provisional incumbent is automatically granted career sta-
tus. This providesa potentiallyimportantbackdoor into
the civilservice.Similarly,newappointeesare subjectto a
six-monthprobationaryperiod,duringwhichtheir direct
superiorsare requiredto evaluatethem.Shoulda superior
failto evaluatean appointeeduringthose sixmonths,the
appointeeis automaticallygrantedcareerstatus.Although
the supervisoris subjectto an unspecifiedsanction,this
scenario does provide an avenue by which underper-
formingnew hirescan attain tenure.
Thus, promotions in Venezuelaare subject to some-
what more competitivepressuresthan in Chile, but less
than they could be. Civilservantsare promisedthe right
to promotionson the basisof their rankingon personnel
performanceevaluationsand training received(Leyde
CarreraAdministrativa,Art. 19;ReglamentoGeneralde
la Leyde Carrera Administrativa,decree 1.378[19821,
Arts. 146-7). Unfortunately,becausecompliancewith
the personnelperformanceevaluationrequirementsap-
pearsto be weak (seebelow)and resourceallocationsfor
trainingare small,it is probablytrue that promotionsare
governedlargelyby seniority,especiallybecauseseniority
is specifiedas the tiebreakercriterion when merit and
trainingdifferencesdo not exist.
The personnelevaluationsystemis elaborate,but ap-
pears to be rarely used to informpromotionand annual
salaryadjustmentdecisions.OCP is responsibleforcreat-
ing a personnelevaluationsystem,whichline agencyper-
sonnelofficesare responsiblefor administering.OCP offi-
cials report that thirty-fourof the seventy-oneagencies
subject to their authority currently use the personnel
evaluationschemedesignedby OCP. Conversationswith
personneloutsideOCP, however,suggestthat the OCP
personnelevaluationprocedureis not widelyused and is
viewedas unwieldy.
The OCP employeeevaluationsystembeganin 1986
and wasmodifiedin 1989and 1992.It beganwith fifteen
evaluativecategoriesfrom which each agency was al-
lowedto selectcategoriesit deemed appropriate.Under
the current arrangement,OCP fixes twelve categories
(with input from management in each government
agency),fromwhicheach agencymustemploythreespeci-
fied by OCP and is free to choose five others from the
remainingnine. Employeesmust be evaluated at least
twicea year,althoughsomeagenciesdo so as manyas ten
timesa year.Along each dimension(category),four rat-
ings(levelsof assessedperformance)are possible.Weights
foreach dimensionare assignedby the personmakingthe
evaluation and can range between 1 and 8. These
weightedrankingsare summedto obtain an overallevalu-
ation, which is used to rank employees.Giventhe sepa-
rate explicit specificationof weights and ratings, it is
PUBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCEMANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
clearly feasible to alter weights to reflect management or
policypriorities.
The resultsof these rankingsare used as follows:
Employeesare assignedto one of six rangesof evalua-
tion (three consideredgoodand three consideredpoor).
* Employeesare rank ordered.Then each unit decides
how much bono (one-timebonus) to distribute to each
employeeon the basisof this rank order.
* Compensaciones de pasode escala(that is, salaryincre-
ments to be added to the employee'sbase salary) are
determinedby these rank orderings.
* Finally,primas(salarysupplementsbasedon the annual
performanceevaluation,whether the employeepossesses
a universitydegree, whether the employeepossessesa
post graduate degree,years of experience,and training
received over the previoustwelve months) are deter-
mined,in part,by these rankingsaswell.Employeesrated
excellentreceivea primaequalto 21 percentof their base
salary,while those rated very goodreceivea primaof 10
percentof basesalary.
In addition,promotions(ascensos)are conditionedon
these rankings(seeabove).
