ل����
ل � �لا لا م ي ح إ ب � يب ي�
�� �� �د ع�� ا ل � �
�ص��� � ل
�� إ� �ض
�ة ّ �ل�خ ّ
����فى ا ��لن��د �م وا �ل�ع ز��مع��لىت�رك ا �ل���م�ع�ا ود . ��مر ،ك كا �ل�ز ن�ا و�ش��ر ب� ا ضر ر إ� لى ا �ل غ��ي��ر� ، إ� �ي���ص�ا ل ��
�أ ئ ن ّ ّ ن ف� ف� ّ �ق
كا �ل�م �ي���ص��ح إ� لا ب��ع�د د ا ��ه إ� �
��زّ �ة � و� ن� � ن ت � ن �خ ا
كا ل � �� كل و � تٍ ��� ��ع�ل�ه ي� � كا �� م�� إ� �ل ل ب�وا ج � بٍ
� �ي���م ك إ
ن �أ ق ف غ ف �ة ّ ق ّ خ ن �أ
�� ن�. � �ا ء إ� � �م ك كا �ل���ص�لا ا ���ت��قر إ� لى الا ش������ت���ا ل �ي� ا �ل�������ض �� تٍ ��� ن ،و� � ا �ت�����ص ب�و�
� إ ك م�
355 355
Admonition
The Muʾtazilites maintain that the punishment must be erased through it,
for otherwise it would be bad to charge the sinner after his sinning, be-
cause he would be left with no way to evade the punishment, nor would he
be left with any way to be rewarded, based on the eternal duration of the
punishment. The Murjiʿites demand that he make amends. Were that not
the case, we would have to accept the apology of one who has caused the
greatest harm to us.13
13 If the sinner repents, he will still suffer the consequences, but because he has thereby become
a better person, he will be spared from further punishments. Should he choose to not repent,
the further harm he does to any of us will lead to correspondingly harsher punishment to
himself.
356 356
تنبيه
ٌ
ّل � ق ت� � ف �ذ �ه� � ت ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة � ل � � ق
���لي�� ا �ل�ع�ا �صي� ب��ع�د �س��وط ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� �ع ن���د �ه�ا ،و�إ ا ل������ب�� ك إ ى و ج و ب� �ب �
ح
�ع���ص���ا ن�ه � �ذ �ل �� ق ��ه � قٌ � ل ا �ل� �م� ن ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ،ف���ل �� ق ��ه � قٌ � ل ا ��لث�ّ ا � ،ه �م� ن ّ
ب� م يب� ل طري� إ ى و ب� و و �ب�ي� � ي � إ �م يب� ل طري� إ ى �خرو ج� �
�أ �ذ ق �ئ�ة �أ نّ ت ف ّ ٌ ّ �ذ
� �ل ،و�إلا �لو ج�� ب� ���بول ع� ر�م� ن� ��س�ا ء إ� �لي�� ن���ا ع��لى د وا �م ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب� .و �ه��ب� ت� ا �ل���مر ج�� � إ� لى ��ه ��������ض
�ة
ع�����مالإ� ��س�ا ء . ��أ � ظ
ب
357 357
Appendix
Abū Hāshim maintained that it is not possible for one bad thing but not
another,14 because repentance for what is bad must be due to its being bad,
otherwise it is not satisfactory as repentance or not satisfactory at all. Now,
badness takes place in all, and if he repents only some of them, the others
will reveal that his repentance is not for the badness.15
Abū ʾAlī has said that it is possible, for otherwise it would not be pos-
sible to perform some obligatory things but not others, because just as
repentance for what is bad is necessary by virtue of its badness, similar-
ly what is obligatory is necessary by virtue of its obligatoriness. If sharing
something entails a preclusion concerning specification in the first case,
then the same holds in the second case as well.16 The difference between
doing and refraining is evident.17
14 In other words, the younger Jubbāʿī held that it is not possible to repent one sin while carry-
ing on with another; for instance, one cannot repent drinking wine while happily carrying on
a fornicacious relationship. On this debate, see Schmidtke 1991, 245-248.
15 That is, one must repent one’s being a sinner, not any other aspect of the particular sin. This
entails repenting for this aspect in all sinful acts, including the fornicacious relationship in our
example.
16 In other words, if repentance must be for all sins because of the general aspect of sinfulness,
then the same holds for obligation: one performs an obligatory act because of its obligation,
not any other feature of the particular act, and so determination to perform one obligatory
act for the right reason entails determination to perform all obligatory acts. However, since
it is agreed, for instance, that one’s fasting remains valid even if one failed to abide by the
prayer, the conclusion must be rejected – and likewise for the negative case of repentance.
