TABLE8.

Venezuela:public versus private sector annual salaries

(dollars)

Publicsector
remunerationas
Total percentageof
Position Basesalary Allawances remuneration priate sector

Managers
Public: Minister/executive director 9,753 11,654 21,407 29.54
Private: President 49,694 22.780 72,474
Public: Sectoral director general 8,201 6,635 14,836 42.38
Private: Director of finances 25,052 9,954 35,007
Public: Unit chief 6,319 3,909 10,228 53.40
Private: Director of internal audit 12,737 6,415 19,152
Professzonal/technical
Public: Top prof./ech., grade 32-10 9,356 2,866 12,222 105.83
Private: Chief systems analyst 8,562 2,986 11,549
Public: Mid-level prof./tech., grade 24-5 5,493 1,682 7,175 97.61
Private: Internal auditor 5,568 1,783 7,351
Public: Bottom prof./ech., grade I5-I 3,145 963 4,108 90.48
Private: Computer operator 3,448 1,093 4,541
Administrative/support
Public: Top administrabve,grade 26- 10 4,726 1,448 6,173 63.41
Private: Executive secretary, bilingual 7,344 2,392 9,735
Public: Middle administrative, grade 14-5 2,329 713 3,042 54.81
Private: Cashier 4,178 1,373 5,550
Public: Bottom administrative,grade I - 1 1,120 343 1,463
Private: Receptonist 2,382 724 3,106 47.10
Bluecollar
Public: Semi-skilled labor 1,491 995 2,485 50.55
Private: Chauffeur 11 3,723 1,194 4,916
Note:All salaryfiguresin annualU.S. dollars,convertedatan exchangerateof 66.85 Bs.l$US.
Source:Forprivatesector,decree2.039,1992;Escala de Sueldosy PnmasparaCargosdeAlto Nivel,Organismos
de la Administraci6n
Publica,OficnaCentralde Personal,
1993;
Republica de Venezuela.For publicsector,Encuestade Compensacin 1992.

has two steps: classifyingpositions and assigning salaries
to them.
Position classification consists of specifying:
* Title
* Functions and purpose of the position
* Responsibilities
* Managerial responsibilities (for example, magni-
tudes of budget, personnel budget, value of equip-
ment, numbers and types of employees supervised
directly and inidirectly)
* Institutional responsibilities (formal relations that
the holder of the position is responsible for maintain-
ing, inside the agency and across agencies)
* Policy and program responsibilities (external pub-
lic policyor service effects of the unit managed by the
holder of the position)
* Skill requirements
* Complexity of demands placed on the holder of
the position (types of challenges to be faced, com-
plexity of thought processes required, extent of au-
tonomy, and discretion that must be exercised)
- Technical and managerial knowledge and capacity
required for the position, including key indicators of
such knowledge and capacities, such as formal edu-
cation and experience.
While this level of detail is perhaps greater than is
found in many other position classificationsystems in the
public and private sectors, the categories are typical: title,
functions, responsibilities,and skill requirements.
Salary assignment is accomplished by giving weights
to the position responsibilitiesand skill requirements. The
Venezuela proposal first rank orders a subset of the re-
sponsibilitiesand skill requirements identified in the posi-
tion classification exercise and then assigns salary incre-
ments across rankings along each given dimension of 5,
20, or 25. The proposal ranks skills along two dimensions
(conceptual and technical and integrative), and identifies
seven ordered levels of conceptual and technical skills

PuBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 5I
TABLE8.5 TABLE8.6

Argentina: public versus private sector Latin American countries: teachers'