Aninualsalaryadjustments, then, includeadditionsto
the basesalaryand nonrecurrentbonuses.Eachministry
or other administrativeunit receivesa fixed sum in its
budget each year for the bonos.Base salaryincrements
and primas,on the other hand, are financednot by these
discretionaryfunds but by budgetgrowth.Consequently,
just as in Chile,managershavestrongincentivesto assign
high performanceevaluationscoresto their employees,in
order to assure them access to the bonos, the com-
pensaciones depasode escala,and the portionof the primas
basedon thoseperformancereviews.In addition,because
promotionsdependupon those performanceevaluations
and becausemanagersface no extra costs if they inflate
their staffs personnelevaluationsbut do run the risk of
upsettingtheir employeesif they assignthem low ratings,
thosemanagershavestrongincentivesto giveall employ-
ees very high evaluations.In short, the incentivesfacing
evaluatorswhen assigningperformanceratings to their
employeesmatch those in Argentina and Chile. As a
consequence,it wouldbe surprisingto find much varia-
tion in employeeperformanceevaluations.This, in turn,
meansthat annual salaryadjustments,as wellas promo-
tions,willtend to reflectnonperformancecriteria-espe-
ciallyseniority.
Training.Expendituresfortrainingaveraged0.45per-
cent-with a medianof 0.18 percent-of total personnel
expendituresamongthe centralgovernment'sministriesin
the 1992budget(Venezuela1992).In 1992,the spending
rangedfroma lowof 0.0013percentin educationto a high
71
of 2.69 percent in the Ministryof Development (Fomento). formance enough to counteract the disruptive effects of
These figurescompare unfavorablywith the private sector, rapid turnover, brought on by the frequent turnover of
which devoted 1.33 percent of personnel expenditures to the highest-level political appointees and their immediate
trainingin 1989.The figuresalso compare unfavorablywith subordinates-ministers and vice ministers.
expenditures devoted to training in Venezuela's public Venezuela's civil service systemencompasses at least
enterprises, which averaged 2.85 percent in 1989 accord- four types of tenure according to the type of contract
ing to a survey conducted by IESA (1990). under which a worker is hired (Ley de Carrera Ad-
Although training is supposed to be assigned on the ministrativa, Title 1, Arts. 2-5):
basisof, first, employee performance and promise for pro- * Career civil servants
motion and, second, employee skill deficiencies in their * Political appointees (funcionariosde librenombramiento
current positions, there is no available evidence as to y remoci6n),including:
whether the limited training resources are targeted ac- * Ministers, secretary general of the presidency,chief
cording to these criteria. The little evidence available on of the Central Office of Coordination and Planning
the targeting of training expenditures shows that in 1991 (CORDIPLAN), and the remaining functionaries of
they were concentrated in narrowly defined skill areas similar rank designated by the president and the gov-
(30.2 percent of all training expenditures) and in profes- emors of the federal territories
sional and technical areas (51.4 percent), and in 1992 * Highest-rankingdirectors and administrators of the
they were concentrated in training activities of short du- autonomous organisms of the National Public Ad-
ration (roughly 55 percent in sessionsof 8 to 20 hours and ninistration, the directors general, directors, judicial
about 35 percent in training activities of 21 to 40 hours). consultants, and other similar functionaries of the
Whether these concentrations are optimal is not clear. same rank in the service of the president, the minis-
No systematic procedures appear to exist for evaluating tries, the autonomous organisms or the governors of
the targeting or outcomes of training activities. the federal territories
* High-level posts, primarily supervisory and mana-
Tenure protection.Roughly 51 percent of Venezuela's gerial positions (extending down to division chiefs or
417,000 public employees in the seventy-one agencies their equivalent), but also all administrators and in-
subject to the Ley de Carrera Administrativa in 1991 are spectors in the Customs Agency
provided tenure protection (see table 8.19). Another 47 * Positions of confidence-a broadly defined cat-
percent of those employeesare wage laborers hired daily, egory that includes employeesat all levels of respon-
although union contracts covering the vast majority of sibility and skill whose functions include activities
these wage laborers apparently make them virtually de such as auditing and inspection; valuation; process-
facto tenured employees. ing of patents, trademarks, licenses, and exonera-