(The example is Ḥillī’s own, see Schmidtke 1991, 246.)
17 This probably refers to Abū Hāshim’s counterargument, according to which the positive and
the negative case are different. To use Ḥillī’s own analogy again (Schmidtke 1991, 246), if one
dislikes sour pomegranates, one refrains from eating all sour pomegranates, whereas even if
one were fond of sour pomegranates, it would not follow that one would try and eat them
all. In the same context in the Manāhij, he maintains that particular aspects of the act must
therefore be included in that which one repents, just as further qualifying factors enter into
the positive case. In our example, the sinner repents the vileness only of the act of drinking
wine, and by way of an analogous qualification, love of sour pomegranates only entails the
willingness to eat some of them.
358 358
تذنيب
ٌ
� �أ ن
� � ���� �
���ذ �ه� �أ � �ه�ا �ش����� � ل �أ ّن��ه�ا لا �ت�� ص�� ّ �م� ن ق�� ���� د ن ال�آ � ،ل�أ ن ا ��لتّ� ��ة �م� ن ا �ل��ق
�
مإ ى � �ح � �ب يح و� �خر � وب � �ب يح ي�ج ب � ب� بو
�أ ّ
��م�� ؛ ف��ل ت�ا � �م� ن �� ن �م��ق��� �ل��ة ،ا �ل��ق��� �� ُ ح�ا �ص� ف� ا �ج�ل �� ن ت� ��ةً�م��ق��� �ل��ةً �ل�مت ح�ه � ،لا �ل�مت ت� ك ن � ق �
� ب و لي ع ي � ح �ب و �بو � ك � و �بو و
� ب ك � �و� ل������ب�� وإ
ش ف �غ �أ نّ
ك���� ي��ره � ت�وب�ت��ه لا �ل��قل����ب�� . � �ه �ل� ب��ع���ض
ح
ّ أ ّ ّ ُ
ّت ّ �أ �ق
ن � � ن ت �ة ك ن � ل � �ص ال ت� ن �
�؛ ل� � ا ��ل�وب� �م�ا ي�ج�� ب� �م�� � د و� وا ج � بٍ و �ا ل ب�وع��لي� ����ص��ح ،و�إ ا ل���م�ا ح إ� ي��ا � ب�وا ج � بٍ
ف أّ ت ف ن قت ُ
� ذ�� ا ف���ع� ا �لوا ج��� � نّ����م�ا ي�ج� ا �ل��ق����ب��ي�� �ل��ق����ب���
ضى الا �ش����را ك �ي� ال� ول �� ب� �لو ج�وب��ه� .إ� � ا ������� بِ إ ل ح�ه ،ك
ح
تّ ف َ
ن ٌ ظ ق ف ذ ف� � ثّ ن خ ن َ ن �تّ
��� ا ي� ا �ل��ا �ي� .وا �ل����فر� ��ا �هر ب�ي��� ا �ل�����ع�ل وا �ل��رك. ا �ل���م�� �م�� ا �ل� �������صي�����ص � �ك
ع
359 359
Investigation 8: On the Possibility of Forgiving
The Muʾtazilites have precluded it on the basis of what is heard from tradi-
tion, but Baṣrians take it to be intellectually possible, whereas Baghdādians
take it to be intellectually precluded. The truth is that it is possible on the
grounds of both the tradition and the intellect, because it is charitable and
therefore good. Besides, it is proper to God most high, and so it can be in-
ferred. Furthermore, He most high has said, your Lord is full of forgiveness
for people, despite their wrongdoing,18 and He has said, God does not forgive
the joining of partners with Him: anything less than that He forgives to who-
ever He will.19 Finally, intercession is asserted by consensus of the prophet,
God bless him and his family and grant him peace. It is not about additional
benefit, for otherwise we would be interceding for the prophet, God bless
him and his family and grant him peace, and so it merely relieves the bur-
den of harms. The denial of intercession that is asked for does not entail
absolute denial of intercession.
They have argued by saying that there is an incitement to what is bad in
it, for when one endowed with understanding comes to know of forgive-
ness, he engages in it. Moreover, it entails that the verses concerning the
threat are lies. The first statement is disproved by the fact that punishment
is lifted through repentance, and allowing its non-existence is like allowing
the non-existence of forgiveness. The verses of threat are to be understood
under the condition that there is no forgiveness.
