1. Cayetano vs.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 200 (practice of law) FACTS: In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
FACTS: On April 25, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod,
respondent, to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. However, allegedly Monsod does
not posses the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. Hence, Renato Cayetano, petitioner, opposed the nomination.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent met the required qualifications of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years
HELD: It was held on the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava that: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Thus in the case at bar, the court held where in the light of the various definitions of the term
“Practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
2. A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014 VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ROMEO
CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents. ( practice of law)
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law. This court
suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution dated September 6,
2006, this court denied complainant Lingan’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human
Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the undatedex parte clarificatory pleading with leave
of court.
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant
Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to
investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter’s suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his
position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga’s suspension
from the practice of law “prevented] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for
want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.”RT THIS AD
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension
from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for
clarification of this court’s resolution dated June 15, 2006 “to prevent further injury and
prejudice to [his] rights.”
As to Atty. Baliga’s claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional
Director and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that
Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the
functions of a “lawyer-manager,” which under the landmark case of Cayetano v.
Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional
Director/Attorney VI requires the officer “to be a lawyer [in] good standing.” Moreover, as
admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V Being a
“lawyer-manager,” Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
ISSUE: Whether or not the duties of a Regional Director of Commission of Human Rights
constitutes practice of law.
HELD: The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the
Constitution with power to investigate “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights[.]” It is divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility
to investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.  Each regional office is headed
by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations
are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public — officers who are
necessarily members of the bar. Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily
by the Commission’s legal officer. Discussing immediate courses of action and protection
remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the
legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney — a member of the
bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this
authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
3. B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, Respondent. ( practice of law)
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
FACTS: On 21 May 2001, a day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against
respondent, Edwin L. Rana, a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against
him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll
of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent’s services.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
RULING: Respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. He was
engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no
authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
The court held that, the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.
It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.  Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
4. In the matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22, January 9,
1973 (practice of law)
FACTS: In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same
day as Rep. Act 6397.
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of
as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING: The Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to “integration” in this
wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of
his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity
of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.REPORT THIS AD
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the
State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action
and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the
principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of
speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the
Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it
does is “to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not
compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the
payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the
lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise
would make every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is
free to voice out his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes
of regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
5. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C.No. 10457, February 5, 2015, MELVYN G. GARCIA, complainant
vs. Atty. RAUL S. SESBRENO, respondent (conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude)
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. Moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide.The Decision showed that the
victim (Amaprado) and his companion (Yapchangco) were just passing by Sesbreño’s house
when the lawyer aimed his riffle at them and started shooting.
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu convicted Atty. Sesbreño of homicide. While
he was on parole, the lawyer represented Garcia’s daughters, in filing an action for support
against their father and their aunt while Melvyn Garcia was in Japan. The case was dismissed.
In 2007, Atty. Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against Melvyn Garcia but Garcia
filed a disbarment case against Atty. Sesbreño. In 2010, the Court ordered the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation regarding the disbarment case against Atty.
Sesbreño. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. The IBPCBD reviewed the decision the RTC and found that the circumstances
leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide
HELD: YES. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD that the circumstances show the
presence of moral turpitude. The Decision showed that the victim (Amaprado) and his
companion (Yapchangco) were just passing by Sesbreño’s house when the lawyer aimed his
riffle at them and started shooting. Both Amparado and Yapchangco started running away but
Amparado was hit. There was an eyewitness supporting their claims and another witness who
saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño walking back towards the gate of
his house while carrying a long firearm. As correctly stated by the IBP-CBD the victims were
just at the wrong place and time.
6. A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507) February 23, 2016 ANGELITO RAMISCAL and
MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent. (lawyer’s
duty to client)
FACTS: Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals)
engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they
were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in
the Province of Isabela.1
Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of
the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. 1âwphi1 As expected, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief.
Upon receipt of the appellants’ brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an
additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees’ brief in
the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. 2
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially
in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee
in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a
probable worth of P3,391,600.00.3
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Orro did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as the
lawyer of the Ramiscals
RULING: Yes. Atty Orro did not completely and diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer of
the spouses Ramiscals. There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct
sufficient to justify his suspension or disbarment if he so acts as unworthy of the trust and
confidence involved in his official oath and is found to be wanting in that honestly and integrity
that must characterized the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.
Based on all the circumstance in this case, the court approved the recommendation of the IBP
for the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.
9. January 10, 2018 A.C. No. 8208 RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant vs.
ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, Respondent (lawyer’s duty to the court)
FACTS: In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline Complainant,
complainant charged respondent with (a) filing a malicious and harassment administrative
case, (b) propensity for dishonesty in the allegations in his pleadings, (c) misquoting provisions
of law, and (d) misrepresentation of facts. Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment
and cancellation of his license as a lawyer.
Position of complainant:
Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 200710, an intra-corporate
case filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself from it on account of
the latter's filing of the administrative case against him. The intra-corporate case was
previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo Encomienda until he voluntarily inhibited after
respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse and a Supplement to Defendant's Urgent Motion
to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in disposing pending incidents, gross ignorance of
the law and gross inefficiency. After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case
was reraffled to the sala of Executive Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself
because she was about to retire. The case was referred to Executive Judge Eloida R. de Leon-
Diaz for proper disposition and re-raffle. The case was finally raffled to complainant.
Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was brought
about by his issuance of the omnibus order, where he ordered the creation of a management
committee and appointment of its members. Complainant further claimed that before the
records of Civil Case 2007-10 was transmitted to his sala and after he had inhibited from said
case, respondent filed thirteen (13) civil and special actions before the RTC of Lucena City.
Atty. Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on
splitting causes of actions involving the management and operation of the foundation.
According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of respondent in filing
cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other intention but to
harass, malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges.
Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18) repetitious and
prohibited pleadings. To complainant's mind, the ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent
in filing the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation and explanations was to prevent the
takeover of the management of CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at the pre-trial stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or inhibition of
judges, there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and hear the Calayan cases.
Moreover, respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against opposing lawyers and their
respective clients before the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. In addition, there were four (4)
administrative cases filed against opposing counsels pending before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline.
Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1)
serious and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as
lawyer for [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138,
Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions or proceedings
inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the judge by false statements (Section
20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate
cases and maliciously misused the same to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly
violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same cause of action.
Position of respondent:
In his Position Paper, respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. He stressed that because no disciplinary measures were leveled on him by the
OCA as an outcome of his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely
ruled out; more so, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated. Respondent argued that the
doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in
nature. Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without
complainant's own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of
courtesy and obedience toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer.
Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following:
(1) grossly unethical and immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;
(2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR);
(3) malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pretrial,22 in violation of the Interim
Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the case; and
(4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.
In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
that respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rules 8.01, 10.01 to
10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR and, thus, recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for two (2) years, for the following reasons:
1. Respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved in the intra
corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and nine (9) criminal
cases against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver before the Office of the
Prosecutor of Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial notice.
2. Respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion.
3. Respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of multiple actions
concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief.
4. Respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant illmotives that were
not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case.
IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years. Aggrieved, respondent moved for
reconsideration. In a Resolution,41 dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration as there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings
of the Commission and the motion was a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Calayan is guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the CPR?
RULING: Yes, The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant to
grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.
Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote
the public good only, but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of
those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof.
In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct
unbecoming of a worthy lawyer. Atty. Calayan is guilty of harassing opposing counsel,
attributing unsupported ill-motives against a judge, failed to observe candor, fairness and good
faith before the court; and failed to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including
complainant, by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen). He claims that the mandate of the ruling
laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring magistrates. In Almacen,
however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges.
Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer. In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent
apologized for not being more circumspect with his remedies and choice of words. He admitted
losing objectivity and becoming emotional while pursuing the cases involving him and the
CEFI. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is not to his client but primarily to the
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo
Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of
Professional Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
10. Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013 FE A. YLAYA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN
CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent. ( conflict of interest)
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the
lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to
decline professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its
acceptance involves a violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules
of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he
has given professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept
employment from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is
his duty to decline employment in any of these and similar circumstances in view of the rule
prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
FACTS: The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of
two (2) parcels of land. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, the property in dispute was
already the subject of expropriation proceedings against its former registered owner. The
respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case
as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged
that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the
property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of
consideration. The respondent then fraudulently – without their knowledge and consent, and
contrary to their understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of
Absolute Sale. The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively. IBP Commissioner found the respondent administratively liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gacott should be held administratively liable for violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The relationship between a lawyer and his
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and
public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid
representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline professional employment, no
matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of the
proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct. Thus, a
lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has given professional advice to the
plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment from another in a matter
adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline employment in any
of these and similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting
interests. Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this
case show that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The
respondent admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and
Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902. Subsequently, he
represented only Reynold in the same proceedings,81 asserting Reynold’s ownership over the
property against all other claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya. We find no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the respondent the benefit
of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that the respondent
retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of his former client, the
complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
11. A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015 WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE
MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY
UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO
T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents (conflict of interest)
FACTS: In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law
firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm),
of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and
Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as
respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain
Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same
law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of
the pertinent provisions of the CPR
RULING: The Court explained in Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat the concept of conflict of interest in
this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
The Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the labor
cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by
mere expiration of professional employment.
Hence, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P.
De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon
M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
12. A.C. No. 7110, April 20, 2016, Arthur s. Tulio, Complainant vs. Atty. Gregory F.
Buhangin, Respondent (conflict of interest)
FACTS: Arthur Tulio has been acquainted with Atty. Buhangin even prior to the latter becoming
a lawyer as he was the surveyor who prepared survey plans for the complainant in connection
with the estate left by his mother. On June 29, 2000, by virtue of Tulio’s agreement
with his siblings, Atty. Buhangin prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights
signed by all of Tulio’s siblings in his favour.Thereafter, Tulio engaged the services of Atty.
Buhangin to represent him in filing a civil case before the RTC Baguio. Through his efforts,
Tulio claims that he and the defendants in said agreed to a settlement and that he
exclusively paid the defendants.