Only 2.2 percent of the central government employ- tions; administration or custody of currency accounts
ees did not enjoy substantial tenure protection. Of those, or documents through which the National Treasury
roughly 4,000 were higher-level management employees
(0.9percent),whileabout 5,000(1.2percent)were hired TABLE8.19
under individually negotiated short-term contracts. Venezuela: Public employment tenure
Although nontenured appointments in the higher composition, 1991
managerial ranks in Venezuela are less than half as nu-
merous,as a fraction of total employment,as in Chile, Employment
stotus ofemployees Percentage
Number
tenured and nontenured officialsin the public bureau- Tenured 211,574 50.8
cracyand officialsof multilateralaid agencieswhoregu- Administrators 134,747 32.4
larly work withlarly
the governmentuniformlylament the Professionals ~
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 67,327 16.2
~~~~~Unclassified
9,500 2.3
disruptiveeffectsof constant turnoveramonghigh-level Nontenured 8,998 2.2
managers in the public sector. As in Chile, the nonten- Highermanagement 3,919 0.9
ured appointments provide a vehicle for introducing Contracted 5,079 1.2
greater competitivepressuresinto the staffingprocess ToWal 4116445 100.0
by opening the recruitment pool to include people outside
bytopenivil thervicruitmend
byccircumventing
pl ntoinctheunompleoutsite
the civilservice-and thee uncompetitive Note: Tenure composition
Administrativa.
based on 71 agencies subject to the Ley de Carrera

salary structure imposed by the civil service salary scale. Distnbuci6n

Source:InformeEstadistico: de Cargos
y CostadelaAdministrocinr
PWbico
In Venezuela, however, it is not clear that these enhanced cionl, Ario 1991,11Cuadro No.
16
(p. 47)(seeVenezuela1992),and infornmation
provided by OCP offioalsindicatingthat publishedmeasures of contract employment
competitivepressuresimproveemployeequalityand per- appear to understate true levels by approximately 25 percent.

72 CIVIL SERVICEREFORM tN LATIN AMERICAAND THE CARIBBEAN

 (FiscoNacional)confers privileges on taxpayers; and
border control and the armed forces. This category
also includes chiefs or equivalent positions respon-
sible for procurement or disbursement; handling of
cash; treasury functions; regulation and control of
payments; public relations and information; cryptog-
raphy, information systems, and reproduction; han-
dling of confidential documents and materials; and
labor procurement. Last, all positions within the Of-
fice of the Presidency are positions of confidence
(cargosde confianza).
* Contractors
* Day laborers.
Although career civil servants enjoy life tenure, po-
litical appointees serve at the pleasure of the president or
his designated representative, consultants (contratados)
serve under fixed-term contracts with individual govem-
ment agencies, and day laborers (jornalados)work only on
daily contracts with individual government agencies.
It is not difficult to justify these four types of job
tenure provisions that reflect differing demands on the
employees. Political appointees are the highest-level ap-
pointees who serve to link the agencies and the career
civil service to the agenda of the current government.
The career civil service provides the permanent body of
civil servants protected from the winds of political pa-
tronage. Their loyalty should rest with either the overall
career civil service or the agencies within which their
current and future careers lie. The consultants provide
an avenue through which agencies can hire persons with
unique skills for projects of fixed duration-skills which
it would be economically unsound to hire on a perma-
nent basis, since they are not required with enough fre-
quency to warrant such an employment arrangement.
Finally, day laborers provide a similar flexibilityfor staff-
ing activities needing temporary infusions of large quan-
tities of readily available unskilled or semi-skilled labor.
In short, on its face, Venezuela's set of employment ten-
ure arrangements answers well to the need for such ten-
ure options to reflect the variety of demands placed on
the public sector labor force.
But when one speaks with managers or line employ-
eeswithin Venezuela'scentral govemment ministries,one
does not hear praise for the ability of this employment
system to match job tenure arrangements to labor market
conditions and work requirements. Instead, one consis-
tently hears concerns reflecting, among other things, its
failure to tailor tenure protection to task demands:
* Extreme instability among the ranks of the political
appointees is severely undermining the ability of some
ministries to manage their operations, especially agencies
in the Office of the Presidency, such as CORDIPLAN.