annual salaries mean earnings as a percentage of a
(dollars) comparator group
Publicsector (percent)
remuneration
as Country 1979 1989
Bose Total percentageof
Position solary Allowances
remunerationprivatesector Argentina 93 75
Bolivia 74 65
Highest-ranking
positions Brazil 92 88
Public: Max.:Escalaf6n Peru - 88
1.428173 Uruguay 109 78
(cat.24) 10,842 39,797 50,639 Colombia 137 165
Private: Chief execu- Costa Rica - 133
tive oflicer - - 210,035 24.11 Chile - 121
Directorof Ecuador - 124
administration Ecuas _ 14
andfinance - - 101,603 49.84 Honduras 310 14I
Directorof bud-Vezul1312
getandfinance - - 68,803 73.60 Venezuel 130 109
Directorof
personnel - - 50,596 100.08 - Not available.
Source:
Psacharopoulos. andArends1993.
Valenzuela,
Modolpositions
Public: Mod.:Escalaf6n
1.428/73 descriptions have been drawn up, it has two drawbacks.
(cat. 16) 2,591 6.236 8,828 First, the 5, 20, and 25 percent salary premiums for each
Private: Chief financial
analyst/planner - - 36,143 24.42 step up one of the job classification dimensions are arbi-
Chief accountant - - 32.370 27.27 trary. The document justifies these increments by citing a
Personnel neurophysiology "law of the minimum threshold of human
manager - - 25.946 34.02 perception" (the Weber-Freshnner law), which asserts t' -t
Seniorsystems
analyst - - 25,326 34.86 humans cannot distinguish changes in stimuli of lessthan
Budget,financial 15 percent. Supposing both that such a claim is true and
analyst - - 17,354 50.87 that it applies to salary increments (as opposed to changes
Lowest-rankingpositons in stimuli the measurement of which, unlike salaries, is not
Public: Min.: Escalaf6n reported to be the subject of the experiment), it remains
1.428rt3
(cat.1) 1,807 4,904 6,710 entirely unclear where the 5, 20, and 25 percent figures
Private:Secretary - - 12,648 53.05 came from-none of them reflecting the 15 percent figure
Receptionist - - 7,564 88.72 that was used to justifya fixed,arbitrary premium for move-
- Not available. ment up rankings along a given dimension.
Note:All salarydatabasedon September1991dataconverted(U.S.consumerprce More fundamentally, however, this technicalmethod-
index)to 1992U.S.dollarsfor comparability.
Source.For public sector,Ministeriode Economia.For privatesector,Informe de ology for assigning salarydifferentials across positions pro-
Remuneraciones.
Anual. vides no means of assuring that salaries so assigned will
bear a consistent relationship with the opportunity costs
and five additional ordered levels of integrative capaci- faced by workers who might fill those positions. This
ties. In addition, the proposal ranks responsibilities along methodology could only by accident yield a salary scale
(1) managerial and (2) policy and program responsibili- that rewards responsibilityor skill requirement increments
ties. Seven levels of managerial responsibilities and four by the same fraction that they are rewarded in the private
levels of policyand program responsibilitiesare identified. sector across all responsibilityor skill requirement levels.
Integrative capacities rankings carry 20 percent salary To illustrate, although an increment from level 1 to level
increments, conceptual and technical skill rankings carry 2 of the managerial responsibilityscale brings a 25 percent
25 percent increments, managerial responsibilityrankings salaty increment, as does an increment from level 2 to
carry 25 percent salary increments, and policy and pro- level 3, it is entirely possiblethat an increment from level
gram responsibility rankings carry 5 percent premiums. I to level 2 would receive a 25 percent increment in the
Although this procedure provides a ready methodol- private sector, while an increment from level 2 to level 3
ogy for assigning salaries to positions once the position could expect a 40 percent premium. If no fixed relation-