On December 10, 2005, Atty. Buhangin represented Tulio’s siblings and filed a complaint
against him over legal matters which he entrusted to him. The complaint was for the
rescission of the deed of waiver of rights which the lawyer himself prepared and notarized.
Tulio claimed that Atty. Buhangin made misrepresentations in the complaint since he know
beforehand that his siblings waived their rights over the parcel of land they inherited and
even before such recent case was filed.Tulio filed a Motion to Disqualiy Atty. Buhangin for his
unethical conduct in gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. The lawyer
subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw counsel on the ground of conflict of interest. Tulio
alleged that the actions of Buhangin were deliberate and intentional in order to serve his own
personal interest against the interest of his clients. Thus this complaint for disbarment was
filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Buhangin is guilty of violating the rule on conflict of interest.
RULING: Rule 15.03 of the Code reads: Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Rule 15 .03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the a fore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and
information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
With this, Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
13. RAFAEL PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN SAMSON, Respondent. A.C. No.
10253, August 22, 2017, En Banc
FACTS: Complainant Rafael Padilla filed a Complaint on November 25, 2013 against his
former counsel, respondent Atty. Glenn Samson, in connection with his case, entitled Indelecia
Balaga and Enrique Balaga v. Rafael Padilla, Case No. 00-05-07038-08. Padilla contends that
Samson suddenly cut all communications with him, which almost caused him to miss the due
date for the filing of a required pleading. He even wrote a demand letter asking Samson to
withdraw his appearance and return all the documents pertinent to his case, but to no avail.
Also, Padilla had been asking Samson for the refund of his overpayment amounting to P19,
074.00. However, Samson failed to offer any response, despite aforementioned demands.
Likewise, when ordered by the Court as well as the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to refute the allegations in Padilla's complaint and
explain his side, Samson refused to do so.                                                   
.                                 On January 26, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
recommended Samson's suspension for six (6) months. 1 On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board
of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-176 which adopted and approved, with
modification, the abovementioned recommendation, hence:
RESOLVED to ADOPT, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner increasing the penalty to one (1) year suspension considering the gravity of the
offense committed by the Respondent.
ISSUE: Is the respondent Lawyer should be administratively liable for his act?
RULING: Yes. The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP that Samson
should be held administratively accountable.                                 .  
Ordinarily, lawyers may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are
not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case,
attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility (CPR) to undertake the
task with zeal, care, and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Every case
which a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of
importance.
Canons 15, and 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR provide:
xxx

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. x x x
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.                                                        2. Obtaining several loans from the Complainant, which remain unpaid ("Second
. Cause of Action");
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. x x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. x x x
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.                                     .
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
disbarment with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"), 31 listing seven causes of action
based on the Respondent's acts of:
1. Failing to file a collection case on behalf of the Complainant, for which the
Respondent received ₱10,000.00 for filing fees ("First Cause of Action");
3. Taking out merchandise (i.e. magnetic bracelets) in excess of what she purchased
from the Complainant ("Third Cause of Action");
4. Acquiring other merchandise from the Complainant without paying for the
same ("Fourth Cause of Action");
5. Inducing the Complainant to open joint bank accounts, out of which the Respondent
made several withdrawals ("Fifth Cause of Action");
6. Obtaining a ₱30,000.00 loan that remains unpaid ("Sixth Cause of Action");
7. Filing libel cases against the Complainant based on incidents related the
transactions that gave rise to the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of
action ("Seventh Cause of Action").1âwphi1
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Lawyer should be held liable for the violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath?  

RULING: Respondent violated Canon 18 when she failed to file the collection case in court. In
14. AURORA AGUILAR-DYQUIANGCO, Complainant vs.  this regard, Canon 18 of the CPR mandates, thus:
ATTY. DIANA LYNN M. ARELLANO, Respondent A.C. No. 10541 (Formerly CBD Case No.
11-3046) July 12, 2016, En Banc A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 thereof emphasizes that:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
FACTS:Complainant Aurora Aguilar-Dyquiangco ("Complainant")  and Respondent Atty. Diana therewith shall render him liable.
Lynn M. Arellano ("Respondent") first met in 2004 at the Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State In Reyes v. Vi tan, this Court held that the failure of a lawyer to file a complaint with the court in
University, College of Law when the latter became Complainant's professor. 3 behalf of his client, despite receiving the necessary fees from the latter, is a violation of the said
canon and rule:
Sometime in 2006, Complainant engaged Respondent's services for the purpose of filing a The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case
case for collection of sum of money against a certain Delia Antigua ("Antigua"), advancing and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
₱l0,000.00 for filing fees and ₱2,000.00 as part of the attorney's fees out of the agreed amount Professional Responsibility  which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
of ₱20,000.00.Three years later, Complainant, upon inquiry with the Regional Trial and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
Court ("RTC")  of San Fernando, La Union, discovered that Respondent failed to file her case "Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
against Antigua. Consequently, Complainant sent a letter to Respondent terminating connection therewith shall render him liable."
