REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW CASES

Judge Jose Ventajar

August 17, 2021

1. BF Homes vs Meralco (636 SCRA 495)

2. Mayamot vs Antipolo City (G.R. 187349)

3. Erorita vs Dumlao ( GR 195477, January 25, 2016)

4. Ignacio vs CFI of Bulacan (42 SCRA 89)

5. Tijam vs Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA 29)

6. De Pedro vs Romasam Development Corp (G.R. 194751, Nov. 26,

2014)

7. Gomez vs Montalban (548 SCRA 693)

8. Concha vs Lumocso (540 SCRA 1)

9. Sabitsana Jr. Vs Muertegui (G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013)

10. Brgy. Piapi vs Talip ( G.R. 138248, September 5, 2005)

DIGESTED CASES

BF HOMES, INC. and the PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND

CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171624 | December 6, 2010 | 636 SCRA 495 | First Division |
Justice Leonardo-De Castro

Remedial Law | Civil Procedure | Jurisdiction

The ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule

43(u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines,
and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers,
functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving
disputes between and among participants or players in the
energy sector.
FACTS:

BF Homes and Philippine Waterworks and Construction Company own and

operate waterworks systems that deliver water to all residents of BF Homes
Villages in Paranaque, Las Pinas, Caloocan, and Quezon City. They provide
water sourced from deep wells, which are in turn powered by electricity
purchased from Meralco.

On May 20, 2003, Meralco, without any prior notice whatsoever, cut off
electric supply to a number of water pumps in BF Homes subdivisions in
Paranaque, Caloocan, and Quezon City, shutting off the water supply to
residents in those areas.

According to Meralco, BF Homes and PWCC were in arrears amounting to

PhP4.7 M

BF Homes replied by saying that Meralco should offset that amount against
the PhP11.8-million refund that Meralco owed BF Homes, as per the decision
in the Meralco Refund Cases (LAMP v Meralco and Republic v Meralco)

Meralco denied the request, stating that it was still waiting for the refund
schedule to be drawn up by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), so it
could not process BF Homes’ refund yet.

Meanwhile, Meralco continued to cut off the electric supply to more BF Homes
villages in Las Pinas. Its residents devoid of access to running water, BF
Homes and PWCC instituted an action against Meralco with the RTC, praying
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and restraining order to compel
Meralco to restore electric supply to the water pumps, and to prevent Meralco
from again cutting off electric supply to said pumps.

Meralco countered by saying that:

1. it had every right to cut off the electric supply to BF Homes’ water
pumps as it was authorized by its service contracts to do so, and
2. the trial court had no jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for by BF
Homes and PWCC because any relief given would preempt the primary
jurisdiction held by the ERC over the issue.

BF Homes and PWCC countered by saying that even if the ERC had primary
jurisdiction over the issue, it was powerless to grant provisional reliefs like
injunctions and restraining orders, which was immediately needed to protect
the interests of BF Homes residents

The RTC of Las Pinas issued a writ of injunction. CA dissolved the writ of
injuction and denied the MR of BF Homes. Hence, the current petition.

ISSUES:
 1. Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Is the ERC powerless to grant provisional reliefs like injunctions and
restraining orders?

RULING:

1. No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction.

According to the EPIRA (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), the
statute that created the ERC, it is the ERC that has primary jurisdiction over
“all cases involving fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the (commission) in
the exercise of the power to” fix wheeling rates and retail rates, among others.

The controversy between BF Homes and Meralco falls squarely within the
primary jurisdiction of the ERC.

In the MERALCO Refund cases, this Court only affirmed the February 16,
1998 Decision of the ERB (predecessor of the ERC) fixing the just and
reasonable rate for the electric services of MERALCO and granting refund to
MERALCO consumers of the amount they overpaid. The Decision was
rendered by the ERB in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine and fix the
just and reasonable rate of power utilities such as MERALCO.

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of
the EPIRA over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed
by the ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and
over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players
in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and
Regulation provides that the ERC shall also be empowered to issue such
other rules that are essential in the discharge of its functions as in
independent quasi-judicial body.