52 CIVILSERVICE
REFORM
IN LATINAMERICA
AND THECARIBBEAN
ship holds with the private sector, this salary scale will
underminc the ability of the public sector to staff those
positions whose salaries happen to fall further below their
private sector counterparts (level 3 in thc hypothetical
example) than do other public sector position salaries
(level 2 in the example).
Argentina (SINAPA). The same flaw can be seen in
Argentina's recent revision of its public sector base salary
assignment policies under its new Sistema Nacional de
Profesi6n Administrativa (SINAPA). The SINAPA posi-
tion classification procedure and salary assignment algo-
rithm is very similar to the proposed Venezuelan proce-
dures. Positions are classifiedbased on responsibilitiesand
skill requiremcnts, includingboth task demands and level
of autonomy demanded by those tasks. On the basis of
thirteen responsibility categories and seventeen skill cat-
egories (eleven task demand categories and six autonomy
level categories), cach position is classifiedinto one of six
possible levels, labeled A through F. Each position classi-
fication has five salary grades (base through 4) (see tables
8.7 and 8.18). Base salaries are computed by multiplying
the appropriate cell index by the current period multi-
plier, thereby allowingready adjustment of the salaryscale
to reflect factors such as inflation or a policy to increase
salaries across the board. Salary increments along the
horizontal axis of that salary scale are attained on the
basis of the employee's historyof annual personnel perfor-
mance evaluations, while vertical movements (across lev-
els) within the salary scale are achieved by meeting the
position-specificresponsibilityand skill requirements for a
higher-level position and being promoted to it.
The index magnitudes were constructed to ass' ,e
that the ratio of the salary of the highest-paid to the
lowest-paid employee covered by that salary scale (the
compression ratio) would achieve a pre-specified magni-
tude-in this case, 10.5. The particular pattern of across-
level and across-gradesalary increments were constructed
to assure 9 percent increments for each grade step (hori-
zontal movement in table 8.7), while satisfyingthis over-
all requirementof a compressionratio of 10.5.Prelimi-
nary versions of the SINAPA salary scale imposed 50
percent increments for promotions across levels F through
C and 60 percent increments for promotions between
levels C and A. The more recent version which was
those different skill and responsibilitylevels. Instead, the
increments have been constructed to achieve a pre-speci-
fied compression ratio.
Other salary scales.The COPRE and SINAPA sys-
tems' lack of a consistent relationship with the opportu-
nity costs of labor is not unique. The complexity and
transparency of the procedures for establishingbase salary
scales vary across countries, but all countries examined in
this study suffer from this shortcoming because they rely
upon technicalrather than opportunitycost factors to con-
struct their salary scales:
* In addition to SINAPA, Argentina's previous and other
public salary scales (the previous salary scale covering
core personnel in the central government under decree
1.428/73,as well as those still governing teachers, various
public enterprises, the judiciary) are also based on techni-
cal considerations, rather than opportunity costs.
* Existing central government salary scales in Chile, El
Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela are based strictly on technical con-
siderations. (Throughout this section "central government
employee" denotes people employed in central govern-
ment agencies subject to the governing civil service stat-
tire. In Venezuela, this set includes seventy-one central
government agencies, although some employees within
those agencies are exempted from the Ley de Carrera
Administrativa-for example, uniformed military person-
nel, teachers, and university administrators.)
* Trinidad and Tobago is currently employing a consult-
ant to revise its civil service salary scale. The approach
being taken is very similarto the Venezuelan and Argen-
tine approaches described above. Points are to be assigned
to various dimensions of position descriptors and those
points are to be used to rank order positions. Salary differ-
entials are to be assigned so as to assure that the overall
salary structure will exhibit a normal distribution. The
assignment of points and the imposition of a particular
functional form on the overall distribution of salaries are
TABLE8.7
Argentina: SINAPA salary scale,
June 1991
Level Bosegrade GradeI Grade
2 Grade3 Grode4
-

adopted under Decree 994/91, relinquished this incre- B 606 660 720 na. na.
ment simplicityto achievethe overallcompressionratio c 408 444 484 527 n.a.
of 10.5 (the overall compressionratio in a preliminary D 260 296 322 351 382
SINAPA salary scale proposal was 10.28). E 150 164 178 194 212
Assignment of salary increments on the SINAPA F 100 109 119 130 141
salary scale has nothing to do with differentialsin the n.a.Not applicable.
Source;
SistemaNacional
deProfesion
Administrativa
(SINAPA),
AnnexI to Decreto
opportunity costs faced by employeesholding positions at 1994/91,Argertina.

PUBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCEMANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 53