Respondent's services and demanding the return of the said money and documents she Further, as this Court ruled in Parinas v. Paguinto,it is of no moment that there is only partial
entrusted to Respondent, who, in turn, refused to return Complainant's documents alleging that payment of the acceptance fee, to wit:
she was enforcing her retainer's lien.  Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code") provides that a lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money from a
These accumulated loans totaled ₱360,8l8.20 as of September 2008, covered by ten (10) client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
checks.11 Upon presentment by Complainant, all of the said checks were dishonored due to client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not
insufficiency of funds and closure of accounts. Hence, Complainant filed complaints for used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.  Paguinto
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ("BP Blg. 22")  against Respondent.12 These cases are returned the money only after Parinas filed this administrative case for disbarment.
currently pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San F emando, La Union, Branch
2.  15. NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR.,
Respondent A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015, En Banc
On May 27, 2011, based on the foregoing transactions and incidents between the parties, the
Complainant filed against the Respondent the instant administrative case for suspension and
FACTS: Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous
relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was made possible by sexual
assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.                                        .
In his Affidavit-Complaint, dated September 13, 2006, Nelson averred, among others, that he
married Sonia on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui, Tarlac; that Sonia was employed as Court
Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation on May 15, 2006; 2 that Sonia admitted
to have had an adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006, a
span of more than five years; that he came to know of the relationship only on April 18, 2006
after receiving an anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair
between the two; and that initially, Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke down and
admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he received
from Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent, on May 4, 2006 at about 9:47
o'clock in the morning, which stated: xxx
Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her extramarital affair
with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual assaults and maintained through intimidation
and threats of exposure, humiliation and embarrassmentbl
Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful, flagrant and shameless conduct was in gross
defiance of the customs, values and sense of morality of the community. He prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral acts showed his lack of moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Nelson alleged that he had previously filed an administrative complaint for "Gross Immorality"
against Atty. Dabon before the CA.                                                                          .
Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also attached to his Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment,
the Joint Affidavit5 executed by Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit 6 of
Virginia D. Ramos (Ramos), dated May 19, 2006; and the Affidavit 7 of Marie Iris Magdalene
Minerva (Minerva), dated May 22, 2006, wherein the said affiants corroborated the declaration
of Sonia in her affidavit.                                    .
ISSUE: 1. Is the respondent should be held liable for grossly immoral and unlawful acts
through sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidations?  The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment,
2. Is the act of the respondents should be a ground or legal basis for his disbarment in the
practice of law?
RULING: Yes. On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.11
After the parties had submitted their respective verified position papers, Investigating
Commissioner Manuel T. Chan (Investigating Commissioner Chan) of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his Report and Recommendation, 12 dated October 2, 2008,
finding that the charge against respondent Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The
recommendatory portion of the report reads;
WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough and exhaustive review of the facts and
applicable legal provisions, recommends that respondent be found guilty of gross immoral
conduct and, accordingly, be disbarred and dropped from the Roll of Attorneys.
On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
recommendation and issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. is
hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. 14ChanRo
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit18 that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member
of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant
behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.                      
.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. 
depending on the circumstances of the case.29 In case of suspension, the period would range
from one year30 to indefinite suspension, as in the case of Cordova v. Cordova, where the
lawyer was found to have maintained an adulterous relationship for two years and refused to
support his family. On the other hand, there is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment, to wit:                                      
In Toledo v. Toledo, a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.                                     
.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., a lawyer was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had
abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The Court
declared that the respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the Bar.                                          .
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, the respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented
himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.                                               of Respondent.
. IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and recommended instead
In Dantes v. Dantes, disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the respondent lawyer who
maintained illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage
to the complainant. The Complainant's testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession.                                       .
In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, the respondent lawyer was disbarred because he was found to
have entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. The Court
declared that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.                       .
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a
serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital
vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril.
Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of
disbarment.
 
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of Gross
Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.          within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
16. GORETTI ONG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, Respondent. A.C. No.
4724. April 30, 2003, En Banc
FACTS: Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City.
Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged the services of respondent, a practicing
lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and
Arlene Villamil for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. 2 During one of the hearings of the
case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to complainant by paying the
amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that payment shall be
made in cash.  reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the
On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case.
She was surprised to learn that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996. 3
Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance 4 and, on the basis thereof, the
public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the court. When
complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the
amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay for his financial
obligations.
On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The records of the IBP show that
respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002, the Investigating
Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment
   16 However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the
respondent’s indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct and
deceit.                            .
ISSUE: Whether the failure on the part of the counsel on the matters to inform his clients of the
status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client’s request for information
may cause and be held liable for the disbarment nor disbarred in the practice of law.
RULING: It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by
his client, the complainant. Were it not for complainant’s vigilance in inquiring into the status of
her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed on September
26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that she talked
to him sometime in December 1996.                                                       .
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule18.04.
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.                  .
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
 
Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status
of the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence
required of every lawyer. 18 His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by the fact that
complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It was
precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-
based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply protected in her absence.
Respondent’s failure to look after his client’s welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his
fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client’s request for
information. Respondent’s failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its
request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed
of the developments in and the status of its case.
Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his
own obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that" [a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Furthermore:
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.                                                                .
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.                                                 .
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may transactions with his clients.                                             .