18 Q 13:6.
19 Q 4:48.
360 360
المطلب الثامن :في جواز العفو
ً ّ ن ً ّ ن ً ف
�م ن�� ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل��ة �م ن���ه ��س���م�ع�ا�� ،ا ��لب����صر�يو� ع��لى ج�وا �ز ه �ع��ق���لا ،وا ��لب� غ���د ا د ي�و� ع��لى �م ن���ع�ه �ع��ق���لا.
ع
ح قّ ا �ل�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا ل ،ف�
��ا �ز ّ
ن نً أ ن ف نٌ ّ
ن ً ق ً أ �ز ّق
ى �ج ح����س���ا ،ول� ��ه �� �و� � ح��س�ا � �ي�� ك ح� ج�وا ه ��س���م�ع�ا و�ع�����لا ،ل� ��ه إ� � وا �ل
�
َ ُ ْ ْ ق َّ نَّ ََّ َ َ�ذُ َ ْ ت
�س���ا ط�ه .و�ل��ق��و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :و�إ� رب�ك �ل� و�م �����غفِ�� �ِل�ل����ن�ا ��ِسع��لَى ���ظ�ل�ِ�م�ه���م) .و�و�ل�ه: �� ق
إ
ُ َِ َ َ رَ�ةٍ َُ ُ نَ �ذَ ف ْ� َ َ َ ْ َّ َ َ �ْ ف ُ �أَ ن ُ نَّ
���� �ا ء). (إ� � ا �ل��ل�ه لا �ي����غِ��ر � ي� �����ش�رك �ِ��بِ�ه و�ي����غِ��ر�م�ا د و� �ِل�كِ�ل���م� ن� ي� � شَ
ّ ف �ة ف ث ت شّ
ل��� ف���ا ع��ة ��لن�� ّ
� �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل ،و�ل��ي����س� ت� �ي� �ز ي�ا د ا �ل���م ن���ا �� ؛ و�إلا ل ب� و�ل�لإ� �ج �م�ا ع��لى ��بو� ا �
ّ ع
ع م ي
ف ش ف ن ّ ق ف ّ ف � نك ف
� �ا ر .و����ي� �����ي�� �ي��ط�اع لا ل�ا �ش���ا ���عي��� �ي� ا �ل��ب���ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل ���� ،ه� �م� ن� إ� ��س���ا ط ا �ل���م���ض
ن ن ��
ع م ي ي
ل��� ف��ي�� .�����س��ت�ل�ز �م ن��ف�� َ �م��ط�ل ق ا � ش
ي� � ع ي
ذ بَ ق �أ ف ق ّن ف ق ً ف ّن �أ ّ
��� � ح��ت�� ج�وا ب� � �ي���ه إ� ��غرا ء ب�ا �ل������ب��ي�� � ،إ� � ا �ل�ع�ا ��ل �م�تى ع��ل ا �ل�ع����و ��د �م ،ولا ����س��ت�ل�ز ا �م�ه ا �ل �ك ا�
م ح
��� ج�و�ي�ز ع�د �م
�ت
�و�ي�ز ع�د ��م�ه�ا �ك�
ت
��س��وط ا �ل�ع��ق���ا � ب�ا ��لتّ�و��ة ،و�ج�ف� �آ �ا ت ا �ل �ع���د� .ن�ت�ق�� ض��� ال�أ ّ � ق
ب ب ي� ي � و ي وي � ول ب
ٌ ف آ تُ
م���روط��ة ب��ع�د �م ا �ل�ع��ف��و. � ا �ل �ع���د � ش
ا �ل�ع����و ،و�ي�ا و ي
361 361
Investigation 9: That the Pain of the Violator Is
Brought to an End
This differs from those who endorse the threat. As to us, He most high has
said, whoever has done an atom’s-weight of good will see it,20 and it is de-
served by the repentant due to his faith. Hence, it is inevitable that it will be
brought about for him. By consensus, it cannot be prior to the punishment,
for he is not free from stains, and so the converse must hold.
They have argued by means of verses that refer to perpetuity, like His
most high saying: and they will remain in torment, disgraced,21 and if any-
one kills a believer deliberately, the punishment for Him is Hell, and there he
will remain,22 and others. Either this is specific to unbelievers or perpetuity
denotes a long time. As regards unbelievers, Muslims as a whole have con-
ceded that they have perpetuity in the fire.
20 Q 99:7.
21 Q 25:69.
22 Q 4:93.
362 362
أن عذاب الفاسق
المطلب التاسع :في ّ
منقطع خالف ًا للوعيد ّية.