based on or reflect technical considerations rather than
opportunity costs. Such a system cannot assure that sala-
ries for all positions will bear a consistent relationship
with opportunity costs.
Assigningsalary supplements
Salary supplements are a significant fraction of many pub-
lic employees' compensation in the typical LAC coun-
try-as much as 84 percent of total compensation in
Argentina, 80 percent in Uruguay, 74 percent in Chile,
and 32 percent in Venezuela. The above reported shares
of total compensation accounted for by salary supple-
ments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile reflect maximum
shares-possible or observed-in the existing salarystruc-
ture, while the shares reported for Venezuela and Trinidad
and Tobago are averages based on salary scale data and
actual expenditure data reported in annual budget docu-
ments. To put this in perspective, although the maximum
share of total compensation that can be accounted for by
supplements in Uruguay is 80 percent, the observed aver-
age is only 20 percent. So, salarysupplements as a portion
of compensation appear to be higher in the former three
countries than in the last two. Data limitationsprevented
reporting precisely the same measures for all five coun-
tries. Although such supplements sometimes better link
public sector salaries to economic factors-to counteract
the fundamental flaw of the technical algorithms used to
assign base salaries-they also tend to reduce the trans-
parency of salary determination and can yield arbitrary
salary assignments.
In Uruguay, for instance, publicemployeewagescon-
sist of a basic wage, defined by the applicable personnel
roster escalaf6n,plus any of more than fifty situation-
specific compensations and fringe benefits. The compen-
TABLE8.8
sations and fringe benefits attach to such things as longer
work weeks (thirty-six, forty or forty-eight hours, rather
than the thirty-hour base), full-time dedication and rep-
resentation expenditures, night work, unhealthy occupa-
tions, seniority, being a member of an organized house-
hold (hogar constituido), family allowance, and so on
(World Bank 1991).z Although some of these situation-
specific compensations obviouslyare tied to the demands
placed on the worker-for example, the bonuses for work-
ing more than the thirty-hour base and the unhealthy-
occupations premiums-many have no obvious link to
job demands; they reflect, instead, equity or special inter-
est considerations. In addition, in practice these situa-
tion-specificcompensations narrow the range of compen-
sations. The seniority premium, a fixed premium per year
of service, inexorably raises the remuneration of more-
senior employees, regardless of their performance or the
demands of their positions. The premium for members of
an organized household is inversely proportional to the
wage level, thereby partially counterbalancing the wage
pyramid embodied in each of the salary scales. The family
allowances are fixed premiums per child.
The situation-specificcompensations account, on av-
erage, for roughly 20 percent of central government em-
ployee compensation and can easily exceed 80 percent of
an employee'stotal compensation.3 Given their large share
of total compensation and the fact that many of these
benefits bear no relation to job demands or employeeper-
formance, it is not surprisingto find that actual compen-
sation packages vary less across employment grades (lev-
els within the salary scales) than do the base pay rates
found in those salary scales. For instance, in the absence
of all situation-specificcompensations, the overall ratio of
highest to lowest salaries-the compression ratio-in the
central administration stood at 13.2 (table 8.8). When

Uruguay: potential weeklypay compensationcomparisonsin the central

administration, July 1989
(dollars)
Basepay Payincludingthreespecialbene,fts
Clossificatjon Minimum Maximum Ratiomaxlmin Minimum Maximum Ratiomoxlmin
University-trained professional 157 1,143 7.3 190 1,211 6.4
Technical-professional 134 858 6.4 170 926 5.5
Administrative 88 651 7.4 128 719 5.6
Specialized 88 205 10.2 128 964 7.5
Trades 86 144 7.4 127 706 5.6
Auxiliary services 94 165 4.0 135 450 3.3
Overall 86 1,143 13.2 127 1,211 9.5
Note: Minimumcompensation includingbenefitsassumes no seniority,whilermaximum compensation includingbenefitsassumes30 yearsof seniority.The three benefitsare
seniority,established
household,andchildcare.AlIfiguresreflectpotentialcompensation packages
ratherthan actualremunerations receivedandassumea 40-hourwork week
and 4.29 weeksper month.Figuresaremonthlycompensations expressed in U.S.dollarsbasedon the july 1989exchangerateof 6111.2.
Source:Thesecomparisons aretakenfrom World Bank1991,tablesVl- 12andVl- 14, pp. 84-85.