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest, to wit; There
ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to PAY complainant Goretti Ong parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision. issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
17. ARTHUR S. TULIO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHANGIN, Respondent. covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
A.C. No. 7110, April 20, 2016, Third Division  in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
FACTS: In his Complaint dated March 8, 2006, 1 Tulio narrated that he became acquainted with will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
Atty. Buhangin even during the time when he was a surveyor and not yet a lawyer. He alleged through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
that as a surveyor then, Atty. Buhangin was the one who prepared survey plans for the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
complainant in connection with the estate left by his mother. Eventually, when he became a undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
lawyer, Tulio sought his legal advice concerning a property owned by his mother which was in the performance thereof.
then transferred in the names of third parties.                                                                .
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
On June 29, 2000, by virtue of Tulio's agreement with his siblings, Atty. Buhangin prepared and cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest
notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights dated June 29, 2000 which was signed by all of his and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.
siblings in his favor. Thereafter, Tulio engaged the services of Atty. Buhangin to represent him The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
in filing a case for specific performance and damages which was docketed as Civil Case No. litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
4866-R entitled "Heirs of Angelina S. Tulio, represented by Arthur S. Tulio vs. Heirs of Artemio or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
E. Patacsil, represented by Lennie Ayuste" before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3.2 Through his efforts, Tulio claims that he and the defendants in Civil Case No. 4866- In Ngayan v. Atty. Tugade, we ruled that [a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against
R agreed to a settlement and that he exclusively paid the defendants.     him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of
On January 2, 2006, Tulio immediately filed a Motion to Disqualify 3 Atty. Buhangin for his Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
unethical conduct in gross violation of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. Subsequently,
on January 11, 2006, Atty. Buhangin filed a Motion to Withdraw 4 as counsel. It was stated in Atty. Buhangin's failure to submit his position paper without any valid explanation is enough
the said motion that Atty. Buhangin: "due to conflict of interest, undersigned respectfully reason to make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful
requests that he be allowed by this Honorable Court to withdraw his appearance in this case directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof, but more so because IBP is the
as counsel for the plaintiff."     Court-designated investigator of this case.14 As an officer of the Court, respondent is expected
to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
Complainant alleged that the actions of Atty. Buhangin were deliberate and intentional in order complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP.
to serve his own personal interests against his interests as his client, hence, constitutes gross
dishonesty in violation of his oath and responsibility as a lawyer and notary public.                             We
       would
           have
          merely
            affirmed the recommended penalty by the IBP-CBD on Atty.
.                                                                   Buhangin, i.e., suspension from the practice of law for two (2) months. However, considering
that aside from his violation of the rule on conflict of interest, he has also shown wanton
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent would be held liable of representing conflicting interests in disregard of the IBP's orders which caused undue delay in the resolution of this case and we
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?   deemed it appropriate to modify and increase the recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law from two (2) months to six (6) months.                                                                  

RULINGS: We concur with the findings of the IBP-CBD except as to the imposable penalty.               WHEREFORE,
                         respondent
                  Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held GUILTY of representing
.                     conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
18. ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR
S. ORRO, Respondent. A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016, En
Banc
FACTS: Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals)
engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they
were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in on all the circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the
the Province of Isabela.1 Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the
respondent handled the trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their
favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately
filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from proportionate to the offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful
the complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of
their appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested.                   
. ACCORDINGLY, the
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially
in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee
in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a
probable worth of P3, 391,600.00.                                       3
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent.
The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s failure or neglect to do so constitutes a serious breach of
his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him liable for the gross
misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.   spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title
RULING: We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and
diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.xxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his
suspension or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved
in his official oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must
characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties. 14 Based
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court
imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,15 the recommended penalty is condign and
defiance of the orders of the IBP aggravated his misconduct.
                                 
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S.
ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
19. THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND
BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely:
HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE,
JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners, vs. VICTORINO (VIC) T.
LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents. G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014,
Second Division
FATCS: The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the
spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were
issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No.
P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the
(TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and
the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the
public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya
on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:
That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent
basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of
₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued its decision in Civil Case No. 1721, reversing the decision
of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses
Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue
another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action 9 against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed,
among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot;
that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from
1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due
consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of
Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled
and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the
proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the Court of Appeals of Attorney’s fee consisting of one-
half of the subject lot be reasonable and valid?  which consists of members duly apportioned among the chapters of each region
RULING: Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into
an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the
agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses
Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between
therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy.
There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is
against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense
in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client.
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services,
the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service,
to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer
is entitled.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM
the decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 4038, with the
MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa
Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot)
as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the respondents previously received from the disputed one-
half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to
return to the petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that
Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.
20. IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRA TED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, April 11, 2013, En Banc
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA and NASSER
MARAHOMSALIC, Complainants, vs. A.C. No. 8292, ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON,
and REYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, Respondents.