ٌ
�ت ّ ّ يَ ُ َ ْ ْ ْ َ �ذَ خَ فَ
ح ق� �ل��لث�وا ب� ��لن��ا ،ق�و�ل�ه �ت�ع�ا لى��َ ���( :م� ن� �ي���ع َ��م�ل �ِم��ث��قَ�� �ا ل ّر ����ْ�ي� ًرا �� � َره) ،و�هو �م����س� ���
َ�ةٍ
�خ ً ق ق ن �أ ن ف ُّ
�و� ���ب�ل ا �ل�ع�����ا ب� إ� �ج �م�ا ع�ا ،و�ل�ع�د �م �لو�ص�ه �� ن� � ي� ك ب��إ �ي���م�ا ن��ه�� ،لا ب��د �م� ن� إ� �ي���ص�ا �ل�ه إ� ��لي��ه .ولا �ي���م ك
ف ّ
ل���وا ئ� ب�� ،ي����ت�عي�� ن� ا �ل�ع�ك��س.
�م� ن ا � ش
�
َ ن َ قْ ��ُ ْ ��ْ ُ ْ ��� ُ هَ نً َ ت ق ّ ّ آ ّ
� �خ�لود ك � ا �ل�د ا �ل��ة ع��ل ا �ل ح��ت��� ا �ا ل� �ا ت
ا� جوب ي
�����و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى( :و ي��خ�ل�د ِ��في��ِ�ه ��م��� �ا �ا)( ،و�م�� ي������ �ت�ل �
ى
� فّ �أ ن ً ف هَ َ
� �زَ ا �ؤُ هُ هَّ ُ جَ فَ ُ ْ ً ُّ �تَ عَ ّ ً
������ا ر وا � �خت�����ص ب�ا ل ك ي��ا) ،و�غ ي��ر �ذ �ل�ك .و �
� �� �ا �ِل�د ا ِ������ � ن�����م � خَ
� جَ �م�ؤ �ِم����ن�ا �م� ��� ِ��م�د ا ���� �
ي
ف ّ ن فّ ً �أ �ّ � ّ ف ن
كا ���ة ع��لى�خ �لود �ه���م �ي� ا ��لن��ا ر.
���ف���ا ر��� ،ق���د �أ�ج �م ا �ل���م��س�ل�مو� � �خ�لود �ل�ل�ز �م�ا � ا �ل���مت����ط�ا ول .م�ا ا ل ك ا �ل
�
ع
363 363
Investigation 10: On Names and Judgments
In terms of language, faith is assent, but in terms of the law, it is assent to
the messenger, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, in all
that he is necessarily known to have brought forth. Assent of the heart is
not sufficient without assent of the tongue, or conversely, for He most high
has said, even when there came to them something they knew to be true, they
disbelieved in it,23 asserting knowledge and unbelief, and they denied them
even though their souls acknowledged them as true,24 and He has said, some
people say, ‘We believe in God and the Last Day’, when really they do not be-
lieve,25 asserting confession by the tongue without the heart.
According to the Ashʾarites, it is an assent of the soul, but according
to the Karrāmites, it is a confession by means of the two testimonies, and
according to earlier Muʾtazilites and Qāḍī ʾAbd al-Jabbār, it is an act of obe-
dience by the limbs.
When it comes to unbelief, it is absence of faith, either through the op-
posite of a belief that one knows or not through an opposite. Violation is
detaching from something, and hypocrisy is to hide something as opposed
to revealing it. In the law, it is the manifestation of faith and hidden unbelief.
They differ concerning the violator, for according to the Muʾtazilites, he
is neither faithful nor an unbeliever but in a situation between the two situ-
ations, because faith is doing what is obligatory and withholding from what
is prohibited. Hence, he is neither faithful nor an unbeliever, because he is
washed, is dressed for the grave, is buried in the graveyard of believers, is
prayed for, married to, and retaliated for. According to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī,26 he
is a hypocrite, because one who believes in the harmfulness of an act ab-
stains from it. Hence, if the violator believed in the punishment, he would
not sin. According to the Khārijites, he is an unbeliever, but according to
the Azraqites27 among them, he is a polytheist, whereas according to the
Murjiʿites, the Imāmites and the Ashʾarites, he is a believer, because he has
necessarily assented to the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant
him peace, in all that he has brought forth.
23 Q 2:89.
24 Q 27:14.
25 Q 2:8.
26 Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) was a major scholar, preacher, and ascetic of the Umayyad period.