54 CIVIL SERVICEREFORMIN LATIN AMERICAAND THE CARIBBEAN

three of the most significant of these situation-specific TABLE8.9
compensations are included-seniority, established house- Venezuela: central government personnel
hold, and health care-this ratio is reduced to 9.5. Within budget, 1992
job descriptions reserved for university-trained profession-
als,the base pay compression ratio was 7.3, but this ratio Percentageof
falls to 6.4 when these three benefits are included. These Personnel Amount total(less
data and the details of the salary-setting provisions in expenditure
category (boliores) collective
contracts)
Uruguay's public sector reveal a public pay-setting policy Totalpersonnel
expenditures 105,889,578.318
that could be made more transparent and more clearly lesscollectivecontracts 88,868,463,107 100.0
linked to the quantity and type of work being performed Basesalary 60,528,484.459 68.1
by eliminating or curtailing the use of many of the situa- Permanentempioyees 58,687,912,457 66.0
tion-specific compensations. Temporary employees 1,840,572,002 2.1
Salared employees 691,163,816 0.8
Like Uruguay, many LAC countries-such as Argen- Wageemployees 1,149,408,186 1.3
tina, Chile, and Venezuela-allow a wide variety of salary Premiums 8,006,264,882 9.0
supplements. Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, Premiums
forsenionty,
relies little on salary supplements. performance,education 3,329,094,597 3.7
Other premiums 4,677,170,285 5.3
Overtimeandrelatedcompensations 9,799,789,702 11.0
Venezuela. In Venezuela, salary supplements repre- Annualbonuses 5,501,338,410 6.2
sent almost 32 percent of budgeted personnel expendi- Aidcontributions
topersonal
tures on public employeesnot covered by collective con- savings
andretirementplans 5.032,585,654 5.7
tracts in the 1993budget, and 40 percent for those covered Percentage
of
I n
11 I I .
by collective contracts (see table 8.9). A . .r.
Moreover, a signifi- Collectivecontracts
Collective
contracts ~~~~~~~Amount contract
collective
'
cant fraction of those salary supplements are not clearly
~~~expenditure
categories
Colectivecotrics
(bolivares)
17,01,1r,21
expenditures
00.0
linked to the quantity or quality of work supplied by an Collective
contracts 17,021,115,211 100.0
Totalwages 10,208,712,133 60.0
employee. Only 3.7 percent of personnel expenditures Bonuses andothercompensabons
6,812,403,078 40.0
were explicitly allocated as "premiums for service," de- Source WolddBankdata.
spite the fact that such "premiums" are allowed to aug-
ment base salaries by up to 80 percent for professional Militarysalaries consist of a base plus four categories
staff and up to 60 percent for technical staff. Up to almost of supplements-allowances, seniority, residency, and
39 percent of allowable service premiums could simply special premiums. Combined, these supplements dwarf
reflect seniority, while the maximum salary supplement the base salary. Base pay accounts for, on average,
resulting from an employee's performance evaluation can- roughly 16 to 23 percent of total compensation (see table
not exceed 21 percent of base salary-or roughly 26 per- 8.10); while allowances account for 24 to 34 percent,
cent of allowable premiums for service. Although over- seniority accounts for 2 to 32 percent, residency accounts
time accounts for another 11 percent of budgeted for 24 to 20 percent, and special premiums are roughly 15
personnel expenditures in Venezuela, non-performance- to 21 percent.5
linked salary supplements appear to account for approxi- A similar yet more complex picture emerges when
mately 11.9 to 20.4 percent of total personnel expendi- the salary scales covering many other central govern-
tures in Venezuela in 1993, exclusiveof employeescovered ment employees are examined. As of 1988, for instance,
by collective contracts. Performance-linked salarysupple- while escalaf6n1.428 had been designed to cover most
ments appear to account for between 11.5 and 20.0 per- central government employees, at least 17 other wage
cent of such expenditures.4 regimes covered employees in various central govern-
ment agencies and more than sixty types of salary supple-
Argentina. Argentina's salary supplements are also ments existed. This plethora of salary scales and supple-
typical of LAC countries. Although each salaryscale that ments contributed to increase variations across agencies
governs personnel compensation in the central govern- in total compensation accorded identical positions and
ment carries its own set of salary supplements, two ex- to compress the salary structure. To eliminate these wage
amples illustrate the significance of such supplements in distortions, the government issued decrees 2.192 and
determining total compensation-the military salarystruc- 2.193 in 1986. These provided salary enhancements on
ture and the D.L.1.428salarystructure, which covered the technical grounds designed to counteract the salary com-
lion'sshare of central government employeesuntil replaced pression introduced by the existing salary supplements.
recentlyby the SINAPA salarystructure (discussedabove). To illustrate, in March 1991, salary enhancements based