 
FACTS: In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated 1 to elevate the standards of the legal
profession, to improve the administration of justice and to enable it to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.2 Governing the IBP was the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG),
consisting of the governors from each of the nine (9) geographic regions of the
archipelago,3 namely: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila,
Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western
Mindanao.4 The governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of Delegates
On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBP-President and the
EVP be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much
as practicable, on a rotation basis.10 It was also provided that the IBP-President and the EVP
hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their
second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the same Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of Section 47, Article VII of
the IBP By-laws, to read:
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491)
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of the election
and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to any office in the IBP
ISSUES: 1] Whether the election for the position of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be  open to
all regions;
2]  Whether Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws to read as
recommended in the body of this disposition.
RULINGS: Each region, as enumerated under Section 3, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court,
shall have the opportunity to have its representative elected as Executive Vice-President,
provided that, the election for the position of Executive Vice President shall be on a strict
rotation by exclusion basis. A region, whose representative has just been elected as Executive
Vice President, can no longer have its representative elected for the same position in
subsequent elections until after all regions have had the opportunity to be elected as such. At
the end of the rotational cycle, all regions, except the region whose representative has just
served the immediately preceding term, may be elected for another term as Executive Vice-
President in the new rotational cycle. The region whose representative served last in the
previous rotational cycle may be elected Executive Vice-President only after the first term of
the new rotational cycle ends, subject once more to the rule on exclusion.
The "rotation by exclusion rule" in the election of IBP-EVP was introduced in Bar Matter No.
491, In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
[21] In that case, the Court annulled the election of the national officers of the IBP held on June
3, 1989 and directed the holding of special elections for the Governors of each of the nine (9)
IBP Regions and subsequent thereto, the election of the IBP national president and IBP-EVP.
This is embodied in the Court's per curiam Resolution of October 6, l989, the fallo of which
pertinently reads;
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (Sec.
8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among
whom is "a representative of the  Integrated Bar," x x x may be the reason why the position of
IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power"
erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP
elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court,
and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate,
expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization x x x the Court hereby
ORDERS:
Sec. 47. Election of National President Executive Vice President. – The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional
Governors. The Governors shall be ex-officio Vice President for their respective regions.
SEC. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for
a term of two years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in
office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to:
1] GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In Intervention;
2] DECLARE that the election for the position of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be open to all
regions.
3] AMEND Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws to read as recommended
in the body of this disposition.
4] CREATE a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs.
21. MANUEL B. BERNALDEZ, Complainant vs. ATTY. WILMA DONNA C. ANQUILO-
GARCIA, Respondent A.C. No. 8698, August 31, 2016, Third Division
 
FACTS: In his complaint, the complainant alleges that during the 2010 National and Local
Elections, Atty. Anquilo-Garcia coerced and threatened registered voters in the Municipality of
Biri, Northern Samar to sign blank and ready-made affidavits stating that they were
illiterate/disabled voters when in fact, they were not and that they needed assistors in voting.
On September 1, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution 5 directing Atty. Anquilo-Garcia to submit
her Comment within 10 days from receipt thereof. In her comment, 6 Atty. Anquilo-Garcia
denied having prepared ready-made affidavits and contended that what she prepared and
notarized were affidavits of affiants who sought her help and services as notary public so that
they may be allowed to vote with assistors because of difficulty in reading and/or some physical
disability.7
In the Resolution9 dated December 6, 2010, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from receipt of the record.
On December 1, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued a notice requiring
both parties to appear for a mandatory conference.  (iv) SUSPEND Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia from the practice of law for a period
On March 22, 2012, the IBP-CBD issued an Order declaring the mandatory conference closed
and terminated. Both parties were then required to file their respective verified position papers
within a period of 10 days from receipt thereof.
On June 28, 2013, before the case was resolved, the complainant filed his Affidavit of
Withdrawal12 of the complaint stating that he is desisting from pursuing the instant disbarment
case. He stated that the filing of the instant case was merely due to misapprehension of facts
and misunderstanding of the incidents.
ISSUE: Is the respondent lawyer (Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia) be held liable for
gross misconduct, deceit, violation of Lawyer's Oath, and abuse of authority as notary public?
RULING:Yes. "In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant." 19 Here, the
complainant failed to show by clear preponderance of evidence that Atty. Anquilo-Garcia
coerced any registered voters in the Municipality of Biri, Northern Samar to sign the alleged
blank and ready-made affidavits. Apparently, the affidavits presented by the complainant point
to other persons responsible in the employment of force, intimidation or threat upon the voters
in the Municipality.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the
affiants must personally appear before them. Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice reads:
Section 2. Prohibitions - (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) Is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Atty. Anquilo-Garcia's failure to perform her duty as a notary public undermines the integrity of
a notary public and degrades the function of notarization.1âwphi1 Thus, she should be liable
for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. 
In Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos, the Court imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of
law against respondent lawyer for a period of one (1) year and disqualified him from
appointment as notary public for two (2) years for notarizing a Deed of Sale without the
presence of affiants.
The same was adopted by the Court in the recent case of Agbulos v. Atty. Viray wherein the
notary public was meted out the same penalty for preparing an affidavit and notarizing it
without the affiant’s personal appearance.