PUBLIC SECTOR HUMAN RESOURCEMANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
* The inability of many ministries to purge themselves of
redundant employeesamong the career civil service ranks
has tied the hands of management, greatly diminishing
their ability to manage their agencies.
* The practice of hiring persons into unclassified but
tenured positions is suspected of sometimes providing a
back door entry into permanent public employment sta-
tus for insufficientlyskilled or credentialed people.
* Contractor arrangements are widelysuspected of being
regularly abused; for example, rather than serving as a
means of obtaining specializedskillsfor specific, time-lim-
ited tasks, frequent renewal of such contracts is suspected
of providinga way to hire line personnel outside the tenure
and salary constraints of the career civil service.
* Day laborer hiring is also widely suspected of providing
potitical patronage and de facto job tenure, at least for the
duration of a given administration.
* Job protection guarantees negotiated into many collec-
tive contracts have made it as difficult to adjust the levels
of wage labor-47 percent of central government employ-
ment-to changing needs for such labor as it is to adjust
the levels of administrative and professionalstaff.
Whether these concems are based in fact has not been
adequately addressed. But the widespread suspicions sug-
gest, among other problems, that the variety of tenure
protection available in Venezuela's civil service is not ap-
propriately targeted. Managerial and many other ranks
appear to be inadequately protected from the ever-chang-
ing winds of political agendas, thereby undermining the
continuity and commitment to agency missionsnecessary
for effectivemanagement; permanent tenure appears to be
too widespread in many nonmanagerial ranks, compromis-
ing administrative efficiency;short-term contracting ap-
pears to be used to circumvent personnel policyconstraints
rather than to avoid over-investingin transferrable human
capital skills that cannot be fully employed within the
public sector; and spot market hiring of day laborers ap-
pears to have relinquished its major advantage-day-to-
day flexibility regarding unskilled staffing levels.
Venezuelasummary. As in Chile, many aspects of the
core personnel policies and practices undermine rather
than enhance competitive pressures needed to improve
performance in the civil service. Recruitment policies do
not limit the pool from which recruits can be drawn as
dramatically as in Chile, but the policy of ranking all
existing civil servants who meet minimum skill require-
ments above any external candidates restrains the com-
petitiveness of recruitment. Furthermore, the reluctance
of many line agencies to regularly undertake the employee
performance reviews mandated by OCP means that, in
many agencies, seniority is the main factor in employee
73
rankings that play a pivotal role in decisions on the filling
of vacancies. In addition, managers who do conduct an-
nual employee performance evaluations have incentives
to consistently give the highest ratings, thereby undercut-
ting the ability of that process to reliably sort employees
according to their performance and foster competitive
pressures. Rules for allocating and monitoring the results
of training activities also do not appear to provide strong
incentives to allocate those limited resources efficiently.
Tenure protection-de jure and de facto-also ap-
pears to undermine competitive pressures upon existing
employees to work effectively and efficiently. The exist-
ence of some 4,000 nontenured higher-level manage-
ment positions, exempt from the recruitment pool re-
strictions that apply to career civil service positions and
from the noncompetitive salary scale governing the ca-
reer civil service, does enhance competitive pressures
within those nontenured ranks. But the extreme instabil-
ity at the government's highest levels-ministers and
vice ministers-seriously compromises the advantages of
the additional competitive pressures among nontenured
higher-level management by dramatically increasing
turnover. Contract positions provide another avenue
around the anticompetitive restrictions affecting the ca-
reer civil service, but monitoring and accountabitliy
mechanisms are so weak that it is impossible to know
whether the use of contract labor for staffing the profes-
sional and managerial ranks enhances efficiency or is
simply another form of patronage.
Examples of successfulpublic sector
human resource management
Examples of successfulpublicsector human resource man-
agement policies and practices in LAC are not numerous,
but they do exist. The Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros (SVS) and the Superintendencia de Bancos e
Instituciones Financieras (SBIF) in Chile and the Banco
Central de Venezuela (BCV) and the Contraloria in Ven-
ezuela have reputations for effective and efficient person-
nel management policies and practices. An analysis of a
few of these examples of effective human resource man-
agement within the public sector can serve to highlight
how these units manage to harness competitive pressures
to enhance the performance of both their agencies and
their employees.