The ERC is the regulatory agency of the government having the authority and
supervision over MERALCO. Thus, the task to approve the guidelines,
schedules, and details of the refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to
implement the judgment of this Court in the MERALCO Refund cases, also
falls upon the ERC. By filing their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and
PWCC intend to collect their refund without submitting to the approved
schedule of the ERC, and in effect, enjoy preferential right over the other
equally situated MERALCO consumers.

Likewise, it is a well-established rule that administrative agencies like the ERC

have primary, albeit limited, jurisdiction over matters that demand special
competence and specialized knowledge.

Courts are not allowed to resolve controversies falling squarely within the
primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies, especially when the
controversy demands knowledge of technical and intricate matters.
 1. No. The ERC has authority to grant provisional reliefs.

Section 8 of Executive Order 172 grants the authority to grant provisional

relief to the Energy Regulatory Board, the predecessor of the ERC. This
provision is still applicable to the ERC by virtue of Section 80 of the EPIRA,
which transfers all powers not inconsistent with the EPIRA from the ERB to
the ERC. Thus, BF Homes and PWCC could have petitioned the ERC to
issue the preliminary injunction and restraining order, instead of going directly
to the RTC.

BARANGAY MAYAMOT v. ANTIPOLO CITY, GR No. 187349, 2016-08-17

Facts:
In 1984, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 787 to 794 were passed creating
eight (8) new barangays in the then Municipality of Antipolo
Antipolo became composed of sixteen (16) barangays.
In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the sixteen (16) barangays
into the map of Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed
Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineate
the territorial boundaries of the sixteen (16) barangays pursuant to the Bureau
of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787
to794
On September 21, 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity and/or Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction[11] against
Antipolo City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Antipolo, Barangays Sta. Cruz,
Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan, the City Assessor and the City
Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City.
Barangay Mayamot claimed that while BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require
Barangay Mayamot to part with any of its territory, the adoption of Resolution
No. 97-89 reduced its territory to one-half of its original area and was
apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and
Mambugan. It also claimed that the City Assessor's preparation of the plan
and the Sangguniang Panglungsod's adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 were
not preceded by any consultation nor any public hearing.
RTC rendered its Decision[14] dismissing the petition
Court of Appeals denied Barangay Mayamot's appeal.
Issues:
In this petition, Barangay Mayamot reiterates its contention that because of
Resolution No. 97-89, its territory was altered and drastically reduced.
Barangay Mayamot argues that the changes and alterations did not have any
legal basis and did not conform to its actual and existing territorial jurisdiction.
Since there was alteration of its territory, Resolution No. 97-89 violated
Section 82 of the Local Government Code of 1983, which requires an
ordinance and a plebiscite to create, alter, or modify barangay boundaries.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and
decide cases.[25] The nature of an action and its subject matter, as well as
which court or agency of the government has jurisdiction over the same, are
determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation to the law
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the
complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs.[26] The designation
or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is not
even an indispensable part of the complaint.[27] Also, jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.[28]
To recall, Barangay Mayamot claimed that as a result of the consolidation and
integration of the boundaries of the old barangays and newly-created
barangays and issuance of Resolution No. 97-89 approving the consolidation
and integration, a portion of its territory was apportioned to Barangays
Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang, and Mambugan.
the allegations and issues raised by Barangay Mayamot are centered on the
alleged inconsistency between its perceived actual and physical territory and
its territory and boundaries, as defined and identified after the Bureau of
Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787 to 794
were consolidated and integrated by respondent City Assessor into the map
of Antipolo. Thus, contrary to Barangay Mayamot's argument that the issue is
the validity of Resolution No. 97-89, the issue to be resolved is the boundary
dispute between Barangay Mayamot on the one hand, and Barangays
Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang, and Mambugan, on the other hand.
There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area
of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two (2) or more LGUs.[30]
Here, Barangay Mayamot is claiming a portion of the territory of Barangays
Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang and Mambugan. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the resolution of a boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
At the time Barangay Mayamot filed its petition before the RTC of Antipolo
City, RA No. 7160 was already in effect. Sections 118 and 119 of RA No.
7160 provide:Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of
Boundary Dispute. - Boundary disputes between and among local
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned.x x x(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to
effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute
was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the
dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall
decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the
sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing thereof. x x xBased on the foregoing, it is
clear that the RTC is without jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute involving
barangays in the same city or municipality. Said dispute shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned. If there is failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within
sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to. Further, the
decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction
over the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules
of Court.

SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, Petitioners,

vs. SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016

FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay San Mariano,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-53000 in which San
Mariano Academy structures are built. On April 25, 1990, Spouses Dumlao
bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale when Spouses
Herminio and Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita) former owners, failed to
redeem it. With the consent of Spouses Dumlao, it however allowed Spouses
Erorita to continue to operate the school and to appoint Hernan and Susan
Erorita as the school’s administrators. On December 16, 2002, Spouses
Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property for they had failed to pay
monthly rent of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) since 1990. The
Spouses Erorita however countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to
continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and friendship. On
March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants
Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita. On June 4, 2007, the RTC ruled in
favour of spouses Dumlao. It ordered the defendants (1) to immediately
vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses Dumlao, and (2) to pay
accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney’s fees. The RTC also prohibited
the defendants from accepting enrolees to the San Mariano Academy. The
defendants Erorita then appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint is a
case for unlawful detainer in which the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. THE CA RULING The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. The CA ruled that in civil actions involving a real property’s title or
possession, jurisdiction depends on the property’s assessed value and
location – if the assessed value exceeds fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in
Metro Manila, and twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside of Metro
Manila, the RTC has jurisdiction. If the assessed value does not exceed these
amounts, then, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction. In the case,
because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of the property
and its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded that the RTC
had jurisdiction. Petitioner’s Argument in SC Spouses Erorita argued that: (a)
the RTC had no jurisdiction because the complaint shows a case for unlawful
detainer; and (b) Hernan and Susan were improperly impleaded as parties to
this case. Respondent’s Argument inSC The respondents argued that: (a) the
RTC had jurisdiction because the case involves issues other than physical
possession; (b) even assuming the RTC initially had no jurisdiction, the
petitioners’ active participation during the proceedings bar them from
attacking jurisdiction; (c) Hernan and Susan are real parties in interest as the
lease contract’s primary beneficiaries; and (d) this last issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or the not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case.

HELD: No. The court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as
the complaint shows a case for unlawful detainer. To make a case for
unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant
lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance;
(b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is
terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of
its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the
last demand on defendant to vacate the property. In the case, the complaint
shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners
to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand
letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to
pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the
property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004)
within a year from the last demand to vacate (February 12, 2004). Thus,
although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under
RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY Question on CFI's Jurisdiction) 23 SCRA 29

byDagitab-January 08, 2014

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

(Question on Court of First Instance's* Jurisdiction)
Digested Case

FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety).
Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued
against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety
which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed
to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of
Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act
placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

ISSUE: 
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI
Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

HELD:
YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking
this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be
estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should
have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was
issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be
carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83
C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with
dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the
defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to
hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows
an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had
been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that
the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer.
Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The
surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