WHEREFORE; premises considered, the Court RESOLVES to:
(i) NOTE the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-547 dated June 20, 2015 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and dismissing the complaint against
Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia without prejudice;
(ii) NOTE the Letter dated April 14, 2016 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline transmitting the documents pertaining to this case;
(iii) REVOKE the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia for
breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and DISQUALIFY her from reappointment as
notary public for a period of ONE (1) YEAR; and
of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
22. DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY.
KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents. A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
Facts: In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since
the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost
touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any
impediment to their marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar
Josef Frederic.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later,
she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her
once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo
requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the
annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.                                                     Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
In a Resolution dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted,
Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved
her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to
August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already
submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the
IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17,
2003 and October 20, 2003, respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper on October 24,
2003.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.
RULING: After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:       
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.                    
.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. 
  In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held: [T]he requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests
are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with
his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. 
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves
to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.              .                                          
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.
23. ELADIO D. PERFECTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO DESALES-
ESIDERA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, CATARMAN,
NORTHERN SAMAR, RESPONDENT.
[A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270 [FORMERLY A.M. NO. OCA IPI NO. 10-3380-RTJ] January 31,
2011], Third Division
FACTS: Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint which was received at the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 5, 2010, charges Judge Alma Consuelo Esidera
(respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Northern Samar, Branch
20, of soliciting and receiving on January 6, 2010 at the Prosecutor's Office the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) from practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma (Atty. Yruma), and the same
amount from Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz (Prosecutor Diaz), purportedly to defray expenses
for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta.  To prove her charge, complainant attached the
Affidavit dated February 16, 2010 of Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching (Prosecutor
Ching) who claimed to have witnessed the first incident, without respondent issuing any
receipt.  In the same Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added that she "heard" that respondent also
solicited the same amount from Prosecutor Diaz.
Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with acts of impropriety scolding her staff in
open court and treating in an "inhuman and hostile" manner practitioners "who are not her
friends." He adds that respondent even arrogantly treats public prosecutors assigned to her
sala, citing instances of this charge in his complaint.
Respeting the complaint against her Order of publication, respondent claims that the Catarman
Weekly Tribune is "not in circulation." Respondent echoes her Comment in A.M. OCA IPI No.
10-3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by complainant bearing on his claim that all orders of
the court should be published in Catarman Weekly Tribune, in which Comment she listed
pending cases the hearing of which had to be reset for failure of the  Catarman Weekly
Tribune  to publish her orders on time.
As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by complainant
in his complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a professional relationship with her
staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.  the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of ignorance of the law?  complainant’s late husband.
 
RULINGS: Section 1 of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC thus provides:
SECTION 1. Scope of application. These Guidelines apply only in cases where judicial or legal
notices are to be published in newspapers or periodicals that are of general circulation in a
particular province or city.
Publication of notices for national dissemination may be published in newspapers or periodicals
with national circulation without need of accreditation.
Adopting the comments she made in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ to the instant case,
respondent Judge Esidera claims that she only arrived at the decision to direct the publication
of her orders in a newspaper of national circulation after repeated failure of the Catarman
Weekly Tribune to meet the publication requirements in other pending cases in the court.  ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Rubia is held liable for gross violations of the New Code of
Respondent Judge Esidera even presented a list of cases where the hearings therein had to be
reset because of the failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune  to publish the pertinent orders on
time.                                 .
In Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 (1991), the Supreme Court said that the Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his  By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia
sala  and as  a  private individual.  There  is  no  dichotomy  of morality. A public official is also
judged by his private morality being the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.  
Thus, the OCA RECOMMENDS that respondent be faulted for Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct for which a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) should be
imposed, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, for Impropriety and Unbecoming
Conduct, ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
24. EMILIESISON-BARIAS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA
ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
A. M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014, En Banc
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
FACTS: Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees.
This case emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to
exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of
respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. 1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was
opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. 2
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. 3 Evelyn Tanael,
only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of
The third case is a civil action 5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties
filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among
others.
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and
part of the estate of complainant’s husband was involved.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for
issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike"
Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Judicial Conduct and respondent Pecaña's actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel for Gross Misconduct;   
 
RULING: Yes they are both liable. Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct
violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his
office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s actions by virtue
of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch
24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that
all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance
with the esteem of their office.
By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her
admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a
fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, this court explained the necessity of a judge’s integrity: By
the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly
stated that:
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., this court held: The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently
explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence.
Respondent Pecaña’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in
accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality."
For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could
cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with
litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in the
judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She
should have refused any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for
those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication
between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the
strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s
knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the
text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication
with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant’s attempts to
communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she continued to
communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an
administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I FIDELITY TO DUTY
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone.
They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official
acts or duties.
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official
custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and
regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is
also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to redocket the case as a regular administrative matter.
Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross
misconduct.
25. CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN, Complainant vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, ETC., Respondent
RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF THEN JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-
PORNILLOS.
A. M. No. RTJ-09-2183, February 14, 2017, En Banc
FACTS: On July 7, 2009, the Court rendered a Decision, 2 dismissing respondent from service,
after having been found guilty of gross misconduct, i.e., borrowing money from a lawyer in a
case pending before her court, aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders,
and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. The dispositive portion of the
subject Decision reads:
  WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court)
which is also a gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay in rendering decision or orders, and violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. She is DISMISSED  from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon service on her of
this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her office and her authority to act as judge is
considered automatically terminated. SO ORDERED.