Superintendenciade Valoresy Seguros
The Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) is
highly regarded among high-level civil servants in Chile
74
for its effectivehuman resource management policies and
practices. Every aspect of their human resource manage-
ment policies and practices introduces greater competi-
tive pressures than can be found in the civil service sys-
tems reviewed above.
The precursor of SVS was created in May 1931 and
was named something like Superintendencia de
Sociedades An6nimos, Bolsas,Compafiias de Seguros. In
1980 this entity was transformed into SVS, in part to
reflect the more general role being played by the agency in
regulating securities and exchange markets-essentially
the same role as the Securities and Exchange Commission
in the United States. SVS used to have 151 functionaries,
but had 162 by 1992. Its total number of permitted posi-
tions is fixed by law, as is the case with all other agencies
of the central government."5 This is where the similarities
end, however.
Recruitment.Two key elements of recruitment in SVS
contribute to its success in hiring highly qualified workers.
First, the recruitment pool is always the entire do-
mestic labor force. SVS advertises positions in newspa-
pers, at universities, and so on. They also seek applicants
through informal channels. Applicants submit resumes,
which are screened by the immediate superior and other
members of a hiring committee. The top three candidates
are selected for interviews.After interviews,the top choice
is forwarded to the General Secretary, who reviews the
files and decides.
Second, SVS can recruit at any grade, unlike the
central government agencies governed by the New Ad-
ministrative Statute. Furthermore, while anyone hired for
a particular position is required to meet the minimum
credential requirements, just as in agencies governed by
the New Administrative Statute, the Superintendent is
allowed to exempt candidates from particular qualifica-
tions standards whenever he can make a case that they
are qualified for the position.
Personnelevaluationsystem.SVS evaluates employees
informally, basing promotion decisions on informal pro-
cesses. This arrangement appears to be well-suited to
their situation-a small number of employees (162 posi-
tions), relatively clear employee performance standards,
and a highly mobile cadre of workers (see tables 8.20 and
8.21).
Compensation.All employees' salaries are governed
by a salary scale for positions with financial transactions
responsibilities (fiscalizador),which means that SVS em-
ployees command salaries higher than for many of
Chile's public employees, but not fully competitive with
CIVIL SERVICEREFORMIN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
the private sector (talle 8.22). SVS partiallycompen- Training.Expenditureson trainingare set in the an-
sates for these below-marketsalariesthrough its train- nualbudgetlaw.Approximately 70percentof SVS'strain-
ing policiesand throughthe skillsdevelopmentemploy- ing budgetis dedicatedto highlytechnicaltrainingout-
ees gain there. Rapid accumulationof human capital side the country-such as with the U.S. Securitiesand
skills as an SVS employeeappears to make SVS posi- ExchangeCommission.(Thelawstipulates,however,that
tions attractive enough to land bright, youngworkers, trainingfunds cannot be usedto financeworktowardan
who remainwithinSVS for relativelyshort times.Turn- advanceddegree.)The heavyconcentrationof training
over rates ranged between 8.6 and 13.0 percent in expenditureson externaltrainingreflectsthe needin that
1987-92 for SVS,while the averagenumberof yearsof disciplineto keep abreastof new developmentsthrough
tenure at the date of departure was 1.3 years for the internationalseminars.The remaining30 percent of the
lower-ranking employees.Stability of SVS tenure is SVStrainingbudgetisspent forextemaltrainingin Chile,
greater among the higher-rankingemployees.Employ- typicallyprovidedby Chilean universities.None is spent
ees at grade 7 or higher averageeight yearsof tenure at in-house. By relyingon external providersfor training
departure. services,SVS can shoparound for the best trainingpro-
SVS is trying to obtain one privilege-held only by grams, rather than being stuck with the servicesof a
the Superintendenciade Bancose InstitucionesFinan- single,monopolistictrainingservicesprovider.