He is venerated by most Sunnī schools of thought, from mainstream theology to Sufis.
27 The Azāriqa were an extreme Khārijite movement.
364 364
المطلب العاشر :في األسماء واألحكام
�ي����ئ�ه ك ّ �م�ا ع��ل �جم ف ّ ًت
الإ� ي����م�ا � �ل غ��� ا ��لت����ص�د �يق� ،و�ش��رع�ا ����ص�د �يق� ا �لر��سول �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل �ي� �
ن �ةً
م ل م
ت ّ ن ّ ّ �ةً
��ف��� ا ��لت����ص�د �يق� ب�ا �ل��ق���ل� ب� �ع� ن� ا ��لت����ص�د �يق� ب�ا �ل��ل��س�ا � وب�ا �ل�ع�ك��س� ،ل����و�ل�ه ��ع�ا لى:
ق ضر ور ،ولا ي� ك ب��ه ��
ي
�جَ� حَ ُ هَ �ة ف��أث ت � ف � � فَ ُ َفُ كَ فَ ََّ �جَ َ ُ َّ
�����فر؛ (و � �د وا بِ����� �ا� � �
(��ل���م�ا �ا ء ���ه��م ���م�ا ��عَ �ر وا ����� �روا �ِ��بِ�ه)�� � ،ب��� ا ل���م�عر � وا ل ك
� �
ْ َ َّ َ ْ َ َ قُ ُ آ �مَ نَّ
ن ��َّ َ ن َ ق ْ ْ �تَ ْقَ نَتْ هَ �أَ ن �ُ ُ ُ
�
� �ل� �ن�ا ��ِس �م�� ي�����ول � ��� ���ا �ِ��ب�ا �ل��لِ�ه و���ب�ا �لي�و�ِم ا �
وا ��س� ي����������� �ا �������ف���س�ه���م) .و و�ل�ه( :و�ِم�
ِ ّ آ
ن ن ف�أ ُْ َ َ ُ
ال� �ِ��خ�ر َو���م�ا ���ه��مبِ����م�ؤ �منِ��ي�� ن�) �� ،ث��ب�� ت� الإ� �قرا ر ب�ا �ل��ل��س�ا � د و� ا �ل��ق���ل� ب�.
ّ �ة �أ ّ ّ ِ ِ
نَ ن ت شّ ن ن ّ ن ف ن ق ت ن ن أ ش ر�ة �أ
�را �مي��� ��ه الإ� �قرا ر ب�ا �ل�����ه�ا د �ي��� ،و�ع���د و�ع���د ال� ����ا �ع ��ه ا ��ل����ص�د �ي� ا ��ل�����س�ا �ي� و�ع���د ا �ل ك�
�أ ّ ت�ز �ة ق ض ق
� ا �م� ن ا �ل��ط�ا ع�ا ت ل ��ّ�ا ر ن��ه ف���ع� ا � �
�. ل و ح � ر �ج ��د �م�ا ء ا �ل���م�ع�� �ل� وا �ل�����ا ��ي� �ع��ب�د ا �جل �ب
ّ �أ ����� ف���ه ع�د �م ال� ����م�ا ن � �ّم�ا ����ض ّ�د ا �ع��تق �أ ّ
�خرو ج �ع� ن � �د .وا �ل��ف����س ق ا �ل
� �ض
�� �
و ب ا ل �همل
� �ع د ا��� � إي إ ب � و � فر � و ك �
ل ا ا
�م
� � �
ف� شّ فَ ُ ّ �أ شّ
�����فر.