  On August 8, 2016, respondent filed a Petition for Absolute Pardon from 'Dismissal from the
Service Sentence'4 accompanied by a letter5 dated August 4, 2016 addressed to the Office of
the President (OP), which was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for
appropriate action.6 In a Resolution7 dated November 8, 2016, the Court denied the said
petition for being an improper pleading.
Meanwhile, on November 3, 2016, respondent also filed a letter 8 addressed to the OCA,
informing the OP's transmittal of her petition for judicial clemency to the Court, and requesting
that the same be subject for judicial review and, consequently, the subject Decision be
reversed in her favor. The Court, in a Resolution 9 dated November 29, 2016, noted the said
letter without action.
On December 28, 2016, respondent filed another letter, reiterating her plea for judicial
clemency. Respondent insists that she has endured almost eight (8) years of unfounded
punishment as the charges and findings against her were based on mere gossip. 11 Likewise,
she cites the Court's exoneration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, begging that
the same privilege be extended to her in the spirit of Christmas
very "slim chance"20 of borrowing money since: (a)  her "salary as a judge was substantially big
enough compared against other employees or lawyers or businessman"; 21 and (b)  both her
parents are lawyers who left her "substantial real and personal property that would easily be
sufficient for her and her children to live for a lifetime." 22 She claims the same of her late
husband who was "well-off' and landed thus, making the act imputed against her unbelievable.
Far from exhibiting remorse and reformation, the tenor of respondent's petition only
demonstrates her attitude of impenitence, self-righteousness, and even, vindictiveness, which
unquestionably renders her undeserving of judicial clemency. Neither did she show compliance
with the other requisites for judicial clemency as cited above. Accordingly, there is no quibble
that the instant petition should be denied
The Court, in numerous cases, has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against
members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial
conduct.24 Judicial clemency is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time, 25 as
the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Verily, clemency, as an act of
mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for judicial clemency is DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for judicial clemency filed by Victoria Villalon-Pomillos
(respondent) would be granted.

RULING: Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring
judge. It can be granted only if there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation
and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
Proof of remorse and reformation is one of the requirements to grant judicial clemency. As held
by the Court in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen
or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Likewise, respondent points out that the charge of borrowing money from a litigant, for which
she was dismissed, occurred more than fourteen (14) years ago and, at that time, she had a

7. A.C. No. 7922 October 1, 2013 MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent. (lawyer’s duty to client)
FACTS: The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in
Criminal Case No. 10309-02 – a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cavite. The complainant and her husband, German, engaged the
services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant maintained
that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable negligence
in performing his duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1)
was often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently
sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a
National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and
Zuraida Porter in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence
despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present
evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and
German of the dates of the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of
judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal.
According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in handling the case resulted in her
own and her husband’s conviction.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, refuting the allegations against
him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the testimony of a
handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the original
copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as
his numerous motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He
denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the scheduled hearings, and
maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his services in the
other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately
corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
In the IBPs’ Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2009, Investigating
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ruled that Atty. Villaseca’s reckless and gross negligence
deprived his clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard
for his clients’ life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to
file a demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by
the RTC to submit this pleading, and waived his right to present evidence for the defense,
opting instead to file a memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty.
Villaseca’s failure to properly attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is gross and inexcusable negligence in the perormance of Atty
Albert Villaseca duties as a counsel to his clients
RULLING: The court stressed in the case at bar that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his
client likewise serves the ends of justice." Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."  It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." It also states
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the
defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it
showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the
presented prosecution evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her husband
to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very least, the
reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP and to
this Court. But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty.
Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence.
After failing in this first line of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty.
Villaseca to present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this,
leaving the lower court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the
detriment of his clients’ cause.
The court emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to
employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his client’s cause. A memorandum, no matter how lengthy,
should not be made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a
criminal case where a conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not
insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca
presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.
 Again, the court reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility
of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of
the law, the interests of his client. 19 A lawyer’s diligence and vigilance is more imperative in
criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also
to the court, to the bar and to the public.
8. A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015 REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent. (lawyer’s duty to client diligence,
competence, fidelity)
FACTS: In the Complaint filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez alleged that he engaged
Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses
Roque v. Ramirez." The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal.
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a
referral from a friend of Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal
services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead
of attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo ₱1,000.00
per court appearance.
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to
Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal
before the Court of Appeals.
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in
2008. On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief.
Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s
Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary
for the brief.
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that
there was still no word from the Court of Appeals.
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been
denied. She told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish
his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim. She also informed him that
they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been
promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was
filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued
that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of ₱1,000.00 per
hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they
only had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the
controversy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Mercedes Buhayag-Margallo violated Canon 17 and Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: The Petition is denied for lack of merit. The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence." Lawyers are expected to exercise the
necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not
only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain
a high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented
party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant.
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but
also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting
the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the
client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per
se a violation.

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to
Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her
client was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to
act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There
was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that
she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which
is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these
reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary.
Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts,
events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she
usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client
discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she
chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer
and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or
negligence.