cieras (SBIF)-that would enable it to supplementthe In addition,if employeesarrangeto pursuea degree
salariesit pays.SBIFby lawis granteda fixed percentage outsidethe country,SVSwillprovidea percentageof the
of fees(rentas)it levieson the banks and financialinstitu- employee'ssalary while they are enrolled, in order to
tions it serves(Law 18.091,Art. 17). SVS has drafteda encouragesuch investmentsby their employees,in ex-
reportthat identifiesthe costsof providingeach servicein change for an enforceablepledge (in writing) that the
order to justifi a fee structure and convincethe govern- employeewillreturn to SVSfor an equivalentnumberof
ment to allowit to imposesuch feesand keepa percent- yearsof work aftercompletingthe degreeprogram.SVS
age of the revenues. claimsthat it has had no troubleenforcingthis require-
ment. They estimatethat about three to four employees
TABLE8.20 per yearhavesuchleave-of-absence or partial-salary-com-
Chile: Superintendenciade Valoresy pensation arrangements.The funds for these arrange-
Seguros:Employeeturnover rates
TABLE8.22
Numberof Number
of Tumover
rate Chile: Superintendenciade Valoresy
Ye9r positions departures (percent) Seguros: Salary comparisons,
1987 ~~~~158 lB8 11.4
1988 162 15 9.3 December1990
1989 162 21 13.0
1990 162 18 11.1 PercentagePercentage
1991 162 16 9.9 GrossSVS Percentoge
of of EUS of EUSnon-
1992 162 14 8.6 annualsalary priovte sector fiscalizadorfiscolizador
Average 161.3 16.8 10.5 Grade (US$) comporator solary, salary
Source:
Republica
deChile,Superintendencia
deValores
ySeguros. Top rank
(I/l/IB) 27,410 85.1 98.1 124.9
TABLE
8.21 26th percenble
(6/7/8) 16,922 77.9 101.3 143.7
Chile:Superintendenciade Valoresy 48thpercentile
(12/12/15) 10,381 92.3 96.4 159.7
Seguros:Employees'tenure at departure 78thpercentile
(18/20/25) 4,181 43.7 145.6 213.6
Yearsof tenureat dateof departure Bottomrank
Employee
group Averoge Maximum Minimum (23/25/31) 1,703 21.6 136.2 119.3
Managers,grades2-5 8.0 11.2 3.3 a.EUSEscala
UnicadeSueldos.
Professionals,
grades6-7 7.9 10,6 5.7 Note:Grades
arematched bypercentile
inthedistributionof grades eachsalary
within
Prof./Fiscaliz.,
grades9-13 1.3 2.8 0.1 scale.
Numbers parentheses
in indicate
thegradeselected fromtheSVS EUSfiscalizador
Overall,grades2-13 4.2 11.2 0.1 andEUSnonfiscalizador
scales,
respectively.
Privatesectorcomparators
aremanagers
(top rank),simpleaverageof managerand professional and technical(26 percent),
Note.Simpleregression
of monthsoftenureon gradeat date of departurerevealsthat professionaland technical(48 percent),simpleaverageof professional andtechnical
tenurerisesby 11.24monthsper grade(standarderror of 1.745;t-statistic
of 6.44; andadministrators (78percent),andadministrators(bottomrank).
Rz0.69). Source:Repiiblicade Chile,Superimtendencia de Segurosy Valores;EscalaUnicade
Source:Republica
de Chile,Superintendencia
de Valoresy Seguros. Sueldos;InstitutoNacionalde Estadisticas(for prnvatesectorcomparators).

PUBLICSECTORHUMANRESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
IN LATINAMERICA
AND THECARIBBEAN 75
ments come from SVS's salary budget. The percentage of
salaryprovided is determined by management on the basis
of factors such as the costs to the employee of pursuing
the degree, including travel, tuition and living costs;avail-
ability of other funds; and an assessment of the potential
performance improvements to SVS if that employee re-
ceives the proposed training. Training funds are allocated
by the Secretary General based on recommendations from
supervisors.In addition, the superintendent allocates some
funds directly.