ن ن
ل���ر إ� ظ���ه�ا رالإ� ي����م�ا � و�إ ب���ط�ا � ا �ل ك ل����ء ،وا ��لن� ف���ا ق� ن� ي�ب���ط� ن� ِ�خ �لا �� �م�ا �ي ظ�����هر ،و�هو ي� ا � ا�
ع ِ ي
ٌ َ ّ �ة �أ ف ف
كا � ٌفر ،ب�ل �هو�م ن���ز �ل��ة ب�ي�� ن� ا �ل���م ن���ز ��لت�ي�� ن�؛ وا خ���ت�� فل��وا �ي� ا �ل��ف���ا ��سق���� ،ع ن���د ا �ل���م�ع��ت�ز �ل� ن��ه لا �م�ؤ �م� نٌ� ولا �
ً أّ
كا �فرا ،ل� ن��ه
ت ف� ا ن ً
�و� �م�ؤ �م ن���ا ولا � ح���ورا �� ،ل ي� ك ل�أ نّ ال� ����م�ا ن ف���ع� ا �ل ا �� �ا ت الا �م��ت ن���ا �ع� ن ا �ل���م��� ظ
ع � � إ ي � ل و ج �ب � و
ّ
���فّ��� نُ ُ��د ف�ّ� ن ف� �م��ق���ا � ا �ل���م��س�ل�م�� ن ���ُ� ،ص��ل ع��ل��ه� ،ن ُغ ّ ُ
ح����س ن ���� وُ���ق���ا د ب��ه .و�ع ن���د ا �ل ك � �ي����س�ل و�ي ك � وي � ي� ب ر
� ي� وي ى ي وي ح ي
ق ف ف ق ضّ ف ف ّ �أ ّ ف ٌ أ نّ
ا ��لب����صر�ي� ن��ه �م ن���ا � ق� ل� � �م� ن� �ي�ع��ت���د ا �ل����رر �ي� ���ع�ل ي����م��ت ن�� �ع ن���ه�� .لوا �ع��ت���د ا �ل�����ا ��سق� ا �ل�ع��ق���ا ب�
م���ت�� ٌ � ،ع ن���د ا �ل���م ���ئ��ة أ�زٍ ق�ةع �أ ّ �أ ّ �ل� ��ع��� � .ع ن���د ا �ل�خ
ش كا � ٌ �ع ن���د ال� ا �� �م ن���ه���م ن ن
رج ر و ك � �ه� � ر �وا ر ج� � فر و
� �ه مي ص و
ف ّ أ ّ �أ
ال� �م�ا �مّ����ة ال� �ش��� ّ�ة ن�ه �م�ؤ �م� نٌ ل� ن�ه �ُ�� ص�د ق ��لن��ّ ّ أ
� �ص��لى ا �ل�ل�ه ع��لي��ه و��س��ل �ي� �ج �مي�� �م�ا �ج �ا ء ب��ه ل� � و إ ي و عري� �
ع م � ي� � بي
ّ �ة
ب�ا �ل�ض���ر ور .
365 365
On The Return
Know that since faith is assent, it does not allow strength and weakness
or increase and decrease. According to the Muʾtazilites, it is a name for
acting obediently, and so it does allow them.
According to the Imāmites, the principles of faith are assent to God, to
His unity, to His justice, to prophecy, and to the imamate. The Muʾtazilites
say that the principles of faith are five: unity, justice, prophecy, ordering
what is accepted and denying what is prohibited, and the promise and the
threat. He who fails to acknowledge any of these is not a Muslim, whereas
he who acknowledges that but performs a great sin is not a believer.
The charge ceases in the hereafter. When it comes to people of reward,
this is because it is necessary to free them from the toil. When it comes to
one who is punished, that is because it is a kind of compelling.
Let this be the last that we intended to establish in this book. God gives
success in righteous efforts.
***
[The book is complete, praise be to God, the Lord of the two worlds.]
366 366
ف �
��ي� ا�لم��ع�ا د
***
367 367
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371 371
general index
372 372
general index
composition 8, 22, 28, 42, 52–54, 58, 36–40, 54, 92, 110, 124, 152–154,
64, 70, 74, 80, 86, 90, 98, 110, 164, 178–180, 186, 198, 204,
146, 156–158, 164, 168–172, 178, 214–216, 232, 268, 330–336, 352,
182, 188–194, 198, 206, 236–240, 360; privation 38, 42, 54, 58–60,
250, 296 70–72, 94–96, 106–108, 112, 128,
conception, conceivability 6, 14, 142, 166, 170, 188, 222; see also:
22–26, 42, 98, 108, 122, 162, 196, God, existence of
214, 224, 236, 242, 258
corporealism 236, 240, 246 F
creation xx, 18, 20, 28, 36–38, 78, 88, faculty 114, 146, 170, 198–202, 210
96–98, 102, 124, 152–154, 158, Faḍl ibn ʿAbdillāh 300
170, 182, 194, 214–216, 222, 226, Faḍlism 300
234, 242–244, 250, 256, 262, 268, faith 126, 256–260, 300, 344,
278, 312, 318, 328, 332–334, 338 362–366