AURORA N. DE PEDRO v. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

GR No. 194751, 2014-11-26
Facts:
Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints that it was the
owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City
Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime in November 1996 that De Pedro put
up fences on a portion of its Antipolo property.[6]  Mr. Ko confronted De Pedro
regarding her acts, but she was able to show... title and documents
evidencing her ownership
Mr. Ko informed respondent about the documents.
DENR issued free patents covering... portions of respondent's property
Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of respondent's property...
signed by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office in favor of De Pedro on December 9, 1991... government could not
legally issue the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land
was already released for disposition to private individuals.
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed
Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of
Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.
Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by
publication
On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion.
respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De
Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers.[20]  Respondent also moved
to be allowed to present evidence ex parte.[21]  The Regional Trial Court
granted the motions on
On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as
nullity the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent's
complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedr... he Regional Trial
Court noted that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an answer
to respondent's complaints.
The Regional Trial Court also found that the title and free patent issued to De
Pedro were void.
De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for
new trial, alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000
decision on March 16, 2000
De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person because of improper and defective service of summons.  Citing
the officer's return dated February 22, 1999, De Pedro pointed out that
summons was not personally served upon her "for... the reason that according
to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their (sic) is no person in the said
given address
Issues:
Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and
Ruling:
Principles:
Regardless of the type of action whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service
Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant
Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action
whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the
parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is required.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is
imperative.  A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a
defect in jurisdiction.  Respondent's institution of a proceeding for annulment
of petitioner's certificate of title... is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with
authority and competence
Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons.
[95]  Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant
or respondent wherever he or she may be found.  If the defendant or
respondent refuses to receive... the summons, it shall be tendered to him or
her.
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown
owner or if his or her whereabouts are "unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry.
It may... only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons
personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant's or respondent's
whereabouts.
Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of
summons impossible renders service of summons and the return ineffective. 
In that case, no substituted service or service by publication can be valid

Gomez vs Montalban GR. No. 174414 March 14, 2008

Facts: Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of
P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month.
Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in
the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she
still failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion,
Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a
decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service of
summons since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs.
Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons and that her failure
to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence
(FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to
appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition. Montalban filed
for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that
counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To
this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction

Held: Yes. it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that
respondent is only liable to petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00
representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest thereon
at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the present;
and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees. Contrary to respondent's contention,
jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately
substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof
showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the
jurisdictional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of
action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately
substantiated and awarded. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an
action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

Heirs of Concha vs. Sps. Lumocso G.R. No. 158121

December 12, 2007

Facts: Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim
to be the rightful owners of certain lots situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso,
Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan, and Jacinto Lumocso, are the patent holders
and registered owners of the subject lots. On August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.
and his children (petitioners) filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or
Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and
Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the
name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to
the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9. On September 3, 1999, two separate
complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, this
time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a onehectare portion of Lot
No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a
one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were
also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City. The three complaints
commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses
Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in
Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly
preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4)
hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they
possessed this excess 4 hectares of land "continuously, publicly, notoriously,
adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of an owner since 1931”; d)
that they continued possession and occupation of the 4hectare land after the
death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May
12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees
standing in the subject lots to the exclusion of the respondents or other
persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (1st case) or January 1997
(2nd and 3rd case) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, and stealth
forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, and disposed" of 21
trees, 22 trees or 6 trees; f) that "the land is private land or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired
imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141; g) that respondents
allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 while the logs taken
from the subject lots in the other complaints were sold to a timber dealer in
Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent
applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned
the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over
the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to
oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the
corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred
to an innocent purchaser. On separate occasions, respondents moved for the
dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b)
failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d)
waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction,
respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints
pursuant to Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in
each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,contending that the instant cases involve actions the
subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under
Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main
causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees
felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered
which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC. The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents. The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration, to no
avail. Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex
Parte with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision, the
CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even
assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been
barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for
reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant
complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-
two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it
unnecessary to resolve the other issues.

Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over the current complaints for
Reconveyances?

Held: MTC has jurisdiction over the cases.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is
conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by
the parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought. The trial court correctly held that the instant cases
involve actions for reconveyance. An action for reconveyance respects the
decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names,
to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.
There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that
the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the
registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. These cases may also be considered as actions
to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation
of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was
used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title. Being in the
nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title,
the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of
B.P. 129, as amended. In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject
lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less
than P20,000.00 hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant
cases. The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner,
Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the RTCs exclusive original
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the MTCs." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial
effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one
involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two
classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in
1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts
to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."

Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter
of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein"
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level
courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the
benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of
justice. The cases relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases
at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for
reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the
case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's
contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees
of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion
for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions
of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was
merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not
determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and
ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved
by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein
was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed
on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the
issue of venue, the Court held that where the action affects title to property, it
should be instituted in the RTC where the property is situated. Petitioners'
contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes
"any interest therein" that should be computed in addition to the respective
assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P.
129, as amended, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that
the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be
included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that
in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the
realty involved that should be computed. In this case, there is no dispute that
the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax
declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant
cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M.

SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by
his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.

G. R. No. 181359

August 5, 2013

Facts: On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an

unnotarized Deed of Sale5 in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui6
(Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot)
located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by
Tax Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7 Juanito’s
father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took
actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees.
They also paid the real property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to
1998. On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer,
petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a
notarized deed of absolute sale.8 The sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds on February 6, 1992.9 TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD
No. 5327, 10 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr.
and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property
taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete
improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a
typhoon.

Issue: Whether petitioner or respondent has better right over the subject
property.

Held: Respondent has better right. Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not
apply to sales involving unregistered land.

Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of
the Civil Code. Both courts seem to have forgotten that the provision does not
apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of
the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is
registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered
owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies
on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in
good faith for value.31 Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for
the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No.
3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice
to a third party with a better right. The question to be resolved therefore is:
who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?
Respondent has a better right to the lot. The sale to respondent Juanito was
executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the
sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17,
1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a
better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void,
because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the
lot. Nemo dat quod non habet. The fact that the sale to Juanito was not
notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Garcia
remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public
document under the Civil Code, 33 is only for convenience, and not for validity
or enforceability.34 And because it remained valid as between Juanito and
Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his
ownership thereof had ceased. Nor can petitioners’ registration of their
purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere registration of a sale
in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no
longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even
if the earlier sale was unrecorded. 35 Neither could it

validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually
has.36 Specifically, we held in Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo37 that:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is
‘without prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase
has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in
one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. NB: -Petitioners’ defense of
prescription, laches and estoppel are unavailing since their claim is based on
a null and void deed of sale. The fact that the Muerteguis failed to interpose
any objection to the sale in petitioners’ favor does not change anything, nor
could it give rise to a right in their favor; their purchase remains void and
ineffective as far as the Muerteguis are concerned. -On the question of
jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in
dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, 29 an action to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by
petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for
registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his
application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of
the Rules.

CaseDig: Barangay Piapi vs.. Talip

G.R. NO. 138248, 07 SEPTEMBER 2005
Posted by: Roque H. Rios Jr. on 23 July 2018

FACTS:

On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein petitioners, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages for a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares
situated in Piapi, Davaol del Sur, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds issued in the name of Juan
Jayag and has a market value of P15,000. They alleged that they have openly
possessed such land for thirty (30) years in the concept of owner, and that
respondent, Talip, fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name.

Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as considering that the
assessed value of the land is P6,030. Under Section 33 (3) of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as the total assessed
value of the property is P41,890, as shown by Real Property Field Appraisal
and Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur, Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr.

On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction hence this certiorari petition alleging that Section 19 (1) of BP
Bilang 129, as amended, gives the RTC jurisdiction over the complaint for
reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint for
reconveyance.

HELD:
The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to Huguete vs
Embudo; where petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment of a deed of
sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Supreme Court ruled that the nature of
an action is not determined by the caption of the complaint but by the
allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.

When the ultimate objective of the petitioners, is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed
value of the property subject thereof. However, they failed to alleged therein
the assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what they stated was the
market value of the land which was at P15,000.00.

The Rule requires that the assessed value of the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant. It bears
reiterating that what determines
jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that
their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have
alleged therein its assessed value. However, they only specified the market
value or estimated value, which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 33 (3), it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and not the RTC, which
has jurisdiction over the case.

RULES:

Section 19 (2) of BP Bilang 129. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial

Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereon, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (3)
Exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.