PUBLICSFCTORHUMANRESOURCE
MANAGEMENT AND THECARIBBEAN
IN LATINAMERICA 55
on decree 2.192 in the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia 12 percent for lower positions. Supplements reflecting
Agricultural Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agri- government program priorities-including program pri-
culture Technology) were 342 percent of base salary (in- ority, exclusive dedication, investment dedication, and
cluding dedicaci6nfuncional) for employees at the top of regional adjustments-accounted for 10.2 to 19.6 per-
the INTA salary scale, 126 percent for those near the cent of total compensation. Seniority factors (time in
middle of the scale, and only 61 percent for those at the position and seniority), in turn, accounted for between
bottom (Republic of Argentina, Ministry of Economy). 1.4 percent and almost 4.0 percent of total compensa-
These enhancements accounted for 21.1 percent of total tion. A productivity factor could account for around 7.7
reported compensation for a prototype top-level em- to 9.2 percent of total compensation for these positions.
ployee in INTA, 23.2 percent for a prototype mid-level Other supplements accounted for another 20.9 percent
employee, but only 13.9 percent for a prototype employee of total compensation, on average, including 18.7 per-
at the bottom of the salary scale (see table 8.11). Total cent dedicated to providing meals to employees. In short,
enhanced base salary, including all position-linked salary salary supplements account for a sizable fraction of total
enhancements as of April 1991, accounted for 27.2, 41.6 compensation under both of these typical salary regimes
and 36.8 percent, respectively,of total reported compen- in Argentina. While a sizable fraction of those supple-
sation for these three prototype employees. Salary supple- ments appear to be linked to levels of responsibility and
ments other than these position-specific enhancements skill requirements, a large portion would appears to have
accounted for 72.8 percent of total reported compensa- little to do with such factors: the 18.7 percent of salaries
tion for the prototype top-level employee, 58.4 percent attributable to meals.
for the middle-level employee, and 63.2 percent for the
prototype employee at the bottom of the salary scale. Chile. Chile's set of salary supplements is perhaps as
Salary supplements reflecting level of responsibility and extensive as that found in Argentina. Salary supplements
job demands-for example, whether the position-holder
held a university title, level in the hierarchy, and TABLE8.11
whether the position was a scientific, technical or super- Argentina: salary components in Instituto
visory position)-accounted for almost 30 percent of to- Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria,
tal compensation for the highest position, but only about April 1991
(percent)
TABLE
8.10
^ . .,. , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Highest-ra
Modal Lowest-ranking
Argentina: military salary components as Compensation position position posiaon
percentage of gross salary, October 1991 component AI-15)(grode
(grade EI-Io) (grade
C2-4)
Enhanced salarybase 27.2 41.6 36.8
Base SeniorityResidencySpeciol Basesalary 2.5 7.3 9.2
Position wage Allowancespremium premiumpremiums Functionaldedication 3.7
Specialbenefit 11.0 13.8
Lieutenantgeneral 15.9 23.8 31.7 13.9 14.7 Ait. 4, D.2.192/86 21.1 23.2 13.9
Majorgeneral 16.0 24.0 31.2 14.0 14.8
Brigadier
general 16.3 24.4 30.1 14.2 15.0 Salarysupplements 72.8 58.4 63.2
Colonel 16.8 25.2 27.7 14.7 15.5 Responsibility/ob
demands, 29.6 12.5 12.1
Lieutenantcolonel 17.7 26.5 23.9 15.5 16.4 Govemmentprogrampriority5 10.2 15.7 19.6
Major 18.7 28.0 19.7 16.3 17.3 Productivity 8.0 7.7 9.2
Major
18.7 28.0 19.7 16.3 17.3 ~Seniority
factorsc 4.0 1.7 1.4
Captain 19.8 29.7 14.9 17.3 18.3 Othersupplements 20.9 20.9 20.9
Firstlieutenant1 20.6 30.9 11.4 18.0 19.1 Meals 18.7 18.7 18.7
Firstlieutenant2 21.3 31.9 8.6 18.6 19.7 Household/domestic
benefit 1.0 1.0 1.0
Secondlieutenant 21.9 33.0 5.5 19.3 20.3 Miscellaneous' 1.0 1.1 1.1
Sergeantmajor 17.1 25.6 26.5 I5.0 15.8 Totalcompensation 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sergeantpdncipal 17.9 26.8 23.2 15.6 16.5
Sergeantadjunct 18.7 28.0 19.7 16.4 17.3 Note:Supplementsfor Law20.340/73, meals,andmiscellaneous
areimputed atagency
Sergeantl 19.4 29.1 16.5 17.0 18.0 averages,andhenceareestimated asconstant average percentagesacrossposition
prototypes.AlIotherfiguresreflectposition prototypecompensationlevels.
Sergeant 20.6 31.0 11.3 18.0 19.1 title. hierarchy
a. Positionand function,university compensation,andsupplemental
Corporal 1 21.5 32.3 7.6 18.8 19.8 Law20.340/73, whichprovidessalary enhancements to stimulate
scientific,
technical,
Corporal 22.2 33.4 4.4 19.4 20.6 andsupervisory functions.
Volunteer1 22.7 34.1 2.3 19.8 21.1 b. Prorityprogram,exclusivededication, investment
dedication,
regionaladjustment.
Gendarme 22.2 33.3 4.5 19.4 20.5 c. Timeinposition,seniority.
d. Undesirableassignments,eradication, Funci6nSCD.cashshortages.
Source:
Word Bank
data. Source:
WorldBankdata.

56 CiVILSER/'ICE REFGRMIN tTIN MlJfR CA AND THE CKIJBBEAN