custom 114, 124, 262, 280, 284, 288, al-Fuwaṭī, Hishām ibn ʿAmr 308
292, 310, 3124
G
D Galen 10, 148
Dayṣānism 228 genus 6–8, 18, 58, 70–72, 76, 80, 86,
definition, making known xxii, 96, 100, 114–116, 140–142, 158,
6–10, 42, 88, 108, 116, 138–140, 162, 166, 178, 186, 198, 238, 284
172–174, 188, 196, 270 al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid 36, 244
description 6–8 God: agency of 102, 170, 214–218,
differentia 6–8, 18, 58, 198, 222, 238 224, 230, 242, 260–264, 270,
Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr 172, 244 274–276; as that which brings
dualism 228, 250 into existence 20, 28, 152–154,
158, 168–170, 210, 216–218, 234,
E 260–264, 268, 332; attributes of
element, elemental 44, 70–74, 146, xxviii–xx, xxiii, 20, 28, 36–38,
184, 188–190 170, 192, 208–210, 214–252,
emanation 70, 194–196 312, 324; eternity xxviii, xxiv,
Epicureanism 52 36, 98, 102, 136, 182, 210, 214,
essence xix, 4, 14, 18, 20, 24, 28, 38, 226–228, 232–236; generating
42, 56, 78–80, 84, 88, 92, 122, 132, (takwīn) 232; knowledge xix–xx,
144, 152–154, 162, 168, 176–180, xxiv, 216–222, 226, 230–234,
186, 194–196, 204, 218, 222, 230, 238, 242–244, 252, 256, 260,
232, 238, 250; see also: God, 264–266, 270, 274, 280, 300,
essence of 322, 328, 338; life 218–222, 226,
eternity xx, 20, 36–40, 136, 170, 230, 238, 252; necessity xix, xxiv,
180–182, 186, 196, 210, 214–216, 14, 28, 38–42, 192–194, 208–218,
222–228, 232–236, 240–246, 222, 232, 232–240, 244–246, 250,
250–252, 346, 356 264, 274; perception 220–222,
Euclid 52, 148 234, 242; power xix, xxiv,
existence xix–xx, xxii, 4, 12–32, 18–20, 58–60, 102–104, 214–218,
36–44, 54, 60, 66, 78, 84, 88, 92, 222–230, 234–238, 244, 264, 338;
100, 108, 120, 128, 136–138, 146, speech 66, 222–224, 228, 304;
152–154, 158, 166, 170, 178–180, unity, simplicity xix, 20, 210, 214,
194, 202–204, 212–220, 226–228, 232, 234–240, 250–252, 366; will,
232–234, 242–250, 262–264, choice xxi, 38, 158, 194, 216–224,
268, 274, 328–332, 336–338, 228, 234, 244, 268–270; essence
352; mental xix, 14, 22, 108–110; of xviii–xix, 14, 28, 38, 192–194,
non-existence xxii, 14–16, 20, 24, 210, 214, 218, 226–232, 238, 244,
373 373
general index
I K
Ibn ʿArabī xv Karrāmism 36–38, 186, 240, 244,
Ibn Fūrak, Abū Bakr Muḥammad 330, 336, 364
ibn al-Ḥasan 300 al-Kātibī, Najm al-Dīn xv, xviii
Ibn al-Haytham 148–150 kawn (mode of being) 56, 80–94, 98,
Ibn al-Ikhshīd, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 102–104, 178, 186, 240
ʿAlī ibn Maʿjūr 154 Khārijism 300, 364
Ibn al-Karrām, Abū ʿAbdillāh 240 al-Khwārizmī, Rukn al-Dīn ibn al-
Ibn Kullāb, ʿAbdullāh ibn Saʿīd Malāḥimī xx, 220, 354
36–38, 64 al-Kīshī, Shams al-Dīn xv
Ibn al-Nawbakhtī, Abū Isḥāq knowledge xix–xx, 6, 22, 94,
Ibrāhīm xvi 106–124, 128–134, 144, 184,
imagination 162, 170, 198–200 192, 200, 218–222, 226–232,
imam, imamate xvi, xxi, xxiii–xxiv, 236, 240–242, 246, 256–260,
298, 302, 306–322, 366 264–266, 270–272, 280, 288, 298,
individual, individuation 18, 44, 58, 308, 318–320, 334, 344–346, 364
142, 154, 158, 162–164, 168, 176,
180, 196, 200–202, 222, 238, 288, al-Kūfī, Taqī al-Dīn xv
308, 338 Kullābism 64, 172
induction 6, 120, 166
infinity 18, 20, 24–26, 36–38, 44, 48, L
56, 100, 120, 154, 162, 168, 174, law xvi, xviii, 256, 292, 310, 364