Tenure protection. All employees are employees of
exclusive confidence (empleadosde exclusiva confianza),
which means that none has guaranteed tenure, thereby
dramatically enhancing the competitive pressureson SVS
employeesto perform.The pressures are reinforced by the
recruitment and promotions procedures, which, as noted
above, force existing employees to compete with external
candidates for promotions.
SVSsummary. SVS core personnelpoliciescreate
considerably greater competitive pressures than exist in
the regular civil service. Recruitment is more competitive
in SVS, because all recruitment efforts canvass as large a
candidate population as possible and because hiring to
position is permitted at all levels. Promotions are more
competitive because of these recruitment policies and
practices and because guaranteed job tenure is not pro-
vided. Compensation packages are more competitive-
compared with the private sector-than in the regular
civil service. But this greater competitiveness comes not
so much from the higher base salaries-because those are
constrained by the fiscalizadorsalary scale the SVS must
use-but because of the heavy investments SVS makes in
human capital acquisition among its employees. Further-
more, because on-the-job experience at SVS confers mar-
ketable skills, it is easier for SVS to attract competitive
employees.Greater abiliry to match salaries to those in
the private sector could further improve the competitive-
ness of the SVS in the recruitment market, as it does for
the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones
Financieras; SBIF is allowed to supplement its base sala-
ries with funds accumulated from some of its user charges.
This is, of course, facilitated by the insulation of the SVS
from the political pressures that often buffet line minis-
tries in the central government.
Central Bank of Venezuela
Like SVS, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) enjoys a
reputation for effectivehuman resource policiesand prac-
76
tices. As with SVS, the key to the success of BCV's
personnel policies and practices appears to be that they
enhance competitive pressures in all aspects of the per-
sonnel system.
Recruitment.Like SVS, BCV is free to recruit to posi-
tion."6 Becauseof this, although BCV has an elaborate pro-
cedure for screening internal candidates for promotion to
vacancies, those internal candidates must also compete
against external candidates. Despite the gap between BCV
salariesand those found in the private sector, top officialsin
BCV report that they are able compete effectivelyfor top
candidates. BCVsalariesare more compet:itivethan in gov-
ernment agencies governed by the Ley de Carrera Adnmi-
nistrativa, but below those available in the private sector.
BCV officialsattribute this competitiveness largely to the
attractive human capital acquisitionprospects available to
recruits. As with SVS in Chile, these attractive skills cn-
hancement prospects result from an active and scrious
training program and from on-the-job skillsacquisition.
Promotions.BCV has an elaborate employce evalua-
tion system (see below) that feeds into its promotions
review process. They maintain a registry of eligiblecandi-
dates based on the permanent employce evaluation files,
which ranks all employees oni the basis of their annual
performance evaluations. Employees are considercd for
promotion on the basis of this ranking-the top three
ranked employeesare considered wheln an opening exists.
Personnel evaluation systern. The BCV has an cx-
tremely complex employee performance review process.
Annual performance evaluations are a weighted average
of monthly evaluations of performance and quarterly
evaluations of potential. Those evaluations are hased on
the followingdimensions:
* Results (productivity)-measured by six factors
* Duties (compliance)-measured by six factors
* Potential-measured by eight factors.
Each of these three dimensions is evaluated on a short-
term, medium-term, and long-term basis. Theni, the fac-
tors within each dimension are combined into weighted
sums, which are recorded in a computerized record-
keeping system, and these are combined inito an overall
performance evaluation and an overall potential evalua-
tion each year.
Interestingly,despite the extraordinary complexity of
this system, and the substantial amoun1tof timc that motst
be spent by managers complying with the requiremiienits
for monthly and quarterly evaluations of all cmpeloyces,
the system does appear to function-that is, these evalu-
ations do appear to be regularly completed and employed
CIVIL SERVICEREFORMIN LATIN AMERICAAND 111 CARIRRIAN