180, 186, 194, 236, 240, 250 logic xvii, xix, 4, 10, 124–126, 130, 258
intellect, intellection 6, 12, 22, 26, 30,
42, 114, 126–132, 162, 166, 194, M
226, 236, 256, 278, 286–288, 308, Manicheanism 228
312, 324, 344, 360 matter 40–44, 48, 54–56, 76, 166,
intention 38, 64, 84, 112, 120, 124, 174–176, 182–184, 188, 194–198,
132–134, 158, 170, 216, 290, 304 202, 238
374 374
general index
Māturīdism 234 P
miracle 66, 128, 222, 256, 282, 288, perfection 8, 42, 88, 236, 242–244,
292, 302, 312 258, 312
modalities: necessity 26–28, 114, Peripateticism (Aristotelianism)
130, 144, 18, 170, 188, 210, 214, xvii, xxii, 8, 42–44, 48, 54, 108,
224, 230–232, 240, 244–246, 168, 174
250, 262–266, 272–274, persistence (baqāʿ) 60–62, 66–70,
288–290, 308–310, 322–324, 346; 76–78, 84–88, 94–98, 104–106,
possibility 26–32, 40, 44, 54, 60, 118, 134–138, 142, 146, 152–154,
86, 102–106, 114, 142–144, 158, 158, 178, 184, 194, 202–204, 210,
180, 186, 190, 194, 198, 204, 214, 232–234, 278, 292, 332
218, 230, 234, 244–248, 266, 280, Philoponus 72, 180
286, 302, 310, 328–330, 336, 360; philosophy xv–xviii, xx–xxi, 28, 36–
impossibility 26–28, 54, 84, 90, 38, 54, 180, 194, 216, 244–246,
114, 122, 148, 156–158, 170, 174, 304, 328–330, 336
184, 194, 204–206, 216, 230–234, place 8, 44, 62, 72–74, 88, 94, 150,
240–246, 266, 328, 336 156, 164, 172–176, 180, 184, 190,
motion 22, 48, 56, 62, 70–74, 78–94, 206, 234, 240, 280
142, 148, 170, 174–176, 180, Porphyry 8, 240
186–190, 202, 236, 248, 256, potency 42, 68, 76, 88–90, 100, 106,
262–264; rest 56, 62, 74–76, 202, 330
80–82, 86, 90–94, 102–104, 142, power 18–22, 56–62, 66–70, 74–76,
156, 174, 178–180, 236, 264 80–86, 92–106, 112, 120, 134–142,
Muʿammar (ibn ʿAbbād al-Sulamī) 154–158, 182, 190 200, 216–220,
202 228–238, 250–252, 262–264,
Murjiʿism 344–346, 352, 356, 364 272–274, 296–298, 320
al-Murtaḍā, Abū l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn al- praise and blame xx, 102–104, 256,
Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī al-Sharīf 58, 262, 268, 298–300, 346
220, 278, 296 premise 6–12, 22, 58, 98, 114,
Muʿtazilism xv, xvii–xx, xxiii, 122–126, 132, 144, 158, 180, 216,
16–20, 56–64, 68–70, 78–80, 220, 230, 242–244, 328
88, 104–106, 114, 118, 124, 132, preponderation 30, 96, 108, 114, 130,
138–140, 144, 150–154, 164–166, 134, 170, 184, 238–240, 264–266,
172, 178, 202, 218–226, 244–246, 274, 332
256, 262, 268–270, 276–278, 290, prophecy xxi, xxiii–xxiv 124, 130,
300–304, 308, 344–346, 352, 356, 256–258, 282–286, 290–294,
360, 364–366 300–304, 312–316, 322, 348, 360,
364–366
N proprium 8, 28, 38–40, 146, 250
al-Naḥwī, Jamāl al-Dīn xv
al-Najjār, Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad Q
218 Qāḍī l-Quḍāt (ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 64,
Najjārism 262 68, 80, 98, 112–116, 364
al-Nasafī Burhān al-Dīn xv quiddity xxii, 8, 14–20, 28, 40, 48,
al-Naẓẓām, Ibrāhīm 62, 148, 152, 172, 54, 108–110, 156, 164, 168–170,
184, 230, 296, 300 180, 184–188, 194–196, 226, 238,
Neoplatonism 8
328, 336
Qurʿān xv, xix–xx, 20, 66, 96, 132,
O
282, 292, 296, 302
obligation 112–116, 130–132, 256–260,
al-Qūshjī, ʿAlāʿ al-Dīn 24
268, 276–278, 288–290, 310, 354,
358, 364
occasionalism 124
375 375
general index
376 376